utlimate sniper chapter 20 us2[1]

8/2/2019 Utlimate Sniper Chapter 20 US2[1]

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Many countersniping

experiences and lessons

have emerged from Iraq,where U.S. and coalition

forces are fighting a

resourceful, dedicated

sniper adversary. In

addition to gleaning ex-

periences from Iraq

veterans, weve incor-

porated into this chapter

dozens of U.S. military

reports, media articles,

and even Iraqi insurgent

accounts involving 16

terrorist sniper engage-

ments against U.S.,

British, and Polish forces.

A PROFILE: THE IRAQI SNIPER

Before analyzing the Iraqi insurgent snipers

other attributes, keep in mind that hes a

terrorist first, whos capable of any kind of act

to further his cause without regard to law or

ethics or what a Westerner would considermorality. An inseparable seam connects him to

his comrades who bomb public places and kill

helpless hostages with little

remorse. Every day he

violates the Laws of LandWarfare by wearing

civilian clothes, assas-

sinating civilians, con-

tinuing to shoot incap-

acitated soldiers and

marines, escaping sniping

incidents in ambulances,

purposely firing behind a

human shield of women

and children, and oper-

ating from mosques.

Expect no quarter from

him and do not be sur-

prised by his outrages.

Explaining his moti-

vation, one Iraqi sniper

told the London Sunday Times, When I snipe at

my target and watch him drop, I feel elated

dizzy with ecstasy. I fall on the ground, shouting

to God, calling Allah akbar, for God is indeed

great. When their snipers kill one of us, we go

to heaven as martyrs. But when we kill them

they go to hell.Based on the threat they pose, Ive cate-

gorized Iraqs insurgent snipers into three

483

COUNTERSNIPING

IN IRAQ

NOT A CAREFULLY AIMED SHOT. This masked

Iraqi terrorist sniper fires at U.S. forces and

appears about to flee.

To assist U.S. forces and our Coalition allies in the War on Terror, any military, paramilitary, or police

unit, or any individual member of such a unit, has the authors and publishers permission to reproduce

and distribute this chapter. It may not be reproduced for sale, and please include this notice: From The

Ultimate Sniper, copyright 1993, 2006 by John Plaster. Published by Paladin Press.

CHAPTER

20


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classes: the potshot sniper, the trained

marksman, and the one shot-one killsniper.

The potshot sniper is a relatively untrained

civilian who has acquired a scoped rifle. His

zealotry exceeds his ability, although hes

reasonably deadly at 100 to 200 yardsabout

two city blocksclose enough that he doesnt

need to master range estimation, wind com-

pensation, etc., to hit targets. Reminiscent of the

Hitler Youth snipers who fought in the closing

days of World War II, he got started with as

little as a couple hours of instruction. Someone

else may even have zeroed his rifle for him, but

all he needs to know is how to hold the

crosshairs on his target. Most potshot snipers

will be captured or killed before they learn

enough to be called snipers, althoughexperience alone eventually will elevate some to

that level. Very roughly, Id estimate this

category constitutes half the snipers in Iraq.

Above him is the trained marksman,

probably a former military or sport shooter who

knows how to fire a rifle competently, but hes

not sniper-trained and lacks sniper experience.

He can hit dinner-plate-sized targets accurately

at 200 to 400 yards, or smaller and partially

exposed targets at closer ranges. If he absorbs

his experiences, he can be as deadly as a school-

trained sniper in a few months. The trainedmarksman comprises perhaps

40 to 45 percent of insurgent

sniper ranks.

The smallest category is that

of the school-trained, fully

qualified, one shot-one kill

sniper, or those with enough

experience from Chechnya or

elsewhere that theyve pre-

viously qualified on the job.

They represent 5 or at the most

10 percent of enemy snipers.

One of Iraqs more accom-

plished snipersallegedly with

23 killstold a British inter-

viewer that he learned his skills

via the Internet and by playing

videogameswhich I dont

believe for a second. Do you just suppose that

he attended a sniper course, perhaps outside

Iraq, which he would never have admitted to a

foreign journalist?

All these snipers watch U.S. forces and study

their tactics and techniques. They understand

what a Quick Reaction Force is and how it

operates and have learned to fire and flee before

a QRF can contain them for a cordon and

search. Repeatedly, I found Iraqi insurgent

media boasting that American cordons were not

in place fast enough to prevent a snipers escape.

ARMAMENT AND

EQUIPMENT

Iraqs snipers have a plentiful

supply of Soviet SVD sniper

rifles or the Iraqi-built version,

the al Kadesih rifle. Despite

being captured by the thousands

in 2003, Saddam Husseins

internal security and special

operations units earlier had

cached stockpiles of such rifles,enough to sustain the current

level of sniping. An indicator of

the al Kadesihs prestigious

image is that Saddam had

hundredspossibly thou-

sandsof them gold-plated for

T H E U L T I M A T E S N I P E R484

A rooftop Iraqi sniper takes aim at distant U.S. forces.

After firing, hell flee, conceal his rifle, and blend into the

populace.

A uniformed Iraqi Army sniper

with the al Kadesih version of the

SVD sniper rifle.


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presentations. These gold rifles have become the

wars most sought after GI souvenir.

Depending on the source, the al Kadesih is

comparably accurateor slightly less accurate

than its Russian SVD cousin, probably in the

realm of 2 MOA. I cannot say for certain

because Ive not test-fired the al Kadesih. But

clearly, this rifle in many ways is identical to the

SVD, its most distinctive difference being the

absence of a cheekrest. Some magazines have apalm tree stamped on them and are not

interchangeable with the SVD. Ive not come

upon a single incident of an Iraqi sniper using a

bolt-action rifle, although one boasted to a

journalist that he was purchasing a quality

European bolt-action rifle.

485C O U N T E R S N I P I N G I N I R A Q

THE AFGHAN SNIPER

Though allied forces have encountered a few snipers in Afghanistan, the enemy

sniper effort there has not been anywhere near the scale of Iraq. Partially I think this isexplained by terrain and typical engagement distances.The fight in Afghanistan is largely in mountainous

country, away from urban areas and their shorterengagement distances. The Afghan Taliban, when theychoose to fight, normally prefer to engage at 1,000 ormore yards with mortars and heavy machine guns, ratherthan AKs or rifles. As well, I think culturally the Talibanwhose members boast of their ignorance and rejection ofthe modern worldmay lack the education, sophisticationand inclination to learn the ballistics and opticaladjustments required for long-range rifle shooting.

This isnt to say that their ideological cousins, the alQaeda terrorists, have no use for sniping. It has beendocumented that al Qaeda formally instructed snipers, confirmed by Nizar Trabelsi, adetainee at Guantanamo Bays Camp X-Ray who told FBI agents hed personallyobserved three-man teams in training. However, these teams were recruited andtrained for attacks overseas, particularly inside the United States. Their graduationexercise simulated assassinating a U.S. Senator on a golf course. By early 2002, alQaeda and its sniper teams had abandoned Afghanistan, leaving the Taliban behind tocontinue the fight against the Americans.

In February 2005, the FBI apprehended Mohammed Kamal Elzahabi, a Lebanesecitizen, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, who admitted hed been a sniper in Chechnya andhad been an instructor at al Qaedas Khalden sniper training course in Afghanistan.

Where his graduates are today is anyones guess.

In Afghanistan, a Northern

Alliance sniper scans the

horizon for targets.

Still in their protective wraps, these captured Iraqi al

Kadesih sniper rifles will never reach a mujs hands.


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The Iraqi snipers maximum effective range

is limited by the capability of his optics. The

obsolescent Soviet-style PSO-1 scope found on

most Iraqi sniper rifles has a fixed 4x

magnification, keeping his well-aimed shots to

400 yards or less. Beyond that range, a talentedmarksman can hit a human torso, but he wont

be making precision shots.

Further, because he lacks a spotter and

spotting scope, the Iraqi sniper cannot

effectively adjust his fire like a Western sniper.

Ive not come upon a single Iraqi sniper

engagement that involved a night weapon sight,

so I doubt that they have themhowever, there

have been shots fired in well-illuminated areas

after dark.

As a rule, the Iraqi sniper does not have a

radio, but sometimes he communicates via a cell

phonewhich, if you think about it, is much

less incriminating if hes stopped by security

forces. Likewise, he carries no gear beyond his

rifle and perhaps one spare magazine, both to

remain flexibly mobile and to keep it simple to

discard incriminating evidence when he must

blend back into the population.

While on an operation he often wears a black

balaclava, a practice perhaps influenced by

similarly attired Palestinian terrorists. Partially

this ski mask generates a mystique, but more

practically it also conceals his identity so hecannot be identified by Iraqi bystanders. Some

Iraqi snipers further hide their identities behind

a nom de guerre or code name.

THE CHECHEN INFLUENCE

While some Chechen fighters have infiltrated

Iraq, in the area of sniping their influence has

exceeded their numbers. During much of the

past decade, Islamic radicals have fought

Russian forces in the breakaway Chechnya

Republic and learned a great deal about urbanwarfare, especially during battles in the

countrys capital, Grozny. Their combat

achievements have been significant, including


An American armorer deactivates a gold-plated al

Kadesih sniper rifle so it can legally be brought home as

a war trophy.

Unconcerned about the civilians that surround him, a

Palestinian masked sniper fires at Israeli troops, much

as some Iraqi snipers have done.


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the January 2000 sniper killing of Maj. Gen.

Mikhail Malofeyev, the commander of Russian

forces in northern Chechnya.

Chechen snipers affiliated with al Qaeda

have become respected as subject experts and

readily share their experiences, and perhaps

even conduct schools for allied combatants such

as the Iraqi insurgents.

It was the Chechens who first organized

hunter-killer teams (fighting groups) bycombining snipers with RPG rocketeers and

machine gunners for roving hit-and-run

attacksa tactic mimicked by Iraqs insurgents

and quite likely inspired or instructed by

Chechen veterans. Some Iraqi terrorist videos

have featured an SVD-armed sniper alongside

insurgents with RPGs and AKssimilar to a

Chechen hunter-killer teamand such squads

have been encountered in Iraqs more

rebellious neighborhoods.

Although not seen in Iraq, five-man teams

with one sniper and four AK- or machine gun-

armed gunmenhave been fielded by the

rebels in Chechnyas rural areas. The sniper

would stalk forward perhaps 500 metersor lie

in ambush that far forwardand fire one well-

aimed shot. Hearing this, his comrades would

open fire to divert attention and provide


THE EMERGING .50-CALIBER THREAT

Despite a U.S. protest, in 2005 the Austrian Interior Ministry issued an

export license to famed gun maker Steyr to sell 800 .50-caliber sniper rifles toIran. These high-quality, single-shot, bolt-action Model 50 HS rifles have aneffective range of 2,500 meters,comparable to quality American .50-caliber bolt guns.

We asked the Iranians to give us acertificate stating that the end user ofthe weapons would be the Iranianpolice, an A ustrian governmentspokesman explained, adding that theIranians would use it to protect thecountrys borders and to combat drug trafficking. Thats not exactly how

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani saw it, telling reporters, Now oursnipers can target the enemy in their armored personnel carriers and concretebunkers.

Iran, which has long supported such major terrorist organizations asHezbollah and recently was caught smuggling an entire shipload of weaponsto terrorists, insisted that the .50-caliber rifles were not intended for use in Iraq,despite its lengthy border with the neighboring country.

In 2005, Iran received some 800 high-quality Steyr

50 HS rifles, despite the countrys history of arming

terrorist groups.

Chechen influence is suggested by this Iraqi terrorist

video, which shows an SVD-armed sniper teamed up

with RPG and AKs as a fighting group.


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covering fire for the sniper to escape from

responding Russian forces.

Given their expertise, its possible that some

of Iraqs best insurgent snipersthe one-shot,

one-kill typeshave been trained or advised by

Chechens. Or some may actually be Chechens.

SNIPER AMMUNITION

The availability of quality ammunition could

be a limiting factor for insurgent snipers. The

most abundant 7.62x54R ammo is low-grade

ball rounds intended for firing in PK machine

guns, which lack consistency and, thus, accuracy.

However, a sniper has such a low expendi-

ture rate that it doesnt require much ammu-

nition to keep him supplied. An Iraqi urban

sniper could operate for an entire year with the

contents of a single ammo can. As is well

known, before the 2003 invasion, Saddam had

his elite units and internal security forcesthe

nucleus of the insurgencycache ammo and

weapons specifically for continued fighting.

This fact, along with the availability of quality

ammunition in neighboring countries, suggests

that ammunition supply is not a significant

problem for snipers. When snipers eventually

are found to be firing chiefly ordinary ball

ammoand one-shot kills declineit will be astrong intelligence indicator that the larger

counterinsurgency effort is achieving success.

SNIPER ATTACKS ON

AMERICAN UNITS

At some time, probably every American

combat unit in Iraq must contend with an

enemy sniper, but too often their counteraction

does not eliminate their attacker.

Montana National Guardsmen assigned to


A Russian sniper in Chechnya, alert for possible

Chechen gunmen.

Collapsed on the pavement after being hit by sniper fire, USMC GySgt. Ryan P. Shane (L) and an unidentified Marine were

shot while attempting to rescue a third Marine in Fallujah. (Photo credit: USMC photo by Cpl. Joel A. Chaverri)


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Task Force Liberty manning a listening post at

Al Huyway Jah had a single sniper shot

narrowly miss a man. Though they returned fire

and rushed the snipers suspected firing

position, they found nothing. As usual, an NCO

noted, there are three other ways out of [his

firing location] besides the side facing our

trucks. He fired one shot, which left him plenty

of time to get away from us before we engaged

him. Especially, the Guardsmen were frustra-

ted by the lack of cooperation by Iraqi bystand-

ers. As usual, no one heard the sniper shot but

heard the rip of the .50 returning fire, reported

one infantryman.

Recalling his predeployment countersniper

training in Germany, a 1st Infantry Division

soldier told Stars and Stripes, You could see thewindow open, you see the rifle and then you see

the guy leaning out of the window. He shook

his head. Here its not like that. They are very

well hidden.

When a sniper inflicts casualties and escapes

unscathed, it can affect morale. After losing a

fellow Marine to a sniper at a traffic control

point, a young Marine confided to a Washington

Postreporter, Having a sniper out there scares

the hell out of me. Hes a pretty good one, too.

Only three shots and he got one of ours.

Here are some examples of the kinds ofsnipers American forces must deal with.

The Opportunistic Neighborhood SniperThe neighborhood sniper operates mostly

near where he lives, which usually is one of the

more dangerous neighborhoods of Ramadi,

Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah, or a dozen other

Sunni triangle towns. Like kicking over a rock

and finding a rattlesnake, U.S. forces encounter

him when they penetrate his neighborhood. He

sees the Americans as a convenient,

opportunistic target right in his own backyard.

Limited by his opticsa 4x PSO-1 scope

he cannot selectively place a shot beyond 400

yards, but urban dead space reduces that

further, to about 250 yards or less. He occupies

a temporary hide atop a building of perhaps

three or four storiesat least as high as the

buildings around him. Lacking a spotter and his

spotting scope, the sniper will search for a target

with his rifle scope. If hes a potshot sniper, he

may expend his entire 10-round magazine

before he flees; with more experience, hell

carefully place one shot so hes certain of a hit,

then flee.

His opportunistic target could be a GI at

the open hatch of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle,

a dismounted patrol, perhaps a soldier

standing beside a temporari ly halted

HMMWV. If a military supply route (MSR)

passes his neighborhood, the sniper may well

take to engaging these, too, when presented

the opportunity.

This neighborhood sniper knows the area

well and has planned his escape route, oftenusing a rope to descend a buildings back side,

beyond the sight and counterfire of those hes

engaged. Early in the war these snipers

sometimes left behind their rifles, but SVDs and

al Kadesih rifles are growing harder to replace;

more likely hell carry his rifle a short distance,

then ditch it in a preplanned hiding place.

Operating against such a potshot sniper in

1969, I spotted him within 30 seconds of his

shot, but already hed hidden his rifle, which I

never foundthats how quickly such a shooter

knows he must discard his weapon.


Iraqi neighborhood snipers, such as this one,

opportunistically engage U.S. forces when they appear.


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The Vehicle-Borne Hit-and-Run SniperAnother kind of opportunistic engagement

has been experienced at American traffic control

points (TCPs). While U.S. servicemen are

stopping and searching vehicles, a civilianautomobile halts 300 or more yards awayfar

enough for a sniperscope to offer an optical

advantage. While the driver remains at the wheel,

a sniper takes aim across the cars hood or top,

fires one or two fast shots, then the car speeds

away and immediately disappears into traffic.

The troops operating the TCP take cover,

so rarely do they even approximate a vehicle

description. Unless a helicopter is already

airborne and in radio contact with the TCP, its

impossible to intercept the snipers vehicle.

This kind of sniper might be apprehendedduring a routine vehicle search that also dis-

covers his riflebut hes just as likely to melt

back into the populace. Because the insurgents

use radios or cell phones to alert their com-

rades whenever they spot a TCP, U.S. forces

have begun running flash TCPs, set up with

no warning for short periods of time, in hopes

of ensnaring vehicles carrying contraband.

The Last-Stand SniperAnother type of insurgent sniper is one whohas decided to occupy dominant terrain with no

possibility of escape and die with his boots on,

so to speak. Like suicidal Japanese snipers in

World War II who tied themselves in trees and

let Marines advance beyond them before

opening fire, this sniper climbs into a minaret

the tower beside a mosque from which a mullah

calls the faithful to prayerwhere he intends to

make his last stand. He will take with him as

many enemies as possible.

The most determined kind of sniperthough likely not the most tactically adroitthe

last-stand sniper is always ready to die, which

yields its own kind of effectiveness. No matter

the accuracy of counterfire, he cannot be forced

from his position or suppressedhe can only be


When a determined Iraqi sniper atop a Fallujah minaret held up a Marine infantry company, tank fire brought down

the entire tower.


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killed. On several occasions in or near Fallujah,

such to-the-death snipers have held up U.S.

forces for extended periods until, finally,

antitank weapons or tank main guns blasted

them from their barricaded FFPs.

The Targeted Sniper AttackThe insurgents best snipers are employed in

carefully planned attacks against somewhat

fixed targets, such as a soldier at a guard post,

security personnel outside a public building, or

a GI manning a guard tower at a U.S. base.

We know that these operations involve their

finest shooters because with uniformity, these are

one-shot killsusually head shotscarefully

placed to bypass the victims body armor. These

usually are shoot and scoot attacks, but if thesnipers first shot misses he may linger for a

second shot. This pattern is clear with quite a

number of incidents. In some instances, the

sniper has been supported by a video cameraman

who recorded the attack for later broadcast on

Arab television or insurgent Web sites.

Typical of these targeted sniper attacks were

two incidents in Ramadi on 8 and 17 August

2004, which each killed a U.S. Marine. In both

instances, they were manning a well-established

observation post, and the victim was killed with

a single shot to the head. The second victim wasatop a seven-story building, not a very simple

shot. The earlier victim, at Outpost Ghetto, was

safely behind a 5-foot sandbag wall when he

paused momentarily at a narrow opening to

speak to a fellow Marine. Thats all it took.

To succeed, such deliberate attacks are

preceded by reconnaissance and surveillance to

confirm the targets location, select FFPs, and

determine stalking and escape routes. The best

counter, it appears, is tactical awareness of this

recon/surveillance stage and being alert to the

presence of suspicious observersif theyre

clumsy enough to appear suspicious.

Because these deliberate attack snipers are

not committed to a particular town or neigh-

borhood, Ive dubbed them floaters who

probably are centrally controlled by regional or

city-level insurgent leaders.

Targeting U.S. SnipersThere can be no question that Iraqi

insurgents have especially targeted U.S. snipers.

Besides being the number-one priority on an

Iraqi terrorist Web site (see sidebar, page 492),American snipers are despised for their

effectiveness, so detested that insurgent

propaganda frequently accuses them of heinous

offenses such as killing women and Muslim

holy mencrimes so despicable that any

punishment is justified.

Though most often these are opportunistic

attacks, some appear to be focused on particular

U.S. snipers. On 2 September 2004, one of the

U.S. Armys finest rifle shots, a Specialist 4th

Class whod previously been with Ft. Bennings

Marksmanship Training Unit and aspired tomake the U.S. Olympic rifle team, was

ambushed near Kirkuk. After his vehicle was

halted by a roadside bomb, the veteran sniper

stepped from his vehicle and was shot dead by

an enemy snipers bullet to his head. He was

slated to return to Ft. Benning to be an

instructor at the U.S. Army Sniper School.

Indeed, there has been at least one incident

where an American soldier was targeted for

assassination and, according to the Iraqi sniper

who took the shot, he was paid the equivalent of

$5,000 for killing him. This same sniper wasalso tasked to kill a particular U.S. Army officer,

which he claimed to have accomplished.

There have been a number of other incidents

where Marine and Army snipers have been

killed by insurgent snipers, usually picked off

individually while operating in support of

platoons and companies. Perhaps more

troubling has been the growth of larger Iraqi

countersniper operations intended to wipe out

entire American sniper teams.

The first of these Ive come upon occurred

on 18 April 2004, in the al Rashid District, near

the Baghdad airport. A three-man sniper team

from the 1st Cavalry Division led by 1st Lt.

Eric Johnson had waited for darkness to occupy

an overwatch position in a building under

construction. While observing from the fourth-

floor rooftop for insurgents planting bombs



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along nearby Highway 8, Lieutenant Johnson

noticed civilian vehicles converging. Cars were

pulling up without lights, scooters were coming

in and out, and 20 to 30 military-aged Iraqis

appeared, he recalled. As Johnson told his

radioman to call for a Quick Reaction Force,

the arriving Iraqis suddenly opened fire,

attempting to overrun the snipers. Johnson was

shot three timesthrough one lung, his back,and his left arm. Friendly forces arrived, com-

pelling the attackers to withdraw. Johnson was

medevacked back to the States and survived.

Two months later, in Ramadi, 20 miles west

of Baghdad, a similar sudden assault by two

dozen insurgents succeeded in overrunning a

Marine sniper position. These four Marines,

too, had been on a surveillance mission, but the

aggressive attack and heavy fire was more than

they could repel. The insurgent attackers

stripped their bodies, then videotaped them for

foreign propaganda distribution.

The next such incident again took place in

Ramadi on 4 November 2004. This time an

eight-man Marine sniper element was crossinga darkened street at 2:30 A.M. when, with no

warning, a remote-controlled bomb detonated,

killing two and seriously wounding several

others, including the sniper platoon sergeant.

The Marines had been en route to a surveil-

lance position.


IRAQI SNIPER TARGET PRIORITIES

Iraqi terrorists often communicate via the Internet, posting messages and setting

up temporary Web sites to convey information. In May 2005, an Iraqi terrorist Web sitesuggested seven duties or target priorities for that countrys insurgent snipers. Hereis a literal translation of that posting, provided by the U.S. Army:

7 Duties of a Sniper1. Target enemy snipers and surveillance teams.2. Target commanders, officers and pilots, that is, to target the head of the snake

and then handicap the command of the enemy.3. Assist teams of mujahideen infantry with suppressive fire. These teams may

include RPG brigades or surveillance teams.4. Target U.S. Special Forces, they are very stupid because they have a Rambo

complex, thinking that they are the best in the world. Dont be arrogant like them.

5. Engage specialty targets like communications officers to prevent calls forreinforcements. Likewise, tank crews, artillery crews, engineers, doctors, andchaplains should be fair targets.

a tank driver was shot while crossing a bridge, resulting in the tank rolling offthe bridge and killing the rest of the crew

Killing doctors and chaplains is suggested as a means of psychologicalwarfare

6. Take care when targeting one or two U.S. soldiers or [Iraqi] agents on a roadside.A team of American snipers [may be] waiting for you. They [may be] waiting foryou to kill one of those agents and then they will know your location and they willkill you.

7. In the event of urban warfare, work from high areas and assist infantry with

surrounding the enemy, attacking target instruments and lines of sight on largeenemy vehicles, and directing mortar and rocket fire to front-line enemy positions.


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The most publicized attack on

American snipers came in August

2005, when two Marine sniper

teamssix menwere ambushed

and killed near Haditha, 140 miles

northwest of Baghdad. In this case

I received a copy of the terrorist

videotape that recorded the

ambush, so I was able to derive

considerable detail. Initially, the

Marines advanced as two three-

man teams through head-high

sand dunes, about 25 meters

apart. Then an insurgent pickup

truck rolled to a stop at a nearby

farmhouse, apparently within sight

of the Marines, who probably didnot notice a 120mm mortar pulled

out and set up. When all was ready, it appears

that insurgent machine gun fire pinned the

Marines atop a sand dune, then the mortar

pounded them with high-explosive rounds until

all were incapacitated. Its not clear in the

videotape, but I suspect a final assault by

insurgents ended the fight. Later, the masked

insurgents videotaped a stripped body, then laid

out a display of captured gear and weapons

beneath palm trees, including two M40A4

sniper rifles.What all these incidents have in common is

that they were not chance contacts. The insur-

gents executed planned attacks or ambushes and

knew where the sniper teams were positioned or

could accurately anticipate their routes. Clearly

these teams were compromised.

The cause could be operational security

OPSECmeaning the Americans had

unwittingly telegraphed their punches or

repeatedly used the same positions or routes.

Equally, though, the cause could have been

penetration by hostile intelligence, a major

problem we faced in my old covert warfare unit,

MACV-SOG. In the Studies and Observations

Group and the 5th Special Forces Group as a

whole, there was such a continuing shortage of

interpreters that Vietnamese nationals often were

hired without proper vettingand some were

enemy agents. The simplest, most

reliable way for a hostile

intelligence service to penetrate

American military units is to

dangle an English-speaking

interpreter before them. We had 14

Special Forces SOG teams vanish

behind enemy lines and another 10

overrun and annihilated, some due

to compromise by enemy moles.

Interpreters are essential, but I

urge readers, deny interpreters

advance knowledge of operations, and

keep them away from operational

maps and planning meetings.

PASSIVE COUNTERSNIPERMEASURES

American forces in Iraq are practicing all the

passive countersniper measures cited in

Chapter 19, plus, as fitting, those learned in

Sarajevo. (See sidebar, page 495.)

Unlike previous conflicts, however, U.S.

military personnel are also benefiting from body

armor that protects wearers from even the

powerful 7.62x54mm sniping round. Several

GIs have survived solid hits from this bullet

Im aware of at least threeand come away withlittle more than an ugly bruise. Its heavy, its hot

in Iraqs summer heat, but it genuinely works.

Modern Kevlar helmets, too, have saved a

number of lives and have proved more effective

than the old steel pot ever was. U.S. Army SSgt.

Chad Chapman would have been another one-

shot kill for an Iraqi sniper, but the bullet struck

his Kevlar helmet, knocking him unconscious

with no lasting effect. At least two other GIs

have survived similar hits to Kevlar helmets.

ACTIVE COUNTERSNIPER MEASURES

As with passive measures, U.S. forces are

employing all the active countermeasures cited

in Chapter 19. Additionally, dismounted

patrols are run through areas in which a sniper

could approach or stalk toward a U.S.


Despite serious wounds, 1st

Lt. Eric Johnsons sniper

team fought off mass attack-

ers in Iraq. Other teams have

not been so fortunate.


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Living proof that body armor works, USMC LCpl. Richard

Guillenavila shows where a snipers bullet struck his

protective vest.

Fragments of the 7.62x54mm bullet intended to take the

life of Lance Corporal Guillenavila.

This ACOG scope saved the life of USMC Sgt. Todd Bowers by stopping a snipers bullet in Fallujah. The scope was a

gift from his father.


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COUNTERSNIPING LESSONS OF SARAJEVO

During much of the 1990s, the city of Sarajevo, Bosnia,was the scene of unrelenting sniping by Serbiangunmen. Hidden in carefully selected dominant terrain inthe surrounding hills or inside modern concretebuildings, these concealed riflemen took an almost dailytoll of men, women, and even children to challenge thedivision of Yugoslavia into independent states.

NATO and UN forces provided security assistance, toinclude countersnipers, who learned much from thisprotracted urban fight. Here are their most important lessons:

1. Intelligence support is critical, to include:a. Dead Space Analysis:Tracking bullet impacts and lines of fire helped identify safe

routes and hazardous ones. This analysis also provided clues to likely SerbianFinal Firing Positions, which could then be intensely observed.b. Periodic Photography:Regularly photographing buildings and high ground likely

to be used by Serb snipers helped detect subtle changes, such as removedwindows, firing ports cut in walls, and shifted barrier materials.

c. Pattern Analysis:Detailed assessment of each sniping incident contributed to alarger mosaic that provided useful clues for future sniping incidents, such astimes, locations, and methods. This analysis was best accomplished by directlyinvolving countersnipers in the process to help interpret the raw data.

2. Passive measures are as useful as active measures:a. Identify Safe Routes: Shift civilian and military traffic away from the snipers

direct fire to streets and alleys and areas into which snipers cannot observe or

fire.b. Install Screens to Block Sniper Observation:Along hazardous routes or locations

within the snipers field of fire, erect screens to block his observation. Suchscreens are not ballistically protective, composed usually of canvas or plywood.

c. Employ Armored Vehicles: Even lightly armored personnel carriers and fightingvehicles offered sufficient protection against sniper fire.

3. Barrier penetration is absolutely essential:a. Sniper Positions Heavily Barricaded:Serb snipers deeply embedded themselves

in rubbled buildings and/or elaborately positioned concrete blocks, timbers, andsandbags around their positions.

b. 7.62mm and .300 WinMag of Limited Application:Although accurately placed,counterfire shots from standard sniper rifles often could not penetrate well-

constructed Serbian firing positions. However, accurate fire usually had asuppressing effect.

c. Need for Overmatching:Only heavy rifles.338 Lapua Magnum and .50-caliberriflescould penetrate Serb barriers with reasonable consistency.

d. Rifle Weight and Bulk Matters: Many NATO countersnipers preferred the .338Lapua Magnum over the .50-cal. because it was lighter and easier to manipulatewhile climbing, running, and stalking.

Riddled by sniper fire, a NATO

vehicle is halted along a Sarajevo

street.


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installation, while dominating terrain is denied

enemy snipers by occupying it or keeping it

under surveillance.

Much more so than the past, surveillance has

become aerial. Both the Army and Marines are

employing small unmanned aerial vehicles

UAVsto search rooftops and likely sniper

positions. The scale of this effort is astounding

more than 1,000 UAVs are currently in use in

Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the U.S.

Defense Department, looking for roadside

bombs, snipers, and a host of other threats.

Despite all these roving eyes in the sky,

however, most countersniper engagements still

result from the tried and trueU.S. snipers

intensely surveilling for their Iraqi foes. Ive


To obscure sniper observation, U.S. Marines in Ramadi burn a large smoke bomb.

U.S. Marines ready an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in

Fallujah to fly reconnaissance in support of the Marine

assault and to watch rooftops for Iraqi snipers.


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been quite impressed by the quality of lures

and decoys fashioned by American counter-

snipers, as good as those waved over the

trenches in World War I to attract fire from

Hun sharpshooters.

And the same old-fashioned techniques still

work. A 1st Cavalry Division sniper, SSgt. Jeff

Young, exploited the shifting rays of the setting

sun to pinpoint an Iraqi sniper. We got lucky

when the sun was going down, he told Stars and

Stripes. It hit his scope at the right angle and we

got a glare in our direction so we engaged it.

Another Army sniper, Sgt. Randall Davis,

twice defeated opposing snipers, engaging them

from a rooftop in Samarra. Firing an M25

Designated Marksman Rifle, he patiently

outwaited an Iraqi sniper who had fired on

Americans three days earlier. When the Iraqifinally reappeared, Davis keen eyes picked him

out of the shadows where he stalked. As the

Iraqi raised up to fire his SVD rifle, one shot

from Davis and it was over. In the second case,

Davis eliminated an Iraqi sniper with a 750-

yard shot with a Barrett .50-caliber M107,

thanks to his teams high-quality optics.


Hoping to attract a hidden snipers shot, a U.S. Army

sniper raises a cleverly designed decoy head in Iraq.

(Note .50-caliber sniper rifle in background.)

With a SAW machine gunner alert to return fire, a Marine

raises a dummy head to attract sniper fire in Fallujah.


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Marine snipers, too, have taken their toll of

Iraqi gunmen. In Fallujah, Sgt. Sean Crane

detected an Iraqi creeping along a rooftop, then

saw him slide down a palm tree and pause for

his rifle to be handed down to him. From more

than two blocks away, Cranes shot hit the

Iraqis leg, then an immediate follow-up shot

dropped him. Scratch one Iraqi gunman, the

Marines 11th kill.

Its that kind of steady, patient, meticulous,day-in/day-out effort thats necessary to win the

sniper war in Iraq.

HIGH TECHNOLOGY IN

THE COUNTERSNIPER FIGHT

The countersniper fight can be assisted by

some surprisingly advanced technologies,

though its still too early to estimate their

potential contribution in Iraq.

Countersniping involves two sequential

steps: first, find the sniper; second, engage him.Each step is now being addressed by cutting-

edge devices.

The first step, finding the sniper, uses

sensing technologies that either acoustically

locate his rifles muzzle blast or acquire a

reflection off his optics. Acoustic-signature

technology employs a number

of sensitive microphones

linked to a computer, which

pinpoint a muzzle blast by

multiple reverse azimuths.

Posted discreetly on buildings

and light poles, these wireless,

cigarette pack-size sensors

hear the shot, then relay it to

the computer, which instantly

compares all these versions of

the sound to calculate where

the shot originated. The

principle is the same as the

crack-bang technique dis-

cussed in Chapter 19timing

the difference betweenhearing a bullets crack and

the bang of its muzzle

blast. Linked to a GPS, the computer precisely

calculates data from several sensor locations,

then spits out a fairly exact location.

Originally developed to fingerprint Soviet

submarines entering the North Atlantic by

analyzing the cavitation noise of their

propellers, accoustic signature technology is

damned impressivebut Im skeptical about

how well its current configuration will perform

real-world. In the midst of heavy fighting inFallujah, can it single out one snipers muzzle

blast? Will it merely cause snipers to become

shoot-and-scoot practitioners who displace so

quickly that theyre gone before theres time for

counteraction? An earlier acoustic gunfire

sensor system, developed by Honeywell, was

tested a decade ago in Atlanta during the 1996

Olympicsand it was already claimed that it

worked. If it was truly effective, wed see it

heavily employed in Iraq, and it hasnt been. I

suspect that despite earlier claims, its still in

development and probably is being further

tested, perhaps on a discreet basis in Iraq.

The other major sensing technology does

work and actually has a deployable system. The

USAF BOSSBattlefield Optical Surveillance

Systemis the latest evolution of a laser-based

acquisition technology that I first heard about


USMC Abrams tanks blast an insurgent snipers position in Fallujah.


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some 20 years ago, when the Soviet Union was

developing a similar system. Just as radar

operates by emitting a radio wave that reflects

back to disclose an aircraft, the BOSS emits a

brilliant flash of laser light that reflects off any

optical lensa rifle scope, spotting scope, night

vision goggle, antitank weapon sight, etc. A

BOSS sensor detects this reflection, then

pinpoints its location by computer analysis.

Instead of just relaying this location, the BOSS

takes the further step of automatically directing

a visible laser beam to the spot to designate a

threatening individual. Although the official

BOSS description correctly notes that this laser

will not harm eyes, in fact, similar U.S. and

Soviet devices developed in the 1990s were not

only capable of that but were intended todetect and neutralize a snipers optics

meaning his eyesight.

More portable versions of this laser

neutralizing devicethe U.S. Armys

Stingray and LCMS (Laser Countermeasure

System)were so close to fielding in 1995 that

they were addressed in a U.S. Army field

manual. This technology is more advanced than

most people realize, for Stingray already had

been installed in some Bradley Fighting

Vehicles, which a manual noted can be set to

scan a specific sector and then [automatically]

engage and neutralize all telescopes and night

vision devices it detects.

After careful reconsideration, the U.S.

government decided not to deploy a weapon

that inflicted casualties by blinding enemy

soldiers. (An opinion I share.) Thus, todays

BOSS offers the detection and acquisition

capabilities but not the blinding laserand that,

alone, can be quite useful. As now mounted on

a HMMWV, the system is too bulky and heavy

to achieve much in most Iraqi neighborhoods,

but a more portable version installed on

rooftops or perhaps towers could have some

usefulness. The director of the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency, Dr.Anthony Tether, in announcing that laser-based

antisniper systems were deploying to Iraq,

realistically assessed their effectiveness.

Theyre not going to be 100 percent solu-

tions, he said, but when youre in a situation

where you have no solutions, even a 25 percent

solution is going to be great.

Indeed, before you get too enthused, keep in

mind that this technology detects optical

reflections, not snipers. In a major urban area

youd still have to determine

what exactly the BOSSdetectedan Iraqi kid playing

with a kaleidoscope, a pretty

girl looking at her face in a

makeup compact, or an

SVD-armed sniper aiming at

you.

The next generation of

gunfire-detection technology

offers considerably improved

capabilities, with IR sensors

that literally track a bullets

flight and special laser radars

that read atmospheric pres-

sure disturbances created by a

bullets passage. Both the

Army and Marine Corps have

prototypes that incorporate

these technologies, in tandem


USAF BOSS (Battlefield Optical Surveillance System), a mobile countersniper

system, uses a laser to detect and illuminate hostile snipers.


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with acoustic sensors and GPS locators. The

Army Research Laboratory is even installing

these countersniper systems on small radio-

controlled robots, and Id speculate that

helicopter-mounted ones arent long in the

future. Some of these prototypes probably will

find their way to Iraq.

High-Tech EngagementsSomething thats here right now and

deployed to Iraq in 2005 is a very capable,

remote-controlled firing unit for optically

equipped rifles, including the USMCs

Designated Marksman Rifle, the Stoner SR-25,

and the Barrett .50 caliber. Manufactured by

Precision Remotes, the TRAP 250 System

incorporates a stabilized cradle and video link

that allows a remote operator to minutely


From a laptop computer inside this HMMWV, a Marine can so precisely control the TRAP 250s .50-caliber that he

can hit a soda can at 100 meters.

The TRAP 250 laptop computer view through a Unertl

scope, with video zoomed to 80x.


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manipulate the rifle and aim with impressive

precision using an ordinary laptop computer.

The TRAP 250s cradle is compatible with

standard U.S. military pintle mounts as well as

machine gun tripods, allowing it to be ground- or

vehicle-mounted. Its sensitive, micrometer-like

adjustments and 0.1 MOA resolution allow the

operator to place a shot with considerable accuracy.

During demonstrations, the company consistently

shoots soda cans at 100 meters with the unit.

Already the TRAP 250 has seen combat

service with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

teams, where its precision fire has disabled Iraq

mines. The USMC has a newer version that

mounts atop the Force Protection Cougar

vehicle, while the U.S. Army has incorporated it

on a remote-controlled robot under the

SWORDS (Special Weapons Observation

Reconnaissance Detection System) program. A

number of SWORDS units have just deployed

to Iraq, where theyll be tested in the most

unforgiving environment of allreal combat.

The day will come, I am sure, when all these

sensing and acquisition and firing systems will

be integrated, but I think they will supple-

mentnot replacethe human countersniper.

Because, always remember, the enemy sniper is

a living, breathing, thinking human who will

adapt to changing situations and new

technologies. Ultimately, it will take another

living, breathing, thinking human to outwit and

eliminate him: you, the countersniper.


USMC Designated Marksman Rifle atop a Force Protection Cougar vehicle. The TRAP 250 System also can be pintle-

mounted or installed on a standard machine gun tripod.


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utlimate sniper chapter 20 us2[1]

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