u.s. nuclear planning after the 2001 nuclear posture...

U.S. Nuclear Planning U.S. Nuclear Planning After the 2001 Nuclear After the 2001 Nuclear

Posture Review Posture Review

Presentation byPresentation by

Hans M. KristensenHans M. KristensenConsultant, Natural Resources Defense CouncilConsultant, Natural Resources Defense Council

Phone: (202) 513Phone: (202) 513--6249 / Fax: (202) 2896249 / Fax: (202) 289--68686868Email: [email protected]: [email protected]

Website: http://www.nukestrat.comWebsite: http://www.nukestrat.com

To the Center for International and Security To the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), University of Studies at Maryland (CISSM), University of

Maryland, October 21, 2004Maryland, October 21, 2004

TodayToday’’s U.S. nuclear postures U.S. nuclear postureThe The ““threatsthreats””New planning capabilitiesNew planning capabilitiesOffensiveOffensive--defense planningdefense planningConclusionsConclusions

U.S. Nuclear Planning After the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review - Hans M. Kristensen / 2004

OverviewOverview

2001 Nuclear Posture Review defined:2001 Nuclear Posture Review defined:Reduce Reduce ““operationally deployed strategic warheadsoperationally deployed strategic warheads””to 1,700to 1,700--2,200 by 2012.2,200 by 2012.Maintain reserve of Maintain reserve of ““responsive forceresponsive force”” warheadswarheadsMaintain Triad of offensive strategic nuclear forcesMaintain Triad of offensive strategic nuclear forcesRussia no longer an immediate enemy, butRussia no longer an immediate enemy, but……China and China and ““rogue statesrogue states”” are enduring opponentsare enduring opponentsRevitalize warhead production infrastructureRevitalize warhead production infrastructureDevelop conventional strategic strike capabilitiesDevelop conventional strategic strike capabilitiesIncrease role of missile defense (?)Increase role of missile defense (?)

TodayToday’’s U.S. Nuclear Postures U.S. Nuclear Posture



SSBNsSSBNsICBMsICBMsLongLong--range bombersrange bombersFighterFighter--bombers based in CONUSbombers based in CONUSTomahawk SLCMsTomahawk SLCMs


Trident SSBNTrident SSBN•• 14 Ohio class SSBNs split 14 Ohio class SSBNs split

between Atlantic and Pacific: between Atlantic and Pacific: -- 7 at Bangor, WA7 at Bangor, WA-- 7 at King’s Bay, GA7 at King’s Bay, GA

•• Life extended to 42 yearsLife extended to 42 years•• 4 oldest SSBNs converted to 4 oldest SSBNs converted to

SSGN (2002SSGN (2002--2006)2006)•• 4 SSBNs on Hard Alert4 SSBNs on Hard Alert





US AND RUSSIAN SSBN PATROLS 1981-2003

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003

Annu

al n

umbe

r of p

atro

ls

Russia US

Poseidon SSBNs retired

4 US SSBNs retired

SSBN patrol rate remains at Cold War levelSSBN patrol rate remains at Cold War level

Trident SLBM forceTrident SLBM force•• All D5 forceAll D5 force•• C4 phaseC4 phase--out 2000out 2000--20052005•• D5 conversion 2002D5 conversion 2002--20072007•• D5D5--Life Extension versionLife Extension version•• IntermediateIntermediate--range ballistic range ballistic

missile with both nuclear and missile with both nuclear and conventional warhead studiedconventional warhead studied

•• W88 deployed in Pacific from W88 deployed in Pacific from 20022002




US Hard-Target Warhead Deployment in Pacific

0

5

10

15

20

25

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Krist e nse n, 2004

W88 Trendline

W88 in PacificW88 in Pacific•• Most powerful ballistic missile Most powerful ballistic missile warhead (455 kilotons)warhead (455 kilotons)

•• First hardFirst hard--target kill warhead ever target kill warhead ever deployed in Pacificdeployed in Pacific

•• When SORT enters When SORT enters into effect in 2012, into effect in 2012, nearly 25% of U.S. nearly 25% of U.S. SLBM warheads in SLBM warheads in Pacific will be hardPacific will be hard--target killtarget kill



Warhead ImprovementsWarhead Improvements•• LifeLife--extension creates new Mod (W76extension creates new Mod (W76--1)1)

•• GroundGround--burst fuze: burst fuze: new missionnew mission

•• FlightFlight--tested October 2002tested October 2002

•• First W76First W76--1/Mk1/Mk--4A in Sep 20074A in Sep 2007

•• ThreeThree--axis flap control system: 3axis flap control system: 3--year year program to develop program to develop ““GPSGPS--accuracyaccuracy”” for for Trident II warheadTrident II warhead

•• Flight tested in April 2003Flight tested in April 2003

•• Maneuverable RV for highManeuverable RV for high--priority targets priority targets such as HDBTsuch as HDBT



Implications of Trident ModernizationImplications of Trident Modernization•• D5/W88 Pacific deployment: firstD5/W88 Pacific deployment: first--ever hardever hard--target kill target kill capability in region (23 % of Pacific warheads by 2012)capability in region (23 % of Pacific warheads by 2012)

•• W76W76--1/Mk1/Mk--4A ground4A ground--burst fuze strike option will burst fuze strike option will increaseincreaseradioactive fallout compared with current W76/Mkradioactive fallout compared with current W76/Mk--4 air4 air--burst burst option; development at the same time Defense Science option; development at the same time Defense Science Board argues for lowerBoard argues for lower--yield warheads to yield warheads to reducereduce falloutfallout

•• 100 kt W76100 kt W76--1/Mk4A with 1/Mk4A with ““GPSGPS--accuracyaccuracy”” would increase would increase kill probability against hard and deeply buried targets; pave kill probability against hard and deeply buried targets; pave way for conventional warhead option on SLBMsway for conventional warhead option on SLBMs



ICBMsICBMs•• 500 Minuteman III at 3 bases500 Minuteman III at 3 bases

•• MIRV retained; up to 800 warheadsMIRV retained; up to 800 warheads

•• $6 billion modernization underway$6 billion modernization underway

•• MX/Peacekeeper retired (2002MX/Peacekeeper retired (2002--2005); 16 left as of October 20042005); 16 left as of October 2004

•• W87 warheads moved to W87 warheads moved to Minuteman III; mix with W78Minuteman III; mix with W78

•• New ICBM in 2018New ICBM in 2018



Strategic BombersStrategic Bombers•• BB--52H (52H (““nuclear workhorsenuclear workhorse””))

•• Barksdale AFB / Minot AFBBarksdale AFB / Minot AFB

•• ALCM / ACM (B83 / B61ALCM / ACM (B83 / B61--7)7)

•• BB--2 (stealth bomber)2 (stealth bomber)

•• All at Whiteman AFBAll at Whiteman AFB

•• B83 / B61B83 / B61--7/117/11

•• Carrier of RNEPCarrier of RNEPU.S. Nuclear Planning After the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review - Hans M. Kristensen / 2004

FighterFighter--bombers (DCA)bombers (DCA)•• Based in CONUS and EuropeBased in CONUS and Europe•• FF--15Es of the 415Es of the 4thth Fighter Wing Fighter Wing

at Seymour Johnson AFB in at Seymour Johnson AFB in North CarolinaNorth Carolina

•• FF--16C/Ds of the 2716C/Ds of the 27thth Fighter Fighter Wing at Cannon AFB in New Wing at Cannon AFB in New MexicoMexico

•• Europe: Lakenheath, Aviano, Europe: Lakenheath, Aviano, Incirlik, RamsteinIncirlik, Ramstein

•• B61B61--3/4/10 gravity bombs; of 3/4/10 gravity bombs; of 1,016 weapons 580 are active 1,016 weapons 580 are active (480 in Europe)(480 in Europe)



Korea Contingency:Korea Contingency:•• Weapons withdrawn from South Weapons withdrawn from South

Korea in December 1991Korea in December 1991•• 1998: 41998: 4thth FW FFW F--15E squadron 15E squadron

simulated nuclear strike against simulated nuclear strike against North KoreaNorth Korea

•• In support of OPLAN 5027In support of OPLAN 5027•• Defense of South Korea against Defense of South Korea against

North Korean attack (including North Korean attack (including chemical weapons)chemical weapons)

•• LongLong--range mission with refueling range mission with refueling and defense (KCand defense (KC--135, AWACS, 135, AWACS, FF--16, F16, F--15)15)



European Contingency:European Contingency:•• 480 U.S. B61480 U.S. B61--3/4/10 bombs remain in Europe3/4/10 bombs remain in Europe•• Eight bases in six countriesEight bases in six countries•• 180 for use by non180 for use by non--nuclear host countriesnuclear host countries



US Nuclear Weapons In Europe, 1954-2004

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004


Tomahawk TLAM/NTomahawk TLAM/N•• All weapons stored on land All weapons stored on land

(SWFPAC, Bangor, WA(SWFPAC, Bangor, WASWFLANT, KingSWFLANT, King’’s Bay, GA)s Bay, GA)

•• Of 304 W80Of 304 W80--0 warheads, 100 are 0 warheads, 100 are active and 204 inactiveactive and 204 inactive

•• Periodic certification of about a Periodic certification of about a dozen SSNs, but followed by dedozen SSNs, but followed by de--certificationcertification

•• Redeployment would take some Redeployment would take some 30 days30 days

•• DOD decided in 2003 to retain DOD decided in 2003 to retain TLAM/NTLAM/N



Stockpile Outlook 2004Stockpile Outlook 2004--20122012

44094409594959491035810358TotalTotal

85885884584517031703NonNon--strategicstrategic355135515104510486558655StrategicStrategic

ReductionReduction2012201220042004



Stockpile Outlook 2004Stockpile Outlook 2004--20122012

Source: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “What’s Behind Source: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “What’s Behind Bush’s Nuclear Cuts,” Bush’s Nuclear Cuts,” Arms Control Arms Control TodayToday, October 2004, p. 7., October 2004, p. 7.


The ThreatsThe Threats

Defined by 2001 Nuclear Posture Review:Defined by 2001 Nuclear Posture Review:•• Russia Russia –– will remain the largest nuclear power with a will remain the largest nuclear power with a

capability to destroy the U.S.capability to destroy the U.S.•• China China –– modernization of nuclear forcesmodernization of nuclear forces•• North Korea / Iran / Syria North Korea / Iran / Syria –– proliferators and “rogue”proliferators and “rogue”•• Issues: IndiaIssues: India--Pakistan / extended deterrencePakistan / extended deterrence



Russia is not considered an immediate threat, but:Russia is not considered an immediate threat, but:"Russia"Russia’’s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (NPR Report, p. 17)(NPR Report, p. 17)



China is considered an immediate or potential threat:China is considered an immediate or potential threat:"Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic "Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." (NPR involved in an immediate or potential contingency." (NPR Report, pp. 16Report, pp. 16--17)17)Taiwan crisis potential Taiwan crisis potential ““immediate contingencyimmediate contingency””Koran peninsula potential contingencyKoran peninsula potential contingency



China scenarios identified in 1994 by STRATCOM: China scenarios identified in 1994 by STRATCOM:

Korean peninsulaKorean peninsula•• Not fullNot full--scale attack scale attack against China; adaptive against China; adaptive planning mission against planning mission against North KoreaNorth Korea

Direct USDirect US--ChinaChina•• Major attack response plan Major attack response plan needed against Chinaneeded against China

•• Taiwan scenario (?)Taiwan scenario (?)



China Returned to SIOP China Returned to SIOP

•• 1994 NPR: STRATCOM and 1994 NPR: STRATCOM and Joint Staff tried but failed to Joint Staff tried but failed to return China to SIOPreturn China to SIOP

•• 1997: Presidential Decision 1997: Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDDDirective 60 (PDD--60) 60) broadened targeting against broadened targeting against ChinaChina

•• 2000: STRATCOM returned 2000: STRATCOM returned China to SIOP; CHISOP China to SIOP; CHISOP (Chinese Integrated Strategic (Chinese Integrated Strategic Operations Plan) createdOperations Plan) created



Proliferators: North Korea, Iran, SyriaProliferators: North Korea, Iran, Syria

•• North Korea: immediate contingency, attack on South North Korea: immediate contingency, attack on South Korea, missile strike against allies or U.S. May have Korea, missile strike against allies or U.S. May have some form of nuclear weaponssome form of nuclear weapons

•• Iran: potential contingency, missile attack against Iran: potential contingency, missile attack against Israel. May pursue nuclear weaponsIsrael. May pursue nuclear weapons

•• Syria: potential contingency, chemical/biological attack Syria: potential contingency, chemical/biological attack against Israelagainst Israel

•• (Iraq and Libya issues gone since 2001 NPR)(Iraq and Libya issues gone since 2001 NPR)



Proliferators: North Korea 1994Proliferators: North Korea 1994--1995 Crisis1995 Crisis

U.S. issued nuclear threat:U.S. issued nuclear threat:

Congress: What role have nuclear weapons played in Congress: What role have nuclear weapons played in preventing WMD from being used by Rogue states?preventing WMD from being used by Rogue states?

““In my view, sir, it plays a very large role. Not only was that In my view, sir, it plays a very large role. Not only was that message passed in 1990 by the President [to Iraq], message passed in 1990 by the President [to Iraq], that same that same message was passed to the North Koreans back in 1995message was passed to the North Koreans back in 1995, when , when the North Koreans were not coming off their reactor approach the North Koreans were not coming off their reactor approach they were taking [sic].they were taking [sic].””

Gen Eugene Habiger, CINCSTRAT, 1997Gen Eugene Habiger, CINCSTRAT, 1997



Proliferators: North KoreaProliferators: North Korea

Source: Christopher Paine, et al., “Countering Proliferation or Compounding it?,” NRDC, May 2003.

The illusion of The illusion of containing fallcontaining fall--out:out:

•• B61B61--11 is 400 kt11 is 400 kt

•• RNEP similar yieldRNEP similar yield



Proliferators: North KoreaProliferators: North Korea

Source: Christopher Paine, et al., “Countering Proliferation or Compounding it?,” NRDC, May 2003.

Fallout from use of a Fallout from use of a single B61single B61--11 against 11 against North KoreaNorth KoreaAssumes depth of 30 feet Assumes depth of 30 feet (10 meters) and yield of (10 meters) and yield of 300 kt (actual B61300 kt (actual B61--11 yield 11 yield is 400 kt)is 400 kt)



Issues other than threats:Issues other than threats:

•• IndiaIndia--Pakistan: nuclear crisis or war, Pakistani Pakistan: nuclear crisis or war, Pakistani command and control, Indiacommand and control, India--ChinaChina

•• Extended deterrence: Japan, South Korea, European Extended deterrence: Japan, South Korea, European countriescountries


New Planning CapabilitiesNew Planning Capabilities

NPR States New Capabilities Are Needed:NPR States New Capabilities Are Needed:

““The current nuclear planning system, including The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons systems assignment, target identification, weapons systems assignment, and the nuclear command and control systems and the nuclear command and control systems requirements, is optimized to support large, requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role.play a much larger role.””

NPR Report 2001, p. 29.NPR Report 2001, p. 29.



……actually, nuclear planning and particularly adaptive actually, nuclear planning and particularly adaptive planning has already undergone extensive planning has already undergone extensive modernization over the last decade:modernization over the last decade:

•• 1993 Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) study1993 Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) study

•• SWPS Modernization completed 2003SWPS Modernization completed 2003

•• Created Created ““Living SIOPLiving SIOP””

•• Reduced complete overhaul from 18 to 6 monthsReduced complete overhaul from 18 to 6 months

•• Major plan production in 4 monthsMajor plan production in 4 months

•• Limited options in 24 hoursLimited options in 24 hours



Definitions:Definitions:•• Deliberate Planned MissionsDeliberate Planned Missions –– executable war plans, executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Provides foundation for adaptive planning by Provides foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crisescould be executed in crises

Examples: SIOP/OPLAN 8044, large attack plansExamples: SIOP/OPLAN 8044, large attack plans

•• Adaptive Planned MissionsAdaptive Planned Missions –– war plans generated war plans generated quickly in timequickly in time--critical situationscritical situations

Examples: Theater Nuclear Options, WMD strikes, Examples: Theater Nuclear Options, WMD strikes, preemptionpreemption



PrePre--Planned Mission Planning:Planned Mission Planning:


Note: Since this chart was made, DOD has formally stopped using Note: Since this chart was made, DOD has formally stopped using the name SIOP. The strategic the name SIOP. The strategic war plan is now called OPLAN 8044. The last plan to be called Swar plan is now called OPLAN 8044. The last plan to be called SIOP (SIOPIOP (SIOP--03) entered into effect 03) entered into effect March 2003.March 2003.


Some Adaptive Planning capability already Some Adaptive Planning capability already existed 10 years agoexisted 10 years ago……

““Within the context of a regional single or few warhead Within the context of a regional single or few warhead detonation, classical deterrence already allows for detonation, classical deterrence already allows for adaptively planned missions to counter any use of adaptively planned missions to counter any use of WMD.WMD.””

USSTRATCOM, answer to 1994 Nuclear Posture ReviewUSSTRATCOM, answer to 1994 Nuclear Posture ReviewWorking Group Five.Working Group Five.

……but Adaptive Planning is underpinning but Adaptive Planning is underpinning everything today and will proliferate the number everything today and will proliferate the number and character of strike optionsand character of strike options



Adaptive Planning is capability as well as doctrine:Adaptive Planning is capability as well as doctrine:

“Adaptive planning challenges the headquarters to formulate “Adaptive planning challenges the headquarters to formulate plans very quickly in response to spontaneous threats which plans very quickly in response to spontaneous threats which are more likely to emerge in a new international environment are more likely to emerge in a new international environment unconstrained by the Super Power standunconstrained by the Super Power stand--off... We can off... We can accomplish this task by using generic targets, rather than accomplish this task by using generic targets, rather than identifying specific scenarios and specific enemies, and then identifying specific scenarios and specific enemies, and then crafting a variety of response options to address these crafting a variety of response options to address these threats. To ensure their completeness, these options threats. To ensure their completeness, these options consider the employment of both nuclear and conventional consider the employment of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Thus, by its very nature, adaptive planning offers weapons. Thus, by its very nature, adaptive planning offers unique solutions, tailored to generic regional dangers unique solutions, tailored to generic regional dangers involving weapons of mass destruction.”involving weapons of mass destruction.”

General Lee Butler, May 1993General Lee Butler, May 1993

Adaptive Planning is basis for preemption doctrineAdaptive Planning is basis for preemption doctrine



……the Pentagon will continue prethe Pentagon will continue pre--planning for the planning for the largest missions:largest missions:““We will continue to do preWe will continue to do pre--planning for our immediate and planning for our immediate and potential contingencies, but one of the important things that potential contingencies, but one of the important things that came out of the QDR is it's necessary to develop new tools came out of the QDR is it's necessary to develop new tools for adaptively for adaptively ---- in a timely way adaptively creating plans for in a timely way adaptively creating plans for situations that may arise very quickly in an unexpected way.situations that may arise very quickly in an unexpected way.””

J. D. Crouch, the assistant secretary of DefenseJ. D. Crouch, the assistant secretary of Defensefor International Security Policy, January 9, 2002for International Security Policy, January 9, 2002



Example of Adaptive Planning: BExample of Adaptive Planning: B--2 modernization2 modernizationOctober 1, 1997: BOctober 1, 1997: B--2 replaces B2 replaces B--1 1 in SIOP (SIOPin SIOP (SIOP--98)98)

•• Planning and processing of a Planning and processing of a single SIOP sortie took “well over” single SIOP sortie took “well over” 24 hours to complete24 hours to complete

November 1998: STRATCOM November 1998: STRATCOM orders new timelines incorporated orders new timelines incorporated into Binto B--2 planning documents2 planning documents

•• Deliberate planned missions: no Deliberate planned missions: no more than 24 hoursmore than 24 hours

•• Adaptive planned missions: no Adaptive planned missions: no more than 8 hoursmore than 8 hours



Example of Adaptive Planning: SSBN modernizationExample of Adaptive Planning: SSBN modernization

October 2003: Navy completes October 2003: Navy completes deployment of submarinedeployment of submarine--launched launched ballistic missile retargeting system (SRS) ballistic missile retargeting system (SRS) on strategic submarines:on strategic submarines:

•• enables SSBNs “to quickly, accurately, enables SSBNs “to quickly, accurately, and reliably retarget missiles to targets” and reliably retarget missiles to targets” and “allow timely and reliable processing and “allow timely and reliable processing of of an increased number of targetsan increased number of targets””

•• will “reduce overall SIOP processing” will “reduce overall SIOP processing” time and “time and “support adaptive planningsupport adaptive planning””



Example of Adaptive Planning: targetingExample of Adaptive Planning: targeting

Support of Regional CINCs and NATO:Support of Regional CINCs and NATO:

•• Theater Nuclear Support mission Theater Nuclear Support mission

•• SILVER Books (1993SILVER Books (1993--1995)1995)

•• NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS)NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS)

•• ISPAN (2003ISPAN (2003--))



Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOMExample of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM

Theater Nuclear Support System:Theater Nuclear Support System:

•• Assist regional CINCs with designing and Assist regional CINCs with designing and maintaining theater nuclear strike plansmaintaining theater nuclear strike plans

•• Mission assigned to STRATCOM in June Mission assigned to STRATCOM in June 1994: 1994: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan nuclear Annex C (JSCP CY 93nuclear Annex C (JSCP CY 93--95)95)

•• JSCP CY 93JSCP CY 93--95 included also guidance for 95 included also guidance for CINCs CINCs ““requesting preplanned targeting requesting preplanned targeting outsideoutside their own AORtheir own AOR””



Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOMExample of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOMSILVER Books (1993SILVER Books (1993--1995):1995):•• SILVER = SILVER = Strategic Installation List of Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability Effects and ResultsVulnerability Effects and Results

•• ““the planning associated with a series of the planning associated with a series of ““silver bulletsilver bullet”” missions aimed at missions aimed at counterproliferationcounterproliferation““

•• Targets: nuclear, chemical, biological and Targets: nuclear, chemical, biological and command, control and communications (C3) command, control and communications (C3) installationsinstallations

•• SILVER Book developed for EUCOM and SILVER Book developed for EUCOM and PACOMPACOM



Example of Adaptive Planning: NATOExample of Adaptive Planning: NATONATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS):NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS):

•• Is Is ““designed to automate NATOdesigned to automate NATO’’s coordinated adaptive nuclear s coordinated adaptive nuclear planning processplanning process””

•• Enables dispersed users to access the NNPS server at SHAPE Enables dispersed users to access the NNPS server at SHAPE Headquarters via remote fixed and mobile PC workstationsHeadquarters via remote fixed and mobile PC workstations

•• Develop Major Contingency Options and Selective Contingency OptDevelop Major Contingency Options and Selective Contingency Option ion plans (target development, DGZ construction, force application, plans (target development, DGZ construction, force application, aircraft aircraft route planning, timing and deconfliction, and consequences of route planning, timing and deconfliction, and consequences of execution)execution)

•• Prepare planning products and messages for external commands anPrepare planning products and messages for external commands and d agenciesagencies



Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOMExample of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOMISPAN (Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network)ISPAN (Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network)

•• Contract awarded in 2003 to Lockheed Martin for 10Contract awarded in 2003 to Lockheed Martin for 10--year year modernization (continues SWPS modernization from 1993modernization (continues SWPS modernization from 1993--2003)2003)

•• Nuclear/conventional strike and missile defense planningNuclear/conventional strike and missile defense planning

““the system will assess a given situation and present DOD decisiothe system will assess a given situation and present DOD decisionn--makers with potential courses of action. For each option, the wamakers with potential courses of action. For each option, the war r planning system will determine the probability of success, potenplanning system will determine the probability of success, potential tial collateral damage, timing and other details. Military officials collateral damage, timing and other details. Military officials can then can then execute one of the options, or change the planning parameters toexecute one of the options, or change the planning parameters to see see a new set of options based on different requirements.a new set of options based on different requirements.””

Lockheed Martin, May 2003Lockheed Martin, May 2003


ConclusionsConclusions

Significant numerical warhead reductions, butSignificant numerical warhead reductions, but

•• Cold War posture maintained (Triad)Cold War posture maintained (Triad)

•• Improved weapons capability and accuracyImproved weapons capability and accuracy

•• Vastly more flexible and adaptive nuclear war Vastly more flexible and adaptive nuclear war planning system (responsiveness is core)planning system (responsiveness is core)

•• CapabilityCapability--based (vs. threatbased (vs. threat--based) planningbased) planning

•• OptionOption--hungry doctrine drives strike planninghungry doctrine drives strike planning

•• Arms control disconnected from visionArms control disconnected from vision


u.s. nuclear planning after the 2001 nuclear posture...

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