Nadia Urbinati (Columbia University)

The Popul is t Phenomenon

University of Chicago -- Political Theory Workshop

March 3rd, 2014

Populism1 is an imprecise concept that may be rendered as bringing politics to the people and

'the people to politics'.2 Its intrinsic vagueness is exacerbated by its usage in everyday politics as a label

to denote a diffuse negative judgment by the people of the performance of representative democracy,

elected politicians and governments.3 In this paper I will present populism as a phenomenon that is

parasitical on (because internal to) representative democracy, which is its true and radical target.4 This

rivalry, I argue, does not necessarily produce more democratic politics, although this is populism's

claim. As for its phenomenology, populism is a certain political style or set of rhetorical tropes and

figures, yet is more than that because it seeks also state power to implement a political agenda whose

main and recognizable character is hostility against liberalism and the principles of constitutional

democracy, in particular minority rights, division of powers, and party pluralism. Although we simply

do not have anything like a theory of populism,5 in this article I propose the following generalization

from historical experience: a populist movement that succeeds in leading the government of a

democratic society tend to move toward institutional forms and a political reorganization of the state

that change, and even shatter constitutional democracy, like centralization of power, weakening of

checks and balances, disregard of political oppositions, and the transformation of election in a

plebiscite of the leader. Populisms polarized view of the political community resonates with the

republican tradition in the Roman format, more than it does with democracy. I regard this point as

relevant (although not studied)6 in order to grasp the anti-individualistic meaning of the appeal to the

1 This article is a synthesis of chapter 3 of Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth and the People, forthcoming for

Harvard University Press. 2 Margaret Canovan, Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy, in Democracies and

the Populist Challenge, ed. Yves Mny and Yves Surel (Oxford: Palgrave 2002), 26. 3 Yves Mny and Yves Surel, The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism, in Democracies and the Populist Challenge,

1-20. 4 This paper is a synthesis of chapter three of my book manuscript titled, Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and

the People to be published by Harvard University Press. 5 Jan-Werner Mueller, Getting a Grip on Populism, Dissentmagazine.org, September 23, 2011. 6 I discuss the differences between republicanism in the Roman tradition and democracy in Competing for Liberty: The Republican Critique of Democracy, American Political Science Review 106 (2012): 607-21. Some theorists propose to derive populism from the modern continental doctrine of popular sovereignty; see for instance Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),

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people.7

The interpretation I advance is inspired by Norberto Bobbios criticism of populism, Margaret

Canovan's interpretation of it as an ideology, and Benjamin Ariditis analysis of its manifestation in the

space of politics. Like Bobbio, I situate populism within representative democracy not simply

democracy, and argue that its critical and sometime dramatic questioning of the procedures and

institutions of representative and constitutional democracy turns out to be hardly an enrichment of

democracy.8 As with demagoguery for ancient direct democracy, although is not itself a breach of

democracy, populism may, if successful, open the door to an exit from democracy. Like Canovan, I take

populism to be an ideology of the people that, although in communication with the democratic

language, is in sharp contrast with practical democracy, that is to say the political activity of ordinary

citizens.9 Like Arditi, I read populism as a permanent possibility within representative democracy

because it is endogenous to the ideological style of politics that elections feed in promoting the struggle

for voting and positions.10 But before developing my argument, I need to clarify upfront the way in

which I use this term in relation to popular movements.

Popular Movements and Populism

I do not treat populism as the same with popular movements or what is popular. Populism

is something else and different, and the characteristics I am going to analyze are meant to show why

this is so. As a preview of the distinction between popular movement and populism, it may be helpful

to consider the two most recent movements in American politics, Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party.

The Occupy Wall Street slogan "We are the 99%" fits inside the formal sketch of populist discourse as

polarization between the many and the few and contestation of representative institutions (two

important components of populism). Yet it does not fit with the populist view of democracy I intend

to analyze (and criticize) because is headless and not organized so as to conquer political power at

government level. I do realize that empirical political phenomena operate in a shaky terrain and are

refractory to generalizations; I do not thus disclaim that some fluidity is possible between popular

movement and populism so that clear-cut distinctions may be problematic. However without the

presence of a leader or a centralized leadership that seeks control of the majority a popular movement

202; this interpretation deserves of course to be explored, although we should recall that the intellectual context of the doctrine of popular sovereignty (as of republicanism) is the Roman law. 7In this paper I will use some of the ideas I proposed in "Democracy and Populism," Constellations 5 (1998):110-24. 8 By Norberto Bobbio see: Saggi sulla Scienza Politica in Italia (Bari: Laterza, 1969); Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature an Limits of State Power, ed. John Keane. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989);

Autobriografia, ed. Alberto Papuzzi (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1997). 9 Canovan, Taking Politics to the People, 39. By Margaret Canovan see also Trust the people! Populism and

the two faces of democracy, Political Studies 9 (1999): 2-16. 10 Benjamin Arditi, Politics on the Edge of Liberalism: Difference, Populism, Revolution, Agitation (Edinburg: Edinburg

University Press, 2008).

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that has a populist rhetoric (i.e. polarization and anti-representative discourse) is not yet populism. The

case of the Tea Party may be used to prove this by default. This is a movement that has many populist

components in its ideology and rhetoric, but lacks a vertical and unified structure which instead, as we

shall see, characterizes populism.11 Yet this lack seems accidental more than premeditated since the Tea

Party was and still is in search of a unifying and representative leader able to conquest and to change the

Republican Party and the country. Unlike Occupy Wall Street thus, since it was born the Tea Party

wanted to be more than a movement of protest.

I would thus say that there is a populist rhetoric yet not populism when the polarizing and

anti-representative discourse is made by a social movement that wants to be a constituency independent

of elected officials, resist becoming an elected entity, and keep elected officials accountable and under

scrutiny: this is the case of a popular movement of contestation and protest like Occupy Wall Street.

And there is a populist rhetoric and populism when a movement does not want to be a constituency

independent of the elected officials but wants instead to occupy the representative institutions and win

the majority in order to model the entire society to its ideology:12 this might be the case of the Tea

Party, a movement with a populist project of power.

In synthesis, a workable definition of populism would need to start analyzing popular

movements in their status nascendi or as movements or set of demands on behalf of self-designated

subjugated groups defining themselves in opposition to what they consider a privileged class. One

might also argue that there are three paths for them to go: 1) The outside route, developing into a

movement that stays outside of conventional politics, and may become revolutionary; 2) The

conventional inside route, which involves changing to a party and competing for office in the legislature

and the executive; and 3) The third way is to actively engage in politics, but not in the legislature-

elections way, but in the web of interactions that we sometimes call lobbying, sometimes popular

participation, sometimes confrontation, ranging from strikes to becoming involved in non-profit and

research groups. This is where the explosion of decision networks has taken over a lot of deliberation,

interest conflict and moral conflict. Popular groups, if they take that route (which is what Occupy Wall

Street did) become 'pluralistic' and participate in politics without going the conventional election and

legislature route, nor the revolutionary one. Yet populism as I try to define it belongs to path 2).

Thus I would say that for populism to pass from movement to government it needs not only

an organic polarizing ideology but also a leader that wants to transform popular distress and protest in 11 For an excellent, rich and well documented analysis of the Tea Party see Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol,

and John Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, Perspectives on Politics, vol. 9 n. 1 (2011): 25-43.

12 The Tea Party has some clear proposals (from social security to taxation) and seeks to revitalize or reshape the Republican Party: we should regard the Tea Party as a new variant of conservative mobilization and intra-Republican party factionalism, a dynamic, loosely-knit, and not easily controlled formation of activists, funders, and media personalities that draws upon and refocuses longstanding social attitudes about federal social programs, spending, and taxation; Skocpol and Coggin, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 37.

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a strategy for mobilizing the masses toward the conquest of the democratic government, and finally an

organized party that can actualize that ideology and leaders plan to power. Without an organizing

narrative and a leadership claiming its people to be the true expression of the people as a whole, a

popular movement remains very much what it is: a sacrosanct movement of protest and contestation

against a trend in society that betrays some basic democratic principles, and in particular equality. Yet

populism is more than populist rhetoric and political protest. Distinction between movement form and

system form is thus essential to analyze populism.

In what follows I acknowledge these two levels and direct my attention to the examination of

the characteristics and implications of populism as a conception and a form of power within a

representative democracy system. In a democratic society, a popular movement of protest or criticism

should not be confused or identified with a populist conception of state power. The former is

consistent with the diarchic nature of representative democracy (procedures relaying on suffrage as the

source of an authoritative power and opinion as indirect power of influencing decisions through a

broad network of judgment); the other deems diarchy an obstacle because it wants to keep the opinion

of the people separate from the authoritative power of the institutions. Populism is a project of state

power whose aspiration is to make the opinion of the majority of the people identical with the

authority of the sovereign state, in fact to makes its leaders and elected officials use the state to favor,

consolidate and extend their constituency.13 In this paper I will focus on this specific phenomenon.

An Ambiguous Concept?

Having clarified the limits and the domain in relation to which the term is used, I can pursue in

my argument and sketch first of all the historical context within which populism was born because this

context has been, and still is, an important variable in evaluating populism. And the distance between

European and American scholars in interpreting it is an important example of the persisting ambiguity

of its meaning.

American historian Michael Kazin considers populism a democratic expression of political life

that is needed from time to time to rebalance the distribution of political power for the benefit of the

majority. Through the vehicle of populism, American citizens "have been able to protest social and

economic inequalities without calling the entire system into question."14 Ralph Waldo Emerson wrote

famously in mid-nineteenth century: March without the people, and you march into the night.15

Consistently with this maxim, the historians Gordon Wood, Harry S. Stout and Alain Heimert

interpreted the Great Awakening of the mid-eighteenth century as the first example of American

democratic populism, a "new form of mass communication" thanks to which "people were encouraged

13 I would like to express my gratitude to Ian Zuckerman for inviting me to reflect upon this distinction. 14 Michael Kazin, The Populist Passion. An American History (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 2. 15 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Power, in The Complete Writings (New York: Wise & Co., 1929), 541.

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-- even commanded -- to speak out."16 Jonathan Edwards's followers, Heimert explained, translated the

abstract language of both liberal and republican intellectual elites into their own language, one made up

of religious symbols and biblical allegories, against professional theologians and political leaders as

well.17 Populism was born as a denunciation of the newly implemented republic, its intellectuals and

representative government. In that early denunciation the basic populist language was de facto coined.

A powerful allegation of that early form of populism was that democracy (but in fact popular

government as I shall soon explain) holds an instinctive anti-intellectualist vocation in so far as it

rejects linguistic styles and postures that are distant from those that the people share and practice in

their everyday life. Intellectualism or indirect language was thus opposed to popular or direct style of

expression. The same dualism was applied to politics as a collective action that was made either by

indirect means (institutions and procedures) or direct expressions of popular opinions. These dualist

couples resurfaced periodically and became the primum movens of populism. The platform of the

People's Party of 1892 was forged out of the binary logic opposing the plain language of crop

producers to the sophisticate language of the financiers and the politicians.18 Polarization as a

simplification of social pluralism into two broad factions the popolo and the grandi was since its inception

the main character of populism, its Roman feature.

American history seems also to show that populism, both as political rhetoric and as a political

movement, has been seen as a viable form of a collective expression of resentment against the

domestic enemies of the people. Its hidden force was contained in the belief of an alleged purity of

the origins of popular government and its adulteration by the artificial complexity of civilization and

the sophisticated institutional organization of the state.19 As the believers in the Great Awakening

aimed at an emancipation of religion from the established churches in the name of a religious purity, so

the People's Party of late nineteenth century claimed the emancipation of the nation from "money

power" (artificial) in the name of property and labor (natural). Directness vs. indirectness paralleled nature vs.

artifice, and popular movements vs. institutional politics. When and if politics takes indirect modes it risks

becoming anti-popular: in America history, this was, since the beginning of the republic, the basic

message of populist ideology, and the reason of its attraction on democrats. It is interesting to notice

that populism as a positive movement of elite opposition by the people was born within the ideological

and institutional frame of a republic.

This line of thought deserves to be pursued: in this paper I suggest that populism can be seen

as an interpretation of democracy made from within a republican structure and perspective of

16 Harry S. Stout, The New England Soul. Preaching and Religious Culture in Colonial New England (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 19394. 17 Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 1215. 18Richard Hofstadter, North America, in Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics, ed. Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 1618. 19 Gino Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978);

Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics (New York: Norton, 1991).

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government and politics. Popular government is its reference point, rather than democracy.

Based on the American experience scholars have proposed to advance the idea that the

difference between "good" and "bad" populism is one between a sincere democratic faith and an

instrumental faith like a thermometer populism would thus measure the tenor of democracy in a

given society. This scheme returns in the work of the most representative scholars of populism,

supporters and critics as well. Peter Worsley proposes populism and elitism as the two extreme poles of

the continuum of politics, whose democratic tenor is like a pendulum from the former (more

democracy) to the latter (less democracy).20 Margaret Canovan suggests we read populism as politics

of faith that aims at emending normal politics of its unavoidable skeptical and pragmatic mood. The

same insight shapes Ernesto Laclau's interpretation of populist movements in Latin America as

processes of hegemonic re-balancing within the power bloc attained through the incorporation of the

popular-democratic ideology of the masses. Laclau, perhaps the scholar who has produced the most

comprehensive theory of populism, goes further and identifies populism not simply with political

action or forms of discourse (i.e. an ideological form of political discourse) but with democracy itself

because a political action that gives the class of ordinary or working people a central role. Populism

seems thus to be a more egalitarian or democratic politics than the one obtained through representative

procedures, which is its true and direct adversary.21

Political theorists have thus stressed the role of peoples mobilization as a symptom of political

discontent with ordinary politics among ordinary citizens, regardless of the outcomes it attains, as

characteristic of populism.22 As Newt Gingrich has said about President Barack Obama and the

Democrats, they are a government of the elite, for the elite and through the elite.23 Protest against

intellectuals, high culture, and college people, attacks against the cosmopolitan trash of fat cats in

the name of the common sense of the common people who live by their work and inhabit the

narrow space of a village or a neighborhood are the components of an ideology that is everywhere

recognizable as populist.24 This has brought Laclau to declare populism a vivid expression of the

democratic imaginary, and moreover a strategy to merge together the various claims, discontents and

demands that political parties fragment and filter instead in the moment they provide for the

20 Peter Worsley, Populism in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. J. Krieger (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1993), 730-31. 21 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism (London: Verso, 1979), 18. Not

so differently from fascism, Peronism was marked by a strong anti-liberal character, whose populist-nationalist language served as a strategy for empowering and homogenizing civil society against the existing economic and political oligarchy (pp. 182-91), even though it also made alliances with the military and landlord elites. Yet, see above all Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005), in particular Part II.

22 Paul Taggart, Populism (London: Open University Press, 2000) and Populism and the Pathologies of Representative Politics, in Democracy and the Populist Challenge. 23 www.politicususa.com/en/gingrich-obama-elite. 24 Ernest Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1992).

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institutional personnel, or occupy the state.25 Canovan has thus advanced the idea that peoples

mobilization works as a redemptive force of democracy because its meaning is bringing politics to the

people.26

In sum, according to this consolidate reading, populism belongs in the democratic family not

merely because it relies upon speech and opinion which is certainly the casebut more importantly

because of its two structural characteristics: polarization (the many versus the few), and the

incorporation of the largest majority in one collective actor with one collective ideology: the people as a

collective united against another collective (as the many against the few). This reading is not

convincing though because polarization is meant to create an ideology of the people less inclusive than

democratic citizenship. In populism's ideology, the concept of the people is endogenously sociological

and identified with a specific portion of the people or the many or the less affluent or the lower class

with no need to relay upon a class conception of society (the many are included in one collective unit

depending on their income for instance yet not their relations of production as in classical Marxism).27

Populism prefigures a politics not of inclusion but of exclusion: this is what polarization is for. It is not

by chance that the people is its pivoting entity, not the citizen as a sovereign actor as per democracy.

Incorporation in the masses is not the same as isonomic equality of the citizens (from the Greek word

of isonomia, or equality by law as the condition for having ones opinion counted as one), so that if

equal liberty is what characterizes democracy populism is a poorer not a richer rendering of it.

This critical diagnosis is confirmed by the European political history after the eighteenth

century. Indeed, the extension of American historians' positive judgment to European societies and

politics would be hardly defensible. Europe is much a more interesting laboratory of populism, though,

because in Europe this phenomenon was able to clear the floor of ambiguity and unveil its most

peculiar potentials and characteristics. This was so predictably because in Europe national or popular

unity (a collective whose members were presumed equal, not merely normatively or as juridical persons)

was the pillar upon which institutional democracy was constructed. In addition, whereas the United

States was a democratic project since its inception (regardless of the intention of its most

representative founders, which was not democratic), in European countries democracy sprung from

within a society in which thinkers and political leaders (intellectuals in the broader sense) tried

systematically to stop or tame democratization of society by subjecting it to a bureaucratic state and a

hierarchical set of social relations, so that consent was to be preferably imposed from above or

orchestrated so as to adhere to the leaders plan. The political experience of continental Europe shows

25 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 129-56. 26 Canovan, Taking Politics to the People, 26-28. 27 As it appears in the work of John McCormick, populisms concept of the people is endogenously sociological

and identified with a portion of the population (the less affluent), although it is not necessarily Marxist, or based on a classist reading of history and society, or progressive; Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

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two things: that populism was born in the representative and constitutional age, and that its role was

devastating for constitutional democracy. Napoleon was the first leader to manufacture consent

through public opinion, to use the means of opinion formation and propaganda that his society

offered to mobilize the people on his behalf, with an increasing number of printed materials and

political clubs.28 Napoleon, facing the opposition of the public (the presses and the acculturated few) to

his imperial ambitions and politics of reconciliation with Catholic clergy, excited people's anti-elite

sentiments to condemn intellectuals as "ideologues" and "doctrinaires."29 Napoleon's demagogic

strategy has been recurrent in Europe. Just to focus on the Italian case (which is far from unique),

Benito Mussolini exploited post-WWI economic distress of the middle class and the impoverishment

of the already poor in order to polarize political life and transform Italy's liberal government in a mass

regime against the political minorities. Although he never suspended the constitutional charter of the

liberal state, Mussolini created a populist regime that made regular appeals to the people and used

propaganda to mobilize the many and mold their opinions, while repressing pluralism and the

opposition.30 As for recent history, new versions of populism have been exemplified in Italy by the

secessionist movement led by the Northern League and Silvio Berlusconis Caesarist politics. Their

main rhetorical strategy consists once again in portraying their respective movements as a true

alternative to both the existing political parties and parliamentary democracy. They attack parliamentary

politics as elitist and anti-democratic because of its distance from common people's opinion. Moreover,

they make a systematic use of propaganda and in some cases own half of the national television

stations and printing industry in order to create a uniform way of thinking and talking in public. New

populists exploit doxa and seem to be able to make it their creation rather than the citizens'.31

To end this brief parallel between American and European experiences of populism, I would

argue that European populism, in its recurrent resurrections (national and now also European), has

more ordinarily followed right-wing kinds of politics, or a politics that did not aim at implementing the

promises of constitutional democracy but disfigured them instead. All in all, although the symptom of

a social and economic malaise, and although its regular appeal to more popular politics (or policies

28 In the spring of 1804, the officer corps and the troops they commanded set up an insistent clamor for the

designation of Napoleon Bonaparte as emperor...The petition that poured into Paris from the military make the proclamation of the Empire seen as an irresistible proposition. It is difficult to reconstruct with exactitude how this campaign of pen and ink was orchestrated, but a few markers survived in the archives; Isser Woloch, From Consulate to Empire: Impetus and Resistance, in Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism, ed. Peter Baehr and Melvin Richter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 29 and 45.

29 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, trans. L. Wirth and E. Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), 74. 30 On the total unity of leader and the people in Italian fascism the more recent study is that of Jan-Werner

Mueller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 117.

31 For an analysis of the various forms of populist strategies that emerged in the years after the collapse of traditional political parties in Italy see Alessandro Lanni, Avanti popoli! Piazze, tv, web: dove va lItalia senza partiti (Venice: Marsilio, 2011).

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tailored on the culture and interests of the majority), populism represents a contestation of

constitutional democracy and the politics of rights it represents.32

This allows me to advance the following comment on the ambiguity and vagueness of the term:

although populism has not acquired the status of an uncontroversial clarity, it is not a neutral political

phenomenon. Any attempt to treat it as such clashes with the bare fact that it is a radical contestation

of representative and parliamentary politics in the name of direct or collective affirmation of the will

of the people, wherein this will is not assessed through certain procedures but declared by some

charismatic orators or leaders or elections transformed into plebiscites. The opinion of a mass of

people comes to be identified with the will of the people, outside procedures and institutions that

detect and regulate the assessment of that will. Populists presume that the voice of the people is

identical with that of a large majority and of the leader who impersonates it.

Competing for Representing the People

How should we evaluate the normative character of populism? To which political family does it

belong? These are daunting questions for scholars of populism, who have never been able to reach a

consensus on the interpretation of this political phenomenon (and make it into a category) and its

relation to democracy. All populist movements, Yves Mny and Yves Surel wrote, exhibit a strong

reservation and even hostility to the mechanisms of representation, in the name of one collective

affirmation of the will of the electors or the people.33 While democratic proceduralism acknowledges

that citizens have the right to make bad decisions, populism presumes the people (in the singular) is

always rightthis makes it blur the diarchic structure and prioritize the domain of opinion (unified

within one narrative). Populism is thus, as Artiti aptly writes, parasitical on representative democracy,

by which I mean that it is not external to it and it does competes with it on the meaning and use of

representation or the way of detecting, affirming, and managing the will of the people.34 I also mean

that if it succeeds in dominating the democratic state, it can modify its figure radically and even open

the door to regime change. It may be useful to briefly recall the genesis of representation.

32 For the view of populism as malaise and pathology of democracy see Pierre-Andr Taguieff, Le Retour du

populisme: Un dfi pour les dmocraties europennes (Paris, Encyclopedia Universalis, 2004). An invaluable resource is the mentioned collection edited by Ionescu and Gellner, Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics, 4-33.

33 Yves Mny and Yves Surel, The Constitutive Ambiguity of Populism, in Democracies and the Populist Challenge, pp.121.

34 I take this definition of a parasite from Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. Samuel Weber (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p.90: The parasite then takes place. And at the bottom, whatever violently takes place or occupies a site is always something of a parasite. Never quite taking place is then part of its performance, or its success, as an event, or its taking place. Populism is a permanent possibility within representative democracy, and the never taking place refers to its being a permanent mobilizing possibility even when it is strong enough to manifest its power. If all the populist potentials were actualized it would replace representative democracy altogether and this would be a regime change (like fascism did when it took place).

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Representation was born in a confrontational environment. Its origins are to be found in the

context of the medieval church and in the recurrent disputes over whether the pope or the council of

bishops represented the unitary body of the Christians.35 Representation was born both as an

institution of powers containment and control (of the chief of the church or the king) and as a means

of unifying a large and diverse population. These two aspects together presumed an active involvement

of both partners because the representative, who was sometimes called procurator and

commissary, was supposed to speak or act for a specific group of people who endowed him with the

power of representing their interests in front of an authority, secular or religious, that was recognized as

superior.36 When a given community delegated some members to be represented before the pope or

the court of the king, with powers to bind those who appointed them, there lay the origins of

representation. This technique was then transferred to state context.

In the form of a synthesis, thus, unification (of the multitude) and subjection (to the decisions

made by the chosen delegates) merged in the institution of representation. Yet it was the

institutionalization of elections by those subjected that injected a new factor of conflict and

introduced the quest for accountability. With eighteenth-century constitutional states, representation

started becoming the terrain of unresolvable tension between its traditional unifying and subjecting

functions and the new ones that elections conferred upon it, namely, electors advocacy and

representativity (the expressions of the call for accountability). The states relationship with civil society

made electoral representation a terrain of political and social conflicts; it made it an institution that

served to mediate among interests and the state more than solely create the unity of the state and make

visible its sovereignty. Populism infiltrates this tension and reclaims the unifying and subjecting role of

representation against the bargaining role that the parliamentary form of electoral democracy has

instead legitimized.37

Populism aims at a more genuine identification of the represented with the representatives than

elections allow. Moreover, it is impatient with the dialectic between pluralism and unity that

representation entails. The representative, Laclau writes, is an active agent who gives words and

credibility to the represented unity; he is the actor of the homogenizing process who puts an end to the

divisions of the electorate.38 An agent, moreover, that no accountability is able to check, not even the

political party he relies upon, because the party is most of the time his creation and instrumental to the

acquisition and the preservation of his power. We need just to mention Carl Schmitts argument in

favor of presidentialism against parliamentarianism. The latter, Schmitt explained, is an assemblage of

35 Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1958), p. 61. 36 Pitkin, Concept of Representation, chap. 4. Pitkin located the transition in the terminological meaning of the word

representation from standing for to acting for between the second half of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century.

37 Cf. my Representative Democracy, chaps.1 and 2. 38 Laclau, On Populist Reason, pp. 15758.

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elected delegates who represent economic interests, political parties, and social classes, while the

President is elected by the entire German people. In the latter case, only elections would be a strategy

for unity and subjection (versus divisions) and represent a truly visual reproduction of the whole nation

at the symbolic and institutional level. The president embodied Schmitts catholic view of

representation as the process of making visible the invisible divinity, which was now the collective

People. In his reading, electoral representation was the denial of that unity because it served to bring

pluralism inside the state, which was the mortal sin in Schmitts political theology, the equivalent of a

religious schism. Following this train of thought I would say that populism builds on a view of

representation that aims at unification and subordination as in the premodern format, but does not aim

at accountability and advocacy or representation.

Clearly, since Schmitt thought of representation as a synthesis of identity and the presence of

the sovereign, party pluralism and parliamentary competition were anathema to him. The President, by

contrast [to the fragmentation of parliamentary grouping] has the confidence of the entire people not

mediated by the medium of a parliament splintered into parties. This confidence, rather, is directly

united in his person.39 In similar manner, populism uses representation to constitute the political

order above the society and through the expulsion of pluralism. As per Schmitt, who thus gave

populism an important argument, representation is political insofar as it repels the liberal calls of

advocacy, control, monitoring, and a constant dialogue between society and politics, and narrows the

distance between the elected leader and the electors so as to incorporate society within the state.40 This

antidiarchic project echoes in Canovans words: A vision of the people as a united body implies

impatience with party strife, and can encourage support for strong leadership where a charismatic

individual is available to personify the interests of the nation.41 The demagogical factor is thus part of

populism, insofar as the ideological construction of consent is its instrument.

Populism is to representative democracy what demagoguery was to direct democracy: internal

to it and parasitical on it. The parallel between ancient and modern forms of democracy is important to

increase our clarity on the populist phenomenon. According to Aristotle's pivotal analysis,

demagoguery within democracy is: a) a permanent possibility insofar as it relies upon the public use of

speech and opinion like democracy; b) a more intense use of the principle of the majority so as to

make it almost absolute or a form of power more than a method for making decisions (populism is the

rule of the majority rather than a politics that uses majority rule); and c) a waiting room for a possible

tyrannical regime. As Benjamin Arditi wrote aptly, populism flourishes within democracy as its fellow

traveler, as a radical form of democratic action in times of social strife and economic duress; yet its

outcome may be risky to democracy. The relationship of populism with democracy is thus an issue of

39 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (1928), trans. and ed. by Jeffrey Seitzer, foreword by Ellen Kennedy

(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), p. 370. 40 Ibid. 41 Canovan, Trust the People!, p. 5; Arato, Political Theology and Populism, pp. 160-62.

12

contention rather than compatibility.

These observations suggest we add a further characteristic to populism, namely that it does not

create people's sovereignty but intervenes once people's sovereignty exists and its values and rules are

written in a constitution.42 Populism represents an ideology of the people in a political order in which

the people is formally already the sovereign. It would be wrong thus to employ it in order to describe a

democratic revolution the French and the American revolutions were not populist although could not

exist without peoples mobilization. Populism does not create democracy. To resume Aristotle's

distinction between a demagogue who is a people leader and a demagogue who can be tyrannical, while

Solon and Cleisthenes were leaders of the people who helped the Athenians to acquire political

liberty, Pisistratus was a tyrannical leader because in acting from within an existing democracy he

subverted it although with the support of the people.43 Populism can be seen as a movement that

expresses the ambition of a new leader to quickly get into power without waiting for political

temporality that democratic procedures regulate. It grows inside an existing democracy and questions

the way in which it works yet with no certainty it will make it more democratic.

Yet although historical and political context is an important variable, populism is more than a

historically contingent phenomenon; it pertains to the interpretation of democracy itself. Both the

character and the practice of populism underline, and more or less consciously derive from, a vision of

democracy that can become deeply inimical to political liberty insofar as it defers the political dialectics

among citizens and groups, revokes the mediation of political institutions, and maintains an organic

notion of the body politic that is allergic to minorities and rights. The ideology of populism displaces

equality for sameness and unity, and thus opposes social and political pluralism (in almost all European

populist movements the xenophobic and anti-immigrant ideology is predicated in the name of the

cultural values of the people who are the majority in a given region or nation). Its extreme consequence

is to transform a political community in a corporate-like entity, where class and ideological differences

are mastered in the attempt to fulfill the myth of a comprehensive totality of state and society. Hence,

in spite of its vociferous antagonism against the existing political order and the elite, populism, when

acquires state power, may have a deeply statist vocation; it is impatient with government by discussion

because it longs for limitless decisionism, which the ideology of the people legitimizes.44

42 Under autocratic rule the mass of the people are completely excluded from power; Canovan, Taking

Politics to the People, 26. 43 Aristotle made an important innovation in the analysis of democracy's trasformations when he broke down

Plato's identification between the demagogue and the tyrant; Aristotle, The Constitution of Athens, trans. J. M. Moore, in Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), XLI: 2; see also Aristotle, Politics, ed. T. A. Sinclair (London: Penguin Books, 1992), IV: 4.

44 For an eloquent application of decisionist rendering of democracy as plebiscitarian and populist leadership that bypasses liberal legalism and constitutionalism in order to rely on opinion instead, see Eric A. Posner ad Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

13

Polarization, Caesarism, and the Populus

Populism treats pluralism of interests and ideas as litigious claims that should be simplified so

as to create a polarized scenario that makes the people immediately know how to judge and with whom

to side. Simplification and polarization are in the view of achieving a deeper unification of the masses against

the existing elites and under an organic narrative that most of the time a leader embodies. Populism can

hardly be conceived without a politics of personality. Hence, I would propose to identify it with two

intertwined political processes: one that goes toward polarization of the citizenry in two organic groups

and the other that goes toward a verticalization of the political system. Polarization and Caesarism go

hand in hand and both of them constitute a radical challenge to representative democracy.

Populists do actually acknowledge political conflict since, following Schmitt, they conceive

politics in bipolar terms, as an arena in which friends and enemies clash. But they regard conflict as a

means for or a cathartic moment in the creation of a thorough unification of the people. Populism

thus prizes polarization more than pluralism. Indeed, it uses political conflict and electoral procedures

for the sake of an overwhelming victory and as instrumental to the mobilization of one part of the

people against the other, in view of making the winner the catalyst of the many fractions or parties,

whose endless litigiousnessit is thoughtweakens social unity. Populism holds the multi-party

system in great suspicion; hence, it is a denial of electoral representation, which is the main institution

or set of institutions through which procedural democracy is implemented.45 It depicts and theorizes

democracy as hegemonic conflict for the domination of the popular sentiment and opinion over its

components. In Robert Dahls words, it gives the demos total and final control over the political

order, which means empirically the control of the majority.46

This unifying project makes politics into a work of simplification that narrows the possibility of

a space of communication open to all equally insofar as it does not belong to anybody. Although Laclau

claims that the populist occupation of the place of power is partial or never complete, the impression

one has is that its impartiality and incompleteness are more a limit that the human practice of consent

formation cannot avoid or overcome than a normative principle. Populism makes opinion public in

the sense that it makes it belong only to one public.

The author who foresaw the populist risk contained within the government of opinion (namely

representative democracy) was Claude Lefort, who not by chance ended up by describing

totalitarianism in the attempt to grasp the extreme implication of a project that ,while opposing

pluralism, aims at materializing the sovereign collective as if it were a homogenous actor. Lefort

described this process as condensation... between the sphere of power, the sphere of law and the

45 A good overview of the main characteristics of the complex phenomenon of populism is the mentioned

volume edited by Mny and Surel, Democracies and the Populist Challenge. 46 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 112-15.

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sphere of knowledge. 47 Populism produces concentration of power and does so in the attempt to

resolve the paradox of politics48 which is determining who constitutes the people.49 Thus whereas

the proceduralist approach leaves this question always open, populism wants to close it, or, as Laclau

argued in correcting Leforts idea that while proceduralization of politics makes the place of power in

democracies empty, populism wants to fill out that empty space by turning politics in the production of

the emptiness through an hegemonic work of ideological realignment of social forces.

Populisms goal consists in emptying the place of power in order to reoccupy it.50 This entails

eroding the symbolic domain and substituting it with the materiality of power. In other words, it entails

that the conflicts of interests and between classes take place no longer in the language of institutions

and procedures, but as the direct expression of social power that makes the state its instrument. From

the recognition that the symbolic framework of power is that which sustains a political regime,

populism deduces its mission, which consists in occupying and conquering that symbolic framework.

From pluralism of opinions to the production of a dominant narrative: this is the main task of a

political process whose goal is to merge the plurality of publics that constitutes what we call public

opinion in a democratic society.

Populism competes with representative democracy on the meaning and practice of

representation since it aims at a more genuine identification between the represented and the

representatives. It does so by making representation essentially a process of people's unification, not

also one of advocacy and the expression of citizens' opinions and interests. Populism regards

representation as a strategy for the constitution of the political order above the society and through the

expulsion of social interests from politics, hence also conflicts. As Schmitt claimed, thus giving

populism an important argument, representation is political insofar as it repels the liberal calls of

control, monitoring and the relationship between society and politics and narrows the distance between

the elected leader and the electors by incorporating society within the state. Caesarism is thus most of

the time its destiny.

People unification versus pluralism is the structural trope in modern populism as it was in

ancient demagoguery. We have already mentioned Schmitt's argument in favor of presidentialism

against parliamentarianism. Laclau revives Schmitt's main themes in his theory of populist democracy.

Aware of the problem of Caesarism and the dictatorial leadership, he argues that although it may take

personalist forms and sometimes has been even identified with the name of a leader (Mussolini, Peron,

47 Claude Lefort, The Question of Democracy, in Democracy and Political Theory (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1988), 13, 19-20. 48 I derive the term paradox of politics from Bonnie Honig, Between Deliberation and Decision: Political Paradox in Democratic Theory, American Political Science Review, 101 (2007):17-44. 49 Jason Frank, Constituent Moments: Enacting the People in Postrevolutionary America (Durham: Duke University Press,

2010). 50 Lefort, The Question of Democracy, 13-20; Laclau, On Populist Reason, 164-68.

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Chavez), it is not personalization that qualifies populist politics. What qualifies it instead is the kind of

thought it puts in motion: through dichotomies such as the people versus the oligarchy, toiling masses

versus exploiters, and so on.51 Populism would thus be not simply political action but a democratic

kind of political action because it gives the working class or the poor or the ordinary people central

stage in the forum. Populism is the same as politics and moreover the same as a more egalitarian or

democratic politics. Thus if personalization is in play, Laclau infers, this is not what makes populist

politics what it is; identification of the movement under a leader is a means that populist politics may

find convenient in order to make polarization succeed. Yet amending personalization with polarization

does not help making populism the same as democratic politics as we have seen above, not even when

coupled with Antonio Gramscis notion of hegemony.

Laclau relays on Gramsci's notion of ideology as a unifying narrative for collective identity

constitution. But Gramsci was explicit in bringing to the floor the risks that the politics of hegemony

contains. He thought for instance that unless it was anchored on a party organization with a collective

leadership and entrenched in a conception of history and social progress that did not leave any

interpreter the liberty of making it into a rhetorical tool of persuasion, hegemonic politics would be

dangerously prone to become a vehicle for a reactionary Caesarism that uses populism to make itself

victorious. In his Notes on Machiavelli, in which he analysis the two forms Caesarism can take, Gramsci

revised classical Marxist doctrine in which all forms of government figured de facto as dictatorship of

the dominant class. Gramscis articulation of Caesarism is an interesting reformulation of Aristotles

analysis of the emergence of demagogical leadership.

Gramsci reinterpreted Marxs category of Bonapartism so as to make sense of a progressive

function of leader politics (i.e. the case of Caesar and Napoleon I) in a revolutionary scenario. Given a

social deadlock or catastrophic equilibrium (equilibrio catastrofico)52 which prepared for a revolution, a

Caesarist leader could play a progressive role when his victory unintentionally helped the victory of the

progressive force, while at the same time striking a compromise with the regressive force. The

outcome, Gramsci thought, could be the exit from a catastrophic equilibrium that would open a

political scenario that might help the progressive force to fulfill its agenda in the future.53 As Benedetto

Fontana acutely observes, Gramscis method is dyadic or shaped by antinomy, as for instance civil

society as opposite of political society, consent as opposite of coercion and hegemony opposite of

violent revolution and also dictatorial or coercive power.54 In Gramscis work, thus, Caesarism was

51 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 18.

52 Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, ed. Valentino Gerratana (Turin: Einaudi, 1975), 1604, 1618-22. 53 Id., 1194-95. 54 Benedetto Fontana, The Concept of Caesarism in Gramsci, in Dictatiorship in History and Theory, 177. On the

conservative and radical interpretation of plebiscitarian or Caesaristic leader in the age of WW1 see Luisa Mangoni, Cesarismo, bonapartismo, fascismo, Studi storici 3 (1976): 41-61; for the birth of the myth of

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primed to break out in a revolutionary situation, not a situation that he defined as war of position, in

which not Caesarism but hegemony would be needed to advance a gradual social and political change.

To transplant Gramscis reflection on Caesarism (war of movement or revolution), which does not

need the politics of hegemony because the social situation is already ripe for change, into a situation in

which gradual or molecular change (war of position) is needed is wrong: where the politics of

hegemony is in place, Caesarism is out of place and vice versa (although in moments of crisis, a party

leader in a parliamentary system can succeed in unifying a large coalition under his representative

figure).55

We can at this point appreciate the sense of linking populism to the republican as Roman vision of

politics and government. Populists think that beyond politics made of electoral campaigns, organization,

ideological platforms, representatives, and publicly debated issues, there is a substance called the People

which is madein the words of Jeffrey Edward Greenof the mass of ordinary, non-office-holding

citizens taken in their collective capacity, and consisting in a spectatorial participation similar in kind to the

populace in Romes contio.56 It is Laclau himself who confirms, quite appropriately, populism's genealogy

in the Roman tradition when he writes that the people as a political category envisions the return of

the populus, and in particular, the populus of the Roman Forum, not of the voting assemblies.57 What was

the people of the Roman Forum and the contio, and how different was it from the people of the comitia?

The populus in the forum was an audience in a reactive relationship with political leaders, who

performed before the crowd to seek support to their power plans. It was not the people in the moment

of voting, or when the citizens gathered to speak by means and through voting procedures so as to give

promulgation to the proposals coming from the Senate. The populus in the forum was made of citizens

who gathered at their please and acted outside the institutions and procedures because they were not

meant to decide; it consisted of the Roman citizens (mostly those who resided in the city of Rome)

who spent some of their daily time in the forum in order to attend to the show performed by political

candidates and rhetoricians. It was not the people in the function of decision making, but the people in

the act of cheering or booing those who competed for a political post or tried to conquer people's

support for their cause. Opposite to that populist gathering was the Senate, whose building was located

at the end of the forum so as to physically mark the other pole of sovereignty. Contrary to the people,

the Senate was always structured and a visible body and place, and its members did not mix with the

crowd in the forum. As two distinct components of the republic, their visibility was essential to the

political life of the Roman state, which did not acknowledge individuals or isotes like Athenian

Caesar and of Caesarism in the nineteenth century see Peter Baehr, Caesar and the Fading of the Roman World: A Study in Republicanism and Caesarism (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publisher, 1998), 89-164.

55 Gramsci, Quaderni, 1195. 56 Jeffrey Edward Green, The Eyes of the People: Democracy in the Age of Spectatorship (New York: Oxford University

Press, 2010), 38. 57 Laclau, On Populist Reason, 81.

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democracy, but cives who acted always within one of the two predetermined groups.58 This dualistic and

polarized paradigm was an essential feature of both the Roman style of politics and republicanism

through the centuries: non-institutionalized people en mass versus institutionalized magistrates; the

organized few versus the crowded many; inclusion within polarized institutional domains versus an

equal chance to participate in the process of political decision or compete for magistracies.59

Comparison with the populus of the Forum allows us to complete the understanding of populism

as a system of power, not simply a popular movement. Now, because populist politics disdains procedures

and considers the crowd rather than a regulated assembly as the site of popular power, its most congenial

method of selection seems to be the investiture of the leader, rather than election. Indeed its expressive

language is acclamation more than discussion; hence the overlapping of populism with plebiscitarianism. A

populist leader is not properly elected, it is acclaimed. Consequently, Schmitt (who followed the Roman

tradition in a very distinctive way) forcefully wrote that the "will of the people" is the same whether it is

expressed in the ballot or by acclamation, "[e]verything depends on how the will of the people is formed."

Populism blurs constitutional and representative democracy because it opposes the idea that the

authoritative will and the informal opinion are and ought to remain two different forms of legitimacy that

should never be identified and confused. Thus Schmitt, after he claimed that everything depends on the

people, added promptly that "the will of the people can be expressed just as well and perhaps better

through acclamation, through something taken from granted, an obvious and unchallenged presence, that

through the statistical apparatus" of voting counting.60 This serves to justify the strong reservation I

suggest on the democratic character of populism.

Conclusion

The impossibility of considering populism a political system or regime of its own has brought scholars

to conclude that precisely because the "populist 'dimension'" is "neither democratic nor anti-

democratic", it can be compatible with democracy insofar as it serves to make sure that the rights of

58 The awareness of the difference between republicanism and democracy is the right approach to avoid merging the latter with popular and populist politics. This difference has been explored by, among others, Samuel Edward Finer who rendered it as follows: The Forum polity, though not necessarily democratic, is popular: that is, authority is conferred on the rulers from below: The History of Government, vol. 1: Ancient Monarchies and Empire (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,1997) I:43. 59 This populist oriented structure of the Roman untrammelled populace was the object of Ciceros heavy criticism of popular government as the force of the mob in which passions exercise powerful control over thoughts: Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Laws, in On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, ed. James G. Zetzel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 163; Fergus Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 34-53. The problem is, however, that the crowd and mob were the result of an institutional organization of the popular presence in the Roman republic, not of democracy (Millar, The Crowd, 197-226). 60 Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, 16-17.

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the majority are not "ignored."61 Yet, if populism in its nascent form can play a democratizing role by

mobilizing the excluded majority to criticize the existent forms of political representation and to

demand further participation and better forms of representation, it can have, in its structured form,

negative effects on democracy because its criticism translates into plebiscitarian forms of participation,

the paradox being that the people end up by playing more the role of an audience than of a political

actor.62 In effect, as Pierre Rosanvallon argued convincingly, populism is the most devastating

corruption of democracy because it radically overturns representative institutions (notably elections

and party pluralism) and transforms the negative power of judgment or opinion from one that controls

and monitors politically elected leaders to one that rejects their electoral legitimacy in the name of a

deeper unity between the leaders and the people; it opposes ideological legitimacy the constitutional

and procedural one.63 Thus, despite the democratic intention of reversing the passivity of ordinary

citizens, populist mobilization does not deliver what it promises. When an audience populist leader declares

to be the true representative of peoples will beyond and outside the electoral mandate, he puts in

motion the destructive power of judgment and calls into question not simply a bad or corrupt

performance of state institutions but electoral politics itself, its advocacy character. From this point of

view, populism is a way for new elites to acquire power quickly, without waiting for increasing

popularity through times and electoral competitions; in its strategy for power, the people play mostly

the role of being just an instrument for support, like the plebs in the declining years of the Roman

republic. The attainment of strong authority by an elite seems to be the hidden logic of the rhetoric of

the masses, in spite of the populists appeal to the common people as the true protagonist of politics.

I would conclude by saying that populism is an expression of extreme majoritarianism that makes

it essentially cross-eyed because it suggests we see democracy from both the perspective of the winner

(the majority) and not the defeated (political minority). Thus, it can be maintained to be consistent with

the democratic principle of sovereignty once democracy has been stripped of its isonomic character. If

one does not want to renounce a notion of democracy that incorporates the limitation of power, a bill

of rights, and discussion as the peculiar form of political life, one is forced to conclude that populism

turns out to be a violation of democracy although a permanent manifestation within the democratic

process.

It is reasonable and meaningful to claim that democracy does not only and simply entail a

constitutional frame and the rules of the game. Indeed, to take seriously this claim it would require not

to confine democracy solely to a quest for political power, like populism does. Democracy is also a

claim for an extension of the values of equality and nondomination to those sectors of social life where

those values are still impotent. In other words, the project of democratization should orient itself also

61 Worsley, "The Concept of Populism," 247; Margaret Canovan, Taking Politics to the People,25-44 62 Green, The Eyes of the People, 109-12; Arditi, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism, 51-52. 63 Pierre Rosanvallon, La contre-dmocratie. La politique lge de la dfiance (Paris: Seuil, 2006), 276.

19

outside the space of political power and toward civil society at large.64 But this project does not look at

all like disclaiming the procedural nature of democracy. The opposite is true, because when we contest

relations of domination in our social relations, we claim to have our voice heard and our will counted,

and moreover that the environment within which we operate functions according to procedures we can

monitor and check. Whenever and wherever we claim for the respect of some conditions and rules that

treat us as morally autonomous beings, who are free and equal in respect and opportunity, we claim for

democracy.

Attention to procedures does not entail that the existing distribution of power should remain

unchallenged or unquestioned. More consistently, it means, first of all, that domination is not only a

political phenomenon and the political sphere is not its only niche, and finally, that a democracy that

incorporates the liberal constraints can become an instrument for pursuing a wider project of

democratization. Far from being an indication of impotence, those constraints give to the democratic

state the legitimization to encourage a consistent politics of democratization insofar as they put the

state under control. But in the hands of a populist democracy, that very politics would actually become

a frightening strategy of social incorporation and homogeneity. In conclusion, a secured and

institutionalized democracy allows for a broader range of political resources and initiatives than

populism does. Populism does not seem to be able to solve the riddle of either being minoritarian or

becoming despotic. Being in the minority is not safe in a populist regime, and this is enough reason to

mistrust it.

64 In this sense Castoriadis has argued, referring to Athens and more generally to democracy, for a distinction

between the notion of politics and that of the political; indeed, the democratic movement is not confined to the struggle around explicit power, it aims potentially at the overall reinstitution of society. Cornelius Castoriadis, Power, Politics, Autonomy, in Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p.159.