u.s.-turkish relations- a review at the beginning of the third decade.pdf

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Report Coordinators

Bulent Aliriza

Bulent Aras

U.S.-Turkish Relationsa review at the beginning of the third decade

of the postcold war era

November 2012


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Blank


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U.S.-Turkish Relationsa review at the beginning of the third decadeof the postcold war era

November 2012

Report Coordinators

Bulent Aliriza

Bulent Aras


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2

About CSIS50th Anniversary Year

For 50 years, the Center or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has developed practicalsolutions to the worlds greatest challenges. As we celebrate this milestone, CSIS scholars continueto provide strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a coursetoward a better world.

CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprot organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. Te Centers220 ull-time sta and large network o aliated scholars conduct research and analysis and de-velop policy initiatives that look into the uture and anticipate change.

Since 1962, CSIS has been dedicated to nding ways to sustain American prominence andprosperity as a orce or good in the world. Aer 50 years, CSIS has become one o the worlds pre-eminent international policy institutions ocused on deense and security; regional stability; andtransnational challenges ranging rom energy and climate to global development and economicintegration.

Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board o rustees since 1999. John J.Hamre became the Centers president and chie executive ocer in 2000. CSIS was ounded byDavid M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke.

CSIS does not take specic policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should beunderstood to be solely those o the author(s).

About SAM

Te Center or Strategic Research o the Ministry o the Foreign Aairs o the Republic o urkey(SAM) is a think-tank and a research center established in 1995 to provide urkish oreign policydecision makers with scholarly and scientic assessments o relevant issues, and reviews o urkishoreign policy with a uturistic perspective.

SAM provides consultancy to the oreign ministry departments as well as other state institu-tions in oreign policy, while also establishing regional think-tank networks.

In addition to its role o generating up-to-date inormation, reliable data and insightul analy-sis as a think-tank, SAM unctions as a orum or candid debate and discussion or anyone who isinterested in both local and global oreign policy issues.

SAM has a large range o publications. Along with its traditional publication, Perceptions, aquarterly English language journal with contributions by distinguished urkish and internationalscholars, SAM recently initiated Vision Papers, which expresses the views o the H.E. ForeignMinister and SAM Papers, which will cover current oreign policy debates by various scholars.

Cover photo credit: Detailed world map, iStockphoto.com/bamlou.

2012 by the Center or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Center or Strategic

Research (SAM).

ISBN 978-0-89206-759-6

Center or Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006el: (202) 887-0200Fax: (202) 775-3199Web: www.csis.org

Center or Strategic ResearchDr. Sadik Ahmet Cad. No. 8 Balgat- 06100Ankara, urkeyel: +(90) 312 292 26 22Fax: +(90) 312 292 26 35Web: www.sam.gov.tr


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| iii

Preface iv

Introduction v

PART I: Developing and Maintaining the Bilateral Alliance in aMultilateral Context, 19521990 1

PART II: The PostCold War Era: The First Two Decades, 19912011 5

PART III: Looking Ahead at the Beginning of the Third Decadeof the PostCold War Era 8

Broader Middle East: The Role of the Turkish Model or Inspiration 8

Syria: Dealing with an Escalating Crisis 9

Iraq: Promoting Stability, Development, and Governance after the U.S. Withdrawal 10

Iran: Balancing Mutual Opposition to Nuclear Weapons and Regional Hegemonywith Diplomatic, Economic, and Energy Ties 12

Israel and Palestine: Promoting a Two-State Solution? 13

Russia: Advancing the Reset while Addressing Differences 14

Central Asia: Advancing Mutual Interests in Energy Development, Security,and Political Reform 15

Afghanistan/Pakistan: Enhancing the Transition to Afghanizationand Regional Stability 16

Caucasus: The Challenge of Frozen Conicts 16

Cyprus: Synchronizing Efforts to Achieve a Settlement 17

Europe: Promoting Integration Efforts Parallel to the EU Accession Process 18

Balkans: Cooperation on Economic Development and Political Stability 19

Economic Dimension: Expanding Bilateral Trade and Cooperation in Third Countries 19

contents


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iv |

preface

As the United States and urkey enter the third decade ollowing the end o the Cold War, they

are enjoying a new cooperative era in their relationship. Teir partnership has recently been

enhanced by overlapping perspectives on the unprecedented transormation sweeping the Middle

East as well as in a number o other regional and unctional areas.

Tis report is the product o a joint eort by the Center or Strategic Research at the Ministry

o the Foreign Aairs o urkey (SAM) and the CSIS urkey Project. It incorporates the perspec-

tives rom both sides o the relationship, and in addition to examining the opportunities and chal-

lenges the alliance has conronted in the past six decades, it looks ahead to those it is likely to acein the uture.

Part I o the report examines the origins and development o the alliance during the Cold

War. Part II looks at the inevitable adjustments brought on by the end o the Cold War and identi-

es the key actors that helped to ensure the continuation o the relationship in the rst two de-

cades o the new era. Part III looks orward at the beginning o the third decade o the postCold

War era to how the relationship may evolve by ocusing on the main areas o cooperation.

We would like to thank all o the current and ormer U.S. and urkish policymakers and dip-

lomats who generously shared their views with us on the past, present, and uture o U.S.-urkish

relations. On the urkish side, we owe a particular debt o gratitude to Deputy Foreign Minister

Naci Koru, urkish Ambassador to the United States Namik an, and Ambassador uncay Babalior their invaluable support or this project rom its inception to its completion. We are also grate-

ul to ormer U.S. national security adviser General Brent Scowcro and ormer U.S. ambassador

to urkey Robert Pearson who participated in our workshop in Washington, as well as current

U.S. Ambassador to urkey Frank Ricciardone. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the invalu-

able assistance o all o our colleagues at SAM and CSIS, especially Dr. Mesut Ozcan and Dr.

Saban Kardas o SAM and Deni Koenhemsi and Andrew Haimes o CSIS.

Dr. Bulent Aras Dr. Bulent Aliriza

Center or Strategic Research (SAM) Turkey Project

Turkish Ministry o Foreign Afairs Center or Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)


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| v

Te partnership between the United States and urkey, which traces its origins to the Cold War,

has gone through constant adjustment since the beginning o the postCold War era.

Te current turmoil in the Middle East has served as a stark reminder to both Washington and

Ankara o their shared interests and complementary strategic perspectives. Close coordination

between the United States and urkey during the Arab Spring, urkeys continuing contribution

to the NAO mission in Aghanistan, urkeys decision to join the U.S.-led NAO missile shield

program, and U.S. security assistance to urkish military eorts against the Kurdistan Workers

Party (PKK) all highlight the extent to which the two countries can cooperate in urkeys increas-ingly volatile and confict-prone region.

However, the relationship is not without its problems. Signicant points o divergence in their

perspectives, as well as policies, remain. Unlike during the Cold War period, when each side knew

what it could give and expect to receive in the relationship, each side has sometimes allen short o

the others expectations. For example, urkey has been critical o U.S. ailure to put greater pres-

sure on Israel, while the United States has been uncomortable with the extent o urkeys contin-

ued dealings with Iran.

Looking ahead to the uture o U.S.-urkish relations, the alliance is likely to be shaped by a

number o actors. Te rst is how the United States will reposition itsel in the world as it reduces

its military presence in the Middle East and continues its pivot to Asia. Te uture o the rela-tionship will also be aected by the extent to which urkey will opt or independent action over

cooperation with the United States when conducting its oreign policy. Needless to say, domestic

political considerations in both countries will be another important determinant. Nationalist cur-

rents in urkish politics do not welcome urkey appearing to act on behal o the United States in

regional issues. Te urkish public still harbors deep skepticism about long-term U.S. intentions

and commitment to urkeys security. At the same time, demands in the United States or a lower

prole in the Middle East may undermine the basis or regional cooperation. Tere could also be a

revival o earlier questions about urkeys place in the West and an axis shi.

Te unolding o a number o specic issues will also help shape the uture o the alliance. In

the Middle East, the trajectory o the Arab Spring, driven by orces unleashed in the orm o popu-

lar uprisings, is likely to exert pressure on both Washington and Ankara to coordinate their poli-

cies, especially as they have similar perspectives on the root causes o the upheaval and the need to

assist the regional transormation toward democracy. How the two countries deal with the Iranian

nuclear program, regional tensions created by Irans stance in the Syrian crisis, and ehrans di-

cult relationship with its Arab neighbors will continue to be major components in the U.S.-urkish

relationship. Te role Russia chooses to play in the various parts o the world in which Washington

and Ankara have interests will also be a actor.

introduction


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vi | u.s.-turkish relations

Like every relationship, the evolving partnership between the United States and urkey has

the potential or improvement as well as deterioration. Consequently, while responding to these

developments, Washington and Ankara need to bear in mind that the alignment o their interests

in security, stability, and democratization requires them to work in tandem as much as possible.


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| 1

Although urks and Americans rst established diplomatic relations with the opening o Ottoman

and U.S. legations 1867 and 1901 respectively, a close alignment between the two countries did

not develop until aer World War II. Tis is understandable as the relationship had no geographic,

cultural, or economic oundations. Te alliance was constructed on urgent strategic needs at the

outset o the Cold War. As World War II was coming to an end, the United States and urkey saw a

convergence o their national interests due to their common but distinct perceptions o the Soviet

Union as a threat.

Initially, urkey enjoyed a close relationship with the Soviet Union during the early period othe Republic. Both had emerged rom the ashes o empires at the conclusion o World War I and

sought to establish themselves in the new global order. Te Soviet Union had been instrumental in

supporting the urkish National Movement during the War o Independence, and Ataturks early

state planning was partly infuenced by the Soviets. World War II had a prooundly negative eect

on the relationship as a newly emboldened Soviet Union under Stalin sought to press its advan-

tage in Eastern Europe, while seeking to establish control over the urkish Straits that linked the

Soviet-dominated Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Ankara was naturally alarmed by Moscows

termination o the 1925 urkish-Soviet reaty o Friendship and Neutrality in April 1945, as well

as by the Soviet Unions territorial demands and desire to modiy the Montreux Convention gov-

erning the use o the urkish Straits.

For its part, the United States slowly came to the conclusion that its ormer ally against Nazi

Germany had become its main challenger in the new global order. Consequently, as the U.S.-Sovi-

et conrontation escalated, Washington and Ankara each gradually began to recognize the need or

strategic cooperation. Tis process culminated in the establishment o the undamental institution

that would underpin the relationship or our decades: a close bilateral alliance within the multilat-

eral context o the main Western collective deense organization, NAO.

While progress toward a mutually advantageous alliance may have appeared entirely logical, i

not inevitable, or both sides, it was in act ar rom preordained. U.S. views on urkeys national

security and its role in the deense o the Western world evolved as the conrontation with the So-

viet Union escalated. Even beore the end o World War II, the United States recognized the Soviet

Unions desire to add urkey to its postwar sphere o infuence. Consequently, it concluded thatthe deense o the Republic o urkey [was] vital to the deense o the United States, according

to a statement by U.S. ambassador to urkey Edwin Wilson. Ambassador Wilson reinorced this

perception o a Soviet threat in a March 23, 1946, cable emphasizing that urkish independence

[had] become a vital interest or the United States.

Accordingly, President Harry S. ruman extended military and economic aid valued at $45

million to urkey through the Lend-Lease Act o 1941, which continued through 1946. Tis aid

package was but a small precursor to the much larger and longer-term unding$75 million in

developing and maintainingthe bilateral alliance in amultilateral context, 19521990I


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2 | u.s.-turkish relations

the 1948 scal yearwhich would be provided aer his proclamation o what became known as

the ruman Doctrine. In March 1947, ruman declared that urkey was essential to the preserva-

tion o order in the Middle East and that the consequences o its all at the hands o the Soviets

would be ar reaching to the West as well as to the East. rumans action was prompted by the de-

cision o the United Kingdom to retreat rom its position in the Near East. A British aide-memoire

delivered in Washington on February 21, 1947, had inormed the United States that the United

Kingdom could no longer extend nancial assistance tourkey and express[ed] earnest

hopethat the United States Government [would] agree to bearthe nancial burden, o which

the major part [had] hitherto been borne by His Majestys Government.

However, the United States did not initially see urkeys uture as a member in the evolving

Western collective deense arrangements that culminated in the establishment o NAO in 1949.

A February 12, 1951, memorandum summarizing the views o Assistant Secretary o State George

C. McGhee argued in avor o an Eastern Mediterranean grouping, centered around urkey,

since the land deense o Western Europe [was] separate rom the land deense o urkey. Ac-

cordingly, the United States rerained rom supporting multiple urkish attempts to enter NAO,

instead backing a Mediterranean Pact or a similar grouping, which the United Kingdom also

preerred, to help allay urkeys security concerns.

U.S. attitudes began to change with the continued escalation o Cold War tensions coupled

with urkish participation in the Korean War. McGheewho would later become ambassador to

urkeycommented in the February 1951 memorandum that by committing itsel to the Allied

eort in Korea, urkey had revealed the tremendous ghting qualities o the urkish troops and

demonstrated its willingness to participate in collective security. Equally importantly, the rst

ree multiparty urkish elections in May 1950 had provided the necessary democratic credentials

or membership in NAO, an issue that had been raised by many o the European NAO members.

Te dramatic change in U.S. views on urkish membership in NAO is demonstrated by two

Joint Chies o Sta memoranda in September 1950 and April 1951. Te rst argued that urkey

and Greeces inclusion [in NAO] may adversely aect the progress being made to strengthenthe collective deense organization. In contrast, the second memorandum declared that U.S.

security interests demand that urkey and Greece be admitted as ull members o [NAO]. Te

Joint Chies o Sta, rom the military point o view, would not regard either bilateral security ar-

rangements between the United States and urkey or Greece as an adequate solution. Te strong

arguments in avor o urkeys inclusion in NAO and its importance deending the West rom

Soviet domination [o] Europe, the Middle East and Asia then led the United States to convince

its hitherto reluctant NAO allies to accept urkeys admission in February 1952. Tis was also

acilitated by urkeys agreement in July 1951 with the United Kingdom to play a leading role in

eorts to construct a parallel Middle East Deense Organization aer it was admitted into NAO.

urkeys admission provided the United States access into a second NAO country sharing a

border with the Soviet Union next to what was perceived as its so underbelly in the Caucasus.

Te United States also concluded hundreds o separate bilateral agreements parallel to the multi-

lateral deense arrangements provided by their common membership in NAO. Once the United

States began to engage urkey in a security alliance, most o its interaction was with the urkish

military. In act, it is no exaggeration to say that the Pentagonurkish General Sta (GS) link

served as the core o the U.S.-urkish relationship or the next 40 years. Consequently, most o the

major interactions between the United States and urkey occurred in the context o this primary

security relationship. In addition to the security guarantee provided by the United States through


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bulent aliriza and bulent aras | 3

NAO, urkey also depended on the protection o the U.S. nuclear umbrella and the massive

amounts o military and economic assistance it received rom the United States. From 1948 to

1975, urkey received over $4.5 billion in military aid rom the United States. Needless to say, U.S.

policies were also in accordance with the U.S. perception o its own security interests.

Te predominance o Cold War calculations in the relationship on the U.S. side can be seen by

its tolerance o the urkish militarys tutelage over the political system, demonstrated by the coupo May 1960. In August, a ew weeks aer the military takeover, a cable rom U.S. ambassador Avra

M. Warren asserted that the United States intend[ed] to work with [the military government] just

as loyally and aithully as [the United States] did during the Menderes government and that it

would work with any uture government to ensure urkeys commitment to the West, unless it is

commie.

Tis imperative would continue throughout the Cold War, with the United States supporting,

or at the very least condoning, the subsequent 1971 and 1980 coups. A memorandum rom Harold

Saunders o the National Security Council Sta o President Richard M. Nixon on March 25, 1971,

refected U.S. priorities. Instead o displaying any sense o apprehension aer the military had

orced the elected government to resign, Saunders merely noted that the military leaders [were]

the nal arbiters and that the United States should now be open to convincing the military

decisionmakers o the urgency o the opium problem, the primary issue o concern to the United

States at the time.

While the United States was committed to the deense o urkey through the NAO Charter,

the United States elt no obligation to consult or even inorm the urkish government o major de-

cisions when it was not perceived to be in its interests. Te Cuban Missile Crisis provided a vivid

example o this tendency. Te United States had placed Jupiter nuclear-tipped missiles in urkey

in 19591960 to bolster NAO deenses against the Soviet Union. Tis decision was also seen as

a strong indicator o U.S. support and commitment to urkey. However, the discovery during the

crisis that the Soviets had placed nuclear weapons in Cuba dramatically changed U.S. security cal-

culations. As part o the secret deal that ended the crisis, President John F. Kennedy agreed quietlyto withdraw the Jupiters rom urkey aer the Soviets withdrew their missiles rom Cuba. Wash-

ington had decided to remove the missiles rom urkey without consulting Ankara. Te absence

o a need or urkish input in a decision that signicantly aected Ankara clearly demonstrated

the inequality in the relationship, albeit not as unequal as the relationship between the USSR and

its satellites in the Warsaw Pact.

Te same lack o concern or urkish sensitivities was displayed over the Cyprus issue. Te

main U.S. motive in this long-estering problem was the prevention o a urkish-Greek clash in

the interests o the stability o the eastern fank o NAO. On June 5, 1964, President Lyndon B.

Johnson went so ar as to question the security guarantee in the NAO Charter in a letter to Prime

Minister Ismet Inonu o urkey. In a message designed to deter Ankara rom an intervention in

Cyprus to protect its ethnic brethren, Johnson bluntly warned that urkeys NAO allies have

not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect urkey against the Soviet

Union i urkey were to intervene in Cyprus.

When urkey nally intervened in Cyprus in 1974, the U.S. Congress, motivated by the emer-

gence o ethnic politics spearheaded by the Greek lobby, came into the U.S.-urkish equation in a

negative way by imposing an embargo on U.S. military supplies to urkey. TenSecretary o State

Henry Kissinger, who strongly opposed the congressional action, argued in an internal memoran-


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dum on December 6, 1974, that the alliance with urkey was essential to Western security, and

that this relationship exist[ed] not as a avor to urkey, but was a product o the importance o

urkey to the security o not only the Mediterranean, [but] o all o Europe and the Atlantic area.

As Kissinger eared, Ankara retaliated by abrogating the Joint Deense Cooperation Agreement

and closing U.S. listening posts ocused on the Soviet Union. However, Lieutenant General Brent

Scowcro, then deputy national security adviser, has noted that while the closing o the listening

posts hurt the United States or a time, Washington succeeded in overcoming the problem by

quietly getting Chinese cooperation to put [listening posts] up in ibet. Te Carter adminis-

tration was eventually able to pressure Congress into liing the embargo in 1978. Although the

episode le a bitter taste or Ankara, the continuing importance o mutual Cold War interests

ensured the maintenance o their strategic relationship.


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| 5

Just as the period toward the end o World War II set the course or the rst phase o the U.S.-

urkish alliance, the adjustment at the end o the Cold War would provide the ramework or the

subsequent two decades.

With the collapse o the Soviet Union and the end o the Cold War, the common bond be-

tween the two Cold War allies was gone. Nonetheless, the close relationship between the United

States and urkey not only endured aer the Cold War, but thrived, unlike many o Washingtons

other relationships established during the same period. Washington and Ankara sought and ound

a new set o rationales or an alliance that they both wanted to maintain. Tis said, it was essen-tially a case o ad hoc adjustment, the implications o which were not ully considered by either

Washington or Ankara.

In contrast to the primarily anti-Soviet partnership during the Cold War, the emphasis was

now on how to redene an evolving alliance that was multiregional and multidimensional in

nature. President George H.W. Bush, who oversaw the transition in 1991 to 1992, highlighted the

changing nature o the relationship in his visit to urkey in July 1991. He said urkeys importance

as an ally had developed beyond being purely the bulwark o NAOs southern fank. urkey

now served as a model to the newly independent ormer Soviet urkic states and as a possible

transit route or energy rom the Caspian Sea to international markets that would bypass Russia.

urkey had thus rediscovered its historic place as a trade hub, uniting EuropeEast and WestAsia, and the Middle East, while acting as a beacon o stability. Bush also emphasized another

important component o U.S. postCold War policy toward urkey to his host, President urgut

Ozal, by saying that there should be no question that urkey deserve[s] entry into the European

Community.

Te strategic alliancebetween the United States and urkeyound a new point o ocus when

Bush looked to Ozal or urkish cooperation aer Iraqs invasion o Kuwait. Bush noted in Sep-

tember 1990, soon aer the invasion, that urkey [had] stood rm and steadast despite the heavy

burden the Iraqi invasion [had] placed on its own economy. As thenNational Security Adviser

Brent Scowcro conrmed, the personal relationship between Bush and Ozal acilitated coopera-

tion in the political, economic, and cultural sphere. He described Bush and Ozals dialogue as

having produced an intimate, personal bond where the relationship really becamevery closeand in a sense less military and more political than it had ever been beore, while demonstrating

the indisputable strategic importance o urkey to the United States.

President Bill Clinton would essentially ollow in his predecessors ootsteps as he managed the

changing bilateral relationship. In October 1993, he highlighted the shi in the alliance rom a

Cold War emphasis on military assistance to shared values and greater political cooperation. ur-

keys strategic location and history would also play a stabilizing role in a host o regional trouble

spots. Clinton continued Bush-era cooperation in Iraq, while working with President Suley-

the postcold war erathe first two decades, 19912011II


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man Demirel and other urkish leaders on NAO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo and actively

supporting urkeys eorts to build an East-West corridor or Caspian energy. In an April 1995

congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary o State Richard Holbrooke stressed that U.S. interests

in urkey were considerable despite the end o the Cold War because it was the ront line state

or U.S. security interests in Europe.

Clinton also sought to rearm and strengthen urkeys institutional ties with the Westthrough eventual EU membership. Ambassador to urkey and later Assistant Secretary o State

Marc Grossman statedthat the United States supports urkeys EU membership; not hal mem-

bership or three quarters o membership; but ull membership. In 1995, urkey concluded a

Customs Union with the European Union, a stepping-stone to its highly sought-aer candidate

status, attained in 1999. Tis step would not have been possible without the support o the Clinton

administration.

Clinton later summarized his view o the signicance o the U.S.-urkish bilateral relationship

during his November 1999 visit to Ankara, when he declared Since the Cold War ended, we have

learned something quite wonderul. We have learned that our riendship does not depend upon a

common concern related to the Soviet Union, and that in act, our partnership has become even

more important in the postCold War era. However, signicant as each o these areas o coopera-

tion were, none o them really lled the void created by the elimination o a common enemy and

the certainties o the Cold War. In that 40-year-long phase, each side o the bilateral relationship

knew what it could expect rom the other and what it could give in return. Te end o the Cold

War allowed a great deal more latitude or a more independent urkish oreign policy, which the

United States tolerated. urkey utilized this newound fexibility to improve its ties with Russia

and Iran. While this caused discomort in Washington, the United States nonetheless endeavored

to maintain cooperation, including the maintenance o the No-Fly Zone over Iraq.

Te postCold War relationship was seriously tested during the presidency o George W.

Bush. As a part o President Bushs Global War on error aer the September 11, 2001, attacks,

he pursued a with us or against us approach. Te urkish Grand National Assemblydid notapprove Bushs request in March 2003 or U.S. troops to operate rom urkish bases and ports

preparing to attack Iraq. Nonetheless, the Bush administration chose to blame the urkish General

Sta instead o the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development PartyJDP), which had

come into power in November 2002. Although the relationship quickly recovered, the event was a

major turning point in U.S.-urkish relations, not least because it accelerated the shi in the bal-

ance o power between the military and civilian leadership in urkey.

In June 2004, Bush reiterated the importance o urkeys ties to the West during his visit to

Istanbul, while highlighting its vital role in the spread o democracy in the region through what

he termed the Freedom Agenda. He stated that, because o [urkeys] character[its] success

is vital to a uture o progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East. urkey not

only belong[ed] in the European Union because o its strategic importance historically ghting

the Soviets, but its membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim

world and the West, because [it is] part o both.

Te damage caused by the split over the Iraq War was partly mitigated by urkeys continuing

support in Aghanistan. Like other NAO members, urkey had answered Washingtons call in the

wake o the September 11 al Qaeda attacks. Ankara sent troops to help establish public order and


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unctioning economic and political structures in Aghanistan aer the United States had over-

thrown the aliban regime that had sheltered al Qaeda. urkey has been one o the top contribu-

tors to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and has twice led the Kabul Regional

Command. As a Muslim-majority NAO member and signicant troop contributor to ISAF, ur-

keys involvement had major symbolic value. Washington also beneted rom valuable intelligence

and expertise provided by urkey in the ght against terrorism.

President Barack Obama would ocus even more than Bush on urkeys role in his declared

endeavor to bridge the divide between the West and the Muslim world. In act, by choosing to visit

urkey in April 2009 just three months aer moving into the White House, Obama signaled in a

highly symbolic manner the priority he would assign to U.S.-urkish relations in his oreign pol-

icy. Tis was underlined by the unveiling o his vision o a model partnership between the two

countries during his visit. Compared to the long-standing strategic partnership between the two

countries, the concept o a model partnership sought to take the relationship between the United

States and urkey a step urther, by emphasizing closer cooperation between a global power and

an assertive regional power.

Obama had argued prior to his election that the Bush administration had alienated people in

many countries, especially Muslims, during its global War on error. In his statements in Ankara,

Obama aimed at pursuing a dierent policy whereby urkey, a country which he emphasized

belonged to the West as well as the Muslim world, would play a key role. While welcoming Prime

Minister Recep ayyip Erdogan to Washington in December 2009, Obama said that urkey was a

great country with growing infuence around the world. Obama also emphasized how, as a ma-

jority Muslim nation, urkey was playing a critical role in helping to shape mutual understand-

ing and stability and peace not only in its neighborhood but around the world.

Obamas approach refected Washingtons growing recognition o urkeys economic strength

and regional infuence. Tis consequently contributed to a change in U.S.-urkish relations during

this period. In other words, urkeys new multidimensional and multilateral oreign policy agenda

changed the U.S. perception o urkeys regional and global role in world politics. Similarly, theact that the JDP has its roots in political Islam and was more interested in the Middle East and the

wider Islamic world than any previous urkish government was undoubtedly perceived to be an

advantage by both the Bush and Obama administrations.

Obama expanded the level o cooperation to the extent that he talked about the riendship

and bond o trust that he had developed with Erdogan during a January 2012 interview. Tis

special relationshipakin to the one between ormer president George H.W. Bush and Ozalmit-

igated strains in 2010 caused by dierences over Iran, urkish-Israeli tensions, and the reintroduc-

tion o a congressional resolution on the Armenian Genocide issue, which had long bedeviled

the relationship.


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8 |

Te uture o the alliance in the third decade and beyond will be determined to a great extent by

the ability o the two countries to maximize their convergence and minimize their divergence in a

number o areas o common interest, in particular the Middle East.

Broader Middle East: The Role of the TurkishModel or InspirationAt the core o growing U.S.-urkish cooperation is the urkish model or inspiration or the

changing Middle East. With its political stability and economic development in a resource-rich

but politically volatile region, urkey, with U.S. backing, has supported widespread Arab demands

or democratic transormation. As Islamist activists and others previously shut out o long-ossied

political systems have risen up against autocratic rulers in the region, the two countries have been

encouraging the revolutionaries to seek power through the ballot box. Te policy convergence

between Washington and Ankara has built on the experience o working together as NAO allies

or six decades. Tey also share a joint vision to spread, throughout the region, democracy, ree-

dom, a ree market economy, and the rule o law, which have come to orm the basis o the urkish

system.

Establishing closer relations with the Middle East and helping it to emulate urkeys ownpositive example have been an integral part o the countrys increasingly proactive oreign policy,

particularly with its declared goal o trying to move toward zero problems with neighbors. Te

more infuential role that urkey has been seeking to play in the region has also dovetailed with

the model partnership concept outlined by President Obama in Ankara in 2009. Tis incorpo-

rated his vision o the two allies working more closely together in the pursuit o their common

values and goals. aking advantage o its unique status as an integral part o both systems, urkey

would also play a special role in improving the strained relationship between the West and the

Islamic world.

Te advent o the Arab Spring constituted a test, as well as an opportunity, or new coopera-

tion. At the beginning o the postCold War era, urkey had seen itsel as a successul democratic

example or the urkic republics that gained independence aer the breakup o the Soviet Union.

Even more so with the Arab Spring, urkey has seen itsel as an example that could be emulated

throughout the Middle East, a country successully combining moderate Islamic values with a

ully democratic secular system. Te common goal o the United States and urkey was to acili-

tate as smooth a transition as possible away rom dictatorship to democracy while countering the

appeal o radicalism.

looking ahead at the beginningof the third decade of the

postcold war era

III


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However, urkish policymakers have rerained rom openly advocating their country as a

model. Instead, they have preerred to portray urkey more as an inspiration or those struggling

to transorm the region. In their view, countries can draw on lessons rom the urkish experience

while applying them in accordance with their own unique historical conditions. In other words,

urkey would be better suited to readily share its experience and thus assist in regional transor-

mation. Wisely, the United States has also rerained rom openly advocating the urkish model,

while taking every opportunity to reer to the urkish example as the process has unolded.

Te developments in unisia and Egypt led the way to genuine democracy or the rst time

in their history relatively quickly aer popular uprisings. Tis made it impossible or autocratic

regimes to survive while serving to demonstrate the soundness o the joint and coordinated U.S.-

urkish approach. Ruled by moderate Islamists committed to maintaining the democratic systems

that brought them to power, to resisting extremists unwilling to show tolerance to those who do

not share their views, and to developing a new and healthier relationship with the West based on

mutual respect, unisia and Egypt can provide their own model or inspiration to others in the

region with the encouragement o Washington and Ankara. Libya also moved away rom a long

dictatorship to a orm o democracy through a very dierent and bloodier path. Te struggle in

Syria is even ercer, and as such presents an interruption in the fow o regional democratizationand a much less desirable example posing a very real challenge to U.S.-urkish cooperation in the

Middle East.

Syria: Dealing with an Escalating Crisisrying to manage the dicult and complicated transition rom autocratic regimes in the Middle

East became the primary theme in the Washington-Ankara relationship in 2011, and the autocrat-

ic government in Syria was seen by both countries as the next domino to all. However, Syria has

broken rom what was seen as a natural progression o democracy sweeping through the region.

Initially, both the United States and urkey viewed the Syrian uprising through the prism othe earlier revolutions in unisia, Egypt, and to a lesser extent Libyaas a homegrown movement

that would inevitably orce long-delayed reorms on the Syrian regime or push it aside. However,

the long-drawn-out struggle with its growing cost in Syrian lives is threatening the entire process

o change.

Prior to the revolution, Syria was the cornerstone o the urkish policy o zero problems with

neighbors. Visas were lied, and there was fourishing cross-border trade and even joint cabinet

meetings. Understandably, Ankaras initial reaction was to engage Damascus and to advise it to

reorm. However, when the Syrian regime resisted and responded with increasing savagery, urkey

chose to support the actions o the Syrian insurgents.

Te Syrian crisis quickly escalated rom a purely domestic confict into an international crisis.While Syria enjoyed the backing o Russia at the diplomatic level and Iran at the operational level,

the rebellion was supported not only by urkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, but also by the Friends

o Syria group including the United States and a wider international consensus backed by the UN

General Assembly. On a wider scale, the crisis underlined and exacerbated other regional issues,

including the political strie in Lebanon and Iraq, regional competition between Iran and the Arab

countries o the Gul, Russias quest or residual infuence in the Middle East, and Israeli security

concerns.


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Te cruelty and sectarianism o the Syrian regime has provoked a similar response rom the

insurgents and consequently made it inevitable that sectarian radicalism will be a major actor

in the post-Assad equation in Syria and probably beyond. Tis is especially unwelcome or An-

kara, which has endeavored to avoid a Sunni-Shia divide in the Middle East. It is also concerned

with the possibility o Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria as the confict worsens, coupled with

resumption o Syrian support or the terrorist activities o the PKK inside urkey.

Te United States and urkey have endeavored to cooperate as much as possible in dealing

with the Syrian crisis. In addition to participating as key members o the Friends o the Syrian

People Contact Group and working together to dra UN resolutions on Syria, they have also

sought to coordinate their response to the escalating confict. However, despite mutual interests,

shared principles and goals, and increased joint operational and intelligence support to the op-

position, U.S.-urkish cooperation on Syria has not been eective rom Ankaras perspective. As

the crisis has become protracted, the nancial, human, and diplomatic costs o the confict have

mounted or urkey. As Ankara has repeatedly made clear, dealing with the Syrian crisis alone is

beyond its own capabilities. urkey needs the United States to give more concrete support or it to

be able to exercise its own regional infuence to help end the confict.

However, while urkey has looked to the United States or greater leadership on this issue,

the United States in turn has looked to urkey to help spearhead the eort in Syria as part o the

Obama administrations multilateral leading rom behind approach. Moreover, having ought

with Islamist extremists or over a decade aer the September 11 attacks, there has been a very

real reluctance on the part o Washington to provide greater backing or the Syrian opposition

due to the presence o what it considers to be potentially hostile radicals in its ranks. Te paradox

is that this approach has had the eect o orcing the opposition in its desperate struggle to look

elsewhere not only or arms, but also or additional volunteers rom the extremist ringe. At the

same time and even more importantly, it has led Ankara to question the scope and depth o U.S.-

urkish cooperation, which has seen its limitations exposed in the ace o a challenge to the entire

Arab Spring process.

Iraq: Promoting Stability, Development, andGovernance after the U.S. WithdrawalAlthough overshadowed by the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis, Iraq and Iraq-related issues

continue to occupy an important place in the U.S.-urkish bilateral relationship. Te ragile politi-

cal structures in Iraq and security concerns generated by its internal conficts have been a serious

concern or urkey since the First Gul War. Te PKKs use o Northern Iraq as a base or its terror

campaign against urkey is a major issue or Ankara. Accordingly, bridging policy dierences and

developing closer security cooperation in Iraq has constituted a challenge or U.S.-urkish rela-

tions.

Despite their serious disagreement immediately prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion o Iraq, the

United States and urkey have both supported the political stability and territorial integrity o

post-Saddam Iraq. Aer the invasion, urkey contributed to stabilization eorts in Iraq, believ-

ing that such support was vital or urkish interests, as well as or broader regional security. Since

then, the United States and urkey have acted on the understanding that a unctioning state in

Iraq is their common objective. aking into account the political turmoil and ongoing realignment


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in the region, both the United States and urkey have perceived that they had a common interest

in helping Iraq consolidate its transition rom authoritarianism to ull constitutional democracy.

However, while the outcome desired by both countries or Iraq was the same, there were impor-

tant dierences between them on the roles o ethnic and sectarian groups during this process.

Following the withdrawal o U.S. orces, changes in Iraqi domestic politics caused U.S. and

urkish policies in Iraq to diverge. Te United States supported Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a Shia, as a strong leader capable o maintaining Iraqs security and stability. Understand-

ably desirous o portraying post-withdrawal Iraq as a oreign policy success, it has been backing

Maliki despite his authoritarian tendencies and close relations with Iran. For its part, urkey has

supported the Sunni and Shia opponents o Maliki and expressed concern about the growth o

Iranian infuence in Iraq. Dierences between urkish and Iraqi leaders during the Arab Spring,

especially in Syria, coupled with ongoing disputes over Northern Iraq, have caused a urther dete-

rioration in the relationship between Ankara and Baghdad.

ensions between the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in

Northern Iraq threaten the stability that both Washington and Ankara desire in this ragile system.

urkeys initially cautious and even hostile attitude toward the KRG contrasted with the positive

relationship the KRG enjoyed with the United States. However, in the past ew years, the situation

has changed considerably. urkeys opening toward Iraqi Kurds, especially in the construction and

energy sectors, has developed to the point o creating additional strains with Baghdad. It has also

added to Washingtons own concerns over Iraqs stability and territorial integrity.

Although the United States is pleased with improved relations between Ankara and the KRG,

it has nonetheless been concerned about the impact o urkishIraqi Kurdish initiatives on the

dicult relationship between Baghdad and the KRG. Tese include a discussion o the export o

Iraqi Kurdish oil to markets via urkey without the permission o the Iraqi Oil Ministry. U.S. and

urkish oil companies have signed a number o agreements with the KRG that have been de-

clared invalid and illegal by the Iraqi government. While the U.S. government has not discouraged

U.S. companies rom dealing directly with the KRG, Washington has indicated that it preers theextraction and export o Iraqi Kurdish oil to be undertaken with the blessing o Baghdad. While

Ankara also seeks such a solution, it has nonetheless indicated that it might go ahead even with-

out such an agreement. Consequently, it is important or Washington and Ankara to nd a way to

resolve their dierences beore developments reach that point.

urkeys increasing political and economic engagement with the Kurdish authorities has

placed it in the unaccustomed position o being the KRGs champion against a potentially hostile

government in Baghdad. o be sure, urkeys problems with the Iraqi central government have

contributed to closer relations with the Iraqi Kurds. However, the most important element o

urkish-Kurdish rapprochement has been urkeys hope that the KRG leadership can serve as a

positive model and a strategic asset in its eorts to deal with Kurdish unrest within urkey and the

PKK presence in Northern Iraq and, more recently, Northern Syria.

Despite the extensive support the United States provided urkey, particularly aer 2007

when Washington agreed to provide actionable intelligence in the struggle against PKK terror-

ism, urkish politicians and ocials have continued to complain. Teir main source o grievance

has been the alleged inadequacy o U.S. assistance in tracking and eliminating PKK terrorists,

especially in Northern Iraq. Tis dissatisaction has been exacerbated by the residual anti-Amer-

icanism within urkey that continues to be ed by skepticism that the United States is not doing


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enough to help in the three-decade-long struggle against the PKK, despite repeated assurances to

the contrary. Tus, it is vital that the two countries nd a way to work even more closely on this is-

sue. Tis could involve the development o a new security structure in Iraq that excludes the PKK,

in order to eliminate this thorn in U.S.-urkish relations.

Iran: Balancing Mutual Opposition to NuclearWeapons and Regional Hegemony with Diplomatic,Economic, and Energy Tiesurkeys eort to maintain good relations with Iran has necessitated a dicult balancing act with

the United States because o the animosity between Washington and ehran. However, the balance

has the potential to be upset by a number o issues, in particular a U.S. or Israeli military strike

against Irans nuclear installations.

Washington has pursued an increasingly stringent policy o sanctions to isolate the Islamic

Republic and to generate international pressure against it on the grounds that it supports inter-

national terrorism, ails to comply with the nuclear nonprolieration regime, and violates humanrights. In contrast, Ankara has opted or continued engagement with Iran, arguing that isolation

and pressure would only urther radicalize its policies and that sanctions cause innocent citizens

to suer rather than the current regime.

Accordingly, urkey has rebued U.S. and EU sanctions on Iran and only complied with

international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. In addition to its general opposi-

tion to sanctions, this is also due to the importance o urkeys trade with Iran. Te urkish and

Iranian economies complement each other to a considerable extent. While Iran oers a protable

market or urkish exports, its vast hydrocarbon resources help meet increasing urkish demand

or energy. Te growing trade between the two countries has an imbalance in avor o Iran due to

urkish purchases o Iranian gas. At the same time, urkey has been soliciting Irans cooperationto tackle security challenges posed by cross-border terrorist activities o the PKK.

Te United States and urkey have important shared interests regarding Iran, most crucially

with respect to the weaponization o ehrans nuclear program and the containment o its rising

regional power. In addition, they have a joint commitment to the nonprolieration regime, share a

mutual concern about a nuclear-armed Iran, and are in general agreement on the use o urkeys

links to Iran to help nudge it in the direction o a negotiated settlement on its nuclear program.

However, the issue has also been a major source o irritation between the two allies. In 2010, the

separate deal on the nuclear issue that urkey and Brazil struck with Iran was immediately op-

posed by the United States, and soon aerward urkey voted against a U.S.-sponsored package o

sanctions at the UN Security Council.

Te competing regional visions o the United States and Iran have also presented a challenge

or U.S.-urkish relations. Iran has approached its neighbors as potential battlegrounds to ght

the United States, while containing Iranian infuence has been a major objective o U.S. policy in

the Middle East. o a great extent, this is consistent with urkeys own perception o Iran as a rival

with policies that could endanger regional stability. For Ankara, this view was reinorced aer Iran

resumed previous support or the PKK and began to give increased backing or the Syrian regime

as it suppressed its opponents with brutal orce. Tese moves, combined with Iranian infuence

in Iraq and in Lebanon through Hezbollah, have led Ankara increasingly to perceive Iran as the


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leader o an emerging de acto Shia ront seeking to curb urkish infuence in the Middle East.

From Ankaras point o view, Iran may be pushing the region toward a sectarian divide, which

is anathema to urkey. urkey has chosen to cooperate with the U.S. strategy o counteracting

Iranian infuence in the region by agreeing to Washingtons request to allow the stationing o an

antimissile NAO radar system in southeast urkey, while publicly insisting that the system was

not specically designed to target Iran.

However, Ankara continues to view the possible escalation o the U.S.-Iranian conrontation

to the point o armed confict as detrimental to regional peace and stability. Consequently, in its

balancing act o maintaining relations with Iran while also cooperating closely with the United

States, Ankara has regularly been conveying Washingtons concerns to ehran in order to try to

deuse tensions. For its part, Washington has made it clear that it regards the use o military orce

against Iran as an undesirable last resort and has shown tolerance toward the nuanced policy o

urkey. Tat implicit understanding has proved useul in limiting disagreements in U.S.-urkish

relations over Iran. However, i strains between Washington and ehran escalate, maintaining a

balance is likely to prove more dicult or Ankara.

Israel and Palestine: Promoting a Two-StateSolution?As a strong supporter o the long-standing relationship between urkey and Israel, the United

States has tried to ease recent urkish-Israeli tensions while continuing to maintain the clos-

est possible cooperation with urkey. However, sustained U.S. backing o Israel is in contrast to

urkeys increasing advocacy o Palestinian rights and may eventually orce the two countries to

conront their dierences on this issue.

Having long maintained good relations with Israel, urkey has also been supporting the idea

that it should live in peace with its neighbors within internationally recognized boundaries. It has

been arguing that a just and durable solution o the Israeli-Palestinian problem is essential or

regional peace in the Middle East and that such a solution is contingent upon a two-state solution.

Accordingly, urkey has been backing international initiatives aiming at such a goal, while seeking

to explain the Palestinian case to the international community, most notably through the United

Nations.

urkey has been underlining the act that it pays close attention to the regional atmosphere

when calibrating its relationship with Israel. When the atmosphere appeared more avorable to a

settlement based on a two-state solution, urkeys own relationship with Israel also continued to

fourish. Te relationship deteriorated as the peace process ground to a halt, and it reached a new

low with the urkish-Israeli dispute during the fotilla incident in 2010. urkeys relations with Is-

rael are also infuenced by public opinion. Tere is strong support or the Palestinians in urkey, andurkish politicians have to take these sentiments into consideration when ormulating policies.

During the Bush administration, the United States supported the Roadmap or Peace Plan

with the target o a two-state solution. Te Obama administration backed the same goal. However,

in the absence o any tangible progress in the peace process, Washington has lobbied strongly

against a urkey-backed eort by the Palestinians to seek recognition as a state by the United

Nations. Te two countries have also diverged on the status o Hamas. While urkey recognizes

Hamas as a legitimate political organization that has to be brought into the equation eventu-


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ally, the United States shuns it as a terrorist organization. Overall, urkey has been expecting the

United States to be more orthcoming toward the Palestinians, while strongly urging Israeli leaders

to work or a settlement.

Although the United States and urkey have ound a way to manage their dierences on this

issue, a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute will undoubtedly have a positive spillover

eect on urkish-Israeli relations and indirectly on U.S.-urkish relations. As a solution to thedispute does not appear likely in the near uture, the two countries will, in essence, have to con-

tinue to compartmentalize the issue within their relationship. However, i the ongoing political

transormation in the Middle East as a result o the Arab Spring changes the strategic equation in

the region and creates more avorable conditions or the peace process, this would surely benet

the U.S.-urkish relationship.

Russia: Advancing the Reset while AddressingDifferences

Te transormation o the urkish-Russian relationship has been a signicant element o urkishoreign policy in the last decade. Building on the positive momentum generated by a fourishing

economic partnership, particularly in the energy sector, Ankara and Moscow have developed a

closer political dialogue. Coupled with greater diplomatic coordination in regional and to some

extent global aairs, they have moved beyond the legacy o centuries-old enmity and rivalry.

Trough what has been described as a multidimensional partnership, the two countries have

endeavored to deepen their bilateral relationship while trying to approximate their positions on

neighborhood issues in the Caucasus and Black Sea.

However, as it enhanced its ties with Moscow, Ankara has experienced occasional riction in

its relationship with Washington. For example, while urkey was lukewarm toward U.S. eorts

to expand U.S. and NAO military power into the Black Sea basin, it was comortable cooperat-

ing with Russia to bolster maritime security in the Black Sea. Similarly, on the issues o the color

revolutions and European energy security, urkeys policy was sometimes ar rom alignment

with the U.S. position and closer to that o Russia. Such dierences came to the surace most vis-

ibly during the Russian-Georgian War o 2008 when, invoking the stipulations o the Montreux

Convention, urkey restricted the passage o U.S. warships into the Black Sea on their way to

Georgia. Tis move, combined with its subsequent shuttle diplomacy in the region, stemmed rom

Ankaras belie in the notion o regional ownership and its ability to help solve regional problems

without external involvement.

Te U.S. policy o reset with Russia was welcomed by Ankara as it promised some relie

rom the burden o balancing its ties with Washington and Moscow. However, the trilateral dy-

namics were negatively aected by growing convergence between the United States and urkeyin the wake o the Arab uprisings, Russias stance on the Syrian uprising, and Ankaras decision to

allow the installation o NAOs early warning radar system despite Moscows opposition. At the

same time, Ankara gradually came to the conclusion that Moscow was not as orthcoming as it

had hoped it would be on neighborhood issues, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

Nonetheless, Russia continues to be a very important trade partner or urkey and the prin-

cipal supplier o natural gas and, to a lesser extent, oil. Consequently, urkey perceives it to be in

its interest to ollow a policy designed to avoid a major crisis with Russia and participation in any


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conrontation between Moscow and the West. In that context, it has been supporting Russia-NA-

O security cooperation and continued talks on the missile shield, the uture o nuclear weapons

in Europe, the application o the reaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in the Cauca-

sus, and the enlargement o NAO parallel to its bilateral dialogue with its northern neighbor.

Given Washingtons own commitment to developing its own nonconrontational relationship with

Moscow, it seems unlikely that the urkish-Russian relationship will cause serious problems in the

U.S.-urkish relationship.

Central Asia: Advancing Mutual Interests in EnergyDevelopment, Security, and Political ReformTe United States and urkey have cooperated closely in post-Soviet Central Asia and share

oreign policy interests in the region. Te key strategic priority o both countries in the region

has been to bolster the political independence o the Central Asian countries, despite the eorts

o Russia and China to assert their regional hegemony. Paradoxically, their joint eorts to help

enhance the independence and sel-condence o the Central Asian states have made the region a

lower priority in U.S.-urkish relations. Nevertheless the existing level o cooperation is likely to

continue, particularly in the elds o energy, regional security, and political reorm.

Energy development in this region has been a very important issue or the United States and

urkey since the region gained independence rom Russia. Both Washington and Ankara have

been encouraging Kazakhstan and urkmenistan to export their oil and natural gas through the

Baku-bilisi-Ceyhan (BC) and the Baku-bilisi-Erzurum (BE) pipelines, which were realized

through the close cooperation o the United States and urkey, as well as that o Azerbaijan and

Georgia. Te United States and urkey have also been in agreement on the need to resolve ten-

sions between urkmenistan and Azerbaijan. Particular sources o tension between urkmenistan

and Azerbaijan stemming rom the status o the Caspian Sea and confict over the Kepez/Sardar

oileld have undermined the development o the rans-Caspian Pipeline project and consequentlyo the EU-backed Southern energy corridor.

Te United States and urkey also have overlapping interests concerning regional security is-

sues in the region. Tey both support better relations between the Central Asian states and NAO

through the Partnership or Peace program, which helps to counter the destabilizing infuences o

turmoil in the Aghanistan-Pakistan region. In addition, the United States and urkey have closely

cooperated on drug tracking, organized crime, and terrorism issues in Central Asia. Ensuring

the saety o the Northern Distribution Network or Aghanistan has been yet another common

interest o the United States and urkey.

Political reorm in the Central Asian countries is an important area o strategic cooperation

between the United States and urkey. Washington and Ankara have long supported the democ-ratization process in the region, which has intensied ollowing Kyrgyzstans ulip Revolution

in 2005. Te authoritarian regimes in the region have rerained rom urther developing their

relations with the United States and urkey, partly due to their ruling elites ear o losing their

privileges during the democratization process. As a result, despite the greater push or democratic

political reorm in these countries, both the United States and urkey still have a lot to do to en-

hance their bilateral cooperation as they promote democratic reorms in this region.


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Afghanistan/Pakistan: Enhancing the Transition toAfghanization and Regional StabilityU.S.-urkish cooperation in the Aghanistan-Pakistan (A-Pak) region has been an important test

o how the two countries can bridge their dierences in order to work toward peace and stabil-

ity in regional aairs. Although urkey has supported the basic elements o Washingtons A-Pakstrategy since 2001, by trying to ensure security and stability, advocating democratic elections,

and increasing economic development and reconstruction, Ankara has been declining repeated

requests to send combat orces to Aghanistan.

Although the Iraq War exposed a serious ssure in U.S.-urkish relations, this was largely

oset by urkish backing or the U.S.-led eort in Aghanistan aer September 11. urkey oered

its support as a NAO member, most notably as one o the main contributors to ISAF and leader

o the Kabul Regional Command. As a Muslim-majority nation in NAO, urkeys partnership

in Aghanistan has been very important or U.S. eorts. Washington and Ankara have also shared

intelligence on the region as part o their broader cooperation to combat terrorism.

Backed by the United States, urkey has also used its diplomatic infuence to establish andmaintain peace and stability in the region. urkey has acilitated tripartite summits involving

Aghanistan and Pakistan, which have been important in trying to generate momentum toward

lasting regional peace. urkey has helped to bolster regional stability through its support or rap-

prochement between Pakistan and Aghanistan, in addition to other local peace initiatives parallel

to the NAO and UN rameworks. Ankara has simultaneously attempted to engage Islamabad in

order to try to reduce tensions between the United States and Pakistan. As U.S. special envoy to

Aghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman noted aer the November 2011 Istanbul Conerence

on Aghanistan, urkeys close contacts with both Aghanistan and Pakistan are important in the

pursuit o common objectives.

A major issue on the agenda o the United States and NAO has been the withdrawal o com-

bat orces rom Aghanistan. In this context, urkeys proactive regional diplomacy is critical asthe United States and NAO prepare or withdrawal in 2014. urkeys contribution to training the

Aghan army and police orce will be even more vital during the transition period, along with its

contributions in the elds o education, health, social charity, and trade investment. Consequently,

aer the withdrawal o international orces, it will be even more important or the United States

and urkey to cooperate as urkey contributes to the Aghanization o security and reconstruc-

tion.

Caucasus: The Challenge of Frozen Conicts

In the immediate aermath o the breakup o the Soviet Union, the United States and urkey co-operated closely in the Caucasus. In particular, they worked together to bolster the newly regained

independence o Georgia and Azerbaijan and helped to ensure the construction o a pipeline

extending through these two countries to urkey to bring previously inaccessible Caspian oil to

markets.

Despite a brie period o tension between the United States and urkey due to the latters poli-

cy during the Russian-Georgian confict, they have continued to maintain cooperation, including

their joint contribution to Georgian stability at a time o increased ragility in the regional security


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environment. In retrospect, it is clear that the Russian-Georgian crisis helped to underline the

dangers o confict in the Caucasus or both Washington and Ankara and reinorced their desire to

coordinate on policy.

Since the confict, Georgia has become an even more important neighbor and economic part-

ner o urkey. Citizens o the two countries can cross the border by presenting only their national

IDs, while Georgias Batumi Airport is served by urkish Airlines as a domestic airport. However,Azerbaijan, a raternal urkic state, is the cornerstone o urkeys Caucasus policy. Despite oc-

casional strains, relations have generally been excellent. In addition to their cooperation on the

transportation o Azeri oil, the two countries are planning to increase their collaboration on the

transportation o Azeri gas to European markets. For its part, Baku considers Ankara a major

partner and ally in the region, with expectations o urkish support in the Karabakh dispute.

Te urkish-Armenian relationship is the trouble spot or urkeys Caucasus policy and the

source o complications in U.S.-urkish relations. Te urkish-Armenian normalization process,

backed by the United States, began with strong momentum generated by President Abdullah

Guls visit to Yerevan or a soccer match in 2008. However, it has since broken down. Although

both sides apparently sustain hope or the revitalization o the process, there is little evidence o

progress. Te bilateral relationship continues to be overshadowed by the Armenian genocide al-

legations, and it is clear that normalization is unlikely until the issue is resolved. Needless to say,

resolution would also eliminate the periodic crises it causes in U.S.-urkish relations.

In line with its regional policy, urkey has sought to create a Caucasus Stability and Coop-

eration Platorm to help bolster regional stability. However, the initiative has ailed to get o the

ground due to the lack o dialogue between Russia and Georgia and the parallel ailure o the

urkish-Armenian normalization process. As an alternative, urkey has been aiming to reener-

gize regional cooperation through a separate trilateral mechanism among urkey, Azerbaijan, and

Georgia. As the United States has been acknowledging, there is a need or closer cooperation and

more constructive involvement in regional issues because the Caucasus has a number o ongoing

and rozen conficts that could heat up at any moment.

Cyprus: Synchronizing Efforts to Achieve aSettlementTe confict between urkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, which led to the most signicant

military intervention beyond its borders in the history o the urkish Republic in 1974, has been

a permanent eature o urkish oreign and security policy, as well as domestic politics or over 50

years. While the Cyprus dispute itsel has not been an issue o equal signicance or the United

States, its importance or Ankara and its implications in the international arena have helped to

ensure it a place on the U.S.-urkish agenda.Te primary role o the United States has been that o a stakeholder in the longstanding UN-

led eorts aimed at resolution o the dispute. Te United States recognizes that the absence o a

solution aects urkeys EU accession process and continues to impede the institutional relation-

ship between NAO and the European Union. Washington is also concerned about the dangers o

a new arena o conrontation between urkey and Israel because o the latters growing coopera-

tion with the Greek Cypriots, as they both exploit gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean.


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However, since the ailure o the last major UN initiative in 20022004, U.S. involvement has

declined. While the United States remains committed to its position that the problem should be

solved, its ocus has been on pursuing joint policy goals with urkey in other areas without the

Cyprus problem getting in the way. Tis is not only because it gives a much higher priority to the

other issues on which it cooperates closely with urkey, but also because it does not have a sense

urgency about this rozen confict, particularly aer the collapse o the UN eort.

While Washington acknowledges the positive contribution Ankara made to the peace process

by supporting the UN plan, this is insucient rom the urkish point o view, as urkey wants the

United States to put greater pressure on the Greek Cypriot side, which rejected the plan but was

still allowed to join the European Union. From Ankaras point o view, the Greek Cypriots have

utilized the prerogatives o international recognition, buttressed by EU membership, to pressure

urkey during accession negotiations and thus contributed to the stalling o the process and disil-

lusionment in urkey about EU membership.

Te communities on the island are a long way rom reaching a negotiated agreement on a bi-

zonal and bi-communal ederal arrangement. Consequently, the Cyprus dispute remains a poten-

tial fashpoint and as such retains the potential to aect U.S.-urkish relations in a negative way,

not least because o the existence o a strong ethnic lobby directly interested in the issue in the

United States.

Europe: Promoting Integration Efforts Parallel tothe EU Accession ProcessFollowing acceptance by the European Union as a candidate state in 1999, urkey enacted political

reorms to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and moved toward convergence with European

standards. In accordance with EU norms o liberal democracy, urkey transormed itsel, espe-

cially in the elds o civil liberties, human rights, and control over the military. However, as the

process backed by the United States has stalled, enthusiasm in urkey or the European Union has

waned considerably. While urkey remains a candidate, negotiations with the Union have entered

a period o uncertainty.

Although urkey started accession negotiations on June 12, 2006, only 1 out o the 35 chapters

o the acquis communautaire has been opened and temporarily closed. Te 12 chapters that were

opened could not be closed because o the Cyprus problem, and the Greek Cypriots themselves

have blocked 6 chapters. France has blocked 5 chapters, and 9 chapters have been blocked by the

EU Council.

Although urkey remains committed to the goal o EU membership, its oreign policy ocus

has inevitably shied to other areas, primarily to its bilateral relationship with the United States

and U.S.-urkish cooperation in the Middle East. With the astest-growing economy in Europe,urkey is increasingly condent in its ability to sustain economic stability even as the European

Union grapples with serious economic problems. Ankara also believes that it can maintain the

political reorms that it developed parallel to the EU accession process.

However, it has been a U.S. priority through successive administrations to support urkeys

EU accession process in order to underline its membership within the Western community. It

remains to be seen how the stalling o the negotiations will impact the dynamics in the Ankara-

Washington-Brussels trilateral relationship.


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Balkans: Cooperation on Economic Developmentand Political StabilityAnkaras perspective on the Balkans has been to consider the region an integral part o Europe and

ultimately o the European Union. Tis is in accordance with the objectives o the United States,

which also welcomes urkeys role as a regional stabilizer. Energy security in the Balkans is amajor concern or both the United States and urkey, and urkeys potential contribution through

various pipeline projects is an example o U.S.-urkish cooperation in this region. However, U.S.

interest in the region has been waning since the resolution o the Bosnia and Kosovo conficts, and

the level o cooperation between Washington and Ankara is not as close as it was in the 1990s.

Trough its activism in the Balkans, urkey has been seeking to create bilateral and multilat-

eral dialogue mechanisms. While urkeys close interest in the region is not a new phenomenon,

its recent policy in the Balkans ts into the new ramework o a urkish oreign policy that aims at

enhanced cooperation and integration with surrounding areas. urkish politicians also see im-

migrants o Balkan origin in urkey as an essential link to the region. As Foreign Minister Ahmet

Davutoglu noted, there are more Bosnians in urkey than in Bosnia-Herzegovina and more Alba-

nians than in Kosovo.

urkey has been aiming or a psychological breakthrough in the region, which was charac-

terized by war, destruction, and ethnic enmity in the previous century. Accordingly, it has made

considerable progress in improving previously dicult relations with Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia.

It has established trilateral dialogue mechanisms with Serbia and Bosnia, as well as with Croatia

and Bosnia. Ankara has also promoted regional cooperation through the South East European

Cooperation Process (SEECP) and seeks to lay oundations or economic interdependence to

secure positive political relations. All o these moves help to buttress regional stability, which is the

common goal o the United States and urkey.

Economic Dimension: Expanding Bilateral Tradeand Cooperation in Third CountriesDespite many commitments by both Washington and Ankara over the years to redress the situa-

tion, U.S.-urkish economic relations remain ar behind the level o political relations. Neverthe-

less, the joint desire or the improvement o their economic relationship remains on the agenda or

both sides, as attempts to create additional mechanisms o cooperation indicate.

Te establishment o the Framework or Strategic Economic and Commercial Cooperation in

Washington in 2010, with an aliated Business Council parallel to existing organizations such as

the rade and Investment Framework Agreement Council and the Economic Partnership Coun-

cil, has contributed to some improvement. In 2011, there was a 21.9 percent increase in urkeysexports to the United States and a 30.2 percent rise in imports compared to the previous year.

rade volume reached almost $20 billion, with $16.03 billion in imports and $4.59 billion in ex-

ports. However, the rise in the trade imbalance, primarily due to sales by U.S. aviation and deense

industries to urkey, needs to be addressed. At the same time, the small and medium-size business

portion o the U.S.-urkish economic partnership also requires attention.

A promising area o economic cooperation is the promotion o entrepreneurship in the wider

area o the Middle East, which is in the midst o a challenging transormation aer the Arab


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Spring. Te Second Summit on Entrepreneurship in Istanbul in 2011 provided an example o what

can be done in this eld. At the same time, there is an expectation in urkey o an increase in U.S.

investment there. Te United States ranked h in 2011 in oreign direct investment (FDI) fows

to urkey, and its share in the overall total FDI o $11.1 million was only $1.4 billion or 12.6 per-

cent. Te situation could be improved by the U.S. designation o urkey as one o six preerential

markets in the world.

urkish companies are endeavoring to increase their presence in the U.S. market through

entrepreneurship programs and trade promotion acilities that may help decrease market pen-

etration costs or urkish companies. o overcome existing obstacles, urkish business organiza-

tions have been working to improve their direct contact with U.S. counterparts. However, they

have oen experienced diculties nding local U.S. partners, as U.S. companies have exhibited

an understandable tendency to ocus on exporting their own products. Nevertheless, the Union

o Chambers and Commodity Exchanges o urkey (OBB) and the Conederation o Business-

men and Industrialists o urkey (USKON) have been engaging in active economic diplomacy

on behal o urkish exporters in conjunction with the urkish-American diaspora to improve the

situation. In the last quarter o 2011 and the rst hal o 2012, or example, delegations comprising

more than 500 businessmen visited more than 23 U.S. states.


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