venezuela a 25 minute approximation to a nation’s crisis © pedro m. burelli | september 2010
TRANSCRIPT
Venezuela
A 25 minute approximation to a nation’s crisis
© Pedro M. Burelli | September 2010
Conclusion: Mostly Bad News
Despite the desire of the vast majority of Venezuelans, there is NO easy or quick democratic, constitutional, electoral or peaceful solution. A violent and volatile future has been very well seeded.
The costs/consequences of losing power are too high for Hugo Chávez (and cohorts) to play fair or respect the 1999 Constitution. When you play for keeps it usually means you have to hold on to power unless you are ready to face justice or worse. While Chávez might underestimate the risks, many of his cronies know too well that they lose and what they face out of power
26-S elections, whatever the outcome, likely to result in more, not less, political turmoil. For government all scenarios are losses versus status quo, this does not mean all scenarios are victories for the opposition, but likely “sore loser” or insolent reaction by Chávez will in all likelihood stoke unrest. He will not accept the “enemy” breaching the walls of his socialist “fortress”.
A future – and unavoidable - transition will be more complex than precedents in LA, or even the former Soviet bloc. There are components of the nation’s systemic crisis that when compounded with growing presence of foreign criminal elements makes for a toxic mix. The damage to institutions, infrastructure and social norms has been tremendous. There are very few, if any, forces of moderation with sufficient whereabouts to serve as arbiters or pacifiers.
A softer landing might be possible, BUT it requires the URGENT and CONCERTED efforts of true democrats inside and outside Venezuela. Possible does not mean viable (or easy), just that it will be impossible to pull out of the collective death spiral without a radical change of diagnosis and approach. “Moderate” elements within chavismo will have to be part of the solution as they know the workings of the bureaucracy and can help break the extreme polarization.
Metaphorically: Big Red Bus Picture Venezuela as a big RED bus. Really big, as it holds almost 29 million passengers. By the
way, the red paint job is not original and it has not been applied artfully or evenly. First obvious sign of trouble is that this RED bus has run out of diesel. After a decade-long (and
maybe even longer) reckless ride in which nobody cared to save fuel for the future, evidence points to a dry tank and unruly passengers in all areas of the bus.
However, empty tank seems to be a lesser concern at this point as the RED bus is now rolling fast down a steep incline. New problems are now more pressing and/or consequential.
The RED bus has no functioning foot or hand breaks; the steering wheel is not connected to the steering column and the stick shift is stuck in R. Hard to imagine fixing these while rolling downhill.
Did we mention that the driver has a legal drivers’ license, but is totally inebriated? Those sitting closer to him are having a blast but do not relish the driver’s seat as they are well aware of what they have collectively contributed to the current predicament. Some tourists on board actually feel protected by the chaos as no one is focused on their antics.
Obvious solutions would be to: A) set a speed bump to slow the RED bus down, or B) seek an immediate change of driver. The first might actually catapult the bus into the air and therefore be seen as cause for what would otherwise be an unavoidable outcome, and a new driver, skilled as he or she might be, is likely to find it hard to deal with the mechanical issues described earlier.
So, it seems as if we are in for a crash of monumental proportions! If avoiding it is not in the cards, then responding rapidly to it must be. This is now a highly predictable and catastrophic event in the making and pretending things at the end will somehow be OK, is both delusionary and highly irresponsible. Remember, blood is also RED.
How did we get here? Anti-Gravitational | Venezuela has long sought to defy the force of gravity – in the political, economical, and
social realm. The result is: high degree of nonchalance and impunity across society. Venezuelans have long thought that their many blessings made them impervious to the forces of change that are typical of viable models of governance and coexistence.. Too many individuals that should have long exited leadership positions remain entrenched as obstacles for generational and/or moral renewal. Too many “crimes” go unpunished.
Reverse-Darwinism | The social-political arrangements of post-1958 Venezuela took oil wealth for granted and its distribution was pre- negotiated. The result is: diminished competition across all political and economic sectors of society and a surprisingly shallow ideological debate. A collective “survival of the least fit” has doomed the nation’s present and promises to derail its future. Without the basis or urge for a dynamic and fact-based ideological struggle the renewal of the party system is in question…and with it the hopes for a plural and healthy representative democracy.
Hugo Chávez | The natural, predictable, result of sustained systemic involution. But, rather than being the savior, HCh is the embodiment of Venezuela's many ills. After 40 years of a copiously financed democratic experience, voters in ’98 opted to elect someone ill prepared to solve their real problems giving credence to those who held that democracy had yielded little in terms of social advancement and values.
Current opposition leadership | There is a immense level of disaffection and dissidence is rampant. However, there is not yet a discernable alternative. Is this the result of lack of unity or quite the contrary? Totally discredited leaders who Chávez has effectively demonized continue to muddy the waters and block the exits. Fresher faces must contend with “guilt by association” perception that has swelled the ranks of the Ni-Nis (those who oppose both extremes in Venezuela’s polarized political struggle). Those who are real threats face the brunt of the regime’s abuse of legal due process. The lack of democratic procedures within the “democratic” political parties has delegitimized their positions and leadership.
The resulting quandary | Could well be that the correct formula to retain power in Venezuela is the counterintuitive “keep your enemies united so that you can defeat them”, in other words, the exact opposite of Sun Tzu’s (and Machiavelli's) maxim of “divide and conquer”.
The Chávez phenomenon Venezuela: long enamored with “Caudillos” and other men in uniform. Of 200 years of republican existence
only 50 years have been under civilian rule. The opposition effectively forfeited 1998 election and some big media chieftains placed a strong – costly - bet
on HChF. AD and COPEI’s hapless candidates, Alfaro Ucero and Irene Sáez ended up with 3.41% of the votes after being dumped by their parties in the final weeks of the contest.
HChF’s communication skills are undeniable and reinforced by an abusive use of power. Almost 1,430 hours of forced simulcasts or “cadenas” (equivalent to 2 months, 24 hrs/day) by Chávez.
The Chávez “vice” has locked millions in a false paradigm: “The past was terrible”…”The future without me is a return to the past”… “Put up with the present as it is better than the past or your future without me”. In 2007, the student movement was able to briefly defy this Manichean formula. In essence they acted as if Chávez was their past, they disdained the present and aspired to a better future. This might explain both the results of the 2007 Constitutional Referendum and the fact that the student movement still tops all opinion polls as the most respected “institution”. For most people under 30 Chávez is the only government they know…so the monotonous “vice” is no longer a very effective tool.
Chávez’s remaining “popularity” defies logic as vast majority rejects most tenets of the Bolivarian “revolution”. Socialism of the XXI Century, a confrontation with the US and close ties to Cuba, expropriations and other anti-private sector measures are all rejected by more than 70% of the population.
Today, Chávez vulnerability comes from being perceived as the past and increasingly responsible for current ills – a one man show imploding? Until recently the blame for the all that was wrong was attributed to the government/cabinet but now the blame is being pinned directly on the president.
The opposition does not have a ready alternative to him, but “Chavismo sin Chávez” is highly improbable. One could conclude that the main support for Chávez comes from the fact that people do not see a governing alternative, something which is particularly disconcerting in countries in which the power of the state and paternalism are taken for granted and to some extent enshrined. The electorate only turns its back fully on a leader when they have found what they perceive to be his replacement. This applies also to government supporters who have not yet found who among them will guarantee continuity/protection in the absence of a HChF. who has done his outmost to eliminate competing figures within his ranks.
Domestic challenges Leadership crisis affects all sectors/segments of highly polarized society.
Institutions of democracy and state apparatus gutted. The state’s ability to efficiently deliver goods and services or insure equitable treatment under the law greatly diminished as a result of politization and lack of adequate processes and controls at every instance.
Crime has become rampant, weapons are plentiful and hatred has been enshrined as integral part of “revolutionary” creed. 140,000 mostly unsolved murders and 6,300 inmates killed in Venezuelan jails since 1999. 9,000,000 – yes, 9 million - small weapons on the streets! Unique among authoritarian regimes, instead of a rigid police state, out-of-control-chaos reigns.
Oil sector threatened by underinvestment, nationalistic zeal, managerial incompetence, corruption and high debt. PDVSA production has remained stagnant, costs have mushroomed and debt has tripled since 2005.
Fractured, politicized and unfit military not in a position to play its constitutional role a guarantor of peaceful coexistence. No longer a monolithic institution with vertical command structure, a single purpose or operational readiness to match its weapons system purchases.
Macroeconomic indicators out of control….and getting worse. Highest inflation rate in the world. Recession despite high oil price environment and in contrast to growth around the region. Foreign reserves do not really reflect government outstanding obligations. 47% of the population is in the informal sector.
Micro economy in shambles as result of punitive measure/policies. 305 firms expropriated in the last 21 months, most of them without compensation. Investment has all but evaporated.
Gap between “revolutionized” social expectations and available resources/competence is now immense. Satisfying this increased expectations will be a daunting challenge for Mr. Chávez or for any government that replaces his. Social unrest could result from sheer needs and frustration.
Exogenous factors Chávez has adroitly positioned himself – funded by oil sales to the US - as a Global “anti-US” icon. While no
longer credible in the Western Hemisphere (see LatinBarometro) there is still support in far away places for he who speaks “truth to power”.
Billions of petrodollars have been spent buying allies and silencing critics. Scandals in various places related to Venezuelan funding or purchases are but the tip of an iceberg that hides corruption and complicity in many quarters.
Cuban regime sees Venezuela as lifeline and even as eventual lifeboat. If the Cuban transition is not successful we can imagine many in the Castro regime seeking refuge in Venezuela, a country where they already control important/sensitive administrative functions.
China and Russia have positioned themselves as important long term stakeholders/creditors. Their appetite for well located natural resources is immense. Both countries have signed what they term State-to-State contracts that they expect will be honored in the future by any Venezuelan administration. They will invest little while the Chávez chaos persists, but they will aggressively seek to defend their contractual “rights”.
Country has become safe haven for all sorts of criminal elements: FARC, ELN, ETA, Russian and Belorussian mafias, Latin drug cartels, Hezbollah, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. It is hard to imagine a column of FARC guerillas marching single file back to Juan Manuel Santos’ Colombia, same goes for the others that enjoy total impunity due to their dealing with different corrupt elements within the Chávez regime. Not much ideological motivation here, criminal objectives explain the presence of these individuals and mafias in Venezuela.
International safeguard mechanisms have failed to stop the deterioration of Venezuela’s democracy and the proliferation of threats to peaceful coexistence. Multilaterals – UN and OAS - have been totally ineffective. Brazil and Argentina have blatantly blunted all efforts to rein in Venezuela's human rights abuses and 24/7 meddling in the region. Mexico and Chile, among others, have all but ignored the issue.
The US government and some western intelligence services know much more than they are willing to divulge about illegal activities and seem to want to wish the problem away. What once could have been seen as a cautious approach has now morphed into something akin to complicit behavior. Plan Colombia and Merida Initiative are good examples of what happens when criminality becomes entrenched and challenges the primacy of the State. Plan Venezuela 20XX?
Is there an Rx for a softer landing? Correct diagnostic has to be made ASAP in and out of Venezuela. There is an apparent diagnostic
and a very different real diagnostic; much depends on which one is adopted by political figures and policymakers. Wishful thinking and fast fixes must be avoided at all cost.
Regime has to be thoroughly exposed for what it has become. An ineffective Petro-state has morphed into a ruinous Narco-state and pretending that this is an issue of “democratic” practices or of the opposition being more “united” is naïve to say the least. Treating the regime as a legitimate government – simply because it has “won” elections - has done incredible harm in and out of Venezuela.
Discredited political figures in the opposition must step aside and facilitate the complete emergence of fresh leadership and the formation of a more inclusive new majority. Under the banner of unity there are many undesirables hiding; the international community must be more careful when blindly urging unity instead of promoting the kind of steadfast competition and vigorous debate that could eventually yield a more sturdy and competent leadership.
Reinvigorated democratic forces within Venezuela must seek – and obtain - the support afforded in the past to other freedom fighters. While this is, in the first instance, a problem for Venezuelans to solve, there are complicating elements of regional and global nature that will require the unabashed assistance of the international community.
International community must stand ready to assist in the difficult task associated with a potentially disorderly transition. Noticeable among this: peacemaking & peacekeeping, disarmament, combating multinational criminal organizations, economic recovery, lasting poverty alleviation, institutional rebuilding. The simultaneity of do or die, urgent and important issues will require all hands approach.
There is still hope for a better – or less bad - outcome … BUT it will require very hard work internally and tons of goodwill internationally. Of course, we can all wait till there is no need to speculate or prepare.
