victoryland case state appeal.pdf
TRANSCRIPT
Case Nos. 1141044 and 1150027 ════════════════════════════════════════════════
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
────────────────────────────────── STATE OF ALABAMA, Appellant,
V.
$223,405.86 et al., Appellees.
──────────────────────────────────
KC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, LLC, Cross-Appellant,
V.
STATE OF ALABAMA, Cross-Appellee.
──────────────────────────────────
On appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County (Hon. William Shashy, sitting by designation,
CV-13-900031)
════════════════════════════════════════════════
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA
════════════════════════════════════════════════
LUTHER STRANGE Attorney General Andrew L. Brasher Solicitor General John L. Kachelman III Assistant Attorney General OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 (334) 353-2609 (334) 242-4891 (fax) [email protected] Attorneys for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
════════════════════════════════════════════════
E-Filed 11/19/2015 @ 03:14:07 PM Honorable Julia Jordan Weller Clerk Of The Court
i
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This case is important, but the answers to the
questions presented are straightforward. The trial court
incorrectly concluded, based on the evidence before it,
that so-called electronic bingo is permissible in Macon
County and that the State disparately prosecuted this case
and violated the equal protection safeguards of the U.S.
and Alabama Constitution. The games played at VictoryLand
were not the traditional game of bingo under Barber v.
Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala.
2009) (“Cornerstone”), and, therefore, were properly seized
as illegal gambling machines. Likewise, the State properly
seized related currency and gambling paraphernalia,
including records. This Court explicitly stated that the
Cornerstone factors should be applied to the seized
machines in this case. See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337,
356 (Ala. 2013). Because the briefs and the record
adequately present the facts and legal arguments, oral
argument is unnecessary. Ala. R. App. P. 34(a)(3). But if
the Court determines that oral argument would be
worthwhile, the State would welcome the opportunity to
present its argument.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ......................... i
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................. v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................... vi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ................................... 5
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .................................... 5
A. State agents made undercover visits to VictoryLand, where they observed electronic machines that were not the traditional game of bingo ............................................ 6
B. State agents obtained and executed a warrant at VictoryLand and seized machines, currency, and gambling paraphernalia ...................... 10
C. KCED presents evidence about how the proponents of Amendment 744 want “bingo” to be defined ......................................... 12
STANDARDS OF REVIEW ...................................... 14
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................. 15
ARGUMENT ................................................. 17
I. The trial court improperly dismissed this action under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution .................................. 19
A. There is no evidence of partiality in the application or enforcement of the law ........... 19
B. The trial court’s equal protection analysis is erroneous as a matter of law .................... 22
iii
C. The trial court’s sua sponte equal-protection ruling is contrary to the sole argument made by KCED ......................................... 25
II. The trial court improperly redefined “the game of bingo” based on testimony regarding voter intent despite this Court’s definition in Cornerstone ....... 26
A. This Court has firmly established the definition of the game of bingo in Macon County and all other counties with bingo amendments ...................................... 27
B. Amendment 744 is a cut-and-paste from other local bingo amendments without any special or unique language ................................. 30
C. Dubious legislative history cannot overturn this Court’s established definition of bingo in derogation of the text of the amendment ...... 32
1. The plain and common meaning, not a secret or technical meaning, controls the interpretation of a constitutional provision .................................. 33
2. The ipse dixit of a single legislator or a handful of voters is irrelevant .......... 35
3. Amendment 744’s drafters intentionally omitted language that would address “electronic bingo.” ........................ 37
III. The trial court failed to apply Cornerstone and incorrectly found that KCED’s machines were legal gambling devices ..................................... 39
A. The evidence showed that the games available for play on electronic machines at VictoryLand were unlawful gambling devices, not “the traditional game of bingo.” ..................... 42
1. The VictoryLand games did not involve cards ...................................... 42
iv
2. The numbers in the VictoryLand games were not drawn and announced like traditional bingo ...................................... 43
3. The VictoryLand games did not require players to pay attention to the announced values or physically act to mark each announced value ............................ 44
4. The VictoryLand games did not permit a player to “sleep” a bingo, as in the traditional game of bingo .................. 49
5. The VictoryLand games did not require a player to recognize winning patterns or announce such a pattern in competition with other players, as in traditional bingo ...................................... 50
6. The VictoryLand games were not like the group activity of traditional bingo because they involved individuals playing at separate computer terminals, unable to determine who else was participating in the same game .............................. 54
B. The servers and related electronic devices seized from VictoryLand were part of the networked system that facilitated illegal gambling ........................................ 56
C. The trial court should have granted the State’s petition for forfeiture of the currency, records, and other gambling paraphernalia seized from VictoryLand ........... 58
CONCLUSION ............................................... 61
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................... 62
APPENDIX - Applicable language from bingo amendments
v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal from a final judgment of Judge William
Shashy, specially appointed for the Circuit Court of Macon
County, Alabama, involves an amount in excess of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000), which places this lawsuit
outside of the exclusive jurisdictional limits of the Court
of Civil Appeals under Code of Alabama (1975) § 12-3-10.
Appellant therefore brings this appeal before the Supreme
Court of Alabama pursuant to Code of Alabama (1975) § 12-2-
7.
The trial court entered judgment on June 25, 2015. C.
1041-1046. On June 26, 2015, appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. C. 1047-1053. On July 7, 2015, appellee
filed a motion and supporting brief under Rule 59,
Ala.R.Civ.P, seeking to alter or amend the judgment and for
findings of fact. Supp. 1 R. 2-35. The trial court granted
appellee’s motion in part on October 2, 2015. Supp. 2 R. 2-
5. Appellee timely filed a notice of appeal of the October
2 order on October 8, 2015. Supp. 2 R. 6-12. The appeals
were consolidated by this Court.
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority et al., 801 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015) ...................... 22, 32
Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 42 So. 3d 65 (Ala. 2009) ............................ passim
Barber v. Jefferson Cnty. Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006) ................. 14, 18, 56, 58
Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) ............... 28, 40
Bright v. Calhoun, 988 So. 2d 492 (Ala. 2008) .............................. 33
Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18 (1944) ...................................... 34
City of Bessemer et al. v. E.B. McClain et al., 957 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2006) ............................ 33
City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435 (Ala. 1994) .......................... 28, 40
City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of City of Oneonta, 986 So. 2d 367 (Ala. 2007) .............................. 38
Davis v. City of Leawood, 893 P.2d 233 (Kan. 1995) ................................ 35
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) ..................................... 28
Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep't, 198 F.R.D. 325 (D.Conn. 2001) ........................... 35
Eagerton v. Terra Res., Inc., 426 So. 2d 807 (Ala. 1982) .............................. 39
Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013) .............................. 35
vii
Ex parte McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 2005) .......................... 15, 59
Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337 (Ala. 2013) .......................... passim
Ex parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2001) .............................. 33
Ford v. Strange, 580 F. Appx. 701 (11th Cir. 2014) ....................... 25
Ford v. Strange, No. 2:13-CV-214-WKW, 2013 WL 6804193 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2013) ............................................... 25
Foster v. State, 705 So. 2d 534 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) ................... 40
Houston County Economic Development Authority v. State, 168 So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2014) ............................ passim
I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) .................................... 22
Idaho Dep't of Law Enf't By & Through Richardson v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 824 P.2d 142 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) ...................... 23
In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 832 P.2d 1303 (Wash. 1992) .............................. 36
Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004) .......................... 24
James v. Todd, 103 So. 2d 19 (Ala. 1957) ............................... 35
Kean's v. Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 668 So. 2d 1343 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ..................... 34
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005) ..................................... 22
Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Ancient Free & Accepted Masons of Kansas v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of
viii
Shawnee, 912 P.2d 708 (Kan. 1996) ................................ 36
Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 1986) .............................. 38
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ................................. 23, 24
State By & Through Dep't of Highways v. Pub. Emp. Craft Council of Montana, 529 P.2d 785 (Mont. 1974) ............................... 34
State v. $191,249.11 et al. (Greene Co. Circuit Court, CV-2014-900041) .............. 21
State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014) ...................... 21, 29, 40
State v. Sayre, 24 So. 89 (Ala. 1897) ................................... 27
Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518 (Nev. 2014) ................................ 37
United States v. “MONKEY”, A Fishing Vessel, 725 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1984) ........................... 23
United States v. United States Currency $31,828, 760 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1985) ............................ 23
United States v. United States Currency Totaling $87,279, 546 F. Supp. 1120 (S.D. Ga. 1982) ....................... 23
Utility Ctr., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453 (Ind. 2007) .............................. 35
Wade v. State, 986 So. 2d 1212 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) ................... 60
Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604 (Ala. 2002) .............................. 34
Statutes 25 U.S.C. § 2703 ......................................... 32
ix
Ala. Code § 12-2-7 ....................................... 15
Ala. Code § 13A-12-20 ..................................... 1
Ala. Code § 13A-12-30 .................................... 59
Rules Ala. R. App. P. 34 ........................................ i
Ala. R. App. P. 4 ......................................... 3
Constitutional Provisions Ala. Const. amend. No. 508 ............................... 31
Ala. Const. amend. No. 674 ............................... 31
Ala. Const. amend. No. 744 ............................... 31
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is about KC Economic Development’s (“KCED”)
attempt to defy Alabama’s anti-gambling laws by labeling
its machines “bingo” despite the characteristics that make
those machines unlawful slot machines and gambling devices.
See Ala. Code § 13A-12-20(5) & (10). Alabama seized the
machines, gambling records, and currency involved in the
gambling operation at VictoryLand, a casino located at 8680
County Road 40 in Macon County. C. 23-25.
In 2013, the State of Alabama filed a forfeiture
petition pursuant to Ala. Code § 13A-12-30, seeking the
forfeiture of those gambling devices, records, and
$263,105.81, used as bets or stakes in gambling activity.1
C. 23-150. The complaint named 1,615 gambling devices,2
including servers and other devices. C. 24-25, 30-150.
The complaint also listed entities that may have an
ownership interest in the property. C. 23-24.
1 The State filed its original complaint on February 25, 2013. Subsequently, the State amended its original petition with a more exact amount for the seized currency after an official count by a financial institution. C. 377-502.
2 The seized gambling devices were listed on the attached Exhibit to the State’s Complaint. C. 30-150.
2
KCED intervened in the forfeiture action filed by the
Appellant. C. 242-246,281. After intervening and answering
the petition, KCED objected to the amended complaint and
moved to dismiss the forfeiture complaint pursuant to Ala.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (4), (5), and (6), arguing that the
State failed to properly plead the entire currency in the
original petition and that trial court lacked jurisdiction
over the seized currency. C. 503-513. The trial court
took no action on KCED’s motion.
The trial court then heard testimony over four days and
reviewed over seventy (70) exhibits, including undercover
video of game play at VictoryLand. R. 79-80; see also
Exhibits 1, 2 and 3 (Videos of Undercover Visits). The
trial court accepted proposed Orders from all parties by
October 27, 2014, and the State filed a post-trial
Summation & Post-Trial Brief. C. 898-1038.
The trial court issued an Order dismissing the petition
for forfeiture on federal constitutional grounds. C. 1041-
1046. The trial court did not make any findings on the
facts of the case, failed to apply the Cornerstone factors
to the games being played at VictoryLand, and determined
that the State unfairly enforced the laws of Alabama
3
against the property and intervenors in the case –
allegedly violating the equal-protection clause of the
Constitution. Id. The State timely appealed this final
order the next day. C. 1047-1049.
After the State filed its notice of appeal, KCED filed
a Motion to Amend or Alter and Make Findings of Fact
requesting the trial court to make factual findings and
rulings with respect to the return of the seized property
that were not included in the previous order. Supp. 1 R.
2-35. The State filed its own post-judgment motion,
requesting that the trial court follow the directions of
this Court and apply the Cornerstone factors to the
evidence submitted during trial. Supp. 1 R. 36-44. The
State’s appeal was held in abeyance pending a ruling on the
post-judgment motions. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(a)(3).
The trial court held a hearing on the post-judgment
motions and issued another Order on October 2, 2015. Supp.
2 R. 2. The trial court held that electronic bingo may be
played in Macon County because of voter intent and ordered
the State to take legal action in other counties within
forty-five days or return the seized property. Supp. 2 R.
2-5.
4
With the trial court’s ruling on the post-judgment
motions, the State’s appeal became effective. KCED timely
filed a cross appeal. Supp. 2 R. 6-8. This Court
consolidated KCED’s cross appeal with the State’s original
appeal.
5
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This case presents essentially three issues:
(1) Did the trial court err by dismissing the case
based on an equal-protection argument that no party raised?
(2) Did the trial court err by dismissing the case on
the grounds that the word “bingo” in Macon County’s local
amendment means something completely different than the
same word in comparable local amendments that apply to
other counties?
(3) Do the electronic devices seized from VictoryLand
play “bingo” as that word has properly been defined by this
Court?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This Court is well aware of the State’s ongoing attempt
to enforce its gambling laws in facilities in various
counties. Despite many previous rulings from this Court,
casinos continue to set up machines that are slot machines
and call them bingo. The State enforces Alabama law that
prohibits gambling, this Court reiterates that gambling is
prohibited and bingo exceptions should be narrowly
construed, and casinos reopen shortly thereafter with new
6
devices. The cycle seems to continue despite every effort
to encourage all elected officials to enforce the laws.
In this latest case, KCED applies the name “bingo” to
activities at VictoryLand that do not remotely resemble the
traditional game of bingo. At VictoryLand, players tap a
computer screen or press a console button, and a computer
populates a digital grid with characters and makes the
determination whether a “winning match” exists. If no
match exists, the game is over; if a match exists, the
player receives the winnings from the wager without any
further action required. KCED applies bingo terms to
various elements of each activity but the games are not the
traditional game of bingo and are illegal under the laws of
this state.
A. State agents made undercover visits to VictoryLand, where they observed electronic machines that were not the traditional game of bingo.
Several state agents investigated VictoryLand in an
undercover capacity, recording what they saw. Agent Gene
Sisson visited VictoryLand two times. R. 73-74. Agent
Crocker visited one time with Agent Smith. R. 222. Deputy
John Weatherly, of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office,
also visited the facility. R. 78. The agents all observed
7
or participated in electronic gambling on machines at
VictoryLand.
Several agents who played the machines at VictoryLand
attempted to record audio and video of their experiences.
R. 74-80; R. 222; see also State’s Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.
Agent Sisson testified that he “observed all of [the
games]” at VictoryLand and that they all substantially
operated in the same manner. R. 449.
After arriving at VictoryLand, the agents purchased a
player card3 and obtained a corresponding PIN number at the
account services area. R. 87-91, 223. VictoryLand patrons
used these player cards to initiate play on the game
systems. Agent Sisson and Crocker testified that they took
their player cards to a machine, inserted or swiped it on
the machine, and entered their PIN. R. 87, 91, 232. Once
logged in, the player was able to adjust his wager after
logging in to the player account associated with the player
card number and connected PIN. R. 98. On some terminals,
players could choose between “six different game systems to
3 The player cards were like credit cards that had a magnetic strip so that it could be swiped on the machine to insert credits onto the machine to play. R. 536. These cards were not cards which were used in the play of the games.
8
play on that one machine.” R. 96. All the games played in
substantially the same manner. R. 449.
After selecting a particular game, Agent Sisson
observed a prominent display of spinning reels on the
screen. R. 99-100. He also saw a small video representation
of a five-by-five bingo grid in the corner of the screen
that was about three inches by three inches. R. 100. He
would “simply hit play and the reels would start spinning.”
R. 99. Agent Sisson would then become a spectator as he
watched the reels spin, heard “bells and dings that you
typically hear with slot machines,” and waited until the
reels stopped. R. 100-101. Players were only required to
press the play button once to go through an entire game
cycle. R. 104, 233-234. Agent Sisson did not have to know
or look for any particular pattern when he played; instead,
the machine identified winning games automatically without
any further interaction. R. 106-107, 125. Touching the
screen or the five-by-five grid at any other time had no
effect. R. 124-125.
Agent Sisson testified that he did not use a paper or
printed card to play the game. R. 93, 129, 136. He never
heard anyone else say “bingo” aloud. R. 107. He never
9
interacted with any other player. R. 142-143. He could
not determine whether any other player participated in any
of the games he played. Id. He never heard an announcer
call any numbers for his game. R. 136. He never
interacted with an announcer, even when he won. R. 107.
And he never informed the announcer or anyone else when he
won a game. Id. KCED’s own expert, Richard Williamson,
corroborates Agent Sisson’s descriptive testimony because
he agreed that the human player did not have to do anything
but hit a single “play” button and allow the software to do
all other aspects of the gameplay. R. 533-534.
Additional testimony showed that the games were not the
ordinary or traditional game of bingo because of other
aspects. Agent Sisson testified about the play of “bonus
rounds.” R. 124-125, 129. During a bonus round, the
machine “would launch into a series of repetitive,
sequential game cycles without any interaction from
[Sisson] at all.” R. 124; see also R. 553-559 (Williamson
testifies that there are actually four separate “bingo
games” played during bonus play without any human
interaction). The machines automatically added any bonus
winnings to Agent Sisson’s account. R. 124. Testimony
10
also indicated that the games on the machines were “house
banked” games. R. 545. Consequently, this differed from
the traditional game of bingo. Instead of paying a jackpot
from the pari-mutuel pool of money from purchased cards,
the machines at VictoryLand jackpot was independent from
the number of players and cards in an individual game. See
generally R. 543-546.
B. State agents obtained and executed a warrant at VictoryLand and seized machines, currency, and gambling paraphernalia.
After gathering evidence about these activities at
VictoryLand, State agents applied for a warrant for the
gambling devices, currency, and materials at VictoryLand.
C. 24-25; see also R. 149 and Exhibit 11 (Search Warrant).
On the State’s petition for writ of mandamus, this Court
ordered a circuit judge to issue the warrant. Ex parte
State, 121 So. 3d 337, 356 (Ala. 2013).
Several agents went to VictoryLand in an undercover
capacity to play games just before others executed the
warrant and remained while agents catalogued the seized
items. R. 356-366, 386-390. When officers arrived to
execute the warrant, they cleared patrons from the casino
floor. R. 391.
11
Teams of agents then inventoried the machines or
terminals on the casino floor. R. 151-152. Agents seized
all of the machines from the casino floor, keeping track of
each machine by serial number. R. 152; see also Exhibit 12
(Property Inventory Sheets). A VictoryLand employee logged
into the servers and showed agents which ones were
controlling and running the devices on the floor. R. 253.
In the server room, away from the casino floor, agents
found and seized servers that controlled game play on the
terminals and other connected devices. R. 270-274. As
agents unplugged the servers, the terminal screens on the
casino floor began displaying a message indicating “network
connection lost.” R. 155.
From the cashier room, agents seized money from the
counter area and drawers in the cashier cage area. R. 315-
316. They also seized money from card kiosks – ATM-like
machines - on the casino floor and money from a case
located behind the “account services” lobby area. R. 324.
To store the seized currency, the agents securely sealed
the money into separate evidence bags for the different
locations. R. 317, 327-328. Initially, agents
unofficially counted the seized currency and believed they
12
had seized a total of $223,405.86. R. 334-336. A later
official count by a financial institution indicated that it
was in fact $263,105.81. C. 378. Agents did not seize
currency from the vault area, ice cream parlor area, pari-
mutual gambling area, bar area, or the restaurant area. R.
340-341. Agents were even circumspect from seizing money
that was clearly marked as “identified as coming from the
restaurant.” R. 337.
Agents also searched for “records that related to the
ownership, the use, the operation of the gaming
devices...records that showed...how the machines were
operated, who owned the machines, where the machines came
from” and other business records in the offices at
VictoryLand. R. 368. They discovered and seized records in
the office area. R. 368-369. Agents also seized computers
they found in the office areas along with the business
records. R. 404.
C. KCED presents evidence about how the proponents of Amendment 744 want “bingo” to be defined.
In the trial court, KCED argued that the word “bingo”
in Amendment 744, which applies to Macon County, means
“bingo in all forms,” including “electronic,” because that
13
is what the voters and the sponsors of the amendment
intended. R. 13.
Tuskegee Mayor Johnny Ford, who originally sponsored
Amendment 744 in the Legislature, testified that he
intended the amendment to allow “all forms of bingo” so
that Macon County would be competitive with all other
gaming in the state – including the Poarch Creek Band of
Indians. R. 634. Former Senator Myron Penn testified that
he also wanted the legislation to “give the citizens of
Macon County the opportunity to vote on different forms of
bingo, including electronic bingo in Macon County.” R.
669. They testified that, during debate in the
Legislature, groups opposed the amendment because of the
concern that it would “lead to expanded gambling in the
state.” R. 637. But Penn encouraged passage in the Senate
because “the citizens of Macon County wanted the
opportunity to have the same forms of bingo that the
Indians had and what the Native Americans had initiated.”
R. 670. Ultimately, the legislation passed both the House
and Senate without dissent, but it did not include any
language that would expressly allow “electronic bingo”. R.
663, 654-655, 682.
14
The subsequent debate in the community by opponents and
supporters focused on a belief, or fear, that the amendment
would lead to “electronic bingo.” R. 638-640. Articles
and editorials appeared in local publications discussing
“electronic bingo.” R. 646-647; see also KCED Exhibits 9-
10. Legislators held meetings where they handed out flyers
and told attendees that passage of the amendment would
allow “electronic bingo” or “all forms of bingo” in Macon
County. R. 661, 691, 705; see also e.g., KCED Exhibits 4-7
(flyers regarding Amendment 744). Three other witnesses
from Macon County testified that they believed that passing
Amendment 744 would allow “all forms of bingo” – including
electronic bingo – in Macon County. R. 686, 691, 706, 714-
715. In 2003, the citizens of Macon County passed the
Amendment and VictoryLand began offering so-called
“electronic bingo” shortly afterward.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Most of the issues in this appeal are legal questions
that this Court reviews de novo. Barber v. Jefferson Cnty.
Racing Ass’n, Inc., 960 So. 2d 599, 603 (Ala. 2006)
(“Barber”). To the extent the circuit court made fact
15
findings, those findings are reviewed for clear error.
Because the trial court heard evidence ore tenus at the
forfeiture proceeding, “the trial court’s judgment is
presumed to be correct unless the record shows it to be
contrary to the great weight of the evidence.” Ex parte
McConathy, 911 So. 2d 677, 681 (Ala. 2005). See also Ala.
Code § 12-2-7(1).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court made three errors, which resulted in
the judgment below.
First, the trial court incorrectly concluded that the
State violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution by enforcing the gambling laws in Macon County
against the seized property. KCED never made this argument
in the trial court, and it introduced no admissible
evidence to show that the State was enforcing the gambling
laws in a partial manner. Even if such evidence were
introduced, however, the trial court did not find that the
State was treating similar parties dissimilarly based on an
unconstitutional classification, which is the legal
standard for selective prosecution. In fact, the trial
court’s sua sponte equal protection analysis is contrary to
16
the only legal argument that KCED made--an argument that
VictoryLand should be treated differently, not that it
should be treated the same, as other gambling operations.
Second, the trial court erroneously held that the words
“bingo games” in the local bingo amendment applicable to
Macon County should be interpreted differently than the
same words in other local bingo amendments. The trial
court’s reasoning flies in the face of a long line of this
Court’s precedents in which it has held that the six-factor
test in Cornerstone applies to all of Alabama’s local bingo
amendments. Even if the Court were to reconsider that
precedent, its reasoning should still apply to Macon
County’s local amendment. The relevant portion of Macon
County’s amendment is exactly like the amendment at issue
in Cornerstone and exactly like the amendment at issue in
an earlier case, Evans, which held that such language must
be strictly and narrowly construed. The drafters of Macon
County’s amendment testified that they intentionally used
the same language of other Alabama amendments. The
ordinary words of the law control, not a secret or
technical meaning intended by the law’s proponents.
17
Finally, because the trial court misapplied the law,
the trial court erroneously denied the State’s petition for
forfeiture. KCED did not meaningfully argue that its
gambling devices were consistent with this Court’s six-
factor Cornerstone test. And the State proved with
overwhelming evidence that the gambling devices seized from
VictoryLand do not play the game of “bingo” as this Court
has defined it. Accordingly, the gambling devices are
unlawful and subject to forfeiture. Moreover, the State
established that the money, records, and other
paraphernalia that it seized from VictoryLand were related
to unlawful gambling, even though KCED contested the link.
Because the great weight of evidence established that the
gambling activity at VictoryLand violated the law, the
trial court erred when it denied the State’s petition for
forfeiture.
This Court should reverse the trial court and enter
judgment for the State.
ARGUMENT
This Court has made clear that Alabama’s constitution
and statutes “prohibit the vicious system of lottery
schemes and the evil practice of gaming, in all their
18
protean shapes.” Barber, 960 So. 2d at 614 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Local bingo amendments to
Alabama’s constitution “should be narrowly construed.”
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 78. These amendments, including
Macon County’s, permit only the traditional game of bingo.
Regardless of actions by local officials, “the question of
what the constitution means by the term ‘bingo’ is a purely
legal question that must be decided by the courts.” Ex
parte State, 121 So. 3d at 356. No state amendment is
exempted from the analysis in Cornerstone. Houston County
Economic Development Authority v. State, 168 So. 3d 4, 11
(Ala. 2014)(holding that the “analysis in Cornerstone is
applicable to the other local bingo constitutional
amendments in this State”).
In light of this body of law, the trial court made
three errors in this case. First, the trial court
erroneously dismissed the State’s forfeiture petition based
on an erroneous equal protection argument, which no one
ever raised and the federal courts have rejected on these
same facts. Second, the trial court erroneously held that,
as a matter of law, the definition of “bingo” in the local
bingo amendment that applies to Macon County is materially
19
different than the definition of the same word in
comparable local amendments. Third, the trial court
declined to grant the petition of forfeiture, even though
the State’s evidence proved the illegality of the gambling
devices and proceeds under established law.
I. The trial court improperly dismissed this action under the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The trial court’s initial error arises from its first
order dismissing the case. C. 1041-1046. Instead of
dealing with the question of the gambling’s legality, the
trial court dismissed the case sua sponte on the grounds
that the State “is cherry-picking which facilities should
remain open or closed.” C. 1044. The trial court held
that this purported “cherry-picking” violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The trial
court’s reasoning is manifestly incorrect under the
applicable law and facts.
A. There is no evidence of partiality in the application or enforcement of the law.
The evidence before the trial court fails to
substantiate the accusation that the State is improperly or
dissimilarly enforcing the law. This Court is well aware of
the ongoing efforts to enforce the anti-gambling laws in
20
our state. Gambling laws that are regularly enforced by
forfeitures and convictions in Jefferson, Madison, and
Mobile counties are actively undermined in other counties.
In this atmosphere, the State has attempted to enforce the
laws as best as possible with the limited resources
available. These efforts most assuredly are not a violation
the U.S. Constitution.
The trial court relied on “testimony and discussion
with counsel for all the parties” to conclude that illegal
gambling devices were openly operated in other areas of the
State. C. 1042. This evidence was inadmissible. KCED
offered demonstrative charts of law enforcement activities,
but those charts have no foundation in testimonial
evidence. R. 734, 749-752. But, even if KCED’s charts and
“attorney conversations” were proper evidence, that
evidence would still fall far short of the kind of evidence
that is required to make a finding of a violation of equal
protection. See generally Supp. 1 R. 20-55. KCED’s
evidence and “attorney conversations” purport to show only
that gambling operations have reopened after the State has
closed them and filed forfeiture actions precisely like
this one. This evidence is not about the State’s law
21
enforcement actions at all; it concerns the actions of
third parties who are breaking the law even though the
State is litigating (and in some cases has already won)
forfeiture actions against their so-called electronic bingo
machines.
In fact, the trial court’s conclusion that the State is
engaged in the selective enforcement of gambling laws is
belied by public records, including cases that have gone
before this Court, which this Court can judicially notice.
The trial court claimed that the State has not enforced
gambling laws in Houston County, but this Court granted the
State’s request to forfeit gambling devices and proceeds
from Houston County last year. HEDA v. State, 168 So. 3d 4
(Ala. 2014). The trial court claimed that the State has
not enforced gambling laws in Greene County, but this Court
has resolved multiple appeals arising out of the State’s
efforts to do precisely that, see, e.g., State v.
Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014), and the
State held a trial in an “electronic bingo” gambling case
as recently as October 2015 in Greene County. See State v.
$191,249.11 et al. (Greene Co. Circuit Court, CV-2014-
900041)(pending final order). The trial court claimed that
22
the State has not enforced gambling laws with respect to
the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, but the State filed a
federal lawsuit to contest the legality of those gambling
activities. Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority et al., 801
F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015). In light of the number and
variety of cases the State has filed to enforce the
gambling laws, it “blinks reality”4 for the trial court to
find that the State has enforced the laws selectively.
B. The trial court’s equal protection analysis is erroneous as a matter of law.
Even assuming that the trial court’s fact-finding is
correct, its sua sponte equal protection analysis is
legally erroneous. This is so for several reasons.
First, the defendant in this forfeiture action is the
property, not a person. Property does not have an equal
protection right under the federal Constitution. The
general rule in forfeiture proceedings is that the
government can forfeit illegal contraband, even if the
contraband is seized in a way that violates a person’s
constitutional rights. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1046–47 (1984); United States v. United
4 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 234 (2005).
23
States Currency $31,828, 760 F.2d 228, 230-31 (8th Cir.
1985); United States v. “MONKEY”, A Fishing Vessel, 725
F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1984); Idaho Dep't of Law Enf't
By & Through Richardson v. $34,000 U.S. Currency, 824 P.2d
142, 145 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991); United States v. United
States Currency Totaling $87,279, 546 F. Supp. 1120, 1126
(S.D. Ga. 1982). Any other rule would require the
government to return cocaine, meth, and marijuana when the
drugs were seized without a warrant or probable cause.
Second, the Constitution does not eliminate a
prosecutor’s discretion to use limited resources in the
wisest way. Instead the United States Supreme Court has
explained that the government’s exercise of prosecutorial
discretion violates the Constitution only if the discretion
is based on an unjustifiable, unconstitutional ground.
Accordingly, the first step of an equal protection claim
based on selective prosecution is to show that the
prosecution is “based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
Here, the trial court did not find that the State’s
purported selective enforcement of the laws was based on an
24
unjustifiable classification. The trial court instead
reasoned that any disparity in the enforcement of the law
violates the Constitution, regardless of the reasons for
that disparity. That ruling is obviously not the law.
“[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in
enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional
violation.” Id. Contrary to the trial court’s legal
reasoning, the Constitution does not require the State to
stop all illegal activity in order to stop any illegal
activity.
Third, the federal courts have evaluated and rejected
this precise equal-protection claim when VictoryLand’s
supporters have made it in other cases. “[D]ifferent
treatment of dissimilarly situated persons does not
violate” the Equal Protection Clause. Jackson v. BellSouth
Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th Cir. 2004). The
Middle District of Alabama has explained that gambling in
Macon County is not comparable to gambling in Greene County
for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause:
Greene County’s constitutional amendment defines “bingo” as including an “electronic marking machine.” To the contrary, the word “electronic” does not appear in Macon County’s Amendment No.
25
744; it only later appeared in the sheriff’s rules and regulations.
Ford v. Strange, No. 2:13-CV-214-WKW, 2013 WL 6804193 at
*4, n.5 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2013) (citations omitted).
And, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that Indian casinos
are not “situated similarly to VictoryLand” because “gaming
on Indian lands is subject to an entirely distinct
regulatory regime in which the State may often have a
lesser role.” Ford v. Strange, 580 F. Appx. 701, 714 (11th
Cir. 2014). KCED obviously has no similar argument that
federal Indian law gives it the right to operate gambling
devices that are illegal under state law.
C. The trial court’s sua sponte equal-protection ruling is contrary to the sole argument made by KCED.
Finally, it was error for the trial court to sua sponte
inject the Equal Protection Clause into this case. KCED
never made an equal-protection-clause argument, and the
trial court’s equal-protection analysis is contrary to the
only argument KCED did make. The only legal argument KCED
ever made is that Macon County’s amendment should be
interpreted differently than every other comparable bingo
amendment in Alabama. See generally R. 781-795. In other
words, KCED argued to the trial court that judicial
26
decisions that apply in other areas of Alabama do not apply
with respect to them because the voters in Macon County
intended something different. This is an argument for
special treatment, not equal treatment. The lower court’s
sua sponte equal protection ruling is inconsistent with the
only legal argument that KCED made in the lower court.
II. The trial court improperly redefined “the game of bingo” based on testimony regarding voter intent despite this Court’s definition in Cornerstone.
The trial court’s second error came in its order
granting KCED’s post-trial motion, in which the trial court
accepted KCED’s only legal argument. KCED erroneously
argued, and the trial court erroneously held, that the word
“bingo” in Amendment 744 has a special definition that
allows so-called “electronic bingo” to be played on devices
that are indistinguishable from slot machines. The trial
court reached this result in spite of the fact that
Amendment 744 does not use the word “electronic.” The
trial court reached this result in spite of the fact that,
prior to Amendment 744’s passage, the Alabama courts had
already held that the word “bingo” in local bingo
amendments must be given its common, ordinary meaning. The
trial court reached this result in spite of this Court’s
27
case law holding that the word “bingo” means the same thing
in every local bingo amendment. The trial court’s support
for its anomalous conclusion was testimony and evidence
about so-called “voter intent” at the time of Amendment
744’s passage. The trial court’s reasoning was erroneous.
A. This Court has firmly established the definition of the game of bingo in Macon County and all other counties with bingo amendments.
This Court has already defined the game of “bingo” for
Alabama’s local constitutional amendments, but the trial
court ignored that definition. In Cornerstone, this Court
held that local bingo amendments must be construed based on
the ordinary meaning of the term “bingo,” interpreted in
light of the history of the term’s use. See Cornerstone, 42
So. 3d at 79 (Ala. 2009) (quoting State v. Sayre, 24 So.
89, 92 (Ala. 1897)). The Court explained that “except where
the language of [the terms used in] constitutional
provision[s] requires otherwise, we look to the plain and
commonly understood meaning of the terms used in that
provision to discern its meaning.” Id. The Court
emphasized that the Constitution’s “words and phrases were
used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from
28
technical” or “secret” meaning. Id. (quoting District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008)).
The Court properly looked to the history of local bingo
amendments in Alabama to develop its six-prong test in
Cornerstone. The Court reviewed definitions from local
statutes in Alabama and definitions from other states
before issuing a six-prong Cornerstone test for whether a
game is “bingo.” See generally, 42 So. 3d at 81-86. The
Court also cited to its longstanding caselaw that local
bingo amendments must be construed narrowly in light of the
state’s strong public policy against lotteries as expressed
in Section 65 of the Alabama Constitution. See id. (citing
Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) and
City of Piedmont v. Evans, 642 So. 2d 435, 436 (Ala.
1994)).
Based on its understanding of the common, ordinary
definition of “bingo,” the Court in Cornerstone adopted a
six-factor test for the legal definition of “bingo.”
Although the case before the Court in Cornerstone
specifically concerned the charity “bingo” amendment in
Lowndes County, Amendment 674, the rule the Court
established in that case applies with full force in all
29
counties with these amendments. The Court in Cornerstone
announced that it was deciding the case, despite the
appellee’s suggestion that the case had become moot,
because it needed to resolve “legal questions” over the
meaning of “bingo” that were “likely to recur and indeed
already have recurred” in “other locales.” Cornerstone, 42
So. 3d at 77. The Court thus “ascrib[ed] meaning to the
term ‘bingo’” not only for the Lowndes amendment at issue
in that appeal, but also for “similar amendments applicable
to other locales.” Id. at 77 n.9.
The Court has continued to apply the six-factor
Cornerstone test in subsequent cases regarding illegal
gambling in Alabama. See Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337
(Ala. 2013); State v. Greenetrack, Inc., 154 So. 3d 940
(Ala. 2014); HEDA v. State, 168 So. 3d 4 (Ala. 2014). The
Court has held that this definition for the game of bingo
applies in every county that has a constitutional amendment
allowing charitable bingo. Greenetrack, 154 So. 3d at 959
(holding that “the game of ‘bingo’ as that term is used in
local constitutional amendments throughout the State is
that game ‘commonly or traditionally known as bingo,’...
this game is characterized by at least the six elements we
30
identified in Cornerstone.”)(emphasis added). The Court
also held that the Cornerstone test specifically applies in
Macon County when it granted the search and seizure warrant
that led to the forfeiture in this case. There, the Court
explained that “that test, which refers to the game
commonly and traditionally known as ‘bingo’ and then
describes further elements of that game, is more than clear
enough to serve as guide in measuring the facts of this
case.” Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d 337, 356 (Ala. 2013).
B. Amendment 744 is a cut-and-paste from other local bingo amendments without any special or unique language.
Even if the Court were inclined to reconsider the body
of law that we have discussed above, it should not. As a
matter of text and history, the Cornerstone definition of
“bingo” is entirely consistent with the use of the term
“bingo” in Macon County’s local amendment. This is so for
at least three reasons.
First, the relevant portion of Amendment 744 is
identical to the same portion in Amendment 674, which was
at issue in Cornerstone. Amendment 674 provides that
“[t]he operation of bingo games for prizes or money by
nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or
31
other lawful purposes shall be legal.” Ala. Const. amend.
No. 674 (Lowndes County). Amendment 744 provides “[t]he
operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit
organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful
purposes shall be legal.” Ala. Const. amend. No. 744
(Macon County). This operative statement about what is
allowed under the amendment can be found in many other
local bingo amendments in Alabama as well. As an Appendix
to this brief, we have reproduced the applicable language
from each of Alabama’s local bingo amendments and noted any
differences between those amendments and Macon County’s.
See Appendix.
Second, when the voters of Macon County adopted
Amendment 744 in the early 2000s, this Court had already
held that the identical language in Amendment 508 had to be
narrowly construed in Evans. The operative phrase of the
Macon County amendment is identical to Amendment 508, which
was addressed in Evans. Exactly like Amendment 744,
Amendment 508 provides “[t]he operation of bingo games for
prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for
charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be
legal.” Ala. Const. amend. No. 508. By incorporating the
32
exact phrasing of pre-existing local amendments, the
drafters of Amendment 744 incorporated this Court’s
announced understanding of those amendments.
Third, Amendment 744 is completely devoid of any
language that could reasonably be interpreted to allow a
special definition of bingo that includes electronic or
technological devices. At the time Amendment 744 was
enacted, federal law had long provided that Indian tribes
could conduct “the game of chance commonly known as bingo
(whether or not electronic, computer, or other technologic
aids are used in connection therewith).” 25 U.S.C. § 2703.
There are legitimate debates about what that language
allows. See Alabama v. PCI Gaming Authority et al., 801
F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2015). But the drafters of Amendment
744 did not use that language. Instead, they simply copied
Alabama’s other local bingo amendments, which say nothing
about so-called “electronic bingo” or the use of machines.
C. Dubious legislative history cannot overturn this Court’s established definition of bingo in derogation of the text of the amendment.
KCED argues, and the trial court agreed, that Amendment
744 allows for the playing of so-called “electronic bingo”
because of the voters’ intent behind the amendment. During
33
trial, KCED produced several witnesses that testified that
when ratifying Amendment 744 it was the intent of the
voters and legislators to approve the play of so-called
“electronic bingo.” R. 632-763. Essentially, this
testimony was offered to show that this Court’s ruling in
Cornerstone did not apply to Macon County. Supp. 1 R. 2-
35. See also R. 790-795. To the extent the trial court
relied on this testimony and evidence, it committed three
errors.
1. The plain and common meaning, not a secret or technical meaning, controls the interpretation of a constitutional provision.
The trial court ignored the fact that the words in
Macon County’s amendment are the same words in other local
amendments in Alabama. When interpreting the Constitution,
we must first look at the plain meaning of the words. Ex
parte Waddail, 827 So. 2d 789 (Ala. 2001); City of Bessemer
et al. v. E.B. McClain et al., 957 So. 2d 1061 (Ala. 2006);
Bright v. Calhoun, 988 So. 2d 492 (Ala. 2008).
In interpreting a statute, this Court must ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature as expressed by the statute ...When determining legislative intent from the language used in a statute, a court may explain the language, but it may not detract from or add to the statute...When the language is
34
clear, there is no room for judicial construction.
Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Selma v. Randolph, 833
So. 2d 604, 607 (Ala. 2002)(citations omitted). Regardless
of what voters and legislators say, it cannot be that the
people of Macon County intended that bingo mean something
completely different when they enacted a constitutional
amendment with exactly the same words as other local bingo
amendments. Instead, when a drafter pulls language from an
obvious source, courts rightly presume that the drafter
intends the words be interpreted in the same way. “[T]he
general rule [is] that adoption of the wording of a statute
from another legislative jurisdiction carries with it the
previous judicial interpretations of the wording.” Carolene
Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944).5
5 See also State By & Through Dep't of Highways v. Pub. Emp. Craft Council of Montana, 529 P.2d 785, 787 (Mont. 1974) (“When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject is framed in the identical language, it will ordinarily be presumed that the Legislature intended that the language as used in the later enactment would be given a like interpretation.”); Kean's v. Par. of E. Baton Rouge, 668 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (La. Ct. App. 1996)(“when a municipality or parish chooses to adopt a tax ordinance which copies the language of a state tax statute, the interpretations given to the state statute are deemed to be incorporated in the municipal or parish ordinance”).
35
2. The ipse dixit of a single legislator or a handful of voters is irrelevant.
When interpreting a law, the court cannot rely on the
words of the legislator or a group of voters in derogation
of the law’s plain text. The overall intent of the entire
legislative body is what is deemed important after it
passes a law and that intent is derived from the text:
The intention of the Legislature, to which effect must be given, is that expressed in the statute, and the courts will not inquire into the motives which influenced the Legislature or individual members in voting for its passage, nor indeed as to the intention of the draftsman or of the Legislature so far as it has not been expressed in the act. So in ascertaining the meaning of a statute the court will not be governed or influenced by the views or opinions of any or all of the members of the Legislature, or its legislative committees or any other person.
James v. Todd, 103 So 2d. 19, 28 (Ala. 1957). The views of
a single legislator are irrelevant.6 Similarly, testimony
6 See Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 414 n.8 (Ala. 2013)(“This Court
will not rely solely on the views of a single legislator in ascertaining the intent of a bill, even when that legislator was a sponsor of the bill.”); Utility Ctr., Inc. v. City of Ft. Wayne, 868 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Ind. 2007) (“In interpreting statutes, we do not impute the opinions of one legislator, even a bill's sponsor, to the entire legislature unless those views find statutory expression.”); Doe v. Bridgeport Police Dep't, 198 F.R.D. 325, 348 n. 16 (D.Conn. 2001) (“Post-enactment views of those involved with the legislation should not be considered when interpreting the statute.”); Davis v. City of Leawood, 893 P.2d 233, 244 (Kan. 1995) (concluding that
36
from a few voters cannot be determinative of the intent of
all voters’ in a jurisdiction. See Most Worshipful Grand
Lodge of Ancient Free & Accepted Masons of Kansas v. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Shawnee, 912 P.2d 708,714 (Kan.
1996) (finding that a small group of “affidavits are not a
representative sample of Kansas voters and have little
value as evidence of voters’ intent”).
Regardless of what the voters or legislators meant to
say or wanted to say, Amendment 744 says nothing about
electronic bingo. There is no textual hook for imposing an
interpretation of “bingo” in Amendment 744 that is
different from the definition of the same word when used in
other local bingo amendments. “[T]o seek the intent of the
provision's drafters or to attempt to aggregate the
intentions of [the] voters into some abstract general
purpose underlying the Amendment, contrary to the intent
expressed by the provision's clear textual meaning, is not
the proper way to perform constitutional interpretation.”
Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518, 522 (Nev.
“post-enactment statements of individual legislators” are not “reliable indicators of the legislative intent”); In re F.D. Processing, Inc., 832 P.2d 1303, 1308 (Wash. 1992) (“[T]he comments of a single legislator are generally considered inadequate to establish legislative intent.”).
37
2014). The words of a law must speak for themselves.
Constitutional interpretation is not a show of hands.
3. Amendment 744’s drafters intentionally omitted language that would address “electronic bingo.”
Finally, to the extent the testimony of legislators and
voters is relevant at all, it underscores that the
Legislature intended Amendment 744 to be interpreted the
same way as other local bingo amendments, although they
rightly feared that local authorities would adopt an
expansive definition.
Legislators and voters testified that, at the time
Amendment 744 was proposed, they knew bingo was being
played in other places using electronic devices. See
generally, R. 632-763. But, in spite of their knowledge,
they did not include any language in Amendment 744 that
would expand the definition of “bingo” to include
electronic bingo or “bingo in all its forms.” Because the
Legislature and voters were apparently aware of the
potential for “electronic” bingo, but chose not to include
words to that effect, the only reasonable conclusion is
that they did not intend to broaden the definition. “It is
not proper for a court to read into the statute something
38
which the legislature did not include although it could
have easily done so.” City of Pinson v. Utilities Bd. of
City of Oneonta, 986 So. 2d 367, 373 (Ala. 2007) (quoting
Noonan v. East–West Beltline, Inc., 487 So. 2d 237, 239
(Ala. 1986)).
Moreover, former Representative Johnny Ford, who was
the sponsor and author of Amendment 744, testified that
this was no oversight. Instead, he testified that he
intentionally chose not to add language that would
differentiate Amendment 744 from all other bingo
amendments. See R. 661 (“I didn’t fail to place it in
there. I decided not to...”). The implication from his
testimony is that he did not want other members of the
Legislature to know that he had a “secret” or “special”
meaning for the word “bingo” in Amendment 744. Allowing a
legislator’s secret, unexpressed intent to become law would
defeat the purpose of the legislative process. The intent
of the legislature is expressed in the words the
legislature voted on. A law’s meaning must be in the open,
not a secret hidden in the mind of a bill’s sponsor.
* * * * * *
39
The trial court completely disregarded this Court’s
definition, its application in Macon County, and the clear
instruction by this Court to apply this definition to the
games at VictoryLand. Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d at 356.
If the trial court had heeded this Court’s direction, it
would have properly excluded testimony from former
legislators and other witnesses regarding the passing of
Amendment 744. See, e.g., Eagerton v. Terra Res., Inc.,
426 So. 2d 807, 809 (Ala. 1982) (“The motives or reasons of
an individual legislator are not relevant to the intent of
the full legislature in passing the bill.”). Instead the
trial court used such testimony to promulgate its own
idiosyncratic interpretation of the meaning of “bingo.” The
trial court’s decision to ignore this Court’s case law and
the plain text of Amendment 744 was erroneous.
III. The trial court failed to apply Cornerstone and incorrectly found that KCED’s machines were legal gambling devices.
The trial court never applied the Cornerstone test to
the machines and gambling proceeds at issue in this case.
But the uncontroverted evidence supports the forfeiture and
condemnation of the seized evidence. Because the trial
court applied the wrong legal standard, the court
40
incorrectly found that the machines, servers, and specific
devices are lawful gambling devices. Supp. 2 Vol. 1 R. 2-
5. The Court should reverse that finding and render
judgment for the State.
Under this Court’s controlling Cornerstone decision and
its progeny, the only game authorized by state bingo
amendments is the ordinary, traditional game commonly known
as bingo––with all of its human skill elements intact.
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 80–81; Ex parte State, 121 So. 3d
at 356 (stating that the Cornerstone “test, which refers to
the game commonly and traditionally known as ‘bingo’ and
then describes further elements of that game, is more than
clear enough to serve as guide in measuring the facts of
this case” in Macon County). Moreover, this Court has
repeatedly said that Alabama’s bingo amendments must be
strictly and narrowly construed, while all prohibitions on
gambling are to be given a broad construction. See
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 78; City of Piedmont, 642 So. 2d
at 436; Barrett, 705 So. 2d at 532; Foster v. State, 705
So. 2d 534, 538 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); Greenetrack, 154
So. 3d 940 (Ala. 2014). Under these precedents, a
41
purported bingo game must, at a minimum, strictly comply
with each and every one of the following six criteria:
1. Each player uses one or more cards with spaces arranged in five columns and five rows, with an alphanumeric or similar designation assigned to each space. 2. Alphanumeric or similar designations are randomly drawn and announced one by one. 3. In order to play, each player must pay attention to the values announced; if one of the values matches a value on one or more of the player’s cards, the player must physically act by marking his or her card accordingly. 4. A player can fail to pay proper attention or to properly mark his or her card, and thereby miss an opportunity to be declared a winner. 5. A player must recognize that his or her card has a “bingo,” i.e., a predetermined pattern of matching values, and in turn announce to the other players and the announcer that this is the case before any other player does so. 6. The game of bingo contemplates a group activity in which multiple players compete against each other to be the first to properly mark a card with the predetermined winning pattern and announce that fact.
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86. The trial court
intentionally ignored the application of these required
factors in this case.
42
A. The evidence showed that the games available for play on electronic machines at VictoryLand were unlawful gambling devices, not “the traditional game of bingo.”
Although the screens on KCED’s machines often showed
the word “bingo” and even displayed a small grid, the game
on those screens was not the traditional game of bingo.
From a player’s perspective, “[w]on or lost, you just
pressed [a button] one time to play and ran through a game
cycle and stopped.” R. 104.
1. The VictoryLand games did not involve cards.
The games offered at VictoryLand did not involve
“cards.” Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86; C. 3696. Instead,
the games showed a small digital representation of a grid
with five columns and five rows. R. 100. No paper cards
were ever used to play the so-called “electronic bingo”
machines. R. 129, 136. Mr. Williamson agreed that the
game uses no physical cards; the alphanumeric designations
are not verbally announced one by one; and the players are
not required to pay attention to the values announced and
match the values on a card or physically mark his or her
card accordingly. R. 532-534.
Amendment 744, like all other Amendments, requires a
bingo “card” used by the player. A video depiction of a
43
card, which the player can only watch, is insufficient.
HEDA, 168 So. 3d at 13 (rejecting HEDA’s argument that an
“electronic depiction of a bingo grid will suffice”).
2. The numbers in the VictoryLand games were not drawn and announced like traditional bingo.
The VictoryLand games did not satisfy Cornerstone’s
requirement that the “[a]lphanumeric or similar
designations [be] randomly drawn and announced one by one.”
42 So. 3d at 86. The numbers involved in the VictoryLand
games were supposedly “randomly drawn” using a random
number generator. R. 484, 490. The display of numbers on
the VictoryLand games is so rapid-fire that not only the
video depiction of a ball draw, but the entire game, is
over within mere seconds after the player presses play. R.
136-137. The draw appears “[v]irtually, all at once” so
that it is “too fast for [a player] to recognize” and
leaves no possibility for player interaction between
numbers. R. 137; see also R. 238 (calling the appearance
of numbers on the screen “faster than I could keep up
with”). This computer-speed mockery of “announcing” could
never be held as compliance with this Court’s requirement.
Thus, the rapid pace and lack of public announcement of the
numbers fail to satisfy the second Cornerstone factor.
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3. The VictoryLand games did not require players to pay attention to the announced values or physically act to mark each announced value.
The VictoryLand games did not require players to “pay
attention to the values announced” or “physically act” when
“one of the values matches a value on one or more of the
player’s cards” by “marking his or her card accordingly.”
Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86. On the games, the player
must do nothing except place a bet, press a button to start
play and wait for the results. R. 550-553. Not only was a
player not required to pay attention to the ball draw, but
attempting to pay attention could not affect the outcome of
the game. R. 102–103. Moreover, attempting to pay
attention was pointless because the player was not allowed
to personally decide what numbers on his card were matching
numbers and physically daub them accordingly. R. 102, 533.
The only matching numbers that the machines daubed were the
numbers, if any, recognized and highlighted by the computer
as part of a winning pattern. R. 103, 534.
At VictoryLand, the machine pays attention to the
values displayed in the mass ball draw and automatically
marks any winning pattern on the player’s screen. On most
machines, the player simply places a bet and presses play
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and watches the machine display a result within seconds. On
a few other machines, the player is prompted to press the
button a second time, which then causes only the numbers
already identified by the machine as matches to be daubed.
R. 239, 497. Neither of these scenarios satisfies
Cornerstone’s mandate. In order for the game to be legal
bingo, the game must require that “each player must pay
attention to the values announced; if one of the values
matches a value on one or more of the player’s cards, the
player must physically act by marking his or her card
accordingly.” Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86 (emphasis
added).
Agent Sisson testified that the player has no
meaningful role in playing the game displayed on the
gambling machines:
Q. Were you required to pay any attention at all to the number drop display in order to win on these machines?
A. No, sir.
R. at 137.
Q. Were you ever required to personally identify and mark any of the individual matching numbers on your bingo video grid as those numbers appeared in the number drop?
46
A. No, sir.
Q. If the matching number was not part of a winning pattern, was it ever highlighted by the machine?
A. I can't answer that. I -- there were times when I wasn't given an opportunity to compare.
Q. Could you ever personally highlight or mark a number on the video bingo grid if the machine had not highlighted it for you?
A. No, sir.
Q. When there was a winning pattern on your video bingo grid, who identified or what identified that pattern to you?
A. The computer determined winning pattern and informed me of such.
Q. Did you have time to react in any way to one number before the rest of the numbers appeared on the screen?
A. No, sir.
Q. When the number drop display was complete, could you ever mark a matching number that was not part of the winning pattern highlighted by the machine?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did the machine decide what numbers to mark as matches on the bingo video grid or did you decide?
A. The machine did -- or the network did. I --
Q. Was it possible for you to fail to any mark any one matching number on your
47
video bingo card display on any of these machines that you played?
A. Well, in the sense that I wasn't required to mark anything, I couldn't fail to mark anything.
R. at 138-139. Most telling of all, Agent Sisson testified
that he could play the machines with his eyes closed. R.
106.
Witnesses agree, including VictoryLand’s own, that once
the player presses the “play” button to start the game, the
player is not required to pay any attention to the numbers
displayed on the machines’ video screens. R. 105–06, 137,
239, 362, and 534. VictoryLand’s own expert admits that the
computer software does all comparative analysis between the
drawn values and the digital representation of a bingo card
on the screen. R. 534. No human decision making,
interaction, or ability could influence which numbers were
daubed or what the outcome would be. Since the player was
not required to pay attention to the ball draw at all, much
less to each number as it is drawn, and neither was
required to “physically” mark “one” matching value on his
card when he personally spotted it, these machines fail the
Cornerstone test for that reason alone. Cornerstone, 42
So. 3d at 86.
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The machines also included bonus rounds, in which the
“game cycles without any interaction from [the player] at
all” as the computer generated numbers, populated the grid,
selected winning patterns, and continued that cycle without
any input at all from a player. R. 124. Instead, “the
machine would play multiple bingo games by itself with no
human interaction.” R. 558. When a player won during
these bonus rounds, the machines automatically credited his
or her account. R. 124.
Both regular play and bonus play on the VictoryLand
machines did not require players to pay attention to any
numbers. Instead, unlike the traditional game of bingo,
players were only required press a single button to
initiate the play of the game and the machine did
everything else. In the bonus rounds, a player was not
required to physically act in any way in order to receive
credit for that win. Because the games on the VictoryLand
machines did not require a player to pay attention or act
in the way a player must during traditional bingo, these
games do not satisfy the third Cornerstone factor.
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4. The VictoryLand games did not permit a player to “sleep” a bingo, as in the traditional game of bingo.
The trial court failed to determine that the
VictoryLand games do not permit a player to “fail to pay
proper attention or to properly mark his or her card, and
thereby miss an opportunity to be declared a winner” in the
manner of traditional bingo. See Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at
86. In the VictoryLand games, as shown above, the player
is not required to pay any attention at all to the video
depiction of a ball draw or the video depiction of a bingo
grid in order to win. Failing to pay attention to those
things does not negatively affect the player’s chances of
winning, and paying attention does the player no good
because the player cannot avoid nor overrule the machine’s
fully automated decisions on what numbers match, what
numbers will be daubed, what if any winning patterns will
be recognized. Likewise, a player cannot react to a called
number during a game on the machines by marking the wrong
number on his card.
Agent Sisson specifically testified about this
impossibility:
Q. Was it possible for you to fail to any mark any one matching number on your
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video bingo card display on any of these machines that you played?
A. Well, in the sense that I wasn't required to mark anything, I couldn't fail to mark anything.
R. 139. Instead, the gambling machines do all the
recognizing and matching. Id. A player does not have to
pay attention to the ball draw at all. A player cannot
improperly or accidentally daub a number. In fact, the
machines ignore any attempt to daub. Agent Sisson
testified about his inability to daub:
Q. Did the machine require you to make your own decision about what numbers you wanted to daub on your video bingo grid and then daub on that basis?
A. Well, you couldn't. Even if you wanted to, you couldn't daub that card.
R. 102-103. Because a player could not lose a VictoryLand
game through inattention or improper marking, these
machines fail to comply with the fourth Cornerstone factor.
5. The VictoryLand games did not require a player to recognize winning patterns or announce such a pattern in competition with other players, as in traditional bingo.
The VictoryLand games did not require a player to
“recognize that his or her card has a ‘bingo,’ i.e., a
predetermined pattern of matching values” or to “announce
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to the other players and the announcer that this is the
case before any other player does so.” Cornerstone, 42 So.
3d at 86. KCED’s attempts to draw analogies between
traditional bingo and the games at VictoryLand again fall
flat.
As evidence before the trial court proved decisively, a
player does not have to recognize a predetermined pattern
to play or win on the machines. R. 240. Instead, the
computer makes all of those decisions by itself:
Q. Did the machine decide what numbers to mark as matches on the bingo video grid or did you decide?
A. The machine did -- or the network did…
...
Q. Could you as the player mistakenly claim a bingo?
A. I mean, I never had to claim one at all; so, if I was to jump up an [sic] holler bingo, it wouldn't have any effect on what was going on anyway.
R. 139-140. All witnesses agree that the machine not only
determines whether there are any matching values, but also
determines whether any matches form a winning pattern—all
on a fully automated basis. R. 72, 106–07, 125, 138–40,
240, and 400.
52
The player also does not have to notify any other
players or announcers that they have a matching bingo
pattern. Nobody audibly announces “bingo” to the other
players. R. 107 and 363. Former Agent Crocker testified
to the absence of audible interaction between players or an
announcer while playing the games.
Q. When you played the machines at VictoryLand, did you hear or see anyone announcing those numbers or those balls that had been drawn one by one to the people playing the game?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you at any point in time hear an announcer calling out numbers or anything else to player's in the game?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you at any time hear the players announcing out that they had had a bingo or a matching pattern on their cards?
A. No, sir.
R. 238.
Q. Were you required to announce to other player's that you had a winning pattern in order to win the game?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever have to yell out bingo?
A. No, sir.
53
R. 240. The absence of announcing anything violates the
Supreme Court’s fifth Cornerstone requirement.
Nor did the VictoryLand games require players to
announce their winning bingo pattern to anyone at all, much
less before any other player had a winning pattern. R.
107. In fact, players at VictoryLand could not learn of
anyone else’s wins or identify the person who won any
particular game, even if they wanted to. R. 107. The only
possible way a player may have been able to tell they were
playing the same game would be if they were sitting side-
by-side and could look at the other person’s game screen.
R. 143.
Unlike traditional bingo, where players compete to be
the first to identify and announce bingo, the actions of
other players in the VictoryLand games were immaterial to
an individual’s game play. Players were racing no one. R.
140. Players never saw any indication that they were
competing against anybody. R. 96.
Because the VictoryLand games identified winning
patterns instead of requiring players to recognize them,
did not require players to announce a winning pattern to
anyone, and did not exclude any players from winning once
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one player announced a win, the trial court correctly found
that they did not satisfy the fifth Cornerstone factor.
6. The VictoryLand games were not like the group activity of traditional bingo because they involved individuals playing at separate computer terminals, unable to determine who else was participating in the same game.
The trial court failed to properly apply the law
despite the overwhelming evidence that the VictoryLand
games look nothing like the traditional game of bingo.
These games are not “a group activity in which multiple
players compete against each other to be the first to
properly mark a card with the predetermined winning pattern
and announce that fact.” Cornerstone, 42 So. 3d at 86.
But even if the games at VictoryLand were configured to
require a minimum of two players, that hardly constitutes a
group activity. And a player at VictoryLand had no way of
knowing how many players were involved in any given game,
or what players were involved in the same game. R. 142.
Also, as discussed supra, players were not required to
announce a winning pattern. Merely linking various
terminals through a central server is not sufficiently like
the traditional game of bingo to satisfy the sixth
Cornerstone factor. See R. 487-488.
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* * *
The only question before the trial court should have
been whether the games meet the Cornerstone factors. And
the evidence was decisive at every point: the machines do
not satisfy Cornerstone and do not play bingo as defined by
this Court. The fully-automated game that state law
enforcement officers observed, videoed, and played at the
VictoryLand facility fails to fully preserve any, much less
all, of these important human and interactive elements.
The so-called “electronic bingo” games at VictoryLand are
played entirely by machines on a server-based system, and a
player is not actively involved in any of the steps of play
of any games on the seized machines. Indeed, the evidence
shows without contradiction that the drawing, matching,
daubing and pattern identification are all completed
entirely by the machine. The player is given no
opportunity to do anything other than place a bet and press
a button to initiate play, and on a few of the machines, to
press “daub” once when told to do so. This complete lack of
human skill, human ability, human recognition, human
performance of the steps of play, and human attention in
the play of the games is fatal to any claim that this form
56
of gambling is legal bingo. These machines are merely slot
machines playing illegal games.
B. The servers and related electronic devices seized from VictoryLand were part of the networked system that facilitated illegal gambling.
It was undisputed in the trial court that the servers
and other electronic equipment were part of the same
networked gambling system. This makes them subject to
forfeiture under Barber, 960 So. 2d 599 (Ala. 2006). This
Court has already held that server-based slot machines with
gambling elements “dispersed throughout the various units
and processes of the integrated network” are illegal
gambling machines. Id. at 614; see also HEDA, 168 So. 3d
at 17 (agreeing that “linking various terminals through a
central server is not sufficiently like the traditional
game of bingo”). As a result, the question the trial court
had to answer was whether these specific servers
facilitated illegal gambling.
Although this Court has held that expert testimony is
unnecessary to prove such facts, testimony from KCED’s own
expert actually supports the finding that the servers were
an integral and necessary component of the gaming systems.
In addition, the record reflects that the particular
57
servers seized from VictoryLand were part of the illegal
gaming systems at VictoryLand.
According to KCED expert Richard Williamson, pursuant
to the request by the Sheriff of Macon County, they looked
at a server, software and player stations for their
testing. R. 482-488. The player consoles had to be
connected to the server to play the game. R. 488, 491.
The server matched numbers on the terminal with drawn
numbers and displayed winning number combinations. R. 497.
The system also maintained a count of the player’s credits,
transmitting the player’s account information to the
VictoryLand cashier. R. 394-395. Even some minimum player
settings were controlled by the server programming. R.
482, 497, 537. The server recorded all the information
regarding the game play activities including the card
number and prize value. R. 494. According to Williamson,
the machines he tested were connected to a server in order
to operate at all. R. 488.
When state agents executed the warrant, a VictoryLand
employee who had the proper credentials to log into the
server assisted them in identifying which servers
controlled which devices. R. 253-263. Agents disconnected
58
and seized servers that were networked with the terminals.
Id. Agent Larry Crocker testified that the servers were
linked in an internal network that controlled the gaming
devices at VictoryLand. R. 263-264. Agent Sisson testified
that as other state agents powered down the servers, he saw
that the terminals displayed a “network connection lost”
message. R. 155.
KCED’s own expert explained that servers facilitated
game play on terminals like those at VictoryLand, and the
record shows that the particular servers seized by the
State facilitated game play on VictoryLand terminals. As
discussed, these networked machines were part of an illegal
gambling operation that was not bingo under Cornerstone.
Such networked machines constitute illegal gambling devices
or slot machines. See Barber, 960 So. 2d at 614.
Accordingly, the evidence attests that the State properly
seized the servers and the trial court should have ordered
the servers forfeited.
C. The trial court should have granted the State’s petition for forfeiture of the currency, records, and other gambling paraphernalia seized from VictoryLand.
It was error for the trial court to refuse the State’s
petition to forfeit the gambling proceeds, records and
59
paraphernalia that the State seized. The State’s evidence
established that the currency seized from the cashier area
and ATMS were used as bets or stakes in the illegal
gambling activity at VictoryLand Likewise, the records
that the State seized relate to that gambling activity.
The evidence at trial established that undercover
agents obtained PIN numbers enabling them to play on the
machines by giving money to the cashiers, and they received
money or winnings in their account by cashing out with the
cashiers. R. 236-237. Agents seized currency from drawers
in the cashier area. R. 313-323. They seized currency
from kiosks located inside VictoryLand. R. 323-329. They
also seized currency from the account services area. R.
329-332. All of these areas were connected to the purchase
of player cards, use of player cards, and cashing-out
activity at VictoryLand.
This evidence required the entry of an order that the
currency was used as bets or stakes in an illegal gambling
operation. See Ala. Code § 13A-12-30(c) (providing for the
seizure and forfeiture of “money used as bets or stakes”
used in violation of the law). KCED’s speculative
assertions during trial that the money could have come from
60
the bar or the restaurant are insufficient to rebut this
evidence or contradict the evidence. Agents found money in
an envelope that was connected to the restaurant, but they
did not seize either. R. 337. Nor did agents seize any
money from the ice cream parlor, bar, pari-mutuel, or
restaurant areas. R. 340. The agents were careful to
seize only the money that was connected to the illegal
gambling, not money that may have been generated through
other legal means. Thus, the unrebutted evidence at trial
showed that “the only business being conducted” at the
cashier cage and account services area related to the
illegal gambling machines. Wade v. State, 986 So. 2d 1212,
1220 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).
Ala. Code § 13A-12-30 provides for the forfeiture of
gambling records possessed in connection with an illegal
gambling operation. State agents looked for and seized
“records that related to the ownership, the use, the
operation of the gaming devices that were located inside
the facility, looking for records that showed who -- how
the machines were operated, who owned the machines, where
the machines came from, whether there was -- there were
funds that were generated -- or proceeds that were
61
generated from the operation of the machines.” R. 368-370.
As discussed above, the gambling activities at VictoryLand
were unlawful. The State properly seized the records of
that unlawful operation.
CONCLUSION
This Court should REVERSE the trial court and RENDER
JUDGMENT for the State.
Respectfully submitted,
Luther Strange Attorney General
BY:
s/ Andrew L. Brasher Andrew L. Brasher Solicitor General John L. Kachelman, III Assistant Attorney General OF COUNSEL:
Office of the Attorney General 501 Washington Avenue Montgomery, AL 36130 (334) 353-2609 (334) 242-4891 (fax) [email protected]
62
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of November, 2015,
a copy of the above and foregoing document has been filed
with the Clerk of the Court using the Appellate Courts e-
Filing System and served by electronic mail to all parties
of record.
John Bolton Charlanna Skaggs Hill Hill Carter Franco Cole & Black P.O. Box 116 Montgomery, AL 36101 [email protected] [email protected]
Joe Espy III William Martin Espy James Flynn Mozingo P.O. Box 5130 Montgomery, AL 36103 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Craig Izard P.O. Box 130277 Birmingham, AL 35213 [email protected]
s/ Andrew L. Brasher Andrew L. Brasher Solicitor General
APPENDIX
Comparison of Amendment 744 (Macon County) Language to Other Amendment Language
Amendment 744 (Macon Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Macon County.
same as Macon Co.
Other Amendments
Amendment 386 (Jefferson Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes shall be legal in Jefferson county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions.
Amendment 387 (Madison Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes shall be legal in Madison county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions.
Amendment 413 (Montgomery Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Montgomery county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.
Amendment 440 (Mobile Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Mobile county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.
Amendment 506 (Etowah Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable or educational purposes shall be legal in Etowah county, subject to the provisions of any resolution by the county commission.
Amendment 508 (Calhoun Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Calhoun county, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.
Amendment 542 The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain
(St. Clair Co.) nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in St. Clair County, subject to the provisions of any resolution or ordinance by the county governing body or the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns within their respective jurisdictions as provided by law regulating such operation.
Amendment 549 (Walker Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal outside of the corporate limits of the City of Jasper in Walker County, subject to any resolution by the county governing body as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.
Amendment 550 (Jasper)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in the corporate limits of the City of Jasper in Walker County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the city governing body as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.
Amendment 565 (Covington Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Covington County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the county commission as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.
Amendment 569 (Houston Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Houston County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the county commission as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.
Amendment 599 (Hartselle, Falkville, & Decatur)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by nonprofit organizations for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal only within the boundaries of the Cities of Hartselle and Falkville and that area of the City of Decatur located within the boundaries of Morgan County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the governing bodies of the respective cities and towns, within their respective jurisdictions.
Amendment 612 (Russell Co.)
The operation of bingo games for prizes or money by certain nonprofit organizations and certain private clubs for charitable, educational, or other lawful purposes shall be legal in Russell County, subject to any resolution or ordinance by the county commission as provided by law regulating the operation of bingo.