upper house assertion - ljiphart
TRANSCRIPT
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EXAMINING THE DETERMINANTS OF UPPER HOUSE ASSERTION
David FiskDepartment of Political Science
University of California-San DiegoSocial Sciences Building 3019500 Gilman Drive, #0521La Jolla, CA 92093-0521
Draft of:14 April 2006
Prepared for presentation at the annual conference of the Midwest Political ScienceAssociation held on 20-23 April 2006. The author would like to thank the National
Science Foundation for providing funding assistance for this project (Doctoral
Dissertation Research Improvement project number 0418503), in addition to thankWilliam Chandler, Matthew S. Shugart, Emily Beaulieu and Nathan Batto for helpful
comments on this draft.
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Abstract
The literature on legislatures has tended to disregard the role of the upper
chamber in the policy process. Recent research has suggested that even under
circumstances where the legislative prerogatives of the upper chamber are relatively
weak compared to that of the government, that policy outcomes are different under
bicameralism than they would be under unicameralism. Discussion of when upper
chambers use their authority, however, has been limited to case studies or empirical
testing relying primarily on one case. This paper seeks to address the circumstances under
which upper houses use their authority to obtain desired policy outcomes (what I refer to
as assertion). Using an original dataset including votes on government legislation from
1993-2003 with over 50,000 observations in four parliamentary systems, the paper
examines the role of institutional authority (veto strength) and legislative timing, party
reach, and policy preferences in shaping upper chamber willingness to assert themselves
in a more comparative manner than previous research. Statistical testing provides support
for examining party composition within both the upper and lower chambers, as well as
the policy preferences of the upper chamber in explaining upper house assertion.
Introduction
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All upper chambers possess constitutional standing, suggesting that they should
have influence within the legislative process. Legislative studies, however, have tended to
disregard the role of the upper house in the legislative process contending that upper
chambers are too weak or inconsequential to exert any influence on legislative outcomes.
This decision is usually based on arguments centered on the congruence between many
upper and lower houses in terms of their composition, and the asymmetrical institutional
relationship between the chambers in terms of constitutional authority, which tends to
favor governments in the lower chamber.
It is unclear, however, that a blanket rejection of the effects of the upper chamber
on policy outcomes is warranted. In fact, we find significant variation in levels of
institutional authority within upper chambers. The German Bundesrat is an example of an
upper chamber that possesses a great deal of authority (an absolute veto over
approximately two-thirds of legislation) with which to obstruct passage of the
governments agenda, and in recent years, the Bundesrat has used this authority to amend
or block government legislation. But even in cases where the upper chamber is classified
as weak, as in the case of the British House of Lords, members of the upper house have
used their institutional prerogatives to frustrate attempts made by governments of both
parties to pass legislation crucial to their agenda1.
This discussion has become more relevant as it has been suggested that some
upper chambers are using their authority with greater frequency than they have in the
past, requiring governments to spend more time dealing with upper house delays and
amendments (see Shell 1992, Shell and Beamish 1993, Shell 1999, Franks 1999, Patzelt
1999, Uhr 1999). This expansion of upper house influence into policy areas formerly
1 Examples of this include the War Crimes Bill under the government of John Major, and Section 28 reformunder the Blair government.
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dominated by governments in the lower house has sparked debate in several established
democracies (such as Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Australia) as to the
appropriate role of the upper house in regards to the ability of the government to pass its
agenda given the fact that many upper chambers are not directly elected but use a variety
of alternative selection mechanisms (indirect election, electoral colleges, appointment,
heredity, etc.). Emerging democracies have also debated whether or not to create or
reform their upper house (e.g. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic).
Bicameral institutional structures have also been a subject for debate for those
who discuss the role of institutions in promoting political stability in deeply divided
societies (Lijphart 1968 and 2000, Roeder forthcoming). As a result, recognition that the
upper house can affect policy outcomes makes examination of how upper houses
function, as well as how they affect these outcomes, a crucial focus of political
institutional research. While the determinants of upper house activity should be
consequential in explaining policy outcomes, with the exception of Lijphart (1999)and
Tsebelis and Money (1997) little work has been done to determine under what
circumstances upper chambers will use their legislative authority to affect policy
outcomes.
This paper examines the circumstances under which upper chambers use their
legislative authority to obtain their desired policy outcomes, what I refer to as upper
house assertion. I argue that when faced with a policy proposal offered by the
government, the upper chamber decides whether or not to assert itself in the policy
process, and that this decision is a function of three factors: veto strength, party reach and
the policy preferences of the upper chamber. First, I argue that veto strength (actual veto
versus suspensory veto) coupled with timing of the legislative session alter the costs
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associated with overriding the upper chamber (in terms of agenda time, supermajority
requirements to override etc.), all of which can increase upper house legislative
bargaining leverage vis--vis the government.
Second, party reach into the upper chamber (ability of political parties to
discipline their members in the upper chamber) is theorized to play a strong role in
determining the ability of the upper house to assert themselves. Under circumstances
where members of the upper chamber are dependent upon national parties or
governments for re-selection, they will be more likely to be acquiescent than in those
chambers where upper houses members are further removed from the governments
whips or are appealing to different selectorates. Where the government possesses fewer
carrots and sticks with which to encourage agreement with their policies, or where
upper chambers are dependent upon actors other than the national party (e.g. appealing to
constituencies at the state rather than federal level), upper chambers will be more
assertive.
Third, upper chambers generally possess greater flexibility than their lower house
counterparts to pursue policy related goals. Where party reach in the upper chamber is
weaker, the median voter in the upper house is in a better position to enact his or her ideal
policy point than the median voter in the lower chamber, because she/he is less likely to
face credible threats from their political party for not voting the party line. As a result, the
policy preferences of the median voter in the upper chamber should play a larger role in
determining upper house assertion.
In the next section, I will examine the literature on upper chambers. In the third
and fourth sections, I explain my theory and discuss my research design and the
construction of my dataset. I present my findings in the fifth section, and conclude with a
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discussion of the limitations of this framework, as well as outline an agenda for future
research.
Literature Review
Many legislative studies ignore the role of the upper chamber in explaining
policy outcomes on the assumption that they have a negligible affect on policy outcomes
due to a lack of institutional strength (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Sartori 1996) or
not meeting the criteria of a legislature due to its composition or its selection mechanism
(Mezey 1979). Recent works have attempted to classify upper chambers on the basis of
their expected influence, suggesting that certain types of houses will be more likely to
exert an independent influence on policy outcomes than others.
While recent research has taken various approaches to explain the effects of
bicameralism, comparative empirical work has been relatively rare. Patterson and
Mughan (1999) provide a series of case studies highlighting several upper chambers,
suggesting that examining how upper houses function internally, is a crucial area for
future research. They also argue that the role of the upper house as a policy improving
body is taken quite seriously in many upper chambers, and that governments in the lower
chamber that attempt to ignore their input, do so at their own risk. Questions regarding
the legitimacy of upper houses as well as a discussion of how upper houses,
comparatively speaking, arrive at decisions are also suggested as areas for further
research.
Lijphart (1999) divides bicameral legislatures into three categories (strong
bicameralism, medium bicameralism, and weak bicameralism) on the basis of two
variables: symmetry and congruence. Lijphart classifies upper houses as symmetrical if
they possess institutional authority commensurate to that of the lower house. Houses are
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considered to be congruent if the method of selection suggests that the two houses will be
composed similarly. It is suggested that congruence and asymmetry greatly diminish the
independent effects of action taken by the upper chamber. Strong bicameralism exists
when an upper house is both symmetric and non-congruent (e.g. the United States Senate,
Australian Senate, Swiss Federation Council and the German Bundesrat), medium
bicameralism exists when one of the two characteristics is missing (e.g. the British House
of Lords, Canadian Senate, French Senate, the Belgian Senate, and the Italian Senate),
and weak bicameralism exists when an upper house is both asymmetric and congruent
(e.g. Irish Seanad and the Austrian Bundesrat).
Money and Tsebelis (1992) take an innovative approach, suggesting that
senatorial power or influence can be operationalized as a function of navette rules
(number of times a bill can shuttle between two houses of parliament) and other
institutional factors (such as stopping rules, intercameral dispute resolution mechanisms,
and confidence procedures). Tsebelis and Money (1997) expands on this definition,
suggesting that the ability to deal with financial legislation, presence of conference
committees, uncertainty over the lower chambers ideal point, and the upper houses
relative level of patience (desire to pass legislation), all influence of ability of the upper
chamber to affect policy outcomes.
Tsebelis and Money (1997) model the process of inter-cameral bargaining using a
Rubinstein bargaining model, characterized by two players who make a series of
proposals and counterproposals such that when the first player proposes, the second can
either accept the offer, or reject it and make a counteroffer (Rubinstein 1982). Payoffs in
this game are a function not only of expected utility of the offer, but also of the level of
impatience/discount factor that each player possesses (the weight each player places on
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gains received in the future). As each round passes, each player in this model gets a
reduced amount of utility for the outcome based on their degree of discounting, leading
players to prefer an agreement sooner rather than later. Players that are more patient are
able to extract more from their opponent, and the order in which players make offers
(who makes the first offer and who concludes the bargaining) affects the equilibrium
outcome. In the Tsebelis and Money model, the legislative bargaining process is driven
by the upper chambers uncertainty of the resolve of the lower house (concept of
uncertainty) as well as both chambers desire to reach a policy resolution sooner rather
than later (concept of impatience). They operationalize this impatience as a function of
strength and cohesion of the lower house governing coalition, and argue that the
bargaining game is structured in such a way that when the navette runs out, the lower
house can unilaterally select its ideal point.
Under these assumptions, Tsebelis and Money argue that the upper house extracts
policy concessions when the coalition is small or non cohesive, and acquiesces when the
government coalition is large or is very cohesive. They suggest that assertion will be
greatest, under situations where the upper house is unsure of the resolve of the
government, which they contend occurs when the governing coalition is of intermediate
strength and cohesion. They also control for cameral learning and cycling. The learning
hypothesis suggests that the upper house will be more acquiescent near the end of the
term as they become more knowledgeable of the ideal point of the lower chamber.
Electoral cycling refers to the idea that cameral negotiation breakdown will be
increasingly more likely near the middle of a parliamentary term as the lower house is
more patient directly following an election, and the upper chamber becomes stronger as a
new election draws nearer, as the governments relative patience evaporates. They
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conclude that regardless of the strength or weakness of the upper house, the presence of
an upper house makes it more difficult to change policy, and generates a different policy
outcome than expected under unicameralism.
Tsebelis and Money (1997) provide a useful framework in terms of analyzing the
relationship between upper and lower houses, but do not examine how or under what
circumstances upper house dynamics should affect this process. In addition, their
theoretical testing relies primarily on one case (France), which restrains comparability.
Analyzing the French case may be problematic on two bases. First, during the French
Fifth Republic, the French Senate has been relatively static in its composition, as the right
has dominated the upper chamber since its reformation and the left did not enter
government in the lower chamber in the French Fifth Republic until the early 1980s,
relatively late in Tsebelis and Moneys data set which covers the French Fifth Republic
until 1985. This makes it difficult to examine how changes in the party composition of
the two chambers affect this process. The model presented here will explicitly examine
party strength and party reach in the upper chamber, as well as outline policy preferences
in explaining upper house assertion more explicitly in a wider range of cases.
Second, the legislative rules in the National Assembly (the lower house) are
unique in that it is relatively easy for the government and its majority in the National
Assembly to override the upper house (the Senate) when the government uses the censure
vote. The censure vote (Article 49) is just one of many unique institutional tools that the
French executive possesses to allow it to dominate the legislative arena. The censure vote
allows the government to make any bill a vote of confidence, in which the members of
parliament do not vote on the bill itself, but on whether to keep the current government in
office. As long as this motion of no confidence is not filed and passed, the bill is
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considered passed in the form designated by the government without debate. This is a
parliamentary rule that is relatively rare,2 which alters the bargaining situation by
skewing the costs of overriding the upper chamber in a manner that is not generalizable
to other cases. Models analyzing intercameral relations need to examine the tradeoffs
between the costs and benefits of overriding the upper house in a wider range of cases.
Theory:
This paper addresses the costs endured by governments in overriding the upper
house, examining legislative timing and veto strength, party reach, and the policy
preferences of the upper chamber, all of which are theorized to alter levels of upper house
assertion. I take each of these variables in turn, outlining previous theories and
hypotheses derived from these theories as well as my own hypotheses regarding
assertion. By extending the analysis to include internal characteristics of the upper
chamber theorized to affect upper house assertiveness, as well as testing prevailing theory
against a wider range of cases, this paper intends to provide a more comprehensive
explanation of the conditions under which upper houses assert themselves in the
legislative process.
Veto strength and Legislative timing
While Tsebelis and Moneys (1997) contention that both the lower and upper
chambers take advantage of their bargaining position to obtain their preferred policy
outcomes is fairly straightforward, it is unclear that the logic underlying the learning
hypothesis as formulated should frame upper house behavior. 3 It may be the case that
upper houses do learn about the resolve or the impatience of the upper house as the
parliamentary session draws to a close, but this may not reduce upper house
2 See Shugart and Carey (1992) on decree powers.3 Tsebelis and Money contend that further research should be done to confirm or reject this hypothesis.
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intransigence, but increase it, as their institutional prerogatives become more absolute
(e.g. costs of overriding them becomes prohibitive). This is increasingly more likely as
the parliamentary session draws to a close and governments have a scarce supply of
agenda time with which to respond (see Doering 1995 on agenda scarcity). Under these
circumstances, governments rather than being able to unilaterally select their preferred
policy outcome at the end of a constitutionally specified time, may choose to drop a bill
rather than incur further override costs (be they expenditures of agenda time on additional
votes or conference committees and/or political risks associated with a failed attempt to
override the upper chamber) associated with the decision to attempt to override the upper
house. The strength of the veto coupled with legislative timing can affect the calculus of
the government as to whether or not to attempt to override the upper chamber, by
affecting agenda scarcity as well as what decision rules are to be followed.
Explaining cameral relations as a game where after a specified number of rounds,
the stronger house (predominantly the government in the lower house) gets to unilaterally
select its ideal point is problematic, as overriding the upper chamber always involves
costs. While overriding the upper chamber is always costly, not all upper chambers,
possess the same ability to affect these costs. While policy matters for upper houses, it is
not the case that all upper houses possess the same institutional authority to assert their
policy preferences. The veto authority held by the upper chamber frames these override
costs, as it is the veto authority of the upper chamber that determines the decision rules
under which the government must proceed if they wish to override the will of the upper
house. Some upper chambers possess suspensory rather than absolute vetoes, which
allow them to delay policy, not block it indefinitely.
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I suggest that upper chambers that possess suspensory veto authority function
somewhat along the lines of a fire alarm (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984), by acting
like a policy watchdog, possessing the ability to review legislation, raise alternative
policies, and in some cases embarrass the government by alerting the populace that the
ideal point of the government is different from that of the electorate. Chambers that
possess an absolute veto, act more akin to an institutional veto player (Tsebelis 1995),
and passage of a given policy under this institutional framework requires the consent of
the both houses. In both instances, overriding the upper chamber involves creating
agenda costs or the need to create supermajorities for governments.
While previous studies of legislatures have suggested that upper houses should be
examined only when they possess absolute vetoes, Cox (2000) suggests that suspensory
vetoes are important, especially when agenda time is scarce (e.g. end of a parliamentary
session). Under these circumstances, I argue that suspensory vetoes can be considered as
being transformed to absolute vetoes as the ability to override the upper chamber in this
situation has dissipated due to time constraints. In addition, by pointing out weaknesses
in bills passed by the lower house, upper houses can inflict political costs on the
governing coalition in the lower house. As a result, these types of chambers should not be
overlooked, as upper houses that possess primarily policy watchdog authority may use
their institutional prerogatives strategically near the end of the term, to get their desired
outcome.
The empirical record suggests that there are instances whereby the lower house
drops bills (in cases where the upper house acts as a fire alarm and as a veto player)
rather than face a protracted fight to overturn the decision of the upper house. I argue that
this occurs when the cost of override (e.g. agenda time, need for a supermajority)
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outweighs the benefits associated with it (enactment of proposal), and that legislative
timing and veto strength can affect these costs. A model of the interaction between
houses should include an interactive variable accounting for upper house institutional
strength as well as the year in the parliamentary session, which structures the bargaining
by transforming suspensory vetoes into something more akin to an absolute veto, creating
additional costs for the government in terms of both agenda time/systemic impatience and
reputation that the upper house can take advantage of to increase their policy bargaining
leverage. This leads to the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis One (Veto Transformation): Upper houses will be more assertive as their
veto approximates an absolute veto. This will occur throughout the entire term when the
house is a veto player, and only during the end of the parliamentary session
corresponding to the length of the suspensory veto in policy watchdog chambers.
Party Reach
The model presented here suggests that the composition of the upper house should
also be included to explain upper house assertion in the legislative process. We may
anticipate that the government would take upper house composition into consideration
when determining the probability of passage of its legislative agenda, suggesting that
when the government controls a larger number of seats in the upper chamber, this would
reduce the likelihood of upper house intransigence. Passage of the governments agenda
would arguably be less likely in cases where the opposition controls a majority in the
upper chamber. In these situations, the upper house may view itself as a second
opposition. This leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis Two (Upper House Composition): High levels of opposition parties in the
upper house will increase levels of upper house assertion.
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It is unclear, however, that the same level of party discipline that we see amongst
backbenchers in the lower chamber can be assumed to carry over into the upper chamber.
While parties certainly frame the debate in most upper houses, many upper house
members are selected by alternate methods or constituencies (indirect or direct election at
different constituency levels) or for longer periods of time than members of the lower
house. This theoretically weakens the delegation chain between the party and government
in the lower house and party members of the upper house.4 Weaker party discipline
associated with many upper houses provides more of an opportunity for members of
upper houses to pursue policy rather than party related goals. In terms of principal-agent
theory, members of lower chambers generally face greater consequences for deviating
from the party line (including de-selection, reduced probability of being promoted to
ministerial positions, and loss of government office), than members of the upper house.
As a result, where party reach is weaker, agency slippage in the lower house should be
less than that observed in the upper house. Due to lower levels of screening (e.g. via re-
selection mechanisms) as well as fewer opportunities to constrain agency slack (e.g.
reduced opportunities for de-selection, removal of party label at election time, etc), party
reach in the upper chamber can be weaker than that in the lower chamber. As a result,
in many instances, upper house members can afford to be more flexible in terms of
seeking policy goals than their lower house counterparts.
Lijphart (1999) suggests that difference in selection mechanisms can have a
critical affect on the type of bicameralism observed, affecting whether or not the upper
chamber can be viewed as more of a rubber stamp for government policy rather then a
legislative hurdle for governments. Levels of party reach can be observed by examining
re-selection mechanisms. In instances where upper house members are appointed for a
4 See Strom (1997) on parliamentary delegation.
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short term by their political party, or are elected on the basis of a closed list system, we
should expect to see political parties playing a stronger role in influencing votes within
the upper chamber, as upper house members see their future membership as dependent
upon convincing the political party to re-select them. In instances where members are
directly elected on the basis of open lists, indirectly elected, or serve for life, we should
expect to see political parties playing less of a role in influencing upper house assertion,
as the party nomination is less critical for their continued membership in the upper
chamber.
Electoral cycles and office seeking incentives may also spark intransigence within
the same party when different constituencies or audiences elect members of each house.
In many cases, the constituencies for upper chambers are based on a state/territorial
distinction, while members of lower chambers are elected on a different basis. In these
situations, members of the upper chambers may view their policymaking role as one of a
legislative agent to a different principal than those elected in the lower chamber, as their
mandate is to serve an alternative constituency (e.g. state party organizations, state voters,
electoral colleges, etc.) than members in the lower chamber (national political party).
This interplay between alternative selection mechanisms as well as alternative audiences
to which upper house members respond, can undercut a political partys ability to
credibly threaten upper chamber members that do not toe the party line. This leads to the
third hypothesis:
Hypothesis Three (Re-Selection Hypothesis): Upper houses that are dependent upon
parties in the lower house (e.g. national leadership) for re-selection will be more
acquiescent than those elected by other means.
Policy Preferences
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Tsebelis and Money use the French Senate as their main case, but the composition
of the French Senate has remained relatively stable due to the over-representation of rural
and agricultural interests in the electoral college which selects members of the Senate that
support parties of the right (the UDF and the RPR). As a result, the dataset used in their
model does not test for the composition of the upper chamber to vary significantly, nor
does their statistical analysis investigate the role of government allies in the upper
chamber in creating uncertainty in the intercameral bargaining game, or in reducing the
effects of assertion.5
I contend that upper houses are concerned about policy outcomes, and that as a
result, and that regardless of institutional authority, we may not expect to see the upper
house acquiescing to the demands of the government solely on the basis of the governing
coalitions strength. The idea that political actors care about policy is not a new
suggestion. Research in coalition theory as well as in the party system literature, suggests
that parties are concerned with both policy and office goals, and that whether policy is
considered as an end, or as a means for procuring office, policy is still an important factor
to consider (Laver and Schofield 1998, Strom and Mueller 1999, Druckman and Thies
2001).
After suggesting that upper houses are concerned with policy and that their
members often posses greater flexibility to pursue policy goals, I maintain that upper
houses use their institutional powers strategically to achieve policy outcomes that are
closer to the ideal point of the chambers median voter. Under this framework, upper
houses have incentives to be viewed as an effective legislative body rather than merely a
rubber stamp. This can arise as a result of the need to appeal to different audiences for re-
5 Although Tsebelis and Moneys (1997) main statistical model does not explicitly address the compositionof the upper house in explaining legislative policy outcomes, their case studies do deal with this issue.
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Case Selection
Case selection will be confined to developed bicameral parliamentary
democracies, thus removing presidential systems from the field of cases included in my
data set. While I concede that the interaction between presidentialism and bicameralism
in an interesting question, I am confining this project to parliamentary systems as a useful
starting point for examining the role of the upper chamber in the legislative process.
Future studies should examine the effects of a presidential veto player on upper house
assertion, but this lies outside of the scope of this paper. Because I am investigating the
role of political parties in explaining upper house assertion, I am confining myself to
cases where parties and institutions are developed and entrenched. Whether or not the
same patterns exist within developing democracies as exist in developed democracies as
regards upper chambers is an interesting question for future research, but will not be
examined here.
In terms of the cases that will be included in the data set, I will use four cases
(Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom), which provide variation along
the independent variables in which I am interested (see table 1).
Table 1: Case Selection
Hypotheses: Belgium Germany Ireland UnitedKingdom
VetoTransformation
Watchdog andVeto Player
Veto Player Watchdog Watchdog
Upper HouseComposition
Has varied by party controlandcomposition.
Has varied byparty control.
Has varied byparty strength.
Has varied by party controlandcomposition.
Re-Selection Direct Election IndirectElection
Election byVocationalBoards andPrime Minister
Appointed bythe PrimeMinister
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PreferenceDifferential
Congruent Not Congruent Congruent Not Congruent
In terms of the veto transformation hypothesis, I have two veto players (Germany
and Belgium on issues of ethnicity and statehood) and two-plus watch dog chambers
(Ireland, the United Kingdom and the remainder of bills in the Belgian case). As regards
re-selection mechanisms, each case uses a different method of re-selection from direct
election in Belgium, indirect election in Germany, lifetime appointment/no re-selection in
the United Kingdom, and party membership/vocational boards/prime minister in Ireland.
As regards policy preferences, Lijphart classifies two of the cases as congruent (Ireland
and Belgium) and two as non-congruent (the United Kingdom and Germany), and all
have had varying compositions in their upper chambers.
Dependent Variable:
Upper house assertion is the dependent variable in this study.I am using votes on
government legislation as my unit of analysis, operationalizing the dependent variable by
examining whether or not a governing party gets rolled on any vote held on
government legislation in the upper chamber. Cox et al. (2000) define a party as being
rolled when a majority of a given party is unsuccessful in their opposition to a bill. A
governing party getting rolled on a government bill in the upper chamber suggests that
the upper house is asserting its institutional prerogatives (be it a suspensory or an
absolute veto) and that support for the bill as proposed in the upper chamber is weak. For
the purposes of this paper, high roll rates for government parties on government bills in
the upper chamber suggests a greater amount of negotiation breakdown, and in turn a
greater amount of time (higher cost of override) that will need to be expended on the part
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of the government in the lower chamber to overturn the will of the upper house. As a
result, the government will have to expend agenda time and create coalitions in the lower
chamber to overturn these wrecking amendments. Where the upper house refines or
improves legislation, we should not expect to see the governing parties being rolled in
the upper chamber, as governments may see the upper chambers policy refining function
as useful, and they will therefore not be rolled on these amendments.
I have coded votes on government legislation from 1993-20036, with a total of
50,103 observations. I have coded each bill with a 1 if a government party gets rolled, or
a 0 if a governing party does not get rolled. In cases where the roll call data is not
available, I will adopt the approach used by Cox et al. (2000), and code a party as getting
rolled if its leader on the given issue area (be it party leader or relevant minister) in the
upper chamber speaks against a bill that is eventually passed. In the German Bundesrat,
votes are cast en bloc by land government delegations. This will provide for a special
kind of roll call vote, but one that is fundamentally similar to roll call votes in other
cases.
This approach improves on the Tsebelis and Money (1997) approach by
examining the role of the upper chamber in greater detail. For their study, Tsebelis and
Money use percentage of bills that are adopted before a conference committee is called as
their operationalization. Under this operationalization, it is unclear whether or not the
upper house or the government is holding up the policy process. The benefit of the
operationalization used here is that it more effectively shows when the upper chamber is
6 This dataset includes all votes on government measures from 1993-2003 for Ireland, Belgium and theUnited Kingdom. Data from Germany from the fall of 1999 to the end of 2003 has also been included. Theremainder of the data from the German case will be included in the final dataset, but it was not available forthis paper.
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asserting their prerogatives by removing the ambiguity over which chamber is
responsible for stalling the policy process.
Hypotheses:
Veto Strength:
Hypothesis One (Veto Transformation):Upper houses will be more assertive as their
veto approximates an absolute veto. This will occur throughout the entire term when the
house is an institutional veto player, and only during the end of the parliamentary
session corresponding to the length of the suspensory veto in policy watchdog chambers.
This hypothesis suggests that when the upper houses refusal authority is more
solid, they will be more intransigent. Under these circumstances, the upper house may
have learned of the resolve of the lower house, but electoral cycles, legislative timing,
and the institutional strength of the upper chamber add to its bargaining power, by raising
the costs of the government overriding the upper house in terms of agenda time and the
political risks associated with failing to override the upper house. This variable allows for
the coding of upper house prerogatives in a more flexible fashion than that provided by
Lijphart and Tsebelis and Money, by introducing both legislative timing and veto
strength into the equation.
This hypothesis will be tested using a variable based on legislative session and
veto strength to be coded as follows: I will code veto player chambers (identified as
chambers which possess an absolute veto over a majority of policy proposals) with a 1,
and policy watchdog chambers (identified as chambers which possess a suspensory veto
over a majority of policy proposals) with a 0 until the duration of parliament when their
suspensory vetoes become absolute. For instance, the British House of Lords can delay
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bills for one year. Bills vetoed in this regard by the House of Lords in the last year of a
parliamentary session must be re-submitted in the next year. This requirement of
resubmission re-sets the clock in terms of the governments ability to use its legislative
authority (in this case, the Parliament Acts) to override the will of the upper chamber and
get their desired outcome.
Units of analysis corresponding to the legislative years where a veto is suspensory
will be coded with a 0, with years corresponding to an absolute veto coded with a 1. 7 I
will also include an interactive variable, multiplying veto with the year in the
parliamentary term. Because some parliamentary systems have fixed terms while many
others do not, I will code fire alarms for the time frame prior to the election where their
veto becomes absolute,8 suggesting that rumors of electoral date decision making coupled
with systemic norms of government length, will make the upper house somewhat likely
to be able to foresee when the next election will be called.
I will also include variables for the strength of the governing coalition in the
lower chamber, and a variable squaring this value, to control for Tsebelis and Moneys
theory of cameral uncertainty and impatience. In addition, I will also control for the
learning and cycling hypotheses, including a variable corresponding to year in the
legislative term and a term squaring that value.
Party Reach
7 The German Bundesrat possesses an absolute veto over two-thirds of all legislation. The Belgian Senatepossessed an absolute veto iin all policy areas between 1993-1995, and maintains an absolute veto in somepolicy areas in the years following 1995. For the veto transformation hypothesis, units of analysis fallingunder these areas are coded with a 1, all others coded with a 0. The Irish Seanad can delay legislation forsix months, and the British House of Lords can delay it for a year. As a result, votes conducted within thelast six months of the parliamentary session in the Seanad, or within the last year of the parliamentarysession within the House of Lords, will be coded with a 1.8 Votes falling within six months of the election date in Ireland, and those within one year of an election inthe House of Lords, will be coded with a 1.
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Hypothesis Two (Upper House Composition): High levels of opposition parties in the
upper house will increase levels of upper house assertion.
This value will be constructed by calculating the percentage of seats held by the
opposition in the upper house, and a second variable will be created squaring this value.
When this value is high (suggestive of alternate party control of the upper house), I
expect disagreement to be high (high roll rates). When this value is low, I expect an
earlier conclusion to bargaining between the chambers. In their model, Tsebelis and
Money (1997) do not include a variable for investigating uncertainty regarding the upper
chamber. In this model, I will control for uncertainty in the upper chamber by including a
variable squaring the percentage of members of the opposition in the upper chamber.
Hypothesis Three (Re-Selection Hypothesis):Upper houses that are dependent upon
parties in the lower house (e.g. government/national leadership) for re-selection will be
more acquiescent than those elected by other means.
This hypothesis suggests that when members of the upper house are dependent
upon the government in the lower house for re-selection (e.g. party list position, re-
appointment etc.), they will be more acquiescent, as they may view their continued
membership in the chamber as beholden to the party. Upper house members that owe
their election due to other means (e.g. lifetime appointment, or indirect
election/appointment at a different level) can afford to deviate from the party line more
often. I hypothesize that members that are elected on the basis of closed party lists or
direct election by party members will be most likely to be acquiescent (e.g. Ireland)
followed by: those elected by open lists that are created by national parties (e.g.
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Belgium),9 those elected at the sub-national level without national party involvement (e.g.
Germany), with those members that are appointed for life as being least likely to fear
sanctions from their party (e.g. Great Britain). In cases where a number of different
methods are used, I will code those cases with the selection mechanism used to elect the
majority of the members of the upper chamber. I will code members in the first category
with a 0, with each group being coded by increasing units, with lifetime appointments
being coded with a 3.
Policy Preferences:
Hypothesis Four (Preference Divergence): Greater levels of preference divergence
between the two chambers will result in greater amounts of upper house assertion.
I expect policy proposals that shift the status quo away from the ideal point of the
upper house to be more likely when the ideological bent of the government is further
away from the ideal point of the upper chamber, than when this ideological space
differential is more compact. As a result, I expect roll rates to be higher on government
bills when this ideological distance is larger. To test for this, I will use the Comparative
Manifesto Project data on party placement to determine the policy position of the median
legislator within the lower chamber (to which arguably the governing coalition responds),
and the location of the median legislator in the upper chamber on the left-right
dimension.10 Taking the absolute value of the difference between these values should
9 Despite being classified as an open list system, the quota that is required for a candidate to shift their partyranking in the Belgian system is quite high. I have decided to code Belgium differently than Ireland,
because it is theoretically possible for voters to be able to change party ranking on the list, even though it isrelatively unlikely to occur.10 Comparative Manifesto Data was not available for the final elections conducted in the four countriesincluded in this dataset. In cases where the median voter in both chambers belonged to the same political
party, this did not pose a problem. In instances where this was not the case, I have calculated the left-rightdistance between the median voters using the last election cycle included within the ComparativeManifesto Project dataset. In the case of the British House of Lords, a substantial number of peers(members of the House of Lords), hold no party affiliation, and organize themselves as the Crossbench. Forthe purposes of this study, I have calculated their ideological placement as being halfway between the
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provide some leverage on the ideological distance between the two chambers. While this
operationalization is certainly not perfect (chambers may make offers that concede some
points to members of the other chamber in return for acquiescence on other portions), it
will provide some leverage on policy preference divergence and upper house activity.
Data Analysis:
I have used probit to estimate the model, using robust standard errors. The results
of the probit estimate for the model can be found in table 2.
Table 2 Probit Estimate of Model of Upper House Assertion
Number of Observations: 50,130
Log Likelihood: -2751.62
Variable Coefficient (RobustStandard Errors)11
Lower House Strength 94(30.3)***
Lower House StrengthSquared
-83.38(26.7)***
Term -.04(.05)
Term Squared -.01(.02)
Veto .14(.08)*
Preference Difference -.002(.007)
Selection .05(.07)
Upper House Opposition 14.38(1.94)***
Upper House OppositionSquared
-9.53(1.38)***
Interactive Variable-Veto -.03(.04)
Constant -33.66(8.53)
The model as specified finds strong support for the hypothesis that as the
oppositions percentage of seats in the upper chamber grows, the upper chamber will be
more likely to be assertive, and are also consistent with Tsebelis and Moneys quadratic
Conservative party and the Labour party.11 * denotes significant at p.1, ** denotes significant at p .05 and *** denotes significant at p.01
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specification of lower house cameral impatience, however the learning and cycling
hypotheses included in their analysis are not confirmed. The coefficient added to the
model to test uncertainty over the upper houses level of patience (not included in
Tsebelis and Moneys account), is also significant. The veto hypothesis estimated using a
dummy variable for veto reaches significance in a one tailed test, but the model does not
support the veto transformation model. The sign on the coefficients for the re-selection
hypothesis is in the right direction, but does not reach significance at conventional levels.
The sign on the coefficient for the policy preferences hypotheses is neither
significant, nor is it in the direction predicted by the hypothesis. Reviewing the dataset
there are a large number of observations during the government of John Major in the
United Kingdom, with a policy preference differential that is unusually large, which may
be biasing the estimate.12 I have estimated the model after excluding observations
associated with this case, the results of which can be found in table 3:
12 Observations associated with the Major government in the House of Lords are associated with apreference differential of 29.15, a function of the ideological polarization between Labour and theConservatives at this time. It is unclear, however, that this accurately reflects the ideological position of theCrossbench. The next highest differential in the dataset is 14.725 corresponding with the Schroedergovernment (SPD) and the CDU-FDP opposition in the Bundesrat, suggesting that this case is an outlier.
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Table 3 Probit Estimate of Model of Upper House Assertion (without Major government
observations)
Number of Observations: 40,100
Log Likelihood: -2399.57
The model estimated without the
observations associated with the Major
government supports the preference
differential hypothesis (larger differences
in policy preferences are associated with
higher levels of upper house assertion), as
well as confirms the upper house
composition hypothesis (higher percentages of opposition seats are associated with higher
levels of assertion). The selection and veto transformation hypotheses are not confirmed,
although the sign for the selection hypothesis is in the expected direction. Hypotheses
relating to cameral patience and uncertainty are consistent with the model as estimated.
Conclusion
Variable Coefficient (RobustStandard Errors)
Lower House Strength 145.92(25.82)***
Lower House StrengthSquared
-129.31(22.97)***
Term -.03(-.54)
Term Squared .01(.02)
Veto -.03(.1)
Preference Difference .05(.02)***
Selection .13(.08)
Upper House Opposition 6.52(2.9)**
Upper House Opposition
Squared
-4.75(1.88)**
Interactive Variable-Veto -.08(.47)
Constant -45.66(7.54)**
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By unpacking the upper chamber, the model here uses an original dataset to
examine when upper houses use their legislative authority, investigating the effects of
veto authority, party reach, and policy preferences in explaining upper house assertion,
providing empirical testing against a wider range of cases than in previous studies. The
results support the contention that both party and policy preferences matter in
explaining responses to policy in the upper chamber, suggesting that an examination of
assertion focusing solely on one or the other overlooks important internal aspects of
decision-making in the upper chamber. Given the smaller size (in general) of upper
chambers, as well as the presence of policy areas that are considered to lie within the
upper chambers area of expertise, it seems possible that while party effects are important
to examine within the upper chamber, different electoral audiences or privileged issue
areas (areas of expertise) may shape preferences in the upper chamber differently than
they would in the lower chamber. Future research should be conducted to determine
whether or not expected relationships between party and preference models of voting
behavior that are observed in the lower house can be carried over to the upper house..
While this paper is an attempt to expand the discussion on the role of the upper
house in the policymaking process, the role of upper house authority requires further
research. This paper is confined to an explanation of assertion, which is not necessarily
the same thing as legislative power. One can think of instances where an upper chamber
could theoretically be very assertive, but they may not necessarily be powerful in terms
of shifting final policy outcomes towards their ideal point. Additionally, it may be the
case that approval of policy outcomes in certain policy areas is traded in order to obtain
approval in other policy areas.13 While the literature suggests that the presence of an
13 The debate relating to institutional reforms within the House of Lords fits this pattern. In this instance,the Blair government negotiated with groups within the House of Lords on constitutional reform, with theBlair government accepting a compromise bill on House of Lords reform in exchange for an agreement by
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upper chamber alters policy outcomes, determining how far these chambers can push
these outcomes towards their ideal point is a subject for further research.
It has also been suggested that upper chambers are using their authority with
higher frequency then has historically been the case (Patterson and Mughan, 1999). A
discussion of whether or not upper houses have become more assertive over time is an
interesting research question, but one that was not included within the scope of this paper.
As several countries debate the appropriate role that the upper house should play in the
legislative process, future research should examine whether or not upper chambers are
using their authority more frequently, and examine the consequences of increases in
upper house assertion on the policymaking process.
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