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TruTh, PercePTion, and consequences

Te Proteus Monograph Series

Volume 1, Issue 1

November 2007



Te Proteus Management Group

Te National Intelligence University, Oce o the Director o NationalIntelligence and the Center or Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War Collegeestablished the Proteus Management Group (PMG) to ocus on examininguncertainty, enhancing creativity, gaining oresight, and developing criticalanalytical and decision-making processes to eectively provide insight andknowledge to uture complex national security, military, and intelligencechallenges. Te Group is also closely associated with Proteus and ForesightCanada.

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Tese scholars can be located either in the United States or abroad. Tisprogram is designed to support the Proteus Management Group’s charter topromote urther discourse, study, and research ocusing on the renement,development, and application o new and emerging “utures” concepts,methods, processes, and scenarios. Te overarching goal o this eort is toprovide value-added and relevant commentary that will assist strategic andhigh-operational level decision makers, planners, and analysts with “outsidethe box” considerations and critical analysis o national, military and

intelligence issues within the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, andMultinational (JIIM) environment.

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by

Christine A. R. MacNulty, FRSA

PRESIDEN & CEO, APPLIED FUURES, INC.

Ms. Christine MacNulty has more than thirty-ve years experience in long-term strategic planning or cultural change, technology orecasting, andtechnology assessment. She consults at to the most senior levels withinthe Department o Deense. Her current DoD projects bring together herknowledge o strategy, cultures, and cognition to help in understandingour adversaries in order to develop non-traditional operations, inormationoperations, and strategic communications. For her contribution to Britishindustry, she was elected a Fellow o the prestigious Royal Society o Arts,Manuactures and Commerce. She has authored numerous papers and is a

very popular conerence speaker. She has co-authored o two books: Industrial Applications o echnology Forecasting, and, Network-Centric Operations:ranslating Principles into Practice (to be published in 2007). She is theounding President and CEO o Applied Futures, a consultancy based near

Washington, D.C.



T able of conTenTs

Abstract

ruth,PerceptionandConsequences

I

W?

TIKE

WWNSLB 4

P—TAP

M-

UM- 5

TM 7

GI

M-A/IW 0

SWCDDD? 4

C-CDA 5

TFCU 4

AC(DF’k) 5

C 7

Appendix

References 4



ABSRAC

oday we, in the United States, tend to regard Sun zu’s maxim “I you know the enemy and know yoursel, you need not ear the result o ahundred battles” as being about the physical capabilities, C4ISR (Command,Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance), weapons, and warghting capability o our own orces andthose o the adversary. Given the rest o Te Art o War, and its ocus onpreventing such actions, it is likely that Sun zu was reerring much more tothe understanding o the psyche than to the material aspects o warare.

In the last ew years, we have seen many commentaries rom ormerSecretary Rumseld and others that indicate that we are not winning the waro ideas. In addition, it has been clear that we have had some signicantailures in intelligence. Some recent conversations indicate that we may beailing in the inormation/ideas war because we, have not taken Sun zu’slessons to heart.

While my concerns are strategic—because I do not believe we have beenable to crat real strategies or intelligence, Inormation Operations (IO),and other non-kinetic operations—we have not even been doing well at thetactical end either. For instance, in an online journal, Major Bill Edmonds,U.S. Army Special Forces, said “I have slowly come to understand that i weare to succeed in Iraq, we must either change the way we perceive and treatthose we want to help, or we must disengage the great percentage o ourmilitary rom the population.”

Intelligence, IO, Psychological and Infuence Operations, and Strategic

Communication (SC) all require a deep understanding o our adversaries and,in some cases, our allies. Tey also require a deep understanding o our owncultural biases, so that we see as clearly as possible while looking throughour own cultural lens. While there may be a single “truth” out there, most o

what we “see” is perception, not truth; and most o what the adversary sees isalso perception, not truth. We have done some things well and have achievedsome o our objectives. We have sometimes achieved rst order results at theexpense o longer-term strategic goals, and in some cases, we have ailed toachieve our desired results and have created unintended consequences. Many o these ailures have happened because o

lack o a systems perspective and the ability to see patterns on astrategic scale;

lack o understanding o the cultural context;

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TruTh, PercePTion, a nd consequencesvi

lack o understanding o some key cognitive dimensions o adversary decision making;

lack o understanding o the cultural-cognitive relationships;lack o understanding o the nature o and complexity o the systems

with which we’re dealing.

Tis monograph ocuses on the key elements o understanding cultures:the stories our cultures develop to make sense and meaning rom the world;the metaphors we use and how those help to rame perception; and thenature and determinants o our mind-sets. I have illustrated all o these withhistorical examples rom the last ty years.

Finally, the monograph outlines a limited number o critical cultural-cognitive dimensions that can be used to evaluate an adversary—includinghis values and motivations—so that we can anticipate his actions and betterdetermine how to infuence them. It also recommends a checklist o otherthings that we can do to enhance our cultural awareness and understanding,and it suggests the kinds o urther research that are needed.

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Introduction

oday we tend to regard Sun zu’s maxim “I you know the enemy andknow yoursel, you need not ear the result o a hundred battles” as beingabout knowledge o the physical disposition, C4ISR (Command, Control,Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), weapons, and warghting capabilities o our own orces and those o theadversary. Given the rest o Te Art o War, and its ocus on prevention, it

is likely that Sun zu was reerring much more to the understanding o thepsychological (culture and cognition) than to the material aspects o warare.Tis implies an understanding o what the dierent parties are seeing, how they understand the situation, what they are thinking about it, and what they are thinking o doing about it. Yet we do not seem to be good at that:

“We are not winning the war o ideas.” –Secretary Rumseld

“We are not winning the IO [Inormation Operations] War.” –COLRandy Gangle, USMC (Ret), USMC Center or Emerging Treats &Opportunities1

“Despite its own multi-cultural nature, the (U.S.) Army was notculturally attuned to the environment (in Iraq).” –Brigadier Aylwin-Foster, British Army 2

“US Army personnel instinctively turned to technology to solveproblems.” –Brigadier Aylwin-Foster3

Most people accept the our domains o warare articulated in many publications rom the Oce o the Secretary o Deense (OSD) – the Oceo Force ransormation and the Command & Control Research Program.In most cases, those our domains—Societal, Cognitive, Inormational andPhysical—are represented as discrete layers, as in a cake. In reality they arenested, with the Societal (or Cultural) domain underpinning the other three;and the Cognitive domain underpinning the Inormational and Physical.Tis is important, as it illustrates the act that our decision-making processesare aected by our culture. Te inormation that we choose to collect is

determined by our culture and the ways our minds work, and even the

1. Colonel Randy Gangle, USMC (Ret), Aviation Week and Space echnology August 92004.

2. Brigadier Aylwin-Foster, British Army, Military Review November 1 2005.

3. Ibid.



TruTh, PercePTion, a nd consequences2

weaponry and systems we develop are products o our cultures and thoughts. We have ideas about truth, and we are strong upholders o “the truth,” but

what is really true? Is there an absolute “truth,” or to what degree is truth aunction o our culture and our perception?

Which is true?

Is a billion 109 or 1012 ? and is a trillion 1012 or 1018 ?

Was Exxon’s prot last year $83,809,000 or $39,500,000?

Is the United States the “land o the ree and the home o the brave”or the “Great Satan”?

Te answer is that both choices are correct or each question. Let us think about them and their implications in more detail.

In the United States a billion is 109 and a trillion is 1012. In the UnitedKingdom and Europe a billion is 1012 and a trillion is1018. While there areprobably some economists in both countries who understand the dierence,think about the response o even well-educated Britons and Europeans toheadlines that discuss the U.S. budget, Federal decit, or trade decit. No

wonder they regard us as greedy and eckless, when they understand thosedecits to be a billion or a trillion times more than they are in our reality.

Te gures or Exxon’s prot are or gross prot and net prot respectively.But the headlines we see in most media, which oten quote the gross prot,do not explain that. Nor do they explain that the costs o exploration andextraction o oil are increasing, and that without prots o that size, Exxoncould not continue to provide the oil that we require.

While we see the United States as the land o the ree, the home o the

brave, and the land o opportunity, Iranians o a radical turn o mind see ourtelevision that suggests that we engage in sexual promiscuity, drug abuse, andother “sins,” and they truly believe that we are oering great temptation toyoung people—hence the Great Satan.

As we shall see, dierences in perception o this sort can be o criticalimportance.

Te Importance o Knowing the Enemy

Tere are two major reasons or knowing the enemy:

o be able to anticipate his actions—by understanding why , not just what and how

o be able to infuence his actions—or otherwise communicate with him

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TruTh, PercePTion, a nd consequences 3

Anticipation o actions cannot be done eectively by extrapolating behavior.It requires an understanding o the motivations and mind-sets o the adversary.

Tis will be discussed at length later in this monograph. Since communicationspermeate all interactions between people, we will consider that rst.

St. Augustine identied the problem o communication in De Magistro, when he said “I I am given a sign and know nothing o which it is the sign,it can teach me nothing. I I know the thing, what do I learn rom the sign?”4 In other words, signs (words, symbols) by themselves do not convey meaning.

We iner meaning rom the context, the individual communicator, and thestyle, intonation, and other characteristics o what is being conveyed.

Inormation Operations, Psychological, and Infuence Operationsall require extremely eective communications rom us to our adversaries.Intelligence also requires eective communication and understanding. Fromits Old French origin, communication means to impart, to share with others.Tis requires an understanding o those others in order to ensure that what weare trying to say is understood by them. We should not assume that everyonegives the same interpretation to the words, phrases, and symbols we use. Wein the West, and particularly in the United States, tend to believe that there

is only one truth and that others see and understand as we do. In the ArmedForces, this is known as “mirror-imaging”; in anthropology it is known asethno-centrism. While we have had successes in Iraq and Aghanistan, ithas been clear to many people, including the ormer Secretary o Deense,that we are not winning the war o ideas. We have not been as successul atinormation operations as some o our adversaries. Tis has been caused, inpart, by our Rules o Engagement (which our adversaries do not have), butit has also been caused by our lack o understanding o the cultures o our

adversaries and those who support them. Teir perceptions and their “truth”are very dierent rom ours.

Tere is not even a single denition o truth about which mostphilosophers agree. Te word is derived rom the Anglo-Saxon word treow (true), which means aithulness in the quality o being accurate. Yet thereare ve theories o truth, ranging rom a perspective o absolute, objectivetruth to a truth that is constructed by social processes or consensus. Lako and Johnson suggest that there is no such thing as objective truth, and that

the belie in such a truth is not only mistaken but socially and politically dangerous. 5 We need to be aware o these perspectives and their implications

4. Jorge J. E. Garcia, Old Wine in New Skins (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,2003), 18.

5. George Lako and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live by (Chicago: University o Chicago, 1980), 159-162.




as we attempt to achieve genuine communication amongst ourselves, withour allies, with those who are neutral, and with our adversaries. Tese authors

also pose a question about what it takes to understand a simple sentence.6

Forinstance, in the sentence: “John red the gun at Harry,” we have to understandthat John and Harry are proper names; we need to understand what a gunis and what it means to re a gun and to re it at someone. We also needto understand the implications o ring a gun at someone; in other words,Harry might be wounded or killed. I all this needs to be understood i weare using the English language, what more do we need to do when conveying

Western concepts to other cultures?

Perception comes rom the Latin meaning to receive or collect; it laterbecame dened as intuitive recognition. Each society, group, and individualhas its own way o perceiving, which is ramed by, or colored by, its culturalbackground. aking truth and perception together, we need to realize thateach o us sees and understands the truth o the circumstances and eventsgoing on around us through a “lens” that is composed o the “story” in which

we live. When we share those perceptions with others who have the same ora very similar “lens,” we tend to nd agreement. When we share perceptions

with those who have a very dierent lens, disagreement—even to the point o believing that others are lying deliberately, which may not be the case.

Why We Need Stories to Live By

Each o us lives inside a metaphor, or story. Te story is based on theevents and circumstances that have created meaning in our lives—ourexperiences. We invent the stories in order to integrate our interpretationso those experiences into a coherent whole. We need meaning to make sense

o our world, and that meaning is created when our intellect and emotion are engaged simultaneously . Yet, with our emphasis on science, technology, andintellect, we in the West oten ignore the emotional aspects o our stories.

While we have stories we tell ourselves to explain our own experiences, wealso have stories we tell ourselves to explain the behavior o others, whetherthose be individuals, groups, or nations.

Te metaphor provides a simple and easy denition o the story. “Lie,liberty, and the pursuit o happiness” is one o the unalienable rights o Man

as stated in the Declaration o Independence, and or many it is still themetaphor or America itsel. Te U.S. Armed Forces ght not just or theliberty/reedom o Americans, but or the reedom o others around the globe.Sometimes we use images as the metaphors: Uncle Sam, an authority gurerepresenting the United States Government; John Bull—a yeoman gure

6. Ibid., 166-169.




representing common sense and doggedness—or the United Kingdom,and Marianne—representing Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—the symbol

o the French Republic. All those symbols were generated during the 18thCentury, and while the older members o those societies still know o themand understand them, the younger members and immigrants probably donot.

We probably think about metaphors as poetic imagery, yet Lako and Johnson have concluded that metaphors pervade all aspects o lie and thatour ordinary conceptual system o thinking and acting is undamentally metaphorical in nature. As an example o this, they posit the American

concept that “ime is Money ” as ollows: 7

You’re wasting my time

Tis gadget will save you hours

I don’t have the time to give you

How do you spend your time?

Tat problem cost me an hour

Put aside some time or socializing

Tis ime is Money metaphor would not apply in Latin America or theMiddle East. Tey have their own metaphors, not about ime and Money,that are meaningless to us. Lako and Johnson argue that, by understandingthe metaphorical nature o the language used, we can gain an understandingo the metaphors, and thus the stories, that the people in a culture live by.8

Every major society or grouping around the world has its own story. Te West shares a story that is based, to a large extent, on its Judeo-Christianheritage; yet there are dierences between the Catholic and Protestantcountries, especially with regard to the role o work and economics. TeUnited States is more religious and capitalist than Europe, which is moresecular and socialist. Religious groups have their stories, which cut acrossthe stories in nation-states. Muslims are divided into Shia and Sunni, andare more or less authoritarian, depending on the particular sects in certaincountries. Political persuasions, especially communism and socialism, havetheir stories that also span nations. oday we see the development o othermovements that span nations—environmentalist movements, political

movements, terrorist groups.

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7. Ibid., 7-8.

8. Ibid., 6.




Finally we have individuals, and each individual has his or her own story.o a large extent, individuals in a particular society will have been enculturated

into the belies and norms o that society as they were growing up. Yet evenmembers o the same amily will have slightly dierent stories, dependingupon their experiences and their psychological tendencies.

So why is all this important?

I we hope to infuence people, then we have to enable them to see that what we are saying ts with their story; or, at least, that it is not so ar removedrom their story that they think that what we are saying is ridiculous or that weare lying. It is the communication version o the martial arts in which we use

the orce generated by our opponent himsel to throw him o balance. Andsince, as we have said earlier, stories engage both the intellect and emotion,

we will do better at this kind o communication i we can include appeals toemotion in whatever we say. Indeed, the situation is even more complex thanthis, as we shall see later.

As an example o each person having a dierent story, consider this. Wehave all heard about several witnesses to a car accident who describe whatappear to be entirely dierent events. Sometimes this is because they have very dierent physical perspectives o what happened (views blocked by people,trees, other vehicles) and sometimes because they have dierent belies. Forinstance, i a sports car is involved, a witness who believes that all drivers o sports cars are reckless is likely to give a negative statement, whether or notthe driver was doing anything reckless at the time.

Some o us have stories that are eective in leading us to good, productive, wealth-creating lives. In the United States, Robert Allen has ounded the

Enlightened Wealth Institute with the aim o creating a million enlightenedmillionaires. His view is that millionaires benet not only themselves, butthe economy at large, and he insists on his protégés donating to charity. Hisphilosophy is that innite money awaits everyone who applies the principleso acquiring it—and he teaches those principles. Tis idea resonates with many

Americans, but is completely beuddling to many Europeans whose stories areless individualistic and more collective, and who regard the making o money assomehow greedy.

I we transpose these ideas o stories to the world o international relationsand confict, where the players generally have extremely strong emotions, thepossibility or misunderstandings and misinterpretations o observations becomeoverwhelming unless we and the other parties try to “see into” each others’ stories.For example, Michael McConnell tells o a meeting with a young Iranian, Mehdi,




who had been tortured by the SAVAK.9 Mehdi and his brother were convincedthat, because the Shah was an enemy to Islam and wanted to denigrate Muslims,

the Shia in Iran were being given rozen meat to eat that came rom the deadbodies o men and women rom the southern United States. He was alsoconvinced that the Shah was the puppet o the Jews. With these and several otherpieces o a story rmly in his mind, he was able to explain all manner o otheractions o the Shah in such a way that he was convinced the Shah was a devilthat must be ought, along with his supporters, the Jews and Americans. Hisstory combined both logic (albeit alsehoods) and emotion, which is why it wassuch a powerul infuence in his lie. It is perhaps not easy or us to believe that

someone sane could abricate such a story and truly believe it, but that is why weneed to understand people like this beore we can think about communicating with and infuencing them.

In the same book, McConnell describes the stories o many young people who turned to such violent political movements as the Baader-Meinho Gangin Germany and the Red Brigade and Prima Linea in Italy.10 Many o thosein Italy came rom the group known as the non-garantiti, young dispossessedpeople who had dropped through the cracks o the Italian economic miracle,

and who were hal-educated, unskilled, and unemployed. Tey saw theMaoist movements that promised workers’ autonomy, actory seizures, andappropriation o property as being the way to solve these problems. And indoing so they were rebelling against their athers’ more traditional communistvalues. Tey had convinced themselves that their new story would work, eveni it took violence to achieve it.

Einstein said that no problem can be solved rom the same level o consciousness that created it. When we are inside our story, we tend not to

recognize it and its biases, and we can certainly not recognize another’s story.oo oten, another’s story appears to be antasy or lies. rue communicationcan occur only i both parties can rise above their stories and “see” them romsome higher level o perspective. Tis requires a signicant understandingo cultures, stories, and psychology/cognition. It requires making these

“invisible” aspects o a culture and o a person’s psychological state, visible.Tis is what we must do i we want to infuence people eectively. Tepurpose o this monograph is not to explore psychology or neuroscience,

but rather to provide a practical means or understanding stories, metaphors,

9. Michael McConnell, Stepping Over: Personal Encounters with Young Extremists (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1983), 28-38.

10. Ibid.; or the Baader Meinho Gang, see pp. 51-60; or the Prima Linea, see pp. 218-244.




and other cultural and cognitive dimensions so that we can develop tools orplanning and assessing interventions o various kinds.

How can we begin to understand these stories? By “listening to theconversations” o our target audiences on the web—in chat rooms, blogs,MySpace, Youube, terrorist websites—in videos and movies, as well ason television channels, and in coee shops and market places. Jokes andcartoons oten contain real truths about how people are eeling about things,and stories can be deduced rom some o these. o get the most out o thesesources, we need interpreters and translators who are current in the languagesand in modern slang and colloquialisms. We need experts who understand

the history, including recent events, and we need specialists in semiotics—thescience o symbols, which includes symbols, signs, gestures, and intonations.Tese sources o inormation and the approaches used to understand storiescan also be applied to perceptions and mind-sets, as described below.

Perception—the Act o Perceiving

Tere are two parts to perception—the observation o something (visual,verbal, physical) and the recognition o what it is or what it means. In Gestalt

(which means “organized whole”) psychology we nd an approach thatemphasizes the context and the way we perceive objects as well-organizedpatterns rather than separate components. Tis can sometimes result in ourseeing something that is more than the sum o its parts.

(a) Gestalt Teory o Visual Perception11

Te ocal point o Gestalt theory is the idea o “grouping,” or how wetend to interpret a visual eld (or problem) in a certain way. Tere are sixmain actors that determine grouping:

Proximity

Similarity

Common Fate

Continuation

Closure

Area

Figure 1 illustrates the gestalt idea o “gure/ground.” Some people will see the vaserst, while others will see the two aces rst.It depends on what you see as the oreground

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Figure1.Figure/Ground

11. John Powderly—derived rom notes taken during his undergraduate degree program.




and what you see as the background (ground). What you see as gure and whatyou see as ground is dependent upon six interdependent laws, which are shown

in able 1.

Tese perceptions are also culturally based. Some cultures are more aware o

the gure, while others are more aware o the ground.(a) Dierences in Tought

Te psychologist Richard Nisbett has discussed the historical andcultural dierences between the West and East in his book Te Geography

1. Proximity

The law of proximity states that things which arecloser together will be seen as belonging together.

2. Similarity

The law of similarity states that things which sharevisual characteristics such as shape, size, color,texture, value or orientation will be seen asbelonging together.

3. Common Fate

This law is difficult to represent here, because it iswhere objects moving in the same direction areseen as a unit.

4. Continuation

The law of continuity predicts the preference for continuous figures. We perceive this image as twocrossed lines instead of four separate linesmeeting at the centre.

5. Closure

The law of closure applies when we tend to seecomplete figures even when part of the informationis missing. For example, here we see a circle,rather than an arc; and three black circles coveredby a white triangle, rather than three incompletecircles. And, in another example, we see atriangle, although no triangle has actually beendrawn.

Our minds react to patterns that are familiar, eventhough we often receive incomplete information.

6. Area

The law of area states that the smaller of twooverlapping figures is perceived as figure while thelarger is regarded as ground. We perceive thesmaller square to be a shape on top of the other figure, as opposed to a hole in the larger shape.

A

B

C

O D

able1.SixInterdependentLawsofGestaltPsychology




situational actors in which the murderers ound themselves, while the Americansattributed them predominantly to the personal traits and dispositions o the

murderers. Again, this illustrates the Eastern recognition o a complex systemo interdependencies, and the American view o more independent, individualaction.

In general, Nisbett postulates areas o dierence in thought (able 2 is

derived rom his work).

Cultural taboos also play a strong role in perception. Tis is illustratedby an anecdote in Te Inuence o Culture on Visual Perception by Segall,Campbell, and Herskovits.16 During World War II, American soldiers and

Algerian laborers were in suciently close contact that they saw each others’cleanliness habits. It is probably not surprising that the Americans viewedthese impoverished Algerians, who lacked both water and soap, as lthy. Whatmight be more surprising is that these Algerians viewed the Americans aslthy, and with even more disdain. Tis was because the Americans put ood

into their mouths with the same hand they used to control direction whenurinating—something that is deeply engrained as taboo in Islamic cultures.Tis taboo against using the same hand or these two dierent purposes camerom a nomadic society that lacked water, except or drinking; and in desert

Area of Interest Eastern Approach Western Approach

Attention and perception Environment, relationships(Background) Objects(Foreground)

Composition of the world Substances Objects

Controllability of environment

Difcult Possible

Stability versus change Change Stability

Explanations of events Environment, context Objects, individuals

Organization of world Relationships-based Category-based

Use of formal logical rules Less inclined More inclined

Application of dialecticalapproaches

Seek Middle WayCorrectness of one belief

versus another

able2.Eastern/WesternDifferencesinhought(afterNisbett)

16. Marshall H. Segall et al., he Inuence o Culture on Visual Perception (New York:Bobbs-Merrill, 1966) 14.




areas, the taboo still makes sense. It makes ar less sense today in urban areas where water or washing is plentiul, but the taboo is embedded so deeply in

the culture that it still applies.Perception as experienced by others can also be deduced by using many

o the same sources and expertise that I recommended or deducing elicitingstories earlier in the paper. Te web is a particularly valuable tool or this.Reliable sources o polling and survey data—such as Gallup’s World Poll—can also be invaluable or this kind o research.

Perception, then, is in the eye o the beholder, and it is a unction o both observation and recognition—or what we call mind-sets (sometimes

also known as mental maps).

Mind-sets

Webster denes mind-set as a “xed mental attitude ormed by experience,education, prejudice, etc.,” and thus it covers a range o cultural and cognitiveconsiderations that lie behind perception. I would like to add that emotionalor aective experiences also add to one’s mind-set. From our perspective, amind-set is the rame o mind we bring to bear on situations and events,

based on our story or the relevant aspect o the story; and it provides a meansor helping us to understand those events.

According to Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits, even anthropologists, who are trained to be as objective as possible, nd themselves to be moreethnocentric and culturally conditioned than they had realized themselves tobe.17 In other words, their mind-sets played a larger role in their interpretationo observations than they had expected. Indeed, ethnocentrism has alwaysbeen underestimated. Much o this section is derived rom the book Mindsets

by Glen Fisher, an experienced Foreign Service Ocer, academician, andresearcher.18

An example o ethnocentrism was given by the late Les Aspin while he wasa Congressman. In an article in Foreign Aairs, he noted that U.S. intelligenceestimates o Soviet military threats may have contained distortions because o the U.S. propensity to ocus on hard evidence o technological capabilities ratherthan on Soviet intentions or on how they might use the technology.19 Anotherclosely related eect o ethnocentrism is attribution o motives. Fisher recountstwo examples.20 When he was a student, he went to rural Mexico as a volunteerhelping with public health projects. Tese projects involved a lot o digging—

17. Ibid., 16.

18. Glen Fisher, Mindsets (Yarmouth ME: Intercultural Press, Inc, 1988).

19. Les Aspin, “Misreading Intelligence,” Foreign Policy 43 (Summer 1981) 166-72.




drainage ditches, latrine pits, and such. Te volunteer group tried to explainthat they were there to “do good” and to help international understanding.

Te Mexicans couldn’t believe those motives. Tey were convinced that thevolunteers were there to dig or gold or oil. Another more serious example was the shooting down o the Korean Airlines Flight 007 near Sakhalin Island.Te Soviets were blamed or being trigger-happy and disregarding human lie.Later analysis suggested that the Soviet pilot who shot down the plane didnot imagine that it could be anything but a oreign military plane conductingreconnaissance. He perceived according to his mind-set.

We all perceive according to our mind-sets. Tat means that we are

predisposed to seeing things that we expect to see or want to see. Considera trivial example, but one that makes the point about dierent perceptions.Imagine going to a brand new shopping mall with your spouse and a coupleo teenagers. Ater two hours, have each person describe the mall and list thestores in it. It is almost certain that each will have a unique perspective, andthe lists will be dierent. Yet each will have been exposed to exactly the sameinormation. In other words, each individual is (unconsciously) very selectivein what he or she observes. Our mind-sets can oten cause us to add what is

not there—as seen in the gure/ground examples rom Gestalt psychology.Mind-sets can also cause us to subtract material that does not t with ourmind-sets—this is known as non-perception. Tere is a particularly dramaticexample, quoted by Charles art, in a story rom anthropological texts aboutCaptain Cook.21 When Cook sailed into a particular bay in the South Seasor the rst time, the islanders gave not the slightest indication that they hadseen his ship, even though it was right there in ront o them. When a smallboat let the ship to row ashore, the islanders saw it immediately and became

alarmed. Apparently they thought the small boat had come out o nowherebecause they had never seen a ship so large beore, and thereore literally didnot “see” it because o their mind-sets.

We need to realize that “acts” are not stand-alone, absolute truths. Whenlooking at historical acts, we need to know how those acts and that history are remembered and by whom. Most people respond to images o acts thatinclude what they think happened, their prejudices about it, and what wasat stake. As Glen Fisher remarked, “international relations revolve around an

interplay o images.”22

He also indicated that mind-sets may be as relevantin oreign aairs calculations as an inventory o development resources or a

20. Fisher, Mindsets 33-34.

21. Charles art, Waking up: Overcoming the Obstacles to Human Potential (Boston, MA:Shambala Publications, 1986) 104.

22. Fisher, Mindsets , 4.




presented, and by whom, which brings us to the media and its role—a topicor discussion later in the paper.

Mind-sets are a unction o culture, and vice versa—as perception over timecan also infuence culture. What is clear is that people in particular cultures, andespecially sub-cultures, share similar mind-sets that simpliy communication.One example o a small subgroup might be the husband and wie who can (andoten do) complete each others’ sentences. Another example might be a politicalgroup that sees conspiracies everywhere and vilies people o another politicalpersuasion. And then we have whole nations who regard major ethnic groups orother nations as unclean, ungodly, and adversarial. One o the interesting ideas

here is that the more people are treated as i they are enemies, the more they become enemies. In other words, those who are perceived as enemies developexpectations that change their mind-sets, which, in turn, change their culture’sorientation to others. In several discussions during the course o the writingo this monograph, various colleagues have remarked that in Iraq, while thebehavior o young soldiers and Marines is entirely understandable, and whilethey are ordered to wear fak jackets and helmets and carry rifes at the ready,they appear to Iraqis to be treating all Iraqis, including women and children,

as enemies. Tey contrasted this with the appearance o British troops who areordered to take o their helmets and fak jackets once major combat is over.

While concerns about orce protection are certainly valid, it may be that oeringa less threatening appearance might help to deuse the potential or conrontation.Tis would be an example o Robert Rosenthal’s “expectation eect.”26 AlthoughRosenthal’s experiments were conducted in elementary schools, to see whetherteachers’ expectations infuenced their students’ perormance, and later theimpact o clinicians’ expectations on their patients’ health, it is possible to extend

the concept to any kind o expectation.Understanding Mind-sets

When considering mind-sets, we may perceive them as barriers to ourunderstanding: they are oreign; they don’t make sense to us; we don’t know thedierences between the mind-sets o dierent tribes or groups living in the samearea…and so on. Understanding them is dicult, and doing so may seem to bemore trouble than it is worth. However, we need also to recognize the benet o understanding mind-sets. Tis is a part o making the “invisible” visible. Once

we understand them, then we can make use o that inormation or all thecommunications in which we wish to engage with a particular group or tribe.Tey will simpliy our approach to IO, Psychological Operations (PSYOPS),

26. Robert Rosenthal, Biography. University o Caliornia, Riverside, June 6, 2007, at www.acultydirectory.ucr.




Strategic Communication (SC), and even Intelligence. What we need to look or, thereore, are patterns o thought—ideas that t together as part o mind-

sets—that are shared by cultures or groups.Orientation towards the past or the uture is one set o patterns. Fisher

provides the example o Argentina trying to take back the Malvinas (FalklandIslands) by orce in 1982.27 Te British were taken by surprise, since they hadgained sovereignty over the islands early in the 18th century, and they werebemused by Argentina’s position. But to the Argentinian mind, the conquest

was still vivid and alive; they were convinced that their’s was a reasonableposture, and they expected world support or it. We have seen similar historic

events raised during the conficts in the Balkans and throughout the variousconficts and wars in the Middle East. Tis is not a mind-set that is shared by the United States and Britain and some o Western Europe. We tend to think o the past as being past, and our orientation is to the uture.

Orientation towards some set o belies also provides a mind-set. Forinstance, we have recently seen the problems that have arisen in academe by adherence to political correctness, as demonstrated recently at Duke University.Te eighty-eight proessors who took out an advertisement supporting those

who were denouncing and threatening the lacrosse players tended to be romthose departments that promote political correctness. It is likely that they

were so immersed in their own story—myths o white “jocks”—that they couldn’t conceive that the students were innocent.

Another example, in which Fisher provides both his own observationsas well as quoting rom Glen Dealy, illustrates some o the key dierencesbetween the United States and Latin America.28 American society is positive,optimistic, and “can-do.” It places great emphasis on individual achievement

and the rewards to be gained rom it, and it emphasizes eciency and progressby the management o “things.” It is essentially middle class, and has middle-class values, and the real source o power is economic power. People who arehighly regarded in society (even including movie stars and sports personalities)tend to have these characteristics, although working hard or a living providesa greater sense o success. In Latin America, class plays a much greater role.Being who you are counts or more than what you have achieved. Indeed, work is to be avoided wherever possible. Education ocuses on the development o

personality and social skills, and the emphasis is on managing relationshipsrather than on managing things. Latin Americans are more atalistic, as seenin their arts, and even a sense o individualism is dened more in terms o

27. Fisher, Mindsets , 41.

28. Ibid., 52-55, 64-65, 110-111.




personal dignity than in terms o achievement. Teir leaders are chosen ortheir orceul personalities and eloquence and or their appearance o being

able to take charge—in other words their social power. ogether, these kinds o patterns in mind-sets can provide a useul background rom which to analyzecommunications and also to direct communications in a more meaninguland infuential way.

We need to realize that these mind-sets and group patterns aect everyonerom a culture, even those who may be involved in diplomacy, the ArmedForces, or multinational corporations and those who have lived abroad ormany years. When they make decisions, set a policy, or execute one, they

reinorce their views about the rightness o that policy or action while trying,at the same time, to pay attention to the culture in which they are operating.

When the policy or action is taken in a country remote rom the country o the actor’s origin, then it is likely to be less acceptable or viable to that country,but it may “sell” better (to Congress, constituents etc.) in the country rom

which the actor comes.

Fisher suggested that one o the best ways to understand mind-sets is toobserve ordinary behavior, such as noting how praise and censure is given,

how and what children are taught, and what makes people sentimental orarouses emotional reactions.29 Insight can be ound in humor, cartoons,literature, poetry, and especially in children’s stories. Tese may not seemlikely sources o intelligence or military organizations, but they shouldbe i we are interested in understanding and infuencing various countries,cultures, or groups. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the internet, which wasnot around when Fisher wrote his book, is also a good source o inormationabout mind-sets, especially those o specic activist/terrorist target groups.

One o the strongest infuences on mind-sets is the Fourth Estate. Tis isdeserving o a section all on its own.

Te Media

We cannot overstate the importance o the media in developing thestories, the mind-sets, and the perceptions o those in our own country—policy makers and the general public—as well as those in our adversaries’countries. Moreover, journalists are rarely the objective reporters that they

would like people to believe; rather than being simply the providers o inormation about events, they have increasingly become part o the events.Teir biases have been recorded not just by people o dierent politicalpersuasions, but by members (or ormer members) o their own raternities,

29. Ibid., 55-56




such as Bernard Goldberg rom CBS, who has ocused on the media’s biases,and John Stossel rom ABC, who has ocused on its lack o understanding

o science and economics.30

Good news has never sold as many copies o newspapers or improved the ratings o television news stations as bad news,so bad news is more widely reported. However, the repetition o horricimages and negative stories must surely have an impact on the mind-sets o requent viewers. In recent years the media have become more political and,in many respects, anti-American, giving predominant voice to those withgrievances and political axes to grind. American news media are not the only ones with problems. Recently, as reported in the New York imes on May 3,

2007, Howayda aha rom Al Jazeera was convicted in Egypt or purportedly abricating a documentary that accused Egyptian police o torturing theirprisoners.

Te media are so dominant in today’s world that diplomacy, internationalaairs, and military engagements have to take note o the media’s watchuleye and conduct their business in that arena rather than at the negotiatingtables and conerence rooms o yesteryear. It places enormous constraintson what can be done and how it can be accomplished when leaks or tactical

errors can be viewed around the world within minutes and can lead to hugestrategic problems. Recently, om Ricks, writing in the Washington Post on

July 1, quotes rom Captain William Ault’s argument in a recent issue o Armor magazine. How could “the undisputed military power in the world” be losing a

war against lightly armed insurgents? Ault’s answer: “Te Media did it.” Ricksgoes on to say that the media assists insurgent orces by continually maintainingpressure on the supporting government and military establishment. Te same

week, Oliver North, expressed his view o the power o the media and their

tendency to exaggerate any statement or event to urther their point o view.Commenting on the media’s coverage o Richard Lugar’s recent statementabout the war in Iraq losing “contact with our national security interests inthe Middle East and beyond,” North noted “America’s media elites….havedetermined the outcome o the war against radical Islam will be decided noton the battleelds o Iraq, but in the corridors o power in Washington. Andabout that, they may very well be right.”31

30. Bernard Goldberg, Bias: a CBS Insider Exposes how the Media Distort the News (Washington DC, Regnery Publishing, Inc., 2002); John Stossel, Myths, Lies, and Downright Stupidity (New York, Hyperion, 2006).

31. Te text o North’s article may be ound online on the Human Events website, athttp://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=21351. Posted 29 June 2007; accessed 5September 2007.




Another problem is that o the “specialist.” Most o the situations inthe world today are complex, and a real understanding is likely to require

a multidisciplinary approach, involving anthropologists, psychologists,regional specialists, military analysts, and many others. All o that takestime, and so the media rely on experts or specialists who come rom a singlediscipline, or on retired military ocers, some o whom grasp the implicationso this new orm o warare, and some o whom do not. Who is the publicto believe? From whom do they get their stories and mind-sets? Generally,rom those whose values and politics they share. Tus, any serious analysiso mind-sets needs to include the role o the media and the mind-sets o its

prime commentators.Group Identity

Everyone is a member o many groups—most o which are taken orgranted—national, race, ethnic, gender, interests, sports, school/university,and many other organizations. We see the strength o identity among seriousans when one ootball or baseball team is beaten by another. In politics,

we see candidates identiying with their constituents, rolling up their sleeves,speaking with slightly dierent accents, and using dierent colloquialismsin order to demonstrate their solidarity with and commitment to them.Clearly, the groups in which we are interested are the terrorist and insurgentorganizations currently operating across the Middle East, the Far East, and

with cells in Europe and the United States. Tese tend to be Islamic (bothSunni and Shia), Arab, Indonesian, and Philippine. While we may also beinterested in drug and terrorist groups in Latin America and Arica and thepotential or conficts with China and North Korea, let us stay with the moreobvious terrorist groups or the moment.

Tese Islamic terrorist groups are ormed around religious ideals andideologies. What are the essential qualities o these groups? Kenneth Hooverdiscusses some o the key attributes o identity, including competence andintegrity.32 In this denition, competence means the ability to have productivesocial and personal relationships that can be validated by the group. Integrity includes belies—religious, ideological, national/tribal—and it involvestransactions between the individual and the group that involve loyalty andethnic ties. It also includes shared meanings that the individuals create oracquire. Tis suggests that values and motivations are key dimensions o group identity.

32. Kenneth Hoover, Te Power o Identity: Politics in a New Key (NJ, Chatham HousePublishers, 1997) 19, 49-52.




ogether with a number o colleagues, I have researched, designed, anddeveloped models o values and motivations that have been used in the

industrialized world since the early 1970s. Tose models have been used by commercial organizations or strategic planning, marketing, advertising, new business and product development, R&D planning, and communications—all areas that are also relevant or IO, PSYOPS, SC, and Intelligence. One o these models will be described briefy in the section on Cultural-CognitiveDimensions and in greater detail in the Appendix.

Mind-sets o the Arab/Islamic World

Since September 11, 2001, we have ocused much o our military activities on Iraq and Aghanistan and on al Qaeda and other radical Islamicgroups rom Europe to Indonesia and the Philippines. Te cultures, stories,mind-sets, and perceptions o Arabs and other Muslims are so very dierentrom ours that it is worth mentioning a ew key concepts here, although thismonograph is not about Radical Islam.

With one or two exceptions, most Islamic countries have an authoritarianepistemology based on the Qur’an. Tis means that their understanding o

everything—science, economics, justice, medicine—is based on the Qur’an.Some sects are more strict than others, with the Wahhabi madrassas inPakistan—where the aliban are educated—teaching a particularly strictand radical orm o Islam. In this kind o education, there is no concepto the individual learning anything, except by rote. He has to be able tomemorize and interpret the Qur’an to obtain answers to any questions.Creativity, intuition, and initiative are virtually orbidden. Conversations with an individual who was trying to run an electronics company in an Arab

state several years ago suggested that, even when administering examinationsto ensure that the electronics engineers were competent, the questionshad to be identical to ones the new engineers had already seen. Ocialsrom the government objected to dierent questions, even when they weresimilar to those in the texts. Tis discouragement o individual initiative andinsistence on the authority o the Qur’an is a likely cause o the poverty andbackwardness o the Arab countries. Even when the ruling amilies and otherindividuals have been educated in the West, they do not have sucient poweror, more likely, the will to change things.

Tese kinds o circumstances, together with the authoritarian epistemology,have prevented many Islamic countries rom developing the kinds o economiesthat they see in the West. David Pryce-Jones goes so ar as to say “Modernizing




in this respect, it seems, atally wounds the core (Islamic) identity.”33 And hethen suggests that the ailure to develop economically and politically generates

sel-pity, especially when they have experienced so many wars, civil wars, coups,and other events that have caused suering and poverty or so many Islamicpopulations.

In conversations with a Pakistani riend, he commented that young peoplein Pakistan today don’t know who they are. He said that many o those rom pooramilies, and who live in Pakistan, seem caught between two worlds—the old,orthodox world o their parents and tribes, and the new world ull o moderntechnology and consumer goods. Tey see the material benets o the West, yet

without the education and understanding o what has created such wealth, they don’t know what to do about it, or how to attain it. Tere are exceptions, o course, especially those rom wealthy amilies who have been educated in the

West and who may live in the West. But he said that even among those youngpeople, there is a great deal o dissatisaction because they cannot nd meaningin their lives. Many o their wealthy parents are not very religious, and theirchildren are becoming more orthodox, partly as a rebellion and partly becausethey are seeking meaning that they cannot nd elsewhere. Tis reminded me

o the interviews that McConnell conducted with young extremists, many o whom expressed similar sentiments.34 It may well be that the “home grown”terrorists and insurgents rom Western countries cannot nd meaning in theirlives; their amilies have become more secular and less concerned about theirreligion, and even the wealthy middle class may eel a sense o being second-class citizens. Te opportunity to be heroes, to have meaning—even i it meanskilling others and dying or the cause—could have an appeal or these youngmen (and perhaps women).

Several questions need to be raised here: What causes teenagers or young men, who have previously beenquiet, serious students or members o their communities in variouscountries in both the West and the rest o the Arab world to goto Pakistan and train in their madrassas, and then to ght in Iraq,

Aghanistan and elsewhere?

What are the tipping points?”

What could be done to prevent them rom going?”

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33. David Pryce-Jones, Te Closed Circle: an Interpretation o the Arabs , (Chicago, Ivan R.Dee, new edition 2002), xi.

34. McConnell, Stepping Over, passim.




Even Osama bin Laden, who came rom a wealthy and privileged amily,exhibited authentic sel pity, as Pryce-Jones noted, in his statement ater

September 11, when he said “Tanks be to God that what America is tastingnow is only a copy o what we have tasted. Our Islamic nation has beentasting the same or more than eighty years o humiliation and disgrace, itssons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated.” 35

Jabal al-Din-al-Aghani (1838-1897) was probably more infuentialthan any other Muslim in shaping the ideas o the Muslim world. As Patairemarked “Aghani recognized and stated emphatically that the British andFrench conquests in the Middle East…were made possible by science and that,

thereore, the Arabs must acquire science i they want to liberate themselvesrom Western domination.”36 He was amazed that the Christians hadinvented the cannon rather than the Muslims.37 Aghani continually appliedthe term “backwardness” to Muslims, setting up the tension o sel-pity andailure resulting rom adherence to Islam, which he exacerbated by exhortingMuslims to ollow Islam as he thought it should be. All o this set the sceneor the Muslim world, which had been well on its way to conquering mucho Europe a ew centuries earlier, to succumb to eelings o shame.

It is interesting to note that, in the West, scientic investigations beganduring the Renaissance (the rebirth o the Classical era) and became ormalizedduring the Enlightenment. Tis was the time o a major paradigm shit orthe West, away rom the authoritarian epistemology o medieval religiousdoctrine and towards an empirical epistemology based on the scienticmethod. Te Islamic world has not been through a similar shit, which couldexplain its current predicament.

Patai discusses at length the problem o Arab stagnation and loss o

initiative between the 7th and 13th centuries, and he quotes many eminent Arab scholars who have suggested that Arabs were living in the Middle Agesuntil Napoleon arrived in Egypt.38 In the three hundred years since then, many scholars have suggested dierent paths to the uture, including the separationo religion and science. However, in the ensuing sel-analysis, since they couldnot accept that the values o the indel were better than the values o theaithul, Muslims came to the conclusion that they had distorted their ownvalues and had become dierent rom what Islam had really taught. Tis was

35. Ibid., xii.

36. Raphael Patai, Te Arab Mind (New York, Hatherleigh Press, Revised edition, 2002),291.

37. Pryce-Jones, Closed Circle , 87.

38. Patai, Arab Mind , 261-283.




the beginning o the religion’s revival, the attempt to rediscover the old valuesand puriy Islam.

In Patai’s conclusions on the Arab mind, he discusses various areas,including language: “It is in this specic, emotionally colored quality languagehas or the Arab, in the sensate satisaction he derives rom the sound, rhythmand cadence o Arabic, that one must seek the psychological bases o hisinclination to rhetoricism, exaggeration, overassertion and repetition, and o his tendency to substitute words or actions.”39 Te psychology o Arabs isto be ound in the two traditional components o society—the pre-IslamicBedouins and then the Islamic component. Te pre-Islamic Bedouin element

contains the sense o kinship, loyalty, bravery, manliness, aversion to physical work, and a great emphasis on honor, “ace,” and sel respect. It also includesraiding, blood revenge, and hospitality. Te sexual honor o women isespecially important, and the honor o the woman’s entire paternal amily depends on it. Te Islamic element is seen in the way religion permeatesevery aspect o lie, providing a sustaining orce and direction. Predestinationor atalism is also a hallmark o the Islamic element; everything is attributedto the will o Allah. Generally the Arab temperament is one o conorming,

but the culture does provide a means through which suppressed emotions canbreak out. Tese are periodic fares o temper, anger, aggression, and violencethat are condoned by society. Patai believes that there is a lack o correlationbetween thoughts, words, and actions, with the Arab thoughts and wordsbeing more idealistic and independent o reality than action. Tis is refectedin Fouad Ajami’s book about the Arab intellectuals in the post World War Iperiod, who longed or the Arab world to embrace modernity. Te chapter onthe suicide o Khalil Hawi is a particularly poignant account.40 It describes the

personal anguish o a Christian Arab rom Lebanon who was angry at what was happening to his country, who saw what was coming yet elt powerlessto do anything about it.

One key concept that Patai examines at length in his book is that o the Arab quest or unity.41 Arabs have a deep conviction that, despite theirbeing citizens o dierent states and members o many social and ethnicgroups, there is one Arab nation, and that all Arab countries are part o asingle homeland. Tis was the supposed raison d’etre o the Socialist Arab

Ba’ath Party, although in practice it has done the opposite. Nonetheless, therestoration o the Caliphate is a highly motivating vision.

39. Ibid., 326-327.

40. Fouad Ajami, he Dream Palace o the Arabs (New York, Pantheon Books, 1998),26-110.

41. Patai, Arab Mind , 359-364.




Since Patai wrote and then revised his book, many events have occurred. Yet today’s terrorists and insurgents seem to represent an uneasy truce between

traditional Arab (Bedouin) and Islamic mind-sets and modernity in the ormo science. While the radicals permit no creativity in general, they exhibit greatcreativity in terms o tactics and the development o IEDs, bombs, and other

weaponry. Tey are innovative in their uses o technology such as cellphones.But behind them are still the concepts o revenge, honor, and “ace” mixed with resentment and envy o the West.

So What Can DoD Do?

First, it seems to me that what is needed in the short term is a way o developing an understanding o cultures, stories and mind-sets that can giveus a much greater awareness o what any adversaries anywhere are thinkingand doing and what they are likely to do next, even i it gives only an 80%solution. Te Department o Deense (DoD) needs that edge now in its counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism eorts. Te approach the Applied Futures’eam is taking in order to accomplish this is the ocus o this monograph—wecall it Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions Analysis.

Second, or the longer term, it seems imperative that Te United Statesconduct a great deal more research on cultures, stories, and mind-sets than it hasheretoore. Tis research should be multidisciplinary and should go ar beyondanything that is being done currently by academe or government. And theresults should be provided to key agencies rom the National Security Councilto the State Department, DoD, and the Intelligence Community. Much currentresearch is being done through single disciplines, on single countries, cultures,or regions o interest, without any attempt to identiy patterns and similarities

that could provide cross-cultural insightsIn terms o the research needed, as mentioned earlier, Fisher suggested

that one o the best ways to understand mind-sets is to observe ordinary behavior, either directly or as refected in humor, cartoons, literature, poetry,and in children’s stories. In addition, the internet is also an excellent sourceo inormation about mind-sets, especially those o specic activist/terroristtarget groups. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has just (25 June) released areport—Te War o Images and Ideas— on the breadth and sophistication o

Iraqi insurgent media.42

It ocuses on Sunni insurgents, as the Shia have accessto established media outlets. We must listen to the conversations o our targetaudiences—on the web as well as in coee shops and market places. We must

42. Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolo, Iraqi Insurgent Media: the War o Images and Ideas . Available on the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website at: realaudio.rerl.org/online/OLPDFles/insurgent.pd. Accessed 7 Sep. 2007.




watch their videos, their movies, and their television shows, and we must learn what is so unny about their jokes and cartoons, which oten contain real truths

about how people are eeling. We can make use o surveys and polls such asthe Gallup World Poll. We need to conduct ocus groups, acilitated by localsamiliar with the particular dialects and cultures, to help evaluate data romthese sources and to reveal stories and mind-sets. o this end, DoD must recruitand develop interpreters and translators who are current in the languages andin modern slang and colloquialisms, experts who understand the pertinenthistory, including recent events, and specialists in semiotics. Tese sources o inormation and the approaches used to identiy and clariy stories can also be

used to understand perceptions and mind-sets. All these orms o research can be used both or longer-term research and

to fesh out and test Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions Analysis as outlined inthe rst recommendation.

Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions Analysis

Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions Analysis is a method to enhance ourunderstanding o what we are seeing our adversaries do and what meaning and

motivation we attribute it to. It is based on an approach or seeing through ouradversaries’ eyes (mind-sets), and deducing how they understand the situation,

what they are thinking about it, and what they are thinking o doing aboutit. Tis will provide a greater understanding o truth or them as well as usand o our perceptions o them and their perceptions o us; this in turn willprovide us with better insight into the possible and probable consequences o any actions that we take in the light o those understandings.

Te author has identied a limited number o key cultural and cognitive

dimensions that can be used to model any culture or country, and whichthe members o our team believe are critical or military/political purposes.

We are not attempting to be comprehensive here; we are looking or 80%solutions, not perection. Nevertheless, the list is airly comprehensive:

Epistemologies

Ways o Tinking

Values, Belies, and Motivations

Approaches to Lie Approaches to Understanding

Approaches to Power

Measure o Achievement

Religious Belies

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Concern about Honor

Concern about Shame

Strategic imeactical ime

Group Orientation

Assertiveness

Attitude towards Death

Reactions to the Foreign

Each o these dimensions is described in more detail below. Tese are not

necessarily orthogonal, indeed some are subsets o others, yet we have calledthem out separately because o their importance. One o the areas that we shallbe researching is to identiy the relationships between the dimensions, so that

we can develop templates or models or each country or culture.

I have developed this list o Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions to enable us todescribe cultures according to several key characteristics. Tey have been urtherrened based on extensive research into cultures and cultural modeling romanthropological, psychological, and sociological perspectives. Te sources orthis research are included in the reerences.

Epistemologies (authority-based – to – empirical)

Starting in the Renaissance, we in the West have adopted an empirical,scientic approach to how we know things. We use the scientic method—positivism, objectivism, and reductionism. We analyze things, break theminto component parts, and reassemble them. In some non-Western countries,

the way o knowing things is much more authority-based (as was the Westernapproach during the Middle Ages.) In the Arab Middle East, or example, theapproach is authoritarian, which is why the Mullahs have so much infuence.Te Qur’an is the prime source o knowledge. People use it, and are required touse the Mullahs’ interpretations o it, to make sense o their situations. DavidCook has written about the deeat o the aliban and how their best clerics arenow poring through the Qur’an to try to nd out how Mohammed overcamehis deeats in battle and went on to victory, so that they might emulate him.43 o us this kind o “knowing” is superstition; thus, we do not even know how to go about understanding such people. I we do not share epistemologies,

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43. David Cook, “Te recovery o radical Islam in the wake o the deeat o the aliban”, inerrorism and Political Violence, 15, 1, Spring 2003, 31-56.




then this is the rst dimension that we need to consider when dealing withanother culture.44

Ways of Tinking (linear – to – holistic)

Research on cultural dierences in Ways o Tinking has been conductedby Richard Nisbett.45 Tis dimension has great importance to us, since wein the West (and particularly the United States) have a very linear, rational(Cartesian) approach to thinking. We pride ourselves on our analyticalcapability and our ability to separate out logic rom emotion. In doing so,however, we oten ignore contexts and the interdependencies that are o

critical importance to other cultures. Indeed we nd it dicult to imaginehow people who think holistically operate. Yet, as mentioned earlier, Nisbetthas discovered that cultures in the Far East tend to have a much moreholistic way o thinking. Cultures in the Middle East seem to be somewherebetween the two. We would consider this to be the next dimension that weshould understand when communicating with other cultures.46

Values, Beliefs, and Motivations (sustenance driven – to – sel actualization)

Tis dimension is based on Maslow’s theory o motivation andhierarchy o needs.47 Since the early 1970s, research has supported the ideathat people have a set o values, belies, and motivations that are relatively consistent, that are culturally based, and that underpin everything they do. Tese values and belies maniest through time as attitudes andliestyles, and in the short-term as behavior and perception.48 On oneside o the continuum are cultures that are sustenance driven. Tey areconcerned with meeting their basic needs and, even when they have the

things they need or survival, they tend to ocus on holding on to whatthey have, including tradition.

44. See Bernard Lewis, Islam and the West , (Oxord, Oxord University Press, 1993) andEdward W. Said, Orientalism, (New York, Random House, 1978) or two contrasting butuseul perspectives on the clash between Western and Middle Eastern epistemologies; see also

W. Kirk MacNulty, “Te paradigm perspective”, Futures Research Quarterly, 5, 3, 1989 35-54.

45. Nisbett, Geography o Tought , passim.

46. See also Helen A. Klein, “Cognition in natural settings: the cultural lens model” inKaplan (Ed) Cultural ergonomics, advances in human perormance and cognitive engineering (Oxord, Elsevier Press, 2004), and K. Peng and R Nisbett, “Culture, dialectics and reasoningabout contradiction”, American Psychologist , 54, 741-754.

47. Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality , (New York, Harper Row, 1954).

48. Christine MacNulty and Leslie Higgins, Applied Futures Social Change ProgramReports (London, 1988-1993).




In contrast, sel-actualized cultures (and people) are not ocused on basicsurvival needs. Tey are driven by intrinsic goals. Tey are psychologically

mature and place more importance on personal accomplishment (such asa career, or to relationships) and on people than they do on material things.Values o this sort represent the third dimension in order o importance when we do not share epistemologies and ways o thinking, and the rstin order o importance when we do. Tey also play a large role in groupidentity.49 See the Appendix or more detail.

Approaches to Life (being – to – doing)

Tis may seem like a peculiar notion to Americans, who are inveteratedo-ers. But there are parts o the world, both Middle and Far East, wherethe society has a much greater acceptance o what is, and very littleinclination to change it. In the Middle East, the phrase “I it be the will o

Allah” is used constantly, and events and circumstances are just accepted without the kind o questioning that Americans would indulge in. In theFar East, Buddhism encourages a similar, almost passive acceptance o lie.

Americans do not understand these attitudes. As a result we too oten try to orce issues ar too ast or the people o those regions. An illustrationo this is the American tendency to try to avoid or speed up the processo sitting down with Middle Eastern or Asian counterparts to drink tea.o Americans the process is a waste o time; they should be getting on with business. o the others, it is a process o becoming comortable withthe Americans—as they do with all guests—and not conducting businessuntil they eel in harmony.50

Approaches to Understanding (thinking – to – eeling)

In the West, with our linear approach to thinking and our empiricalepistemology, we have an intellectual approach to understanding. Weexpect to be able to analyze things intellectually, and we pride ourselveson being objective. Tis contrasts with Middle and Far Eastern culturesthat place a much higher value on eelings and emotions. Clearly thisdimension is related to the others mentioned here, but we have called itout separately because o its importance in developing and understandingcommunications and reactions.

49. See SRI International, VALS Program Reports , (Menlo Park, CA, 1978-1981); RonaldInglehart, Culture Shit in Advanced Industrial Society , (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990; and Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, (Princeton, NJ,Princeton, University Press, 1997).

50. Martha Maznevski et al “Cultural dimensions at the individual level o analysis,”International Journal o Cross-Cultural Management , 2002, 2.




Approaches to Power (centralization – to – decentralization)

Te dierence between centralization and decentralization is airly

obvious, and its importance lies in understanding how tightly or loosely thegovernment and other major institutions control the people. Tis tells ushow much reedom the citizens have and, thereore, how well, or little, weas Americans may be able to infuence them as compared to the infuenceo their own government. It also indicates the press and media’s degree o autonomy with regard to reporting events.51

Measure of Achievement (material – to – social)

Tis is not so much a dimension along which a country can be measured,as it is part o the success mind-set. Earlier I mentioned that achievementis a strong American value, and it is usually measured in terms o materialsuccess—acquisition o material wealth and power. Tis contrasts with theLatin American success, which is measured in terms o social relationshipsand social status.52 It appears that within terrorist organizations successis based on numbers killed, amount o daily lie disrupted, and probably minutes/hours o broadcast time and inches o newspaper reports on their

activities.

Religious Beliefs (critical or all aspects o lie – to – lack o religiousbelies)

Islam is more than a religion. It is a way o lie that permeates everythingin the Arab world, including its governments and system o justice. Shari’ameans Divine Law. While there are interpretations o the Qur’an that arear less undamentalist than we see in many Middle Eastern countries,

those interpretations most infuential at present are the undamentalistones. Tese have strict rules about women, dress codes, behaviors, andso orth. While many o the young people envy our reedom, even they regard us as ar too materialistic and licentious. Tey do not see ourapproaches to Christianity or Judaism as being religious in their sense,even i they recognize those religions. Since they do not hold us in highregard, it makes our work o infuencing them very dicult.53

51. See the related ideas o the Power Distance Index in Geert Hostede, Cultures

and Organizations , (London, McGraw Hill, 1991), and Hierarchy in Shalom H. Schwartz,“Beyond individualism/collectivism: new cultural dimensions o values” in Kim et al (Eds)Individualism and Collectivism: Teory, Methods and Applications , (Newbury Park, CA, Sage,1994) 85-119; and in Mazneski, “Cultural Dimensions.”

52. Fisher, Mindsets .

53. For the ollowing discussion o Religious Belies, Concern about Honor, and Concernabout Shame, see Patai, Arab Mind ; Pryce-Jones, Closed Circle ; and Lewis, Islam and the West .




Concern about Honor (low – to – high)

Tis and the next dimension are related to Values and Motivations,

but I believe that they are important enough to be called out separately.Honor is o great importance to everyone in the Middle and Far East,and it is a critical value or individuals, amilies, tribes, and nations. Incontrast, outside the Armed Forces, in the West, the concept o honor hasall but disappeared. Tus we do not pay anywhere near enough attentionto this value in our dealings with people o other cultures.

Concern about Shame (low – to – high)

Tis dimension is the opposite o honor, but because it is so criticalin its own respect, I consider it to be a key dimension. Te Arab MiddleEast, especially, is very concerned with “saving ace” and not bringingshame to onesel or one’s amily. (this is true o Far Eastern countries too).In the West, the concept o shame has almost disappeared. According tomany o its own commentators, the Arab Middle East eels lacking in sel respect because o the importance people place on how they are perceived,especially by the West. Tis oten leads them to resent any kind o aid

that we give them, and to resent us in turn. Tey are typically quick tosee condescension in any communication or aid that is oered.

Strategic ime (short – to – long)

Tis dimension is about a culture’s sense o history and theunderstanding brought about by that sense o history. It permeates every story, every perception, and every decision. It is also about the time over

which they expect their actions to play out. In the United States, we have

probably the shortest strategic time o anywhere on the planet, and thiscan be seen in our desire or everything to happen “right now.” Tis canbe a real handicap or IO and PSYOP, which can take considerable timebeore results are seen. China likely has the longest strategic time. TeMiddle East is generally somewhere in the middle: radical Islam talksabout the re-conquest o Europe and the re-establishment o the Caliphateon the one hand, while countries such as Iraq have a very short history o their various tribes and religious groups working as a nation.54

actical ime (short – to – long)

Te concept o tactical time is related to that o Strategic ime, butit is ocused on the time taken to respond to events. A trivial example o

54. See Hostede’s Long erm Orientation in, Cultures and organizations.. Also related tothis dimension is the concept o ime Horizon: see, Klein “Cognition in natural settings.”




long actical ime is that o Finland where, at the end o a presentation,the audience expects to wait or several minutes beore asking questions.

Tey want to ensure that they have the time to think about what hasbeen said, so that their questions are well considered. Tey regard it asrude to ask a question too quickly, unlike Americans who are ready to ask questions beore the speaker has nished. Te delay in the Radical Islamresponse to the Danish Cartoons raises a question: What caused the delay,and could we expect similar delays in responses to other events? Tis isa new concept that we are working on, and one which does not seem tohave been explored by others. It could have signicant implications or

IO and PSYOPS.Group Orientation (individualistic – to – collective)

Tis is a measure o the degree to which the society regards itsel as asingle entity or as a collection o individuals who are simply members o that society. On the individualist side we nd societies in which the tiesbetween individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look ater him/hersel and his/her immediate amily. On the collectivist side, we nd societiesin which people rom birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesivein-groups: oten extended amilies with uncles, aunts, and grandparents

who continue protecting them in exchange or unquestioning loyalty.Te word ‘collectivism’ in this sense has no political meaning. It reers tokinship in the group, not to the state.55

Assertiveness (masculinity – to – maternalism)

Although this dimension began by reerring to the distributiono roles between the genders, Hostede’s work indicated that women’s

values dier less among societies than men’s values.56 Moreover, men’svalues rom one country to another contain a dimension rom very assertive and competitive to more caring and concerned values. In

work conducted by Applied Futures, masculinity has come to mean anoutgoing competitiveness and aggressiveness, while maternalism impliesmore caring and concern, even passivity.57 Japan is the most Masculinecountry yet examined, while Sweden is the most Maternal. Te MiddleEastern countries tend to be more Maternal because o their passivity

and atalism.

55. See Hostede, Cultures and Organizations , and Maznevski et al, “Cultural dimensions,”and the concepts o Aective and Intellectual Autonomy in Schwartz, “Beyond individualism/collectivism.”

56. Hostede, Cultures and Organizations .

57. MacNulty and Higgins, Applied Futures Social Change Program Reports .




Attitudes owards Death (acceptance/avoidance)

Tis is not a dimension in the sense that we can measure countries

along it as we can with the other dimensions; rather it is about the impacto attitudes about death on behavior. For instance, the Islamic suicidebombers do not appear to be araid o death—they go to it willingly—andthey are regarded as martyrs. Tere may be various reasons or this. Notonly do they get the promise o heaven and virgins, they may remove theshame o poverty and unemployment and bring honor to their amilies.In addition, since some get paid or doing it, they also bring nancialrewards to their amilies. While Christians also expect to go to heaven

ater death, they do not seem to welcome death in the same way. Indeed,they do everything they can to avoid death. Tis makes them much morevulnerable to acts o terrorism than almost any other culture. Although weare probably not going to be too concerned with studying Buddhists, they tend to have a calm acceptance o death, perhaps even welcoming it.

Reactions to the Foreign (open – to – closed)

While this dimension has some relationship to the political system,

it is also cultural and related to values. Some countries are open tooreigners and oreign ideas (e.g., the USA, UK, and Canada). Some areopen to innovations and assimilate them easily, but are not quite so opento oreigners (e.g., Japan). Other countries are quite closed to new ideas(e.g., Burma). Tis dimension is likely to be useul in determining how inormation operations might be conducted.58

In gure 2, I illustrate educated guesses about how the U.S. and Iraqicultures would all on some o these dimensions. I have also included an

ally—France—to indicate that, even in the West, there are dierences, whichmakes it necessary to understand allies rom these same perspectives.

Where the countries’ positions are close together, it means that they havegreater likelihood o understanding one another—although even here, weneed to be aware o the totality o the dimensions and how they maniest ineach country. Where they are ar apart, it means that they are likely to havereal dierences in perception, understanding, motivation, and behavior. Atpresent, the positions o dierent cultures on these dimensions will have to

be estimated using the subjective judgment o experts. Later, our team hopesto be able to quantiy them.

58 Ibid., For a description o Western versus Arab openness, see Patai, Arab Mind , andLewis, Islam and the West .




For instance, as an example o the dierences between us and anIslamic culture, let us imagine communications written in our normalashion—applying logic in our usual linear style—and the content o ourmessage is based on some empirical or scientic analysis. How will theIslamic culture (authoritarian, and with a more holistic way o thinking)view our communication? In May o 2006, President Ahmadinejad o Iran

sent a personal letter to President Bush. According to media reports, theletter was about sixteen pages long, rambled on in some unintelligible way,contained many quotations rom the Qur’an, and appeared to be askingPresident Bush to convert to Islam. Te media’s response was that theletter was the ramblings o a madman. I have not seen a translation o theletter, but it would not surprise me i it was a airly typical Islamic/Iraniancommunication (rom an authoritarian epistemology, and holistic way o thinking). President Ahmadinejad was not educated in the West, and

thereore probably lacked the knowledge o Western diplomatic language.Te letter certainly contained the rst phase o a typical 3-phase Islamicthreat—conversion, then coercion, then invasion. But because we (or ourmedia) were viewing the letter through our Western mind-set, and probably through stories that we have told ourselves about Ahmadinejad, we couldnot give it credibility.

Figure2.CulturalDimensions–Examples




When we, in the United States, engage in IO, PSYOPS, or SC, we doemploy oreign nationals to help us crat messages. However, we need more

than educated people who can translate what we are wanting to say, we needto ensure that we are addressing the appropriate mind-sets in the appropriate way. When we engage in Intelligence operations, we need to ensure that we are understanding what is really being communicated, not just what atranslator or interpreter tells us.

Te Future o Cultural Understanding

Each o these Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions needs to be developed and

feshed out urther or each culture under consideration. I believe that thematerial in this monograph will provide a good starting point or anyone who is working to understand adversaries and to develop means or dealing with them. Te Applied Futures eam (composed o Applied Futures, Inc.,Cognitive Perormance Group LLC, and Alidade Incorporated) is workingto identiy the relationships between these dimensions in order to developtemplates and models or applying them to any culture rapidly.

But there are two urther elements to the whole picture.

Cognitive ask Analysis (Cognitive Perormance Group), which providesa perspective on culture and decision mechanisms in order to identiy the appropriate “lens” through which to assess a society’s behavior, andthereby understand how to infuence it. Tis analysis includes Sense-Making and Decision-Making at group and individual levels.

Complex Network Analysis and Complex Systems Research (Alidade), which provides an understanding o how collective behavior propagates

and amplies through the structure, dynamics, and evolution o networks(such as media, social relationships or other networked cultural [political,military, economic, social, inrastructure, inormation – PMESII]artiacts).59 Tis includes identication o ipping Points.

ogether with the Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions, these two areas orm atechnique our team has called Cultural-Cognitive Systems Analysis (CCSA)SM Tis provides the most comprehensive approach or planning and assessing IO,PSYOPS, Eects Based Operations (EBO), and SC that exists.60 A diagram

o that approach, developed together with the Cognitive Perormance Groupand Alidade Incorporated, is shown in gure 3. But that is another story…

59. Te acronym PMESII stands or Political, Military, Economic, Social, Inrastructure,Inormation systems.

60. Christine MacNulty, William Ross, and Jerey Cares, “Cultural-Cognitive Systems Analysis (CCSA)SM” – Te subject o many presentations.




Additional Considerations (derived rom Fisher’s checklist).61

Fisher oers an approach or becoming more cross-culturally aware. While it was developed more or diplomats and oreign service ocers thanor members o the military, it provides a systematic way o diagnosing aspectso mind-sets in addition to our Cultural-Cognitive Dimensions. We, in theU.S., need to understand the particular contexts within which we and theadversary are operating. Tat means being able to answer such questions as:

How do obvious dierences in historical, geographical, or economicacts o lie translate into special patterns o priorities and concerns?For instance, clearly, at one time, Arabia was a center o learning and civilization. What must people eel to have lost that Golden Age, and to be

perceived as inerior to the West? It must aect their attitudes and behavior towards us.

How does the context in which issues are presented aect the way they are perceived, or alter their dramatic or emotional impact? Repetition,loud music, and somber voices heighten the drama o video ootage. Routine military exercises may be perceived as saber rattling, when conducted near a country o interest.

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61. Fisher, Mindsets , 71-90.

Figure3.Cultural-CognitiveSystemsAnalysis(CCSA)SM




Do any unanticipated higher priority concerns or hidden agendasinfuence the perception o the issue? Tese may range rom

misperceptions o motives to concern about the economic or “loss-o-ace” costs o compliance with some agreement.

We need to be aware o the knowledge and inormation base that we andour adversaries have.

What knowledge or inormation base do people bring to the issueor event? Has their education or their experience equipped them tounderstand the issues? Do they interpret the issues the same way?

What is the eect o new inormation such as that coming rom themedia or the internet? Does it add to the knowledge base? Does it add to misperceptions? Is it propaganda? What impact is it likely to have onthe public o our country and others?

What myths (including historical ones) are included in theinormation? Much o the Middle East blames the West and/or Israel

or its poverty and stagnation, or instance, and that myth permeates public perception o anything that we do.

Te Image Factor

What images o the other side require consideration? Tis is adifcult area, and we need to look careully or the sources o the images.Some would say that we are so politically correct that we do not permit ourselves to recognize the violent aspects o Islam.

What images o us require consideration in the context o our goals?Te image o the Great Satan is still a pervasive one. And some people

have not orgotten the Christian crusades. Handing out candy and toys to children in war zones projects a good image, but acing women and children while armed with ries does not.

Which o our national sel-images help explain reactions to issues orevents? We seem to see ourselves as the world’s policeman—keeping order,maintaining the peace, being helpul. We are generous, and we fnd it dicult to imagine that people are willing to “bite the hand that eeds them.”

Te nal section o Fisher’s checklist covers the cultural and socialdeterminants o the dynamics between countries. He discusses mismatches indeep cultural belies, values, and assumptions. In act, our Cultural-CognitiveDimensions Analysis goes well beyond anything that Fisher discusses.

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Conclusions

Future warare is likely to include more action against terrorist groups

and insurgents, more stability operations, and more operations in urban areas where our Armed Forces will have to deal with civilians as well as their targets.Even i we acquire a peer competitor, our knowledge o its culture is likely tobe less comprehensive than we would like. Tis means that we need to think very careully about the outcomes and results we want to achieve—rom bothtraditional, kinetic warare and rom non-kinetic operations, including IO,PSYOPS, and SC—wherever in the world we may be operating. In addition, we need to ensure that the intelligence gathered by whatever “_IN” seems

appropriate, is what we need. Without a thorough understanding o what weare up against in terms o cultures, mind-sets, perceptions, and truths, we willnot be able to rame our real, desired outcomes or the strategies and tacticsor achieving them.

Misperceptions or misattributions o motivations can produceunanticipated consequences o enormous magnitude.

I cannot emphasize enough the importance o this understanding o cultures. It is needed or our decision makers and planners; it is also needed by our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines with their boots on the ground. In-depth education and training in cultures must become part o the curriculumor anyone going into combat overseas. Tis may require more time and eortthan we have time or at present; it may even require dierent people romthose we currently recruit and commission—but we need to start thinkingalong these lines.



APPENDIX

Applied Futures’ / Cultural Dynamics’ Social Models

Since the early ‘70’s, Applied Futures and its sister company, CulturalDynamics, have conducted studies o the uture, including research intochanging values, belies, and motivations. Our studies included a statisticalmodel o the UK society in which Applied Futures’ headquarters was locateduntil 1993. During that same period, associates in other industrialized nations,including the United States, developed similar models.

Te model we use is based on Abraham Maslow’s theory o motivation,62

and it has been validated by data rom periodic surveys o random samples o the UK population conducted since 1973.63 In the United States, similar surveys,conducted rom 1968 to1986 showed very similar results. 64 Discussions withProessor Ronald Inglehart (University o Michigan) about two o his booksprovided urther validation or this model.65 Maslow’s contention was thatevery individual has within his psychological ramework a hierarchy o needs,as represented in gure A1. Shalom Schwartz has also produced a values-based

model that has been tested in many dierent countries and which correlates well with our model.66

According to Maslow, the individual must satisy, at least in part, theneeds at one level o the hierarchy beore he can be even conscious o thoseat the next level. Maslow saw this as a process o psychological developmentthat takes place throughout lie; so that by learning to satisy the needs o progressive levels the individual can, in time, realize his ull psychologicalpotential. Maslow also made the distinction between “deciency needs,”

which the individual perceives as some sort o lack, and “growth” needs, whichare recognized as experiences needed or the realization o one’s individualpotential.67 From our data and rom discussions with colleagues around the

62. Maslow, Motivation and Personality .

63. aylor Nelson, Monitor Program Reports , (Epsom, Surrey, 1973-1988); see also,MacNulty and Higgins, Applied Futures Social Change Program Reports .

64. SRI International, VALS Program Reports .

65. Inglehart, Culture Shit in Advanced Industrial Society, and Modernization andPostmodernization.

66. See in Shalom Schwartz, “Beyond individualism/collectivism” and in ShalomSchwartz, “Basic human values: an overview” (Jerusalem, Hebrew University 2005) < www.mag.unict.it/Allegati/convegno%207-8-10-05/Schwartzpaper.pd >.

67. Abraham Maslow “Deciency motivation and growth motivation,” NebraskaSymposium on Motivation (Nebraska, University o Nebraska, 1955).




FigureA1.Maslow’sHierarchyofNeeds

world, we believe that most o the industrialized countries are moving into thegrowth needs, while most Arab and Islamic countries are still in the deciency needs. Tis is one o the major causes o Arab resentment.

Te undamental idea that underlies our social model is that every individual possesses a set o values and belies. Tese are based on the needsthe individual perceives; and i they change at all, they change only slowly—as he works his way through the hierarchy o needs. Tese values and belies

motivate almost everything the individual does. Tese long-term values (by long-term, we mean values that are held or a period o rom ve to twenty years) are maniested in the medium-term as attitudes and liestyles, andin the short-term as behavior. By understanding their motivations, we canassess the likely attitudes and behavior o people to a much greater degreethan we can by extrapolating behavioral data.

In addition to these social values being the most undamental drivingorce or change, it is the very act that they change slowly that makes

them so important and valuable when taking a longer-term view; they area relatively stable element in a world o “ast-changing” data. Our modelproposes that by understanding the values o individuals in a society andthe way those values are changing we can observe the developments takingplace within that society, identiy the way in which they are occurring, and(in a general way) assess the manner in which the society will behave.




We recognize three major groupings o social values within the UnitedStates, United Kingdom, other Western countries, and Japan. We reer tothese groups as Pioneers, Prospectors, and Settlers. In each country we also havesub-groupings that give added renement to the model. In the paragraphsbelow we describe briefy the principal identiying characteristics o each o these groups, set out what our understanding o their role in society is, andsuggest how we expect them to infuence the uture. While Maslow saw thatevery individual has the potential or moving through the entire hierarchy o needs, he also recognized what he called “dominant motivation”—thetendency o an individual to have a “center o gravity” around which heoperates. Te three groups we have identied are named or the dominantmotivation o the people who espouse them.

Examples o national groupings are given in gure A2, which was

prepared or a project undertaken or IBM Europe.

Geert Hostede, the Dutch anthropologist, has examined a number o countries in terms o a small number o dimensions.68 We have plotted some

o his work on to a map o our values, as shown in gure A3.Pioneer Group

Te Pioneer Group is so named because its members derive their senseo personal direction, their personal rewards, and their criteria or success

FigureA2.InternationalComparisonofValues(FromMacNulty&ZetterbergforIBM,1986)

68. Hostede, Cultures and Organizations .




FigureA3.GeertHofstede’sCulturalModel(withFactorAnalysisbyCulturalDynamics)

rom exploring the bounds—physical, mental, and emotional. Te standardsby which Pioneers measure themselves, and the world, tend not to be thematerialistic standards o wealth, social class, income, status, or possession; butrather they are standards involving such things as integrity, honesty, quality, andappropriateness to the situation. Pioneers are the most psychologically mature

o the groups, yet they are still seeking greater maturity. Although most are notanti-materialistic, they consider people rather than things to be o paramountimportance; thereore, they tend to see people in ways which have ar greaterhuman signicance than the social role o membership in a class or the economicrole o producer/consumer.

Teir introspection is a characteristic that makes these people very easy to misunderstand; and it is important not to conuse Pioneer introspection

with introversion or sel-centeredness. While they do try to maximize their

own, individual, potential, they generally seek to do that in a way that is notexploitive o others.

Pioneers are dicult to observe because the thing that distinguishes themrom the rest o the population is their motivation rather than their behavior ;and as a result o this, the media has real diculty in presenting Pioneers.




69. In 1986, Hans Zetterberg rom SIFO in Sweden conducted research or IBM thatincluded surveys o the populations o a number o countries, including the United States. Teauthor contributed to that project. In 2006 the Canadian Social Research company, Environics,used those questions on a survey they did in the United States. Tese percentages are based onthat survey.

70. Faith Popcorn, Te Popcorn Report , (New York, Doubleday, 1991)

Pioneers tend to be sel condent; and although they are by no means anti-social, they do not eel obliged to conorm to stereotyped social “norms.”

It seems likely that it is the combination o their sel condence andtheir inner sense o what is important in their lives that gives the Pioneergroup its signicant role as “trendsetters” in society. During the past thirty years, almost every major trend in Western societies has been started by thisgroup, although the trends have then been picked up and driven, as ashion,by Prospectors. In almost every area, the Pioneer group has infuence out o all proportion to its size. Indeed, the 1998 Yankelovich Monitor, in describing

“America’s New Agenda” suggested that Generation X had adopted many

earlier Pioneer approaches to lie. Te Pioneer group has been growing slowly or the past thirty years; and although the growth rate has slowed recently, weexpect it to continue to grow slowly in most industrialized countries. Indeed,in the United States it has grown rom 22% twenty years ago to 37% o thepopulation today.69 However, it is possible that, i industrialized countriesexperience signicant immigration, the proportion o Pioneers may decline.In any case, we expect that they will maintain signicant infuence.

With respect to the “bad” side o Pioneers, we should note that they are, at

heart, idealists. From what we have seen through the media o Osama bin Laden,he is probably a Pioneer whose idealism was thwarted, and hence became anideology

Prospector GroupIn contrast to inner-directed people, Prospectors rely heavily on external

indicators o their own sel worth. o put it another way, a Prospector’sconcept o himsel depends upon his being able to compare himsel withothers; his sel esteem depends upon nding himsel to be “better o”—

usually in some materialistic way. Since they are, especially in the West,characterized by the idea that “you are what you consume, they orm aneasily visible group.”70 Display, and particularly the display o possessionsand “badges,” is a necessary element in establishing their place in society. Tisshows clearly in their homes, which tend to be neat, tidy, and well organized,

with their most prestigious possessions, particularly consumer goods, openly exhibited. Display can also be seen in evidence o recent exotic vacationsor activities, or in the use o high quality tness and sporting gear. In Latin




America and some other countries, where success comes rom social statusrather than material things, Prospectors will seek social success and the power

that accompanies it. As the notation on Maslow’s diagram indicates, Prospector needs are

centered on esteem. Tereore, at work the Prospector person is conscious o,and seeks actively to acquire, status and the symbols related to it. Such peopleare very much at home in structured, hierarchical organizations in whichthey can establish their position clearly and then display their position andmeasure their progress relative to others. In identiying themselves with a peergroup in this way, Prospectors automatically judge themselves to be up to the

group’s level, and they generally use the group as the source o the standardsby which they judge their world. Te people in this group are o vital socialimportance; they are the dynamo, the energy source, in our society. Tey are the ones who eel the need to compete, who need to prove themselvesagainst the opposition, who have the drive to win at virtually any cost. TisProspector energy is essential to business as it operates today and to society in general i it is not to stagnate. Tis group grew very quickly during the‘80’s, declined a little during the early ‘90s, and now appears to be bouncing

back. In the United States, this group is 50% o the population. For the nextdecade, at least, we expect it to continue to grow in most o the industrializedand in the rapidly developing countries as long as their economies are viable.

Settler GroupEverywhere we look in Western industrial society, the two groups that we

have just considered are growing at the expense o a third group, which we callthe Settlers. Tis pattern has been a consistent trend or some time. Becauseo its declining size, we consider the direct impact o the Settler group on the

long-term uture o Western countries to be relatively small. However, they areinfuential at the moment, and to neglect them would be to miss the essentialrole they will play in infuencing the uture. Indeed, i the industrializedcountries experience signicant immigration rom the developing world, thisgroup may increase in size, although that has not been the case in the UnitedStates, where it has declined to 13% o the population.

Settler needs are deciency needs, and the distinguishing characteristico the Settler is a desire to “hold what you’ve got.” Tis orientation tends to

make them orm homogeneous groups with well-dened characteristics andrelatively impermeable boundaries. Te typical picture that this idea brings tomind is the tightly knit, clannish, working-class community. A little refection

will indicate that these characteristics also describe a good many company directors o the “old school,” a lot o the traditional “proessions” includinga university aculty, not to mention a good part o the hereditary peerage in




FigureA.CulturalDimension–Values–ExampleofUse

the UK. In act, we nd that the Settler groups include a substantial numbero people rom all these conventional classications, and the thing that they have in common is that they resist change. Not only do they hold on to theirpossessions, but to their institutions as well.

Te majority o the populations o developing countries are likely to beSettler, not just because some o them are poor, but because o close-knit tribal

values and a political power structure that works to keep them dependent. With a ew exceptions, the leaders o countries in the developing world seemto be Prospectors. Tey appear to be motivated by the need to acquire andmaintain power—and the wealth that goes with it—or themselves and otenor their amilies. Tey do not seem interested in wealth or everyone.

Comment It is important to understand that these statements o unction are not

value judgments. Nor is it sucient to think o these groups as being in

competition one with another, although the Settlers, particularly, might beprone to that view. Rather it is necessary to take a system’s view o society and understand that each o these unctions is both essential and benecialto the overall well-being o society. We are looking at a symbiosis in whichSettler inertia keeps Prospector enthusiasm in check, while the Prospectors,in turn, provide a ocus that prevents a Pioneer evaporation into personal




space. Conversely, the Pioneers constantly provide the Prospectors with new ideas and opportunities, while the Prospectors provide the energy to drive

businesses that service their material needs and those o the Settlers. What we have here, in act, is a psychological view o the great dynamic o society;it is the interplay o these three orces that really keeps the wheels movingthroughout the industrialized world and which, in our view, provides themajor driving orce or change.

o illustrate very simply how this model can be used, let us look at someo the characteristics and some personalities as shown in gure A4. With theexception o the Arsenal Soccer team members (Veira, Wenger, and Henri), on

whom we have data, the rest are guesstimates based on what we know aboutthem rom the media. However, such guesstimates can oten be correct.

However, the way in which they select their leaders and ollowers isgenerally correct. Since we know their values, we can understand how tomotivate the dierent groups to action, as we have done or commercialorganizations, their employees, and their customers.



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