uranium: a case-study in franco-african relations

Uranium: A Case-Study in Franco-African RelationsAuthor(s): Guy MartinSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 625-640Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161112 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 27, 4 (1989), pp. 625-640

Uranium: a Case-Study in Franco- African Relations

by GUY MARTIN*

FRANCE continues to wield considerable power and influence in Africa three decades after her former colonies achieved their independence. Based on a variety of socio-economic, political, and cultural interests, many of her actions in Africa are essentially neo-colonial in so far as

they are designed to perpetuate the prevailing pattern of dominance.1

Yet, France also suffers from an almost excessive dependence on African sources for the supply of cheap minerals essential to her

economy and national defence. One of the most striking characteristics of franco-African relations

has been their unchanging nature throughout the Fifth Republic from I960 to I989. There is no doubt that an autonomous and permanent policy exists, transcending the traditional political cleavages, the various regimes, and individual leaders. The successive Governments of Charles de Gaulle, Georges Pompidou, and Valery Giscard d'Estaing have inaugurated and strengthened this African policy. Although FranCois Mitterrand had proclaimed his desire and willingness for this to be somewhat 'liberalised', his socialist regime (inaugurated in May 1981, and confirmed in May I988) found its room for manoeuvre

strictly limited by 'historical' constraints, and by the weight of economic, political, and strategic interests. Mitterrand was thus led to

manage rather than to radically transform his inheritance. In the final

analysis, it seems that it is indeed the permanence of these interlocking interests which account for such remarkable continuity,2 nowhere more

apparent than with regard to France's raw materials (and particularly nuclear) policy.

* Visiting Lecturer, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi. This is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the i4th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 28 August-i September 1988.

1 See Guy Martin, 'The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases on France's African Policy', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 23, 2, June I985, pp. i89-208, and 'France and Africa', in Robert Aldrich and John Connell (eds.), France in World Politics (London and New York, I989), pp. 101-25.

2 Jean-Francois Bayart, La Politique africaine de Franfois Mitterand (Paris, 1984) ;John Chipman, French Power in Africa (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Martin, 'The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African Policy', p. I96, and 'France and Africa', pp. 104-5.



This article is based on the assumption that a major goal of France's African policy is to ensure the free and continuing access to those

'strategic' minerals whose regular supply is absolutely vital to the

proper functioning of an atomic industry and an ambitious nuclear-

energy development programme. France currently imports most of her uranium requirements from what might be described as the franco-

phone 'core' in Africa, namely, Niger, Gabon, and the Central African

Republic, with whom she entertains a privileged relationship. This article will attempt to show that there is, indeed, a close correlation between the significance of these countries as France's major uranium

suppliers, and her heavy and continuing political, economic, and

military presence there.

STRATEGIC MINERALS AND STRUCTURAL DEPENDENCY

A number of minerals are called 'strategic' because they are vital to the functioning of the world's high-technology industries, notably in

aeronautics, nuclear energy, and defence. The actual minerals in this

category may vary from country to country depending on circum-

stances, commercial and defence priorities, and on the level of their domestic availability. However, uranium can rightly be considered as

'strategic' in so far as it is the crucial input in nuclear research and

development, an important subject of contemporary international relations.3

Admittedly, strategic minerals are available in great quantities in a number of developed countries, including Australia, Canada, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Yet, Africa remains an important source of supply for the following six: chromium, cobalt, manganese, platinum, uranium, and vanadium. Thus, Africa's share of world uranium production has typically been around 35 per cent during I981-5, slightly decreasing to about 32 per cent in I986-7.4 Furthermore, the constant modernisation of industrial production, mainly as a result of technological progress and innovation in the

developed countries, tends to increase the priority of their continuing need for certain minerals.

The phenomenon known as 'strategic dependency' arises from two sources: the physical absence of essential minerals, and the existence of uneconomic conditions for exploiting what is actually available.

3 Oye Ogunbadejo, The International Politics of Africa's Strategic Minerals (London and Westport, Conn., 1985), p. vii.

4 O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand (Paris, I988), p. 34.

626 GUY MARTIN



URANIUM: FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS

Historically, capital accumulation in the advanced capitalist economies has been accompanied by an increased reliance on foreign suppliers of

cheap raw materials.5 In the post-independence era of neo-colonialism,

apart from traditional political techniques such as interventions,

unequal treaties, and diplomatic pressures, more subtle control methods such as aid, trade, and foreign investment are being used with great effectiveness to secure control over primary commodities in the Third World.6

The structural dependency of countries in the so-called 'periphery' leads to external vulnerability and limited economic action, and is the

counterpart of the strategic dependency of the 'core'. In other words, the former are globally conditioned, in their socio-economic, political, and cultural dimensions, by the structural requirements of the more

dynamic centres of world capitalism. It should also be noted that

although strategic dependency is a major determinant of the foreign

policy of developed countries, there are great differences in degree.7 Thus, Japan and the member-states of the European Economic

Community (E.E.C.) are more heavily reliant on strategic minerals than the United States. Finally, there is no doubt that the nations of the centre generally have a greater range of options to reduce or control their dependency than do those in the periphery.

FRANCE S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND REQUIREMENTS

The energy strategy inaugurated by France in I974 was based on three main assumptions: (i) that the domestic consumption of energy would have tripled between I950 and I978, and according to official estimates would again double between 1978 and the year 2000, when it was expected to reach about 300-330 million tons of fuel-equivalent (T.F.E.); (ii) that the country's energy dependency would have increased from 30 to 75 per cent from I950 to I980, and to about 80 per cent in 1988; and (iii) that this could be reduced to less than 60 per cent

by I990 as the result of an increasing reliance on nuclear energy which, by the year 2000, should provide more than three-quarters of all French electricity requirements.8

Heraldo Munoz, 'Strategic Dependency: relations between core powers and mineral- exporting periphery countries', in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Pat McGowan (eds.), The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior (Beverley Hills and London, I98I), pp. 191-3, and Faycal Yachir, Enjeux miniers en Afrique (Paris, 1987), pp. 21-42.

6 Munoz, loc. cit. p. 93.95-6. 8 Liberation-Afrique, 'Les Particules de Giscard: l'uranium africain', in La France contre

I'Afrique Tricontinental (Paris), I, 1981, p. 141.

627



During the I98os France has pushed ahead with one of the world's most ambitious and comprehensive programmes of nuclear research and development, involving all stages of the fuel cycle, and has become a significant exporter of nuclear-power plants to, for example, Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as to some of the newly industrialising countries. Since any manufacturer of such advanced technological installations must also provide the scarce fuel for their operation, France needs to have continuing access to more natural uranium resources than those strictly necessary for her domestic requirements.9

This article is concerned only with the first stage of the nuclear fuel

cycle - i.e. the provision of uranium ore. It should be noted that reference will be made to the following categories:

(I) Reasonably Assured Resources (R.A.R.) refers to uranium that occurs in known mineral deposits that can be recovered within the given production-cost ranges, with the existing technology.

(2) Estimated Additional Resources- Category I (E.A.R.-I) refers to uranium in addition to R.A.R. that is in as yet imperfectly assessed

deposits. (3) Estimated Additional Resources Category II (E.A.R.-II) refers to

uranium in addition to E.A.R.-I that is expected to occur in deposits believed to exist in well-defined geological trends or areas of mineralisation with known deposits.

(4) Speculative Resources (S.R.) refers to uranium, in addition to E.A.R.-II, that is thought to exist, mostly on the basis of indirect evidence and geological extrapolations, in deposits discoverable with

existing exploration techniques.10

As of January 1988, France's R.A.R. uranium amounted to a total of 61,790 tons, with recovery costing up to U.S. $130 per kilogram, plus an estimated additional 37,440 tons of E.A.R.-I. French uranium

production increased from 3,246 tons in 1986 to 3,376 tons in 1987, and was estimated to have been about the same in I 988. In addition, French

uranium-production capability projections (supported by R.A.R. and E.A.R.-I at U.S. $I3o/kg or less) amounted to 3,900 tons in 1985, expected to stay around that level in I990, I995, and 2000, which

would then represent 9 per cent of the world's total. As for French reactor-related uranium requirements, they are expected to increase

9 Ibid. p. I42. 10 O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand. Summary Report (Paris, I988), p. 6.

628 GUY MARTIN




from 6,500 tons in 1988 (i.e. i6'8 per cent of the world's total) to 9,250 tons in 1990 (2I per cent), 8,800 tons in 1995 (19 per cent), 9,000 tons in 2000 (I7'6 per cent), and Io,ooo tons by 2005 (I8'I per cent).1l

In general, uranium deposits in France are small and of relatively low grade. The prospects for expansion of both resources and

production are limited, and consequently production by 1990 will only represent about one-third of France's domestic uranium requirements (the comparable figure for 1982 was about 80 per cent). With the

prospects of a heavy reliance on imported uranium to meet this

expansionary nuclear programme, French mining companies have been extremely active in overseas ventures.12 In 1984, they were involved in uranium exploration in as many as I8 countries, but by 1986 were concentrating their activities in half this number, namely: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Zaire, and Zambia.l3 Expenditures on uranium exploration in France amounted to some U.S. $64 million in 1986 and $50 million in 1988, and overseas

they totalled $I 7.59 million (23-6 per cent of the western world's total) in 1986 and $I4.36 million (23 per cent) in 1988.14

The Compagnie generale des matieres nucleaires (COGEMA), a o per cent subsidiary of the French Government's Commissariat a l'energie atomique (C.E.A.) created in 1976, is the dominant company in all

aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle in France, having taken over the Compagnie franfaise de Mokta from the IMETAL group in 1986. Other French companies with uranium mining interests are the Societe nationale Elf-Aquitaine/Production, and TOTAL-Compagnie miniere France, which controls both the Compagnie miniere Dong Trieu and the Societe centrale de l'uranium, des minerals et metaux radioactifs.15 It is interesting to note that the French pattern of uranium specialisation closely resembles the South African model, whereby exploration and production are undertaken by a consortium of mining companies, state corporations, and electricity boards from the major capitalist countries, with the aim of providing their nuclear-power reactor requirements

1 O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand. Statistical Update, i988 (Paris, I988), pp. 3-7.

12 A. D. Owen, 'The World Uranium Industry', in Raw Materials Report (Stockholm), 2, 4, I984, p. 15.

13 O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand (Paris, i986), p. I90, and ibid. i988, p. 90. 14 O.E.C.D., Statistical Update, 1988, pp. 9-o0. Four French companies are major shareholders of Canada's rich Cluff Lake deposits in Saskatchewan through Amok Ltd., namely, Compagnie franfaise de Mokta (37%), C.E.A. (30%), Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann (25%), and COGEMA (8 %). In addition, the French firm known as MINATOME completely owns the Ben Lomond Australian uranium deposits in Queensland. Owen, loc. cit. pp. io and 15. 15 O.E.C.D., Uranium, 1988, p. 89.

629



under long-term supply contracts. While the major western banks

generally co-finance these projects, the host states usually hold a share of the equity.16

Uranium has been consistently produced at levels in excess of reactor

requirements since the beginning of the industry's commercial era in the mid-I960s, thereby leading to a build-up of stocks that are estimated to be equivalent to the next three to four years of reactor

requirements. Thus, the state corporation known as Electricite de France

currently possesses emergency uranium stocks, the minimum level of which has been set at the equivalent of three year's consumption, in order to cope with any possible supply interruptions.17 While world uranium production increased from 34,900 tons in 1985 to 37,100 tons in I986, it still remained 1,200 and 2,100 tons below reactor

requirements in 1985 and i986, respectively.18

FRANCE S URANIUM POLICY IN AFRICA

As shown in Table i, Africa's total uranium production from I98I to I987 amounted to 94,o25 tons, or about 35 per cent of the world's cumulated output. In I986, the major African producers were South Africa (4,600 tons), Namibia (3,300 tons), Niger (3, IO tons), and Gabon (900 tons). Since there is no nuclear industry yet in the continent (except in South Africa), the bulk of the uranium mined has been exported to the various nuclear powers, notably to France, whose

imports from Africa amounted to 7,460 tons (i.e. 68-6 per cent of total

imports) in 1984, 6,8io tons (46 per cent) in 1985, and 6,048 tons (38'5 per cent) in 1986. In that year, France's major uranium suppliers were

Niger (3,708 tons), South Africa/Namibia (I,20I tons), and Gabon

(I,039 tons).1l Africa's total uranium exports amounted in 1980 to

17,000 tons, representing 76 per cent of the world's total, and according to O.E.C.D. estimates, these will amount to 23,000 tons (i.e. 50 per cent of the world's exports) in i990.2o The role played by this small handful of African countries in the production and export of uranium is even more decisive when viewed against the background of franco-African relations. Before analysing France's relations with Gabon, Niger, and the C.A.R. in that context, some observations on her ambiguous trade with South Africa and Namibia are in order.

16 Yachir, Enjeux miniers en Afrique, p. 36. 17 O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand, I988, p. 93. 18

O.E.C.D., Summary Report, I988, p. 9. 19 Secretariat du Comite monetaire de la zone franc (Comozof), La Zone franc: rapport, i986

(Paris, I986), p. 359. 20 Liberation-Afrique, loc. cit. p. I43.

630 GUY MARTIN




TABLE I

France's and Africa's Uranium Production, I98I-7

Tons

I98I I982 1983 1984 I985 I986 I987 Total

France 2,552 2,859 3,271 3, 68 3,I89 3,247 3,376 21,662

Gabon 1,022 970 i,oo6 918 940a 9ooa 90oa 6,656 Namibia 3,971 3,776 3,7I9 3,700a 3,40oo 3,300" 3,200" 25,066

Niger 4,363 4,259 3,426 3,275 3,I8I 3, I10 2,960 24,575 South Africa 6,131 5,8I6 6,o6o 5,72I 4,9ooa 4,600" 4,500a 37,728

Total Africa I5,487 I4,82I 14,211 13,615 12,421 II,9IO I ,560 94,025

World Total 44,167 41,426 36,871 38,80I 34,935 37, 12 35,557 268,869

Africa as % of World Total 35'o6 35'78 38'54 35'09 35'55 32'09 32-51 34'97

Sources: O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand, 1988, p. 34, and Statistical Update, I988, p. 5.

a O.E.C.D. Secretariat estimates.

I. France and South Africa/JNaamibia

While the French Government officially condemns the apartheid policy of institutionalised racial segregation stubbornly pursued by successive Afrikaner regimes, economic and trade relations between the two countries continue to flourish. France signed an uranium purchase agreement with South Africa in I964, and it was revealed the following year that the C.E.A. was helping to train a number of South African

engineers and technicians in nuclear technology. In I967, a further French purchase of South African uranium amounting to Ri4 million was publicised,21 and in I977, COGEMA signed a contract with Randfontein Estates that authorised the annual purchase of I,ooo tons of uranium during the next ten years at a price well below the

prevailing market rate.22 South Africa re-imports in an enriched form some of the uranium currently supplied to France.

In 1976, France agreed to build a nuclear power plant at Koeberg, and the FRAMATOME, Alsthom, Spie-Batignolles, and E.D.F. consortium was able to complete the first reactor in I981, while a

21 Bernard Taillefer, Le Dernier rempart: France-Afrique du Sud (Paris 98, 80) pp. i96-7. 22 Ibid. pp. i96-202, and Sophie Passebois, 'Total: le carhurant de l'apartheid', in Apartheid

Non (Paris), 64, November 1986, pp. 42-3.

631



second became operational in I985. These most profitable contracts, estimated at over 5,000 million FF, were awarded to French (rather than to American or Dutch) firms on political grounds.

In Namibia, the British company Rio Tinto-Zinc has played a

leading role since I975 in the exploitation at Rossing of the world's

largest uranium mine, with a regular annual production of 5,000 tons of uranium oxide since April I979.23 As early as I970, a subsidiary of

TOTAL/C.F.P. acquired a Io per cent share in this mine,24 thereby making France one of the beneficiaries of profitable long-term uranium

supply contracts since TOTAL/C.F.P. is entitled to 15,000 tons of uranium oxide from I977 to I990. COMURHEX, a subsidiary of

Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlmann, is the main consumer of this uranium, with a contract for I,000 tons during the same period.25

Thus, France continues to entertain close and highly profitable economic relations with Pretoria, in blatant violation of the U.N. General Assembly's Resolution of 27 October 1966, which declared South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia illegal, and also of Decree No. I of 13 December I974 for the Protection of the Natural Resources of Namibia.26 Evidently, in this case, French national interests prevail over international law and moral considerations, while

surprisingly little regard has been given to the opinion and feelings of France's privileged African partners.

2. France and Gabon

Gabon is still very much a neo-colonial enclave, in which a wide

range of French interests prevail.27 Their 1974 Accord de Cooperation

stipulates that Gabon will provide uranium, thorium, lithium, beryllium, and helium on a priority basis. These, as well as oil and gas, are classified as 'strategic raw materials' which, according to the Accords de Defense signed with certain francophone African states, must be made readily available to France, and restricted to third countries, as required by 'the interests of common defence'.28 As Pierre Pean

rightly observes, 'France has complete mastery over the Gabonese

resources, and Gabon has been officially made into a French preserve

23 Ogunbadejo, op. cit. pp. 63-8, and Alun Roberts, The Rossing File (London, I980), published by the Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract.

24 Taillefer, op. cit. p. I98. 25 Passebois, loc. cit. p. 75.

26 Cf. ibid. pp. 73-5. 27 Pierre Pean, Affaires africaines (Paris, 1983), p. 20, and Michael C. Reed, 'Gabon: a neo-

colonial enclave of enduring French interest', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 2, June I987, pp. 283-320. 28 Martin, 'France and Africa', pp. 105-7.

632 GUY MARTIN




of raw materials'.29 Economic relations between the two countries remain very close. Thus, in 1987, France took 36'4 per cent of Gabon's

exports, valued at U.S. $465'6 million, and supplied 53'5 per cent of its

imports at a cost of $40oII million.30 Similarly, in 1985, French aid to Gabon amounted to $ I40-7 million, or virtually 70 per cent of the total bilateral amount received by that country.31 Under defence and technical military assistance agreements with Gabon that date back to

1960, France seems to have more or less 'permanently' stationed some 600 troops in that country, as well as over Ioo military advisers.32

Uranium exploration in Gabon began in I947 on the initiative of the French C.E.A., leading to the discovery of the Mounana dep6sits in

I956. The Compagnie des mines d'uranium de Franceville (COMUF) was formed in 1958, and is currently still the only uranium producer in Gabon.33 During 1985 three groups, which between them held concessions that amounted to 21,350 square kilometres, were active in uranium exploration, namely: (i) COMUF in the Mounana/ Franceville area, which had spent $1,897 million the previous year; (ii) the Leyou North Joint-Venture (Government of Gabon, COGEMA, and Korea Electric Power Corporation), which had spent U.S. $2,o85 million; and (iii) the Franceville-South Joint-Venture operated by COGEMA (49 per cent), Urangesellschaft (25 per cent), COMUF (I6 per cent), and the Government of Gabon (IO per cent).34

The production of uranium concentrates was 918 tons in I984, 940 in 1985, and 900 in 1986 and I987. During the same years, exports to France annually averaged around I,Ioo tons.35 The Mounana deposits are now exhausted, and mining is currently in progress in Mikou-

loungou, Boyindzi, Oklo, and Okelobondo.36 The short-term production capability from known resources and existing plants is I,500 tons per year for the io-year period I985-95.

A yellowcake plant started operations in I978, prior to which all ore was shipped to France, which remains the dominant buyer, with small

29 Pean, op. cit. pp. 42-3. 30 I.M.F., Direction of Trade Statistics: Yearbook 1988 (Washington, D.C., 1988), p. I85. 31 O.E.C.D., Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries (Paris, I987), p.

I o4. 32 John Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security (London, i985), published by the

International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 201, pp. 24-5 and 50. Also Chipman, French Power in Africa, p. 147.

33 COMUF is jointly owned by the Government of Gabon (24-75 %) and by a consortium of French companies (7I'79%) that include Compagnie franfaise de Mokta (39'98%/), COGEMA (I188I %), and MINATOME (I3 %). Owen, loc. cit. p. I6.

34 O.E.C.D., Uranium, 1986, pp. I99-20I. 35 Comozof, La Zone franc, 1986, p. 359, and ibid. i987, pp. 387-8. 36 O.E.C.D., Uranium, 1986, pp. 20I-2.

633



amounts being sent to Italy and Japan. Infrastructural problems cause the ore to be of relatively high cost. The Government of Gabon

provides incentives for uranium exploration in the form of total

exemption from import duties on equipment and machinery, as well as deferred write-offs of expenditures against later earnings.

Two main facts emerge from the above survey. The first is that French firms hold majority shares in all uranium exploration and

exploitation ventures in Gabon - 7 I8 per cent in COMUF and 65 per cent in Franceville-South. The second is that Gabon seems content with being merely a junior partner in the various uranium joint- ventures- 24-75 per cent in COMUF and io per cent in Franceville- South. Thus, with only relatively minor German and Korean interests, uranium exploration and production activities in Gabon, which are

quite substantial by world standards, remain firmly controlled by various French public and private interests.

3. France and Niger

Niger may also be described as a neo-colonial enclave dominated by French political, economic, cultural, and strategic interests.37 Thus, as in Gabon, the April 1961 Accord de Defense included the requirement that Niger should supply France with uranium, along with other

strategic minerals, on a priority basis. In the area of security, the technical assistance agreement signed in I977 included an arrangement whereby the Niger Government would benefit from the

continuing presence of French military advisers, and they numbered around 60 throughout the 9g8os.38 Meanwhile the two countries have retained their preferential economic relationship. Thus, in I987, France took 82'2 per cent of Niger's exports, valued at U.S. $339-09 million, and supplied 34'3 per cent of its imports at a cost of $121 85 million.39 Similarly, French aid in 1985 amounted to $44'7 million, i.e.

23'4 per cent of Niger's total bilateral aid.40 The search for uranium in Niger was started in the mid- 95os by the

French C.E.A., and its discovery in the Arlit region in I965 led to further development work and the formation in 1968 of the Societe des mines de l'Air (SOMAIR). This was followed by an exploration programme to the southwest of Arlit, and in I972 the Akouta deposit

37 Richard Higgott, 'Structural Dependence and Decolonisation in a West African Land- Locked State: Niger', in Review of African Political Economy (Sheffield), 7, January-April 1980, pp. 387-8. 38 Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, pp. 24-5.

39 I.M.F., Yearbook, 1988, p. 303. 40 O.E.C.D., Geographical Distribution, p. i80.

634 GUY MARTIN




was confirmed. Hence the formation two years later of the Compagnie miniere d'Akouta (COMINAK), which started mining operations in

1978, and thereafter reported the existence of a further 15,000 tons of ore in Akola during I983-4. The discovery of more uranium has

precipitated the creation of several major joint-ventures. For example, the Societ miniere de Tassa ' Taghalgue (S.M.T.T.) was formed in 1979 to exploit deposits in Arni, although prospecting activities slowed down

during 1981-2, and some concessions were cancelled.41 The exploration, production, and marketing of minerals within

Niger is the responsibility of the Office national des ressources minieres

(ONAREM). Created in I974, this state enterprise is able to participate on a commercial basis in all companies or groups working in this field, and currently controls about one-third of the country's uranium

output. France, through COGEMA and MINATOME, has a 53'92 per cent share in SOMAIR's Arlit project, a 34 per cent share in COMINAK's Akouta project, and a 33 per cent share in S.M.T.T.'s Arni project.42 COGEMA and ONAREM are continuing work in connection with deposits at Imouraren and Afasto-West in collab- oration with CONOCO and OURD, respectively, while ONAREM is involved also in concessions at Abkrorum Azelik (with IRSA) and at Sekiret (with P.N.C.), where about 4,000 tons have been discovered. In March 982, the Afasto-West partners revealed the existence of

deposits of 25,000 tons R.A.R. and 60,ooo tons of E.A.R.-I. Five of the six companies involved in Niger's major on-going uranium projects are

foreign-based, between them holding concessions that total nearly I0,OO square kilometres.43

As of January 1987, Niger had I73,706 tons of uranium R.A.R. and

283,600 tons of E.A.R.-I, both resources estimated to be recoverable at costs of up to U.S. $80 per kilogram. Production of uranium concentrates reached 3,276 tons in 1984, 3,1 8 tons in 1985, 3, I 0 tons in 1986, and an estimated 2,960 tons in I987.44 During the same years, exports to France ranged annually between 3,700 and 5,600 tons.45 To the extent that substantial expenses are incurred by transporting uranium to its overseas markets, as well as by importing fuel and mining equipment, Niger is regarded as a high-cost producer.46

Once again it is the French that control both the exploration for, and production of, uranium. For one thing, SOMAIR is wholly owned by

41 O.E.C.D., Uranium, 1986, pp. 270-2. 42 Owen, loc. cit. pp. I7-I8. 43 O.E.C.D., Uranium, 1988, pp. I24-8. 44 Ibid. pp. 125-6. 45 Comozof, La Zone franc, 1986, p. 359, and i987, p. 352. 46 Owen, loc. cit. p. I8.

635



GUY MARTIN

France, since Niger's share of its capital was financed through a loan from the Caisse centrale de cooperation economique (C.C.C.E.), the French aid agency. While all the substantial albeit undisclosed profits from the

exploitation of Niger's rich uranium mining estates accrue to French

firms, the Government receives only C.F.A. I,OOO million a year in

royalties. Starting in I971, France has progressively brought in a number of western partners in joint-venture agreements, notably Italy (AGIP), West Germany (Urangesellschaft), Spain (ENUSA), and Japan (OURD). However, this diversification, as well as SONAREM's increased share in SOMAIR (33 per cent in I974), does not in any way affect the predominance of French influence in the uranium sector. In

any event, Niger is bound to sell its production to France on a priority basis.47

The Niger President's long and unsuccessful struggle to obtain a better uranium deal has been abundantly documented by Jacques Baulin.48 Soon after the discovery of the Arlit deposits in 1959 by the French C.E.A. and the Bureau de recherches geologiques et minieres

(B.R.G.M.), Hamani Diori started to press Niger's case for a more favourable uranium deal from the French Government, but met with little or no sympathy. In I967, Diori complained to Paris about C.E.A.'s attempt to obtain Ioo,ooo shares of SOMAIR on a

complimentary basis, only to receive a reply from Jacques Foccart, then the French President's adviser on African affairs, that 'any modification of the agreement already signed would seriously jeop- ardise the setting up of SOMAIR', which amounted to a veiled threat that Diori should unconditionally accept C.E.A.'s request.49 In fact, co-

operation between France and Niger in the uranium sector has taken

place in the context of rising tensions, depending on time and

personalities. Following an agreement signed in November 1968, the newly

established Commission franco-nigerienne de l'uranium (C.F.N.U.) met several times between February 1969 and October i974.50 However, throughout this period the C.E.A.'s rather heavy-handed, haughty, and disdainful attitude towards Niger's point of view found substantial

support in French government circles. While Diori insisted that a final decision needed to be taken at the highest state-to-state level because of uranium's strategic significance for France, C.E.A. officials kept arguing in terms of exploitation costs, world market prices, and profit

47 Liberation-Afrique, loc. cit. pp. I46-9. 48 See Jacques Baulin, Conseiller du President Diori (Paris, 1986), pp. IOI-I9.

Ibid. pp. I02-3. 50 Ibid. p. 105.

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URANIUM: FRANCO-AFRICAN RELATIONS 637

margins. The dramatic increase in the price of oil during I973-4 meant that the struggle over the price of uranium took on added urgency and a distinctly political dimension. Indeed, the French authorities made much of the fact that Niger's sales of uranium did benefit, in fact, from a 'political price' that was higher than the average market rate of

FF26,250 per ton. However, according to calculations made by Nigerien experts after taking into account the factor of energy equivalence, the price per ton of uranium concentrates ought to have been anywhere between FF35,ooo and IIo,ooo.51

In March 1974, representatives from France, Niger, and Gabon met in Niamey in order to discuss the demand and supply of uranium, but due to the refusal of the French delegation to consider any price increase for producers, it was agreed that negotiations should be

adjourned and resumed the following month. It is hard to believe that it was a complete coincidence that President Diori was overthrown by a military coup d'etat just 72 hours prior to the resumption of these

tripartite negotiations, and a mere 48 hours before Diori was due to leave for New York, where he was scheduled to address the U.N. General Assembly on the subject of raw materials.

4. France and the Central African Republic

The heavy French military and administrative presence in the C.A.R. since September I979 means that it is as neo-colonial in character as Gabon and Niger. As regards trade with the C.A.R., in

1987 France took i6'8 per cent of its exports, valued at U.S. $I5'5I million, and supplied 52'4 per cent of its imports, valued at $65 io million.52 Of the total bilateral aid received by the C.A.R. in 1985, the French contribution amounted to $50'9 million, namely 77'6 per cent.53 As a result of the defence and assistance agreements that were concluded in I960, France continues to exercise her rights and/or obligations by stationing in the C.A.R. a number of troops and military advisers, reported in 1985 to be as many as 2,500 and 78, respectively.54

As in Gabon and Niger, all explorations for uranium in the C.A.R. are strictly controlled by French public and private interests. Although the search began in I947, it was not until C.E.A.'s exploratory work had been restarted, and intensified over I years later at Patou/ Bakouma, that workable deposits were located in I96I. However, the

51 Ibid. p. I12. 52 I.M.F., Yearbook, 1988, p. I30.

53 O.E.C.D., Geographical Distribution, p. 70. 54 Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, pp. 24-5 and 50.



GUY MARTIN

Compagnie des mines d'uranium de Bakouma (URBA) set up by the Government in I969 as the outcome of a partnership between the C.E.A. and the Compagniefranfaise pour le minerai d'uranium (C.F.M.U.), ceased its activities in I971. There were more disappointments to

follow, because the Compagnie centrafricaine de l'uranium (URCA) that had been set up between Alusuisse and the three original partners of URBA in I975 concluded that the deposits were non-economical at

prevailing prices and, in 1978, the project was abandoned. The C.A.R.

reports that i6,ooo tons of R.A.R. uranium have been located in the Bakouma district, recoverable at costs below U.S. $130 per kilo.55

CONCLUSION

To the extent that France suffers from 'strategic dependency' on a few francophone states, it can be maintained that the supply of uranium is a major determinant of her African policy behaviour. On the other hand, they find themselves in an even more disadvantageous situation of'structural dependency', since their own socio-economic, political, and cultural developments remain essentially conditioned by French requirements. Nowhere is their vulnerability more evident than in the case of la zonefranc, a monetary co-operation arrangement which enables France to control the issuance and circulation of currency in her former African colonies, as well as their monetary and financial

regulations, banking activities, credit allocations and, ultimately, budgetary, and economic policies.56 As for the continuing deployment of French troops and military advisers in several francophone states, this seems to be essentially designed to integrate them into the Western alliance, in which France enjoys the status of a junior partner vis-a-vis America,57 not to mention providing the opportunity for occasional armed interventions in the continent.

The ongoing contribution being made by the francophone states in Africa to the continuing prosperity of the French economy is much

greater than a mere survey of their production and export data would indicate. In particular it is noteworthy that Niger and Gabon alone

provided between 33 and 36 per cent of all French uranium imports between 1985 and I987.58 While C.E.A. and COGEMA in the French

55 O.E.C.D., Uranium, 1986, pp. I55-7. 56 Guy Martin, 'The Franc Zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa', in Third World Quarterly (London), 8, i, January 1986, pp. 205-35.

57 Martin, 'The Historical, Economic, and Political Bases of France's African Policy', pp. 206-7, and 'France and Africa', pp. 115-17. 58 Comozof, op. cit. 1987, p. 352.

638




public sector undertake all uranium exploration and exploitation in

Africa, private consortiums such as FRAMATOME and MINA- TOME reap the dividends of these activities.

At this point, it might be appropriate to quote at length from the

1986 report of the O.E.C.D. experts who analysed the short- and long- term prospects of uranium supply and demand:

Since the beginning of the commercial era in the mid-g60os, the uranium industry has consistently produced at levels in excess of reactor requirements ... In I985, while production capability is still above demand, actual production is estimated at 35,000 tonnes U, slightly below estimated reactor requirements... uranium production capabilities are projected to be fairly stable over the next ten years... Available data indicate a downward trend in uranium prices in terms of US dollars over the reporting period...

However, most uranium continues to be delivered under medium to long-term contracts at an average price of around US $30/lb U3 o8, very roughly twice the level of current prices on the spot market... Analysing the uranium supply and demand situation... up to 2025 ... it should be possible to make sufficient uranium available to meet the most likely levels of demand over the time frame considered ...

However... it will be necessary to realize much of the uranium potential reflected currently as estimates in the EAR-II and Speculative Resources categories, in order to support the required additional production capability. This will require extensive exploration activity. Thus, there should not be complacency about the long-term availability of uranium... Appropriate market incentives and forward planning will be necessary to ensure that adequate levels of exploration are maintained and that new production centres are developed to meet future requirements. Also, possible future political factors could cause disruptions of supplies. For security of supply reasons, some countries may choose to diversify sources of supply (my emphasis added).59

The last sentence may be taken to refer, inter alia, to the possibility that majority rule in South Africa and Namibia under 'hostile' regimes might lead to a disruption of uranium supplies to the West in general, and to France in particular. In such an eventuality it would be

necessary to turn to the more 'dependable' African suppliers, and hence the highly diversified uranium exploration activities of the French mining companies already mentioned, that involved a total

expenditure of U.S. $366-2 million during the period I979 to 1987.60 What, then, will be the significance of uranium in the context of the

evolving pattern of franco-African relations? There is no doubt that France is heavily dependent on African

sources for a number of cheap minerals essential to her economy and

59 O.E.C.D., Uranium: resources, production and demand. Overview (Paris, 1986), pp. I4-23. 60 O.E.C.D., Uranium, Io86, p. I80, and io88. D. qo.

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national defence. The knowledge that France's large atomic-energy industry cannot function without regular supplies of uranium provides the main explanation for her heavy and continuing political, economic, and military presence in Niger, Gabon, and the C.A.R.61 Thus, their structural dependency is the counterpart of France's strategic de-

pendency, and both types are intimately linked to the evolution and

organisation of the world capitalist system. Yet, to the extent that Namibia and South Africa are also important

sources of uranium for France, political changes there are bound to affect the overall pattern of her strategic dependency on African

supplies for this strategic mineral. After the current U.N.-sponsored independence process in Namibia has been completed in April I990,

and bearing in mind the slow but steady process of political change now

unfolding in South Africa, what are France's prospects for a regular and continuous supply of uranium?

Recent political statements by the leaders of the South West Africa

People's Organisation (Swapo) seem to indicate that a future regime in Windhoek will, at least for some time, maintain the present heavily South African-dominated Namibian economic system. This means, inter alia, that production at the Rossing mine will continue at the current level of 5,000 tons of uranium oxide per year, and that the

supply contract of TOTAL/C.F.P. and COMURHEX will probably not be adversely affected. The objectives and strategy of these French firms with respect to the renegotiation of these contracts with the new Namibian Government in 1990 is a matter for speculation. In any event, there is no doubt that uranium will remain a significant factor in franco-African relations for the foreseeable future, and that it will continue to determine the pace and degree of change in the

strategic/structural dependency pattern that now prevails.

61 Cf. Chipman's conclusion in French Power in Africa, p. 163, that 'political relations with countries such as Niger and Gabon are maintained in part to ensure the continued supply of uranium to France'.

640 GUY MARTIN



uranium: a case-study in franco-african relations

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