vandenabeele - on the notion of disinterestedness

8/20/2019 Vandenabeele - On the Notion of Disinterestedness

1/17

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On the Notion of "Disinterestedness": Kant, Lyotard, and SchopenhauerAuthor(s): Bart VandenabeeleSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 705-720Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654335Accessed: 18-05-2015 16:42 UTC

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2/17

n t h e

o t i o n o

Dsinterestedness

K a n t

Lyo ta rd

n d

chopenhauer

Bart Vandenabeele

The

strange

hing,

on

looking

back,

was the

purity,

he

integrity,

of

her

feeling

for

Sally.

It

was

not like

one's

feeling

for

a

man.

It

was

com-

pletely

disinterested,

nd

besides,

it had

a

quality

which

could

only

exist

between

women,

between women

ust

grown

up.

-Virginia

Woolf,

Mrs.

Dalloway

If

the

genuine

aesthetic

experience

exists

empirically-and

it does-then

the definitionof its specific qualityis at the coreof anyaesthetictheorythat is

concernedwith

the

particularity

f aesthetic

appreciation.

irstly,

shall

attempt

to

provide

an

acceptable

nterpretation

f this

extremely

ntricate ssue

in

Kant

and,

moreover,

question

the

interpretation

f

two

philosophers-Lyotard

and

Schopenhauer-who

both

struggled

with

the

notion of

"disinterestedness"

nd

provided

a

highly original

(but

often

misunderstood)

nterpretation

f

it

in their

own

aesthetic

theories.

I

shall

argue

that

Lyotard

ook

for

granted

omething

n

Kant's

aesthetics that

Schopenhauer's

aesthetic

theory

tries

to

resolve,

that

is,

the

wide

gap

between

the

agreeable

andthe

charming

on

one

side,

and

the

beau-

tiful on theother.

Kant:

Disinterestedness

nd

Existence

The first

moment of

Kant's

Analytic

of the Beautiful

asserts

that

our

liking

in

the

beautiful

cannot

originate

rom

any

interest

and

that

in

the

beautiful

"we

are not

compelled

to

give

our

approval

by any

interest,

whether

of

sense

or of

reason"

?

5,

52).'

But

Kant

also insists

thatthe

liking

in the

beautiful

does

not

create

any

interest

n

the

object

either.

Kant,

Critiqueof

Judgment,

r

Werner

S.

Pluhar

Indianapolis,

1987),

references

to

the

section

numbers

and

pagination

of

the Pluhar

edition.

705

Copyright

001

by

Journal

f the

History

f

Ideas,

nc.


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3/17

706

Bart

Vandenabeele

What

may

this

mean?As Kant

asserts

n

the

beginning

of section

5,

it means

that

"a

judgment

of

taste

is

merely

contemplative,

.e.,

it

is a

judgment

that is

indifferent o the

existence

of the

object [indifferent

n

Ansehung

des Daseins

eines

Gegenstandes]:

t

[considers]

he

character

f

the

object

only by

holding

t

upto ourfeelingof pleasureanddispleasure nurseine Beschaffenheitmitdem

Geflihl

der

Lust

und

Unlust

zusammenhdlt]"

?

5,

51).

The

requirement

hat

a

pure

udgment

of taste

be

devoid of

all

interest

orms

the

foundation

of

Kant's

important

istinction

between

aesthetic

iking

and the

pleasure

hat

may

accom-

pany

moral

udgment

or

action.2Kant's

analysis

of aesthetic

response

calls for

another

discrimination,

oo: the

separation

f

aesthetic

iking

from

mere

sensory

pleasure,

which is the

distinction hat

will

occupy

us

here.

Objects

that

arouse

mere

sensual

pleasure,

such

as

Belgian

chocolates,

are

said to

"gratify"

(vergniigen)

someone,

and are

then

called

"agreeable"

(angenehm).An object"whichonejust likes"(was ihmbloJ3 efdillt) s called

beautiful. The

incentive that

corresponds

o

this

object

for

thought

is,

respec-

tively

inclination

Neigung)

or favor

(Gunst).

Favor,

hus accorded

he beauti-

ful,

is "the

only

free

liking"

(das

einzigefreie Wohlgefallen)

?

5,

52).3

Only

pleasure

n

the

beautiful

s

free

of a

connection

with

an interest.

Both

inclination

and rational

desire

are

connected

with

interest,

and

"all

interest

either

presup-

poses

a

need

[Bediirfnij3]

r

gives

rise to

one;

and,

because

interest

s thebasis

that

determines

approval

[als

Bestimmungsgrund

es

Beifalls],

it

makes the

judgment

about the

object

unfree"

ibid.).

As Paul

Guyer

rightly

remarks,

"in

definingthe 'quality'of aesthetic udgmentKant is not makinga phenomeno-

logical

distinction

between differentkinds of

feelings

of

pleasure,

but

a distinc-

tion

between

the

ways

in

which

different

nstances of

pleasure

may

be occa-

sioned."4

WhatKant s

suggesting

is "that

he

presence

or

absence

of a

connec-

tion

to

interest

may

serve as a

criterion

or

the reflective

classification

of

given

pleasures" ibid).

Section 3 aims to

show that "a

liking or

the

Agreeable

is

connected

with

Interest"

?

3,

47).

Pure

favor,

which is connected

with

the

beautiful,

"cannotbe

an

inclination,

or else

the beautifulwould be

agreeable

and

there

would

be

no

aestheticpleasure."'Kant,therefore,makes a crucial (but often overlooked)

distinctionbetween

two

senses

of "sensation."'

In the

sense

of

the

Critique

of

2

See Anne-Marie

Roviello,

"Du

Beau comme

Symbole

du

Bien,"

Kants

Asthetik,Kant's

Aesthetics,

L'esthetique

de

Kant,

ed. H. Parret

New

York, 1998),

374-85;

also

Birgit

Recki's

article

"Das

Sch6ne

als

Symbol

der

Freiheit"

n the same

collection,

386-402.

3

Jean-Franqois

Lyotard,

Lessons on the

Analytic

of

the

Sublime,

tr.

Elizabeth

Rottenberg

(Stanford,

1994),

161.

4

Paul

Guyer,

Kant and

the Claims

of

Taste

Cambridge,

1997),

152.

5

Jean-Franqois

Lyotard,

Lessons on the

Analytic

of

the

Sublime,

161.

6

See

Jean-FrangoisLyotard,TheDifferend.

Phrases

in

Dispute,

translation

by

G. Van

Den

Abbeele

(Manchester, 1988),

132,

where the

important

distinction

between

the

two

kinds of

"sensation"has been

elaborated.




4/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

707

Pure

Reason this

term

denotes

"an

objective presentation

f sense"

(eine

objec-

tive

Vorstellung

er

Sinne),

or a

presentation

vailable

or

knowledge

of

objects

(?

3,

47).

The

sensation

of

green,

for

instance,

s

an

objective

sensation,

because

it

can

become

a

component

n

empirical

concepts,

such

as

that

of

grass.

When

theterm s usedinconnectionwithaestheticpleasureanddispleasure, hough, t

is

related

"solely

to the

subject

and is not used

for

cognition

at

all,

not

even for

that

by

which

the

subject

cognizes

himself'

(ibid.).

This

kind

of sensation

must

always

remain

purelysubjective.

Through

t

no

objects

are

represented,

hough

on its

account,

objects

are

regarded

as

objects

of

delight.

This distinction

is

presumably

meant

to

avertthe

problems

consequent

o

the

identification

of

all

formsof

delight

with

sensation.

Kantdoes

not

explain

how

it does

this,

however,

and in

fact this

distinctiondoes not solve

the

purported

roblem.

Moreover,

this

important

distinction

does

not establish

a

philosophically

acceptablebasis fordiscriminating etweenthebeautifulandtheagreeable.In-

stead of

distinguishing

between kinds

of

pleasure,

what

Kant

supplies

is "adis-

tinction

between

feelings

of

pleasure

and

all

other

kinds

of

sensation."7

Kant

merely

confirmsthe

view that

pleasure

consists

in

some

special

kind

of sensa-

tion.

Further,

esthetic

udgment

has been

argued

o

depend

upon

an

assignment

of

one's

own

feelings

of

pleasure

to their

proper

source,

and

that

suggests

that

aesthetic

udgment requires

a

form

of

self-knowledge.

But

here

Kant seems

to

deny

that he

feeling

of

pleasure

can be

the

basis

of

any

form

of

knowledge,

even

self-knowledge.

Fortunately,he failureof Kant'sdistinctionof kindsof sensationto sepa-

rate

kinds

of

pleasure

s not

damaging,

or

he

has

no need

to

disprove

the

view

that

delight

always

consists of the same sensation

of

pleasure-the

view,

which

he himself

generally

maintains.

Firstly,

he

basic

identity

of

all

pleasures

does

not

imply

that

pleasure

s the

only

ground

or action-that

would

really

be hedo-

nism.

Secondly,

Kant's

argument

n both

the

Introduction

nd

?

5 is

perfectly

compatible

with

the

thesis that

?

3 attacks.

Section

5

makes

it clear that

to

distinguish

between

the

agreeable,

he

good,

and

the

beautiful,

we need to

differ-

entiate not kinds

of

pleasure

but

rather

relationships

n which

objects

standto

the feeling of pleasure,orways in whichtheymayoccasionthisfeeling. While

different

objects,

or

differentuses of our

own

faculties

(sense,

reason,

judg-

ment),

may

all

produce

the same effect on

our

faculty

of

pleasure-namely,

a

feeling

of

pleasure-there

is

still room for

discrimination.

Even

if

they

involve

the

same

sensation,

differentoccurrences

of

pleasure

can be

judged

to

differ

in

precisely

the

way

taste

requires-in

their

grounds

and

in

their

intersubjective

validity.8

Basically,

the distinction that

Kant

provides

just

seems

to follow

from

the

essentially

reflective character of

pure

aesthetic

appreciation.

The immediate

7

Guyer,

Kant and the

Claims

of Taste,

153.

8Ibid.,

153.




5/17

708

Bart

Vandenabeele

judgment,

.e.,

aesthetic

feeling

(GefJihl),

perates

without

given

rules

or

deter-

minate

criteria,

and

"thuswithout

being

able

to

anticipate

he

kind of

object

or

the

unique object

that

could

provide

pleasure."'

Let us

return

o

Kant's

exposition

of the

arguments

or

the disinterestedness

of aestheticappreciation.The lastparagraph f section3 arguesthataffirming

that

something

is

agreeable

expresses

an interest

n

it,

because

"the

udgment

arouses

a

desire

for

objects

of that

kind,

so

that

the

liking presupposes

some-

thing

otherthan

my

mere

udgment

about

the

object:

t

presupposes

hat

I

have

referred he existence

of the

object

to

my

state insofar

as

that

state

s affected

by

such

an

object"

(?

3,

48).

The

agreeable

does

not

merely

please,

it

satisfies

or

gratifies

(vergniigt).

nterestmeans not

just

a

simple

delight

in the

existence

of

the

object

but

rather

a

desire

for

pleasure

rom

objects

of

a

certain

ype.

Agree-

ableness

is

interested,

not

just-as Lyotard

believes-because

it

"gratifies

an

inclination,"'•not because of how this pleasure s producedby its object (the

Belgian

chocolate,

say,

which

actually

satiates

he

desire),

but

because

t creates

a

desire

for

more

such

objects.

More

fundamentally

till,

this

argument

presup-

poses

that

delight

n

the

beautiful s

disinterested,

.e.,

only

related

o the

subject's

feeling

of life

(Lebensgeflihl),

ather

han

proving

t.

It

presupposes

ather

han

proves

that

pure

aesthetic

iking

is

directed

o the

representation

f

the

object,

as

opposed

to

the

connection

between

the

subject

and

the

existence

of the

object.

So the

argument

n

?

3

seems

to

introduce

a

new

conception

of

interest,

as

a

desire

for

satisfaction

rom

objects

of the

same

kind,

and

it

also

assumes

what

still needs to be provenaboutpleasure n the beautiful.Only by makingthese

assumptions

does

?

3

imply

a

genuine

contrast

between

the

agreeable

and

the

beautiful."

The last

(rather

Schopenhauerian)

aragraph

f section

4

argues

the

disin-

terestednessof

pleasure

more

successfully.

Kant

writes

that,

despite

all

the

dif-

ference

between the

agreeable

and

the

good,

"they

do

agree

in

this:

they

are

always

connected with an

interest

n

their

object

[dalf

siejederzeit

mit

einem

Interesse an

ihrem

Gegenstande

verbunden

ind].

This

holds

not

only

for

the

agreeable-see

?

3-and

for what is

good

indirectly

(useful)...,

but also

for

what is good absolutelyand in everyrespect[dasschlechterdingsundin aller

Absicht

Gute],

i.e.,

the moral

good,

which carries

with

it the

highest

interest"

(?

4,

51).

Moreover,

andthis is

precisely

the

Schopenhauerian

wist

in the

argu-

ment,

this

resemblanceresides

in

the

will,

which

sets

aesthetic

pleasure

apart

from

the rest. "Towill

something

andto

have a

liking

for

its

existence, i.e.,

to

take an

interest

n

it,

are identical"

ibid.).

9

Lyotard,Lessonson theAnalytic of theSublime,160.

'o

Ibid.,

162.

"

Guyer,

Kant and the Claims

of

Taste,

158.




6/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

709

Lyotard

nthusiastically

oncludes

from

this

that

"the

disjunction

between

the

aestheticand the

ethical

seems

final"and

thatthis

"disjunction

esponds

o

the

heterogeneity

of

the

two

'mental

faculties' that

are

in

play,

the

feeling

of

pleasure

and

displeasure

and the

faculty

of

desire,

respectively....

There

will

alwaysbe adifferendbetween'to taste'and'to desire.'

",2

Schopenhauerwould

have loved this

passage.

But

Lyotardplainly

accepts

Kant's

thesis

that"there

s

no

desire

for

the

beautiful"without further

qualification."3

e

seems

to

ignore

that

Kant's

argument

till

fails

to

prove

that our

liking

of

the

beautiful

is

not

connectedto

any

interest.For Kanthas shown

neither

hat the

beautifulcannot

be

an

object

of

the

will,

nor

that

willing

something

and

taking

a

delight

in its

existence are

identical.

This

is

precisely

the

remarkable

endeavor

of Scho-

penhauer's

philosophy-no

matterhow different

he

latter's

conception

of the

will

may

be.

Itappears o be easier to foundthe differencebetweentheaestheticandthe

ethical in this

respect

thanto

argue

successfully

for

the

gap

between

the beauti-

ful

and the

agreeable.

Before

turning

o

Lyotard's

ndeavor

o tackle

this

prob-

lem,

let us first

summarize

he

complex

semanticsof"interest"

n Kant.

First,

an

interest s

always

a

concept

of

an

object

or

action,

which has

a relation

to the

faculty

of

desire: t

is a

cognitive

representation,

which

is

an incentive

for

that

faculty.

Secondly,

an

interest s

always

connected

to

the existence

of

an

object,

for

an

incentive

of

the

will

is

always

an incentive

to

will

the

existence

of

some-

thing. Thirdly,

nterest

s

always

connected

to

delight,

for

an

incentive

to

will

something s apromiseof pleasure n itsexistence.'4This briefsurveyshouldbe

sufficient

to

show

that

George

Dickie's claim

that,

according

o

Kant,

"toview

something

with

an

interest s

to

have

a

desire

that

that

thing actually

exist"

is

overly

simplistic.'5

For

aesthetic

udgment,

a

presentation

Vorstellung)

f

the

object

is all that

is

required.

n an

interested

response

to

an

object,

its actual

existence

may

be

involved. In

a

rather

amusing

note

taken

from his

Reflexionen

from the

mid-

1770s,

Kant

urnishes

examples

of

the sorts

of interest

n existence

that

must

be

excluded fromthe

pure

aesthetic

appreciation:

Taste shows

itself

if

one

does

not choose

merely

on

account

of useful-

ness.

Therefore,

a

porcelain

button

s more beautiful

han

a silver

one.

12

Lyotard,

Lessons

on

the

Analytic of

the

Sublime,

163-64.

'3

Ibid.,

162:

"There s no

desire

for

the

beautiful.

It is

either

one or

the

other,

desire

or

beauty.

That

s

to

say:

it

is

eitherthe

faculty

of

desire or

the

faculty

of

pleasure

and

displeasure."

14

For

the

sake of

clarity,

I

leave aside

here the fact

that

"to will

something"

can also be

the

conformityof the objectof the will to the morallaw; see PaulGuyer,Kantand the Claimsof

Taste,

166.

'~

George

Dickie,

Introduction

o Aesthetics:

An

Analytic

Approach

New

York,

1997),

22.




7/17

710

Bart

Vandenabeele

The

beauty

of

lace

consists

in

the

fact

that it does

not

last

long.

Clothes

are

herefore hosenof

delicate

colors,

because

hey

are

perishable.

low-

ers

have

their

beauty

in

their

perishability.

Nature

has

given

the least

beauty

o that

which is

enjoyable

because

t nourishes:

ows,

bees,

swine,

sheep;to thatwhichrefreshes nenjoyment,somewhatmore:fruit; hat

which

smells

nice,

more:and

thatwhich can

merely please

the

eye,

the

most.

16

According

o

Guyer,

"this

passage

misinterprets

he

requirements

f disinterest-

edness,"

as

it

not

only separates

aste

from

practical

dependence,

but

in

fact

"proposes

n actual onflict

between

beauty

and

practicality."'7

echnically

peak-

ing,

Guyer

s

right.

Disinterested

ontemplation

oes

not

logically

mply

an

asym-

metry

of

beauty

and

practicality.

A kind of

syncretism

of both

remains

possible.

ThusKantonly pointsout thatthereis quiteoftena realconflictbetweentaste

and

usefulness,

or

beauty

and

practicality,

which

can

serve

as

a

corroborating

fact

about he

disinterestedness

f the

pure

udgment

of

taste.

The

inverserela-

tionship

between

beauty

and usefulness

is

not a

necessary

consequence

of the

judgment's

disinterestedness,

ut this

logical

fact

does

not

subsequently

uleout

the

possibility

of

an

actualconflict between

both.

Analogous

examples

can be found

in

Schopenhauer's

esthetics

(although

he

adds,

as

is

his

custom,

artistic

examples

as

well):

"Tall

and

fine

trees

bearno

fruit;

fruit

trees

are

small,

ugly,

and

stunted.

The double

garden

rose is not

fruitful,but the small,wild, almostscentlessrose is. Themostbeautifulbuild-

ings

are not

the

useful

ones;

a

temple

is

not a

dwelling-house"

WWR

I,

Ch.

31,

388).1'

But

Schopenhauer

does not

claim

that this

conflict

necessarily

follows

from the

disinterestedness

of

aesthetic

contemplation

either.

He

merely

states

that

"we

rarely

see

the

beautifulunited

with the useful"

(sehn

wir ...

das

Sch6ne

selten

mit

dem

Niitzlichen

vereint)

(ibid.).

The

criterion

of

disinterestedness

hence

demands

only

that

he

liking

we

take

n the

beautiful

be

purely

contempla-

tive,

and

not based

on

any

practical

or

cognitive

facts

which

may

be

involved

in

the

object's

actualexistence.

Lyotard:

The

"Facultary"

nterest

Lyotard's

nterest

n the Kantian

opic

of

"interest"

s

founded

on at least

two crucialconcerns.

Firstly,

Lyotard

presents

he

disinterestedness

f

the

judg-

ment

of taste as

a

possible

escape

from"the

riumph

f

determinant

udgment

n

'6

Reflexion

868,

Ak.

XV,

1,

382.

'~

Guyer,

Kant and

the

Claims

of

Taste,

174.

8ArthurSchopenhauer,The World s WillandRepresentation, ol. II, ch. 31, 388. Refer-

ences

areto the translation

y

E.

F.

J.

Payne

(New

York,

1969),

abbreviated

WWR. n a few cases

I

have

changed

a word

or two in

quotations

rom

this source

where

it

seemed

necessary.




8/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

711

the

contemporary

world."'"

He

will,

therefore,

ncessantly

stress

(the

impor-

tance

of)

the

absence

of

concepts

n

the

aesthetic

udgment

and

uphold

he

abso-

lute

discontinuity

between

aesthetic

reflection

and

conceptual

knowledge.

Sec-

ondly,

Lyotard

argues

or

the

irreparable

ap

between

the aesthetic

and

the ethi-

cal, betweenthebeautifuland the good. "There s no interestatall, but,rather,

sentimental

mmediacy,

n

taste.

In

ethics

there s interest

..

that

s

'mediatized'-

an

implicit

nterest.

Interest

s

what results

n

ethics.

Disinterest

s what

initiates

in

aesthetics."'"

However,

t is

important

o note

that,

he

moment

Lyotard

ntro-

duces the term

"disinterestedness"

n

his Lessons

on

the

Analytic

ofthe

Sublime

to

argue

for the

"differend" etween

the beautiful

and

the

good,

he

also

warns

for

a

too

easy

interpretation

f

this

intricate

relationship.

"The

opposition,"

he

cautions,

is

not

"as

radical"

as

one

may

think.2'

The

good

is bound

to an

inter-

est,

according

o

Kant,

but hat

does

not mean

hat

practical

udgment

s "founded"

on any interest.As Lyotardrightlyclaims, "the law does not result fromthe

interestof the

will in

the

good,

it dictates

t....

If

in

morality

he

will

aimed

for

the

good

as its

object

'before'

the

good

was

prescribed

o

it,

the

will

would

be

subordinated o

this

good

object,

just

as

it is to

an

empirical,

desirable,

agree-

able,

or useful

object.

There

would

thenbe

no transcendental

ifference

between

pathos

and

pure

ethos"

(ibid.).

Lyotard

s

certainly

right

to

countenance

the

transcendental

ifference

between

pathos

and

ethos,

but

our

main concern

here

is

with

the

differencebetween

purely

aesthetic

sensation

(pure

feeling)

and all

other

kindsof sensation.

nstead

of

arguing

or

the difference

between

the

agree-

able and the beautiful with respectto interest,Lyotardrestrictshimself to an

analogy

in his

Kant

commentary:

"If in

morality

he

will

aimed

for

the

good

as

its

object

'before' the

good

was

prescribed

o

it,

the

will

would

be subordinated

to this

good

object,

just

as

it

is

to

an

empirical,

desirable,

agreeable,

or useful

object."

Insteadof

exploring

he distinction

between

the

feeling

of the beautiful

and the

agreeable,

he

simply

takes

it for

granted.

For

the

difference

between

the

beautiful

and

the

agreeable

s not as

obvious

as

Lyotard

would

like

us

tobelieve.

It

is

beyond

doubt

that,

according

o

Kant,

the

interest

he

moral

law has in its

object

is

not

determined

by

a

prior

concept

of

the

good,

and

the

delight

in an

objector actionjudged to be morallygood resultsfromthe "presence"of the

rational

dea

of

absolute

causality.

The

pleasure

follows

from

the

subsumption

of

the

object

undera moral

conception,

or

practical

aw,

and

the resolution

o act

under

he

law.

Respect

(Achtung)

s

whatdetermines

he

will to

realize

morality.

An

agreeable

object,

however,

pleases

by

means of

a

purely

physiological

effect

on

thesenses.

If

the

experience

of

pleasure

n

an

agreeable

object

depends

on the

senses

alone,

and "is due to a

causal

relation

between

properties

of the

object

19

It

is

not

very

clear whetherthis

concern

is

mainly

ethical

or

political;

see

Jean-Franqois

Lyotard,Peregrinations:

Law,

Form,Event(New York, 1988),21.

20

Lyotard,

Lessons on the

Analytic

of

the

Sublime,

171.

21

Ibid.,

168.




9/17

712

Bart

Vandenabeele

and

one's

own

physiology,

henone

may

come

to

believe

in a

lawlike connection

between

objects

of that

sort and the

experience

of

pleasure-at

least

for one-

self."22

One's

past

experiences

of

agreeableness

may

thus

be an

incentive

for

action

towards

realizationor

possession

of the

object,

e.g.,

the

Belgian

choco-

late.

Pleasure

n

thebeautiful

annot

produce

n

interest

f this

type.

Whatawakens

the

feeling

of

the

beautiful

is,

according

o

Kant,

the

form

of the

object

alone.

"The

privileging

of form

protects

hinking,"

Lyotard

laims,

"from

any

interest

in

the

'material'

of the

object

and

consequently

from

any

interest

in

its

real

presence."23

From

this it

does

not

immediately

follow-although

Lyotard

x-

plicitly

states this-that

pure

taste

is

disinterested.

magination's

production

of

forms s

no

longer

subordinated

o the rules and

principles

of

the

understanding.

There is a

kind of

"competition"

n

the

beautiful

between

the

powers

of

the

imaginationandtheunderstanding. kindof harmonious"freeplay"or"accor-

dance"

Einhelligkeit)

s

established,

but

"each

s

unable

o

overpower

he

other"

(CJ, ? 27,

115).24

This neither

mplies

disinterestedness

nor

clarifies the

mean-

ing

of

it,

but

merely rephrases

Kant's

definition

of aesthetic

reflection.

An

aes-

thetic

appreciation

"cannot

be

made on the basis

of

introspection

of

a

single

sensation

taken

n

isolation,

but

requires

reflection

on

the context

and

cause

of

the

feeling,

or

on

its

particular

relation o

representation.'

'25

Moreover,

he

liking

in

the beautiful s

not associated

with

any

general

con-

cept

under which the

object

may

be

subsumed,

and cannot

be

linked

with

the

predicatesdefiningsuch a concept.Unlikeadeterminantudgment, aste udges

without

concepts

and

yet

claims to be

universally

valid. This

does

not

mean,

however,

that

aesthetic

appreciation

s caused

by anything

other

than

an

ordi-

nary

object

of

experience,

as the idealist

philosophers

countenance.

Kant be-

lieves that nature

can

provide

far

better occasions

to

experience

the

pure

aes-

thetic

pleasure

of

beauty

than

artcan.

The

associability

of sensual

pleasure

with

the

specific

properties

f,

e.g.,

the

Belgian

chocolate

might

make

the

representa-

tion of a

Belgian

chocolatean

impetus

or

me,

but

there

s

no

such

representation

connectedwith

the

pleasure

n

beauty

(ibid.).

Whatever

concepts

we can

predi-

cate of an objectof aestheticappreciationwill not serve to foundan interest.

Beauty

does not

produce

any

interestof

this

kind.

Yet

it

remains rue

hat

he disinterestedness

f

pure

aste

can

only

be

argued

convincingly,

if

one is

willing

to

accept

Kant's

thesis

that

an interest

always

requires

a

general

concept. Thus,

Kant's

argument

"provides

no reason

to be-

lieve thatour

response

to the beautiful not

only

is

independent

of

antecedent

determination

by concepts

of desire but also

has no

effect on

the

faculty

of

22

Guyer,

Kant and the Claims

of

Taste,

167.

23

Lyotard,Lessons on theAnalytic of theSublime,77-78.

24

Franqois

Lyotard,

Lessons on the

Analytic

of

the

Sublime,

100.

25

Guyer,

Kant and the

Claims

of

Taste,

103.




10/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

713

desire."26

yotard,

however,

does not discuss these

matters-"for

this

pleasure

to

be

aesthetic,

t must

be

independent

of all

interest

n the

materialof the

phe-

nomenon;

t

mustbe

due

only

to

the

objects'

form insofar

as

the form can

affect

the

'state'

of

thought."

t

must

Why? Lyotard

does

not

provide

us

with

any

clear

arguments.He does not questionthis apparent ack in Kant'sexposition and

barelyaccepts,

or

even

promotes,

he disinterestedness

f

the aesthetic

apprecia-

tion. He

continually

tresses he

importance

f

the

purity

anddisinterestedness-

which he

mostly

identifies--of

the

aesthetic

udgment,

probably

hoping

that he

reader

becomes too

weary

to

question

or

oppose

the claim.

For

Lyotard

s

mainly

concerned

with,

what he

(rather

nigmatically)

calls,

the

"facultary"

nterest n

Kant's

critical

philosophy.

This

intricate ssue

cannot

be

dealt with

here

exhaustively.

One

of the most

fundamental

questions

of

Lyotard's

philosophy

is

"how" it is

"that

on

a

certain

occasion

(at

the

'right

moment')understanding, r,rather,asteorperhaps hewill is exercised.How

is

the divide between

posse

andesse crossed?"

His

answer

s

straightforward

s

well

as

complex:

it

"is

crossed

precisely by

'interest.'

"27

In the

famous inter-

view with

Christine

Pries,

he even

suggests

that there

is "a

kind of

secretive

dynamic

ontology

at

work"

n Kant's

philosophy.28

Whatcould

this mean?

Ac-

cording

to

Lyotard,

"the

primacy

of

interest"

n

Kant's

critical

philosophy

"be-

longs

to

practical

reason."29

s

Kant

writes in his

Critique

ofPractical

Reason:

"every

nterest s

ultimately

practical"

CPR,

126).30

In this

sense,

Lyotard

ays,

one

can

speak

of "a

kind of

facultary

will to

be'

(which

would

require

urther

examination)."3'

Even the interest of speculativereasonis "onlyconditional"

(CPR,

126).

"What

actualizes

knowledge,

what

prompts

scientific

research,"

Lyotard

laims,

"this

very

thing

is

dependent

on a

transcendental

nterest

ight

at

first,

on

a

'will

to

effect' the

potential

of

understanding."32

hese

complex

but

fascinating

speculations

ead us to

the kernel

of

Schopenhauer's

philosophy

of

will.

Schopenhauer:

Disinterestedness

s

Will-lessness

In

Schopenhauer's

philosophy

the

world-inorganic

and

organic-is

describedas objectifiedwill. Everymovement,action,feelingorthought s pur-

ported

to

be

nothing

less than

"the act

of

will

objectified,

i.e.,

translated

nto

perception"

objektivierte,

d.h.

in

die

Anschauung

getretene

Aktdes

Willens).33

26

bid.,

103.

27

Lyotard,

essons n

the

Anal'ytic

f

the

Sublime,

73.

28

See "Das

Undarstellbare-wider

as

Vergessen.

in

Gesprich

wischen

Jean-Franqois

Lyotard

ndChristine

ries,"

Das Erhabene.

wischen

Grenzerfahrung

nd

Grossenwahn,

d.

C.

Pries

Weinheim,

989),

347.

29

Lyotard,

Lessons

on

the

Analytic

of

the

Sublime,

176.

30

Critique f

Practical

Reason,

r.

Lewis

White

Beck

New

York,

1956),

126.

31

Lyotard,Lessonson theAnalytic of theSublime,177.

32

Ibid.

33

Arthur

chopenhauer,

WR,

ol.

I,

?

18,

100.




11/17

714

Bart

Vandenabeele

"Only

in

reflection,"

Schopenhauer

ays,

"are

willing

and

acting

different:

n

reality

they

are

one"

(in

der

Wirklichkeit

ind

sie

eins)

(WWR

,

?18,

100-

101).34

The intellectcan

do

nothing

more

than

"clearly

examine

the nature

of

the

motives from

everypoint

of

view."It

is unable o

determine

he

will

itself,

forthe

will is "wholly inaccessibleto it"and"is for it inscrutableandimpenetrable"

(WWR

,

?

55,

291).

The

will

is a

blind

irrational

triving

"that

constitutes

the

kernel

and n-itself

of

everything"

WWR

,

?

56,

309).

If

something

s

"interest-

ing"

to

someone,

"it

must

[...]

in

some

way

excite

[one's]

will"

(WWR

,

?

56,

314).

One

immediately

notes

the

Kantian onnection

of interest

with "will" nthis

excerpt-no

matterhow

different

he

meanings

of

the

latter

erm

n

their

respec-

tive

theories

may

be.

For

Schopenhauer,

every

true

act of

[the]

will is at

once

and

inevitably

a

movement of

[the] body.

The

act of

will and

the action

of

the

body are not two differentstatesobjectivelyknown,connectedby the bond of

causality; hey

do

not stand n

the relation

of cause

and

effect,

but

are one

and

the

same

thing"

WWR

,

?

18,

100).

So the

will is not

the

cause

of some

move-

ment of the

body:

it

is that

very

movement.

The

same

holds

true,

Schopenhauer

says,

of the

knowledge

I

have

of

my

will: it is "an

mmediate

knowledge,"

but it

"cannot

be

separated

rom

thatof

my

body"

(WWR

,

?

18,

101

.

Echoes

of this

will

be

heard

throughoutWittgenstein's

philosophy,35

.g.,

in his

Notebooks,

where

one

can reada

passage

dated4 November

1916:

"The

act

of

will is not

the

cause of

the action but

is

the

action

itself.

One cannot

will

without

acting."36

Thisclaim,thoughoftenignored, s central o Schopenhauer'sphilosophy.

The

will

is not-as C. Rosset

thinks-primarily

a kind of

hidden

metaphysical

"thing"

behind the

"veil

of

appearances,"

ut

is

a sort

of

drive

which can

be

observed

empirically

n,

e.g.,

bodily

movements.37

Willing

is

acting

(and

vice

versa)

and

every

thought

or

affect is

an individual

manifestation

of

and

con-

nected with the

interests

of

this will.

"Thus,

originally

and

by

its

nature,

know-

ledge

is

completely

he

servant

of

the

will"

and

as

"it

s the

principle

of

sufficient

reason

that

places

the

objects

in

this

relation o

the

body

and

so

to

the

will,

the

sole

endeavorof

knowledge,

serving

his

will,

will

be

to

get

to

know

...

just

those

relations thatare laid down by the principleof sufficientreason,and thus to

follow their

many

different connections

in

space,

time,

and

causality."

Schopenhauer

dds most

conspicuously

to this:

"For

only

through

hese

is

the

object

interesting

o the

individual,

n other

words,

has

it

a relation

o the

will"

34

"Reflection"

nvariably

means "abstract

onceptual

hinking"

n

Schopenhauer's

heory;

it

has,

of

course,

a

completely

different

meaning

in Kant.

3

For

Schopenhauer's

nfluence

on

Wittgenstein,

ee

Christopher

anaway,

Self

and

World

in

Schopenhauer

Philosophy

(Oxford,

1989),

317-42,

and

Bryan

Magee,

The

Philosophy

of

Schopenhauer

rev.

ed.;

Oxford,

1997),

310-39.

36

LudwigWittgenstein,Notebooks1914-1916,

ed. G.

H. von

Wright

nd

G.

E. M.

Anscombe

(Oxford,

1979),

87 e.

37Clement

Rosset,

L

'esthetique

de

Schopenhauer

Paris,

1969),

104.




12/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

715

(WWR

,

?

33,

176-77).

It is

beyond

doubt

that,

according

to

Schopenhauer,

perception

and

knowledge

n

general

always

remain

ubordinate

o the service

of

the

will. The

brain

"came

into

being

for this service"

(WWR

,

?

33,

177).

There

is,

however,

an

important xception

to

this

picture

of

ordinaryper-

ception.Now andthen,it is possibleto "letourwhole consciousnessbe filledby

the

calm

contemplation

of

the

[...] object

actually

present"

WWR

,

?

34,

178),

and one

then

feels

liberated rom

the

striving

of

the

will

and "the entire

con-

sciousness

is

filled

and

occupied

by

a

single image

of

perception"

WWR

,

?

34,

179).

One

can,

of

course,

easily

enumerate

many

differences

between

Kant's

and

Schopenhauer's

ccountof

aesthetic

response.

But

what

is

of interest

here,

is

rather

he

striking

imilarities

hat

aretoo

often

overlooked.

Many

commenta-

tors,

e.g.,

Nietzsche and

Heidegger,

like to

oppose

both

accounts

and

eagerly

stress

Schopenhauer's

misunderstanding

f

Kant's

aesthetic

theory,

especially

of the notionof disinterestedness.38

I

have

alreadypointed

out that

Schopenhauer's

use

of

the

term

"will"

s

far

richer

and subtler han

Nietzsche

suggests

in On the

Genealogy

ofMorals.

Ac-

cording

to

Nietzsche,

Schopenhauer's

reatment

of

aesthetic

disinterestedness

would

be

a

symptom

of his

being

tormented

by

his

own sexual

desires

anddesir-

ing

release

from

hem.

Although

his

may

possibly

be

true

from

a

purely

psycho-

logical point

of

view,

it

remains

highly

unsatisfactory

s

a

philosophical

expla-

nation of

the

problem

of

disinterestedness.39

ietzsche

even

maintains that

Schopenhauer

says

that

aesthetic disinterestedness

"counteracts

exual

'int-

erestedness', like lupilin and

camphor."40

This is, to say the least, extremely

exaggerated.

Aesthetic

contemplation

eleases

not

only

from

sexual

interest

but

from

all

merely

ndividual

nterests

as such.

Moreover,

Schopenhauer

onsiders

sexual

interestas

one of

the

very

few

interests

hat

are

not

purely

individual.41

Schopenhauer's

minute

account

of the aesthetic

exaltation,

especially

when

ap-

plied

to

the

experience

of

music,

is

far more

closely

linked

to

Nietzsche's

own

aesthetic

theory

in

TheBirth

of Tragedy

han the

latter

s

willing

to

admit.42

Far

more

mportant

o us now is

Schopenhauer's

xplanation

f

the

disinter-

estedness

of

aesthetic

response

as an

escape

from

the

ordinary

way

of

perceiving

andestimatingan object.If one readsbetweenthe lines of Schopenhauer's c-

38

See

my

"Schopenhauer

nd

Heidegger.

OUber

in

MiBverstindnis

n

der Geschichte

der

Asthetik,"

Schopenhauer:Philosophie, Literatru;

Medien,

ed.

W.

Schirmacher,

chopenhauer-

Studien

7

(Vienna,

forthcoming).

39

See

C.

Janaway

ed.),

Willing

and

Nothingness:

Schopenhauer

as

Nietzsche

's

Educator

(Oxford,

1998).

40

Friedrich

Nietzsche,

"What

s the

Meaning

of

Ascetic

Ideals?,"

n

On

the

Genealogy

of

Morals,

tr. W. Kaufmann

and R. J.

Hollingdale

(New

York,

1967),

104.

41

See

Clement

Rosset,

Schopenhauer,

hilosophe

de I 'absurde

Paris,

1989),

82:

"De

toutes

celles-ci,

la

sexualite

est la

seule

qui depasse

radicalement

1'interit

de

l'individu

et la

conserva-

tion

de

son

etre et

bien-etre,

pourparticiper

directement

aux

interits

de

1'espece."

42

See

Guyer,

"Pleasure

and

Knowledge

in

Schopenhauer's

Aesthetics,"

Schopenhauer,

Philosophy,

and the

Arts,

ed.

D.

Jacquette

Cambridge,

1996),

129.




13/17

716

Bart

Vandenabeele

count,

one

shall

see

that

he

provides

just

the

argument

we need

to

clarify

the

Kantian

riddle

of

disinterested

appreciation

described

above.

The crux

of

Schopenhauer'sargument

rests

in

his

insisting

on the fact

that,

ordinarily,

all

perception

and

knowledge

s "subordinateo

the

principle

of sufficient

reason n

all its forms"andthat"theparticular hing" s always "ina particular lace, at

a

particular

ime,"

and

constitutes

a link

"inthe chain

of cause

and

effect"

WWR

I,

?34,

179;

see

also

?36,

185),

whereas

in

aesthetic

contemplation

we "leave

entirely

out of

sight

our own

interest,

our

willing,

and our

aims,"

and become

a

"pure

knowing

subject"

(WWR

,

?36,

185-86).

Common

knowledge

is

only

interested

n

the relationsof

objects

to

the individual

will,

whereas

the

aesthetic

subject "lingers"

over

the

mere

perception

WWR

,

?36,

187),

for

"it is

only

when

the

will

with

its

interests

has

forsaken

consciousness

and

the

intellect

freely

follows

its own

laws,

and

as

pure subject

mirrors

he

objective

world,

yet

... is in the highest state of tension and activity [in h6chsterSpannungund

Tdtigkeit],

oaded

by

no

willing, only

then do the

color

and

form

of

things

stand

out in

their true and

full

significance"

(treten

in ihrer

wahren

und

vollen

Bedeutung

hervor)

(WWR

I,

Ch.

30,

373;

see

also

Ch.

31,

38;

italics

added).

This

description

can

easily

match

the

dynamic

(Burkean)

metaphors

f tension

(Anspannung),swing

(Schwung),

animation

(Belebung),

and

feeling

of

life

(Lebensgefiihl)

hat

abound

n

Kant's

Critique

ofJudgment.43

Contrary

o

Kant,

Schopenhauer

cknowledges

the fact

that

aesthetic

plea-

sure is

associated

with the

achievement

of

a

special

kind

of

cognition.

Only

in

aestheticcontemplationdo "thingsstandoutin their rueandfull significance."

This

cognitive

stand

convincingly

accounts

or an

intrinsic

and

positive

pleasure

in

the aesthetic

contemplation,44

but

it does

not

imply

that

aesthetic

contempla-

tion

therefore nvolves a

generalconcept. Concepts,

Schopenhauer

ncessantly

repeats,

are

of no

use

or

value

whatsoever

in

the realm

of

aesthetics.45

n this

sense

he

obviously

remains

a true Kantian.

"Knowledge

of

the

Idea,"

Scho-

penhauer

claims,

"is

necessarily knowledge

through perception,

and is not

abstract"(WWR

,

?36,

186).

Pure aesthetic

perception

clearly

"outshines

he

colorless

concepts"

(WWR

,

?36,

190;

see also

WWR

,

?52,

260).

Inaestheticperception, things" reseen"withdifferent yes,"Schopenhauer

argues,

which

means, first,

that the

things

are

now

"no

longer"

apprehended

"according

o

their

relations,"

but as

what

they

are

in and

by

themselves,

and,

43

See

Edmund

Burke,

A

Philosophical

Enquiry

nto

the

Origin

of

our

Ideas

of

the Sublime

and

Beautiful,

ed.

A.

Phillips

(New

York,

1992);

also

Herman

Parret,

"Kant

on

Music

and the

Hierarchy

of the

Arts,"

The

Journal

ofAesthetics

and

Art

Criticism,

56

(1998),

251-64.

*

See

Guyer,

"Pleasure and

Knowledge

in

Schopenhauer's

Aesthetics,"

Schopenhauer,

Philosophy,

and

the

Arts,

ed.

D.

Jacquette

Cambridge,

1996),

109-32.

See

also

Michael

Podro,

TheManifold nPerception:TheoriesofArt rom Kantto Hildebrand Oxford,1972), 100-106.

45

See

my

"Schopenhauer

n the

Beautiful and

the Sublime:

A

Qualitative

or Gradual

Dis-

tinction?,"

Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch,

2

(2001),

99-112.




14/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

717

second,

that

we

remain

"wholly

foreign

to,

and

detached

rom,

the

scene to

be

contemplated,

nd

not

being

at

all

actively

involved

in

it"

(WWR

I,

Ch.

30,

372-

73).

"The

ndividual

object"

of

the

aesthetic

contemplation

appears

n so

strong

a

light

thatthe

remaining

inks of

the

chain,

so

to

speak,

to

which

they

belong,

withdraw ntoobscurity" WWR, ?36, 194).Pureaestheticperception"plucks

the

object

of its

contemplation

rom the

stream

of the world's

course,

and holds

it

isolated

before

it"

(WWR

,

?36,

185).

This

contemplative

attitude

s itself

a

source

of

pleasure.

This

argument

s both

interesting

and

disappointing.

t is

disappointing

be-

cause it

does not

tacklethe

specificity

of

aesthetic

disinterestedness

n a

satisfac-

tory

manner.That

someone be

not at

all

actively

involved

in the

scene

or

object

perceived

does

not

necessarily

render

he

perception

a

purely

aesthetic

one.The

interesting

and

more

convincing

point

is

Schopenhauer's

epeated

and

explicit

insistingon theneglector absenceof therelationsor causalconnectionsof the

object

that

is

aesthetically

contemplated.

In

ordinaryperception

he acknowl-

edgment

of

the

relations

of

the

perceived

object

with other

objects

and/or

with

the

perceiving

ndividual

s

the norm.

This is what

taking

an

interest

n

an

object

is all

about.To

get

a clearer

view on

this,

though,

we need

to

go

back

to

Kant's

exposition.

Back

to Kant

Kant not only says thatthe agreeablecreatesinterest;he also holds thatin

the

pathologically

conditioned

delight

in

the

agreeable

t

is not

just

the

object,

but its

existence

as

well,

that

pleases

(CJ,

?5,

51).

Beauty

is the reflection

upon

the form

of

an

object

and

reveals

a

sort

of

unity

or

harmony

"which,

as

it

were,

satisfies

our

craving

or

cognition

without

offering

us

any

conceptually

determi-

nate

claims to

knowledge."46

Kant

is

very

clear

on

this

point:

"the basis

of

the

pleasure

s

posited

merely

in

the

formof the

object

for reflection

n

general,

and

hence not in a

sensation

of

the

object,

nor with

a

reference

o

any

concept

that

might

involve

some

intention

or

other"

CJ,

VII,

30).

The

disinterestedness

of

thejudgmentof tasteis limitedby Kant's heory hatsuchajudgmentexpresses

a free

harmony

between

understanding

nd

imagination.47

The

full

ramifications

f

Kant's

heory

need

not

concern

us

here.

But one

of

the

main

problems

is

that,

according

to

Kant,

the

experience

of

beauty

also

depends

on the

perception

of

an

actual

empirical

object ust

as much as does

the

experience

of

sensory

gratification.

The

only,

but

important,

difference

is that

the

former nvolves the

harmonious

play

of thefaculties

and

not

just

the

physi-

ological

reactionof the

senses.48

However,

Guyer

s

right

n

remarking

hatKant

46

Guyer,Kantand theExperienceof Freedomi,104.

47

Ibid.,

106.

48

Guyer,

Kant

and the

Claims

of

Taste,

177.




15/17

718

Bart

Vandenabeele

sometimes

argues

as if

the

play

of

the

higher

faculties

of

knowledge

excludes

rather han

depends

on

ordinary

ense

perception

ibid.).

The

same

problem

can

be

detected

n

Schopenhauer's

esthetics.

According

to

Schopenhauer,

esthetic

perception

s the

perception

f

an Idea

n and

through

anordinary bjectof perception.49will notgo intothestatusof Schopenhauer's

theory

of

the

Ideas,

which

bearsremarkableimilarities

o

Kant's

aesthetic

deas,

since I

have

done

this

elsewhere.5"

ut

what should

attract

our

attention

here is

that

both

Kant

and

Schopenhauer

eem to

connect

the

quality

of disinterested-

ness with

the

non-empirical

or

non-sensual

character

of

the aesthetic

object.

Both

Kantand

Schopenhauer,

owever,

not

only

want

to

stick

to the

singularity

of

the aesthetic

appreciation

nd of the

object

that

occasions

it but also

to

avoid

a

too

sensualistic

nterpretation.

Kantasserts

that t

is the

design

rather

han

the

color of a

painting,

which is "the

basis

for

any

involvement

of

taste."The

colors

"belongto charm"(geh6renzum Reiz) (CJ, ?14, 71). Schopenhauer,on the

other

hand,

although

he

radically

claims

that

he

depiction

of

"oysters,

herrings,

crabs,

breadand

butter,

beer,

wine"

and

"nude

igures"

are

totally

inadmissible

in

painting,

because

they may

excite

"lustful

eeling

in

the

beholder"

WWR

,

?

40,

208),

does

acknowledge

the

importance

of

"eyes

and

color"

in

painting.

Color

and

eyes

"contribute

a

great

deal

to

beauty"

(ibid.).

Moreover,

Scho-

penhauer

makes an

important

distinction

between "the

real

purpose

of

paint-

ing,"

viz.,

to

facilitate

he

comprehension

of

the Idea

(which

he sometimes

calls

the

"substantial

orm")

and "a

separatebeauty

ndependent

f

this,"

hat

s

"pro-

ducedby themereharmonyof thecolors, thecongenialaspectof thegrouping

[Wohlgefdllige

er

Gruppierung],

he

favorable

distribution

f

light

and

shade,

and

the tone of

the whole

picture

[den

Ton

des

ganzen

Bildes]"

(WWR

I,

Ch.

36,

422).

Schopenhauer ompares

"this

accompanying

and

subordinate

indof

beauty"

o "what

diction,

meter,

and

rhyme

are

in

poetry."

Both

are

"not

what

is

essential,

but

what acts first and

immediately"

ibid.).

Schopenhauer

s

absolutelyright

o stress

this more sensual

character f

the

experience

of

beauty.

Kant's

endency

o

oppose

sense

perception

and

pure

aes-

thetic

response

is

not a

necessary consequence

of

the

disinterestedness

of

aes-

theticjudgment.Forthe criterionof disinterestednessdoes notrequire hat the

material

aspect

of

an

object, say,

the colors

of

a

painting

by

Gauguin,

can never

procure

pure

aesthetic

iking,

but

only

that

pure

aesthetic

iking-the

feeling

of

beauty

under

deal

circumstances-cannot

be based

on

an

interest

n thecolors

of

the

painting.

However,

"all

simple

colors,"

Kant

thinks,

"insofar

as

they

are

pure,

are considered

beautiful;

mixed

colors do

not

enjoy

this

privilege"

(CJ,

49

Patrick

Gardiner, chopenhauer Harmondsworth, 971),

206.

50

See

my

"We

Weep

But

Are Not Wounded:

The Sublime

Feeling

in

Schopenhauer's

Aes-

thetics,"

Ttjdschrift

oor

Filosofie,

61

(1999),

663-95.




16/17

Kant,

Lyotard,

and

Schopenhauer

719

?

14,

71).

I

will

not

go

into this

matter

n

detail,

since this

would

require

a minute

analysis

of

Kant's

"formalism."51

Kant's

basic

idea

is that of the contrast

between

the

mere

presentation

(Vorstellung)

of an

object

and the

full

nexus

of its causal

relations.

Both

the

beautifulandthe agreeableareof coursecausallyrelated o us, butonly in the

case of the

lattercan we

have

empirical

knowledge

of

its causal

basis.

A

physi-

ological

response

can

be the

subject

of

empirical

investigation

and

empirical

causal aws. The

agreeableness

f the

object

may

be included

n

the causalnexus

that

constitutes he real

existence of

the

object.

Kant's

examples

of

unacceptable

answers

to

a

question

of

beauty

in

?2

of

the

Critique

ofJudgment

manifest

nappropriate

nterests

n the existence

of the

object.

Disapproving

of a

palace

because

it

was

made

"merely

o

be

gaped

at"

(CJ, ?2,

45)

depends

on

judging

its causal

history

rather

han

the character

of

"ourmerecontemplation intuitionor reflection)"of it (ibid.).Preferring"the

eating-houses"

n

Paris to

the

palace, expresses

a

judgment

not

on the mere

presentation

of

the two

places,

but

on the

satisfaction

or

comfort

to

be

had

in

actually

eating

in

one

place

or

the

other

(ibid.).

Each

of

Kant's

examples

con-

trasts

pleasure

n

the mere

contemplation

of

an

object

with

approval

of

its

exist-

ence,

depending

upon judgments

about

the

causal

connections

comprising

ts

actuality.

This does not mean that

one

needs

knowledge

of

causal

connections

to

feel

sensory

pleasure,

but

that

udgments

about

the

agreeableness

of an

object

may

take the formof ordinary mpiricaludgments.Beautycannotbe linkedwithany

determinate

concepts;

thus

judgments

of

beauty

are

not

empirical

udgments

about

the causal

connectionsor

existence

of their

objects.

It

is

in

this sense too

that

Schopenhauer

sserts

hat

n

the

pure

experience

of

beauty,

when one

"con-

siders

things

without interest"

WWR

,

?38,

196),

one

forgets

"the individual

thing",

i.e.,

"the link

of

a chain

to

which

we also

belong"

(WWR

,

?38,

198).

Schopenhauer's

onclusion,

however,

that

he

object

of

an

aesthetic

experience

be, therefore,

an

Idea

(and

not an individual

hing)

is

fallacious.

The disinterest-

edness of

aesthetic

appreciation

does

not

imply

that

the

aesthetic

experience

s

not dependent on the actual perception of an empirical object. But even

Schopenhauer

does not

always

want to defend

this

claim,

as

he

maintains

hat

the

aesthetic

contemplation

of

an

Idea

can be

founded

not on

concepts

but

on

intuitions.

"Knowledge

of the

Idea,"

he

declares,

s

not

abstract

but

"knowledge

~'

See Donald

Crawford,

Kant's

Aesthetic

Theory

Madison,

1974),

esp.

93;

also

Jacques

Derrida,

The

Truth

n

Painting,

tr.

G.

Bennington

and

I.

McLeod

(Chicago,

1987),

esp.

15-147;

and Kirk

Pillow,

"Formand

Content

n Kant'sAesthetics:

Locating

Beauty

and

the

Sublime

in

the Work

of

Art,"

Journal

of

the

Historyof Philosophy,

32

(1994),

443-459.

See

A. L.

Cothey,

The

Nature

ofArt (London,

1990),

75;

also

Christopher

anaway,

elfand

World

n

Schopenhauer

Philosophy

(Oxford,

1989),

277.




17/17

720

Bart

Vandenabeele

through

perception"

Anschauung)

WWR

,

?36,

186).

Again,

the aesthetic

perception

s

perception

of

the

Idea

in and

through

he concrete

individual

ob-

ject.

Both Kant

and

Schopenhauer

maintain

hat

an

aesthetic

appreciation

s

logi-

cally singular.Bothassert,moreover,hat he beautiful s largelyconcernedwith

the

form

or the

Idea

of the

perceived

object,

respectively.

Thus

they

not

only

hope

to

secure

the

"differend" etween

the

beautiful

and

the

good,

as

Lyotard

supposes,

but

they

offer an

acceptable

account

of the

irreparable

ap

between

the

beautifuland the

agreeable,

without

underestimating

he

sensory quality

of

the

pure

feeling

of

beauty.

Disinterestedness,

nterpreted

n this

way, may per-

haps

serve

as

an

antidote o

aesthetic

ndifference.

Beauty

s

the intense

and

pure

feeling

of an internal

harmony,

but-and

this is fundamental-can

only

be

en-

gendered

by

the

contingent

confrontation

with

a

singular

empirical

object.

By

"travelling"romKant'stheoryto Lyotard'sand Schopenhauer'sand back to

the

startingpoint,

I

hope

not

only

to have clarified

the

complex

notion

of

disin-

terestedness

rom

different aluable

nineteenth-

nd

twentieth-century)

erspec-

tives

but

also

to

have

arguedagainst

a too

ideological

or

reductionist

nterpreta-

tion,

which has often

contributed o an

unwarranted

ejection

of

(the autonomy

of)

the aesthetic

stance

altogether.52

Katholieke

Universiteit,

Leuven,

Instituteof

Philosophy.

52

See,

e.g.,

George

Dickie's

objections

against

the aesthetic

attitude

in

his

Art and the

Aesthetic:An

Institutional

Analysis (Ithaca,

1974).

vandenabeele - on the notion of disinterestedness

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