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U.S. Supreme Court Criminal Law and Procedure Colonel Gregory E. Maggs (USAR) Professor of Law & Co-Director, National Security Law LL.M. Program The George Washington University Law School Review of October Term 2013 Outlook for October Term 2014

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Stanton v. Sims 134 S. Ct. 3 (2013) Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit seeking damages for injuries he caused by kicking in a gate while chasing a person suspected of a misdemeanor because the law regarding warrantless entry in hot pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant is not clearly established.

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Kansas v. Cheever 34 S. Ct. 596 (2013) The question here is whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from introducing evidence from a court ordered mental evaluation of a criminal defendant to rebut that defendants presentation of expert testimony in support of a defense of voluntary intoxication. We hold that it does not.

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Fernandez v. California 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) Precedent: [P]olice officers may search jointly occupied premises if one of the occupants consents. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). [T]he consent of one occupant is insufficient when another occupant is present and objects to the search. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006). Held: Randolph [does not apply] if the objecting occupant is absent when another occupant consents.

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Riley v. California 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.

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Navarette v. California 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) Majority: Under the totality of the circumstances, we find the indicia of reliability in this case sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver of the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road. That made it reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to execute a traffic stop. Dissent: So long as the caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic stop. This is not my concept, and I am sure would not be the Framers, of a people secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.

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White v. Woodall 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) Perhaps the logical next step would be to hold that the Fifth Amendment requires a penalty-phase no-adverse-inference instruction in a case like this one; perhaps not... [T]here are reasonable arguments on both sideswhich is all Kentucky needs to prevail in this [habeas corpus] case. The appropriate time to consider the question as a matter of first impression would be on direct review....

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Plumhoff v. Rickard 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014) [P]olice officers attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. We now consider respondents contention that, even if the use of deadly force was permissible, petitioners acted unreasonably in firing a total of 15 shots. We reject that argument. It stands to reason that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.

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Certiorari Granted Heien v. North Carolina No. 13-604 [Argument Oct. 6, 2014] Whether a police officers mistake of law can provide the individualized suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop.

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Certiorari Granted Holt v. Hobbs No. 13-6827 [Argument: Oct. 7, 2014] Whether the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy violates... 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., to the extent that it prohibits petitioner from growing a one-half-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs.

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Certiorari Granted Elonis v. United States No. 13-983 [Argument Dec. 1, 2014] Whether, consistent with the First Amendment... conviction of threatening another person under 18 U.S.C. 875(c) requires proof of the defendant's subjective intent to threaten... or whether it is enough to show that a reasonable person would regard the statement as threatening....