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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEJOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBAAPO AE 09360

JTF GTMO-CG l0 June 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,Miami, FL33172.

SUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DOD Control (DoD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9AG-000659DP (S)

JTF GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (FOUO) Personal Information:

o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Abdenour Sameuro Aliases and Current/True Name: Mustafa. Sameur/SamirAbdenour. Abdul Rashid. Carlos Perrerao Place of Birth: Alsiers. Alseria (AG)o Date of Birth: 28 March 1973o Citizenship: Algeriao Intemment Serial Number (ISN): US9AG-000659DP

2. (FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health, has no known allergies and is not currently onany medications. He has no travel restrictions.'

3. (S/NF) JTF GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF GTMO recommends this detainee be Retained in DoDControl (DoD).

b. (S//NF) Summary: JTF GTMO previously assessed detainee as Transfer to the Controlof Another Country for Continued Detention (TRCD) on 30 August 2003. Based uponinformation obtained since detainee's previous assessment, it is now recommended he beRetained in DoD Control (DoD).

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCESREASON: E.O. 12958 SECTION 1.5(C)DECLASSIFY ON: 20300610

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JTF GTMO-CGSUBJECT: Update Recommendation to Retain in DoD Control (DoD) for GuantanamoDetainee, ISN: US9AG-000659DP (S)

For this update recommendation, detainee is assessed as a member of Al Qaida's globalterrorist network with specific ties to the North African Extremist Network Q.JAEN) inLondon and Afghanistan. Detainee has a history with Islamic Jihad and trained at the Al-Qaida sponsored Al Farouq Camp. Detainee was armed and likely participated in hostilitiesin Jalalabad and Tora Bora. It is assessed this detainee is a HIGH risk, as he is likely to posea threat to the US, its interests and allies.

4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unless otherwise noted, the followingparagraphs are based solely on the detainee's statements.

a. (S) Prior History: Detainee held a variety of odd jobs and deserted from the Algerianmilitary after a few months of service. In 1995 detainee fought in the jihad in Bosnia.Detainee left Algeria and traveled via Tunisia to Rome, Italy (IT). A man named Nouradinfacilitated his travel. From the airport in Rome, IT, detainee went to a bus station. Here heasked a group of unknown Algerians for help in obtaining false documents so he could travelto the United Kingdom (UK). An unknown associate of the group provided detainee with aSpanish ID card and told him to travel to London via Sicily, IT. In October 1999, detaineeand an associate named Korim, variant Kareem, traveled to London, UK. They stayed for ayear and a half. In London, detainee attended the Finsbury Park mosque, the Baker Streetmosque, and the Shepard's Bush mosque.

b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: At the Finsbury Park mosque, detainee met Algerians,Jamal Al Din and Toufik who told detainee about living in Afghanistan (AF). Detainee livedin the UK illegally and Afghanistan appealed to him. (Analyst note: His illegal status may bea reference to traveling to the UK on false documents. Detainee noted he has political asylumin the UK.) Detainee decided to travel to Afghanistan to study Islam and seek a better life,noting he did not like the treatment he received in the UK from the government and citizens.Toufik provided detainee with a contact number for Muhammad (Likely Muhammad Shah,who served as a facilitator under network facilitators Jafar Al Jazaieri and Sulayman Allazaierl) and a Pakistani visa, but detainee paid for his own ticket. Detainee traveled withNouradin from London to Islamabad, Pakistan (PK), in the summer of 2001. An Afghannamed Muhammad escorted detainee to Peshawar, PK, and then to Jalalabad, AF. InJalalabad, detainee stayed about 40 days at the Algerian guesthouse run by Abu Jaffar.

c. (S) Training and Activities: Detainee traveled to Khandahar, AF and then to the Al-Qaida sponsored Al Farouq training camp where he trained on the AK-47 for about oneweek. (Analyst note: In Kandahar, detainee likely stayed at the Haji Habbash guesthouse.)The 11 September attacks on the US occurred and detainee's trainer, Abu Assad Al-Suri(Asuri), informed the trainees the program was canceled because the US would be bombingthe camp. Detainee traveled to Abu Jaffar's Kabul, AF, guesthouse. Then he went to the

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Algerian guesthouse in Jalalabad to retrieve his belongings and attempted to leaveAfghanistan. Detainee stayed at the guesthouse until forced to leave due to the US campaign(probably mid November 2001). Detainee and other residents fled to the mountains of ToraBora where he remained for approximately one month. Detainee and a group of over 100men then fled to Pakistan. While at the guesthouse in Jalalabad, prior to fleeing to Tora Bora,an unknown individual assigned an AK-47 to detainee.

d. Capture Information: In February 2002, Pakistani military captured detainee and hisentire group after they had crossed into Pakistan. Pakistani forces held the group and duringa transfer to another prison, the prisoners rioted, flipped a bus detainee was on, and detaineeattempted to escape. During this escape attempt, Pakistani forces shot and woundeddetainee. (Analyst note: Based on detainee's account, he was likely captured in the operationthat netted over 100 Al-Qaida/extremist members who were led out of Afghanistan by IbnSheikh Al Libi.) On 5 April 2002, the Pakistani government handed detainee to US custody.

e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 14 June2002

f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provide information on thefollowing:

o The Algerian Guesthouse. Terrorist personalities at the Algerian Guesthouseo Terrorist personalities and methods in the UK

5. (S/NF) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: It is assessed the detainee poses a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose athreat to the US, its interests and allies.

b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:

. (S) Detainee trained at the Al-Qaida sponsored Al-Farouq training camp. He isassessed to be a member of the NAEN because of his recruitment and noted associationsin London and Central Asia. (Analyst note: The NAEN is a Tier 0 Counterterrorismtarget defined as terrorist groups which pose a clear and immediate danger to US personsor interests. Detainee noted Toufiq might have performed a background check on himthrough Toufiq's connections to the mujahideen in Algeria. This indicates detainee hadassociations with other extremist organizations in Algeria, possibly including the ArmedIslamic Group (GIA) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).)

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o (S) Detainee was an associate of extremists including Toufik in London,Muhammad in Pakistan, and Jaffar in Jalalabad. Detainee attended jihadindoctrination classes given by Jaffar at the Algerian guesthouse. (Analyst note:Toufik is likely Rabah Kadre aka Toufiq. Toufiq was the number two man of the Al-

Qaida cell in London and assumed control of the Al-QaidaA{orth African ExtremistNetwork recruiting and facilitation segment in London. Al-Qaida member Abu Doharan this segment until his arrest. Toufiq operated out of the mosques in London andserved as a recruiter and facilitator for the camps in Afghanistan. Muhammad islikely Muhammad Shah. Shah was involved in a radiological plot involving uraniumand red mercury (a nuclear scam material). Shah also served as a facilitator undernetwork facilitators Jafar Al Jazaieri and Sulayman Al Jazaieri. He moved personnelacross the Afghanistan/Pakistan boarder. Jaffar is Jafar Al Jazaieri aka OmarChabani, a known extremist facilitator with direct links to Algerian training camps inJalalabad and the North African Extremist Network. He also has direct links to Al-

Qaida operatives in the UK and throughout Europe.)o (S) In London, detainee attended the Shepard's Bush Mosque, the Finsbury ParkMosque, and the Baker Street Mosque. All three mosques have reported links toextremist recruiting and facilitating.

. (S) Detainee has historical ties to Islamic jihad and extremist groups. Interrogatorsbelieve much of detainee's cover story is fabricated. Detainee denied fighting in Bosniaalthough he previously admitted to doing so. (Analyst note: Detainee believes he issmarter than interrogators but has unwittingly given information of intelligence value.Additional claims and recantations by detainee are designed to negate such incriminatingstatements. Detainee likely did participate in the Bosnia jihad, indicating an establishedhistory with Islamic jihad and likely extremist entities that are also known to haveparticipated in Bosnia. This indicates detainee likely received additional training in 1995.If his military training from Algeria was deemed sufficient, detainee could have bypassedtraining in Bosnia and immediately joined the hostilities.)

o (S) Detainee is a supporter of the Islamic Liberation Front (ILF), which advocatesviolent opposition to the govemment of Algeria. (Analyst note: The ILF is the IslamicSalvation Front (FIS). The FIS, as a member of the NAEN.)

. (S) Detainee utilized counter interrogation techniques by recanting previousinformation or leaving out significant information when discussing his past, associates,and activities in an attempt to prevent association with incriminating entities andactivities. Detainee rarely repeated the same information with the same details.

o (S) Detainee claimed advance knowledge of the 11 September 2001attacksagainst the US. Detainee admitted an unidentified individual informed him one weekprior to the attacks that something was going to happen to the US. (Analyst note:Anyone with information about attacks on the US would not provide such

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information to a simple acquaintance. Detainee would have to be a trusted memberof the network in order to have acquired the information.)

. Detainee later claimed no one had discussed the attacks directly with him,contradicting information he admitted to in previous debriefings.

o (S) Detainee acknowledged that other individuals actively conducted fundraisingand recruiting activities in the mosques in London, but denied he went to Afghanistandue to these activities. (Analyst note: Detainee has not provided specific detailedinformation on these activities, although he noted money collected at the FinsburyPark mosque funded Abu Jaffar's Algerian guesthouse in Afghanistan. It is possibledetainee, and other recruits, couriered money from the UK to Abu Jaffar. Detaineecan likely provide information concerning recruiters, fundraisers, methods,couriering, facilities, and recruits themselves.)o (S) Detainee claimed he paid he own way to Pakistan, but later contradictedhimself and stated the Finsbury Park Mosque (likely Toufik) provided him with aticket, Pakistani visa, and false French passport. This is assessed to be the mostaccurate account. At one time, detainee had four passports.o (S) In initial interviews, detainee did not disclose he and London associateNouradin traveled to Pakistan together. Detainee also changed his story to stateToufik had provided the phone number for Muhammad to Nouradin instead ofdetainee. Detainee funher changed details stating Nouradin and Toufik were thesame individual, but detainee traveled alone. Another change is detainee stated hesaw Nouradin in London and then in Jalalabad. (Analyst note: Changing the story inthis manner attempts to place extremist associations with Nouradin and remove themfrom detainee in one instance, and helps to protect the identities of associates andattempt to avoid incriminating himself with the others. Detainee himself, as notedabove, is assessed to have been a member of, and have associations with, extremistsin the NAEN in London and Italy. Detainee had several variations in his storyregarding his travels.)o (S) Detainee stated he traveled to London via Rome after leaving Tunisia, thencontradicted himself and stated he traveled to Sicilv from Tunisia.

c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee's behavior is generally noncompliant andaggressive. Detainee has threatened to kill military members several times and has beencited routinely for failure to comply and harassing guards. Detainee incited disturbances onat least two occasions.

6. (S/NF) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

a. (S) Assessment: JTF GTMO determined this detainee is of MEDIUM intelligencevalue.

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. (S) Detainee is routinely noted for deception during interrogations and was identifiedas a habitual liar with a superiority complex. He likely has information of high value, butdoes not provide it willingly, if at all. He likely has information regarding terroristoperations in Algeria, North African Extremist Network personnel and operations in theUK. He may possess information on Al-Qaida in Afghanistan and on the 11 Septemberterrorist attacks.

b. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:

o l1 September 2001 terrorist attacks - personnel in Afghanistan during 2001 withadvance knowledge of the attackso Terrorist facilitieso Al-Qaida/network personnel in Afghanistan/Pakistano Algerian terrorist groups

7. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 4 October 2004, andhe remains an enemv combatant.

L.bl"gTAY W. HOODBrigadier General, USACommanding

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