Fernando Prieto SIS 686 Research Paper November 18, 2014 6,184 words

RESEARCH QUESTION

“Did the US act as a ‘defensive-positionalist’ power and was it primary moved by local and re-

gional stability concerns when it recognized South Sudan in 2011? Did interest groups in the US

substantially influence the decision?”

INTRODUCTION

1. According to author J. Paquin the US has been primarily motivated by stability concerns when

it has recognized the new states that have appeared since 1991. He asserts that the US is a ‘de-

fensive-positionalist’ power that tries to maintain stability when it faces a secession: the US ini-

tially supports the central authorities but shifts and supports the secessionists if they provide a

better guarantee for local and regional stability. Ethnic lobbies or business interest groups in the

US do not decide the US positions. Similarly, the US takes into account the interests of global

and regional powers, but they are not decisive.

2. The US recognition of South Sudan in 2011 is a good case to test this theory. Some authors

assert that oil interests or religious lobbies dictated the US position while the stability-seeking

theory would predict that its position derived from the efforts of the US to ensure stability in Su-

dan and Southern Sudan. My research concludes that the stability-seeking theory explains well

the US recognition of South Sudan and that the other hypothesis don’t provide appropriate an-

swers. In my Conclusion I offer some qualifications about the indicators used by the stability-

seeking theory, as well as a suggestion to complement the realist framework employed by the

author with elements of the liberal and institutionalist approach.

Page ! of !1 22

2. This paper has three parts, besides the Introduction and the Conclusion. The first part explains

why this paper is relevant, summarizes the theory that I am testing and answers the basic

methodological questions. The second part provides a brief background of the civil war in Sudan,

of US policy about Sudan and of the peace negotiations. The third part is the test of the stability

theory, versus the business and religious lobbies hypothesis.

Part I: relevance, theory tested and methodology

Relevance

3. Recognizing a state is an essential act in International Relations (IR) and recognition by the

US is particularly important. Recognition is essential in IR because as a result of it a new actor

joins the roughly 200 states that exist today. From a general political standpoint, conferring or

denying recognition is relevant in the post-Cold War world because many new countries have

appeared since 1991 and many other entities aspire to recognition. The breakup of the USSR

gave way to 15 new countries. The dissolution of Yugoslavia to 7 new states. The Czech Repub-

lic and Slovakia separated in 1993. Eritrea, East Timor and South Sudan seceded respectively

from Ethiopia, Indonesia and Sudan. Besides, the list of candidates for full recognition is large 1

and the problem whether to recognize or not these new entities will come up in the future.

4. This paper tries to contribute to the analysis of the US practice of recognition: it’s relevant to

explain why and how the US has refused or granted recognition because as the most important

country in the world, the US can help or hinder the creation of a new state more than any other

country.

Page ! of !2 22

Somaliland, Western Sahara, Palestine, Abhkazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, 1

Tamil Eelam, Taiwan, Kurdistan…(Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States.” p. 726)

Theory tested

5. J. Paquin sets forth the theory that the US is a ‘defensive-positionalist’ power whose main

concern is to maintain its position as the preeminent power : it must therefore prevent any power 2

losses and avoid any stability gaps that rival states or enemies could exploit. The US grants or

refuses recognition in order to maintain or improve regional or local stability. Internal and exter-

nal stability before secession can be estimated with the following indicators: conflicts in the fron-

tiers and refugees are indicators of external instability; dialogue with secessionist, third party in-

tervention and absence of repression indicate that negotiations are ongoing and thus, that there is

relative internal stability. The stability of the new or secessionist state can also be estimated with

the following indicators: if secessionist authorities assert control, respect internal boundaries,

hold a referendum and respect human rights there is internal stability; if secessionist authorities

respect the new frontiers and abandon further territorial claims the new state has external stabili-

ty . J. Paquin’s theory is based on six case studies (Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Er3 -

itrea and Somaliland). He says that the US Presidency is the basic decider, with limited interven-

tion of the US Congress, US interest groups or other global or regional powers.

Methodology

6. This paper presents a single case study to test that theory. I selected to study South Sudan be-

cause the most important cases of recognition by the US of the states is covered in Mr. Paquin’s

study (see par. 5). My paper pretends to be a “building-block” study of the phenomenon of

recognition of states and to be useful by testing the stability-seeking theory. It attempts to follow

Page ! of !3 22

Paquin, A Stability-Seeking Power U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts. p. 28-292

Ibid. p 34-403

the conditions of George and Bennett for a theory-testing case . I examine two ‘most-likely’ ex4 -

planations of the US recognition of South Sudan: one is that the US sought to promote regional

and local stability by ensuring that the Sudan peace agreements were implemented, thus putting

an end to a long and protracted civil war; the other ‘most-likely’ explanation is that recognition

of South Sudan was determined by US domestic political factors: the pressure of the religious

lobbies in favor of the Christian Southern Sudanese . There is a third explanation, which is the 5

‘least-likely’: that US economic lobbies determined the US position on Sudan and South Sudan . 6

I examine these three possibilities in Part III of this paper.

7. I’ve assumed the following variables : 7

- dependent variable or outcome: recognition of South Sudan by the USA (previous acceptance

by the USA of the right of self-determination for South Sudan and an accompanying referen-

dum with the option of secession)

- independent variables: US preference for stability; religious lobbies; US Business interests

- other intervening variables: intervention of regional powers and international organizations

Page ! of !4 22

George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 76, 78 and 1154

For religious lobbies as the decisive influence on G. W. Bush policy on Sudan: Cohen, “Sudan.” p. 324-5

325; a detailed account of evangelical activism on G. W. Bush policy on Sudan in Huliaras, “Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists.” p. 711-717

For oil interests as the decisive influence on G. W. Bush policy on Funk and Fake, Scramble for Africa 6

p. 55-56; a detailed account of US economic and oil interests in Sudan in Huliaras, “Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists.” p. 719-721

George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences p. 797

8. For consistency, I adopt the same theoretical framework as the author of the theory I test: re8 -

alism . In particular, he uses the “Defensive positionalism” approach: ‘states are unitary-rational 9

agents that seek to maintain their relative position and are “sensitive to any erosion of their rela-

tive capabilities”’ . Also for consistency I use “stability” as Paquin does: ‘a state of peace exist10 -

ing between sovereign states in a region. It implies the maintenance of and respect for in-

ternational borders (including no refugees flowing across international borders) and non-inter-

vention in states’ internal affairs’ . A final precision on self-determination and secession is need11 -

ed in the case of South Sudan: self-determination by itself is not the same as secession because it

can lead to just a high degree of autonomy within the host state . But in the case of South Sudan 12

the right of self-determination was linked to a referendum with the option of secession: from the

time that self-determination was granted the option of separation became much more probable

than the possibility of increased autonomy for Southern Sudan within a unified Sudan.

9. I have mostly used secondary sources and official documents that are publicly available. Some

of the studies I use cannot be considered primary sources but are particularly valuable because

they were written by persons of the US Administration who were directly involved in the long

Page ! of !5 22

George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. p. 778

Paquin A Stability-Seeking Power U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts p. 289

Ibid. p. 28; Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation, p. 498; Waltz, Theory of International Poli10 -tics p. 126: ’The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the sys-tem.’

Paquin A Stability-Seeking Power U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts p. 911

Radan and Pavkovic, Creating New States.p. 2312

process that led from the US and international peace mediation to the independence referendum

of 2011 . 13

Part II: Background

Sudan civil war

10. Sudan became independent in 1956. The territory comprised two well-defined portions and,

though some entertained the notion of dividing them up at the time of independence, the South

continued to be integrated into, and administered by, the North . Forced arabization and is14 -

lamization generated unrest that led to the first civil war around 1960 . The war was particularly 15

ferocious between 1965 and 1969 but both sides arrived at a much praised peace agreement in

1972 that gave the South a large degree of political and administrative autonomy . Autonomy 16

for the South and peace lasted eleven years only. Confident of American support as an ally

against Soviet-backed Ethiopia, the Khartoum government abolished the regional government in

the South and imposed sharia in 1983 . Civil war resumed. Officially, Southern rebels were 17

fighting for ‘revolution’ in a united Sudan but “Southern independence remained an unspoken or

even coded option” . Armed groups appeared in other parts of the country, but the North-South 18

Page ! of !6 22

These are the two studies by H. Cohen (see note 41); the paper by P. Lyman, who was Special Envoy to 13

Sudan and South Sudan form March 2011 to March 2013; and the paper by J. Millington who between 1998 and 2005 was Office Director for East Africa and Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Khar-toum.

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. p 25-2914

Ibid. p. 3115

Ibid. p. 34-4116

Ibid. p. 56-57 and 6717

Ibid. p. 6518

war proper lasted from 1983 until it ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005

(CPA). The official mediator for the CPA was the Inter Governmental Authority on Development

(IGAD) . It’s important to note that a crucial part of the CPA had been agreed upon earlier: both 19

sides had accepted that the South would exercise its right of self-determination through a refer-

endum with the option of secession (Machakos Protocol of July 20, 2002). Shortly after the 2005

peace agreement, the leader of the southern Sudanese John Garang died and the leadership that

replaced him changed the objective: instead of revolution in a united Sudan (i.e. gaining power

in Khartoum) they tried to attain independence . The interim period of 2005 to 2011 saw a nor20 -

malization in the refugee situation created by the North-South war (different to the crisis in Dar-

fur) and the creation of an autonomous government in the South. A UN Mission was established

in Southern Sudan. The referendum took place in 2011: 98.8% of Southerners voted for indepen-

dence, with a turnout of 97.58% . 21

US-Sudan relations 22

11. In the 1980s “The Sudan became important to the US as a regional counterweight to Soviet-

backed Ethiopia” : Chevron received oil rights in the South from Khartoum; American support 23

gave Khartoum confidence to abolish Southern autonomy and to reimpose sharia in 1983;

Page ! of !7 22

IGAD was created to deal with water problems in the Horn of Africa but its mission changed in the 19

1990s and it became the central mediator in the Sudanese conflict; the US increased its support for IGAD as it obtained some successes and as it ensured the involvement of both sides of the conflict. Khartoum accepted IGAD’s mediation but it tried to involve other mediators more favorable to its interests, like Egypt and Lybia. See Leach, War and Politics in Sudan p. 197-201

Lyman, Negotiating Peace in Sudan p. 5420

http://southernsudan2011.com/21

Congressional Research Service 2012, p. 25-2822

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars p. 5723

meanwhile, Southern guerrillas received support from Ethiopia; George H. W. Bush then Vi-

cepresident visited Khartoum in 1984 accompanied by Christian tele-evangelists . In this period, 24

there is no question that the US supported the Sudanese central government against secessionists,

despite internal repression, since Khartoum was an ally and an element of US stability. But the

alliances changed in the 1990s: in 1989 a coup by the army and islamists put Bashir in power in

Khartoum; the fall of Mengistu in 1991 removed the Soviet influence in Ethiopia while the dis-

solution of the USSR itself ended of the Cold War. The Administration of George H. W. tried a

policy of ‘constructive engagement’ with Khartoum and also tried to make peace between the

warring factions with a peace mediation led by President Carter. By the end of this Administra-

tion, however, the tensions between Washington and Khartoum increased seriously and the US

assessed that Sudan had become ‘a regional problem’ . Afterwards, the Clinton Administration 25

adopted a policy of ‘containment’ of the Khartoum regime, designated Sudan as a supporter of

terrorism, increased sanctions and bombed a factory near Khartoum in 1998. The Clinton Admin-

istration meanwhile supported the peace negotiations led by IGAD. Despite its opposition to the

regime in Khartoum, the US Administration did not support self-determination or secession of

the South: the Clinton Administration supported instead the Southerners’ goal of revolution in

Sudan (i.e. obtaining power in Khartoum) . 26

12. US policy changed again under the Administration of George W. Bush: it tried to renew the

engagement with Khartoum and to obtain antiterrorism cooperation. At the same time, the US

Page ! of !8 22

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars p. 45-6724

Cohen, Intervening in Africa p. 67-8125

Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan p. 109-11526

renewed its pressure on the peace negotiations and the US Special Envoy for Sudan John Dan-

forth had a decisive role in the negotiations that ended with the peace agreement, the CPA, of

2005 . But the US relationship with Sudan worsened dramatically because of the crisis in Darfur 27

and the formal denunciation by the US in 2004 that the Sudanese government had committed a

genocide in this province of northern Sudan . The Obama Administration adopted a policy on 28

Sudan not long after coming into office, in October 2009. The goals of the US policy in Sudan

were the implementation of the peace agreement, CPA, solving the crisis in Darfur, and ensuring

counterterrorism cooperation . 29

The US and the peace negotiations

13. To clarify why the US recognized South Sudan we must pay special attention to two mo-

ments of the peace process: the US position about the right of self-determination (including a

referendum); and the US determination to see the peace agreement implemented. Since 99% of

the Southern Sudanese voted for independence we might think that independence was inevitable

from the moment the parties agreed to hold a referendum with the option of secession in 2002

(see par. 10). However, self-determination does not mean independence (see par. 9) and, at any

rate, independence was not the main goal of the leaders of Southern Sudan until the dead of

Garang in 2005 (see par. 10). Most importantly, the referendum was scheduled to be held after a

Page ! of !9 22

Ibid. p. 119-12427

Lyman, Negotiating Peace in Sudan p. 56- 57; Congressional Research Service 2012 p. 2628

US Department of State. Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach; Congressional Re29 -search Service 2012 p. 27

long interim period, six years, and it was far from assured that the CPA would be faithfully exe-

cuted and that the referendum would be effectively held . 30

14. Self-determination for Southern Sudan was discussed for a long time during the negotiations

and, though the US supported that principle, the US tried to avoid that it would lead to secession.

The parties had agreed in a ‘Declaration of Principles’ of May 1998 that the Southern Sudanese

had the right of self-determination and that there would be a referendum ; four years later they 31

signed a formal agreement on that point (Machakos Protocol of 2002). The US was closely in-

volved in the peace process during all those years and its pressure was decisive to make the par-

ties sign the 2002 agreement . Concerning self-determination, the US accepted that it be includ32 -

ed in the agreement of 2002 but tried to restrict its impact to ‘forming an autonomous region in

the South’ . Even after the Machakos Protocol was signed the US policy was that the 2002 Pro33 -

tocol or its antecedent, the 1998 ‘Declaration of Principles,’ were ‘just a framework agreement

that involves autonomy for the South, not independence for the South’ . Likewise, in his report 34

of April 2002 to President George W. Bush, US Special Envoy Danforth opposed secession and

Page ! of !10 22

Lyman, Negotiating Peace in Sudan p. 5730

Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan p. 105-107 and p. 11131

Ibid. p. 121-122; Leach, War and Politics in Sudan p. 207-20932

Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars p.17933

US Department of State Assistant Secretary for Africa Karnsteiner on July 29, 2002 http://sudan34 -reeves.org/2002/07/30/where-does-the-us-stand-on-self-determination-for-southern-sudan-july-30-2002/

proposed self-determination for Southern Sudan within a united Sudan and under ‘a government

that respects their religion and culture’ . These declarations pleased Khartoum . 35 36

15. While the US publicly opposed secession it was also helping ensure, at the same time, that

secession remained a real possibility. The peace negotiations went on until the parties signed the

CPA of 2005. Again, the US was closely involved in the negotiations and pressed both sides to

sign the peace agreements of January 2005 . The CPA reconfirmed that ‘the people of South Su37 -

dan have the right to self-determination’ and that they would have the possibility ‘to vote for se-

cession’ . 38

16. The US was later decisive to ensure that the referendum and the option of secession became a

reality. This was the responsibility of the Obama Administration, whose foreign policy team in-

tegrated many members who were very familiar with the situation in Sudan . The Department of 39

State presented its Sudan policy on October 19, 2009. The implementation of the CPA was one of

the three strategic objectives of the US and the US engaged itself to try to make sure that the ref-

erendum was held with all due guarantees. Since 2010 the US prepared for the likely indepen-

dence of South Sudan and was ready to pressure Khartoum to accept it . In fact, US options to 40

Page ! of !11 22

Danforth Report p. 25-2635

International Crisis Group. Africa Report n 48 p. 1036

Leach War and Politics in Sudan, p. 213-214; Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan p. 122. The Bush administra37 -tion, for instance, promised Khartoum to take Sudan off the terrorism list if it signed the CPA, see Lyman, Negotiating Peace in Sudan p. 59

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and 38

The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army

Congressional Research Service 2012, p. 2739

Congressional Research Service 2012, p 27; Lyman Negotiating Peace in Sudan, p. 56-57 and 6040

promote stability in Sudan in 2009-2010 were limited by the very existence of the peace agree-

ments and the promise of a referendum with the option of secession. Holding the referendum was

not inevitable. US pressure to implement the CPA and to celebrate the referendum was not prede-

termined either. Other options are imaginable. But an obvious way forward was taking the CPA

to it logical conclusion and offer the South ‘unity or secession’. This was all the more to be ex-

pected since the US had invested a lot of effort in the Sudan peace process and had had a con-

stant and decisive influence over it.

!Part III. The test

17. To test the theory of J. Paquin we will first see if independent variables other than stability

determined the US recognition of South Sudan. The most important challenge comes from the

possible influence of US religious lobbies, while there is little evidence about a decisive US

business interest in Sudan.

The religious lobby in the US

18. The view that religious evangelical groups were the decisive influence behind US policy in

Sudan can be considered a ‘most-likely’ explanation of why the US recognized South Sundan

(see par. 6) and it’s held by former US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa H. Cohen . His 41

view is that President George W. Bush ´owed a lot to the evangelical vote´ and that by pushing

hard for the CPA he had achieved his primary political goal of helping the Christians of Southern

Page ! of !12 22

“Sudan: American Policy toward the Land of Endless Conflict.” H. Cohen’s opinion is particularly rel41 -evant since he was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa in the George H. W. Administration (1989-1993) and had been previously Africa Director at the National Security Council.

Sudan . A full quote summarizes his view: ‘the administration of George W. Bush wanted to sat42 -

isfy its evangelical support base in the Bible belt. The objective was to end, once and for all, the

Khartoum regime’s repression and discrimination against the Christian, English-speaking popu-

lations in the South. Achieving overall peace in all of Sudan was important but secondary to the

Bush administration’s objectives. Bush’s main political objective was achieved. South Sudan is

now an independent country with massive problems of underdevelopment and ethnic tensions.

But it is independent.’ What this view lacks, however, is the causal connection between the 43

evangelical pressure to support the Southern Sudanese, and the actual decision by the US Presi-

dency in 2005 to accept self-determination and a referendum with the option of secession. All

studies about the US policy on Sudan highlight how influential this US interest group was in

placing Sudan on the US foreign policy agenda during the Presidency of George W. Bush but

none provide evidence that it determined its policy about of South Sudan’s independence . To 44

our effects, most importantly, this proposition can’t be sustained about the Obama Administra-

tion nor about its decision to press for implementing the CPA and for holding the independence

referendum. Cohen only goes as far as to say that Obama ‘was not unmindful’ of the evangelical

pressure . In fact, Obama’s democratic political base was very different to George W. Bush’s 45

and he did not need the vote of the evangelicals of the Bible belt as much as Bush did.

Page ! of !13 22

Cohen “Sudan: American Policy toward the Land of Endless Conflict.” p.324-32542

Ibid. p. 32743

Huliaras, “Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists.” p. 72344

Cohen “Sudan: American Policy toward the Land of Endless Conflict.” p. 32645

19. Therefore, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that the US evangelical lobby was

the decisive force behind the US acceptance in 2002 or 2005 of the principle of self-determina-

tion for Southern Sudan (with the option of secession), and much less that it was decisive in the

US pressure for a referendum in 2010 and in the US recognition of South Sudan in 2011.

The US business lobby

20. While the US religious lobby was not the fundamental variable behind the US recognition of

South Sudan, could the decisive variable be the satisfaction of US economic and business inter-

ests? I consider this as a ‘least-likely’ explanation of the US recognition of South Sudan (see par.

6) although one study considers that oil interests were the decisive influence on George W. Bush

policy on Sudan . The study, however, does not provide evidence about the causal connection 46

between the actions of the oil lobbies and the decisions of the Bush Administration. Even if we

were to accept that oil interests decided the policy of the George W. Bush Administration this

would only explain why the US accepted self-determination for the South and the referendum: it

would not explain the policy of the Obama Administration when it pressed for the referendum

and recognized South Sudan. Furthermore, this case can be dismissed on logical grounds since

US oil interests pushed to end the sanctions and to accommodate Khartoum, not towards promot-

ing independence for South Sudan . Finally, had US oil company been the promoters of US pol47 -

icy in Sudan they would surely be profiting by now from the results. But no US oil company is

Page ! of !14 22

Funk and Fake, Scramble for Africa p. 55-5646

Huliaras, “Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists.” p. 720-72147

present in South Sudan or Sudan, and national oil companies from Asia dominate their petrol

sectors . 48

The stability-seeking theory applied to the negotiation of the CPA

21. We now turn to examine the application of the stability-seeking theory, which is a ‘most-like-

ly’ explanation. What were the conditions in Sudan when the US accepted the principle of self-

determination and the possibility of a referendum? How were the indicators proposed by J.

Paquin? This affects the period 1998-2005 which corresponds to the last years of the Clinton

Administration and to the Presidency of George W. Bush. Since the new secessionist state did

not yet exist, only the indicators J. Paquin uses for the phase prior to independence are taken into

account . 49

22. External stability was only assured in part: on the one hand, there was a large number of

cross-national refugees and millions of internally displaced people; but, on the other hand, the 50

sovereignty of neighboring states was not seriously compromised by the parties and Khartoum

had normalized relations with the neighboring countries more favorable to the Southerners: Er-

itrea, Ethiopia and Uganda . 51

23. Peace negotiations were going ahead, and thus some internal ‘stability’ existed: the central

State had not paralyzed nor collapsed, it was negotiating with the secessionists and it had accept-

ed external mediation. Military clashes did indeed continue from October 1999 even to 2004 and

Page ! of !15 22

US EIA, Country Analysis Brief: Sudan and South Sudan p. 5-648

Paquin, A Stability-Seeking Power U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts p. 3549

418,270 in 2004 according to UNHCR, Update on Southern Sudan January 200950

Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan p. 11351

June 2002 was ‘the deadliest phase of war’ but, nevertheless, these clashes did not prevent the 52

parties reaching a peace agreement.

24. Applying the indicators proposed by Paquin, the central state in Sudan maintained an accept-

able level of stability at the time of the peace agreements and before. The evidence supports the

stability-seeking theory for this period so I conclude that the US was supporting the unity of Su-

dan and opposing secession between 1998 and 2005 (see par. 14) because the unity of Sudan

then seemed the best option for stability.

The stability-seeking theory applied to the implementation of the CPA

25. The US later changed its position and recognized South Sudan independence in 2011, after

the referendum. Why? According to the stability-seeking theory, because the conditions were

there for the US to change and support independence for South Sudan. There existed relative sta-

bility in the secessionist portion of Sudan, according to the indicators of the theory : after 2005 53

the authorities in Southern Sudan mostly achieved effective control and respected internal and

external borders; refugees had returned in large numbers and a UN Mission for Sudan was es54 -

tablished in March 2005. Overall the situation in the South was relatively stable, even if there

were internal tensions due to the fact some factions resented the dominance of the group that

signed the agreements, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement . 55

Page ! of !16 22

ICG, June 2002; Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan p. 115, 116 and 121; UNSG report of June 2004 p. 752

Paquin, A Stability-Seeking Power U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts p. 3953

UNHCR, Update on Southern Sudan January 200954

ICG, April 2011 p. 1-455

26. There existed however a big potential for external instability and for a relapse to war with the

North. The risk lied in the derailment of the peace process: the peace agreements were not being

properly implemented and US and international oversight was lacking ; tensions between North 56

and South reappeared and ‘Sudan was sliding towards a violent breakup’ . The source of con57 -

flict and instability was the possibility that the CPA remained ineffective. According to a report

of the International Crisis Group titled ‘Sudan: Preventing Implosion’ not implementing the CPA

would lead to further instability and ‘disastrous results’ . The review of the US policy on Sudan 58

of October 2009 affirmed: ‘Sudan’s implosion could lead to widespread regional instability or

new safe-havens for international terrorists’; also: ‘delays in implementing key portions of the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (…) represent a dangerous flashpoint for renewed conflict.’ . 59

As we have seen, implementing the CPA meant holding a referendum in 2011 and many believed

that the Southern Sudanese would vote decisively for independence . 60

27. In 2009-2010 the US changed its preference and backed the secessionists in accordance with

the stability-seeking theory: the secessionist authorities had achieved reasonable stability, while

the external stability was seriously compromised for lack of implementation of the peace agree-

ment. I conclude that the US supported the separation of South Sudan since that seemed the best

option for local and regional stability.

CONCLUSION

Page ! of !17 22

Millington, Lessons from the past p. 1156

ICG, December 2009 p. 157

Ibid. p. 1758

US Department of State. Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive Approach59

Lyman Negotiating Peace in Sudan p. 60; ICG, December 2009 p. 160

28. My conclusion is that the stability-seeking theory best explains why the US opposed seces-

sion in 2005 and its later change to back secession and recognize South Sudan in 2011. I there-

fore reply to the research question that the US acted as a ‘defensive-positionalist’ power that was

primary moved by local and regional stability concerns when it recognized South Sudan in 2011

and that interest groups in the US did not substantially influence that decision.

29. I would, however, suggest that this theory could be improved in two ways: including another

indicator of internal and external stability, and enlarging the realist theoretical framework. In the

case of South Sudan, the implementation or not of the peace agreements was crucial to estimate

if Sudan and its Southern region tended toward stability or instability. J. Paquin’s theory takes

peace negotiations and third-party intervention into account when formulating indicators but he 61

does not pay attention to the actual implementation of a peace accord between the central author-

ity and the secessionists. The case of South Sudan clearly shows that implementation or not of a

peace agreement is an indicator of stability that is relevant to the problem of recognizing new

states -when the agreement includes self-determination and a referendum. The stability-seeking

theory would therefore benefit if it would include another indicator or reformulate the existing

indicators to take this point into account.

30. Finally, the stability-seeking theory about the recognition of new states by the US would also

benefit if it would take into account contributions of the liberal theory of IR . The long and deep 62

involvement of the US in Sudan was guided by stability considerations as we have seen. But the

US was operating within a cooperative and multilateral process dedicated to peace mediation and

Page ! of !18 22

Paquin, A Stability-Seeking Power U.S. Foreign Policy and Secessionist Conflicts p. 3561

Nye and Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation. Chapter 6.; Ruggie, Multilateralism 62

Matters.p. 5; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.”p. 15

conflict resolution that partially constrained US options (see par. 16). The process included other

countries like Kenya, Uganda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Eritrea, United Kingdom, Norway… and

nominally at least it was managed by an international organization (IGAD) . The realist ap63 -

proach adopted by the author of the theory does not allow us to take into account this multilateral

and institutional framework. It is therefore advisable to follow the suggestion of Fearon and

Wendt that ‘if the goal of the discipline (of IR) is insight into world politics then it makes little

sense to rule out one or the other approach on a priori grounds’ and to use some flexibility and 64

pragmatism to incorporate the contribution of the liberal institutionalists to the stability-seeking

theory about US recognition of new states. My suggestion is to rephrase the theoretical frame-

work of the theory as applied to the case of South Sudan. I would therefore complement my re-

ply to the research question and affirm that the US acted as a ‘defensive-positionalist’ power

whose primary search for stability in Sudan was carried out through a multilateral and coopera-

tive framework, and whose options were conditioned and limited by the Sudanese peace media-

tion and conflict resolution process.

!

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ICG, May 2010; Leach War and Politics in Sudan. Chapter 6; Iyob and Khadiagala, Sudan Chapter 563

Fearon and Wendt “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View” p. 6864

!BIBLIOGRAPHY

!Bereketeab, Redie, ed. The Horn of Africa: Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts and Security. London: Pluto Press in cooperation with the Nordic Africa Institute, 2013. !Cohen, Herman J. “Sudan: American Policy toward the Land of Endless Conflict.” American Foreign Policy Interests 34, no. 6 (November 1, 2012): 322. !Cohen, Herman J. Intervening in Africa. Studies in Diplomacy. St. Martin’s Press, 2000. !Centre for Strategic and International Studies. US Policy to End Sudan’s War. February 2001. http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/sudan.pdf !Congressional Research Service. Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and US Policy. Lauren Ploch Blanchard. October 5, 2012. !Danforth John C. Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan April 26, 2002, thttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10258.pdf !Fearon, James and Alexander Wendt. “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View” Hand-book of International Relations. Eds. Carlsnaes, Walter, Thomas Risse-Kappen, and Beth A. Simmons.SAGE Publications, 2005. !Funk, Kevin, and Steven Fake. Scramble for Africa: Darfur-Intervention and the USA. Black Rose Books, 2009. !George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. BCSIA Studies in International Security. MIT Press, 2005. !Grieco, Joseph M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 485. !Huliaras, Asteris. “Evangelists, Oil Companies, and Terrorists: The Bush Administration’s Policy towards Sudan.” Orbis 50, no. 4 (2006): 709–24. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.010. !INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP Africa Report n. 48. Nairobi/Brussels, 27 June 2002 Africa Briefing n. 68. Nairobi/Brussels, 17 December 2009 Africa Report n. 159. 6 May 2010 Africa Report n. 172. 4 April 2011

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