us foreign policy towards northeast asia.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
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3PERCEPIONS, Winter 2012, Volume XVII, Number 4, pp. 3-26.
Key Words
Japanese-Amercan relatons, Japanese-
Amercan allance, Korean-Amercan
relatons, North Korea, Sno-Amercan
relatons, awan Strat ssue.
Introduction
Te date 7 December 2011 was the
70thannversary of the surprse Japanesear attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawa.
Tat day of nfamy long ago not only
brought Amerca nto a global war, but
propelled the US towards becomng the
domnant mltary and poltcal power n
East Asa. US foregn polcy n Asa was
shaped by four wars, three hot and one
cold. Te outcome of the Second WorldWar created a permanent Amercan
mltary presence n the regon and
transformed Japan nto a key ally. Te
Korean War, Amercas frst war fought
entrely on the Asan manland, saved
South Korea, whch became another US
ally. It also created a defensve permeter
for the Cold War, n whch the US faceddown both the Sovet Unon and the
Abstract
Snce the md-19th century, the US hasbeen a Pacfc power. Trough three warsand the Cold War, Amerca became a majorregonal player. Modern Japanese-Amercanrelatons were shaped by the Cold War, anda strong poltcal-mltary allance served thegeopoltcal needs of both countres. As Japanseconomy matured and ts poltcs transformedn the 1990s, okyo sought greater poltcalndependence, and used an upgradng of the
allance as part of ts effort to acheve the morenormal status as a great power. US relatonswth South Korea have been drven by a sharedpercepton of threat from North Korea. Sncethe Cold War, the nature of ths threat hasshfted from mmedate concern about conflctto danger from an essentally faled state. Sno-Amercan relatons centre on the nteracton oftwo great powers. Chnas quas-allance wththe US and market-orented reforms meant
that the relatonshp n the 1980s centred onrentegraton of Chna nto the global poltcaleconomy. Snce the md-1990s, Chnas rsehas led to ncreased tensons, especally nstrategc and economc ssue areas. Amercasclose but unoffcal relatonshp wth awanremans an rrtant to overall Chnese-Amercan tes.
Joel R. CAMPBELL*
US Foreign Policy towards Northeast Asia
* Associate Professor in the Masters of Scienceof International Relations program of royUniversity, teaching on the Pacific Region(Japan and Korea).
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newly communst Chna. Te Vetnam
War, whch has been perceved as a US
loss, nserted Amerca nto SoutheastAsan poltcs, wth Japan as a key
stagng area. wo more recent wars, n
Afghanstan and Iraq, reled on Japanese
bases for supply and tranng.
Post-Vetnam US foregn polcy
downplayed East Asa. Amerca
wthdrew from manland Southeast Asa
n the 1970s, and lost ts Phlppne
bases by 1991. Chna algned tself wth
Amerca n the latter days of the Cold
War, whle t ntroduced economc
reforms and opened up to foregn
trade and nvestment. Te end of the
Cold War eased regonal tensons, wth
only the Korean pennsula remanng
a flashpont. Japan contnued to rely
on Amercan defence guarantees as a
foundaton of ts own foregn polcy, but
ts outszed economc presence n the
1980s seemed on the wane by the md-
1990s.
Amerca has long seen tself as a Pacfc
power, and a key goal of US foregnpolcy has been to prevent any major
power or combnaton of powers ganng
control of Eurasa.1Much was made of
the Obama admnstratons pvot fromSouth Asa and the Mddle East to the
Asa-Pacfc n 2011. Te Presdent spent
most of last November bolsterng US
trade, poltcal, and mltary tes n the
regon. Te US hosted the Asa-Pacfc
Economc Cooperaton forum (APEC)
summt n Hawa. Obamas openng
address noted that the Asa Pacfcregon s absolutely crtcal to Amercas
economc growth we consder t a
top prorty.2He promoted the rans-
Pacfc Partnershp (PP), a free trade
area that would span the Pacfc, whch s
n prelmnary negotatons and has been
sgned up to by Australa, Malaysa, New
Zealand, Sngapore, and Vetnam (Japan,Canada, and Mexco have expressed
nterest n jonng the talks). Vstng
Australa, Obama joned wth Prme
Mnster Jula Gllard to reaffrm ther
allance, and both agreed that 2,500 US
Marnes would begn rotatng through an
Australan base near Darwn. Hs speech
to the Australan parlament focused onfreedom, some observers vewng ths
as an obvous contrast wth Chna. He
then attended the East Asa Summt n
Indonesa, where he announced that
the US was consderng normalsng
relatons wth Burma/Myanmar, based
on the mltary governments recent
prelmnary reforms. Secretary of StateHllary Clnton quckly vsted Yangon,
Te outcome of the SecondWorld War created a permanent
American military presencein the region and transformedJapan into a key ally.
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US-Japanese Relations
A History of Mutual Dependence
Te Unted States and Japan frst
encountered each other as md-19th
century rsng Pacfc powers. Te US
sought to open Japan ostensbly to
establsh ports of call for Amercan
whalng shps, and to promote Asan
trade. It was also a way to nsert tself nto
the mperalstc poltcs of Asa. Japan
was perhaps fortunate that a relatvely
small power lke the US came to call
n 1853, rather than the hegemonc
Great Brtan, whch was preoccuped
wth ts efforts to domnate Inda and
Chna. It took the Japanese 15 years to
fully decde how to respond to Western
encroachment, but the Mej Restoraton
n 1868 thrust Japan nto the modern
world along a path of economc and
poltcal modernsaton. At frst, Amerca
vewed Japans transformaton postvely,
as a naton replcatng the Anglo-Saxon
model, and as a counter to Russa and a
collapsng Chna.4
Amercas postve vew gradually
changed as Japan aggressvely entered the
Asa mperalsm game. Unlke European
powers, Japans colonal efforts were
mostly contguous, creatng mmedate
tenson wth other Asan countres.
Amerca protested Japans moves nto
Chna n the 1930s, and rsng blateraltenson culmnated n the attack on Pearl
and met wth both the leaders of the
rulng junta and opposton leader Aung
San Suu Ky.3
Te frst week of 2012, accompaned by
Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, Obama
announced a new mltary strategy to
support ths Asa pvot. Amerca would
draw down forces statoned n Europe
and reduce ts overall mltary strength,
whle mantanng force levels n East
Asa and deployng US Marnes to the
Phlppnes and Taland.
Ts artcle surveys Amercan foregn
polcy n Northeast Asa snce the Cold
War, focusng on shared hstory and
current ssues. It dscusses relatons
wth four key states or enttes: Japan,the Republc of Korea (hereafter called
Korea), Chna, and awan. It suggests
that Asa s once agan becomng
central to US polcy. Te Obama
admnstratons recent pvot to Asa s
only the latest manfestaton of Amercan
preoccupaton wth the regon, and
heralds an enhanced role for Asa nAmercan thnkng over the next decade.
America has long seen itself asa Pacific power, and a key goalof US foreign policy has beento prevent any major power or
combination of powers gainingcontrol of Eurasia.
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Harbor. Japan greatly mscalculated
Amercan wllngness to fght, and pad
dearly for t. Te subsequent PacfcWar (1941-1945) was marked by
ntense brutalty, and ended n Japans
overwhelmng defeat. Te crushng
nature of the vctory, followed by the
benevolence of the occupaton, helped
make Japans poltcal and economc
transformaton relatvely smooth.5
Japan emerged as Amercas key Asanally n the 1950s. Te frst key event
that shaped the relatonshp was the
San Francsco reaty of 1951 whch
restored Japans soveregnty after the
Amercan occupaton; along wth the
later Mutual Securty reaty, t made
Japan Amercas junor partner n East
Asa.6 Te allance was based on threemplct understandngs: Japan would
accept an nferor poston n return for
an Amercan guarantee of ts securty,
Japan would concentrate on economc
development and gan access to the US
market, and Japan could have a degree
of ndependence n ts foregn polcy but
would do nothng that would challengethe new regonal order n Asa or US
hegemonc leadershp.7 Ts trade-off
became known as the Yoshda Doctrne
after Prme Mnster Yoshda Shgeru,and whch stated that the US would
lead n the securty area, and Japan
would concentrate on developng ts
economy. A second key event was the
1960 renewal of the Mutual Securty
reaty whch, despte ant-treaty rots,
put securty tes on a more permanent
bass.8
Te relatonshp held througha number of challenges, notably the
drawn out reverson of Oknawa,
popular opposton to the Vetnam War,
and the Nxon Shocks of the early
1970s (Nxon slapped puntve tarffs on
Japanese exports, and decded to forge
a quas-allance wth Chna wthout
nformng Japanese leaders).As Japan became one of the worlds
largest economes n the 1970s, the
bfurcated nature of the relatonshp
became panfully clear. Whle Japan
contnued to defer to the US on regonal
and global securty, and remaned a
steadfast Cold War ally, Japanese neo-
mercantlst exports and predatorybusness behavour created huge trade
surpluses wth the US, helped destroy
several key Amercan ndustres, and led
to a number of hgh-profle takeovers of
Amercan companes. rade frcton
reached a peak n the md-1980s, as
Amercan calls for apprecaton of the
undervalued yen led to the Plaza Accordn 1985. Japanese banks and ndustral
Unlike European powers,Japans colonial efforts weremostly contiguous, creatingimmediate tension with otherAsian countries.
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waters of Japan, and would only work
wth Amercan forces n functonal
areas such as operatons, logstcs, andntellgence. After a three-year process,
okyo and Washngton specfed
condtons under whch the two natons
would jontly operate n future conflcts.
Te two mltares would now cooperate
n peacetme condtons, would work
together to thwart attacks on the
Japanese homeland, and would react toregonal threats that could affect Japans
securty. Tey also lsted new areas of
cooperaton, such as relef operatons
of US forces, support n rear areas, and
jont work on operatons.10
Begnnng n the 1960s, varous leaders
n the Japanese Lberal Democratc Party
(LDP), the governng party at the tme,sought ways to acheve two goals: greater
ndependence for Japanese foregn polcy
and more equalty n Japanese-Amercan
relatons. Comprehensve securty was
an effort n the 1970s to gve Japan more
breathng room n an era of ol shortages.
Meanwhle, okyo became a more actve
partner wth Amerca. By the 1970s,Japan funded 75 % of the costs of the US
frms began to recycle export earnngs
to the US economy, and Japan became
Amercas leadng credtor.Te allance faced ts greatest post-
Cold War test (and thrd key event)
not n East Asa but n the Mddle
East. Durng the 1991 Gulf War, Japan
was roundly crtcsed by Amercan
lawmakers and pundts for ts falure
to robustly support the Amercan-led
allance. okyo belatedly pledged US$4 bllon (wth an addtonal US $9
bllon later) to help defray the US $500
mllon daly war costs, and dspatched
a mne sweeper to the Persan Gulf
after the war had ended. Respondng
to nternatonal crtcsm, Japan wthn
two years undertook two major changes:
t markedly ncreased fnancal supportfor US forces n Japan, and commtted
to jonng UN peacekeepng operatons.
After ts frst successful postwar overseas
troop deployment n Camboda (1992-
1993), t partcpated n UN operatons
n several other countres.9
Upgrading the Partnership
A fourth key epsode was the draftng
of blateral defence gudelnes n 1997.
Earler agreements from the 1970s stated
that Japan would buld up suffcent
forces to provde ts own self-defence,
though the Japanese Self-Defence Force
(SDF) would carry out most of tsoperatons wthn the land and terrtoral
As Japan became one of theworlds largest economies in the1970s, the bifurcated natureof the relationship becamepainfully clear.
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bases n Japan, and had enacted a range
of legal measures to support US forces.
Japans fadng economc pre-emnenceand Chnas rsng economc power
meant that Japan receved less attenton
from Amercan poltcal leaders, and
Japan bashng gave way to Japan
passng n recent years. Domestc
poltcal changes n Japan n the 1990s,
ncludng the meltdown of the pacfst
Socalst Party, allowed conservatveleaders to promote the noton of Japan
as a normal naton, n other words
one that could project ts own mltary
mght as a great power. Te ascent of
Kozum Junchro to the premershp
was a game-changer n that t brought a
full upgradng of the Japanese-Amercan
relatonshp. Kozum beleved thatthe 9/11 attacks created a new global
securty realty, and that partcpaton
n the US-led coalton n Afghanstan
would provde an opportunty for Japan
to attan both greater ndependence and
equalty wth Amerca. Kozum was one
of the frst alles to pledge support for
the US campagn. He pushed the Ant-errorsm Specal Measures Law through
the Det, the Japanese parlament, n
October 2001, and then sent Martme
Self-Defence shps to the Indan Ocean
n support of the war.11
Te Iraq War two years later provded
an even more potent opportunty for
Kozum to boost tes wth Washngton.One of the few Amercan alles to
pledge support n ths war, Kozum
agreed to send an SDF force to do
humantaran and reconstructon workn Iraq. Kozum was lucky that there
were no casualtes, and the two-year
deployment took place wth only mld
protests n Japan.12 Kozum and US
Presdent George W. Bush also generally
agreed about the need to put pressure on
North Korea about ts nuclear weapons
programme, and both were equallyalarmed about the Chnese mltary
buld up. As long as Bush, Kozum, and
Kozums LDP successors were n offce,
the relatonshp remaned farly close,
though dsagreements over North Korea
surfaced when the USs hard-lne stance
dd not produce tangble results (Japanese
leaders were encouraged when Bushsteam made some temporary progress
wth Pyongyang durng hs last 18
months n offce). Te two governments
made headway on realgnment of US
bases to lmt ther mpact on Oknawa,
the creaton of a ballstc mssle defence
system for Japan, and on allowng
Japanese SDF a stronger role n natonaldefence.13 Te two governments also
worked together on a range of securty
ssues, such as ballstc mssle defence,
martme securty, and nter-operablty
of defence systems.14
Perhaps the bggest recent challenge
to the blateral relatonshp was the
landslde vctory of the Japaneseopposton party, the Democratc Party
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personnel n manland Japan, okyo
prefers basng n the southern sland
prefecture of Oknawa. Over 70 % of USforces statoned n Japan are based there,
and bases take up around 30 % of land
on the tny sland. Due n part to a strng
of crmes and varous accdents nvolvng
US servce personnel, there s sgnfcant
opposton to the bases on the sland.
Whle many Oknawans work on the
bases, large numbers of people would lketo reduce the mpact of US operatons,
and eventually move Amercan bases
off the sland. After a 1995 rape of a 12
year-old grl by three US servcemen,
whch sparked mass protests throughout
the country, Presdent Bll Clnton and
Prme Mnster Hashmoto Ryutaro
promsed to reduce the Amercanfootprnt on the sland. okyo and
Washngton later agreed to move 8,000
US Marnes to Guam, and to relocate
the Futenma Marne Ar Staton from ts
urban locaton to Henoko n northern
Oknawa.17
Te Oknawan prefectural government,
along wth local envronmental actvsts,has long pressed for the closng of
Futenma wthout relocaton to Henoko.
LDP leaders were commtted to the
agreement, but n 2009 the DPJ came to
power promsng to reopen the ssue. Te
Obama admnstraton dug n ts heels,
and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates
nssted that the agreement would not berenegotated. Prme Mnster Hatoyama
of Japan (DPJ), n September 2009.
Te DPJ platform called for major
changes n the allance, such as ganngmore equalty n the relatonshp,
promotng stronger regonal tes, and
lessenng the mpact of Amercan bases
on Oknawa. Once Hatoyama Yuko
took offce as prme mnster, blateral
tensons mounted.15 However, Japanese
people gave the LDP a landslde vctory,
ejectng the DPJ from power after threeyears durng the general electon on 16
December 2012. Japans recently elected
Prme Mnster Shnzo Abe met wth
Presdent Barack Obama on 22 February
2013 n Washngton, seekng to renforce
US-Japanese relatons n a tme of hgh
tensons for Japan, caused by a terrtoral
dspute between Japan and Chna overthe Senkaku/Daoyu Islands n the East
Chna sea, and a North Korean nuclear
test. At the summt wth Abe, Obama
called the allance wth Japan the central
foundaton of U.S. polcy on Asa.16
Futenma
Te Futenma ssue encapsulates
those unresolved tensons n Japanese-
Amercan relatons. Sxty years after
the postwar occupaton of Japan ended,
Japan stll depends on Amercan securty
guarantees, and a large Amercan
mltary presence remans, but t does
not st easly there. Unwllng to acceptlarge numbers of Amercan mltary
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was unable to convnce the prefectural
leaders to accept the agreement, hs
poston became poltcally untenable,and he resgned after only nne months
n offce. Te fasco ndcated a clear
poltcal falure by the DPJ to transform
the ncdent: attemptng to follow publc
opnon on the ssue, t poltcsed
securty polcymakng, but was not
able to come up wth coherent polcy
alternatves, and blateral securty polcyoutcomes remaned largely unchanged.18
Curts, for one, suggests that the
Obama admnstraton deserves much
of the blame for the crss, especally
for Secretary of Defence Robert
Gates puttng pressure on Hatoyamas
government mmedately after the
electon, and then Obamas reluctanceto help the prme mnster as he began
to flounder.19 Te Futenma agreement
remans n place but, 16 years after the
rape ncdent, t s uncertan when the
base wll be moved.
Recent Issues
Te 11 March 2011 earthquake,
tsunam and nuclear dsaster precptated
the worst humantaran and poltcal
crss n Japan of the postwar era. Te
mpact on an already strugglng Japanese
economy was ncalculable, and the
sluggsh handlng of the crss led to
the downfall of Kan Naoto, Hatoyamassuccessor as prme mnster. Ironcally, the
dsasters aftermath marked an upswng
n US-Japanese relatons as Amercan
mltary unts statoned n Japan assstedn relef operatons n the ohoku
regon (called Operaton omodach, or
frend), and US government agences
advsed ther Japanese counterparts on
dealng wth the crppled Fukushma
Dach nuclear plant. Overall relatons
had been mprovng snce md-2010,
when a Chnese fshng trawler rammeda Japan Coast Guard vessel n the East
Chna Sea. A mn-crss over Japans
holdng of the boats captan was averted
when Kan agreed to return hm to
Chna, but ths hurt the prme mnsters
publc approval. Suddenly, okyos old
fear of a rsng Chna trumped any desre
to equalse relatons wth Amerca, andthe DPJ government began to realse the
value of the allance.20
Japanese and Amercan polcymakershave worked to reduce economc
okyo and Washington havediscussed new frameworksfor cooperation, including
agreement to take bilateralissues to the World radeOrganisation (WO), draftingnew sector-specific agreements,and creating a bilateral freetrade agreement (FA).
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trade tes wth the US. Te need to
keep dversfed trade relatons became
manfest n late 2011 and early 2012, asncreased energy mports due to a post-
tsunam nuclear shutdown combned
wth softness n the Chnese market
caused Japan to run ts frst general trade
defcts n a generaton.
US-South Korean Relations
A Shared Treat Relationship
Amercas relatons wth South Korea
are a bond forged n blood, and are
domnated by one ssue: the threat
to the South from North Korea. US
troops occuped the southern half of the
pennsula at the end of the Second World
War, whle the Sovet army took thenorthern half. Te wartme alles agreed
that the two halves would be reunted
nto a democratc Korea, but they could
never agree on the terms under whch an
electon would take place. In 1948, the
Democratc Peoples Republc of Korea
(DPRK) under the Sovet-nstalled
leader Km Il Sung, and the Republc ofKorea (ROK) under the authortaran
Syngman Rhee (Lee Sung Man) began
as separate states. Sovet and Amercan
forces wthdrew from the pennsula, and
the Amercans unntentonally sgnalled
that they would not defend the South
f t was attacked. North Korea nvaded
the ROK n June 1950 and the rumanadmnstraton quckly ntervened n
frcton over the past decade, and have
cooperated on economc recovery snce
the 2008-2009 global recesson. Gonewere the hgh-profle trade dsputes of
the 1980s and 1990s, despte contnued
Japanese trade surpluses, and okyo dd
not protest the Obama admnstratons
efforts to revve the Amercan automoble
ndustry. Japan has attempted no
major devaluaton of ts currency to
take advantage of the recesson, andcontnued ts conservatve monetary
and fscal polcy. okyo and Washngton
have dscussed new frameworks for
cooperaton, ncludng agreement to
take blateral ssues to the World rade
Organsaton (WO), draftng new
sector-specfc agreements, and creatng
a blateral free trade agreement (FA).
21
Obamas polcy pvot to Asa was taken
n part to reassure Japanese leaders,
especally DPJ leaders who felt that the
US had sabotaged Hatoyama over the
Futenma ssue. Obama sees the Japan
allance as bedrock for hs Asa polcy,
snce Amercan forces wll contnue to
be based n Japan for the long term. Forther part, Japans DPJ leadershp by 2011
seemed much more wllng to cooperate
wth the US on Asa-Pacfc regonal
and securty ssues. Japans January 2012
announcement that t wshed to jon
multlateral negotatons on the PP
ndcated that the DPJ had embraced
the LDP polcy to lnk efforts towardsregonal ntegraton to contnued strong
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the conflct. Te ensung Korean War
lasted over three years, takng the lves
of over one mllon Koreans, perhaps300,000 Chnese, and more than 33,000
Amercans.
When the war ended n the stalemate of
an armstce, Amercan troops remaned
n the mpovershed South, whch was
ncorporated nto the US-East Asan
allance. Lke Japan, the ROK sgned a
mutual securty treaty wth Washngton,and Amerca provded heavy mltary and
economc ad to the strugglng country.
Snce the 1950s, the prmary motvaton
of the Korean-Amercan allance has
been to prevent another North Korean
attack on the South. Unlke Japan,
South Korea faced an antagonstc
state bound on ts destructon across aheavly fortfed border, the roncally
named Demltarsed Zone (DMZ).
Outsde threats to the country were
more mmedate, and the Amercan
role n the defence of the country more
heavy handed and drect. Amercan
forces were ntended as a trp-wre,
.e., suffcently large that Pyongyangwould always know that, n the event of
another Korean war, they would agan
face overwhelmng Amercan frepower.
Ts deterrence has apparently worked.Despte varous attempts to destablse
the South wth nfltraton, assassnaton
attempts and terrorst acts, North Korea
has never mounted a sustaned breach of
the armstce, at least untl two serous
ncdents n 2010.
Also unlke Japan, Korean poltcs
remaned authortaran under Rhees
tradtonal strong-man government
untl 1960, and then under the mltary
governments of Park Chung Hee and
Chun Doo Hwan from 1961 untl 1987.
However, Korea followed a Japanese-
style state-led, export-orented growth
path, and ts economy took off n the
1960s, achevng very hgh growth rates
n the 1970s and 1980s and becomng
one of the prosperous East Asan ger
economes (or newly ndustralsng
economes). As wth Japan before t,
blateral trade ssues emerged as sources
of frcton from the 1980s onward. rade
dsputes have been generally more mutedthan those wth Japan, and the two alles
concluded a free trade agreement n
2007 (see below).
Wth the collapse of the Sovet Unon
n 1991, North Korea lost ts most
mportant source of foregn ad and trade,
and ts economy cratered. Te nature of
the northern threat now shfted, as theDPRK was now trapped n ts own self-
With the collapse of the SovietUnion in 1991, North Korealost its most important sourceof foreign aid and trade, and itseconomy cratered.
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nuclear development as a precondton
for blateral talks accomplshed lttle,
and so Amercan negotators trednformal blateral talks, leadng to the
Norths agreeng to dsmantle ts nuclear
facltes. Te Obama admnstraton
refused to follow what t vewed as largely
reactve approaches of Clnton and
Bush. North Korea reacted to perceved
US ndfference by gong back on the
nuclear deal, and a seres of provocatons,ncludng another nuclear test n
2009, the snkng of the ROK corvette
Cheonan n early 2010, and shellng of
ROK-controlled Yeongpyeong Island off
the west coast at the end of the year.23
Current US-Korean Issues
Te Bush admnstraton concluded
a free trade agreement (FA) wth
Korea n June 2007. Despte sgnfcant
opposton n both countres, the
agreement was ratfed by the US
Congress n October 2011 and by the
Korean Natonal Assembly the next
month. Te FA s the largest for the USoutsde North Amerca, and sgnfcantly
lowers tarffs and encourages lessened
regulaton of key sectors such as
automobles and beef. Wthn fve years,
the agreement wll elmnate tarffs on
95 % of traded goods, and both sdes
commtted to openng up trade n
servces.24 Implementng the agreementn ways that avod protectonsm on
relance (Juche) deology and seemed
lke a dangerous wounded anmal. It
was at ths pont that the North beganto develop nuclear weapons, leadng to
the frst nuclear crss n 1994. Ts was
defused wth the Agreed Framework,
by whch Pyongyang would gve up
ts weapons programme n return for
a non-weapons grade reactor and a
supply of fuel ol. In the mdst of the
crss, Km Il Sung ded, leavng thecountry n the hands of hs son, Km
Jong Il. A subsequent crss over mssle
development led to another deal n
1998. Due to poor agrcultural practces,
the country descended nto a prolonged
famne, but the Clnton admnstraton
made progress towards normalsaton
of relatons n ts last year. Te SouthKorean governments of Km Dae Jung
and Roh Moo Hyun tred to engage the
North through ther Sunshne Polcy,
but t produced lmted results.22
Te George W. Bush admnstraton
was unnterested n accommodaton
wth Pyongyang, and saw North Korea
as regonal threat equal to that of Iraqor Iran n the Mddle East. Te Norths
admsson that t was refnng uranum
sparked a long-runnng second nuclear
dspute. Te DPRK clamed that t
tested ts frst nuclear devce n 2006,
and experts debated over whether the
country mght already possess several
weapons. Bushs nsstence that thecommunst regme agree to gve up
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ether sde wll test the agreement gong
forward.
North Korea remans the mostmportant concern between the two
alles. Whle lberals Km Dae Jung and
Roh Moo Hyun publcly opposed Bushs
hard-lne approach, Lee Myung Bak has
been eager to work wth both Republcan
and Democratc admnstratons, and
hs approach to Pyongyang parallels
that of the Obama admnstraton. Both
leaders have nssted that they wll not
reward the North for provocatons, and
wll nsst on good-fath negotatons
through establshed north-south and
sx-party talks mechansms. Snce the
Youngpyoung Island ncdent, Lee has
mantaned a hard-lne stance towards
North Korea, but support for hs rulng
Grand Natonal Party (renamed the
Saenur, or New Fronter, Party n
February 2012) has fallen.25
Accordng to a Councl on Foregn
Relatons (CFR) task force, the Norths
nuclear stockple represents the gravest
threat n the regon, and ths ncludesmultple problems: the nuclear devces
themselves, ther relatonshp wth
advanced mssle technology, and
chances that nuclear technology or
materals mght be gven to other natons
or groups, especally n the Mddle East.
Te task force noted that these ssues
have become more dffcult due to anunpredctable and reclusve regme
whose future s uncertan, and progress
n persuadng that regme to gve up ts
nuclear programme has been elusve,as the sx-party talks have remaned
stalled snce 2008. Te CFR called
on the Obama admnstraton to use a
combnaton of sanctons, ncentves,
sustaned poltcal pressure, and
cooperaton wth Chna to acheve the
goal of denuclearsaton.26
North Koreas medum and long-
range mssles also reman a concern to
both alles. Pyongyang has substantally
upgraded ts mssle arsenal snce an
earler agreement wth the Clnton
admnstraton n 1998 to curb
development. Te DPRK may have 800-
1,000 medum-range mssles, ncludng600-plus Scud-types and 200 Nodongs,
whch were developed by the North on
ts own. It has made progress wth ts
long-range aepodong-2 mssle, tests
for whch were only partally successful
n 2006 and 2008. Most worryng for
the US, the North tested the very long-
range Unha-2 mssle, whch could reachthe western half of the contnental US
Both leaders have insisted thatthey will not reward the Northfor provocations, and will insiston good-faith negotiationsthrough established north-southand six-party talks mechanisms.
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1911-1912 revoluton easly swept asde
the Qng dynasty, but the successor
republcan government was unable toconsoldate poltcal power untl the
1930s. Just as that was happenng, Japan
conquered much of the ndustral and
agrcultural heartland of the country,
eventually plungng Chna nto the
Second World War.
By contrast, the young and dynamc
Unted States expanded across the
North Amercan contnent, enjoyed
heady economc growth averagng
roughly 4 % per year, bult the worlds
largest ndustral structure, became the
worlds leadng economc and mltary
power by 1945, and led the Western
alles to vctory n the Second World
War. Unlke the other Western powers,Amerca never made any terrtoral
clams n Chna. Beneftng from the
Chna trade, t pushed for an even-
handed Open Door polcy n Chna.
Durng the Second World War, US ar
and ground forces fought alongsde the
Chnese army, Amercan ad propped up
the Chnese economy, and US advsorsasssted Communst forces n the north.
n 2009. Te North has also exported
ts Nodong technology, and Pakstan
Ghaur and Iranan Shahab rockets arebased on t.27
Ultmately, many observers note,
comprehensve negotatons wth
Pyongyang may be needed. Perhaps
the most effectve approach would be
a package deal n whch the DPRK
would trade ts nuclear weapons (and
maybe mssle development and abasket of market-orented reforms) for
recognton, ad, and non-aggresson
pledges from South Korea, Japan, and
the US. Te Norths desre for regme
survval may be key to ts embrace of such
an approach, and Chnas nvolvement
n such negotatons could help reassure
Pyongyang of contnued poltcal
support durng mplementaton.28
US-Chinese Relations
Love and Loathing Between wo
Great Powers
For 2,000 years of ts long hstory,Chna was the predomnant East Asan
power, and most countres on Chnas
borders acknowledged the Mddle
Kngdom and ts emperor as ther
suzeran. Due to populaton pressures,
economc stagnaton, and gradual
encroachment of Western powers, that
domnance waned durng the centuryof shame from 1839 to 1949. Te
Most worrying for the US, theNorth tested the very long-range Unha-2 missile, whichcould reach the western half ofthe continental US in 2009.
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Te sudden trumph of Mao Zedongs
Communsts n the cvl war (1947-
1949) shocked the Amercans and, nthe tense clmate of the early Cold War,
conservatves questoned who lost
Chna? Te massve corrupton and
nepttude of the rulng Guomndang
party (the Natonalst party) vrtually
guaranteed ther oustng, but the fall of
Chna seemed lke a major defeat n the
developng global struggle. Tere were
then two Chnas: the Peoples Republc
of Chna (PRC) on the manland and
ruled by the Communst Party, and
the Republc of Chna on awan ruled
by the Guomndang. Amercan and
Chnese forces battled each other n the
Korean War and, as a result, the two
countres had no formal relatons for
over 20 years and the US fully embracedGuomndang-ruled awan. A low pont
n Sno-Amercan tes came at the 1954
Geneva Conference on Indochna, when
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
reportedly refused to shake hands wth
Chnese Premer Zhou En-la. Te two
countres also faced off n two crses
n the 1950s over the awan Strat.Amercan eltes and publc vewed Chna
as part of a Communst monolth,
and were slow to grasp a growng rft
between the Sovets and Chnese. Te
John F. Kennedy admnstraton even
contemplated bombng Chnas nuclear
weapons facltes.29
Te electon of Rchard Nxon as USpresdent changed everythng. Nxon
had been one of the most ardent Cold
Warrors, often lambastng Red Chna,
durng the 1950s. By 1968, the realstNxon saw an opportunty to explot
a growng Sno-Sovet rft and create a
trangular dplomacy that would allow
the US to manage great power relatons,
nudge the Sovets towards negotaton n
the superpower arms race, and allow a
poltcal settlement of the Vetnam War,
whch had become a US quagmre. ForChnas leaders, re-establshng relatons
wth Washngton could gan valuable
manoeuvrng room and releve Sovet
pressure (the two Communst gants
fought a bref border war n 1969, and
Nxon nssted that the Sovets back off
from a full-blown attack on Chna).
Bejng and Washngton cautously edged
towards rapprochement, culmnatng
n Nxons vst to Chna n 1972. On
the trps fnal day, the two sdes ssued
the Shangha Communqu, whch
became the bass for all subsequent
Sno-Amercan relatons. It called for the
two sdes to work towards normalsedrelatons, for the US to accept Bejngs
One Chna concept (.e., that the PRC
allows for only one Chna, ether n
Bejng or ape, to have dplomatc
recognton), and for awans status to
be resolved peacefully. Amercans now
vewed Chna qute favourably, busness
tes began to grow, and blateral goodfeelngs lasted well nto the 1980s.
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weakened poston n Asa, and to step
up contanment of the Sovet Unon n
the wake of the perceved loss n VetnamWar. Chna got to be taken serously as
Amercas partner n the Cold War, and
the Chnese pressure on the Sovets may
have hastened the end of the global
conflct.30
Te 1989 bloody crackdown on pro-
democracy protesters n Bejng was
a major turnng pont, as t forced areassessment on both sdes of the Pacfc.
George H.W. Bush, another realst, tred
to contnue the relatonshp, but hgh-
level contacts remaned largely frozen.
Hs successor, Bll Clnton, came to
offce wth promses to get tough on
human rghts but, n hs second term,
moved to create a strategc partnershpon trade and securty and pushed for
Chnese membershp n the WO.
George W. Bush faced a mn-crss only
three months nto hs term when a US
spy plane was forced to land on Hanan
Island. Te ssue was hastly defused,
and blateral relatons quckly warmed
up after the 9/11 attacks. Chna wasone of the frst countres to support
the Bush admnstratons Global War
on errorsm. In return for support of
Amercan efforts n South Asa and the
Mddle East, the US took no acton
aganst Chna for ts suppresson of
Ughur natonalsts n the western
Xnjang provnce, and ssued relatvelymld condemnatons of a 2008 Chnese
Jmmy Carter took the next step
by formally recognsng the Peoples
Republc of Chna n 1979, andendng formal tes wth awan. Chna
quckly became a quas-ally of the US,
and the two natons mltares shared
ntellgence. Ronald Reagan, who
had been one of awans staunchest
defenders, as presdent accepted the
allance wth Chna n the nterest
of defeatng the Sovets n the ColdWar. rade and other blateral tensons
emerged, and the Communst Party
remaned determned to hold onto ts
poltcal power monopoly.
Both powers ganed sgnfcantly from
rapprochement. Te US got Chna
to abandon the path of revolutonary
change abroad, and to focus on trade-frendly, market-frendly economc
development. Bejng also obtaned
US assstance to re-enter the global
economy. Deng Xaopngs reform
and openng polces created a hybrd
socalst-captalst economy that became
a major tradng naton and one of the
worlds largest economes. Te quas-allance also helped bolster Amercas
Nixon had been one of the
most ardent Cold Warriors,often lambasting Red China,during the 1950s.
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crackdown n bet. Durng the Bush
years, there was a good deal of dscusson
of the mplcatons of the rse of Chna.Much of the Amercan elte reacted
negatvely to Chnas sem-offcal noton
of a peaceful rse, whch Hu Jntao
then reformulated as a harmonous
nternatonal socety. A number of
blateral strans began to surface n 2004-
2005, ncludng Amercan concern over
Chnas overtures to the Assocaton ofSouth East Asan Natons (ASEAN)
member countres and Latn Amerca.31
Current and Emerging Bilateral
Issues
Te Obama admnstraton has taken a
harder lne wth Chna snce early 2011.
Chna has done a range of thngs,
asserted Obama n hs press conference
after the APEC meetng, that
dsadvantage not just the Unted States
but a whole host of ther tradng partners
n the regon enough s enough.32
Te US has been partcularly concernedby Chnas asserton of terrtoral clams
n the East and South Chna Seas, and ts
refusal to condemn ts North Korean ally
after Pyongyangs 2010 provocatons.
Amercan offcals also have expressed
alarm over Chnas mltary buld-up and
double-dgt spendng ncreases snce
the early 1990s,33 whle concern aboutChnese suppresson of human rghts
and relgous freedom s never far from
the surface.
Despte these recent strans, Chna hasgenerally adopted a conclatory foregn
polcy lne over the past 20 years, focused
on mprovng relatons wth both regonal
neghbours and the US, and robust
multlateralsm. Chna now cooperates
more completely wth nternatonal
non-prolferaton ntatves.34It has also
resorted to use of postve natonalsm,
whch s much more pragmatcally and
s economcally orented, yet s more
harshly reactve and defensve than ts
deologcal Maost counterpart.35 Ts
natonalsm has often mpacted relatons
wth other major powers, most notably
n the ant-Amercan protests after thebombng of the Chnese embassy n
Serba durng the Kosovo War (1999).
Chnas peaceful rse has enhanced ts
ablty to use soft power and economc
power to reassure neghbours and make
frends n both developng and developed
countres.36 Te unrestrcted natureof Chnas economc ad and loans, .e.,
China has generally adopted aconciliatory foreign policy lineover the past 20 years, focused onimproving relations with bothregional neighbours and theUS, and robust multilateralism.
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countres would shape the management
of the globalsed economy through a
G-2 arrangement. Gven obvouslydvergng nterests on such matters as
clmate change and global governance,
that s probably fancful, but the noton
underlnes the mportance of blateral
economc tes.
A recent Bejng foregn polcy whtepaper noted that the external envronment
s becomng more challengng and, lke
Amerca, sees the Korean pennsula as
one of the most troublesome. o be sure,
21stcentury great power competton n
East Asa wll be largely shaped by Sno-
Amercan competton. Te queston s
whether ths wll result n a second ColdWar, or even mltary conflct. Chna
clearly seeks a return to ts tradtonal
domnance of East Asa, and ths could
undoubtedly create tensons wth three
other regonal powers, namely the
US, Japan, and Inda. Bejng hopes
gradually to push the US out of what t
calls the frst sland chan (the Ryukyus),to the second chan (the Maranas), and
wth no poltcal condtons attached,
has ganed t many potental alles n
Afrca and Latn Amerca. Chnas hugestate-owned enterprses and soveregn
wealth funds, wth vast funds and no
shareholder accountablty, can sustan
losses for extended perods. Even so,
Chna may not yet be completely
compettve wth the US and ts Western
alles, snce t has a narrower base and
lmted experence abroad. Te latter hasled to varous soco-cultural conflcts and
msunderstandngs, especally n Afrca.37
Amercas Chna polcy s
contnually constraned by economc
nterdependence. US offcals upbrad
Chna on a range of ssues beyond
Chnas growng trade surplus, such
as ts undervalued currency, the yuan,lmted ntellectual property protecton,
curbs on rare earth exports, and varous
forms of protectonsm. For ts part,
Chna accuses the US of heghtened
protectonsm snce the fnancal crss.
However, Amerca cannot afford to
alenate the Mddle Kngdom, due to
contnued relance on Chna to fundts budget defcts and to fuel ts stock
markets. Amercan companes depend
on Chna as a manufacturng platform
and market. Te 2008 fnancal crss
was a chance to get Chna to partally
coordnate ts economc polces wth
the US.38 Te centralty of the Sno-
Amercan economc relatonshp has ledvarous pundts to suggest that the two
Te centrality of the Sino-
American economic relationshiphas led various pundits tosuggest that the two countrieswould shape the managementof the globalised economythrough a G-2 arrangement.
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eventually the thrd chan (Hawa). As a
Pacfc power, Amerca has no ntenton
of pullng back from the Ryukyus for theforeseeable future, and t would never
leave US terrtores n the Maranas.
Obama announced at the 2009 ASEAN
Regonal Forum a return to Southeast
Asa, and has opposed Chnese moves
n the South Chna Sea.39Te challenge
for Chna s to mprove ts constraned
geostrategc poston whle not openlythreatenng ether neghbours or
Amerca, and the challenge for Amerca
s to mantan ts forward poston n
East Asa and robust economc tes
wth Chna whle avodng great power
conflct n the regon or globally.
America and aiwan: A SpecialRelationship
Te thornest ssue between the US
and the PRC has always been awan.
Tough t has had no dplomatc
relatons wth the US snce 1979,
the sland enjoys a partcularly close
nformal relatonshp wth the USthat shares smlartes wth the even
closer but formal Israel-Amercan
relatonshp. Both awan and Israel
are small, poltcally solated, embattled
states facng larger hostle powers wthn
ther respectve regons. Both countres
have been, to varyng degrees, shunned
by some of the nternatonal communty,n awans case mantanng dplomatc
recognton wth only 23 natons, mostly
ad-seekng states n Central Amerca,
the Carbbean, and West Afrca. Bothcountres have depended on US mltary
ad and economc assstance (access to
US markets and nvestment, along wth
sales of mltary equpment for awan).
Both have long been protected by
powerful poltcal lobbes and bpartsan
poltcal coaltons n Washngton,
the longstandng Chna lobby andconservatve Republcans n awans
case.
Te awan relatonshp traces ts roots
to Amercans sentmental attachment
to Free Chna before 1949. Amercan
traders, mssonares, and wrters
presented the Chnese as a noble people
that needed to be saved from war and
poverty. Durng the Second World War,
the Guomndang regme of Chang Ka-
shek appeared n Amercan propaganda
as a stalwart ally, and the ruman
admnstraton outraged conservatves
by cuttng off mltary ad durng
the subsequent cvl war, but qucklyembraced the Guomndang durng the
Korean War.
Wth US support, awan retaned
Chnas seat on the UN Securty
Councl for a generaton. US forces were
statoned n awan, and the Seventh
Fleet patrolled the awan Strat. All
ths suddenly changed n 1971, whenAmerca dd not oppose a resoluton to
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admnstraton permtted awans
Presdent Lee eng Hu to vst hs
alma mater, Cornell Unversty. Bejngwas outraged, snce t seemed lke an
Amercan acknowledgement of awan
offcaldom, and ths led drectly to the
thrd awan Strat crss the next year:
Chna tested mssles and conducted
war games, as two US arcraft carrer
groups patrolled north and south of
the sland. Both countres backed awayfrom the brnk, but Chnese leadershp
was determned to erase ts mltary
dsadvantage n the Strat, and so
accelerated ts mltary buld up.
Te US-awanese relatonshp was
straned wth the electon of Chen
Shu Ban, leader of the opposton
Democratc Progressve Party, n 2000.A awanese natonalst, Chen wanted
to push towards eventual ndependence
from Chna by creatng a Republc
of awan that would replace the
awanese Republc of Chna. Chna
became ncreasngly angered by Chens
moves, whch they vewed as volatons
of the One Chna prncple. Te Bushadmnstraton found Chen rrtatng, as
hs actons dstracted from Washngtons
efforts to cultvate Chna as a partner n
the Global War on error. Under US
pressure and sufferng from personal
scandals, Chen moderated hs rhetorc n
hs last years n offce. Guomndang leader
Ma Yng-jeou, who won the presdencyback n 2008, and was subsequently re-
gve Chnas seat to the PRC (awan
walked out of the General Assembly
before the vote). As the prce for USrecognton of the PRC n 1979, Congress
passed the awan Relatons Act. Ts
legslaton specfed that Amerca would
contnue nformal relatons wth awan,
and guaranteed that the sland would
contnue to be suppled wth the latest
mltary hardware so that t could keep
up wth the manland. Mltary sales tothe awan have been a constant source
of stran wth Bejng. Approvng a
moderate US $5.85 bllon sales package
n September 2011, Obama attempted
to satsfy awan whle not antagonsng
Chna.40
As Sno-Amercan relatons warmed,
Amercan nterest n awan cooledonly slghtly. Lke Korea, awan
became a dynamo ndustral and hgh
tech economy, and ts I ndustry was
heavly ted to Amercas Slcon Valley.
Te sland ganed much legtmacy
wth Amercans by becomng (also lke
Korea) a full-fledged democracy n the
1990s. Te awanese ssue came to thefore agan n 1995, when the Clnton
Like Korea, aiwan became adynamo industrial and high techeconomy, and its I industrywas heavily tied to AmericasSilicon Valley.
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elected n 2012, has begun to buld a
more cooperatve relatonshp wth the
manland. Hs efforts have been vewedmore postvely by US offcals. awans
government seeks to upgrade relatons
wth Washngton by concludng a
free trade agreement, a vsa waver
programme, and an extradton treaty,
whle resumng cabnet-level vsts to
the US. So far, none of these has been
concluded.41
Conclusion
Chnas recent assertveness has
encouraged varous Asan countres to
upgrade relatons wth the US. Openngs
to Vetnam and Burma have been
applauded by both realsts and lberalsas a new paradgm n nternatonal
relatons: a judcous applcaton of
balance of power poltcs that can
advance human rghts and democracy.42
However, ntractable conflcts reman,
and the pvot s unlkely to have any
mmedate effects on regonal hot-spots,
such as the Korean pennsula. Amercamay only be able to make gans there to
the extent that t s able to work wth
other partes, especally Chna.43
Is Amercas pvot to Asa lkely to
reman a long-lastng development?
So far, Obama has had more room to
manoeuvre than hs two predecessors,
who also sought to shft to Asa butwere dverted by events elsewhere.44
Hllary Clnton nssts that the future
of global poltcs wll be decded n
Asa. Asa, she declares, s the keydrver of global poltcs, and that s
msguded to merely come home
as the Iraq and Afghanstan wars wnd
down. Harnessng Asas growth and
dynamsm s central to Amercan
economc and strategc nterests.45From
a realst perspectve, Amerca naturally
wll stay n Asa as t tres to check therse of Chna as a strategc compettor.46
Assessments of Obamas foregn polcy
have been mxed n poltcal crcles, but
many meda and academc assessments
have been farly postve, one notng thaton balance, Obama has proved tough,
dscplned and, overall, reasonably
successful.47 For the short term,
much wll be determned by, among
other thngs, the state of the Amercan
economy. Observers have questoned the
sustanablty of an Asa-centred strategy,
and the pvot could be more lke anIndan summer of Amercan power n
Te importance of tradeand economic developmentnaturally suppresses age-oldnatural strategic rivalries in
the region, and assists EastAsias multilayered regionalintegration centred on ASEAN.
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centred on ASEAN. Trd, Japan has
played generally constructve regonal
economc and poltcal roles, and Asansuspcons about ts hstory and possble
re-mltarsaton make t a qute cautous
power. Fourth, Chna has proved a farly
cooperatve nternatonal player snce
the md-1990s, and has commtted
tself to workng wth other East Asan
countres, the US, and the wder
nternatonal communty.50 Amercahas clearly sgnalled that t ntends to
perform ts tradtonal role as a major
power n East Asa, and that t ntends
to upgrade ts regonal presence for the
foreseeable future. And that consttutes a
ffth reason: Amerca wll contnue to act
as East Asan stablser.
the regon.48However, gven East Asas
centralty n the global economy, any
Republcan successors are unlkely tocompletely abandon ths Pacfc shft.49
Despte perodc crses over
North Korean mssles and nuclear
weapons, and concerns about Chnese
assertveness n the East and South
Chna Seas, there are many reasons to
be optmstc about Asas future. Frst,
as the most economcally dynamcregon n the world, Asa generates
perhaps a thrd of global producton and
trade. Second, the mportance of trade
and economc development naturally
suppresses age-old natural strategc
rvalres n the regon, and asssts East
Asas multlayered regonal ntegraton
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Endnotes
1 Stephen M. Walt, Explaining Obamas Asia Policy, Foreign Policy, at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy [last visited 14December 2012].
2 Te White House Office of the Press Secretary, Opening Remarks by President Obama atAPEC Session One, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/13/opening-remarks-president-obama-apec-session-one [last visited 20 March 2013].
3 Steve Jones, Obamas November 2011 Asia-Pacific rip: President Unveils Policy Shifttoward Pacific Region, About.com Guide, at http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/alliesenemies/a/Obamas-November-2011-Asia-Pacific-rip.htm [last visited 14 November
2012].4 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, US Foreign Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008,
p. 277.
5 Ibid.
6 Arpita Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, StrategicAnalysis, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 504-506.
7 Cox and Stokes, US Foreign Policy,p. 278.
8 Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, pp. 504-506.
9 Yoshihide Soeya, Redefining Japans Security Profile: International Security, HumanSecurity, and an East Asian Community, Institute for International Policy Studies, at http://www.iips.org/04sec/04asiasec_soeya.pdf [last visited 18 February 2013].
10 Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, pp. 506-507.
11 Heigo Sato, Japan-U.S. Security Relations under the Koizumi Administration: Implicationsfor Bushs Second erm, at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/event/symposium/pdf/2004/e2004_09.pdf [last visited 12 February 2013].
12 Mathur, Japans Changing Role in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, p. 509.
13 Ibid., pp. 513-514.
14 Emma Chanlett-Avery, Te U.S.-Japan Alliance, Congressional Research Service Report, 18January 2011, pp. 11-13.
15 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
16 Colette Beukman, Te Abe-Obama Presidential Meeting, Te Journal of urkish Weekly,23 February 2013.
17 William L. Brooks, Te Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: RelocationNegotiations in 1995-1994, 2005-2006, Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian
Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 2010, pp. 4-10.
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18 Vivian Wong, Te DPJ Effect: Implications of Leadership Changes in Japan on theManagement of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Te United States and Japan in Global Context:2010, Te Edwn O. Reschauer Center for East Asan Studes, Johns Hopkns Unversty,
Washngton, 2010, pp. 10-13.
19 Gerald Curts, Future Drectons n US-Japan Relatons,JCIE New Shmoda Conference,okyo, February 2011, pp. 2-5.
20 Justn Logan, Asas Free-Rders, Foregn Polcy, at http://www.foregnpolcy.com/artcles/2011/11/09/asas_free_rders?page=0,1 [last vsted 14 December 2012].
21 Wllam H. Cooper, U.S.-Japan Economc Relatons: Sgnfcance, Prospects, and PolcyOptons, Congressonal Research Servce Report, 14 February 2012, pp. 6-15.
22 Andreas Henneka, Reflectons on Korean Hstory and ts Impact on the U.S.-North Korean
Conflct,Journal of Scence and World Affars, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2006), pp. 19-27.23 Albert Chang, Te North Korean Nuclear Crss: Addressng the Problem wth Carrots
and Stcks, Polcy Background and Optons Paper 1.04, Nathan Hale Insttute Asa Program,March 2004, p. 2.
24 Jeffrey Schott, Prospects for Implementng the Korea-US Free rade Agreement, PolcyBref, Peterson Insttute for Internatonal Economcs, October, 2010, pp. 1-4; US radeRepresentatve Offce, U.S.-Korea Free rade Agreement, at www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta [last vsted 21 February 2013].
25 Internatonal Crss Group, South Korea: Te Shftng Sands of Securty Polcy, Asa
Brefng No. 130, Seoul/Brussels, 1 December 2011, pp. 6-8.
26 Scott Snyder, Charles L. Prtchard and John H. lell Jr., U.S. Polcy oward the KoreanPennsula, Councl on Foregn Relatons, Independent ask Force Report No. 64, 2010, pp.x-x, 3-4.
27 Joel S. Wt, Andrew Hood, Jeffrey Lews, Scott Pace and Leon Sgal, Mssle Negotatonswth North Korea: A Strategy for the Future, US-Korea Insttute at SAIS- Report, JohnsHopkns Unversty, October 2011, pp. 3-5.
28 Chang, Te North Korean Nuclear Crss, p. 16.
29 Cox and Stokes,US Foregn Polcy,p. 280.30 Ibd., pp. 280-281.
31 Aaron L. Fredberg, Te Future of U.S.-Chna Relatons: Is Conflct Inevtable?,Internatonal Securty, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7-8.
32 U.S. Foregn Polcy urns oward Asa, Te Washngton Post, 16 November 2011.
33 Jn Canrong, Reason for Optmsm n Sno-Amercan Relatons, East Asa Forum, at http://www.eastasaforum.org/2010/02/14/reason-for-optmsm-n-sno-amercan-relatons/ [lastvsted 13 March 2012].
34 Bates Gll, Rsng Star: Chnas New Securty Dplomacy, Washngton, Brookngs Insttuton,2007, pp. 1-21.
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35 Chen Zhmn, Natonalsm, Internatonalsm and Chnese Foregn Polcy, Journal ofContemporary Chna, Vol. 14, No. 42 (February 2005), pp. 46-48.
36 Zheng Bjan, Chnas Peaceful Rse to Great-Power Status, Foregn Affars, Vol. 84, No. 5(September/October 2005), pp. 22-24.
37 Kerry Dumbaugh, Chnas Foregn Polcy: What Does It Mean for U.S. Global Interests?,Congressonal Research Servce Report, 18 July 2008, pp. 12-16.
38 anjn Sh and Meredth Wen, Avodng Mutual Msunderstandng: Sno-U.S. Relatonsand the New Admnstraton,Carnege Endowment Polcy Bref,January 2009, pp. 2-3.
39 Jn, Reason for Optmsm n Sno-Amercan Relatons, p. 3.
40 Carlyle A. Tayer, US Arms Sales to awan: Impact on Sno-Amercan Relatons, Chna-US Focus, at http://chnausfocus.com/slder/us-arms-sales-to-tawan-mpact-on-sno-
amercan-relatons/ [last vsted 13 March 2012].
41 Shrley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrson, U.S.-awan Relatonshp: Overvew of PolcyIssues, Congressonal Research Servce Report, 4 August 2011, pp. 9-14.
42 Dan wnng, Burmas Openng and the Balance of Values n Asa, Foregn Polcy, athttp://shadow.foregnpolcy.com/posts/2011/12/02/burmas_openng_and_the_balance_of_values_n_asa [last vsted 14 December 2012].
43 U.S. Pvot oward Asa Unlkely to Have Quck Impact on Korea, Te Korea Herald, 12December 2011.
44 U.S. Foregn Polcy urns toward Asa, p. 1.45 Hllary Clnton, Amercas Pacfc Century, Foregn Polcy, at http://www.foregnpolcy.
com/artcles/2011/10/11/amercas_pacfc_century?page=0,6 [Last vsted 14 December2012].
46 Stephen M. Walt, Explanng Obamas Asa Polcy.
47 Martn S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Leberthal and Mchael E. OHanlon, Obamas ForegnPolcy: Progressve Pragmatst, at http://www.brookngs.edu/opnons/2012/0309_obama_foregn_polcy.aspx [last vsted 11 March 2012].
48 Logan, Asas Free-Rders, pp. 1-2.49 John . Bennett, US Foregn Polcy to Refocus on Asa, Te Hll, at http://thehll.com/
news-by-subject/defense-homeland-securty/185341-us-foregn-polcy-to-refocus-on-asa[last vsted 14 February 2013].
50 Cox and Stokes, US Foregn Polcy,p. 287.