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Dashed hopes and shattered dreams: On the psychology of disappointment

van Dijk, W.

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Citation for published version (APA):van Dijk, W. (1999). Dashed hopes and shattered dreams: On the psychology of disappointment. Amsterdam:UvA.

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The quote of Stanley tells us that psychologists were already interested in the anticipation of disappointment at the beginning of this century. Although this interest never completely faded, research interest was modest and disappointment was mainly studied in the margins of psychology. Recently, however, research attention has increased (see, for example, Armor & Taylor, 1998; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996). In this chapter we examine how people anticipate disappointment, and how they try to avoid it. W e also investigate how people attempt to reduce the intensity of disappointment. In Chapter 2 we found empirical support for the assumptions that: (a) disappointment is an aversive emotion, (b) people attempt to avoid the experience of disappointment, and (c) people try to reduce the intensity of disappointment. Below we first address the avoidance of disappointment, and then go on to consider ways of reducing the intensity of this emotion.

Avoiding Disappointment Since disappointment is a negative emotion, people, not surprisingly, would prefer not to experience it and generally attempt to avoid it. To do so, people can employ several strategies when disappointment is anticipated. When people are uncertain about obtaining desirable outcomes they can, for example, strategically adapt their cognitions or behaviour in an attempt to influence their future affective responses to the outcome in question. There are three basic ways in which people can try to avoid disappointment. First, people may t ry to live up to their initial expectations. Second, people may lower their expectations. Third, people may set global expectations. These three ways will now be discussed.

People may attempt to avoid disappointment by trying to live up to their initial expectations. The motivation to avoid disappointment may prompt a person to intensify effort in order to avoid the possibility of a negative outcome (cf. Averill, 1968). In other words, people may try harder to attain a desired outcome. Investing effort generally increases the probability of attaining a desired outcome, and therefore decreases the probability of becoming disappointed. However, people are often confronted with uncertain outcomes in which trying harder does not necessarily have the effect of making the desired outcome more likely, and therefore, reducing the likelihood of disappointment. For example, when playing a lottery, when waiting for the result of an exam or job interview, or when watching an important soccer match, trying hard (in whatever way) does not bring the desired outcome any closer. In these situations investing (extra) effort does not decrease the possibility of disappointment, and people may employ other means of avoiding disappointment.

A second way in which people may attempt to avoid disappointment is by strategically lowering their expectations. This strategy is based on an assumed link between expectations, disappointment, and satisfaction. Feather (1967, 1969) suggested that people perceive unexpected positive outcomes as more attractive than expected positive outcomes, and unexpected negative outcomes as more repulsive than expected negative outcomes. When an outcome is inferior to what was expected, one may experience disappointment. By contrast, when an outcome surpasses expectations, one may experience elation (see also Chapter 5). Thus, the lower one's initial expectations, the greater one's satisfaction or the less intense one's disappointment with the actual outcome. This relationship between expectations, disappointment, and satisfaction may be an incentive for lowering expectations. Thus when people are faced with uncertainty regarding the occurrence of a desirable outcome, they may attempt to protect themselves from the

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experience of disappointment by underestimating their chances of obtaining the outcome in question. Pyszczynski (1982) obtained evidence that was consistent with such a strategy. In his study participants played a lottery in which two different prizes (a high value prize or a low value prize) could be won with different (objective) probabilities (20%, 50%, or 90%). Results showed that when a high value prize was at stake and the objective probability of winning the prize was high (90%), participants' subjective probabilities of winning were lower than the objective probabilities. Thus, people may avoid "getting their hopes up" when a desirable outcome is at stake.

An important determinant of lowered expectations seems to be the temporal proximity of feedback on whether an outcome is obtained or not. For example, in a study by Nisan (1972), participants reported how confident they were that they would correctly answer a random item from an exam that was anticipated immediately or in four weeks time. Participants who anticipated taking the exam immediately were less confident that they would answer the item correctly than were participants who would take the exam in four weeks. In a related study by Loewenstein and Linville (1986), students were asked to give estimates of their scores on a 'verbal logic test'. They were told that the test consisted of items taken from the Graduate Records Exam, and that GREs are an important determinant of graduate admissions and academic success. Students' estimates of their test scores were assessed twice, once directly after they finished their test, and once just before they anticipated feedback on their test score. Results showed significantly lower estimates when feedback on their test score was closer in time. More recently, Shepperd et al. (1996) asked college sophomores, juniors, and seniors to estimate the likely starting salary of their first full-time job after graduation. Students' estimates of their starting salary were assessed twice, once at the beginning of the semester and once at the end of the semester (i.e., two weeks prior to graduation for seniors). Results showed that only seniors became less optimistic at the end of the semester, that is, as graduation approached. Sophomores and juniors, for whom graduation was a year or more in the future, did not change their estimates. In a second study they asked students to estimate their exam score a month before their exam, and again several times after completing the exam but prior to receiving feedback. As the moment of feedback approached, students lowered their estimates. Thus whether or not individuals lower their expectations about future desirable outcomes seems to be a function of (at least) two conditions: (a) whether self-relevant feedback is anticipated and (b) the temporal proximity of self-relevant feedback.

Apart from trying to live up to initial expectations and lowering expectations, a third strategy of avoiding disappointment is to set very global (i.e. less specific) expectations. Armor and Taylor (1998) suggested that setting global expectations has an advantage over specific expectations, in that the former are less easily disconfirmed than the latter. Because of this they are less likely to lead to the experience of disappointment. For example, students are less likely to be disappointed when their expectation concerning their studies is to do well, as opposed to finishing their first year with a straight A. Armor and Taylor report research showing that people's overly optimistic expectations for success were associated with greater disappointment following performance, but only when these predictions were specific and thus potentially verifiable.

Reducing Disappointment Although people try to avoid disappointment, this is not always possible and the best thing they can do is to attempt to reduce their disappointment. Armor and Taylor (1998)

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suggested that people can employ several (cognitive) strategies that enable them to reduce the intensity of experienced disappointment. These strategies are: (a) biased perception of what has been obtained, (b) biased recall of initial expectations, (c) shifting the standard of comparison, (d) adopting a 'silver lining' strategy, and (e) putting the outcome into perspective. These five strategies are partly overlapping, and not mutually exclusive. The second one focuses on the probability component, and the remaining four focus on (re-) evaluating the outcome by using a different standard of comparison, emphasising different aspects of the experience, or changing the context. Next, we briefly discuss the five strategies.

Biased perception of what has been obtained People may reinterpret their obtained (disappointing) outcomes by adjusting their perception of what has been obtained. Some evidence for the use of this strategy comes from a series of studies by Klaaren, Hodges, and Wilson (1994). They found that people who expect a positive experience but actually experience a negative one, actively reinterpret the unexpectedly negative experience so that the retrospective report is (more) consistent with the initial (but disconfirmed) expectations. In one study, participants' expectations about how much they would enjoy their vacation were found to have an impact on their evaluations of their vacation. These evaluations were independent of how favourably they reported their actual vacation to be. In a second study, both expectations and actual pleasantness of an experience were manipulated. Results showed that, regardless of whether the actual experience was pleasant or not, the induction of favourable expectations caused people to evaluate the actual experience more favourably. Moreover, people reported greater willingness to repeat the experience by participating in the study again. These results suggest that people who expect a positive experience actively reinterpret unexpected negative experiences. They tend to judge and interpret these experiences in such a way that their retrospective reports of these experiences are more consistent with the initial expectations.

Biased recall of initial expectations. Another way of reducing the intensity of disappointment is by biasing the recall of what was initially expected. This can be obtained by simply forgetting the initial expectation, and removing it as a basis for evaluation. Similarly, people may question the validity of their initial expectation. For example, people may argue that their initial expectation was perhaps too optimistic, and adjust their expectation retrospectively in such a way that the discrepancy between the obtained outcome and their expectation is smaller. The smaller the discrepancy between outcome and expectation, the less intense any ensuing disappointment.

Shifting the standard of comparison. Another way of reinterpreting outcomes is by shifting the standard of comparison. People can reduce the disappointment of disconfirmed expectations by shifting the standard against which attained outcomes are evaluated. Armor and Taylor (1998) propose several ways in which people can employ this strategy. First, they may select a worse-off social comparison target. This enables an individual to maintain a belief that his or her current status is not as bad as other (more objective) standards might suggest. A second way of shifting standards involves the generation of counterfactuals (imagined alternatives to reality; see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; see also Chapter 7). One can feel good about one's current outcome (despite a failure to meet initial expectations) if one compares the outcome with an even worse situation that could have occurred (see also Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993).

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Adopt a 'silver lining' strategy. People may also employ a 'silver lining' strategy in order to reduce the intensity of disappointment. This strategy involves focusing on the beneficial aspects of a bad situation. Instead of focusing on the discrepancy between expectations and actual outcomes, people may focus on the lessons they have learned from the experience. This 'silver lining' strategy may avert disappointment because it directs attention away from disappointment, thereby reducing its magnitude. Furthermore, reframing a disappointing outcome can emphasise the lessons obtained from the experience, and this may reduce the intensity of disappointment (cf. Armor & Taylor, 1998).

Putting the outcome into perspective. A fifth way of reducing the intensity of disappointment is putting the outcome into perspective. For example, when confronted with an outcome that was less than expected, people could argue that the outcome was not that important anyway, because there are other even more important things in life. By derogating the importance of an (unobtained) outcome, any experienced emotion in reaction to this outcome is likely to be less intense.

In sum, we suggest that the aversiveness of disappointment can lead people to either avoid or reduce disappointment and that they have various ways of doing so. It should be added that the above-mentioned strategies are not necessarily employed consciously or deliberately, so people may not be aware that they employ such strategies. In Study 8.1 we investigate which strategies people know they use in order to avoid or reduce disappointment and how frequently they use the strategies described above. In Study 8.2 we address in more detail one particular strategy of avoiding disappointment, that of lowering expectations. W e examine the role of self-relevant feedback and the temporal proximity of the feedback on expectations.

STUDY 8.1 Avoiding and Reducing Disappointment

In the present study we investigate which strategies people use in order to avoid the experience of disappointment or to reduce its intensity. We examined this issue by asking participants in an open-ended response format which strategies they generally use in their lives to avoid and to reduce disappointment. Furthermore, we asked people to what extent they use the 'avoiding' strategies of: (a) lowering expectations, and (b) having global expectations. Furthermore, we asked people to what extent they use the five strategies described above to reduce the intensity of disappointment; namely: (a) biased perception of what has been obtained, (b) biased recall of the initial expectation, (c) shifting the standard of comparison, (d) adopting a 'silver lining' strategy, and (e) putting the outcome into perspective.

Method

Participants and Design The sample consisted of 102 university students (51 students at the University of Amsterdam and 51 students at Eindhoven University of Technology). Participants were presented with a booklet that consisted of two open-ended and 20 closed-ended questions concerning their own experiences of disappointment. Since disappointment can vary in intensity, we decided to explicitly ask questions about both intense and less intense

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disappointment. Half of the participants were asked to think about one or more experiences of intense disappointment. The remaining participants were asked to think about experiences of less intense disappointment.

Procedure and Measures First, participants were asked two open-ended questions concerning the reduction and avoidance of disappointment. Specifically, they were asked: "If you are feeling disappointed, how would you reduce this feeling?" and "If you want to avoid disappointment beforehand, how would you do this?" Next, participants were asked 20 closed-ended questions concerning the extent to which they used different ways of avoiding and reducing disappointment. These 20 questions consisted of 10 statements describing three ways of avoiding and seven ways of reducing disappointment (see Table 8.1). Each statement was followed by two questions about the appropriateness' and effectiveness of the strategy described in the statement. Responses to the appropriateness questions were made on a 9-point scale labelled (I) not at all appropriate to (9) very appropriate. Responses to the effectiveness questions were made on a 9-point scale labelled (I) not at all effective to (9) very effective.

Results and Discussion

First, we discuss the results concerning the closed-ended questions, followed by the results from the open-ended questions. Analyses did not reveal significant differences between intense and less intense disappointment in terms of prevalence of the various strategies: multivariate differences between the two intensities of disappointment were not significant, both for the avoidance and reduction statements, as well as for the appropriateness and effectiveness questions, Fs < 1.70, ns. As a consequence, the intensity factor was ignored in further analyses. Mean ratings concerning the appropriateness and effectiveness of the strategies are shown in Table 8.1. Means for the appropriateness items and effectiveness items for both the avoiding and reduction strategies were (separately) compared using paired-sample t-tests.2

Results showed that for avoiding disappointment the items "If I'm looking forward to something nice, I always take into account that it may not happen" and the item "With important matters, I always have very global expectations, in this way I will always obtain something" received the highest appropriateness scores. The second item referring to lowering expectations ("I expect the worst, so I will never be confronted with severe disappointments") received somewhat lower ratings. This could be due to the rather more extreme formulation of the item.

Results showed that for reducing the intensity of disappointment the item concerning adopting a 'silver lining' strategy and the item involving a strategy of biasing the perception of what has been obtained received the highest appropriateness scores. The two items capturing a strategy of shifting the standard of comparison received the next highest scores. The other strategies were judged to be less appropriate. The item "When I want something very much and it turns out badly, I forget what I initially wanted" received the

' Appropriateness of a statement means the extent to which the statement applies to the respondent. " Required significance levels were adjusted from .05 for the number of t-tests (Bonferroni-Holm correction; cf. Holm, 1979). This resulted in a p-value of .016 for the avoidance strategies, and a p-value of .0023 for the reduction strategies.

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lowest score. This could indicate that people use this strategy to a lesser extent, or that they are least aware of the use of this strategy. Results concerning the effectiveness of the strategies for avoiding and reducing disappointment showed a similar pattern to the one assessed with the appropriateness questions. This indicates that people use those conscious strategies that they perceive as most effective.

Table 8.1. Mean Ratings of Appropriateness and Effectiveness of Strategies for Avoiding and Reducing Disappointment (Study 8.1)

Strategies Appropriate Effective

Avoiding Strategies

Lowering expectations If I am looking forward to something nice, I always take into

account that it may not happen. 5.00a 5.41a

I expect the worst, so I will never be confronted with severe disappointments. 4.08b 4.48b

Global expectations With important matters I always have very global

expectations, in this way I always obtain something. 4.76a>b 5. l6a-b

Reducing Strategies

Biased perception of what has been obtained When an event is disappointing, I interpret it in such a way

that it is not that bad. 6.28b 6.54a

Biased recall of what was initially expected When I want something very much and it turns out badly,

I forget what I initially wanted. 3. | of 3.42^ When I expect something positive and it does not happen,

I try to comfort myself by thinking that I expected too much. 4.93d>e 4.88c

Shifting the standard of comparison When I perform badly, I compare myself to others

who performed even worse. S^C 'd 4.85b 'c

If something goes wrong, I often think: "It could have been worse" 5.83b>c 5.71 b

Adopting a 'silver lining strategy When something does not work out, I think:

"At least I learned something from it." 7.03a 7. I2 a

Putting the outcome into perspective If I want something very much and it does not happen,

I often think: "it was not that important after all." 4.25e 4.23c 'd

Note. A l l questions were answered on 9-point scales, appropriately labelled at each endpoint . Higher scores refer t o increased appropriateness or effectiveness. Means for the avoidance strategies w i th a di f ferent superscript differ significantly (ps < .01). Means for the reduct ion strategies w i th a di f ferent superscript differ significantly (ps < .002).

Answers to the open-ended questions concerning the avoidance of disappointment were coded by two independent judges as belonging to one of the two strategies, which were also included in the closed-ended questions, that is, lowering expectations and having global expectations. Answers that could not be categorised into one of these two strategies were coded separately (inter-rater agreement was 95%; disagreements were resolved by

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discussion). Results showed that most responses fell into the lowering expectations category (see Table 8.2). None of the open-ended responses referred to having global expectations. The remaining responses referred mostly to two other strategies. First, respondents mentioned investing (extra) effort in obtaining an outcome as a strategy they use in order to avoid disappointment. This strategy is comparable to the strategy described earlier as "trying to live up to expectations." Second, respondents mentioned avoiding a (possibly disappointing) situation as a strategy of avoiding the experience of disappointment.

Answers to the open-ended questions concerning the reduction of the intensity of disappointment were also categorised in terms of the different strategies discussed earlier. Answers that could not be categorised as belonging to any one of the five strategies were coded separately (inter-rater agreement was 95%; disagreements were resolved by discussion). Results showed that a large proportion of responses referred to a strategy of "doing something different/nice" (see Table 8.2). The second most frequently mentioned strategy was "putting the outcome into perspective." Other frequently mentioned strategies were "adopting a silver lining," and "talking about it."

Table 8.2. Number of Responses for Strategies to avoid or reduce Disappointment (Study 8.1)

Strategies Number of Responses (%)

Avoidance of disappointment Lowering expectations Investing (extra) effort Avoiding the situation

Reduction of disappointment Doing something different/nice Putting the outcome into perspective Silver lining Talking about it

59 (60%) 34 (34%)

6 (6%)

61 (47%) 39 (30%) 17 (13%) 13 (10%)

Note. Participants could indicate more than one strategy to avoid or reduce disappointment.

Results showed that people indicated strategies of avoiding and reducing disappointment other than the ones addressed in the closed-ended questions. One such strategy of avoiding disappointment was investing more effort beforehand. As described earlier, this strategy is comparable to the strategy described as "trying to live up to expectations." Investing more effort can lower the chances of becoming disappointed; however, as shown in Chapter 6, investing more effort also raises the intensity of disappointment when a desired outcome is eventually not obtained. This strategy could therefore be risky: on the one hand it lowers the probability of disappointment; on the other hand it increases the intensity of any ensuing disappointment.

Results also revealed some other interesting findings concerning the strategies that can help to reduce the intensity of disappointment. First, the most frequently mentioned way of reducing disappointment was a strategy in which people do something different or something nice. Although this strategy was not mentioned by Armor and Taylor (1998), our results showed that people report using this quite frequently. Doing something different enables people to distract their attention from the disappointing event. This could be related to the literature on coping styles. For instance, people who adopt a blunting

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coping style distract themselves from threat-relevant cues or information (Miller, 1981). Doing something nice not only distracts from the disappointing event, but could also compensate the negative feeling of disappointment with possible positive feelings experienced when doing something nice. Another frequently mentioned strategy was talking about the disappointing experience. This strategy could be viewed as social sharing of emotion (Rimé, Philippot, Boca, & Mesquita, 1992).

One way of avoiding disappointment that received relatively high scores on the appropriateness and effectiveness questions was lowering expectations. This was also mentioned most often in response to the open-ended question. In Study 8.2 we address this strategy in more detail. Lowering one's initial expectations reduces the chances of becoming disappointed. The lower one's expectation, the smaller the chance that this expectation exceeds an obtained outcome and hence the smaller the chance of getting disappointed. As described above, whether or not individuals lower their expectations about desirable outcomes seems to be a function of at least two conditions: (a) whether self-relevant feedback is anticipated, and (b) the temporal proximity of self-relevant feedback.

In Study 8.2 we investigate these proposed conditions for lowering expectations. W e hypothesise that people lower their expectations concerning a desired outcome when they expect to be confronted with self-relevant feedback about this outcome. When people do not expect to be confronted with self-relevant feedback, there is no possibility of becoming disappointed and therefore no motivation to lower expectations. Moreover, we hypothesise that lowering expectations is only a useful strategy for avoiding disappointment if the self-relevant feedback is anticipated in the near future, that is, when the possibility of becoming disappointed is nearby, and therefore relevant.

STUDY 8.2 Avoiding Disappointment

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a study in which psychology students took a test described as a strong predictor of future success in a career in psychology (Self-relevant) or in law (Self-irrelevant). Half the participants were told that they would receive their test score at the end of the experimental session (Immediate feedback); the other half were told that they would receive their result in about two weeks (Delayed feedback). Participants estimated their test score at two points during the session: Time I, immediately after completing the task; and Time 2, at the end of the session. For the participants in the Immediate feedback condition Time 2 was just before they received feedback on their test score. For the participants in the Delayed feedback condition, Time 2 was about two weeks before they received feedback on their test score. W e expected that only the participants who received self-relevant feedback in the near future would lower their estimates concerning their test score. More specifically, we predicted that participants in the Self-relevant/lmmediate feedback condition would lower their estimates ratings from Time I to Time 2 to a greater extent than would participants in the other three conditions.

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Method

Participants and Design

Psychology students at the University of Amsterdam (N = 80) participated in this study, which was part of a large test session. Participants were seated in separate cubicles. They were randomly assigned to one of 2 (Self-relevant vs. Self-irrelevant) x 2 (Immediate feedback vs. Delayed feedback) conditions of the factorial design. Time of measurement was a within-subjects factor. There were 20 participants in each condition. One student was excluded because it appeared that this student studied law rather than psychology.

Procedure and Measures First, participants were presented with a 'career questionnaire.' The two relevant questions were: "How important do you find a career as a psychologist?" and "How important do you find a career as a lawyer?" Both questions could be answered on a 9-point scale labelled (I) not at all to (9) very much. These two questions were embedded in questions concerning the importance of a career as a chemist, physicist, and economist. Next, participants were presented with an 'intuitive intelligence test.' They were told that: "This research is concerned with the evaluation of a new intelligence test, that is, the intuitive intelligence test. We are interested in how you evaluate this new test. First, we would like you to complete the test and after the test you will receive a questionnaire intended to evaluate the test." The introduction of the questionnaire varied across conditions. Participants in the two Self-relevant conditions read the following introduction:

The test you have just done is an intuitive intelligence test. Intuitive intelligence is especially important for quick and accurate responses in a wide variety of situations. One could describe it as a kind of direct, immediate intelligence. Research has shown that this kind of intelligence is especially relevant for psychologists; they work with a lot of people and often have to respond quickly and accurately. Research has shown that there is a high correlation between the score on the intuitive intelligence test and success in a career in psychology.

In the two Self-irrelevant conditions, participants were told that the test was especially relevant for lawyers. Furthermore, participants in the two Immediate feedback conditions were told that they would receive their test score in an envelope at the end of the test session . Participants in the two Delayed feedback conditions were told that they would receive their score at the end of the study, which would be in about two weeks. These participants were asked to write their name and address on an envelope.

The questionnaire consisted of 14 questions, including the dependent variable. First, participants were asked: "What percentage of answered questions do you think you answered correctly?" Participants could answer by marking a point on a 100 mm line, labelled 0% at the one endpoint and 100% at the other. The remaining 13 questions were filler items requesting information about the test. Examples of these questions are: "What do you think about the layout of the test?", "To what extent did you find the questions difficult?", and "To what extent did you enjoy the questions?" All these questions could be answered by marking a point on a 100 mm line appropriately labelled at each endpoint.

In order to obtain two "independent" estimates of the percentage of correct answers over time, the questionnaire was constructed in such a way that after participants answered the

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first question (percentage of correct answers) they were confronted with a page that consisted of questions concerning a 'group A' and a 'group B.' Thus, after participants gave their estimates concerning their test score, they were presented with questions they could not answer. After discovering this 'mistake' participants typically warned the experimenter, who told them that "probably something went wrong while copying the questionnaires." The experimenter told the participants that a new questionnaire would be given. Because the questionnaires were somewhere else in the building, participants were asked to continue with another questionnaire. They were given an unrelated filler task, which took about 30 minutes. After this task participants received the 'evaluation' questionnaire for the second time. This questionnaire contained the same 14 questions (this time the 'wrong page' was left out). The first question assessed (for the second time) participants' estimates concerning their test score. After finishing the questionnaire, participants in the two Immediate feedback conditions received a bogus test score in a sealed envelope. These test scores indicated that they belonged to the best 10%, 20%, or 30% (randomly determined) of the tested population. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and fully debriefed.

Results

First, we investigated whether our participants found a career in psychology more important than a career in law. Overall, participants found a career as a psychologist significantly more important than a career as a lawyer, M(psychologist) = 65.6, M(lawyer) = 27.2, t(78) = I 1.56, p < .001. More importantly, to test whether a career as a psychologist was seen as important in the two Self-relevant conditions, and a career as a lawyer was seen as unimportant in the two Self-irrelevant conditions, ratings of importance were tested against the midpoint of the scale. Analyses revealed that in the Self-relevant conditions importance ratings for a career as a psychologist were significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, M = 68.92, t(38) = 5.36, p < .001. By contrast, in the Self-irrelevant conditions importance ratings for a career as a lawyer were significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale, M = 25.18, t(38) = 6.26, f» < .001.

Recall that we predicted that participants in the Immediate/Self-relevant feedback condition would lower their estimates from Time I to Time 2 to a greater extent than would participants in the other conditions. As can be seen from the scores in Table 8.3, participants in the Immediate/Self-relevant feedback condition became less optimistic in their estimates over time, t(l9) = 2.45, p < .05. Participants in the other conditions did not change their estimates, ts < I, ns.

Table 8.3. Expectations as a Function of Self-Relevance and Time of Feedback (Study 8.2)

Feedback

Immediate Delayed

Self-relevance 71 72 71 72

Self-relevant

Self-irrelevant

58.3a

58.1

5l .5b

56.3

63.7

61.0

63.2

60.6

Note. Entries are mean estimates of percentage of correct answers; scores could range from 0 to 100. Means per condition that have a different superscript differ significantly, p < .05.

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An analysis of covariance was performed using estimates at Time 2 as the dependent variable, Self-relevant and Feedback as the independent variables, and estimates at Time I as a covariate. Controlling for initial estimates, participants in the Immediate feedback conditions lowered their estimates over time more than participants in the Delayed feedback conditions, F(l, 78) = 4.10, p < .05. No significant main effect was found for Self-relevant condition, F(l, 78) = 1.10, ns. Also, no significant interaction effect was found for Feedback by Self-relevant, F(l, 78) = 1.42, ns. Next, we compared the differences between estimates at Time I and Time 2 for the participants in the Self-relevant/lmmediate feedback condition with the differences for the participants in the other conditions. Analysis revealed a significant effect, the difference between Time I and Time 2 being greater for participants in the Self-relevant/lmmediate feedback condition than for the participants in the other three conditions, t(75) = 2.17, p < .05.

In sum, our results show that people lower their estimates when confronted with an uncertain outcome. People tend to lower their expectations concerning an outcome when two conditions are met. First, they have to be confronted with self-relevant feedback about the outcome. People are more likely to lower expectations when these can be disconfirmed. Second, the self-relevant feedback should be anticipated in the near future.

GENERAL D I S C U S S I O N

In this chapter we investigated ways of avoiding disappointment and ways of reducing the intensity of disappointment. In Study 8.1 we showed that people tend to use several strategies in order to avoid or to reduce disappointment. Combining the results of the open-ended and closed-ended questions suggests that the most frequently used strategy of avoiding disappointment is lowering expectations. That 60% of our participants mentioned this strategy in response to the open-ended question suggests that people are quite aware that they use this strategy. Another frequently mentioned strategy for avoiding disappointment was investing (extra) effort in obtaining a desired outcome. We argue that these strategies differ in one important respect, namely in their appropriateness to specific situations. Investing (extra) effort is only useful when the effort increases the probability of obtaining a desired outcome and therefore decreases the probability of disappointment. Investing effort is therefore only appropriate when people are confronted with a situation in which something can be done about obtaining the desired outcome. Examples are taking an exam or going for a job interview. In these situations investing extra effort in preparation can increase the probability of passing the exam or performing well in the job interview, and therefore decrease the probability of disappointment. Lowering expectations is most appropriate in situations when nothing can be done about the outcome or performance, but people have not (yet) been provided with feedback about an outcome or performance. Examples are the period after taking an exam or job interview, but before feedback is provided on the result of the exam or job interview. Lowering expectations decreases or eliminates the discrepancy between expectations and a possible negative outcome, and therefore decreases the probability of disappointment.

Results concerning strategies for reducing the intensity of disappointment indicate that people use a variety of strategies. In response to the closed-ended questions, people gave the highest ratings to a strategy of adopting a 'silver lining.' People confronted with a disappointing situation tend to focus on its beneficial aspects. Other strategies for reducing

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disappointment that received relatively high ratings were those of interpreting an event in such a way that it is not that bad (biasing the perception of what has been obtained) and shifting the standard of comparison. This last strategy can involve both comparing one's outcome to the poorer outcomes of other people, or comparing one's outcome to a less favourable outcome that could also have been obtained. Responses to the open-ended questions revealed another important strategy that has been neglected by the literature. This concerned doing something different or doing something nice after a disappointing outcome. This strategy was the most frequently mentioned response to the open-ended question, suggesting that it may be an important way for people to reduce or compensate for disappointment. This strategy differs in an important respect from the strategies assessed in the closed-ended questions. Focusing on the beneficial aspects of a disappointing situation or interpreting the outcome in a more positive way are strategies that change the disappointing outcome in some way. By contrast, the strategy of doing something different or doing something nice could be regarded as a 'distraction' strategy.

In Study 8.2 we tested the hypothesis that people lower their expectations concerning the attainment of a desired outcome when two conditions are met. First, whether self-relevant feedback about the attainment of the outcome is anticipated and, second, whether this feedback is anticipated in the near future. Results support our hypothesis, showing that people lower their estimates only when the outcome is relevant for them and when they expect immediate feedback on their score. W e suggest that people lower their expectations as a pre-emptive attempt to regulate disappointment. That is, people may anticipate the disappointment they would feel if their expectations exceed their (actual) performance. As a consequence they reduce their expectations to minimise the possibility of performing worse than expected, and to avoid any ensuing disappointment. This suggestion is consistent with the findings of Study 8.1, in which people frequently mentioned that they use a strategy of lowering expectations in order to avoid disappointment.

Thus, people who wish to avoid or reduce disappointment (should they perform worse than expected), strategically lower their expectations. Other research (Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996) shows that people differ in the extent to which they engage in this strategy of lowering expectations. Shepperd et al. showed that self-esteem is an individual difference variable that determines the extent to which people lower their expectations. They suggest that people with low self-esteem respond more positively to favourable feedback and more negatively to unfavourable feedback than do people with high self-esteem. This greater reactivity to external positive and negative feedback on the part of people with low self-esteem may encourage them to lower their expectations. This line of reasoning is consistent with Blaine and Crocker (1993), who argued that successful affect regulation on the part of people low in self-esteem involves acknowledging the possibility of future negative outcomes by pre-emptively preparing for failure.

Anticipating disappointment can be regarded as functional when it leads to taking greater account of the possibility of disappointment and thereby reduce the intensity of disappointment because of lower expectations. Furthermore, the anticipation of disappointment can prompt people to intensify efforts to avoid an anticipated negative outcome. It needs to be added that when the anticipation of disappointment excludes hope, confidence, and optimism, it may be less functional. For example, anticipating disappointment may lead people to avoid situations or discourage them from taking

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behavioural action. The threat of disappointment could lead to the adoption of (maladaptive) coping styles to deal with this threat, such as fatalism, hopelessness, or avoidance (Rippetoe & Rogers, 1987). These coping styles can be seen as maladaptive because, avoidance not only eliminates the possibility of becoming disappointed, but also the possibility of experiencing elation. When the anticipation of disappointment leads to extremely low expectations people may also put less effort into obtaining the desired outcome, which is likely to increase the likelihood that the anticipated negative outcome occurs. Finally, when the anticipation of disappointment excludes hope, confidence, or optimism altogether, it may eventually even result in learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975). Thus, people have to find a balance between the motivating properties of high expectations and the self-protective properties of low expectations.3

3 This chapter is partly based on van Dijk, Zeelenberg, and van der Pligt (1999b).

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