updated sentencing memorandum · web viewthat is to be assessed pure meth and therefore reject the...
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTCENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ))
Plaintiff, ))
vs. ) Crim. No. 17-cr-10061)
WADE BONK, ))
Defendant. )
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM ANDMOTION FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE
Defendant, WADE BONK, by and through his Attorney, SHARBEL A. RANTISI of
RANTISI LAW LLC, comes before this Court for sentencing after having pled guilty to Count
One of the Superseding Indictment, a charge of knowingly and intentionally distributing and
possessing with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).
As indicated in the second revised Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), dated April
8, 2019, by the probation officer, the Total Offense Level for Mr. Bonk is 35. See PSR ⁋ 35.
Mr. Bonk’s Total Criminal History Score places him in Category VI. See PSR 62.⁋ Mr.
Bonk’s sentencing guideline range is 292-365 months.
The advisory guideline range is but one factor to be considered in determining the
sentence of a defendant so that it is sufficient, but not greater than necessary. See Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (quoting 18 U.S.S.G. § 3553(a)). The Court shall
consider the following factors when determining a particular sentence:
1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant;
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2) The purpose and need for a sentence imposed;
3) The kinds of sentences available;
4) The advisory guideline range;
5) Any policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission;
6) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
7) The need to provide restitution to victims of the offense
18 U.S.S.G. § 3553(a).
After these considerations under § 3553(a), as well as other factors unique to the Defendant,
including his entire background and character, not just the negatives characteristics and negative
events reflected in his criminal history, the Court can conclude that a sentence below the
advisory guidelines is an appropriate sentence for Mr. Bonk. Additionally, not only are the
Guidelines not mandatory, the sentencing court is not “to presume that a sentence within the
applicable Guideline range is reasonable.” Nelson v. United States, 555 U.S. 350, 352 (2009).
I. MOTION FOR DOWNWARD DEPARTURE AND/OR VARIANCE
1. Offense Conduct .
Relatively speaking, this conspiracy did not cover any extensive period of time. It ran
from May, 2017 until September, 2017. This was a relatively low-level conspiracy that involved
defendants with drug and alcohol addictions; this is especially true of Mr. Bonk. He and co-
defendant Kampas were selling meth so that they could feed their addictions, including alcohol
and substance abuse and gambling. No evidence was presented, nor exists, of Mr. Bonk living a
lavish lifestyle. Mr. Bonk lived in a run-down house with Kampas and spent most of his time
trying to figure out how to get high.
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Mr. Bonk reported to Probation that he was using 2-5 grams of meth on a daily basis.
See PSR ⁋ 103. The start of the conspiracy (May, 2017) through the date of Mr. Bonk’s arrest
(September 13, 2017) covered approximately 136 days. Based on Mr. Bonk’s reported drug use,
272-680 grams of the meth obtained was for personal use. The Court may also have information
made available to it through the co-defendants’ PSR’s that provides an idea of how much meth
Ms. Kampas and Mr. Wood were using on a daily/weekly basis.
Mr. Bonk has nothing in his name…except debt. Paragraph 115 lists over $6,000 worth
of debt. Again, this conspiracy was not meant to earn significant money, but rather to feed the
drug addictions of everyone involved, including the co-defendants. Additionally, Mr. Bonk is a
first-time drug offender, that faces an extremely high guideline range of 292-365 months; the
range is based on the fact that the meth at issue, i.e. ICE, is disproportionately punished when
compared to meth mixture and all other drugs.
2. Disparity of Methamphetamine Mixture (diluted) vs. Actual (“ICE”) .
The uniqueness of pure methamphetamine that once existed is no longer the reality
within the drug trade. When the Sentencing Guidelines were first drafted, it was thought that
those obtaining/acquiring pure methamphetamine, commonly known as “ICE”, were those at the
top of the drug trade “food chain” and were considered the high-level dealers. Therefore, the
penalties for those distributing ICE were more severe than those that were distributing a mixture
of meth that was either a) diluted as the ICE made its way down the food chain and eventually to
the streets or b) that was “shake-n-bake” meth.
The underlying theory behind increasing a defendant's sentence based on drug purity is
found in the comments of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which states that “since controlled substances are
often diluted and combined with other substances as they pass down the chain of distribution, the
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fact that a defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a prominent role in
the criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs.” U.S.S.G § 2D1.1 cmt. n. 27(c).
“The point, then, of increasing a defendant's sentence based on drug purity is to punish
defendants who have prominent roles in drug distribution. However, the Commission's
assumption regarding the connection between methamphetamine purity and criminal role is
divorced from reality. As illustrated [in the chart below], the average purity of methamphetamine
today is over 90 percent. This means that the sentencing Guidelines would treat the average
individual convicted of a crime involving methamphetamine as a kingpin or leader, even though
that simply is not true.” U.S. v. Ibarra-Sandoval, 265 F.Supp.3d 1249, 1255 (D. New Mexico,
2017).
As depicted above, since 2007, the price of pure meth has decreased from $293 per gram
down to $70 per gram in 2013. Over that same time period, the purity of meth increased from
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(U) Figure 2: All Methamphetamine Purchases Domestic STRIDE DataJuly 2007 -
Source: DEA
40.4% to 94%. In other words, the meth became purer as the price of meth dropped, which
means that it has become more and more common as it is significantly cheaper to obtain
compared to what it would cost about 12 years ago. This trend continues as depicted by the chart
found in U.S. v. Nawanna where “from 2011 to 2016, the average purity of one gram of
methamphetamine has ranged from a low of 85.5 percent in early 2011 to almost 95 percent in
early 2014, and most recently, for the third quarter of 2016, averaged 93.5 percent pure.” U.S. v.
Nawanna, 321 F.Supp.3d 943, 951 (N.D. Iowa, 2018). See chart below.
And thus the court in Nawanna held that “because today’s methamphetamine is substantially
pure, purity is not a proxy for relative culpability.” Nawanna at 951 (emphasis added). “Because
of the generally very high purity of methamphetamine available today at all levels of the
distribution chain, virtually all defendants today face enhanced punishment for a factor present in
virtually all methamphetamine cases, not enhanced punishment based on individualized
determinations, making the Guidelines purity enhancement excessive.” Id. at 954. Nawanna
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was eventually sentenced to 200 months1, which was a downward variance from his guideline
range of 360 months to life, i.e. a downward variance of at least 160 months. He was found to be
responsible for 4,406.39 grams of ICE (just shy of the next base offense level), had a Criminal
History Category of V, and was assessed +3 level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c).
The following table depicts the significant difference in guideline range sentences
between not only pure meth and meth mixture, but also as compared against crack cocaine,
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Again, the differences in the guideline ranges are significant. If
the same enhancement and deduction that have been applied to Mr. Bonk, i.e. 2-level
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c) and a 3-level reduction for accepting responsibility,
are applied to a defendant that is responsible for 1.5 Kg of each of the following drugs, the
guideline range is significantly higher for a defendant possessing Pure Methamphetamine or
“ICE” versus a defendant possessing a meth mixture, i.e. there is a difference of 104 months on
the low-end of the guideline range and a difference of 130 months on the high-end of the
guideline range.
DRUG TYPE COMPARISON
DRUG TYPE QUANTITY TOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATERGORY
GUIDELINE RANGE
Methamphetamine – Pure or “ICE”
1.5 – 4.5 Kg 35 VI 292-365
Crack Cocaine 840 – 2.8 Kg 31 VI 188-235
Methamphetamine mixture
1.5 – 5.0 Kg 31 VI 188-235
Heroin 1 Kg – 3 Kg 29 VI 151-188
Cocaine – powder 500 g – 2 Kg 23 VI 92-115
Marijuana 1 Kg – 2.5 Kg 7 VI 15-21
1 This was prior to any credit given for Nawanna’s substantial assistance under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
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Additionally, within each base offense level of the Drug Quantity Table, there exists a 10:1 ratio
of pure meth (“ICE”) to meth mixture. U.S.S.G § 2D1.1. The following are different examples
and explanations, found in Nawanna, of how pure meth is punished more severely than meth
mixture:
“Defendant A, who sold 5 grams of methamphetamine to his five customers (1 gram per customer), versus Defendant B, who sold 49 grams of methamphetamine to 25 customers (almost 2 grams per customer). Without other adjustments, if Defendant A’s methamphetamine is treated as ice or actual (pure) methamphetamine, his resulting base offense level is 24. Similarly, without other adjustments, if Defendant B’s methamphetamine is treated as a mixture, his base offense level is 22. Thus, the Commission’s judgment is that Defendant A is more culpable, even though he sold far less methamphetamine to far fewer people, but that is contrary to what a reasonable observer would like conclude”.
Nawanna at 952.
Additionally, the prosecution in Nawanna, agreeing with the defendant’s example above,
provided its own example:
In response, the prosecution argues that, if Nawanna’s position is adopted, it leads to the perverse result that a defendant who sold 150 grams of pure methamphetamine, treated as pure methamphetamine, would be treated the same as a defendant who sold 4 kilograms of actual (pure) methamphetamine whose methamphetamine was treated as a mixture. That is precisely the result of the current Guidelines calculation, based on the 10-to-1 ratio, which would score both defendants as level 32. (Citation omitted). On the other hand, if the methamphetamine attributed to both defendant is treated as methamphetamine mixture, as Nawanna argues it should be, the defendant who sold 150 grams of methamphetamine would be scored as level 24, while the defendant who sold 4 kilograms of methamphetamine would still be scored as level 32. The difference does more properly reflect the relative culpability of the two defendants.
Nawanna at 958 n.7.
Both examples efficiently describe the problem with the Guidelines’ handling of pure meth vs.
meth mixture considering the change that has occurred over the past 15-20 years that has resulted
in the new normal of pure meth being found everywhere.
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In U.S. v. Ortega, the Court found that a sentence below the guideline range was
appropriate for Ortega because he was “at most, a street-level distributor, dealing drugs in the
same purity as most methamphetamine sold on the street”…and “to punish him as harshly as an
upper-level distributor because of a presumptive ten-to-one ratio does not reflect his position in
the hierarchy nor will it promote respect for the law.” U.S. v. Ortega, 2010 WL 1994870 at 7 (D.
Nebraska, 2010). Additionally, the Court in U.S. v. Harry states that “there seems to be no
empirical evidence supporting the need for a drastically-increased sentence based solely on the
purity of the meth at issue. U.S. v. Harry, 313 F.Supp.3d 969, 973 (N.D. Iowa, 2018). In Harry,
after the defendant was found guilty at jury trial of possession with intent to distribute at least 50
grams of pure meth, the Court sentenced the defendant to 280 months, which was a downward
variance from the defendant’s guideline range of 360 months to life, i.e. a downward variance of
at least 80 months. The defendant in Harry was found responsible for 1,800.3 grams of pure
meth and had a Criminal History Category of VI.
In Spears v. U.S., the Court held a sentencing judge has the power to “reject the disparity
created by the crack-to-powder ratio.” Spears v. U.S., 555 U.S. 261, 265 (2009). Like the Court
in Spears, the sentencing courts in meth cases have begun to follow suit to that of the crack-
cocaine sentencing courts; and they have addressed the disparity that exists between pure meth
(“ICE”) and meth mixture, i.e. the 10:1 ratio disparity between pure meth (“ICE”) and a meth
mixture. As such, like the sentencing court in Ortega, the Court here can reject the higher ratio
that is to be assessed pure meth and therefore reject the 4-level increase, which is the result of a
10:1 ratio between pure meth (“ICE”) and a meth mixture.
In U.S. v. Hayes, the sentencing court followed the court’s recommendation in Spears
and reduced the guideline range by one-third “in response to the fundamental problems with the
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methamphetamine Guidelines range. The one-third reduction is a good starting point and a
reasonable way to express [the court’s] policy disagreement with the Guidelines.” U.S. v.
Hayes, 948 F.Supp.2d 1009, 1031 (N.D. Iowa, 2013).
In Nawanna, the court rejected the methamphetamine guidelines based on two reasons:
1) because they “are based on a flawed assumption that methamphetamine purity is a proxy for
role in the offense,” Nawanna at 954; and 2) because the 10:1 ratio of pure meth to a meth
mixture is not based on empirical evidence, which creates a Guidelines range for pure meth that
is not in the “heartlands.” Id. at 950-955. Even the prosecution in Nawanna admitted with the
defendant’s argument that the 10-to-1 ratio is unsupported by and not based on empirical
evidence. Nawanna at 950-951. Furthermore, the parties in Nawanna agreed that they “were
unaware of any statement in the guidelines or elsewhere of why only certain controlled
substances, including meth, are singled out in the Guidelines themselves for enhancement based
on purity, while others, such as heroin, are not. Nawanna at 949.
In Harry, the Court adopted the approach used and described in Nawanna, i.e. based on
policy disagreement, when the Court calculated an “alternative Guidelines range, starting with a
base offense level determined by reference to the methamphetamine mixture Guidelines.” Harry
at 974. “While it may seem logical to punish a pure substance more than mixed substance, there
is no support in the legislative history to explain the formula underlying greater
methamphetamine purity to greater months of imprisonment.” Hayes at 1025.
Additionally, take the recent and significant rise in fentanyl-based overdoses nationwide.
As it pertains to the Central District, Peoria County Coroner reported 71 fentanyl-related
overdoses in heroine starting in 2016 through November, 2018. Peoria Counts Cost of Fentanyl
Deaths after CDC Names Its Deadliest Drug. December 12, 2018,
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https://week.com/news/2018/12/12/peoria-counts-cost-of-fentanyl-deaths-after-cdc-names-it-
deadliest-drug/. This rise in overdose-related deaths is caused, at least in some cases, by the drug
users not knowing what is in the drug mixture.
3. Double counting for “Purity” and “Role in Offense” .
Like the defendant in Nawanna, Mr. Bonk argues here that the 4-level enhancement for
meth purity (versus the base offense level for meth mixture) and the 2-level enhancement for role
in the offense punishes him twice for the same reason. “Because the purity-based meth
guidelines improperly punish virtually all defendants for their assumed role in the offense…they
result in sort of ‘double counting’ when a defendant is further enhanced 2 levels for his or her
actual role in the offense pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b).” Nawanna at 954. Mr. Bonk’s 2-level
enhancement for “role in the offense” is a defendant-specific enhancement, based on his actual
role as “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in
(a) or (b).” U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). However, Mr. Bonk’s guideline sentence has already been
enhanced 4 levels based on a flawed assumption about his role in the offense simply because the
meth in this case is pure and without any individualized determination. As in Nawanna, Mr.
Bonk submits that this Court may also conclude that “the proper way to consider [a defendant’s]
role in the offense…is not [to be] based on such an assumption, particularly a demonstrably
erroneous assumption, based on purity, but on an individualized determination pursuant to
U.S.S.G. 3B1.1. Nawanna at 955.
4. The Methamphetamine Guidelines are not Heartlands .
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each
guideline as a carving out a “heartland,” a set of typical cases
embodying the conduct that each guideline describes. When a
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court finds an atypical case, one to which a particular guideline
linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from
the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1.6 (1987).
It was the intention of the Commission to make each sentencing guideline a heartland so
that there would exist a consistency in sentencing such that a departure from the guideline would
be a rare occurrence. Despite that intention, “sentencing data over the years reveal that the
Guidelines range for methamphetamine offenses do not constitute the typical case or heartland.”
Hayes. at 1030. In 2017 and “for the third year in a row, methamphetamine offenses were the
most severely punished drug crime, with an average length of imprisonment of 91 months.” U.S
Sentencing Commission, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases, Fiscal Year 2017, available at
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf. In 2017, only 30.1% of methamphetamine
trafficking offenders were sentenced within their range, and 0% were sentenced above their
range; in other words, almost 70% of methamphetamine trafficking offenders were sentenced
below their guideline range. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Quick Facts Methamphetamine
Trafficking Offenses available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/quick-facts/Methamphetamine_FY17.pdf (emphasis added) (hereinafter “Quick
Facts”) and attached hereto as Exhibit A. Additionally, in 2017, methamphetamine trafficking
offenders received an average reduction in their non-government sponsored sentence of 33.8%
regardless of the weight, i.e. “The median Base Offense Level in these cases was 32. This
corresponds to a quantity of drugs between 3.3 and 11.0 pounds of methamphetamine.” U.S.
Sentencing Commission, Quick Facts Methamphetamine Trafficking Offenses available at
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https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/
Methamphetamine_FY17.pdf. See Quick Facts (emphasis added). This type of pattern, i.e. that
methamphetamine sentences below the guideline range is the standard, indicates that the
Guideline range for methamphetamine offenses is not the heartland and that the guideline ranges
need to be adjusted down. “The heartland itself is flawed. The high number of downward
departures indicates that the Guidelines range is not a heartland or typical case.” Hayes at 1030.
“A district court's decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect
when the sentencing judge finds a particular case ‘outside the ‘heartland’ to which the
Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply.’” Kimbrough at 89 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at
351).
5. The Methamphetamine Guidelines are not based on Empirical Data .
In United States v. Hayes, 948 F.Supp.2d 1009 (2013), Judge Bennett issued a sentencing
order wherein he addressed several issues concerning the methamphetamine sentencing
guidelines, including the development of the sentencing guidelines as compared to the
development of the methamphetamine guidelines. His sentencing order cited prior case law,
federal law, reports to Congress, and other publications and reports. To say the least, the
sentencing order was thorough. A courtesy copy of Judge Bennett’s sentencing order was sent to
the Court for this Court’s review.
One of the main points of the Judge Bennett’s sentencing order is that the original
sentencing guidelines were developed through an empirical approach that included analysis of
10,000 presentence reports. Hayes at 1019. The Court repeatedly praised the empirical process
by which the Guidelines were written, Id., after all, it is the Commission’s role to draft the
guidelines and to “base its determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a
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professional staff with appropriate expertise.” United States v. Pruitt, 502 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th
Cir. 2007).
However, when it came to drug-trafficking offenses, the Commission did not use the
same empirical approach in developing guideline ranges, and instead the Commission conformed
the drug-trafficking guideline ranges with the statutory minimums that were being implemented
by Congress as a result of certain political and social atmospheres, e.g. “Congress swiftly
enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986” as a result of the drug overdose death of Len Bias, a
University of Maryland basketball player. Hayes at 1020. The mandatory minimums that were
being implemented by Congress, which focused on the drug weight and quantity, effectively
raised the guideline ranges for drug-trafficking offenses.
Judge Bennett went on to analyze the sentences imposed for methamphetamine cases and
found that in 2011, the average sentence length was 144 months for methamphetamine offenders;
this was the “highest average sentence length for any drug type,” even though only 38.3% of
methamphetamine offenders that were subject to a mandatory minimum in 2011 received a
sentence within the Guidelines range. Id. at 1025 (emphasis added). In other words, over 60%
of methamphetamine offenders were receiving sentences below the guideline range, yet the
average sentence was still the highest average sentence among drug-trafficking offenses. “Thus,
methamphetamine Guidelines are entitled to less deference than those Guidelines that were based
on the Commission’s exercise of institutional expertise and empirical analysis.” Id. at 1027. “A
variance based on a policy disagreement is particularly appropriate for methamphetamine
offenses because the Guidelines range results in sentences greater than necessary to achieve
sentencing objectives and the Guidelines are not based on empirical data and national
experience. Hayes at 1031 (citing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. at 96 (2007) (“The
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Commission did not use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for
drug-trafficking offenses.”); (citing Gall v. U.S., 552 U.S. 38, 46 n.2 (2007) (“[T]he Sentencing
Commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the Guidelines range for drug
offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences
that Congress established for such crimes.”).
6. Career Offender Status .
A. Career Offender Status is not based on Empirical Evidence or National Experience
The Career Offender Guidelines are not based on empirical evidence or national
experience; instead, the Career Offender Guidelines recommend sentences that are greater than
necessary to satisfy the purpose of sentencing.
i. Deterrence
The imposition of a Career Offender Guideline sentence in a case such as the one before
the Court does not have a deterrent effect. Criminologists and law enforcement officials have
testified in front of the Commission and have stated that “retail-level drug traffickers are readily
replaced by new drug sellers so long as the demand for a drug remains high. Incapacitating a
low-level drug seller prevents little, if any, drug selling; the crime is simply committed by
someone else.” USSC, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the
Federal Criminal Justice System Is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform, at 134 (Nov.
2004).
ii. Unwarranted Disparity and Unwarranted Uniformity
The Career Offender Guideline does not take into account the specific defendant and that
specific defendant’s criminal history. The Commission noted that the Career Offender guideline
“makes no distinction between defendants convicted of the same offenses, either as to
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seriousness of their instant offense or their previous convictions…even if one defendant was a
drug ‘kingpin’ with serious prior offenses, while the other defendant was a low-level street
dealer whose two prior convictions for distributing small amounts of drugs resulted in sentences
of probation,” and for this reason the Career Offender Guideline is potentially over-inclusive.
USSC, Career Offender Guidelines Working Group Memorandum at 13 (March 25, 1988). “The
Career Offender Guideline provisions provide no mechanisms for evaluating the relative
seriousness of the underlying prior convictions.” U.S. v. Moreland, 366 F.Supp.2d 416, 424
(2005).
iii. Large Disparity Between Prior Sentences and Career Offender Sentence
As it pertains to Mr. Bonk, below is a summary of his criminal history for the convictions
that would be considered in determining his career offender status:
Case Sentence Actual Time Served
06-CF-79 (Tazewell County) 3 years 8 months
07-CF-523 (Tazewell County) 2 years 61 days
08-CF-249 (Tazewell County) 2 years 3 months, 21 days
09-CF-172 (Tazewell County) 42 months 12 months, 20 days
12-CF-404 (Tazewell County) 1 year 61 days
Mr. Bonk’s longest sentence was 42 months, however, he actually served just over 12
months after day-for-day credit, credit for time served, and good-time credit were applied.
Application of the Career Offender Guidelines would result in a sentence of approximately 262-
327 months. The ratio of the Career Offender Guidelines proposed sentence to the time actually
served by Mr. Bonk’s longest prior sentence is approximately a ratio of 24-to-1.2 This disparity
2 Ratio of 294 months (which is the median of Mr. Bonk’s Career Offender Guideline range) to 12 months (longest time actually served for a crime that may be considered to his career offender status).
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is significant as “Courts have noted that a large disparity between the punishment prescribed by
the career criminal designation and the time served for prior offenses might indicate that the
career criminal sentence is in excess of that needed to accomplish the desired deterrent effect.”
U.S. v. Patzer, 548 F.Supp.2d 612, 616-617 (N.D. Illinois, 2008) (citing U.S. v. Mishoe, 241
F.3d 214, 220 (2d Cir. 2001)). Scenarios and circumstances exist where the “Career Offender
guideline creates sentences far greater than necessary” when the time served on prior sentences
are relatively short and therefore makes “the guideline range applicable to the instant offense a
colossal increase.” U.S. v. Qualls, 373 F.Supp.2d 873, 876-77 (E.D. Wis, 2005). Similarly, in
Rivera, the defendant’s longest prior term of imprisonment did not exceed 39 months at any one
time; the Court held “any term of imprisonment significantly greater than this amount will
achieve the deterrent effect underlying the career offender designation.” U.S. v. Rivera, 2006
WL 3432062 at 6 (S.D. New York 2006) (emphasis added).
Therefore, any sentence that is greater than 12 months will achieve the deterrent effect
underlying the career offender designation.
B. Career Offender – Implementation of First Act .
The implementation of the First Step Act now requires that any mandatory minimums
under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) will be triggered only if the defendant commits a serious
violent felony. Mr. Bonk submits to this Court that it should give the same consideration to
Career Offender Status. In other words, the Court can disagree with a sentence range under the
Career Offender status/guidelines if the Career Offender status is not based on serious violent
felonies as defined in 18 U.S.C § 3559(c)(2) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(58)(2). The reason is one of
consistency; it is probable/possible that the Sentencing Commission will now redefine
requirements to find a Career Offender based on the Legislature’s redefining of what is necessary
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to find a mandatory minimum is necessary. “I fully agree that the broad definition of a ‘crime of
violence’ in U.S.S.G. section 4B1.2(1) merits reexamination by the Sentencing Commission.”
Parson at 875. See also U.S. v Rutherford 54 F.3d 370, 277 (7th Cir. 1995)(sharing Parson’s
concerns and calling upon Commission to re-evaluate”). Mr. Bonk is essentially being treated as
a defendant with two prior serious violent felonies and a mandatory minimum of 25 years even
though he did not commit even one serious violent felony and does not have a conviction for a
serious drug felony as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(58)(2),
i.e. none of his prior criminal convictions were crimes of murder, manslaughter, sexual assault,
arson, robbery, extortion, etc.
Mr. Bonk has a severe history of alcohol and drug abuse that dates back to the age of
twelve years old. Most, if not every, crime committed by Mr. Bonk was committed while he was
either heavily/extremely intoxicated or high, which is represented clearly throughout his PSR,
not only with what information Mr. Bonk provided directly to probation, but also in the summary
of his criminal history portion of the PSR. The following list includes examples of Mr. Bonk
using drugs or being intoxicated during the commission of his criminal activity:
Paragraph 49: When arrested for aggravated battery in 2006, the officers stated
that Mr. Bonk was “highly intoxicated”;
Paragraph 51: When arrested for domestic battery, the officer reported in Pekin
Police Report #: 07-03014857 that he was “unable to question/speak with Wade
about striking [the victim] due to his extremely intoxicated state”;
Paragraph 52: “Officers arrested [Mr. Bonk] and had to help him to the police car
because he was heavily intoxicated.”
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Paragraph 56: Regarding this arrest, the Pekin Police Department Report #12-
02709 stated that Mr. Bonk was “extremely intoxicated” and “had a strong odor
of alcohol about him and he was staggering around as he walked.” The officer
noted that Mr. Bonk’s “speech was very garbled and it was very difficult to
understand him.”
Mr. Bonk has been arrested for DUI at least four times.
The PSR’s criminal history section is littered with numerous instances of drug
use, possession of drug paraphernalia, and alcohol use.
Compared to defendants who may appear in front of a sentencing court with criminal
histories consisting of attempted murders or arson or sexual assaults or robberies through use of
force, Mr. Bonk’s criminal history does not consist of serious violent felonies as defined under
18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F) and 21 U.S.C.A. § 802(58)(2). Sentences in the range of 262-327
months under the Career Offender designation should be reserved for the most hardened
criminals, i.e. those that commit serious violent felonies. “The guidelines for Career Offender
are the same regardless of the severity of the crimes, the dangers posed to victims’ and
bystanders’ lives, and other appropriate criteria. U.S. v. Carvajal, 2005 WL 476125 at 5 (S.D.
N.Y., 2005).
Mr. Bonk’s criminal history is made up of activity committed while he was drunk or
high. His activity was reckless, and he was not making a living through his criminal activity. As
previously stated, Mr. Bonk was not living a lavish lifestyle, driving nice cars, and living in big
houses. The Court in Parson stated that the term “‘career offender’ implies an ongoing intent to
make a living through crime, and it is doubtful that one can make a career out of recklessness.”
U.S. v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858, 874 (3rd Circuit, 1992).
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That being said, Mr. Bonk submits to this Court that, for reasons stated herein, a sentence
below not only the guideline range, but also below the career offender guideline range is
appropriate.
7. Psychological Evaluation .
Attached is a copy the Psychological Evaluation completed by Dr. Kirk Witherspoon. See
Exhibit B. Additionally, attached as Exhibit C is a group of news articles. Whenever Mr. Bonk
was arrested for an offense, the local papers in Tazewell County would print an article about Mr.
Bonk’s arrest and charges. In addition to reporting the current charges, the newspaper article
continually referenced two stories in which Mr. Bonk was questioned, but never charged, in
connection of two murders from 1995 and 2009.
8. Support – Character Letters.
Mr. Bonk submits sixteen character and support letters written by his family and friends.
Said letters are attached hereto as Group Exhibit D.
9. Education and Certificates.
Mr. Bonk submits copies of certificates earned and a college transcript for the Court’s
review. In 2015, Mr. Bonk earned a welding certificate from Lake Land College. Said
documents are attached hereto as Group Exhibit E.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, WADE BONK, respectfully requests of this Court, for the
reasons contained in this Sentencing Memorandum and Motion for Downward Departure and
Variance, the following:
A. For a downward departure from his Sentencing Guideline range;
B. For a downward variance from his final Sentencing Guideline range; and
C. For any other relief that the Court deems equitable and just under the circumstances.
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WADE BONK, Defendant
Date: April 10, 2019 /s/ Sharbel A. Rantisi Attorney for Defendant5832 N. Knoxville Avenue, Suite H2Peoria, Illinois 61614Phone: (309) 285-0424Fax: (309) [email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1I hereby certify that on the 10th day of April, 2019, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:
Ms. Katherine Legge Assistant United States Attorney211 Fulton Street, Suite 400Peoria, IL [email protected]
WADE BONK, Defendant
/s/ Sharbel A. Rantisi Attorney for Defendant5832 N. Knoxville Avenue, Suite H2Peoria, Illinois 61614Phone: (309) 285-0424Fax: (309) [email protected]
THIS DOCUMENT PREPARED BY:
Attorney Name Sharbel A. RantisiFirm Name Rantisi Law LLCAttorney for Wade Bonk Firm Address 5832 N. Knoxville Avenue, Suite H2, Peoria, IL 61614Firm Phone (309) 285-0424Firm Facsimile (309) 285-8870Attorney No. 6293608
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