utilitarian understanding 1
TRANSCRIPT
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 1/9
A Defense of Utilitarian Policy Processes in Corporate and Public ManagementAuthor(s): F. Neil BradyReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 23-30Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25071468 .
Accessed: 21/10/2012 22:20
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Business Ethics.
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 2/9
A Defense of Utilitarian Policy Processes
in Corporate and Public Management F. Neil Brady
ABSTRACT. Thegrowing
awareness that corporate and
public policy forming processes areintensively utilitarian
has provokeda variety of criticism. The procedural dif
ficulties of utilitarianism are well known; less well
known butpotentially
moredevastating
is a set of
chargesthat utilitarian
policy processes intrude upon
important relationshipsand societal processes. This
paper defends utilitarian methodsagainst these
charges.
More specifically, two criticisms aresingled
out for
examination. The first is the claim that utilitarian policy
processes systematicallydiscriminate
againstthe
rights
of non-human life and suppress any feelings of sympathyor
obligationhumans
mighthave for animals or
plants.
The second is the argument that utilitarianism ultimatelycircumvents considerations of process which are essential
for the development of individual and societal identity.Given these criticisms, the goal of this paper is to
defend the role of utilitariantechniques
in corporate and
public policy processes againstsuch
charges.
Classically,the functions of the human
facultyof reason have been divided into two realms,
roughly reflecting the means-ends distinction
(Kant, 1985; Whitehead, 1929). One function of
reason was to chooseappropriate
human ends,
the other to select the means forachieving
what
everpurposes one
may have. Kant's (1785) dis
tinction between thecategorical
and hypotheticaluses of reason is
typicalof the classical position.
Accordingto this view, however, the two
functions of reason were notequally regarded.
F. Neil Brady is Assistant Professor of Managementat
the College of Business Administration, San Diego
State University. He is the author of 'Feeling and
Understanding: A Moral Psychology for Public
Servants', Public Administration Quarterly 7, and
'Ethical Theory for the Public Administrator: The
Management of Competing Interests', American
Review of Public Administration 15, pp. 119?126.
Traditionally,the
objective function of reason
(to choose proper ends) heldpriority
over the
subjective function and reflected the common
assumption that carefulthinking produced
objective truths?
especiallyin ethics. Max
Horkheimer (1947) describes some of its uses
below:
This view asserted the existence of reason as a force
not only in the individual mind but also in the
objective world? in relations among human beings
and between social classes, in social institutions, and
in nature and its manifestations... Thedegree
of
reason-ableness of a man's life could be determined
according to its harmony with this totality... The
theoryof
objectivereason did not focus on the co
ordination of behavior and aim, but onconcepts
?
howevermythological they
sound to ustoday
?on
the idea of the greatest good,on the
problemof
humandestiny,
and on the way of realization of
ultimategoals.
So, the classical view of the human
facultyof
reasonplaced great trust in its promise
to
providea 'center
point'from which the
proprietyof individual
preferences could be assessed.
The twentieth century industrialized world,
however, seems to have lost confidence in
reason's claim toobjectivity, according
to Hork
heimer. Hisdiagnosis for recurring
western crises
of nihilism anddespair
incapitalism points
to
the pervasive mistrust of reason toclarify
human
ends and theresulting preoccupation with the
utilitarian calculation ofpersonal preferences.
Daniel Bell reaffirms this view when he writes,
"There is no center; there areonly peripheries'
(1976, p. 104). Scott and Hart (1973, p. 419)also echo this concern when
theywrite:
"One of the distinctive features of oursociety
is its
goallessness.More than one observer of western
Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985) 23-30. 0167-4544/85/0041-0023*01.20.
? 1985
by
D. Reidel Publishing Company.
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 3/9
24 F. Neil Brady
culture has noted the ceaseless busynessof its
people,
questingfor better and better means to achieve
instrumental ends... It is assumed that ultimate
ends will take care of themselves, and they tend to
be taken forgranted."
Therefore, thelargest question
is whether the
subjectivefunction of reason as found in the
predominantlyutilitarian or instrumental pro
cesses of the administrative worldexcessively
distorts life, as Horkheimer and others suggest.
Despite its great difficultythe need to resolve
the issue leaves thethoughtful
administrator
withsignificant philosophical
discomfort. Are
utilitarian techniques fundamentally flawed,
biased, or distorted? Does one servesociety
well
whomerely manages resources in the service of
unexamined wants, withoutconsidering
whether
things (especially preferences) should be any dif
ferent from what in factthey
now are? The link
of corporate andpublic policy
with utilitarian
theoryis
virtually axiomatic, with little or no
recognition givento
objective goalsor
philo
sophical purpose. At the same time, itsprocedures
have beenseverely
criticized and are well-known
topolicy analysts (Maclntyre, 1977; Tribe 1972;
Tribe, 1974). Such
problems
will notgo away,
but willcontinually
serve tokeep
makers of
policy firmly if uncomfortably immersed in
the fluidreality
of human wants and needs. Yet,
the focus of this paper goes beyond these well
known procedural difficulties to defend
utilitarian policy-analytic techniques against
chargesof
alleged distortion to human nature
inherent in its use. Ifprocedures
have flaws, that
is one matter; but if a method intrudes upon
essentialrelationships
or modifies important
social processes, that is
quite
another.
Therefore, althoughthis paper cannot
respondto Horkheimer's
largeassertions head
on, it does respondto two
specific charges made
against utilitarian processes in the world of cor
porate andpublic policy making.
The first is the
claim that utilitarianpolicy processes system
aticallydiscriminate against the
rightsof non
human life and suppress any feelingsof sym
pathyor
obligationhumans might feel for
animals orplants.
The second is the argument
thatutilitarianism
circumventsconsiderations
of
process which are essential to the development
of individual and societal identity.This paper hopes
to show that from aphilo
sophical pointof view utilitarian
policy-analytic
techniques'hold their own'
againstcertain
powerful and specific complaints. In that
event, themonkey
is placedon the back of
those who are so critical of thepredominantly
utilitarian nature ofpolicy processes
to show
what theobjective
function of reason and add
topolicy processes beyond
the presentcon
tribution of utilitarian techniques.
Utilitariantheory
and homocentrism
Even if the widely recognized procedural diffi
culties ofapplying
utilitariantheory
to decision
makingin
publicand corporate policy
were
overcome, it does not follow that aperfected
techniquewhich encompasses all manifestations
of human preferencewill prove satisfactory.
Laurence Tribe (1974) hasargued
that utilitarian
techniquesin the law and in
public policy sys
tematical suppress certain kinds of values
which expresssome individuals' concern for
naturalobjects
and non-human life. That is,
utilitarianism as asystem of
publicdecision
makingtends to
suppress the expressionof
sympathyand other felt
obligationstoward
animal life and, instead, distorts thosefeelings
by translating them into mereexpressions of
human interest. Any obligationsor
feelingsof
intrinsic worth, apart from human self-interest,
arecomparatively unimportant
in thepolicy
game.*
Every year, business leaders andpublic
executives, for
example,
face issues where
someargue that the
'rights'of
higheranimal
life or that one's initialsympathies
for the
intrinsic worth of aneco-system take priority
overcountervailing
human interests.Whaling,
forexample,
is animportant Japanese industry
which could beseverely
hurt if the general
obligationtoward the whale were felt to super
sede the first order interests of millions of
Japanese whodirectly
orindirectly
benefit from
the traditional whaleindustry. Unfortunately,
Tribeargues,
thesystem
in which such issues are
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 4/9
ADefense of Utilitarian Policy
Processes 25
debated is a utilitarian one. As a result, any felt
obilgationsor
sympathiesfor whale life are
under great pressureto be translated into the
languagewherein such issues are
currently
processed. Thus, what wasinitially
agenuine
selfless stance is reduced to an argument playing
onlyto the motive of human self-interest: future
generations will not be able toexperience whales,
science will lose theopportunity
tostudy
and
learn from asignificant mammalian species,
etc.
Theinadequacy
of'planting' plastic
shrubs
alongour
highwaysas the aesthetic equivalent
toliving species
or ofreplacing
the Parthenon
piece-by-piecewith material
designedto with
stand the corrosive effects of twentieth century
pollution testifyto the claim that the utilitarian
satisfaction of human aesthetic preferences is
somehow not the whole storyto these
public
policyissues.
Historically,utilitarian
analytic
techniques have had difficulty taking seriously
any interests other thanirreducibly
human ones.
Ironically, however, even those who feel most
stronglythe kinds of values suppressed by
utilitarianpolicy procedures may be further
legitimatingthe distortion inherent in the game
by consentingto
play:
[The environmentalist] may be helping to legitimatea
system of discourse which so structures human
thoughtand
feelingas to erode, over the
long run,
the very sense of obligation which provided the initial
impetus for his ownprotective efforts. (Tribe, 1974,
p. 1221)
So, there issomething
about currentpolicy
analytic techniques,if Tribe is
right,which dis
courages theadoption
of positions thatappeal
tofeelings
andobligations which transcend mere
human self-interest.
This conclusion, however, is both useful and
flawed inimportant ways. It is useful in
illuminatingthe kinds of distortions that occur
inpublic policy analytic processes, but it is
flawed inattributing
themwholly
to utilitarian
causes and insupposing
the distortions to
consistonly
inneglecting
non-human interests.
Rather, the following discussion will show how
such distortions arise not from theapplication
of utilitariantheory per
se but from the
strategies
of social choice.
For the defender of the utilitarian faith, the
crucial issue iswhether utilitarianpolicy-forming
processes systematicallydiscriminate against
'higherorder' human sentiments, merely
because
they sympathetically represent inferred interests
of non-human life.The
historyof the
developmentof utilitarian
theory appears to allow room for the 'higher
order'sympathies.
Eventhough
the originating
expression of utilitariantheory
in Bentham's
(1789) work waspurely hedonistic, Mill's
(1859) arguments seemedsuccessfully
to allow
for even the most idealistic form of human
preferencein the utilitarian scheme.
Nevertheless, the distortion Tribe calls our
attention to does exist, but it has been induced
not so much by utilitarian theory. Rather, social
choice strategies have been anticipated by
persons who understand thecompetitively
democratic nature ofpolicy-making,
whether
corporateor
public.In
theory, utilitarianpolicy-forming
institu
tionshope
to elicit first order preferences from
those involved. However, humanbeings
are also
reflective beingswhich assess
prospects, anti
cipate outcomes, and make tactical (andnot
necessarily personal) preferences.In other
words, as Tribe and others havecorrectly shown,
the traditionalpolicy-making system, corporate
andpublic,
cannot control the translation of
personal preferenceinto tactical
preference.If
this distortion isalways
to be regardedas a
degradation of human sentiment, then Tribe's
concerns would be ontarget. What Tribe fails to
see is that the kinds of distortion which occur
work both ways?
both to thepossible degrada
tion of sentiment as well as to theenhancing
of
motive.
As for the latter alternative, consider the case
of a 'malicious whaler' whose primary motive
is to cause whales pain, but whoopenly defends
thehunting
of whalesby appealing
to more
widely acceptedreasons: the industry
creates
jobs,it
supplies products needed in the market
place,etc. Here, it is not the utilitarian nature of
apolicy process that distorts one's true motives,
it is the awareness of what kinds of argumentsseem to have wider
appealto those who solicit
one's
preferences. Further,consider the
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 5/9
26 F. Neil Brady
arguments commonlyused to
justifya collection
of industries of doubtful social utility. The
production and distribution ofpornographic
material, forexample,
isjustified by appeal
to
itsalleged
status as an art form, byits influence
in liberalizing outmoded attitudes toward sex, or
byits social function to
challengestate censor
ship and control.
The list could be made muchlonger, but the
insight that emerges is therecognition
that both
corporate andpublic policy
can transform even
the lowest of humanpreference
intoexpressed
preferencesmore
acceptableto
policy-makingcontexts. Whereas Tribe
insightfully argues that
policy-analytic techniquescan suppress
expressions of'higher' sentiments, as the above
examples show, it may also be true that expres
sions of the 'lower' forms of humanpreference
are alsosuppressed. Sympathy
fordisappearing
whales may reduce topotential experiential
losses for future generations, but base appetitescan likewise be
publicallytransformed into
literaryor artistic freedoms. Whether
ultimatelyeither initial feeling ('high'
or 'low') isdissipated
byits transformed
public expressionis an
open
question, but it is notmerely
aquestion any
more of the utilitariandegradation
ofhigher
human sentiments.
In short, utilitarianpolicy processes do not
have a selective impacton
'higher order'
preferences only. Theimpact does occur, but it
issymmetrical;
both'higher'
and 'lower'
preferences get washed out in favor of
preferencesmore
openlyand
widelyheld.
Thistendency
of utilitarian processesto wash
out the extremepositions and
clingto middle
ground is also illustratedby
the reduced atten
tion
given
to issues which are
temporally
removed
from the present. Whenpolicy
isbeing made for
present problems, preferencesare
stronger; but
when the issue is situated in the pastor the
future, it seems to attract less attention.Thinking
of the past, consider theplight of those citizens
of the desert southwest who areseeking
com
pensation for deaths and injuries resultingfrom
radiation fallout from theabove-ground nuclear
tests of the 1950s. Or consider the attempts to
securecompensation
for the Japanese victims of
internmentduring
World War II. If such incidents
occurredtoday, presumably public sympathy
would be far stronger, but it is at leastplausible
tosuppose that
simplytoo much water has
passed under thebridge
to make easy such
attemptsto reform
public policy. Similarly,with
respect to corporate policy, businesses seem to
show little interest in historical relations. Tradi
tion means less than innovation, andprecedent
less thanperformance.
Sympathies representing future developmentsare
similarly impotentin utilitarian discussions.
A present oil crisis seems far moreimportant
than one facedby
future generations. Likewise,
the domination of the presentover future
interests in corporate policyis also easy
to see.
The emphasison short-term over
long-term goals
is a well-known weakness of American corporate
strategy.
In short, there is a kind ofmyopia
that occurs
in both corporate andpublic processes, but it is
a narrowness of vision whichdiscourages
the
expression of extreme orunpopular preferences
and solicits, instead, moderate, current, or
commonpreferences. That is, expressions of
preferenceat the
periphery get washed out, not
just selected preferences such assympathies for
whales. Furthermore, even if this were true,
nothingthat Tribe has said can
convincinglyconnect this flaw to utilitarian
procedures perse. Utilitarian
theoryin principle allows for
theweighing
of allpreferences
?'high'
or
'low', retrospectiveor
prospective. Andalthough
policy processes do seem to undervalueperiph
eral interests, such aphenomenon may be due as
much to human socialization, forexample,
as to
agiven decision-making procedure.
Utilitariantheory and the circumvention of
process
A second criticism of utilitariantheory applied
inpolicy making objects
to its circumvention of
aprocess valuable to
society,viz. the constitutive
orvalue-forming process. Marx, for
example,
objectsto utilitarianism from the perspective of
a social reformer. For him, utilitarian methods
promotea static
society:
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 6/9
A Defense of Utilitarian PolicyProcesses 27
... the theoryof utility [changes]
... into a mere
apologyof what exists; into a demonstration that
under theexisting
conditions the present relations
amongmen are the most
advantageousand in the
generalinterest. It has this character in all the recent
economists. (Bottomore, 1956, p. 166)
That is, utilitarian ethicsonly inquires after the
strengthof current values; it does not
promote
their review orchange.
Of course, Marx's interest inpromoting
societal dynamismis motivated
bya sense of
direction: adynamic society
is arevolutionary
societywhich will, in the long run, promote the
classical Marxist ideals. On the other hand, one's
interest in societaldynamism
need not be
instrumental; awareness and self-criticism can be
prizedfor their own sake, regardless
of the out
come. Morespecifically,
the process in which a
society chooses what it will value is one in which
the society continuouslyconstitutes itself; and
contrasted with asystem of runaway technology,
forexample,
where societal values are in part
determinedby
the forward momentum of
technological development,a
society which con
tinuallyor
periodicallystudies the
implications
oftechnological development
for its well-being
'chooses itself'. It may doso
incrementally andwithout
lofty vision, but all that isimportant
is that society takes itsdevelopment
into its own
hands.
Laurence Tribe (1972) has argued that the
utilitarian system oftechnology
assessment
institutionalized in the United States often
results in the circumvention of the kind of
process essential for thedevelopment
of the
higher forms of humanrationality
and for the
promotion ofdemocracy.
That is, standard
utilitarian assessment techniques are outcomeoriented:
they collapsewhat
mightotherwise
be ahealthy
review ofpublic values into a
speedy judgment regardingthe comparative
merit ofpossible
outcomes.
'In most areas of human endeavor?
fromperforming
asymphony
toorchestrating
asociety
?the processes
and rules that constitute theenterprise
and define the
rolesplayed by
itsparticipants
matterquite apart
from any identifiable 'end state' that is ultimately
produced. Indeed, in manycases it is the processes
itself that matters most to those who take part in it.
By focusing all but exclusivelyon how to optimize
someexternally
defined end state, policy-analytic
methods distortthought,
and sometimes action, to
whatever extentprocess makes
? orought
to make?
anindependent difference. (Tribe, 1973, p. 631)
Thus, thefundamentally
utilitarian nature of
technologyassessment may distort or abbreviate
animportant societal process simply
in order to
obtain closure on an issue.
Another way to describe the phenomenon
involves seeing technologyassessment
procedures
as a scientific method. In terms of scientific
ideals, nomeasuring technique should have an
effect upon the item it seeks to measure. Yet, if
Tribe is correct, utilitarian assessment tech
niquesdo distort the nature of the
phenomenon
they inquire after, principally byvirtue of the
fact thatthey ignore
thetruly
societal nature of
policy processes in the course ofsampling
personal preferences.Daniel Bell is getting
at
the sameproblem
when he writes that
"utilitarianism neglectsthe
realityof structures
thatnecessarily
stand outside individuals".
(1976, p. 257)
Nevertheless, despairover the
proprietyof
utilitarian techniques for societal processes may
be premature. There are at least two reasons for
supposingthe criticism of utilitarianism outlined
above to be overstated.
The first is related to the corporate experience
with utilitarianpolicy-making.
Itsimply
is not
clear that thetraditionally
utilitarian character
of corporate decision-making stifles the more
constitutive orvalue-choosing functions of
reason. Indeed, the decision-making phaseof
weighing preferencesat least causes executives
to consider the comparative strengths of cor
porate values, if not absolutestrengths.
A
company, forexample,
which iswrestling
with
the issue of expansionof facilities must review
the comparative strengthsof several
goals:the
short-term interests of stockholders, thelong
term survival andgrowth
interests of the cor
poration, public image, the sacrificingof alter
native uses of thecapital,
etc. Such discussions
can be vigorous. Just because utilitarian methods
press for outcomes does notrequire that the
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 7/9
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 8/9
A Defense of Utilitarian Policy Processes 29
tariantechniques
to defend the status quo,one
might conclude that the alternative to utilitarian
rationality,viz. constitutive
thinking,could have
posedan even
greater obstacle to societal
dynamism!The contribution of the constitutive
function of rationality is discovery ? the iden
tification of values orprinciples
which sustain
themselves over time and lend permanenceto
individual identity. The danger lies in attributingmore
permanenceor absoluteness to the products
of constitutivethought
than is consistent with
changingtimes
?the result being institutionalized
dogmaand a form of 'constitutive
rationality'
which nolonger
constitutes but merelyre
affirms.
It seems fair to conclude, then, that Marx
would have beenunhappy
with too much
societalstability,
whether it were due topolicies
derived from the utilitarian inertia of present
preferential relations amongmen or to the
privileged status of historical ideology. Both
instrumental and constitutive forms ofrationality
can be carried to extremes; but there isnothing
about theapplication
of utilitarian techniquesto
the process ofpolicy-formation
that theoretical
ly requires societal stagnationor abdication of
self-formativeresponsibilities.
The successful
management of societies as well ascorporations
mustrely upon an uncomfortable
balancingof
instrumental and constitutiverationality
?of
operatingin an
ambiguous realm of notknowing
fully what should be achieved nor how it should
be achieved?
of the counterposition of incre
mentalpolicy
formulation with 'fell swoop'
analysis.Even
though thetraditionally 'closed' nature
of much ofpublic and corporate policy-making
in the United States is not so 'closed' as some
would have us believe, there is reason to suppose
that'opening' the
policy processes would lead to
its own set of difficulties. One suchproblem
is
the escalation ofpreference.
Anexample might
show how 'open' processesrun the risk of
provoking momentary expressionsof
preference
which do not reflectlong-term
interests. Con
sider the phenomenonof the public
auction and
open biddingon some stained glass
windows
from an old church which is being demolished
for future development of the site. The essential
difference between open and closed bidding is
the fear of distortedjudgment.
That is, the
intensely competitivenature of an
open process
mightcause a bidder to inflate one's sense of
value of theglass windows beyond
one's initial
judgments in quieter moments. In this sort of
circumstance, it isprecisely
the inflation of
perceived value which ispromoted by
the 'open
ness' of the process, which candelight
holders of
propertyto be auctioned but which can result in
regret for successful bidders when cool reflec
tionagain replaces
thefrenzy
of the moment.
So, whereas 'closed'policy processes may be
accused of certainshortcomings, 'opening'
policy processes falls short in its ownways by
'fanningthe fires' and causing preferences
to
betemporarily
inflated.
The question 'What is the trueintensity
of
preference?'is not an
easy questionto answer.
It isplausible
to suppose that at least in some
cases one would find rueful bidders to comment,
'Ijust
wasn'tmyself;
I lost control for amoment;
Ireally
didn't want it that much', etc. The result
is a distorted assessment of individualpreference
and thevolatility
of the notion ofpersonality,
so far aspersonal identity depends upon the
stabilityof one's
preferences.Similar
problemsoccur in the area of
public
policy formation, as well. Perceiving the power
ofpublic
servants to be anobject
ofcompetition,
thousands ofpolitical
action groups each year
vigorously plead their cases beforecity adminis
trators, county commisioners, legislators, and a
widevariety of
public officials. To suppose
under these conditions that somesimple
measure of theintensity of expressed preferences
would provide reliable informationregarding
real wants and needs is naive.Instead,
in an
effort to resist the atmosphere of an auction,
administratorsregularly
makejudgments regard
ing reasonable wants and tryto avoid
being
unduly influenced eitherby
the extravagant
claims of those who are overrepresented
or the
muffled cries of theunder-represented.
The important pointto notice is that in
public, corporate, and individualpolicy issues,
opening the utilitarian assessmentprocedures
to
promote constitutive processes couldbuy
an
increase in involvement and public participation
7/29/2019 Utilitarian Understanding 1
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/utilitarian-understanding-1 9/9
30 F. Neil Brady
and commitment with a decrease incertainty.
Indeed, perhaps the epitome of openness in
competitive utilitarian contexts isadvertising,
where combative marketing strategies result in
confused orduped customers, self-deceived
salespersons, and a general degradation of the
notion ofpersonal preference.
Conclusion
For acentury, philosophers, policy-makers,
and
administrators have been aware of theprocedural
shortcomingsof utilitarian theory,
whether
appliedin ethics, cost-benefit analysis, policy
science, or in neo-traditional economics. Human
preferencesare often 'soft', incommensurable,
and indistinct, while the pursuit of alternatives
for choice isambiguous, complex,
and inex
haustible. Even so, humanbeings
do act on
preference,do make judgments
ofpreference
among alternatives, and often do sofreely, being
unrestrainedby principle, precept,
or even
public opinion? as when
choosing toppings for
an ice-cream sundae.
The concerns of this paper generallyrun
much
deeper
than the well-known
proceduralshortcomings
of utilitarianism. Some writers
haveargued
that even if themerely procedural
difficulties could be overcome and the basic
techniques perfected,a set of distortions to
human nature are incurred with the institution
of utilitarian policy-analytic techniques.This
paper has focused on two suchalleged
distortions
and has tried to defend the traditionalpolicy
making techniques againstthose
charges.In the
end, there may benothing
morewrong with
utilitarianapproaches
topolicy-making
than
what isalready
reflected in human nature.
Surely,instrumental reasoning
can be overused
to the neglect of the constitutive orobjective
functions of reason. Horkheimerultimately may
be correct in his assessment of the character of
twentieth century rationality.At the same time,
in cases where reason has yetto rule on law and
principle, preferencerules the
day;and short of
theunlikely
scenario in which every preference
comes under the rule ofprinciple (What
a dull
world that would be!), utilitarian processes
remain democratic, fair, reasonably non-intrusive,
and free.
References
Bell, Daniel, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism,Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1976.
Bentham, Jeremy, Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation (1789), W. Harrison (ed.),Hafner Press, Oxford, 1948.
Bottomore, T. B., Karl Marx: Selected Writingsin
Sociological and Social Philosophy, Mcgraw-Hill
Publishers, New York, 1956.
Horkheimer, Max, The Eclipse of Reason, Oxford
University Press, New York, 1947.
Kant, Immanuel, Foundations
of
the
Metaphysics ofMorals (1785), Lewis White Beck (trans.), Bobs
Merrill, Indianapolis, 1959.
Maclntyre, Alasdair, Utilitarianism andCost-Benefit
Analysis: An Essayon the Relevance of Moral
Philosophy to Bureaucratic Theory, Kenneth Sayer
(ed.),Notre Dame
University Press, Notre Dame,
Indiana, 1977.
Mill, John Stewart, OnLiberty, J. W. Parker, London,
1859 (widely reprinted).
Rowen, 'Objectives, Alternatives, Costs, and Effective
ness', in H. Hinrichs and G.Taylor (eds.), Program
Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis, Pacific Palisades,California: Goodyear Publ. Comp., 1969, pp. 83-93.
Scott, William G. and David K. Hart, 'Administrative
Crisis: TheNeglect
ofMetaphysical Speculation',
Public Administration Review 33 (4), (1973), pp.
415-422.
Tribe, Laurence, 'PolicySciences: Analysis
orIdeology?'
Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1972), pp. 66-84.
Tribe, Laurence, 'WaysNot to Think About Plastic
Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law',
The Yale Law Journal 83 (7) (1974), pp. 1315
1348.
Tribe, Laurence, 'Technology Assessment and the
Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of Instrumental
Rationality', Southern California Law Review 46
(1973), 631.
Whitehead, Alfred North, The Function of Reason,
PrincetonUniversity Press, Boston, 1929.