utilitarianism good bad - ddix 2013

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Util Good



Util Good (“Is True -til”

Moral Obligations must be verified by policy analysis —looking at the principle

in a vacuum has no valueMinteer 2004 (Ben, et al, Human Dimensions of Biology Faculty, ASU School of LifeSciences,JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS, v!7, p. 139-140)<^.^> In sum, Dewey argued that moral principles should operate very differently than the way mostcontemporary environmental ethicists employ them in discussions regarding environmentalpolicy making and problem solving Ethical theories are, in this opinion, critical instrumentalities- tools — for analyzing and interpreting particular social problems and conflicts, not fixedends to which we owe any son of special treatment or obedience. As a result, the "rightness" ofmoral claims depends on their ability to contribute to the resolution of specific problematicsituations - an ability determined through intelligent appraisal and inquiry — not On the intrinsicnature Of the principle itself (Dewey. 1989, p. 280). In making this move, Dewey significantlyshifted discussions of moral theory and argument away from a preoccupation with the ontologicalstatus and justification of general moral principles and moved it toward the refinement of theprocess of intelligent inquiry and the development of better and more effective methods ofdeliberation, cooperative problem solving, and conflict resolution. It is important to note that inarguing for the instrumental and experimental role of moral principles in problematic situations,Dewey did not deny the existence of Such principles, nor did he reject their role within moraldeliberation and decision-making. He only Sought to put them in their proper place. Historicallysuccessful moral principles promoting the good and the right were not to be uncritically accepted

before experimental inquiry, just as I hey were not to be cast aside simply because they traffickedin generalities or presumed to hold a universal currency. Instead, they should be understood aspotentially useful resources for comprehending and ultimately transforming particular unstableand disrupted moral contexts: In moral matters there is ... a presumption in favor of principlesthat have had a long career in the past and that have been endorsed by men of insight.... Suchprinciples are no more to be lightly discarded than are scientific principles worked out in the past.

But in one as in the other, newly discovered facts or newly instituted conditions may give rise todoubts and indicate the inapplicability of accepted doctrines (Dewey, 1989, p. 330). Still, inDewey's way of thinking, the conceptual and practical demands placed on previously held moralprinciples by the emergence of new experiences and evolving factual circumstances required anadaptive moral system, one in which standards, rules, and principles would necessarily undergo

various degrees of revision and reinterpretation in order to meet new socio-historical conditionsand changing individual desires Often, this process led to the formulation of entirely newprinciples as moral inquirers responded to the dynamic and evolving quality of humanexperience: In fact, situations into which change and the unexpected enter are a challenge tointelligence to create new principles. Morals must be a growing science if it is to be a science at all,not merely because all truth has not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but because life ISa moving affair in which Old moral truth Ceases to apply Principles are methods of inquiry andforecast which require Verification by the event: and the time honored effort to assimilate moralsto mathematics is only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic authority, or putting a new oneupon the throne of the old. But the experimental character of moral judgments does not meancomplete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment(Dewey, 1959, p. 221).

CONSEQUENTIALISM CAPTURES THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RIGHTST.M. Scanlon, Prof. of Philosophy, Harvard, CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS, ed. by SamuelScbeffler, 1988, p. 74.



In attacking utilitarianism one is inclined to appeal to individual rights , which mereconsiderations of social utility cannot justify as overriding . But rights themselves need to be

justified somehow, and how other than by appeal to the human interests their recognitionpromotes and protects? This seems to be the incontrovertible insight of the classical utilitarians.Further , unless rights are to be taken as defined by rather implausible rigid formulae, it seemsthat we must invoke what looks very much like the consideration of consequences in order todetermine what they rule out and what they allow.

Only consequentialism can resolve conflicting moral values and promotehealthy society

Bailey 97 (James Wood 1997; “Oxford University Press; “Utilitarianism, institutions, andJustice” pg 9 ) Phil PaperslA consequentialist moral theory can take account of this variance and direct us in our decision about

whether a plausible right to equality ought to outweigh a plausible right to freedom of expression. 16 Insome circumstances the effects of pornography would surely be malign enough to justify our banning it, butin others they may be not malign enough to justify any interference in freedom. I? A deontologicaltheory, in contrast , would be required either to rank the side constraints, which forbid agentsfrom interfering in the free expression of others and from impairing the moral equality ofothers, or to admit defeat and claim that no adjudication between the two rights is possible.The latter admission is a grave failure since it would leave us no principled resolution of aserious policy question. But the former conclusion is hardly attractive either. Would we really wish toestablish as true for all times and circumstances a lexical ordering between two side constraints on ouractions without careful attention to consequences? Would we, for instance, really wish to establish that theslightest malign inegalitarian effect traceable to a form of expression is adequate grounds for an intrusiveand costly censorship? Or would we, alternatively, really wish to establish that we should be prepared totolerate a society horrib le for women and children to live in, for the sake of not allowing any infringementon the sacred right of free expression? 18 Consequentialist accounts can avoid such adeontological dilemma . In so doing, t hey show a certain healthy sense of realism about whatlife i n society is like. In the world outside the theorist's study, we meet trade-offs at everytum. Every policy we make with some worthy end in Sight imposes costs in terms ofdiminished achievement of some other plausibly worthy end. C onsequentialism demands that wegrapple with these costs as directly as we can and justify their incurrence. It forbids us to dismiss them withmoral sophistries or to ignore them as if we lived in an ideal world.

Claims to moral obligation undercut political obligation and allow for violenceto occurIsaac , 200 2

(Jeffrey C., James H. Rudy professor of Political Science and director of the Center forthe Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Bloomington, “Ends, Means and

politics,” Dissent , Spring) – <^.^> As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt havetaught, a n unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. Theconcern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from threefatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of

what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally



compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it ishard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2)it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form ofpowerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint ofpolitics — as opposed to religion —pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categoricallyrepudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect;and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is aboutintentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant.Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotenc e, it is often the pursuit of “good” thatgenerates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough thatone’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects ofpursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways.Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotesarrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.



Util Bad



Util Bad/Impact Framing

Util inevitably results in social paralysisHurford ’12 — political science and psychology undergraduate at Denison university (Hurford, Peter. "How a

Utilitarian Crosses the Street - Greatplay.net." Greatplaynet RSS. N.p., 16 Nov. 2012. Web. 09 July 2013.<http://www.greatplay.net/essays/how-a-utilitarian-crosses-the-street>.)We’ll always have a shortage of time to make the calculations before we have to act, we’ll have a shortageof relevant information , we’ll be biased by our own int erests and cognitive errors , we’ll have weakness of will ,

we’ll never know how our actions might influence things in the long -run (especially as precedents), and it just

generally will always be too hard to accomplish, so as to be useless . Maybe that cold, careless,

calculating robot could implement the util itarian software directly, but the human brain certainly can’t ;

especially not for the thousands of choices that need to be made daily. It would be utterly paralyzing, andalmost always go badly .

Stop being pessimistic —Humanity is extraordinarily resilient. Total extinction is

laughableNaam ’13 - Ramez Naam was the CEO of Apex Nanotechnologies. He currently holds a seat on the advisory boardof the Institute for Accelerating Change, is a member of the World Future Society, a Senior Associate of the ForesightInstitute , and a fellow of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies . (Naam, Ramez. "Can Humans SurviveMass Extinction? | Guest Blog, Scientific American Blog Network." Can Humans Survive Mass Extinction? | Guest Blog,Scientific American Blog Network. N.p., 31 May 2013. Web. 03 June 2013.<http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2013/05/31/can-humans-survive-mass-extinction/>.)Threats that could wipe out the bulk of life on earth abound. Planetary catastrophe could come in the form of a killer asteroid impact,

the eruption of massive supervolcanoes , a nearby gamma ray burst that sterilizes the earth, or by human-driven environmental collapse. Yet lifewill endure , says Annalee Newitz, and so will humanity . In her new book , Scatter, Adapt, and Remember: How Humans Will Survive a Mass Extinction , Newitz surveys

billions of years of history and five previous mass extinctions to draw lessons about how catastrophe comes and how – and why – life abides .¶ The breadth of the book is

truly astounding, ranging from the planet’s first mass extinction – as cyanobacteria exhaled massive amounts of oxygen into the Earth’s atmosphere, poisoning most other life even as they paved the way for theecosystem we see today – to the techniques that grey whales, Jewish communities, and plague survivors have used to ensure their survival. In between we see the Earth freeze over then then thaw again. Wewatch as dinosaurs rise and fall, mammals come to dominate the world, and primates evolve into hominids and eventually modern humanity with all its varied challenges. The scale starts at billions of years, thenzooms down to millions, then thousands, and then into the present day, before zipping ahead into the future.¶ Newitz came to this topic with a pessimistic outlook, she writes, believing that humanity was

doomed, and intent on producing a book with that slant. Yet her research convinced her that the opposite is true – that while global risks abound, and while we

humans ourselves are potentially the greatest threat to both our own species and other life on Earth – we willnevertheless (probably) find ways to survive and bounce back from even the worse catastrophes .¶ In the

introduction she tells us that disaster, whether human created or not, is inevitable – but doom is not. How can she believe this? In her words:¶ Because the world has been almost completely destroyed half a

dozen times. [..] Earth has been shattered by asteroid impacts, choked by extreme greenhouse gases, lockedup in ice, bombarded with cosmic radiation, and ripped open by megavolcanoes so massive they are almost

unimaginable. Each of these disasters caused mass extinctions, during which more than 75% of the species on Earth died out. And yet every single time, livingcreatures carried on, adapting to survive under the harshest of conditions.¶ Humans , Newitz says, have also adapted: topast episodes of climate change , to new locales , to new diets, and to persecution at the hands ofother humans . That repeated pattern of survival and adaptation – of life as a whole and of humanity in particular – convinces Newitz that

we can do it again.

Util justifies massive atrocities — Things like rape can be considered theabsolute moral actionArmstrong ’13 —Undergraduate in biology (Armstrong, Reeve. "Transhumanitywhere Strange Brilliant Ideas forthe Future Intermingle and Breed..." Utilitarianism Is Immoral and Inconsistent with Transhumanism. N.p., 25 Apr.2013. Web. 09 July 2013. <http://transhumanity.net/articles/entry/utilitarianism-is-immoral-and-inconsistent-with-transhumanism>.)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_bias



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akrasia



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CEO



http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foresight_Institute




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institute_for_Ethics_and_Emerging_Technologies



http://amzn.to/112IuZ7












Suppose there is a doctor about to perform an operation on a female patient . The patient isunconscious ; under general anaesthetic. Suppose that the doctor is considering raping the woman.And the doctor is assured that he can : make sure he do es it without physically harming her and that noone will ever find out about it, apart from him, not even the woman . Suppose he also knows that

both he and the woman are healthy; they do not have any sexually transmitted infections and the

doctors knows that the woman is infertile , so she will not be able to become pregnant. In this situation the

doctor is considering the moral status of the act of raping this woman. What does util itarianism tell him ?

Clearly, no one is going to ever suffer . That is assured. And he , the doctor, will derive pleasure from the

act. Therefore, not only does util itarianism tells us that the act of raping the patient is not immoral, it tells us that,

in fact, the act is positively moral because it increases the happiness of the doctor . The doctor,under util itarianism, would actually be morally obligated to rape this woman . Take a few moments to

think about that. No thinking person with any modicum of human decency can base their morality of

[off ] such a disgusting , abominable system of thought that can allow for situations where rape isa moral obligation .

Their mentality to sacrifice anything and everything to avoid war causesontological damnation —the impact is hell on earthZimmerman 94 , (Professor of Philosophy at Tulane), 1994 (Michael, Contesting the Earth’s Future, p. 104).

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion , combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relationbetween being and human Dasein. 53Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a

nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction ofthe earth ."54This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the worldthan to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possiblethat after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again

occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself . Further, since

modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any " being " at all, the loss ofhumanity 's openness for being is already occurring .55Modernity's background mood is horror in the face ofnihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure

energy.56The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. Ifhumanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed wewould exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise .

Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price ofeverything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good asdead . But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclearomnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessenedbecause they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

utilitarianism good bad - ddix 2013

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