Texas State University

Interpretations of Hobbesian Social Contract Theory

Dr. DeHart 5302C

Christian Marrero3-6-2014

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In his famous work Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes explicates his theory of how and why

man chooses to enter into civil society. Denying the metaphysics of Aristotle’s final causes-the

philosopher’s teleological approach towards human civilization-Hobbes instead claims that

human society and his construction of the Leviathan state is but “artificial man”1. This synthetic

civilization is to be ruled by an absolute sovereign, whose power stems from a social contract in

which subjects surrender the majority of their natural rights to a ruler in exchange for security.

By establishing an absolute sovereign, security is maintained and the integrity of the social

contract is guaranteed as so long as the sovereign does not compromise the lives of his subjects.

Jean Hampton argues that Hobbes’ social contract argument is invalid because of a flaw in

Hobbes’ psychology which denies the conditions necessary for absolute sovereignty; this

approach is defective due to Hampton misidentifying a contract as a coordinative agreement, a

contract when properly understood allows for absolute sovereignty. Hobbes’ social contract

allows for a commitment to obedience that is stronger than self-interest, circumvents the “free-

rider” problem, and allows for the complete alienation of rights as opposed to authorizing mere

agency.

Hobbes’ social contract theory must be understood within the contexts in

which such an agreement is made. By denying Aristotle’s teleological approach of the

development of civil society, Hobbes presents his reader with an alternative view on the growth

of the state. Instead of claiming that man naturally enters into civilization, our author instead

presents a theory where man chooses to enter into society through an agreement with his fellow

man for their mutual benefit. This due to conditions within what Hobbes describes as the state of

nature.

1 Thomas Hobbes and E. M. Curley, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668 (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1994), 3.

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Hobbes describes the state of nature-as specified in his title to chapter XIII of Leviathan-

as “…the Natural condition of Mankind”2. This is the world in which man lives in the absence of

a civil society to direct his action. An existence in which all men are equal to each other. A claim

that Hobbes holds to despite the physical differences between men, which he claims can be

easily nullified since “…the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret

machinations, or by confederacy with others that are in the same danger with himself.”3

In fact, the only difference among men within the state of nature claimed to by Hobbes

would be the natural differences of intelligence. He explains “For such is the nature of men that

howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty, or more eloquent, or more

learned, yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves. For they see their own

wit at hand, and other men’s at a distance.”4 Hobbes continues by describing how this leaves

man in essentially an egalitarian state since “…every man is contented with his share.”5

But these egalitarian conditions create very real problems in Hobbes’ state of nature. The

author continues by explaining how without civil society the notion of right or wrong, or the

conceptualization of justice as we may understand it does not exist. “To this war of every man

against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and

wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no

law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.”6 Without an

authority able to establish and promulgate notions of justice, who has the ability to arbitrate

between parties, humans exist in what is essentially a state of war. In such a condition

2 Ibid., 743 Ibid.4 Ibid., 755 Ibid.6 Ibid., 78

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…there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, no culture of the earth, no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, bruitish, and short.7

Man’s life within the state of nature does not allow for the development of any of man’s great

achievements. His focus instead is strictly on his own survival.

Recognizing the deficiencies of living under such conditions, and driven by passions

which “…incline men to peace [such as] fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to

commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them…”8 man chooses to enter into a

social contract.

This contract is established when individuals in the state of nature forfeit the majority of

their natural rights to a sovereign, effectively becoming his subjects. In Hobbes’ own words

…thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will, which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person, and everyone to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety, and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man…9

Here as Hobbes describes the basic terms of the social contract one sees that those individuals

within the state of nature are effectively giving full representative power to the sovereign,

including the power to make final judgments on behalf of the members of the Leviathan state.

7 Ibid., 768 Ibid., 789 Ibid., 109

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Continuing, Hobbes describes the commonwealth created by such a contract:

And in [the sovereign] consisteth the essence of the commonwealth, which (to define it) is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence.

And he that carrieth this person is called SOVEREIGN, and said to have sovereign power; and every one besides, his SUBJECT.10

By the mutual agreement of all the subjects the sovereign is authorized certain powers with the

intention that she will defend the peace and preservation of the commonwealth. The strength and

means of them all also include the majority of the subjects’ natural rights, which are forfeited to

the sovereign creating what is essentially an absolute sovereign power. “…the sovereign

power…is as great as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a

power men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is

perpetual war of every man against his neighbor, are much worse.”11 To deny the sovereign

absolute authority would allow for conditions that would unravel the Leviathan state, leaving the

commonwealth’s subjects back in the state of nature.

Under the rule of an absolute sovereign the life of man can be secured and allow for the

development of civil society. With the absolute sovereign as the final arbitrator of disputes, and

the fountainhead of all civil law and justice, the dangers of the state of nature-and the state of

war which accompanies it-are avoided. This agreement is thenceforth considered unbreakable

except under specific conditions.

The purpose of the social contract is to protect society from the inherent dangers to life

and limb present in the state of nature. As long as the sovereign is respecting the basic right to

10 IbId., 10911 Ibid., 135

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life, all other infractions against the subject are authorized. But here is found the limits of the

social contract’s authorization of force to the sovereign. Hobbes explains “…that covenants not

to defend a man’s own body are void. Therefore, if the sovereign command a man(though justly

condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that assault him, or to abstain

from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing without which he cannot live, yet hath that

man the liberty to disobey.”12 If the sovereign were to disrespect this right, then, and only then,

do the subjects of the Leviathan state hold the right of rebellion.

But in her article The Failure of Hobbes’s Social Contract Theory Jean Hampton argues

that Hobbes’ social contract theory is invalid because he fails to establish absolute sovereignty.

Hobbes’ theory claims that the subjects within the Leviathan state retain the right of rebellion

under the condition that the sovereign threaten their lives. This precludes that the subjects retain

the right to judge whether or not the sovereign’s commands are authorized by the terms of the

social contract. Under these circumstances the sovereign is not as Hobbes described, the final

arbitrator in the state. Without the ability to make final judgments within the Leviathan state, the

conditions for absolute sovereignty have not been met, therefore invalidating Hobbes’ social

contract argument.

Hampton begins her argument by first asking the reader to accept a number of ideas as

fact which she has defended in detail in a previous work. First is what she describes as

“Hobbes’s regress argument”13 which concludes that “…civil society must have a person with

unlimited decision and enforcement power at its helm: That person is called the sovereign, and

he has the power to decide all questions in the commonwealth, holding power permanently

12 Ibid., 141-14213 Jean Hampton, "The Failure of Hobbes's Social Contract Argument," in The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 43.

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insofar as he has the power to decide the most important question in the commonwealth, that is,

whether or not he should remain in power.”14 Hobbes does point to the importance of the

sovereign acting as the final arbitrator of disputes. “…he is judge of what is necessary for peace,

and judge of doctrines; his is sole legislator, and supreme judge of controversies…”15

Additionally, one truly authorizes a sovereign when she is willing to obey her commands

to punish another and do nothing to frustrate her power of enforcement. Only by supporting and

aiding in the sovereign’s harshest edicts-those of punishment-does the subject prove her

authorization of power to the sovereign. But the question then is posed, could such a sovereign

be authorized by a Hobbesian people?

According to Hobbes’ social contract theory, though the subjects of the Leviathan state

forfeit the majority of their rights, they cannot by the laws of nature surrender their lives to the

sovereign. Therefore, any command of the sovereign that would threaten the life of the subject

can be lawfully disobeyed. This creates real problems for Hampton, she contends that the people

essentially hold the power to decide whether or not the commands of the sovereign are

authorized by the conditions of the social contract. As Hampton explains

…because empowerment comes about only from obedience, why doesn’t this make the sovereign’s empowerment conditional on people’s determination that such obedience is rational? Yet, insofar as it does, they do not really empower a truly absolute sovereign at all, because there is no single permanent power to decide all questions and hence ensure peace among men.16

By retaining their ability to judge the sovereign’s actions, the people have denied the sovereign

absolute authority as the ultimate decision maker.

14 Ibid.15 Hobbes, 12816 Hampton, 44

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Hampton points to a number of examples within the text of Leviathan in which she feels

that Hobbes is admitting that the subjects within the commonwealth retain a right of judgment.

Among them Hobbes’ statement that “The obligation of subject to the sovereign is understood to

lasts as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them…The end

of obedience is protection…”17 This claim seems to point directly to subjects who have not

forfeited all of their rights to an absolute sovereign. Hampton claims that in order for the

sovereign to have absolute rule over her subjects she must in actuality exist in a master/slave

relationship with the people. The problem with the Hobbesian construct is that essentially “…

these “slaves” are continually deciding whether or not to let their master have the whip!”18

This relationship between sovereign and subject then cannot be considered one in which

a complete alienation of rights has occurred. At best it can be described as a loan from the people

as opposed to a permanent grant. Whenever the people feel that their self-preservation is in

jeopardy the sovereign can lose his punishment power. In fact, Hampton goes on to say that the

people essential have the ability to hire on or terminate the sovereign as they deem fit. As she

explains “…as long as people retain the right to preserve themselves in the commonwealth,

Hobbes is also forced to admit that there is really an agency relationship between people and

ruler, and this is exactly what he did not want to conclude in Leviathan.”19

This leads us back to Hobbes’ redress argument which Hampton then openly attacks

based on three major flaws. First, as stated before, the Hobbesian psychology of the subjects

within the Leviathan state allows them to retain what is essentially private judgments over the

sovereign’s commands. This to Hampton does not signal a contract, but an agency relationship

17 Hobbes, 14418 Hampton, 4919 Ibid., 50

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between the sovereign and the subjects. The nature of this relationship makes the creation of an

absolute sovereign impossible since the sovereign essentially answers to the people.

Furthermore, Hampton presses that though the subjects contract with each other, the

sovereign makes a contract with no one.20 Hobbes explains:

That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand is manifest, because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant, or he must make several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible, because as yet they are not one person; and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof is the act both of himself and of all the rest, because done in the person and by the right of every one of them in particular.21

Hobbes believed that any agency created commonwealth, that is, a commonwealth created by a

direct contract between the sovereign and the subjects which lacks an overarching authority to

enforce it, could not long survive. Individuals within the commonwealth will inevitably take it

upon themselves to decide whether or not the sovereign’s commands threaten their self-

preservation. It will then only be a matter of time until violence commences over whether or not

the sovereign is performing her role adequately.

Finally, when the subjects surrender their right to all things they are essentially bestowing

the sovereign with a property right. To snatch this right away from its new and legal owner is

considered an injustice in Hobbes’ view. But whether or not one accepts the subjective moral

argument here is irrelevant. The central point is that the subjects allow the sovereign to rule at

their pleasure.

20 Hobbes, 111-11221 Ibid.

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But if one does turn to the moral rhetoric taken up by Hobbes in this discussion, Hampton

expresses how “…given Hobbes’s subjectivist meta-ethics and his analysis of the validity of the

laws of nature, that moral tone is completely out of place in his argument, and actually signals

that argument’s failure.”22 Pronouncing a moral judgment regarding the ability of the subject to

retake certain rights from the sovereign is contradictory to Hobbes’ previously expressed views.

Hampton concludes by showing how her attempt to define ‘authorization’ effectively

concluded in the subject not surrendering power to the sovereign, she simply loans power to her.

Hobbes characterizes authorization as surrender in an attempt to appear unfailing in his

understanding of absolute sovereignty. But when these two concepts are shown to be

inconsistent, Hobbes’ political argument is proved to be invalid.

Hampton’s position is built on the premise that what Hobbes refers to as the social

contract is no contract at all and that Hobbes’ alienation is instead a form of agency. From her

position what occurs amongst the individuals entering into Hobbes’ artificial man can instead be

understood as a self-interested agreement. This is a convention in which the subject gives agency

to the sovereign so long as she protect the lives of the subjects.

But to read Hobbes’ social contract as a self-interested agreement is to misunderstand

Leviathan’s author. David Gauthier in Hobbes' Social Contract instead defines a contract as “…

exchanges of intentions to act that introduce or replace each party’s motivation to attain the true

objective of the agreement.”23 By using this definition of contract, Hobbes’ social contract takes

on more than just the qualities of a self-interested agreement between parties. With the exchange

22 Hampton, 5423 David Gauthier, "Hobbes' Social Contract," in The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 61.

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of intentions to act as opposed to self-driven motivation, the temptation to refer to the social

contract as a self-interested agreement is removed.

This conceptualization of the social contract as a self-interested agreement also fails due

to how Hobbes himself prohibits any sort of direct covenant between the sovereign and the

subjects. “…because the right of bearing the person of them all is given to him they make

sovereign by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen

no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any

pretense of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection.”24 The social contract does not lay

between the subject and the sovereign, but amongst the subjects alone. The sovereign exists as a

tool for the utility of the social contract. Hobbes’ absolute sovereign acts as an enforcement tool,

not as a part of the objective of the contract.

For even if we suppose that everyone keeps this covenant for purely self-interested reasons, yet these reasons stem, not simply from the concern to achieve the primary objective of agreement, peace and security, but rather from the power of the sovereign, a supplementary incentive called into play, and indeed created, by the agreement itself. The institution of a sovereign is not the primary objective of agreement, or part of this objective. Were mere agreement on conditions of peace sufficient-were the covenant a purely coordinative agreement-then a sovereign enforcer would be not merely unnecessary, but positively undesirable.25

Hampton seems to overlook that the point of the agreement is the peace and security of all those

within the Leviathan state, not just individual self-interest. The person of the sovereign falls

within this context as a necessary evil needed to maintain these ideal conditions. To view the

social contract as a coordinative agreement defined by individual self-interest is incorrect.

Hampton also contended that the redress argument allowed for the subjects to retain their

private judgments which conflicted with absolute sovereignty. But this interpretation of

24 Hobbes, 11125 Gauthier, 62

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authorization in the social contract does not need to be accepted. One could argue that Hobbes’

psychology can be understood differently. Hobbes states that:

…the sovereign [has] the right of judicature, that is to say, of hearing and deciding all controversies which may arise concerning law (either civil or natural) or concerning fact. For without the decision of controversies there is no protection of one subject against the injuries of another, the laws concerning meum and tuum are in vain, and to every man remaineth, from the natural and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himself by his private strength, which is the condition of war, and contrary to the end for which every commonwealth is instituted.26

Hampton’s argument stands if you agree that adherence to the social contract allows for subjects

to make judgment calls in each particular situation, but Hobbes does not give the subjects such

license. Instead each subject must support the sovereign even under conditions in which the

individual may be placed in danger. He must understand that actions that will allow for the peace

and security of the Leviathan are authorized by the social contract.

If each subject decides whether or not to obey by considering whether to not, in each particular situation, obedience is to his own interest or advantage, then private appetite remains the measure of good and evil, and the sovereign will be unable to elicit the degree of obedience requisite for him to bring about and maintain peace. Each subject must realize that his prospect of living securely and at peace with his fellows is maximized if he is committed to offering active support to the sovereign, even when giving that support is not itself maximally conducive to his peace and security.27

Any interpretation of Hobbes that contradicts such an understanding of authorization will

inevitably end in a psychology dependent on self-interest which will not allow for an absolute

sovereign.

But such interpretations are essential erroneous in their contradiction of Hobbes’ own

pronouncements. The protection of self-interest alone is necessary but not sufficient in justifying

rebellion against the sovereign. The subject must show that the command is not only against his

26 Hobbes, 11427 Ibid., 67

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self-interest (that of survival), but that the command proves not to have utility in maintaining the

conditions of the social contract. Hobbes explains that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himself or any other man; and consequently, that the obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the command of the sovereign, to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office, dependeth not on the words of our submission, but on the intention, which is to be understood by the end thereof. When, therefore, our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse…And when the defense of the commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, every one is obliged, because otherwise the institution of the commonwealth, which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve, was in vain.28

Natural law’s prescription to avoid personal harm is extended to the members of the

commonwealth as one of the few rights retained by the subjects. Since the very purpose of the

commonwealth is peace and preservation, any action done against this purpose is a violation of

one of the few natural laws retained by the citizens; therefore against the terms of the contract. In

such cases the subjects hold a right to rebellion. This right does not extend though to conditions

in which the very survival of the commonwealth is at stake. Since the purpose of the contract is

peace and preservation, the subjects are required under the terms of the social contract to do

everything necessary to preserve the Leviathan.

Hobbes does not ever explain that living under the absolute sovereignty of the Leviathan

state would not come without its inconveniences or dangers, instead he claims that it is still many

times more advantages to live under the absolute sovereignty of the Leviathan than to suffer the

condition of perpetual war found in the state of nature.

And though of so unlimited a power men may fancy many evil consequences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences; but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but what proceeds from the subject’s disobedience and

28 Ibid., 143

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breach of those covenants from which the commonwealth hath its being. And whosoever, thinking sovereign power too great, will seek to make it less, must subject himself to the power that can limit it, that is to say, to a greater.29

Life in the commonwealth through agreement to the social contract does not remove all of life’s

impediments and inconveniences for the subject. It is the surrendering of certain liberties in

exchange for security. This does not remove the responsibility to actively assist the sovereign in

his attempt to maintain peace. “…no man can thence infer that a particular man has more liberty,

or immunity from the service of the commonwealth, there than in Constantinople.”30 The real

inconveniences and dangers occur when the subjects disobey the sovereign, effectively

preferring the state of nature over the security found in the Leviathan.

Hampton also points to what may be called the “free-rider” problem which effects

subjects as they attempt to aid the sovereign in fulfilling his punishment commands.

…we argue that one authorizes a sovereign when one obeys his commands to punish others and, in general, when one does nothing to frustrate his enforcement powers. We found, however, that there had to be one big exception to any person’s willingness to support the sovereign’s punishment efforts in the commonwealth: One could never willingly obey the sovereign’s command to punish oneself, insofar as doing so would endanger one’s self-preservation, Hobbes must grant that each human being will “surrender” her punishment powers to the sovereign only insofar as doing so will not endanger her life. Thus, according to Hobbes, each human being carries with her into the commonwealth a “self-defense” right. But if she does, is the resulting ruler a genuine sovereign? Does he still have the power to decide all questions in the commonwealth? Does he still reign permanently?

If the individual retains a right to self-defense even in cases of guilt then any subject sent to

punish them is placed in mortal danger. The question becomes, does this authorize the individual

to rebel against the sovereign’s command?

29 Ibid., 13530 Ibid., 140

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Hampton, based on her understanding that the social contract as a self-interested

agreement would answer in the affirmative. For such a command to be acceptable under the

terms of the social contract would require that said action would provide a greater utility to the

small group charged with enforcement than it would provide for the society as a whole.

Following the command in this case requires that two conditions to be met in order to comply

with the provisions of Hampton’s self-interested agreement. First, each individual’s contribution

must be shown necessary to increasing the peace and preservation of the state. Secondly, the

sovereign must show a benefit to the small group asked to perform the dangerous task which is

over and above the benefit it provides to society. These being necessary to prove that the group’s

actions are both absolutely necessary for peace and preservation and personally advantageous.

Without this incentive to act, any member of this enforcement group can easily instead choose to

be a “free-rider”. By allowing someone else to put their lives in danger, they still gain the same

benefit as would be incurred if they did the dangerous task themselves. Gauthier comments:

Can the sovereign provide his subjects with peace and security, if he may expect their active assistance only when the good to be provided is so much greater than the cost of providing? Surely not. The sovereign cannot motivate the members of a small group voluntarily to provide a non-excludable public good…unless it offers a net benefit to the small group alone. And such goods will not suffice for peace and security. Hobbes has no general solution to the free-rider problem that confronts a sovereign in need of the active assistance of his subjects, if we assume…that each subject will decide whether to assist the sovereign by a direct appeal to her overall self-interest.31

There can be no justification for placing oneself in mortal danger in order to punish another party

if self-interest is prioritized over all other considerations within the state.

But an understanding of contract which reflects the intention to act as opposed to self-

driven motivation allows for a psychology more accepting of the sovereign’s dangerous

commands. Under this conceptualization of contract, the subject is made to understand by the 31 Gauthier, 64-65

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terms of the covenant that though their actions may place them in mortal danger, but there is a

greater utility in their actions which positively effects the overall peace and preservation of the

Leviathan. If this increased utility is not present, that is, if the contribution of the small group

will not promote peace and preservation, then the citizen may invoke her right to rebellion.

Hampton also claims that the alienation social contract theory is false, and that what is

truly established by Hobbes’ contract is an agency theory. In her eyes, the subjects allow the

sovereign to rule on their behalf, as their agent. In this way sovereignty is removed any time that

the subjects feel the sovereign’s rule is no longer aligned with the conditions of the social

contract. But as Gauthier states “The issue is not whether the sovereign is the agent of his

subjects, but whether he is only their agent.”32 In order to show that the sovereign is more than

just an agent one can again turn to Hobbes for direction. Leviathan’s author explains that when

one enters into the social contract they are essentially stating: “I authorize and give up my right

of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up

thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner.”33 The act of giving authorization

in this context is effectively that of surrendering rights, including the right of judgment, to the

sovereign. Without an alienation social contract theory designed to defend an absolute sovereign

neither complete nor permanent power can be established.

Jean Hampton presents the reader with an argument against the validity of Hobbes’ social

contract theory. She believes that the condition of absolute sovereignty cannot be reached by the

subjects of the Leviathan primarily because the social contract acts in practice as a coordinative

agreement based on self-interest. This interpretation of Hobbes’ contract allows for a psychology

to develop in the minds of subjects which is antithetical to the terms of the contract. Specifically

32 Ibid., 6833 Hobbes, 109

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such a mindset will not allow for the full authorization of the sovereign since subjects effectively

retain the right of personal judgment in deciding whether or not a command is contrary to their

self-preservation. This focus on self-interest also gives traction to the “free-rider” problem when

the sovereign issues punishment commands. Such an understanding of Hobbes’ contract also

essentially reduces the social contract to an agency theory. If one instead defines a contract as

exchanges of intentions to act that introduce or replace each party’s motivation to attain the true

objective of the agreement the self-interest component is stripped from the social contract. Under

such conditions absolute sovereignty can be established with the sovereign retaining her right as

final arbitrator of the state. The “free-rider” problem is avoided since the peace and prosperity of

the Leviathan overrides personal safety. The contract itself also cannot be viewed as a mere

agency agreement since in each subject’s authorization of the sovereign is a complete surrender

of natural rights. Without such an alienation social contract theory Hobbes’ theory would not

stand, but to interpret the contract and the authorization of the sovereign differently is to have

misunderstood Hobbes’ position.

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Bibliography

Gauthier, David. "Hobbes' Social Contract." In The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 59-71. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Hampton, Jean. "The Failure of Hobbes's Social Contract Argument." In The Social Contract

Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, 41-57. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999.

Hobbes, Thomas, and E. M. Curley. Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of

1668. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1994.