unsung heroes? the rhodesian defence regiment and

<UN>

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/24683302-03901005

brill.com/ijmhIJMH

international journal of military history and historiography 39 (2019) 88-120

Unsung Heroes? The Rhodesian Defence Regiment and Counterinsurgency, 1973–80

Evans B. Tsigo1Bindura University of Science Education [email protected]

Enock Ndawana2University of Johannesburg and University of Zimbabwe [email protected]

Abstract

This article examines the Rhodesian Defence Regiment’s role in the Rhodesian Secu-rity Forces’ counterinsurgency efforts against the Zimbabwe African National Libera-tion Army and Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army guerrillas. It argues that the two guerrilla armies successfully used sabotage targeting installations of strategic and economic significance to Rhodesia. This compelled the Rhodesian regime to change its policy of restricting the conscription of Coloured and Asian minorities into the Rhodesian Security Forces to undertake combat duties beyond defensive roles. How-ever, the Rhodesian Defence Regiment largely failed to serve its key duty of countering the guerrilla tactic of sabotage against all major installations and centres of strategic and economic importance. The article concludes that the failure was due to the many

1 Evans B. Tsigo is a postgraduate student at the Bindura University of Science Education. He holds a BA Hons in War and Strategic Studies from the University of Zimbabwe and is inter-ested in Zimbabwean military history.

2 Enock Ndawana is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and International Rela-tions, University of Johannesburg, South Africa and a temporary-full time lecturer in the War and Strategic Studies Section of the History Department, University of Zimbabwe, Zimba-bwe. His research interests include: human security, African peace and politics, gender and conflict, conflict resolution and transformation. He has authored (or co-authored) a number of articles published in refereed journals that include African Security Review, African Securi-ty, Migration and Development, Contemporary Arab Affairs, Conflict Studies Quarterly, Journal of African Military History Jadavpur Journal of International Relations and sage Open, as well as book reviews.

Downloaded from Brill.com02/04/2022 10:30:13AMvia free access

89 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

challenges the majority members, Coloureds and Asians, that constituted the Rhode-sian Defence Regiment faced, including discrimination and mistrust. These challenges derailed the Rhodesian Defence Regiment operations and partly contributed to the overall end of the Ian Smith regime.

Keywords

Rhodesian Security Forces (rsf) – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (zanla) – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (zipra) – guerrilla strategy – sabotage – Rhodesian Defence Regiment – counterinsurgency

1 Introduction

The military history of the Rhodesian bush war3 has been dominated by ac-counts of the liberation movements4 and the often militaristic memoirs of white members of the Rhodesian Security Forces (rsf).5 The belligerents in this war included the security forces of the Rhodesian white minority regime

3 The term Rhodesian bush war largely dominates the literature by some whites and former white Rhodesians, while Zimbabwean and African scholars prefer the term Zimbabwe war of liberation (Second Chimurenga) to refer to the struggle for independence by the African majority against the white minority colonial rule in the then Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Therefore, in this study the term Rhodesian bush war is used to refer to the Zimbabwe war of liberation for the sake of consistency.

4 See, for example, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (London, 1981); Fay Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Uppsala, 2006); Terence Ranger, Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London, 1985); Norma J. Kriger, Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge, 1992); David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (Harare, 1985); Eliakim Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961–1967: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Asmara, 2005).

5 See, for example, Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and Guer-rilla Warfare 1962–1980 (Gweru, 1989); Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, The Rhode-sian War: A Military History (Barnsley, 2008); Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Al-berton, 1982); Ken Flower, Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to1981 (London, 1987); Barbara Cole, The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Transkei, 1984); Ron F. Reid-Daly, Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Sel-ous Scouts (Weltevreden Park, 1999); Peter Godwin, Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa (London, 1996); Ed Bird, Special Branch War: Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush Southern Matabeleland, 1976–1980 (Amanzimtoti, 2013); James MacBruce, When the Going was Rough: A Rhodesian Story


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

90

on the one hand and the military wings of the two main nationalist move-ments, that is, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (zanla) of the Zimbabwe African National Union (zanu) and the Zimbabwe People’s Revo-lutionary Army (zipra) of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (zapu) on the other. The Rhodesian bush war began in the early 1960s and ended in 1979 when the Lancaster House Conference paved way for Zimbabwean indepen-dence at the beginning of 1980. It is important to note that the Rhodesian bush war was entrapped in the Cold War context. Consequently, the Cold War in Southern Africa witnessed the liberation movements mostly being sponsored by countries in the communist bloc, while those from the capitalist one sup-ported colonial regimes either for purposes of transferring their ideologies or securing geopolitical interests.6 zanla was mainly sponsored by the People’s Republic of China, while zipra was mostly supported by the Soviet Union and her allies.7 On the other hand, the Rhodesian regime received support from apartheid South Africa and, although inconsistently, the United States among other capitalist-aligned countries.8 Beyond Zimbabwe, Angolan, Mozambican, Namibian and South African liberation movements mostly, though variably, got support from the communist bloc, whereas the colonial regimes of these countries were backed by some members of the capitalist bloc.9 Thus the Cold War context had, albeit incoherently, far-reaching effects on the ideologies and strategies the belligerents adopted in both waging and fighting against the anti-colonial insurgencies, respectively.

Against this backdrop, the story of the Coloured and Asian soldiers who served in the Rhodesian Defence Regiment (rdr) and its predecessors, the Reinforcement Holding Unit (rhu) and the Protection Companies in the 1970s, has received little scholarly or other attention in the literature.10 This

(Pretoria, 1983); Peter McAleese, No Mean Soldier (London, 1993); Jim Parker, Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton, 2006).

6 Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi, “The Transnational His-tories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction”, Journal of Southern African Studies 43 (2017): 1.

7 Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, “War Stories: Guerrilla Narratives of Zimbawe’s Liberation War”, History Workshop Journal 57 (2004): 81.

8 A.S. Mlambo, “‘We have Blood Relations over the Border’: South Africa and Rhodesian Sanctions, 1965–1975”, African Historical Review 40 (2008): 5.

9 Alexander, McGregor and Tendi, “The Transnational Histories of Southern African Libera-tion Movements”, 1–12. See also, Vladimir Shubin, “Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern Africa”, Cold War History 7 (2007): 251–262.

10 J.K. Seirlis, “Undoing the United Front?: Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–90”, African Studies 63 (2004): 76.


91 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

paper traces the formation, operation and effectiveness of the rdr. It is im-portant in two main ways. First, it broadens our understanding of the military history of Zimbabwe. Second, the sources the article used allow a significant explanation of the rdr’s nature and its role in the counterinsurgency efforts during the decisive phases of the war.

The main evidence of this study was collected through a combination of unstructured interviews with ex-rdr members, black African ex-soldiers who also served under the rsf, and liberation war ex-combatants (both still serving and retired members in the Zimbabwean army), a few archival sources from the National Archives of Zimbabwe (naz) and secondary sources. The inter-views were done between 2010 and 2011. This methodology was chosen in or-der to overcome the dearth of archival material on the rdr. Notwithstanding some loopholes, it assisted the researchers to produce their narrative with the available sources.

The article begins with a brief survey of the the status of Coloureds and Asians in Rhodesia. The discussion then turns to explain the formation of the rdr’s precursor units, the rhu and the Protection Companies, and the rdr itself, its structure and role in the overall strategy of the rsf. It ends with an as-sessment of the contribution of the rdr to the broader rsf counterinsurgency efforts against the liberation fighters.

2 The Racial Attitudes of Whites and the Status of Coloureds and Asians in Rhodesia

Rhodesia was established on values of racism with white settlers dominating blacks, Asians and Coloureds in almost every facet of life. From the early days, Asians and Coloureds’ status was different from that of whites although it was better than that of blacks. Racial inequality involved the blacks as the subor-dinate group, Indians (Asians) and Coloureds the intermediate one, while the Europeans (whites) were the dominant group, socially, economically and polit-ically.11 Although Southern Rhodesia successfully voted against becoming part of South Africa and its racial policies became less inflexible, it continued to be influenced by developments there. Broadly, the term “Coloured” in Southern Africa meant people of “mixed race”. This means the problematic “existence

11 Hasu H. Patel, “White Power in Rhodesia: The rise and fall (?) of the Rhodesian Front”, A Current Bibliography on African Affairs 12 (1979): 3–18; Josiah Brownell, The Collapse of Rhodesia: Population Demographics and the Politics of Race (London, 2011), 15.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

92

of people with no colour — or too much colour”.12 According to Whisson, Co-loured people in South Africa were described as people of mixed ethnic origin and included all people who were not classified as white persons or Bantu in terms of the Union of South Africa’s Population Registration Act of 1950.13 They were the result, for instance, of intermarriages between Dutch settlers (Boers) and Khoikhoi women.14 Likewise, in Southern Rhodesia Coloureds were also defined as people who were neither African nor European. Coloureds in Rhodesia were also attributed to the illegal intermarriage of white men and African women.

On the other hand, the term “Asians” in this paper generally refers to In-dians who were either Hindu or Muslim. According to Patel, Asians came to Rhodesia via Mozambique in Portuguese East Africa and they also migrated from South Africa at the turn of the nineteenth century.15 Similarly, Dotson and Dotson posit that Asians came to Southern Rhodesia looking for economic opportunities and were motivated and helped by kinsmen already established in South Africa.16

Since 1923 when the first constitution was drawn, Southern Rhodesia and then Rhodesia had strong prohibitions against interracial fraternisation writ-ten into its statutes. It also persisted with the 1903 anti-miscegenation leg-islation, the Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act which essentially outlawed sexual intercourse between black men and white women.17 Never-theless, the law did not outlaw sexual intercourse between European men and black women. While the 1923 constitution said nothing about races vis-à-vis voting, only Europeans were eligible to vote because an African average wage was 3 pounds per month. Yet, voting required one to have, among other things, “an income of £100 per annum or occupied property or buildings worth £150 or owned a mining claim”.18

12 Seirlis, “Undoing the United Front?”, 73.13 M.G. Whisson, “The Coloured people”, in South Africa’s Minorities (Johannesburg, 1971),

46.14 Ibid.15 Hasu H. Patel, Indians in Uganda and Rhodesia: Some comparative perspectives on a minor-

ity in Africa (Denver, 1973), foreword.16 Floyd Dotson and Lillian O. Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi

(New Haven, 1968), 35.17 Munyaradzi Mushonga, “White power, white desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rhode-

sia, Zimbabwe”, African Journal of History and Culture 5 (2013): 8.18 M. Aaron Benjamin Mutiti, “Rhodesia and her Four Discriminatory Constitutions”, The

African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs 4 (1974): 263.


93 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

Moreover, two racially discriminatory laws were passed. First, the 1930 Land Apportionemnt Act marked the beginning of the imprinting of racial separa-tion when it divided land into white and non-white areas in which the Euro-pean designated land was the prime land, for both mineral wealth and farming purposes.19 This was followed by the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act which banned blacks from particular jobs, especially skilled employment as well as excluding them from wage and industrial contracts discussed on its basis.20 The 1961 Constitution also failed to build confidence in the different races that made up Southern Rhodesia regarding safeguarding their rights and interests. Apart from failing to address the Electoral Act’s high property requirements for one to qualify to vote which most Africans lacked, the Constitution failed to repeal or nullify the existence of numerous discriminatory laws.21

It is important to note that Asians and Coloureds faced the income qualifi-cation standard and were allocated to either the A or B electoral rolls. Among other things, for one to be eligible to vote under the A roll, required earnings of 792 pounds or 528 pounds and possession of immovable property worth 1650 pounds or 1100 pounds, during each of the two years before one sought to enrol. In addition, under the B roll, one had to fulfil the income rate of 264 pounds per annum in the six months before the date of seeking to enrol or owning immovable property worth 275 pounds, among other requirements.22 Thus most Asians and Coloureds could qualify for the franchise, but the ma-jority of blacks were rarely able to meet the requirements even for the B roll, except for chiefs, headmen and kraal heads.

The 1962 electoral victory of Ian Smith’s Rhodesian Front party marked the further bolstering of Southern Rhodesia as a white homeland.23 The 1965 Con-stitution provided voting rights on racial lines in which there was a European roll and an African higher roll with qualifications that included having an in-come of over 1800 pounds per year in the two years before seeking to enroll or possessing property worth over 3600 pounds. There was also an African lower roll which required prospective voters to earn not less than 600 pounds per year in the two months before one sought to enroll to vote or owning property worth more than 1100 pounds.24

19 J.L. Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The Decolonisation of White Identity in Zim-babwe (Canberra, 2010), 3.

20 Mutiti, “Rhodesia and her Four Discriminatory Constitutions”, 262.21 Ibid., 264.22 Ibid., 266–268.23 Fisher, Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles, 4.24 Mutiti, “Rhodesia and her Four Discriminatory Constitutions”, 275–277.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

94

The 1969 constitution permanently precluded any potential for racial equal-ity in the socio-economic and political affairs of Southern Rhodesia. Politically, the 1969 constitution was discriminatory because of “the elimination of a com-mon electoral roll and its replacement by two separate electoral rolls based on race”.25 Although the 1969 constitution provided for racial equality of Co-loureds and Asians by classifying them as Europeans, it was purely “a matter of expediency and not a matter of principle”.26 The classification seemed to have been done only for the sake of voting.27 However, their small number had no significant effect on the political scene.

In addition, Coloureds and Asians could not enjoy the same privileges as the white community. For instance, education was differently provided in both quality and space in which blacks largely attained primary education while Europeans, as well as Coloureds and Asians, had the chance to go to secondary school. Despite that, the number of schools for Coloureds and Asians was lim-ited during the 1950s. Moreover, Coloureds and Asians were mostly not allowed to pass examinations to venture into skilled professions, but had to learn from others already doing the jobs in trades such as building, carpentry, welding and baking resulting in them getting low wages.28 The schools for Coloureds in Salisbury included Moffat Primary School and Morgan Secondary School. Asians went to Louis Mountbatten School. Both Coloureds and Asians were able to go to Catholic boarding schools such as St John’s School.29 Thus the way education was provided negatively affected the economic prospects of both Africans and the Coloureds and Asians with adverse effects for political par-ticipation. This is because all the colonial constitutions since 1923 required a minimum income, property owned, level of education reached and ability to write in English as key conditions for one to be eligible to vote.30

Further, Coloureds and Asians and blacks did not mix with whites in resi-dential areas, hospitals and recreation facilities. The 1969 constitution had a

25 Ibid., 273–274.26 Ibbo Mandaza, Race, Colour and Class in Southern Africa (Harare, 1997), 689.27 Angus Shaw, “Coloureds and Asians allege discrimination”, The Sunday Mail, 20 October

1974, 15.28 James Muzondidya, “Race, ethnicity and the politics of positioning: the making of co-

loured identity in Zimbabwe, 1890–1980”, in Burdened by Race: Coloured Identities in Southern Africa (Cape Town, 2013), 156–184.

29 Ibid.30 Jephias Mapuva, “The Trials and Tribulations of Constititutionalism and the Constitution

Making Process in Zimbabwe”, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11 (2012): 116–117.


95 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

Land Tenure Act which sought to replace the existing Land Apportionment Act and divided the country almost equally into European and African areas. Africans were banned from living in the major industrial and urban areas found in the European section.31 Residential areas reserved for whites included but were not limited to Avondale, and Mount Pleasant in Salisbury. Coloureds resided in Ardbennie, Acardia, Braeside and St. Martin that were medium den-sity surbubs but below the standard of the Asians. Asians lived in suburbs such as Belvedere, Sunridge, and Ridgeview medium density surbubs, which were better than those where Coloureds resided. Africans were concentrated in high density suburbs such as Highfields, Rugare and Kambuzuma.32 Importantly, the racial inequalities privileged the white minority despite the fact that in terms of numbers, in the 1970s, out of the 6.2 million people in Rhodesia, Eu-ropeans were three percent, Africans were 96 percent, while Asians and Co-loureds were just one percent.33

Regarding healthcare provision, there were two main hospitals in Salisbury, Central and Andrew Fleming which catered for blacks and Europeans, includ-ing Coloureds and Asians.34 However, there was also Princess Margaret Hospi-tal, which specifically catered for Coloureds and Asians.35 Even in hospitality, race determined who had access to certain places, and hotels such as Meikles, Ambassador and the Jameson were solely white areas in which the first two were largely exclusively for whites while the last one was somehow open to all.36 In both Bulawayo and Salisbury, Coloureds and Asians were not allowed to swim in the local pools in town.37 Again, racism occured in sports such as rugby and cricket which were predomoniantly white sporting activities.38

31 Mutiti, “Rhodesia and her Four Discriminatory Constitutions”, 275–277.32 G. Kay, “A Socio-Geographic Survey of Salisbury, Rhodesia”, Zambezia 3 (1974): 71–87.33 Charles D. Melson, “Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations”, Small Wars and Insur-

gencies 16 (2005): 57.34 Michael Gelfand, “The Incidence of Gall-Stones in Zimbabwe”, The Central African Journal

of Medicine 27 (1981): 47.35 National Association for the Advancement of Mixed Race Coloureds, Baseline Study on

the Situation of Coloured People in Zimbabwe (2003), 30, archive.kubatana.net/docs/re-sour/naac_bls_0308.doc (accessed 15 October 2018).

36 Ruth Craggs, “Towards a political geography of hotels: Southern Rhodesia, 1958–1962”, Po-litical Geography 31 (2012): 219–220.

37 Angus Shaw, “Troops’ pay boost a ‘bitter victory’”, The Sunday Mail, 31 March 1974, 2.38 Andrew Novak, “Sport and Racial Discrimination in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Reanalysis”,

The International Journal of the History of Sport 29 (2012): 850–867.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

96

In military service, Coloureds and Asians were barred from becoming regu-lars in the army as it remained a privilege of the white minority.39 Moreover, Asians and Coloureds were exempted from undergoing the national service training.40 Compulsory training started in October 1928 during the time of the Responsible Government.41 It was made compulsory due to the fact that pre-viously the company rule and the Responsible Government had encouraged voluntary conscription but it failed to provide sufficient manpower. In Novem-ber 1940, the Native Affairs Act was enacted allowing the forced conscription of African youths into the Rhodesian African Rifles (rar).42 The rar was an African regiment which was officered by the white minority until the late 1970s when it began to promote African soldiers to commissioned officers.43 This was done in a bid to hide and deny the fact that the Rhodesian defence system was racially structured. The rar was created during the Second World War for the purpose of relieving white soldiers in non-combatant duties. However, as the war intensified the rar began to undertake combatant duties and was even expanded from a single battalion to four battalions.44

Although the Coloureds and Asians participated in the Second World War, they could only undertake support or service duties rather than combat du-ties. Akin to South Africa during the Second World War, Asians and Coloureds in Rhodesia were barred from compulsory military service and their entrance into the army was on a voluntary basis.45 Coloured soldiers served in the Re-serve Motor Transport Company as drivers in 1939 and with the intensification of the war the number of Coloureds and Asians who were recruited into the army rose.46 More so, another division was formed, the Mechanical Transport

39 National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter naz), MS308/54, Racial Minorities 1972–1980 (Newspaper cuttings).

40 Martin Meredith, The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890–1979 (Chicago,1979), 117.41 naz, S.749, Territorial Forces Regulations.42 naz, S482/18/39, P.M. Corresp. 1923–50, Conscription of Natives, S. Rhodesia 1942–46, Cir-

cular No. 23/40 of October 1940.43 First Black soldiers to become army officers were commissioned as Lieutenants in June

1977. See, Peter Abbott and Philip Botham, Modern African Wars (1): Rhodesia, 1965–80 (Oxford, 1986), 14.

44 Peter McLaughlin, “Collaborators, Mercenaries or Patriots? The Problem of African Troops in Southern Rhodesia during the First and Second World Wars”, University of Rho-desia Henderson Seminar No. 47 (1979), http://ir.uz.ac.zw/bitstream/handle/10646/3213/McLaughlin_Collaborators_mercenaries_or_patriots.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (ac-cessed 15 October 2018).

45 Ian Gleeson, The Unknown Force: Black, Indian and Coloured Soldiers Through Two Worlds Wars (Cape Town, 1994), 105.

46 James Muzondidya, Walking A Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Com-munity of Zimbabwe (New Jersey, 2005), 103.


http://ir.uz.ac.zw/bitstream/handle/10646/3213/McLaughlin_Collaborators_mercenaries_or_patriots.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y


97 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

Unit and as the war neared its end, a number of Coloureds were serving in the 55th Southern Rhodesian General Transport Company.47 Gleeson also argued that Coloured, Asian and black troops who participated in the World Wars were “an afterthought” establishment by the Allied powers owing to manpower deficiencies.48 Similarly, in Rhodesia Coloureds and Asians could only perform defensive duties and there was no provision for them to enlist into the rsf as regulars but as reserves. As will be shown below, it was also the increasing pressure on the established forces that resulted in Coloureds and Asians being enlisted into the rhu, Protection Companies and finally in the rdr.

The racial policies of the Rhodesian government were also replicated in the exclusively white unit, the Rhodesian Light Infantry (rli) that was established in 1961. Instead of recruiting Coloureds and Asians, the authorities opted to staff it with white foreigners who enjoyed the same conditions as white native born Rhodesians.49 The Smith government in 1976 passed the National Service Act forcing all male European, Coloured and Asian youths to enrol for national service.50 Significantly, the training that was given to Coloureds and Asians, according to Moorcraft and McLaughlin, was not impressive.51 The Rhodesian white settlers were of the view that the qualities of Asian and Coloured as well as “African soldiers could only be nurtured and promoted by the leadership of whites.”52 Consequently, it was one of the reasons that was used by rsf com-manders to deny Coloureds and Asians, akin to blacks, the opportunity to join the army at par with whites.

3 Early Precursor Units: The Reinforcement Holding Unit (rhu) and Protection Companies

The opening of the south-east front in 1972 as the Mozambique Liberation Front (frelimo) operations gathered pace in Mozambique resulted in the existing units such as the rar, the rli, British South Africa Police, the Spe-cial Air Services and the Air Force being overwhelmed. This resulted in the intensification of the war which compelled the rsf to rethink the enlistment

47 Ibid.48 Gleeson, The Unknown Force, IX–X.49 Alexandre Binda, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (Johannesburg, 2007), 8.50 naz, MS308/14/35, International Defence and Aid Fund (Idaf), Military, 1972–1980.51 Paul L. Moorcraft and Peter McLaughlin, Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia 1965–1980

(Cape Town, 1982), 56.52 Luise White, “Imagining Independence: The racialized utopia of Rhodesia in the era of de-

colonization”, http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/01/21/34/00001/white.pdf (accessed 15 October 2018).


http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/01/21/34/00001/white.pdf

Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

98

of Asians and Coloureds into rhu and Protection Companies. This was be-cause disruption of Rhodesia’s major communication networks, harassment of the settler economy and attacks on government infrastructure, among others, constituted key tactics of the zanla guerrillas in their pursuit of the Maoist guerrilla strategy.53 Sabotage activities were mainly directed against Rhodesia’s means of production so as to ruin its commerce and weaken its ability to sus-tain the war against the liberation fighters. The main targets were white farms and roads, especially the Salisbury-Beitbridge road that linked Rhodesia and South Africa, which was essential for tourism and export goods that earned foreign currency for the country.54 Farmsteads were attacked. For instance, the Altena farm was attacked on 21 December 1972 and two days later, Whistlefield farmhouse was also attacked. White property such as stores, tobacco barns, bridges, a District Commissioner’s (DC) office and a police station were also attacked in Mount Darwin.55 All these sabotage activities compelled the Rho-desian government to react by adjusting the prevailing security arrangements.

Furthermore, the rsf experienced manpower shortages when the war in-tensified. Although Rhodesian intelligence was aware that guerrillas were be-ing trained in Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Yugoslavia, Ghana, China, and the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Smith ignored the advice from the Rhodesian Intelligence chief Ken Flower, of the security threat.56 The underestimation of the guerrilla threat was partly due to the initial failures of guerrilla incur-sions in the 1960s, such as the Chinhoyi Battle of April 1966.57 However, the defence ministry was unable to contain the second round of guerrilla threats that started in December 1972.58 The intensification of the war resulted in large numbers of whites leaving the country. By 1976 there were 14,854 emigrants compared to 7,782 immigrants.59 As a result, there was a population loss of

53 See, Enock Ndawana and Mediel Hove, “Traditional Leaders and Zimbabwe's Libera-tion Struggle in Buhera District, 1976–1980”, Journal of African Military History 2 (2018): 127.

54 M. Evans, Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1972–9 (Harare, 1981), 5–6.

55 Michael Raeburn, Black Fire! Accounts of Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (Harare, 1978), 166–172.

56 For a more detailed study on the work of the Rhodesian intelligence, see Flower, Serving Secretly.

57 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War, 29.58 Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defence, the Commander of the Army and the Com-

mander of the Air Force for the year ended 31 December 1972, 3.59 International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa (Idaf), Zimbabwe: The Facts

About Rhodesia (London, 1977), 8.


99 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

7,072. According to Gann and Henriksen, the white population was reduced from 278,000 to 230,000 between the period 1976 and 1978.60 The shrinking of the manpower base for the military to recruit from left Rhodesia with no choice but to include once excluded groups.

In 1973, the Rhodesian government began to enlist Asians and Coloureds and a small number of whites between 38 and 50 years old, who had completed their territorial service into the rhu, also known as the Reserve Holding Unit.61 The rhu was a reserve or non-regular unit of the rsf. Coloureds and Asians who therefore joined the army were only given non-combatant duties. As such, Coloureds and Asians in the rhu were responsible for non-combatant defensive duties. The rhu was organised like a normal battalion.62 It was com-manded by a Lieutenant Colonel. According to Collin Wolfenden, the head-quarters of the rhu was at Beit Hall in Salisbury, now Makombe Building in modern day Harare.63 Training for the rhu was done at Llewellin Barracks in Bulawayo. Members of the rhu were deployed all over the country where they secured key installations. They were usually deployed and operated in sticks. A stick consisted of five men comprising a stick commander, a radio opera-tor, a medic and riflemen. The number was determined by, and also varied in relation to, the security threat, significance of the area or installation to be protected and the number increased with the distance from a town.64

In 1974, Protection Companies which were also made up of Asians and Coloureds were established. Protection Companies were similar to the rhu. They were companies that were formed to reinforce the rhu.65 Their duties in-volved carrying out all the tasks the rhu performed and providing protection to white farms, ranches and securing government buildings. Like the rhu, the Protection Companies were not regulars. There were about seven Protection Companies that were also deployed in Rhodesia to guard areas of military and economic importance. The only differences that were identified were that the groups of Protection Companies being numerically smaller than the rhu, they

60 Lewis H. Gann and Thomas Henriksen, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (New York, 1981), 92.

61 Anti-Apartheid Movement, Fire Force Exposed: The Rhodesian Security Forces and their Role in Defending White Supremacy (London, 1979), 17.

62 A battalion is a military unit that ranges from 300–1200 soldiers made up of between two to seven companies.

63 Interview, with Collin Wolfenden, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier, Acardia, Harare, 22 October 2011.

64 Interview, with a Senior zna officer and ex-rdr member, Malbereign, Harare, 19 October 2011.

65 A company is made up of at least 100 soldiers.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

100

were commanded by the rank of a Major as the Officer Commanding (OC) and they were more mobile than the rhu.66

4 The Formation of the Rhodesian Defence Regiment in 1978

The rdr emerged from the amalgamation of the rhu and the Protection Companies.67 Apart from its rebranding under a new name, it operated on much the same lines as its predecessors. The establishment of the rdr on 1 January 1978 was a milestone in the Coloured and Asian military history of Rhodesia.68 It lends credence to the view that the existing forces were being overwhelmed due to intensifying guerrilla war, so that when the established forces went out hunting for guerrillas, some of the key installations were left vulnerable to sabotage and as a result new units had to be created. In support of this view, several units were created and others expanded during this time. For instance, Selous Scouts became operational from 1973.69 Again, the Guard Force was established in 1976 following the intensification of the war and the Rhodesian regime’s establishment of protected villages (PVs) meant to prevent Africans from cooperating with guerrillas.70 The police force and army were overstretched culminating in the formation of the Guard Force for the purpose of guarding and patrolling PVs.71

However, Martin and Johnson argued that in terms of regional military strength, Southern Rhodesia was regarded as powerful.72 Depite that, the rsf was well equipped to defeat zapu’s frontal assaults across the Zambezi in the 1960s but its manpower shortages made it very difficult to defeat the “people’s war” tactics of infiltration from Mozambique that characterised zanla’s Mozambique-based campaign from 1972, which increased in effectiveness af-ter its independence in 1975 under frelimo.73 As a result, white Rhodesians

66 Interview with, Williams Gibbions, an ex-rdr soldier, Arcadia, Harare, 22 October 2011.67 Anti-Apartheid Movement, Fire-force Exposed, 17.68 Ibid.69 Stiff, Selous Scouts.70 J.K. Cilliers, Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism and

Insurgency (London and New York, 2015), 92–93.71 Ibid.72 David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Chitepo Assassination (Harare, 1985), 9.73 Well armed armies in history have been defeated by guerrillas. Good examples include

Vietnam, Algeria, Iraq and Malaya. Sometimes the good armies never lost any battle but they lost the war. See, James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, “Measuring Effectives in Irregu-lar Warfare”, Parameters Summer (2007): 88–100.


101 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

were forced by the uncertainties of the war to conscript Coloureds and Asians into the army as regulars.

4.1 The Structure of the rdrThe rdr was organised and operated like a formal conventional regiment. When the rdr was established it had a numerical strength of approximately 6,000 soldiers.74 The rdr had two battalions. Number One Battalion was in Mashonaland, based at Old Cranborne Barracks in Salisbury. Number Two Bat-tallion was in Matabeleland, stationed at Brady Barracks in Bulawayo. Inkomo Barracks, near Salisbury acted both as the training depot and its headquar-ters.75 It was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Boyd-Sutherland who reported to the army commander.76 The commander of the rdr was deputised by the rank of a major who acted as the regimental second-in-command. Sev-en companies made up the rdr. There was the Headquarters Company at Ink-omo under the command of a major who reported to the deputy commander of the rdr. At the headquarters there were also administrative appointments such as the Quartermaster who was responsible for the clothing, food supplies and equipment of the regiment, transport officer and the signals officer. All these appointments were given to the rank of a captain. Noteworthy is that there was neither a Coloured nor an Asian in the rdr’s higher echelons.77 Co-loureds could not rise beyond the rank of a Warrant Officer 1 (WO1).78

The other six companies of the rdr were deployed around the country in the operational areas. A company was a sub-unit of a regiment usually un-der the command of a major. rdr companies were made up of at least one hundred soldiers.79 Companies were sub-divided into platoons. A platoon was commanded by a Lieutenant and at least four platoons made a company. A section or a stick was the smallest sub-unit of the rdr. Number one company was based at Hwange. Members of this company were responsible for the de-fence of the Victoria Falls airport and the tourist resort centre, roads and bridg-es, the Hwange power station and the railway line which linked Bulawayo and

74 Anti-Apartheid Movement, Fire Force Exposed, 17.75 Interview with Wolfenden.76 Interview with John Martin, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier with the rank of Sergeant, Acardia,

Harare, 15 November 2010.77 Interview with William Moris, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier with the rank of corporal, Arca-

dia, Harare, 15 November 2010.78 “Hawkins discounts charges of brutality”, The Rhodesian Herald, 6 October 1977, 6.79 Ibid.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

102

Victoria Falls.80 Number Two company was stationed at Kariba. The Kariba Dam was a strategic installation to the Rhodesians which was important for power generation. Members of Number Two Company had to protect the hydro-electric power generation plant, carrying out border patrols, guarding the major road that linked Salisbury and Chirundu border post, which was important for economic activities such as imports and exports between Zam-bia and Rhodesia.81 The third company was based in Inyanga. It was respon-sible for mobile border patrols, protection of tourist resort centres in Inyanga, guarding bridges and roads.

Number Five and Six companies were based in Umtali (now Mutare) and were responsible for border patrols, protection of settler agricultural produc-tion, guarding communication networks and the fuel pipeline from Beira to Feruka. The deployments of the rdr companies were not strictly permanent; they could be moved to areas where there was a threat.82 More so, the com-panies were attached to each brigade and by 1979, the Rhodesian Army had about four brigades. One Brigade was in Bulawayo, 2 Brigade was in Salis-bury, 3 Brigade was in Umtali and 4 Brigade was based at Fort Victoria (now Masvingo).83 White soldiers were found in most of the sub-units of the rdr as Coloured soldiers who comprised the regiment numerically could not be trusted.84 Coloured soldiers were not trusted by white soldiers due to the fact that they often abused alcohol even when they were on duty. At times they could leave the positions they guarded unattended for alcohol.85 However, very few Asians could go to the bush, most of them were attached to service and support duties as radio operators, medics, storemen, batmen and office orderlies. According to Wolfenden, this had been attributed to the fact that Asians were generally moderate drinkers and smokers so they were somehow trusted by the whites.86

80 Interview with Anthony Smith, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier with the rank of Corporal, Arcadia, Harare, 15 November 2010.

81 Interview with a senior zna officer who served in the Rhodesian Airforce, Zimbabwe Defence College, Harare, 12 October 2011.

82 Ibid.83 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War, 48–49.84 Interview with Anthony Smith. He revealed that although most of the Coloured Soldiers

could smoke and drink, there were also others who were neither smokers of dagga nor drinkers of alcohol.

85 Ibid.86 Interview with Wolfenden.


103 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

4.2 The Role of the rdr in the Overall rsf StrategyThe rdr was tasked to provide security to centres and installations of strategic and economic value to the settler government. Key installations included com-munication networks such as major roads, bridges and railway lines.87 Some of the main roads and railway links which were targeted by the guerrillas includ-ed the Salisbury-Beitbridge railway line that linked Rhodesia and South Africa and the Bulawayo-Beitbridge railway link between South Africa and Rhodesia, the Beitbridge-Rutenga, Bulawayo-Mafeking and the rail-line to Beira. These were guarded by the rdr. Rail and road communication lines were of great significance for the economic survival of Rhodesia. Disruption of these major roads and railway links affected tourism and export and import flows which were essential for foreign currency earning. The rdr had to make sure that railway lines, roads and bridges were not sabotaged by guerrillas through the use of landmines and other explosives such as grenades. Buttressing this point, Moorcraft and McLaughlin asserted that “frequent sabotage of the rail line compelled the Rhodesians to guard virtually every culvert and bridge along its lengths and eventually to protect trains with nanny wagons”.88

Provision of defence to settler farms was another key responsibility of the rdr. Rhodesian agricultural production was a prime target of guerrilla attacks. Attacking the settlers’ agricultural economy constituted one of the primary ob-jectives of zanla.89 Timber, tea, coffee, fruit and dairy production in the east-ern parts of the country were major targets while in the south-eastern lowveld, sugarcane plantations and irrigation infrastructure were also targeted. Tobacco production and other cereal crops were some of the targets of the guerrillas in the north-east.90 The rdr companies had to guard these farms and deter guer-rillas from undermining agricultural activities which formed the backbone of the settler economy.

The rdr also acted on behalf of the ordinance department responsible for the provision of supplies to army units. It transported supplies that included food rations, clothing, ammunition and other equipment that was needed in the operational areas and the battlefield. For example, Hotz notes that some of the rdr members who were deployed and operated in Honde Valley were responsible for ferrying equipment and supplies to camps near the border.91

87 Anti-Apartheid Movement, Fire Force Exposed, 17.88 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Chimurenga, 85.89 Evans, Fighting Against Chimurenga, 56.90 Interview with a senior zna officer who served in the Rhodesian Airforce.91 Paul Hotz, Muzukuru: A Guerrilla’s Story (Johannesburg, 1990), 56.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

104

Escorting army and civilian convoys also became the responsibility of the rdr. Army vehicles were targeted by the guerrillas who frequently ambushed them. Civilian and commercial vehicles were also attacked, especially along the Salisbury-Beitbridge road. Escorting duties could be traced from April 1976 after the guerrillas attacked four tourists from South Africa on the Beitbridge to Fort Victoria road.92 In addition, rdr members carried out patrols, especially along the borders and around areas of strategic and economic significance such as radio relay stations. As a result of undertaking patrol and escorting convoys, the rdr became more mobile than the previous rhu and Protection Companies, which were mostly immobile and less mobile respectively.

Provision of security to military cantonments of other units who might have gone for a military operation was provided by the rdr. Thus, military camps were also strategic centres. Government buildings also turned to be key installations following the attack of the DC’s office, a police station and a country club by the guerrillas in Mount Darwin in 1973.93 Guarding of valuable construction projects was also the duty of the rdr. Eddie Kierman explained his duty in the rdr when he said, “our job was to guard the road-making equipment, we were there to stop the locals stealing the road-making equipment”.94 They were responsible for guarding bulldozers, graders and oth-er tools from being vandalised during the construction of the Binga and Karoi roads.

4.3 ChallengesMembers of the rdr faced the problem of racial discrimination, which was a serious setback in their efforts towards counterinsurgency. The most serious form of discrimantion was in pay where, for instance, in 1974:

While a Coloured or Asian private or rifleman is [was] paid a daily rate of $1 during Army service, with an additional $1.50 service allowance, $2.55 marriage allowance and children’s allowance of 48c for the first child and 38c for each subsequent child, his European counterpart gets [was get-ting] $1.50, $2.00, $3.30 respectively.95

92 Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, “Rhodesians Never Die”: The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970–1980 (Oxford, 1993), 162.

93 Raeburn, Black Fire!, 172.94 Hotz, Muzukuru, 6.95 Shaw, “Troops’ pay boost a ‘bitter victory’”, 2.


105 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

There were three types of pay scales namely, the white scale, the Coloured and Asian and the African scale. Whites inside and outside the security forces re-ceived high rates, Asians and Coloureds got a lesser but higher rate than that of Africans. Non-whites in the security forces got between Rhodesian $60 and $100, while white soldiers received a minimum of $400 per month.96

Additionally, the racist attitudes of the rsf towards the non-white mem-bers of the rdr were evident in some of the problems the latter faced. These included sub-standard living facilities. There were separate barracks for non-white soldiers in Bulawayo and Salisbury.97 Similarly, instead of the rdr sol-diers swimming in available swimming pools in surbubs, they had to be ferried for swimming to faraway places outside the camps simply because the swim-ming pools that were available were only open to white soldiers. Ellert also gives a similar incident when Asian and Coloured troops during an operation in the north-east were denied access to bathing facilities at the base camp due to the fact that they were reserved for white soldiers only.98 In addition, non-white soldiers of the rdr were refused entry into restaurants and hotels that were reserved for whites. This occurred at Karoi and Kariba when Coloured and Asian soldiers were refused service while they were off-duty.99 Thus they were turned away from the very places they were defending. The discriminato-ry provision of mess facilities resulted in Coloured and Asian soldiers at some point going for days without bathing and washing their plates in toilets.100

Additionally, Ellert noted that there was scant regard to the welfare condi-tions of the rdr members. He cites two examples: One was the experience of ‘E’ Company 1rdr that was deployed out of Mtoko in 1977 to guard a bridge and they received their first re-supply of provisions by air drop after six weeks. Fol-lowing another six weeks there was no communication between them and the responsible joint operations command (joc) in Mtoko. An investigation team later discovered that the rdr unit had repeatedly came under attack from the zanla guerrillas but failed to call for assistance because their radio batteries had long since died. The second one was in the Mount Darwin district in which an rdr unit was neglected for more than two months. Coloured soldiers were compelled to run away from their base camp at the Ruya river bridge into the bush and walked through to Rushinga due to repeated attacks by the zanla

96 Anti-Apartheid Movement, Fire Force Exposed, 42.97 Shaw, “Troops’ pay boost a ‘bitter victory’”, 2.98 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front, 48.99 Patel, Indians in Uganda and Rhodesia, 15.100 Shaw, “Troops’ pay boost a ‘bitter victory’”, 2.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

106

guerrillas.101 This reveals some of the worst forms of racist attitudes towards the rdr members that obviously derailed the Coloureds and Asians’ morale.

Coloured and Asian soldiers in the rdr were handled with great distrust and regarded as outcasts by European communities in Rhodesia, which bred poor motivation. When the non-white members of the rdr learnt that they were far from as reliable as Europeans resulting in biased sharing of information, they were aggrieved.102 At one point they dismissed themselves from a parade, ar-guing that they had been given a different security briefing compared to what the whites in the same unit had been given.103 The fact that Coloureds were strongly associated with drugs and alcohol resulted in most of them not being trusted and never given important briefings. Thus, Coloureds, the majority in the rdr, were regarded as “a useless bunch of layabouts who did nothing but smoke dagga (marijuana) and drink dop (brandy)”.104 This culminated in the rdr being nicknamed the “Rhodesian Dagga Regiment”.105 Collin Wolfenden admitted that they often abused alcohol and smoked dagga for the purposes of relieving the stress of racial challenges in the army.106

Linked to the above, the lack of trust in the non-white rdr members by the whites was compounded by the fact that the former also acted in ways that demonstrated a lack of sympathy to the Rhodesian cause than to the guer-rillas. This is supported by cases of attempted mutiny, absent without official leave (awol) and desertion.107 One Coloured deserter revealed that several Coloured soldiers deserted and collaborated with guerrillas in the north-east and sometimes a whole platoon could desert and help guerrillas with medical, food supplies and exchanging information.108 More so, Coloureds and Asians who constituted the majority in the rdr did not identify with the white cause. Eugene Raftopoulos, a Coloured who served as a Regimental Sergeant-Major in the rdr, figured that at least ninety percent of the Coloured troops opposed the Rhodesian regime.109 Coloureds and Asians joined the rsf against their

101 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front, 48.102 Shaw, “Troops’ pay boost a ‘bitter victory’”, 2.103 Ibid.104 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, 48.105 Ibid.106 Interview with Wolfenden.107 Anti-Apartheid Movement, Fire Force Exposed, 42–44.108 Julie Frederikse, None But Ourselves: Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe (Harare,

1982), 237.109 Ibid.


107 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

wish, not from their hearts.110 They became involved in the war like mercenary troops who took fighting as a business. Like mercenaries, Asians and Coloureds became soldiers to earn a living and provide for the welfare of their families. As a result, when they faced discrimination in pay and conditions of service as well as forced conscription, their morale – which is an important motivational aspect for a soldier – became very difficult to find in the rdr.111 Nevertheless, it must be noted that Coloureds and Indians who comprised the rdr were sympathetic to the different warring sides ranging from the Africans’ guerrilla armies to the Rhodesian regime, but some found themselves in the rdr for the sake of surviving the conflict.

There are examples of those who took up leadership positions in the nation-alist movement. These include Gerald Raftopoulos who had a leadership post in zapu and had hope that the Africans were going to decide the fate of the Coloured people.112 On the Asian side, Kantibhai Gordanbhai Patel, an Indian, is a good example. After his arrival in Rhodesia in 1961, he worked with other Indians in support of the nationalist movement, particularly through mobil-ising financial support for the armed struggle.113 However, although many Asians and Coloureds were frustrated with the Rhodesian Front politics, others “were equally fearful of what black majority rule might mean in terms of politi-cal and social status”; hence they found themselves on both sides of the Rho-desian bush war.114 The political experiences in newly independent “Malawi and Zambia, where the coloured racial category had been abolished in post-independence constitutions, were enough evidence of African nationalists’

110 Interview with William Scott, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier, Arcadia, Harare, 23 October 2011. Scott narrated that they could not have fought for the regime that discriminated them in the political, social and economic way of life.

111 Ibid.112 Christopher J. Lee, “Voices from the Margins: The Coloured Factor in Southern African

History”, South African Historical Journal 56 (2006): 214. For other Coloured people who were involved in the nationalist movement, see, Seirlis, “Undoing the United Front?”, 85–86.

113 Staff Reporter, “zanu-PF Politiburo Declares Cremated Patel a National Hero”, Bula-wayo24, 14 September 2011, https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-7502 -article-Zanu-PF+politburo+declares+cremated+Patel+a+national+hero.html (accessed 15 October 2018). Asian support to the liberation struggle was both overt and covert and was largely in the form of financial support. See, Hasu H. Patel, “Asian Political Activity in Rhodesia from the Second World War to 1972”, Rhodesian History 9 (1978): 78–79.

114 Lee, “Voices from the Margins”, 214.


https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-7502-article-Zanu-PF+politburo+declares+cremated+Patel+a+national+hero.html


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

108

prejudice against coloureds”.115 This further complicated the Asians and Co-loureds in Rhodesia’s fears and suspicions resulting in them being unsettled by the prospect of majority rule and the deracialisation of society. This possibly meant the reversal of the Asian and Coloured people’s middle position with restricted rights and privileges.

However, Africans too did not trust Coloureds, and this also partly contrib-uted to their failure to convincingly tap into their support. A zanu nationalist in the 1970s, Maurice Nyagumbo remarked that: “we could not hold executive meetings as we could not trust Coloured men in our section.”116 This could be attributed to the fact that Coloureds like blacks were also found on either the rsf side or on the side of the guerrillas and in other instances could have joined these sides voluntarily or involuntarily. Thus in September 1974, the Zimbabwe News published an article, “The Coloureds: Are they for Zimbabwe or Rhode-sian fascism? The moment for them to decide is now.”117 It demanded Coloured people to openly declare which side of the fighting parties they supported. Still, it demanded the Coloureds to join the guerrillas when it said, “those Coloureds who are with the rebel forces should cross over to the People’s Army-zanla”.118

Furthermore, Peter Gibbons also revealed that rdr members were as-signed dangerous tasks and usually deployed in unfavourable environments that were shunned by white soldiers such as hot areas in the lowveld.119 Their tasks were made dangerous due to the nature of training and equipment they received. Asian and Coloured troops received a training of five to six weeks prior to deployment, while their fellow white soldiers received at least four and half months of rigorous training.120 For Hotz, the rdr military train-ing included running, combat exercise, basic tactics and going to a shooting range a few times.121 However, the nature of training might have been deemed enough since initially most of the duties of the rdr were defensive rather than

115 Muzondidya, “Race, ethnicity and the politics of positioning”, 174.116 Maurice Nyagumbo, With the People: An Autobiography from the Zimbabwe Struggle

(London, 1980), 215.117 Zimbabwe African National Union, Zimbabwe News, September 1974, http://psimg.jstor.

org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197409_final.pdf (accessed 15 October 2018).

118 Ibid.119 Interview with Peter Gibbons, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier with the rank of Sergeant, Arca-

dia, Harare, 20 November 2011. Gibbons narrated of their deployment in the Hwange area and Binga which experienced hot temperatures and were inaccessible due to poor roads.

120 “Hawkins discounts charges of brutality”, 6.121 Hotz, Muzukuru, 6.


http://psimg.jstor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197409_final.pdf


109 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

combat-oriented.122 In terms of weaponry, they were armed with FNs, mags, 60 mm and 82 mm mortars, 61mm commando mortars and 30mm cannons.123 Wolfenden, Gibbons and James concurred that these weapons were suitable for their duties and admitted that they were enough. However, they under-scored that equipment was poor when it came to transport facilities. The rdr vehicles were equivalent to commercial vehicles without armour protection and included, Bedfords, Nissan UDs, Mercedes Benz Unimog and ordinary Toy-ota and Jeep vehicles of the time.124 In this light, although rdr vehicles were ill-suited for combat as they were not armoured like those of other regular forces, the rdr members were compelled by their duties to sometimes fight – prompting the need for relevant logistics. Nevertheless, the issue of poor equipment and understaffing for non-regular units was a major challenge that has also been highlighted by participants such as Don Price, who operated in Beitbridge from 1978.125

Put together, a combination of the above challenges aided in facilitating the problems of poor discipline, low morale, awol and finally desertion that largely characterised the rdr. In this regard, Eugene Raftopoulos’ revelation that there were incidents of resistance to command and that “discipline in the unit had gone completely” is not an understament.126 Consequently, lack of manpower in the rsf more generally and lack of motivation on the part of the rdr beyond the monetary incentive comprised the major challenges the Coloured and Asian soldiers in the rdr faced. This undeniably impacted nega-tively on the performance of the rdr in resisting the guerrilla incursions and exploits as demanded by their duties.

5 Conclusions: Impact of the rdr on rsf Counterinsurgency Efforts

5.1 The First Phase: 1973–1977 (the rhu and Protection Companies)The existence of the rhu did not stop guerrilla attacks on Rhodesian tar-gets. For instance, the rhu failed to secure settler farms in Centenary. Mr J.C. Klyenhans, a farmer, was attacked with grenades, small arms and oth-er explosives resulting in the death of his wife and an African store was also

122 Interview with Anthony James, Ex-rdr soldier, Arcadia, Harare, 22 October 2011.123 Interview with Wolfenden.124 Interview with Wolfenden, James and Gibbons.125 Bird, Special Branch War, 34.126 Frederikse, None But Ourselves, 238.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

110

attacked in the area.127 More so, the attacks on the Victoria Falls, an impor-tant tourist resort centre which was important for the economy of Rhodesia through foreign currency exchange, also signified the ineffectiveness of the rhu to efficaciously execute its duties. For example, in March 1973, American and Canadian tourists were attacked during their visit at the Victoria Falls and two Canadian girls were killed. The attack impacted negatively on Rhodesia’s tourist resort centre as “foreign tourists also tended to avoid Rhodesia”.128 Al-though there were several isolated cases of sabotage and other acts against installations of economic and strategic importance, the mentioned are some of the major incidents that were launched against the Rhodesians. The attacks of 1973 were evidence to show that the rhu was a failure as the unit failed to deter attacks by the guerrillas on the areas of its responsibility.129 However, the failure of the rhu might also have been due to inadequate numbers because of the lack of significant cases of combat and casualties, which might mean that the rhu was not there in some of the areas that were guerrilla targets.

The period of 1974 and 1975 witnessed insignificant confrontation between the guerrillas and the rsf. However, one significant incident cited by second-ary sources occurred in 1975, when the short-lived Zimbabwe People’s Army (zipa) used sabotage in Manicaland and also tried to demolish part of the new railway line to South Africa that passed through Rutenga.130 There were minor confrontations during this time due to the effects of the “Nhari rebel-lion” of 1974–75 which witnessed a clique of disgruntled zanla cadres uncon-stitutionally supplanting the existing military leadership and establishing a High Command.131 The perpetrators of the rebellion were executed, includ-ing Thomas Nhari and Dakarai Badza, who led the rebels in airing grievances that included but were not limited to accusations that some members of the zanla High Command based in Lusaka were misusing funds, sexually abus-ing women and had a penchant towards high living, while the guerrillas at

127 Dorothy K. Davies, Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey for 1972–73 (London, 1975), 241–241.128 Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, 144.129 Interview with Elvis Edwards, a Coloured ex-rhu and rdr soldier, Arcadia, Harare, 19

November 2011. Edwards revealed that by mid-January 1973, there were rhu troops that were responsible for patrolling and securing all bridges, roads and farms in the north-eastern parts of Rhodesia.

130 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Chimurenga, 33.131 Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, “Volume Introduction: Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Lib-

eration War”, in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Vol. 1, (Harare, 1995), 9. Bhebe and Ranger argue that the “rebellion occurred in 1974” when zanla members in Chifombo, Zambia on the border with Mozambique rebelled against the organisation. See also Wil-fred Mhanda, Dzino: The Memories of A Freedom Fighter (Harare, 2011), 27–54.


111 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

the front were suffering from insufficient arms and supplies.132 Although the “rebels” were executed, they killed approximately fifty to sixty zanla person-nel.133 The rebellion caused serious squabbles within the organisation result-ing in the execution of important seasoned commanders, leaving the direction of the war effort to less competent and inexperienced cadres. Additionally, after the Nhari rebellion came the controversial assassination of Herbert Chite-po, the zanu chairman, through a car bomb in Lusaka, Zambia. This prompted Kenneth Kaunda, who had been permitting the guerrilla forces to operate in Zambia, to bar Zimbabwean pro-independence groups and imprison a num-ber of their leading members and supporters, including Josiah Tongogara, the zanla commander. Thus, apart from the Nhari rebellion, a combination of the detentions and Chitepo’s demise, generated a leadership void within zanu that was soon filled by zipa in the wake of a period of relaxation in fighting (détente).134

However, 1976 marked an increase in the infiltration of guerrillas due to the opening up of the eastern and south-eastern fronts in which the rsf respond-ed by introducing Operation Thrasher in February 1976 and Operation Repulse in May 1976 respectively.135 The former was headquartered in Umtali, while the latter was based in Fort Victoria. The introduction of Operation Thrasher followed increased attacks along the border. Tea and coffee plantations were frequently attacked. Meredith noted that “between February and June the gov-ernment recorded about ninety incidents in the Mt. Selinda area” of guerrilla attacks against settler agricultural production.136 It is difficult to tell where the rhu and Protection Companies were when these attacks were launched. More so, Evans asserted that mission schools, clinics, settler farms around Cashel

132 Luise White, The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Bloom-ington, 2003), 20–24; Chung, Re-Living the Second Chimurenga, 89; Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi, For Better or Worse: Women and Zanla in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Harare, 2000), 57–58; Gerald Chikozho Mazarire, “Discipline and Punishment in zanla: 1964–1979”, Journal of Southern African Studies 37 (2011): 571–591. For a more nuanced ver-sion of the Nhari Rebellion, see, Blessing-Miles Tendi, “Transnationalism, Contingency and Loyalty in African Liberation Armies: The Case of zanu’s 1974–1975 Nhari Mutiny”, Journal of Southern African Studies 43 (2017): 143–159.

133 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesia War, 41.134 Détente occurred from 1974–5. It was a period when tension eased between the guerrillas

and Rhodesian government over the right to independence of the black majority living under white minority rule. See, Mhanda, Dzino, 27–54.

135 Cilliers, Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, 26.136 Meredith, The Past Is Another Country, 238.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

112

and Melsetter (Chimanimani ) collapsed as a result of zanla disruption of the black labour force.137

Regarding the duty of providing security to military cantonments, the rhu and Protection Companies also failed to serve their purpose. For instance, the Grand Reef airbase and military camp near Umtali was attacked by zanla guerrillas in December 1977, leaving one soldier dead and six wounded.138 The rhu and Protection Companies failed to curb guerrilla infiltration through their border patrols. The geographical area of conflict had widened from the north-east to the south-eastern parts of Rhodesia. At the same time, guerrilla strength grew at an alarming rate to a point that they could not be adequately fed and provisioned.139 In this regard, the numerical superiority of the guer-rillas and numerical inferiority of the rsf became a determining factor in the rhu and Protection Companies’ failure to implement effective border patrols along the eastern and south-eastern areas that witnessed an unprecedented infiltration of the guerrillas into the country.

Additionally, the rhu and the Protection Companies failed to secure the main roads and railway lines. There were frequent guerrilla attacks on Nua-netsi ranch and the railway line near Rutenga. In June 1976, the Salisbury- Umtali railway line was attacked at Macheke.140 Bridges that were supposed to be secured by the rhu and Protection Companies were lost to guerrillas. Two Coloured Soldiers, P.M. O’Reillly and M.F. Kaschula were killed on 15 Septem-ber 1976 following an attack on the bridge they were guarding.141 During the same month, five members of the number 3 Protection Company were killed after guerrillas attacked their field base camp in the Burma Valley area south of Umtali.142 In the first week of October 1976, the Matetsi river bridge about 47km from Victoria Falls was blown up, the locomotive was derailed resulting in 11 wagons of a goods train falling into the river.143 Although nobody was hurt, the bridge was extensively damaged. In addition, the end of the month of October also witnessed the attack of the main railway line to South Africa on the south-western and western parts of Matabeleland.144 Thus 1976 proved

137 Evans, Fighting Against Chimurenga, 6.138 “Guerrillas Attack Base in Rhodesia, Killing one Soldier”, The New York Times, 20 Decem-

ber 1977, https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/20/archives/guerrillas-attack-base-in-rhode-sia-killing-one-soldier.html (accessed 15 October 2018).

139 Ellert, Rhodesia Front, 6.140 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, The Rhodesian War, 43.141 Chris Reynolds, “Family wants full details”, The Rhodesian Herald, 16 September 1976, 2.142 Ibid.143 Chronicle Reporter, “Railway bridge blown up”, The Chronicle, 7 October 1976, 1.144 “Inyanga couple killed by terrs”, The Chronicle, 29 October 1976, 1.


https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/20/archives/guerrillas-attack-base-in-rhodesia-killing-one-soldier.html


113 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

a difficult year for the rsf resulting in the national service period being ex-tended from 11 to 18 months.145 This signified increasing pressure on the rsf, and the rhu and Protection Companies were not excepted. Increased guerrilla infiltration also resulted in urban guerrilla warfare. However, most of the main urban centres of economic and strategic importance were not guarded by the rhu and Protection Companies.146 Despite that, the failure of the rhu and Protection Companies in executing their duties was manifest in the continua-tion of attacks on the very centres that they were supposed to protect, and the experience of some casualties as a result of some instances of engagement in combat.

5.2 The Second Phase: 1978–1979 (The rdr period)Like its predecessors, the rdr failed to contain guerrilla sabotage activities. By 1978, the war had reached its peak. This was evidenced by the fact that many farms had been abandoned and the government had been financially strained.147 There was increasing emphasis on attacks against strategic and economic targets in 1978, especially settler agriculture and communication networks. Major economic hubs of the Rhodesians were by 1978 under siege. Intensification of sabotage activities compelled a change of strategy by the Rhodesians. At the end of 1978, the Rhodesians changed their strategy of mo-bile counter offensive to a strategy of area defence.148 Thus the rdr became a key unit in charge of the provision of static guard duties. Its failure in this regard is evident in that guerrillas increasingly and successfully focused their attacks on military cantonments, police posts, fuel supplies, vehicles, and administra-tion offices where sometimes they engaged in combat which resulted in casu-alties.149 The emphasis on strategic defence was also a result of the attack on the Salisbury fuel depots which contained about a quarter of Rhodesia’s fuel in 1978.150 According to Evans, twenty-two out of twenty-eight tanks were com-pletely destroyed. Although it has been argued that the Salisbury fuel depots were not guarded by the rdr,151 the attack attested to the vulnerability and inability of the rsf as a whole to defend key installations. Ineffective border

145 Godwin and Hancock, “Rhodesians Never Die”, 158.146 Interview with Robert Scoffield, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier, Acardia, Harare, 15 November

2011.147 Muzondidya, Walking A Tightrope, 244.148 Jeremy Brickhill, “‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’: The Military Strategy of zapu 1976–1979”,

in Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Vol. I (Harare, 1995), 53.149 Ibid.150 Evans, Fighting Against Chimurenga, 7.151 Interview with Scoffield.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

114

patrols along the eastern border by the rdr were also evident in its inability to deter guerrilla attacks on surbubs in Umtali, including one launched by zanla forces in 1979 on Fairbridge Park, a white suburb.152 The guerrillas’ attack on a white settlement seems to have been informed by the need to dampen the morale of the white community and compel it to have its government sue for peace in a similar way strategic bombing theorists envisaged.153 This partly demonstrated the weaknesses of the rdr in its duty of border patrols that were intended to prevent such occurrences.

In addition to the above, there were frequent ambushes and mining of the major roads. For instance, the Fort Victoria to Beitbridge road was frequently targeted for ambush and mining. The main objective was to make the route inaccessible for longer periods, and thereby to bring the white economy to its knees and reduce its ability to sustain the war financially. Moorcraft and McLaughlin have argued that by 1979, many tankers had been set alight com-pelling the Rhodesians to reinforce the rdr with armoured cars so as to keep the fuel flowing.154 The rdr alone had failed to provide adequate defence through convoy escort of these commercial vehicles, and therefore needed re-inforcements. Consequently, given the overwhelming of existing rsf units by the guerrillas, it is plausible to argue that where attacks occurred and the rdr was not there it can hardly be blamed. Rather, it would appear to reflect the lack of manpower in the rsf more generally and racist inspired negligence of the rdr units that resulted in a lack of adequate logistical provisions.

However, viewing the rdr and its predecessors as entirely a failure misses some critical aspects of the Rhodesian bush war. The rdr managed to deter attacks and sometimes its mere presence reduced the magnitude of destruc-tion of centres of economic and strategic significance. For instance, in 1977 the Coloured and Asian unit managed to defend the Deka Drum, a water pump station that served Thompson Junction and Hwange. In 1978 Matetsi River Bridge was attacked by the zipra guerrillas but was not totally destroyed as rdr members were able to make a counterattack to the guerrillas.155 Former

152 Post Reporter, “Morale is high as the city survives more rocket and mortar attacks”, Umtali Post, 12 October 1979, 1.

153 For a detailed review of the debates on strategic bombing including on civilian popula-tion, see Aaron Belkin, Michael Clark, Gulriz Gokcek, Robert Hinckley, Thomas Knecht and Eric Patterson, “When is Strategic Bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and Aer-ial Denial”, Security Studies 11 (2002): 51–88.

154 Moorcraft and McLaughlin, Chimurenga, 137.155 Interview with Wolfenden.


115 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

members of the rdr also argued that the fact that communication networks were not totally destroyed but disrupted and continued to serve their pur-poses indicates that the rdr had a positive impact. They also argued that the transport system continued to function throughout the war although roads were frequently mined and bridges attacked. Furthermore, the fact that major bridges such as Birchnough and Save were not destroyed substantiates that the rdr was able to execute its functions with some degree of efficacy.156 As Brown has argued, had it not been the challenges that the rdr members faced inside and outside the army, they might have contributed immensely to the defence of key installations and perhaps could have prolonged the military defeat of the rsf.157

In the end, the rdr was a failure because of the numerous challenges it faced during the course of its operations. Apart from the general lack of man-power in the rsf, the rdr challenges had their roots in the racist attitudes of the Rhodesian Front regime that engendered, among others, mistrust, unequal pay and lack of motivation. As a result, the rdr’s incompetence to deliver the intended results was part of the failures of the rsf more broadly. The whole structure of the rsf was overwhelmed by the guerrillas. Nevertheless, while the rdr did not achieve its grand objective of defending all installations of strategic and economic significance, it managed to deter attacks on some key installations. Overall, the sustained attacks on the very centres that the rdr and its predecessors (rhu and Protection Companies) were supposed to pro-tect, and the experience of some casualties as a result of some instances of engagement in combat, are glaring evidence that illuminates how they were unsuccessful in serving their purpose. Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the need to establish a national army witnessed the rdr being disband-ed. The reintegration process saw the amalgamation of the three erstwhile fighting armies, the rsf, zanla and zipra paving the way for the establish-ment of the Zimbabwe National Army (zna) that was later reconstituted into the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, consisting of two branches, that is, the zna and the Air Force of Zimbabwe. This means that some former rdr members were integrated into the new zna.

156 Ibid.157 Interview with Arthur Brown, a Coloured ex-rdr soldier, Acardia, Harare, 22 October

2011. Brown went on to argue that they were not defeated but they lost the war due to the fact that they were overwhelmed by the size and geographical areas that were under threat from guerrillas.


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

116

Bibliography

Abbott, Peter and Philip Botham. Modern African Wars (1): Rhodesia, 1965–80 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1986).

Alexander, Jocelyn and JoAnn McGregor. “War Stories: Guerrilla Narratives of Zim-bawe’s Liberation War.” History Workshop Journal 57 (2004): 79–100.

Alexander, Jocelyn, JoAnn McGregor and Blessing-Miles Tendi. “The Transnational Histories of Southern African Liberation Movements: An Introduction.” Journal of Southern African Studies 43 (1) (2017): 1–12.

Anti-Apartheid Movement. Fire Force Exposed: The Rhodesian Security Forces and their Role in Defending White Supremacy (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1979).

Annual Reports of the Secretary of Defence, the Commander of the Army and the Commander of the Air Force for the year ended 31 December 1972.

Belkin, Aaron, Michael Clark, Gulriz Gokcek, Robert Hinckley, Thomas Knecht and Eric Patterson. “When is Strategic Bombing Effective? Domestic Legitimacy and Aerial Denial.” Security Studies 11 (4) (2002): 51–88.

Bhebe, Ngwabi and Terence Ranger. “Volume Introduction: Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s lib-eration war.” In Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Vol. 1, eds. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), 6–23.

Binda, Alexandre. The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry (Johannesburg: 30° South Publishers, 2007).

Bird, Ed. Special Branch War: Slaughter in the Rhodesian Bush Southern Matabeleland, 1976–1980 (Amanzimtoti: A.A. Bird, 2013).

Brickhill, Jeremy. “‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’: The Military Strategy of zapu, 1976–1979.” In Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War, Vol. 1, eds. Ngwabi Bhebe and Ter-ence Ranger (Harare: University of Zimbabwe Publications, 1995), 48–86.

Brownell, Josiah. The Collapse of Rhodesia: Population Demographics and the Politcs of Race (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).

Chronicle Reporter. “Railway bridge blown up.” The Chronicle, 7 October 1976, 1.Chung, Fay. Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe’s Liberation

Struggle (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2006).Clancy, James and Chuck Crossett. “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare.” Pa-

rameters Summer (2007): 88–100.Cole, Barbara. The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (Transkei: Three

Knights, 1984).Craggs, Ruth. “Towards a political geography of hotels: Southern Rhodesia, 1958–1962.”

Political Geography 31 (2012): 215–224.Davies, Dorothy K. Race Relations in Rhodesia: A Survey for 1972–73 (London: Rex Collin-

gs, 1975).


117 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

Dotson, Floyd and Lillian O. Dotson. The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Ma-lawi (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1968).

Cilliers, J.K. Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, Routledge Library Editions: Terrorism and Insurgency (London and New York: Routledge, 2015).

Ellert, Henrik. The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla Warfare 1962–1980 (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1989).

Evans, M. Fighting Against Chimurenga: An Analysis of Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia, 1972–9 (Harare: Historical Association of Zimbabwe, 1981).

Fisher, J.L. Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens and Exiles: The Decolonisation of White Identity in Zimbabwe (Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 2010).

Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly. An Intelligence Chief on Record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981 (London: Murray, 1987).

Frederikse, Julie. None But Ourselves: Masses vs Media in the Making of Zimbabwe (Ha-rare: Oral Traditions Association of Zimbabwe, 1982).

Gann, Lewis H. and Thomas Henriksen. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (New York: Praeger, 1981).

Gelfand, Michael. “The Incidence of Gall-Stones in Zimbabwe.” The Central African Journal of Medicine 27 (3) (1981): 46–47.

Gleeson, Ian. The Unknown Force: Black, Indian and Coloured Soldiers Through Two World Wars (Cape Town: Ashanti Publishing, 1994).

Godwin, Peter and Ian Hancock. “Rhodesians Never Die”: The Impact of War and Politi-cal Change on White Rhodesia c. 1970–1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Godwin, Peter. Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa (London: Grove Press, 1996).“Guerrillas Attack Base in Rhodesia, Killing one Soldier.” The New York Times, 20 De-

cember 1977. https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/20/archives/guerrillas-attack-base-in-rhodesia-killing-one-soldier.html (accessed 15 October 2018).

“Hawkins discounts charges of brutality.” The Rhodesian Herald, 6 October 1977, 6.Hotz, Paul. Muzukuru: A Guerrilla’s Story (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1990).International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. Zimbabwe: The Facts about

Rhodesia (London: Idaf, 1977).“Inyanga couple killed by terrs.” The Chronicle, 29 October 1976, 1.Kay, G. “A Socio-Geographic Survey of Salisbury, Rhodesia.” Zambezia 3 (2) (1974):

71–87.Kriger, Norma J. Zimbabwe’s Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 1992).Lan, David. Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (Harare: Zimba-

bwe Publishing House, 1985).Lee, Christopher J. “Voices from the Margins: The Coloured Factor in Southern African

History.” South African Historical Journal 56 (1) (2006): 201–218.




Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

118

MacBruce, James. When the Going was Rough: A Rhodesian Story (Pretoria: Femina, 1983).

MacDonald, J.F. The War History of Rhodesia 1939–1945, Vol. 1 (Bulawayo: Books of Rho-desia, 1951).

Mandaza, Ibbo. Race, Colour and Class in Southern Africa (Harare: SAPES Books, 1997).Mapuva, Jephias. “The Trials and Tribulations of Constititutionalism and the Consti-

tution Making Proces in Zimbabwe.” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 11 (1) (2012): 110–126.

Martin, David and Phyllis Johnson. The Chitepo Assassination (Harare: Zimbabwe Pub-lishing House, 1985).

Martin, David and Phyllis Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (London: Faber and Faber, 1981).

Mazarire, Gerald Chikozho. “Discipline and Punishment in zanla: 1964–1979.” Journal of Southern African Studies 37 (3) (2011): 571–591.

McAleese, Peter. No Mean Soldier (London: Orion, 1993).McLaughlin, Peter. “Collaborators, Mercenaries or Patriots? The Problem of Af-

rican Troops in Southern Rhodesia during the First and Second World Wars.” University of Rhodesia Henderson Seminar No. 47 (1979). http://ir.uz.ac.zw/bit-stream/handle/10646/3213/McLaughlin_Collaborators_mercenaries_or_patriots.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (accessed 15 October 2018).

Melson, Charles D. “Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 16 (1) (2005): 57–82.

Meredith, Martin. The Past Is Another Country: Rhodesia 1890–1979 (Chicago, IL: Univer-sity of Chicago, 1979).

Mhanda, Wilfred. Dzino: Memories of A Freedom Fighter (Harare: Weaver Press, 2011).

Mlambo, A.S. “‘We have Blood Relations over the Border’: South Africa and Rhodesian Sanctions, 1965–1975.” African Historical Review 40 (1) (2008): 1–29.

Moorcraft, Paul L. and Peter McLaughlin. Chimurenga: The War in Rhodesia 1965–1980 (Cape Town: Sygma Books, 1982).

Moorcraft, Paul L. and Peter McLaughlin. The Rhodesian War: A Military History (Barn-sley: Pen and Sword Books, 2008).

Mushonga, Munyaradzi. “White power, white desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rho-desia, Zimbabwe.” African Journal of History and Culture 5 (1) (2013): 1–12.

Mutiti, M. Aaron Benjamin. “Rhodesia and her Four Discriminatory Constitutions.” The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Af-fairs 4 (2) (1974): 259–278.

Muzondidya, James. “Race, ethnicity and the politics of positioning: the making of co-loured identity in Zimbabwe, 1890–1980”. In Burdened by Race: Coloured Identities in Southern Africa, ed. Mohamed Adhikari (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 2013), 156–184.





119 Unsung Heroes?


<UN>

Muzondidya, James. Walking A Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Com-munity of Zimbabwe (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005).

National Association for the Advancement of Mixed Race Coloureds. Baseline Study on the Situation of Coloured People in Zimbabwe (2003). archive.kubatana.net/docs/resour/naac_bls_0308.doc (accessed 15 October 2018).

Ndawana, Enock and Mediel Hove. “Traditional Leaders and Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle in Buhera District, 1976–1980.” Journal of African Military History 2 (2) (2018): 119–160.

Nhongo-Simbanegavi, Josephine. For Better or Worse: Women and Zanla in Zimbabwe’s Liberation Struggle (Harare: Weaver Press, 2000).

Novak, Andrew. “Sport and Racial Discrimination in Colonial Zimbabwe: A Reanaly-sis.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 29 (6) (2012): 850–867.

Nyagumbo, Maurice. With the People: An Autobiography from the Zimbabwe Struggle (London: Allison and Bushby Limited, 1980).

Parker, Jim. Assignment Selous Scouts: Inside Story of a Rhodesian Special Branch Officer (Alberton: Galago, 2006).

Patel, Hasu H. Indians in Uganda and Rhodesia: Some comparative perspectives on a minority in Africa (Denver, CO: University of Denver, 1973).

Patel, Hasu H. “White Power in Rhodesia: The rise and fall (?) of the Rhodesian Front.” A Current Bibliography on African Affiars 12 (1) (1979): 3–18.

Patel, Hasu H. “Asian Political Activity in Rhodesia from the Second World War to 1972.” Rhodesian History 9 (1978): 63–82.

Post Reporter. “Morale is high as the city survives more rocket and mortar attacks.” Umtali Post, 12 October 1979, 1.

Raeburn, Michael. Black Fire! Accounts of the Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (Harare: Zim-babwe Publishing House, 1978).

Ranger, Terence. Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe (London: James Currey, 1985).

Reid-Daly, Ron F. Pamwe Chete: The Legend of the Selous Scouts (Weltevreden Park: Covos-Day Books, 1999).

Reynolds, Chris. “Family wants full details.” The Rhodesian Herald, 16 September 1976, 2.

Seirlis, J.K. “Undoing the United Front?: Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia 1939–1980.” Af-rican Studies 63 (1) (2004): 73–94.

Shaw, Angus. “Troops’ pay boost a ‘bitter victory’.” The Sunday Mail, 31 March 1974, 2.Shaw, Angus. “Coloureds and Asians allege discrimination.” The Sunday Mail, 20

October 1974, 15.Shubin, Vladimir. “Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation of Southern

Africa.” Cold War History 7 (2) (2007): 251–262.Sibanda, Eliakim. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union 1961–1967: A Political History of

Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Asmara: Africa World Press, 2005).


Tsigo and Ndawana


<UN>

120

Staff Reporter. “zanu-PF Politiburo Declares Cremated Patel a National Hero.” Bu-lawayo24, 14 September 2011. https://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-7502-article-Zanu-PF+politburo+declares+cremated+Patel+a+national+hero.html (accessed 15 October 2018).

Stiff, Peter. Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton: Galago, 1982).Tendi, Blessing-Miles. “Transnationalism, Contingency and Loyalty in African Libera-

tion Armies: The Case of zanu’s 1974–1975 Nhari Mutiny.” Journal of Southern Afri-can Studies 43 (1) (2017): 143–159.

Whisson, M.G. “The Coloured people.” In South Africa’s Minorities, ed. Peter Randall (Johannesburg: Golden Era Printers and Stationers, 1971), 46–77.

White, Luise. “Imagining Independence: The racialized utopia of Rhodesia in the era of decolonization.” http://ufdcimages.uflib.ufl.edu/AA/00/01/21/34/00001/white .pdf (accessed 15 October 2018).

White, Luise. The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo Texts and Politics in Zimbabwe (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003).

Zimbabwe African National Union. Zimbabwe News, September 1974. http://psimg.js-tor.org/fsi/img/pdf/t0/10.5555/al.sff.document.nuzn197409_final.pdf (accessed 15 October 2018).









unsung heroes? the rhodesian defence regiment and

Documents