unlucky gettier cases

UNLUCKY GETTIERCASES

by

JIM STONE

Abstract: This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often arenot true due to luck. I offer two unlucky Gettier cases, and its easy enoughto generate more. Hence even attaching a broad anti-luck codicil to thetripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, tworelated questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isnt distinctive ofGettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?

Luck is considered essential to Gettier cases. As Stephen Hetherington(2005) writes:

What is most distinctive of Gettier cases is the luck they contain. Within any Gettier case, infact the well-but-fallibly justified belief in question is true. Nevertheless, there is significantluck in how the belief manages to combine being true with being justified.

Heres the sort of case Hetherington has in mind (call it Sheep-ShapedRock 1). I see a rock that erosion has carved into a sheep shape, so Ijustifiably believe a sheep is on yonder hill. Coincidently a sheep is grazingbehind the rock. Here justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge. AsDuncan Pritchard writes: The standard diagnosis of these examples is thatthey show that merely true belief supported by good reflectively assessablereasons would not suffice to ensure knowledge because such reasons wouldnot be sufficient to rule out epistemic luck (2005, p. 151). My beliefsjustification consists of the good reflectively assessable reasons thatsupport it.We might try to avoid Gettier cases, therefore, by adding a general

anti-luck codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge (namely, thatknowledge is justified true belief). Some sorts of luck are benign,however (Unger, 1968). That I witness a crime because I chanced to walk

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (2013) DOI: 10.1111/papq.12006 2013 The AuthorsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd & University of Southern California.

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home a new way is epistemically harmless. Pritchards concern isthe veritic luck that exists when it is a matter of luck that the agentsbelief is true (2005, p. 146). Veritic luck is at issue in Gettier counterex-amples, he maintains (p. 148), and the way to avoid them is to identifyan external epistemic condition which ensures that the agents true beliefcannot be acquired in a veritically lucky fashion (p. 151). Satisfaction ofthis condition entails the target propositions truth and also that thebelief in question tracks the truth across the relevant nearby possibleworlds.Which external epistemic condition? Robert Nozick (1981) maintained

that Ss true belief p is knowledge just in case S would not have believedp if p had been false (sometimes called the sensitivity condition) andwould have believed p anyway if p had been true in a somewhat differentway or under somewhat different circumstances (Ss belief adheres tops truth; more about this later). Knowledge is true belief that so tracksthe truth (p. 178) that is, the belief satisfies both the adherence andsensitivity conditions. Nozicks account of knowledge is defeated byunlucky Gettier cases (see Section 4, below), however it can still bedeployed as an anti-luck constraint.1 However Pritchard strongly favorsa safety condition: roughly, if I know contingent proposition P, then, innearly all nearby possible worlds in which I form my belief in the sameway I form it in the actual world, I only believe P when P is true (2005,p. 163).2

Happily, theres no need to decide the competition. Lets secure a stronganti-veritic luck constraint by conjoining safety with truth-tracking (whichis itself a combination of sensitivity and adherence). I submit that robustrelations of mutual counterfactual dependence between my belief and itstruth-maker intuitively preclude my beliefs being true by luck or coinci-dence.3 Note that in SSR 1 my belief that a sheep is on the hill satisfiesneither conjunct of the constraint, but my present belief that Im typing ona computer satisfies both. If this strong anti-luck constraint (sensitivityand adherence (which together constitute Nozickean truth tracking) plussafety) doesnt rule out the Gettier cases I will offer, no part of it willexclude them.In what follows, I will argue that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases

often are not veritically lucky. I offer two unlucky Gettier cases, and itseasy enough to generate more. Hence ruling out veritic luck doesnt avoidall Gettier cases. Pritchard, however, points out that epistemic luck alsoincludes an internalistic sort of luck, reflective epistemic luck. I will showthat Gettier cases generally do not involve reflective epistemic luck, either.Therefore epistemic luck is not what is most distinctive of Gettier cases.This raises two related questions: First, if epistemic luck isnt distinctive ofGettier cases, what is? And, second, given unlucky Gettier cases, what doGettier cases reveal about knowledge?

PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY2

2013 The AuthorsPacific Philosophical Quarterly 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd & University of Southern California.

1. An unlucky Gettier case

We add a wrinkle to SSR 1 (call this new example SSR 2). Unbeknownstto anyone, the county through which Im hiking is infested by a breed ofshy sheep whose keen senses detect approaching human observers. Thesesheep hide behind anything big enough to hide them, but they favor rocks.As sheep in this county have always vastly outnumbered rocks, from timeimmemorial sheep are lined up several deep behind every rock big enoughto hide a sheep. Also, rocks in this area occasionally shift position due toearth tremors. Especially they tend to roll down hills. Call this world A(for actual).As the closest possible world (w) where the hill is sheepless resembles

A in the above respects, in w the sheep-shaped rock I see in A has rolleddown the hill. Otherwise sheep would be hiding behind it on the hill. Soin w I see neither sheep nor rock. Hence the sensitivity condition is sat-isfied: I wouldnt have believed a sheep was on the hill if none had beenthere.Nozicks adherence condition is unsatisfied, however. He writes of

this condition that not only does S actually truly believe p, but in theclose worlds where p is true he also believes it; the subject believesthat p for some distance out in the p neighborhood of the actual world(1981, p. 176) Now moving some distance out, but remaining close tothe actual world, there is a world where the rock behind which the sheephides isnt sheep-shaped. I apply the same epistemic method in thatworld looking at that very hilltop and do not believe a sheep is on it.4

As the adherence condition is unsatisfied, so is our strong anti-veriticluck constraint.A new feature must be added to our example (SSR 2 will henceforth

denote this amended version). An ancient tribe of sheep-idolaters secretlypeoples the unexplored region through which Im trekking. They chisel allappropriately sized rocks on hilltops into perfect facsimiles of sheep. Con-sequently the hilltops are peppered with sheep-shaped rocks with sheephiding behind them. These sheep are paranoid a breed-wide neuralartefact of their genetically-determined morbid shyness. Consequentlythey hide only behind sheep-shaped rocks, since they distrust other rocks.Moving some distance out, but remaining in the neighborhood of theactual world, there is no world where a sheep (perhaps of another color orgender) is on yonder hill but the rock I see on the hilltop isnt sheep-shaped. (Note that neither the rock nor its shape is caused by the sheepspresence, nor are the rocks representations of particular sheep.) Is there aclose-in world where the sheep-shaped rock is obscured by trees or otherrocks? A basic tenet of the idolaters religion is that nothing shouldobscure the view of a sacred rock; long ago they removed all obstructions.Consequently the adherence condition is satisfied.

UNLUCKY GETTIER CASES 3


What about the safety condition? My belief that a sheep is on the hill istrue in the closest worlds to A where I arrive at it in the way I actually did,namely, by looking at that hilltop. For in nearly all nearby worlds whereI arrive at my belief in this way, I see a sheep-shaped rock that hides asheep. As my justified true belief satisfies the safety, adherence and sensi-tivity conditions, it satisfies our strong anti-veritic luck constraint.Nonetheless SSR 2 is a Gettier case. For I know nothing about any of

this. I believe a sheep is on the hill because Im making a knowledge-nullifying mistake, namely, mistaking a rock for a sheep. If I learned I waslooking at a rock, not a sheep, I would judge that I didnt know what Ithought I did. Since the falsehood that I see a sheep on the hill is my wholereason for believing one is there, as the first belief plainly isnt knowledge,neither is the second.

2. Mistakes and knowledge-nullifying mistakes

Lets say I make a mistake when I take one thing for another, wherething covers objects, like rocks, and particular situations, like particularparallel lines being equal in length. Paradigmatic mistakes flow fromimmediate sensory inputs, but this can be extended to include false testi-mony and inductive evidence about what will soon happen. It is requiredof a mistake, as I will use the term, that it consists at least partly in acognitive change in the makers mind. When I mistake a rock for a sheep,for instance, I come to believe that I see a sheep. When I reach into a boxof Sure Fire matches, convinced by strong inductive evidence that strikingSure Fire matches always causes them to light, the cognitive change iscoming to believe that striking this particular match (the one I now graspin my hand) will cause it to light.Part of what is required for my belief that p to be based on a mistake,

as I will use the term, is that the cognitive change (c) in which the mistakepartly consists is part of my beliefs cause. Also required is that thecausation involves a cognitive process by which c is part of my reason formy belief.5 In standard Gettier cases, the mistake closely precedes thebeliefs formation, perceptual and testimonial contexts being the naturalhabitat of Gettier cases (as mistaking a rock on the hill for a sheep is atleast a near-proximate cause of my believing that a sheep is on the hill).By way of definition, to say a mistake upon which my belief is based is

knowledge-nullifying is to say that, if Im rational and I come to think mybelief is based on my making the mistake, I would for that reason seriouslydoubt my beliefs truth. Seriously signals the doubt is stronger than mereskeptical doubt; note that knowledge doesnt occur in the definiens. InSSR 2, if I came to believe that I had mistaken a rock for a sheep, Iwouldnt even believe a sheep is on the hill. Suppose, on the other hand, I



know that sheep are hiding behind every sheep-shaped rock. Then themistake would not be knowledge-nullifying: I know that, even if somehowIm seeing a rock, a sheep is behind it. So, if I learned my belief is based onthat mistake, I would not doubt a sheep is on the hill. Mistakes needntnullify knowledge. Note that I make the same knowledge-nullifyingmistake in SSR 1, which is sufficient to explain why it isnt knowledge.

3. Is SSR 2 reflectively lucky?

Pritchard, recall, maintains that epistemic luck includes an internalisticsort of luck. I suffer from reflective luck when my belief that P is true inthe actual world, but P is false in many of the nearest possible worldswhere these worlds are ordered solely in terms of what Im able to know byreflection alone in the actual world (2005, p. 175). That is, given what Imable to know by reflection alone, its a matter of luck that my belief is true(p. 175). For example, suppose I believe P on the basis of reliable clair-voyant powers that I disbelieve I have. In fact, I have no reason to thinkI have them and good reason to think I dont. Given what I know byreflection alone, therefore, theres no reason to take my believing P to beanything more than a groundless hunch. Let S be the set of the nearestworlds consistent with what I know by reflection alone; these are theworlds that matter in estimating reflective luck. My belief that P is false inmost of these nearby S-worlds, since groundless beliefs are highly unreli-able in the actual world. So my true belief that P, though not veriticallylucky, suffers from reflective epistemic luck.Pritchards talk of reflective luck is meant to flesh out what it is for a

belief to be supported by good reflectively assessable reasons. My belief isso supported if and only if, given what Im able to know by reflectionalone, it is true in most nearby worlds where it is formed in the way Ibelieve it is in the actual world. As every Gettier-case belief is supported bygood reflectively assessable reasons, no justified true belief in a Gettier caseis reflectively lucky.In evaluating our reflectively assessable grounds for a particular belief,

Pritchard points out that we implicitly bracket fundamental skepticalhypotheses, or, perhaps better, consider them true only in distant worlds(pp. 2078). If memory, perception and induction are all questionable, Ihavent enough reflectively assessable knowledge to justify any contingentbelief about the external world. So good reflectively assessable reasons canadvert to the world, to the deliverances of memory, induction, to thetestimony I have reason to consider reliable, and so on.Concerning SSR 2, suppose I reflectively know this much: I have a good

view of something on the hill that looks just like a sheep, on numeroussuch occasions when I accosted the sheep-shaped thing, it was invariably



a sheep, Im an expert at identifying sheep, and Im aware of nothing thatwarrants doubting its one. In virtually all the nearby worlds ordered interms of this reflectively assessable knowledge, I see a sheep on the hill.In sum, SSR 2 is neither reflectively nor veritically lucky; so it isnt

epistemically lucky. Both SSR 1 and SSR 2 exclude knowledge becausethey are based on the same knowledge-nullifying mistake. Hence neitherGettier case depends on epistemic luck to defeat knowledge.6

4. Another unlucky Gettier case

My friend, Sally, takes me for a drive in her new Porsche, shows me thebill of sale, and so on.7 Sally has always proven honest in the past, and Imaware of no reason to disbelieve her. I conclude that she is presenting mewith what she says is her new Porsche because she owns one, and Iwhimsically infer D: Sally is presenting me with what she says is her newPorsche because she owns one, or Venusians have bribed her to deceiveme. (I routinely add the second disjunct to suitable propositions, a privatejoke to which Im addicted.) In fact a Venusian research team has bribedSally to deceive me, and lent her the automobile. Suppose, too, thatVenusians alone want to bribe Sally, she doesnt play practical jokeswithout a substantial bribe, shes broke (though I dont know it), andnobody is about to give her a car.Note that my belief that D tracks the truth. If D had been false, it would

have been because the Venusians didnt bribe Sally to deceive me. Asstipulated, no one is waiting in the wings to bribe her, and Sally, unbribed,isnt going to come up with a Porsche. So if the Venusians dont bribe her,shes not going to showme her new Porsche or even tell me she owns one.What if D had been true? Note that the second disjunct is true in the closepossible non-actual worlds where D is true; hence I believe D in thoseworlds, e.g. the Venusians lend Sally a different color or model Porsche.8

Further, D is true in the closest relevant worlds where I arrive at my beliefthat D in the way I actually did, so the safety condition also is satisfied. Somy belief isnt veritically lucky.Nor is it subject to reflective luck. After all, I know that Sally, who has

always proven honest in the past, has taken me for a drive in what she saysis her new Porsche, shown me what she says is the bill of sale (which looksfine to me, an expert on such documents), and that Im aware of no reasonto disbelieve her. D is true in virtually all nearby possible worlds soordered. So my belief that D is not true due to reflective luck. In short, mybelief that D is justified by good reflectively assessable reasons.Nonetheless its strongly counterintuitive to insist I know D. I inferred

D from the false disjunct and I have no warrant for the true one; indeed,I attached it because I disbelieve it. My true belief fails to be knowledge for



standard Gettier reasons. Note that the example mimics the logical struc-ture of the second of Edmund Gettiers original cases (Gettier, 1963).9

Here we have a second Gettier case where my justified true belief isnttrue due to epistemic luck. Why isnt it knowledge? On account of Sallysdeception, I mistake a situation where Sally doesnt own a Porsche for onewhere she does. If I learned Id made it, I wouldnt even believe D.

5. Two questions

Unlucky Gettier cases motivate two related questions. First, if epistemicluck isnt distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettiercases reveal about knowledge? I offer one answer to both. Necessarily, ifmy true belief that b is knowledge, then, for every knowledge nullifyingmistake m that can readily be made in my general circumstances by anormally-able human observer, my good reflectively assessable reasons forbelieving b preclude the beliefs being based on m.10

To take an example from Alvin Goldman (Goldman, 1976; originallydue to Carl Ginet), suppose Im an ordinary fellow unwittingly looking atthe one real barn in an area peppered with papier-mch barn-facades.The above condition is unsatisfied, which is why my justified true beliefthat I see a barn isnt knowledge. On the other hand, the condition issatisfied if Im an expert on papier-mch who can immediately spot itvisually even at a distance. My visual experience of the barn is part of thereflectively assessable reasons why I believe theres a barn before me, andit precludes my beliefs being based on mistaking a papier-mch facadefor a barn even though I never suspect that such a mistake might readilybe made in the circumstances in which I judge.11

Note, too, that the constraint on knowledge is vacuously satisfied whenno relevant knowledge nullifying mistake can readily be made in thegeneral circumstances in which a normally-able human observer judges;for instance, the barn I see is in ordinary-barn county. So the constraintis typically satisfied. The motivating mistake must be one that can bereadily made in the circumstances in which I judge, whether or not Imaware of it.In sum, Gettier cases, both lucky and unlucky, consist of true beliefs

whose justification precludes reflective luck but not such mistakes. This,not epistemic luck, is what is most distinctive of them. What do theyreveal about knowledge? The constraint and its force. Knowledge that b,if it is justified true belief, is such that, for every knowledge-nullifyingmistake m that can readily be made in Ss general circumstances, Ssreflectively assessable reasons for believing b preclude his beliefs beingbased on m.12



6. Conclusion

B. J. C. Madison expresses the prevailing conviction when he writes thatGettier cases share a common structure:

Notably, luck is always present in a Gettier case. There is always some odd way that thejustified belief is made true, in that the belief would have been false, but for some strange twistof good luck (Madison, 2011, p. 48).

Ive given what I submit are persuasive examples of unlucky Gettiercases. Its easy enough to generate more. I conclude that the Gettierproblem has been underestimated and misunderstood. For instance, evenattaching a broad anti-luck codicil to the tripartite account leaves theproblem intact. Considering unlucky Gettier cases may help move usforward.13

Department of PhilosophyThe University of New Orleans

NOTES

1 I would ultimately deny that the adherence conditions satisfaction is necessary topreclude veritic luck; my claim, above, is that the conjunction of sensitivity and adherence issufficient to do so. I believe that sensitivity and safety (see below) are sufficient, too. As partof a strong anti-luck constraint, however, I will assume here and in sections 1, 2, 3 and 4,below, that adherence is necessary to preclude veritic luck. I thereby make it harder to findthe counterexamples I seek.

2 Roughly and intuitively, the difference between adherence and safety is this. Adherence:If what I believe had been true, I would have believed it. My belief sticks to the truth. Safety:If I had believed what I do, it would have been true. The truth sticks to my belief.

3 I focus on the very influential account of luck which I find most clear and persuasive.However the article has a substantial thesis for those who doubt that some external epistemiccondition ensures the agents true belief cannot be acquired in a veritically lucky fashion. Itsthis: Either Gettier cases do not depend on veritic luck or external epistemic conditions willnot avoid it. Of course, those who insist that some external condition or other precludesveritic luck can object that there might still be such a condition; my article doesnt proveotherwise. If this is to have more force than hand waving, however, it is incumbent on themto provide it.

4 Nozick maintains that, typically, S knows that p via a way of coming to believe p. So thesensitivity and adherence conditions must be understood relative to a method. He writes: Iknow there is a pair of scissors on my desk . . . now; but it is not accurate simply to say thatif there were a pair of scissors there, I would believe there was. For what if I werent looking,or hadnt looked, or were elsewhere now?(p. 185). In my example, my method of coming tobelieve that a sheep is on that hilltop is by looking at that hilltop.

5 The cognitive process neednt be inferential e.g. Im not reasoning from premisses toconclusion when I believe a sheep is on the hill on the basis of taking a rock for a sheep. Also,given overt inferential reasoning, even from premisses I know are true, there can still be an



underlying cognitive process leading to my belief, one that involves a knowledge-nullifyingmistake. So, when I know that my colleague, Hanks, tells me he owns a Lincoln, and Icorrectly infer that there exists a colleague who tells me this, fromwhich I justifiably infer thatsomeone who is a colleague owns a Lincoln, if I learn that Hanks does not own one, I wouldseriously doubt my conclusion (compare Feldman, 1974; also see next paragraph).

6 Im lucky Im in a county where my true belief is neither veritically lucky nor false. Doesthis higher-order luck account for the Gettier intuition? Lets eliminate it. God (for his owndeep reasons) wants me to arrive at Gettier beliefs without forming veritically lucky beliefs.He long ago introduced shy sheep and idolaters into the county; he now leads me to walk init. If it werent as it is, I wouldnt be there. If I werent going to be there, it wouldnt be as itis. Since the falsehood that I see a sheep on the hill is my whole reason for believing one isthere, as the first belief plainly isnt knowledge, neither is the second.

7 This is a revised descendent of an example I deployed in Stone, 2000, specifically againstNozicks theory of knowledge.

8 I believe D even in the more distant worlds where the first disjunct is true. In all thesecases, the relevant method by way of which I come to believe D is by observing Sally presentthe car to me, hearing her tell me she owns it, and viewing the bill of sale.

9 As safe belief that tracks the truth and isnt reflectively lucky is insufficient for knowl-edge, the bullet-biting objection to SSR 2 that I do know a sheep is on the hill, since my truebelief is safe, tracks the truth, and isnt reflectively lucky, is invalid.

10 Arguably this can be viewed as a species of the indefeasibility account of knowledge (seeLehrer and Paxson, 1969), but one that severely restricts the sorts of things which can countas defeaters. Also, Im not offering an entire account of knowledge, but merely an addi-tional condition. Of course, this constraint is to be read on the understanding that I have noinformation such that m, were I to make it, would not be a knowledge-nullifying mistake inmy case (see end of Section 2, above).

11 Ss reflectively assessable reasons preclude his beliefs being based on m, when, if Swanted to determine whether his belief was based on m, his reasons would enable him to tellthat it was not.

12 Jill reads an accurate newspaper-report of the presidents assassination; as its detailedand the media have always been reliable, she justifiably believes hes dead (b). Meanwhileelements in the government are widely broadcasting the lie that only a bodyguard was killed.Jill would believe these reports, or anyway doubt b, but she happens not to see them (this isa version of Harman, 1973). In my experience, intuitions are divided as to whether Jill knowsb (to the victor go the spoils, I submit). I say she knows b: as her belief is justified, that shemisses disinformation doesnt undercut her knowledge. Must I not say Jill knows b eventhough she could easily have made a mistake? However her belief couldnt have been basedon mistakes she could easily have made; those would have led her to believe not-b. So thecondition on knowledge is satisfied.

13 My thanks for comments to Juan Comesaa, Joe Salerno, and to two anonymousreferees from this journal. I am substantially indebted to John Greco, who gave me detailedcomments on several earlier drafts.

REFERENCES

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Journal of Philosophy 66(8), pp. 22537.Madison, B. J. C. (2011). Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology,Australasian Journal of

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Harvard University Press.Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Stone, J. (2000). Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological

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