NATO-Russian cooperation is very limited today

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict, with potential involvement of regional states, has been overshadowed by the European refugee crisis in 2016, but remains a challenge to peace and stability in Eastern Europe. On the sidelines of the Dahrendorf Symposium, Alexander Graef, PhD candidate and Research Associate at the University of St. Gallen, sat down with the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council, Andrey Kortunov, to discuss a realistic politcal roadmap for solving the Ukraine crisis and the Russo-European Relations beyond Europe (Part 2 coming tomorrow).

ALEXANDER GRAEF: How does Russia perceive NATO’s new double strategy of political dialogue and deterrence? Is it efficient or does it reinforce images of the Cold War, thereby undermining cooperation?

ANDREY KORTUNOV: The political and military establishment in Moscow is very skeptical about any substantive cooperation with NATO at this particular stage. We had some good collaboration over Afghanistan and in fighting terrorism in the past but right now the agenda for cooperation is very limited. For instance, the recent meeting of the NATO-Russian Council discussed several issues ranging from Ukraine to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Europe, but there is not much new that can be revealed. The current skepticism will become even more explicit after the NATO Summit in Warsaw. We know that NATO is trying hard to stick, at least formally, to the provisions of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security (1997). However, even if the additional deployments are not permanent and will be rotated, Moscow will still interpret them as a deviation from the spirit of the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Contacts of course remain useful to avoid accidental crashes and to enhance the predictability of actions, but it is unlikely that NATO will be a major partner of Russia. We would almost need a miracle for this.

You mentioned Ballistic Missile Defence in Europe. How are NATO’s deployment plans perceived in Russia? Is the current system a threat to the second strike capabilities of the country?

In its current form the Ballistic Missile Defence system does not present any credible threat to Russia’s second strike capability. However, those who are very suspicious of NATO see it as a seed from which a big tree might eventually grow. Their concern is that if the system is developed further it will one day inflate the Russian potential for retaliation. The second dimension is more political. When the West started the whole thing it was argued that it is not targeted against Russia, but Iran. Now we have the nuclear deal with Iran. There is no longer a danger that Iran will develop nuclear weapons any time soon. Nevertheless, the West continues to work on the system. For Moscow this means that the West has been lying. It appears that the system was directed against Russia from the very outset and not against Iran or any other hypothetical threat in the Middle East. This Iranian factor creates additional anti-Western momentum in Russia, which is widely used by state propaganda.

Western commentators argue that upholding sanctions is the only possible way to ensure Russian cooperation on the Minsk agreement Would Moscow interpret the withdrawal of sanctions as a sign of weakness or of goodwill?

Some in Moscow would definitely perceive the lifting of sanctions as a confirmation of their own righteousness. On the other hand, if they are lifted, this might also strengthen pro-European forces which currently suffer more from sanctions than anti-European forces.

Back in 2014 the EU introduced sanctions because it was the only feasible option to respond to Russia. The alternative – military action – was impossible. The problem today is that European discussions are centered only on sanctions, but do not envision a more comprehensive policy with sticks and carrot.

Of course sanctions hurt the Russian economy and, with time, they are likely to hurt even more. But they cannot change Russian policies. I would, therefore, encourage the West to be more specific about what it expects from Russia. It is simply not very logical to connect the lifting of sanctions to the full

implementation of the Minsk agreement, if one believes that the agreement will not be implemented anyway.

Do you think the Minsk agreement is still a realistic political roadmap for solving the Ukrainian crisis?

Whatever we do should be based on the Minsk agreement. However, any agreement can be reviewed and revised if all sides agree. In my view it is therefore important to keep the spirit, but also to face reality. First, the document itself is very ambiguous and simply too short. Secondly, in today’s world, a year and a half is a long time. The crisis in Ukraine is a moving target. We have to catch up with recent developments. We need another Minsk Summit which will review the implementation of the Minsk agreement. We also probably need some changes in the format. The EU or the US should be at the table. At the same time the summit should introduce some changes to the modalities of the implementation process. It is clear that President Poroshenko cannot enforce a constitutional reform; he simply would not get a majority in the parliament even if he wanted to. Finally, we should also go beyond the initial mandate of the Normandy group (France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) which negotiated the Minsk Agreement. It is not just about regulating the conflict in Eastern Ukraine but about re-building the country and facilitating future trilateral interaction between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. We need a solution like that on gas transit through Ukraine. This compromise showed that we can find common ground.

Do you see a greater role for the OSCE in this process?

Absolutely. I think the OSCE is arguably the only institution which is considered impartial and legitimate. Neither NATO, nor even the EU, would be perceived as an honest broker by Russia. Of course the OSCE is not perfect. It might not have the needed institutional capacity. But we already see movement in this direction. President Putin has stated that he would like to see a stronger role of the OSCE by enhancing its monitoring functions. President Poroshenko wants to have police missions. These positions are not identical, but I am sure we can find a common denominator.

13 june2016

Ahead of the ‘Substantial’ Talks on Nagorno Karabakh in June

Photo:etatist.com

Discussion 

Touring Nagorno Karabakh with a group of international journalists in early May, I walked in the ruins of townhouses in Mardakert district to rethink the conflict resolution “mantras” that experts and mediators have been repeating year after year since 1990s. The truth is, that it’s well beyond political will, vision and

courage to embark on such a process when there is zero trust among the parties in the conflict, more so after the alleged war crimes during the Four Day War that now, properly itemised in folders, are being channeled to international courts. 

The use of heavy weaponry against civilian targets until April 28-29 nullified the personal chemistry between negotiators and widened the gap between the sides to agree upon the Basic Principles consistently advertised by the mediators for a few years.

While shepherds are still continuing to discover parts of Smerch and Grad rockets in the Nagorno Karabakh battlefields, the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan scheduled separate meetings in Brussels and Paris on May 31 and June 2 with the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group - the international mediators charged to actually shepherd the sides to a negotiated settlement. These gentlemen are now working to prepare “substantial negotiations”, to quote Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, between Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev marked in calendars for “late June”. In these meetings the Foreign Ministers were equipped with “expert-level elaborated ideas”, or drafts, about the implementation of Vienna agreements, precisely about the so-called incidents investigation mechanisms. The first, and still the only post-war meeting of Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, moderated by John Kerry, Sergey Lavrov and Harlem Desir (one-of-a-kind high-level gathering as such in a long time) on May 16 in Vienna, produced few crucial agreements in order “to reduce the risk of further violence”. Apart from invoking international obligations for respecting the ceasefire regime and exchanging POWs and missing persons, sides agreed to establish an OSCE investigative mechanism and expand the existing Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk, presumably within his existing mandate. President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia confirmed his readiness to embark on inclusive implementation of Vienna agreements en route to Yerevan.After initially denying knowledge of any deal, Azerbaijan later on committed later on.

It’s well beyond political will, vision and courage to embark on such a process when there is zero trust among the parties in the conflict.

Interestingly, Nagorno Karabakh authorities expressed “optimism”, but underlined that they should have a seat around the table “to implement Vienna agreements”, as a full-fledged party in ceasefire agreements of 1994-95 and one that has due acknowledgement both in UNSC resolutions of 1993 and CSCE Budapest Summit decisions of 1994.

The issue of having Nagorno Karabakh representatives around the table has been in the air for a while, with Azerbaijan fiercely denying such a possibility, and Minsk Group mediators promising it after document on Basic Principles is signed, despite the call for “direct contacts” within the OSCE Minsk Group in the relevant UNSC resolutions, e.g. Resolution 853 (1993).

Still to be brainstormed how the additional monitoring equipment can be installed along the Line of Contact without an express authorization or formal engagement of the Nagorno Karabakh authorities, for a while, however, the incident investigation and expanded presence of OSCE CiO PR’s mission (albeit with the same limited mandate) will guide the peace process to move on (as predicted).

REUTERS/Leonhard FoegerJaw-Jaw is Always Better than War-War

Two stumbling blocks

Ever since the Vienna meeting on May 16, the situation along the First World War-style trenches in the Line of Contact between NKR and Azerbaijan remains calm, with occasional violations of ceasefire, giving space and a rare chance to the white-collar men.

A continued respect for ceasefire regime and steady progress on Vienna agreements will provide space for peace talks to enter a negotiation level, bypassing the populist rhetoric in the air.

And there have always been two packs of issues on the table: first - the future status of unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic and second – the fate of regions around it, occupied by local Armenian troops in the 1992-94 war.

Now, any expert in this conflict, depending on the weather outside and their affiliations, would easily identify a number of problems in the short sentence above, ranging anywhere between challenging the legitimacy and legality of existing statehood for Nagorno Karabakh Republic and issues with regards to withdrawal of local Armenian forces. Shall a publishing editor add commas and replace synonyms here and there, one should better cage in soon not to embrace eggs and tomatoes to their face.

Nagorno Karabakh authorities expressed “optimism”, but underlined that they should have a seat around the table “to implement Vienna agreements”.

The most crucial issue is the status of the region - to be put on a referendum.

Ahead of Lavrov’s visit to the region in late April, Armenia reminded that “the main requirement of peace process shall be the recognition of independence of [Nagorno Karabakh]”. Azerbaijan continued stressing on the importance of agreeing on phased withdrawal as a precondition for implementation of Vienna agreements.

Around same time the Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian confirmed on record that “compromise” solution is still on the table, but after the recent war, “other approaches” shall be applied instead of elements such as “delayed referendum” for determining the final status of Nagorno Karabakh, which earlier was included in the package “to allow face-saving in Baku”.

REUTERS/StaffThe Four-Day War: the Status Quo Has   Become Dangerously Explosive

Leave aside politically-loaded statements, Azerbaijan claims referendums can only be held in the entire territory of the country according to Constitution and domestic laws (thus, will require new amendments to enable resolution as such); while for Armenia there is a parliament resolution, adopted on July 8, 1992, rendering any international agreement even in theory stipulating Nagorno Karabakh Republic within the borders of Azerbaijan as “inadmissible”.

For students of international conflicts, however, it’s clear that any referendum will be held based on the modalities and principles inscribed in the international agreement, not domestic by-laws. And it’s been more or less reflected in one of earliest editions of the Madrid Document, leaked at an Armenian expert blog in April.

For the regions around former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, the public attitude and official rhetoric in Yerevan and Stepanakert have transformed many times (on all but readiness to live in association with Azerbaijan, as polls suggest), whereas in Azerbaijan there had been predictable stability of perceptions, agonised by official propaganda. The “land for peace” philosophy of late-1990s remained largely in place even in the NKR Constitution Article 142 (adopted in 2006), providing for land swap of chunks of Mardakert, Martuni and entire Shahumian region – the original pieces of NKR now under Azerbaijani control – with the regions identified in relevant UNSC resolutions as “occupied”. For now, the April war predictably resulted in hardened positions and rally-round-the-flag in the background, and even an attempt of selling this to public may bear high political costs.

In the wider region it affects the Kremlin plans to consolidate and reintegrate the post-Soviet space.

To reconcile domestic politics, rally public support and iron out a workable and legally sound package (if Vienna spirit is here to stay), presumably, the sides will need to create expert-level workgroups, and in fact more people allowed to dive in the process.

A glance on impact onto post-Soviet reintegration

The relations of Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan with their allies is something that affects the conflict dynamics and the pace of its resolution.

In the wider region it affects the Kremlin plans to consolidate and reintegrate the post-Soviet space, as now-unfreezing conflict in Nagorno Karabakh threatens fellow Armenia’s security, a CSTO Member-State in its own right. A negative alliance dynamics in EAU and CSTO, as evidenced by Astana’s call to postpone the long-planned EAU high-level meeting in Yerevan shortly after the Four Day War, will do no good to Moscow plans – as others may draw their lessons, too. Speaking at the high-level EAU summit in Astana on May 31, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan hinted that “a permanent hotbed of tension and discord” on EAU map won’t be bad for Armenia alone, but will reverberate well beyond.

REUTERS/Staff: A Little War that Didn’t Shake the World: a Viewfrom Yerevan

It’s also all but obvious that Baku will ever consider bidding for Eurasian Economic Union membership, which yet again will change its brand-name soon, as Azerbaijan has consistently been backed by Western powers for being an (yet minuscule) alternative to Russian hydrocarbons, not for ranking in Russia-led enterprises.

Therefore, Kazakhstan’s continued alliance with a fellow-Turkic Azerbaijan will continue to weaken formal regional arrangements from within; and this is a challenge that Moscow has to deal with as a leading power.  

The utility of deadlines

Shall be momentum reached Vienna be missed, the urgency of finding a compromise will continue to fade away with passage of time. Neither the economic hardships, such as inevitable decline of international investments, will make parties to settle, despite the fact that filthy and effortless oil revenues largely enabled the Four Day War in the first place.

There is a stack of literature on the utility of deadlines in peace processes, most famously developed at fingertips of George Mitchell on Northern Ireland and Rickard Holbrooke on Bosnia. No public record of deadlines in Karabakh talks known yet, there have always been milestones that Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh, Azerbaijan, or the mediators themselves, tried to embark on.

The urgency of finding a compromise will continue to fade away with passage of time. Neither the economic hardships, such as inevitable decline of international investments, will make parties to settle.

It can be inferred from various statements by all parties, as well as frequency of their communication (between Lavrov, Kerry, Ayrault and on other levels), that the “substantial” meeting in June has been urged by the mediators as a milestone event.

There are other deadlines to watch out in the calendar, too.

As of now, the one and most important milestone (no, it’s not the Formula One) in the peace process is perhaps June 16, which marks the 12-month deadline envisaged by the European Court of Human Rights in Chiragov and Others v Armenia and Sargsyan v Azerbaijan cases in Grand Chamber. To refresh, these are two cases before the Grand Chamber dealing with the aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, among important legal aspects (there is a lot of rhetoric of what actually these cases are about!), raising the question of Armenian and Azerbaijani refugee rights and just compensation. The Strasbourg Court invited the two governments “[to file] their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach” within 12 months period, expiring this week.

AP Photo/Abbas Atilay

The Karabakh Dimension of the   Russian-Turkish Crisis

While neither Yerevan, nor Baku reported any breakthrough just yet, like any other valuable document in the course of this conflict, ECHR GC judgments on Chiragov and Sargsyan cases are only second to the four UN Security Council resolutions of 1993 in terms of the volume of misinterpretations and fake-expert-analysis flooding the 24/7 essentially free of charge news circle. Only few actually read (highly recommended) Dissenting opinions by the Portuguese Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque to both judgments which, to compare in depth and insight, stand equal to Thomas De Waal’s illuminating account in “Black Garden”, albeit in legal interpretation of the issue.

Whether or not we will see this deadline disregarded (not unprecedented in Court’s history), remains to be seen; yet it’s utility for the peace process shall be questionable at least. 

The other red flag (not to be overlooked) is that Armenia will enter an unusual electoral season this Fall for parliamentary elections in Spring 2017 – first after Constitutional Amendments of December 2015 –that may suggest a reshuffle in the national balance of power in the new parliamentary system. In other words, this is another milestone that shall load minds of mediators (not to mention U.S. elections, of course) to use the “window of opportunity”, if there is one.

One point is clear. 

Economic hardships are not likely to produce mutually hurting stalemate for any of the sides involved in Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Although Azerbaijan sees its worst fears coming true with thinning oil revenues, and Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh see a steep downslide in foreign investments together with still-low revenues on mining, these are unlikely to affect negotiators choice to stick to their well-known positions unless the economic downturn challenges the internal political stability of governments.

0 june201606 june2016

Russia and the West: An Information War?

Photo:REUTERS/Eduardo Munoz A man takes a picture of an artwork by British graffiti artist Banksy at Lower Manhattan in New York, October 15, 2013

Since 2013 when the crisis in Ukraine broke out, the notion of information warfare has been widely used in Russia, in the West and of course in Ukraine. However, the term itself provides little, if any, insight into what is happening in the information space, and is as broad and vague as “hybrid warfare.”

By definition, war is mainly characterized by targeted hostile action carried out by centralized groups. While it is true that information flows may include substantial amounts of hostile content intentionally produced by professionals, the problem is that today’s media can hardly match the centralization criteria. Even for state-owned media the relationship between a directive to promote a specific hostile agenda and the content is factitious. Adding the explosive development of social media to the equation where every user can operate as a media outlet in each user’s own right, the link between the assumed general quarters and the assumed soldiers in information warfare becomes even less obvious.

So why are independent media and blogs often much more aggressive than state-owned networks? Why are people eager to spread propaganda at their own free will without any coercion, producing a multiplier effect?

To answer this question, we should look deep into our collective consciousness, so deep that it goes beyond the ongoing political developments. The inner self we need to look at can be linked to what Sigmund Freud, Erich Fromm and later David Riesman called “conscience” – a mental set shaped by culture and education, as if some kind of public subconscious planted specific value systems into an individual subconscious. Individuals view these values as their own. The success for a propaganda specialist lies in the ability to identify these mental sets and target them with a relevant media message. If the target is hit, it only strengthens the pre-existing mindset. Politicians saw their role change from manipulating public perception to that of being its hostage. They find it extremely challenging to change their message, and have to adapt it to the existing coral reef, especially considering that this “reef” has a very long history.

semneletimpului.roEnemy.media: The Creation of Enemy Image   in Russian-American Relations

It is striking to see how relative information flows are is perceived in a similar fashion. In fact, both Russia and the Western countries, let alone Ukraine, view themselves as victims of information warfare. Each party insists that it is on the defensive in terms of information policy, seeking merely to counter hostile information distribution. All sides tend to significantly overstate the possibilities of their neighbors in terms of information warfare and its outcome. They all try to make a political issue out of developments with no apparent political dimension or to dramatize them.

Of course, this has to be examined from a broader perspective as a combination of intentional efforts to promote a political agenda and a manifestation of a collective subconscious. As far as politics is concerned, the things to keep in mind are unresolved issues of Russia and the West in the post-Soviet space. This relationship is still marked by competition, a zero-sum game and a security dilemma. The developments in the information space are reminiscent of the issues related to European security architecture. As for the collective subconscious, it is important to be mindful of the serious shocks sustained by Russia and its neighbors in Eastern and Central Europe, as well as in the post-Soviet space.

In the case of Eastern and Central Europe, almost all countries in one way or another sustained shocks in their relationship with Russia or the Soviet Union. The fact that local political elite is trying to manipulate these experiences, reinvigorate and mythologize them does not mean that they do not exist. This further complicates the EU’s communication policy, where Western Europe’s responsible approach coexists with the sensitive and fragile identities of the Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, a victim mentality has spilled over into Georgia and Ukraine.

REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi Imperatives of Neomodernism for the Middle East

It is even more important to understand that Russia too has had shocks or experiences that were also painful, if not more so. With respect to its Eastern European neighbors, this is about being a victim in the grand scheme by the major players, in which Eastern Europe’s role was confined to serving as a buffer zone separating the West from Russia. In the post-Soviet period this notion was aptly transformed into a driver of national consolidation within these countries.

Russia’s pain is of a different nature. First, it is related to the deep scars left by repression and other instances of crippling overreach by the state. This resulted in a deep-rooted feeling of mistrust toward the state system in Russia itself mixed with an almost sacred fear and ritual submission to it. The second point is the downfall of the leviathan and nostalgia for its greatness, along with the loss of any intelligible reference points and attempts to find them again. It all blends with an instinct that urges people to love their motherland, portraying it as some kind of an ideal that goes far beyond the institutional dimension of the state and makes Russia’s recovery from the hardest blows possible. However, there is still a long way to go before the pain from these two traumas goes away, and it will surely be felt in the future. In fact, the information impulses coming from within Russia and from abroad can lead to the most unpredictable consequences.

Against this background, it is interesting to consider the general structure of the message coming from Russia and from what could be called “Europe”. The notion of information warfare implies that this structure should be similar - the parties to the conflict exchange cohesive ideological messages aimed at winning the support of as many people as possible. But this is not the case. The messages coming from what could be called the “Russian” message and what could be called the “West European” message are very different in terms of their structure.

The Western message has not changed much since the Cold War: democracy and a full nation state, the market, the rule of law, freedom as equality before law, etc. Tolerance and trans-border mobility have recently been added to this mix. Overall, this is an ideology of emancipation. The countries of Eastern and Central Europe have been showing much more zeal in promoting this vision than the US and Old Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War. This message sounds different in every country. In practice, emancipation coexists with less individual freedom and stronger surveillance on the part of a state. This vision has been a major factor for the post-Soviet space.

Interestingly, Russia, unlike the USSR, does not offer an alternative (and on closer examination, the Soviet experiment was also intrinsically Western, since it promoted emancipation and enlightenment). In fact, Russia lacks a mature democratic tradition, since well-established rule of law is a prerequisite for developing a market economy. And Russia has not disavowed a single Western-inspired value. Even patriotism that is now officially regarded as a bedrock of Russian identity is a Western value rooted in the Western idea of a nation state and a nation as a political, not ethnic, community.

REUTERS/Toby Melville 

Russia and the West: Recalling the Cold War

The Russian message seems to revolve around the notion of the West playing unfairly by spreading chaos while calling for order. This idea permeates the debate on the Ukrainian and the Syrian crises. Just

as the Soviet Union once did, Russia accuses the West of acting in bad faith without, however, posing an existential threat to the West.

On the other hand, a force has emerged that is able to offer an alternative that is radically different from the Western project and openly challenges it. Radical Islam promotes a different vision of justice, state, freedom and other fundamental values. The tragedy for Russia and the collective West is that they continue to fight the wars of the past against one another, while underestimating the ideological strength of radical Islam.

This struggle between Russia and the West is a phantom that leads nowhere. But phantoms can have a serious impact on real politics. The “Russian threat” is likely to remain a consolidating force for Ukraine, Georgia and many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe for years to come. And Russia will continue to view them as marionettes of a certain Western “core” or “center” where anti-Russian conspiracies originate. All this is ensuring more votes for politicians and larger audiences with higher ratings for the media.

By the way, another paradox of the current interaction on the informational front is that it is capitalist by nature. Even state-owned media are motivated not so much by political orders or directives coming from above, as they are by the eagerness to strike a chord with the political elite and a larger audience. Changes in terms of supply and demand could put an end to this “Phony War” of information. They could also spell the end of capitalism. It is clear that neither Russia, nor the West want that.

Ivan Timofeev leads the program “Contemporary State” at Valdai Discussion Club. Also he has been a Director of Programs at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC).

First published in Valdai Discussion Club

http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=7758#top-content

http://russiancouncil.ru/blackseamilitaryne2016

Russian Foreign Policy Finding New Bearings

This year will see the 25th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s breakup and the emergence of new Russia on its ruins. Time is ripe for taking stocks and mapping a road into the future.

A group of members of Russia’s Council on Defense and Foreign Policy (CDFP) has presented to the state and society its vision of the country’s future foreign policy. We believe that resuming a creative foreign policy discussion will be useful. Amidst massive worldwide propaganda it is easy to fall into the trap of somebody else’s or one’s own delusions. The acute foreign policy discussion in Russia that lasted throughout the 1990s helped prevent both hopeless retreat and an attempt at a suicidal revanche, and laid the groundwork for return to a more realistic, national interests-oriented policy. These days we are recalling with “legitimate pride” the major role that the CDFP and its “liberal imperialists” (as our veterans were often referred to then) played in that debate.

The CDFP has drafted a list of key points and ideas it is now pleased to present (See: www.svop.ru and www.globalaffairs.ru). This memorandum contains an analysis of global and regional trends, achievements and failures of Russian policies, and also some proposals regarding Russia’s future foreign policy that we deem beneficial. This article is an extra-brief summary of the last two sections of the memorandum in question.

Russian Foreign Policy Achievements

Russia’s foreign policy in the past decade was successful by and large and quite masterful at times. It largely matched the world challenges. A stagnant economy was the weak link. Foreign policy has compensated for that weakness so far. But this resource is now close to exhaustion. The country has regained its military potential at a qualitatively new level and at still tolerable costs. The expansion of Western alliances to the territories Russia considers vital to  its security has been stemmed, although it had to pay a dear price for that. The West is developing the long-awaited awareness that Russia’s interests have to be taken into account. This means the basis is being laid for more sound and fairer relations in the future.

Russia is making a turn in the economy and to a certain extent in politics towards booming Asia through the development of Siberia and the Far East, although the turn is belated and slow. Relations of friendship and profound strategic partnership with China have been established. The agreement to pair the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union has proved helpful in avoiding rivalry in Central Asia. Vast potential has been built up for deepening cooperation with the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea.

As a result, Russia has secured a rather robust geopolitical position ahead of a new round of development (if it is destined to begin). In its day the Soviet Union was in confrontation with the West around the world and with China in the East. Also, it had to maintain the costly socialist bloc and countries of "socialist orientation" in the Third world. Today, Russia is involved in inevitable but eventually hopefully easing confrontation only with the West.

In contrast to what was observed in the last years of the Soviet Union and in the early days of new Russia, society’s political morale has changed. The feeling of dismay and fading Communist ideology of the 1980s and the frustrating situation of the 1990s, when the revolutionary-minded minority was dictating to the majority a set of “liberal” values (that would eventually prove alien and not viable on Russian soil) have given way to the rise of patriotism, state nationalism and more or less normal, traditional values. The same values are shared by a majority of humanity and, quite possibly, they have begun their comeback to the Western world, whose elite tried to reject them. It is very important that a majority of Russia’s population and the elite find the new policy to be morally right and proper. This spells a fundamental distinction from the shame and wish to be liked of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Certain foreign policy setbacks did happen, of course, and many persisting problems remain unresolved. Attempts to build mutually beneficial and, consequently, stable relations in Europe and a viable system of European security ended in failure. The fratricidal conflict in Ukraine has not been prevented. To a large extent, because for the past twenty five years there was no sensible strategic policy in relation to that country. For many years it would remain a factor complicating constructive relations with Europe and a source of “black swans”—unpredictable challenges and provocations. There is a great risk that political, intellectual, managerial and economic resources will continue to be wasted on this sore spot, likely to remain hopeless for the coming years. Quite erroneous was the hope for resetting U.S.-Russia relations, because the underlying motive—strategic arms reductions—was of secondary importance. Moscow did not insist on the solution of the key issue—an end to the expansion of Western alliances.

The economic and political turn to the East has been slow. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, although it has expanded, is in half-slumber, and for almost a year one there have no results of the agreement to pair the Silk Road Economic Belt project and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian policy remains targeted at the past and this is one of its worst problems. We are still correcting mistakes of the past. The Russian elite has not yet devised a national development strategy, including a proper foreign policy, that would be targeted at the future.

The basic conclusion is this: foreign policy achievements, the country’s stronger strategic foothold and security, restoration of Russia’s status of a first class great power which both a majority of the elite and the people aspire allow for—and the old and new challenges strongly require—shifting the attention of the state and society to the tasks of internal economic development and the preservation and buildup of the nation’s human capital. That a majority of the elite is not prepared for such overripe change in politics is rather discouraging.

Future-Targeted Foreign Policy

Russia’s foreign policy in a new world should apparently proceed from the following principles and goals (complementing and developing the officially proclaimed ones): prevention of another global military collision; all-out support for the country’s technological and economic development; and the preservation and multiplication of its human capital. There is no way of ensuring development without active involvement in international cooperation. It is essential to focus efforts on restoring and maintaining the supremacy of international law, above all the United Nations Charter. Russia must regain the status of a leading legitimistic world power.

The position Russia should seek in the future world is that of a stronghold of international peace and stability, a safeguard of free development by all countries and peoples, and a firm barrier against the dictating of alien rules and values from outside, let alone attempts to do so by force.

Russia’s ideal foreign policy and economic status in the future is that of a great economically developing Atlantic and Pacific power that plays a central role in the Big Eurasian community, in the economic, logistic, military and political integration of Asia and Europe, a safeguard of international peace and a provider of military-political stability for Eurasia.

In practical policy, the following tasks should enjoy priority:

high combat readiness and flexibility of the armed forces, nuclear forces in particular;

launch of practical projects to back up Russia’s turn eastwards; a policy of gradual creating—in cooperation with China, India, Iran and, apparently, with the ASEAN countries, South Korea, the EAEU allies and other countries—a Greater Eurasia Community, open to the world and seeking cooperation with the EU countries. A more active SCO is seen as the central organization for Russia’s future political and economic orientation. The movement towards creating a  Eurasia community will provide a counterbalance to China’s soaring strength and place it in a wider context. Apparently, China will benefit from this, too, for it will eliminate the risk China’s neighbors, worried over its growing potential, might start to organize to balance it.

The foreign policy’s primary bias towards the entire post-Soviet space should be gradually phased out. The Soviet Union ceased to exist 25 years ago. Remaining nostalgic for it will make no sense. The world has changed. A new policy is the imperative of the day.

Further efforts to step up the policy of support for Russian culture and language abroad and the establishment of relations with Russian diasporas is an urgent need. Russian citizens outside Russia must to be certain that Russia will firmly rise in their defense, if need be. But using the slogan of “protecting the Russian world” to rationalize the feasibility of using military force outside Russia is unrealistic and counterproductive. Which does not mean, though, that Russia should refrain from the use of military force outside its national territory to counter obvious threats to its key interests.

Lastly, while turning towards the rising world of the Southeast the strategic orientation towards restoring and advancing neighborly relations with the European countries should be preserved. Recreation of the system of European security on the old basis is impossible. Promotion of the widest possible pragmatic cultural, economic, scientific, educational and humanitarian cooperation is the issue of the day. In relations with NATO, professional discussions among the military over ways to maintain peace and prevent conflicts will be useful, but the same can hardly apply to the just-started restoration of the political dialogue within the Russia-NATO Council; such debates proved either useless or often harmful in the past.

It might be sensible to preserve the OSCE for the period of uncertainty and turbulence, but the organization should be re-oriented mostly towards the upgraded and expanded “first basket”—that for security—aimed at preventing and settling conflicts, drafting joint policies in the struggle with terrorism and in cooperation to maintain border security, at controlling immigration from neighboring regions, and at fighting cybercrime.

In relations with Europe for the coming decades it will apparently make sense to proceed from the understanding it is no longer a model to follow and  still more so, not a threat. It is a close culture and a partner in economic and humanitarian interaction. We have drifted apart for the time being, but a new rapprochement  is desirable and apparently possible.

The Ukraine and other similar crises should in the long term be addressed on the basis of agreed permanent neutrality and merger in new formats of cooperation and security. In the first place, Eurasian.In view of the new realities, above all, China’s movement westward, the stake should be put on replacing Russia’s failed unilateral European geopolitical integration by Eurasian one, by transition from the aborted Greater Europe project towards Greater Eurasia or, in the long term, even towards a Community of Greater Eurasia from Singapore to Lisbon. The purpose of relations with the United States is to firmly prevent it from taking dangerous actions, particularly so during the period of adjustment to the new realities, and to create incentives that might make it give up its revolutionary democratic messianism. It will be most important, though, to push ahead with a long-term policy of cooperation in settling crises and preventing them from turning global. The main instrument here must be proactive, including multilateral, dialogue to prevent shaking international strategic stability loose.

We reiterate once again that number one task of Russia’s foreign policy, just as of Russia’s overall strategy, should be to ensure early exit from the development crisis, which the country is experiencing today and which endangers its long-term positions in the world and its sovereignty. Foreign policy is to help mobilize society, and not distract it from the main goal of economic, scientific and technological revival. It should help develop the country along the promising track for the coming 5-10 years—the southeastern on, and not let it be distracted to other projects, either costly or promising little or no return.

ne2016

Russian Foreign Policy Finding New Bearings

This year will see the 25th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s breakup and the emergence of new Russia on its ruins. Time is ripe for taking stocks and mapping a road into the future.

A group of members of Russia’s Council on Defense and Foreign Policy (CDFP) has presented to the state and society its vision of the country’s future foreign policy. We believe that resuming a creative foreign policy discussion will be useful. Amidst massive worldwide propaganda it is easy to fall into the trap of somebody else’s or one’s own delusions. The acute foreign policy discussion in Russia that lasted throughout the 1990s helped prevent both hopeless retreat and an attempt at a suicidal revanche, and laid the groundwork for return to a more realistic, national interests-oriented policy. These days we are recalling with “legitimate pride” the major role that the CDFP and its “liberal imperialists” (as our veterans were often referred to then) played in that debate.

The CDFP has drafted a list of key points and ideas it is now pleased to present (See: www.svop.ru and www.globalaffairs.ru). This memorandum contains an analysis of global and regional trends, achievements and failures of Russian policies, and also some proposals regarding Russia’s future foreign policy that we deem beneficial. This article is an extra-brief summary of the last two sections of the memorandum in question.

Russian Foreign Policy Achievements

Russia’s foreign policy in the past decade was successful by and large and quite masterful at times. It largely matched the world challenges. A stagnant economy was the weak link. Foreign policy has compensated for that weakness so far. But this resource is now close to exhaustion. The country has regained its military potential at a qualitatively new level and at still tolerable costs. The expansion of Western alliances to the territories Russia considers vital to  its security has been stemmed, although it had to pay a dear price for that. The West is developing the long-awaited awareness that Russia’s interests have to be taken into account. This means the basis is being laid for more sound and fairer relations in the future.

Russia is making a turn in the economy and to a certain extent in politics towards booming Asia through the development of Siberia and the Far East, although the turn is belated and slow. Relations of friendship and profound strategic partnership with China have been established. The agreement to pair the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union has proved helpful in avoiding rivalry in Central Asia. Vast potential has been built up for deepening cooperation with the ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea.

As a result, Russia has secured a rather robust geopolitical position ahead of a new round of development (if it is destined to begin). In its day the Soviet Union was in confrontation with the West around the world and with China in the East. Also, it had to maintain the costly socialist bloc and countries of "socialist orientation" in the Third world. Today, Russia is involved in inevitable but eventually hopefully easing confrontation only with the West.

In contrast to what was observed in the last years of the Soviet Union and in the early days of new Russia, society’s political morale has changed. The feeling of dismay and fading Communist ideology of the 1980s and the frustrating situation of the 1990s, when the revolutionary-minded minority was dictating to the majority a set of “liberal” values (that would eventually prove alien and not viable on Russian soil) have given way to the rise of patriotism, state nationalism and more or less normal, traditional values. The same values are shared by a majority of humanity and, quite possibly, they have begun their comeback to the Western world, whose elite tried to reject them. It is very important that a majority of Russia’s population and the elite find the new policy to be morally right and proper. This spells a fundamental distinction from the shame and wish to be liked of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Certain foreign policy setbacks did happen, of course, and many persisting problems remain unresolved. Attempts to build mutually beneficial and, consequently, stable relations in Europe and a viable system of European security ended in failure. The fratricidal conflict in Ukraine has not been prevented. To a large extent, because for the past twenty five years there was no sensible strategic policy in relation to that country. For many years it would remain a factor complicating constructive relations with Europe and a source of “black swans”—unpredictable challenges and provocations. There is a great risk that political, intellectual, managerial and economic resources will continue to be wasted on this sore spot, likely to remain hopeless for the coming years. Quite erroneous was the hope for resetting U.S.-Russia relations, because the underlying motive—strategic arms reductions—was of secondary importance. Moscow did not insist on the solution of the key issue—an end to the expansion of Western alliances.

The economic and political turn to the East has been slow. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, although it has expanded, is in half-slumber, and for almost a year one there have no results of the agreement to pair the Silk Road Economic Belt project and the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian policy remains targeted at the past and this is one of its worst problems. We are still correcting mistakes of the past. The Russian elite has not yet devised a national development strategy, including a proper foreign policy, that would be targeted at the future.

The basic conclusion is this: foreign policy achievements, the country’s stronger strategic foothold and security, restoration of Russia’s status of a first class great power which both a majority of the elite and the people aspire allow for—and the old and new challenges strongly require—shifting the attention of the state and society to the tasks of internal economic development and the preservation and buildup of the nation’s human capital. That a majority of the elite is not prepared for such overripe change in politics is rather discouraging.

Future-Targeted Foreign Policy

Russia’s foreign policy in a new world should apparently proceed from the following principles and goals (complementing and developing the officially proclaimed ones): prevention of another global military collision; all-out support for the country’s technological and economic development; and the preservation and multiplication of its human capital. There is no way of ensuring development without active involvement in international cooperation. It is essential to focus efforts on restoring and maintaining the supremacy of international law, above all the United Nations Charter. Russia must regain the status of a leading legitimistic world power.

The position Russia should seek in the future world is that of a stronghold of international peace and stability, a safeguard of free development by all countries and peoples, and a firm barrier against the dictating of alien rules and values from outside, let alone attempts to do so by force.

Russia’s ideal foreign policy and economic status in the future is that of a great economically developing Atlantic and Pacific power that plays a central role in the Big Eurasian community, in the economic, logistic, military and political integration of Asia and Europe, a safeguard of international peace and a provider of military-political stability for Eurasia.

In practical policy, the following tasks should enjoy priority:

high combat readiness and flexibility of the armed forces, nuclear forces in particular;

launch of practical projects to back up Russia’s turn eastwards; a policy of gradual creating—in cooperation with China, India, Iran and, apparently, with the ASEAN countries, South Korea, the EAEU allies and other countries—a Greater Eurasia Community, open to the world and seeking cooperation with the EU countries. A more active SCO is seen as the central organization for Russia’s future political and economic orientation. The movement towards creating a  Eurasia community will provide a counterbalance to China’s soaring strength and place it in a wider context. Apparently, China will benefit from this, too, for it will eliminate the risk China’s neighbors, worried over its growing potential, might start to organize to balance it.

The foreign policy’s primary bias towards the entire post-Soviet space should be gradually phased out. The Soviet Union ceased to exist 25 years ago. Remaining nostalgic for it will make no sense. The world has changed. A new policy is the imperative of the day.

Further efforts to step up the policy of support for Russian culture and language abroad and the establishment of relations with Russian diasporas is an urgent need. Russian citizens outside Russia must to be certain that Russia will firmly rise in their defense, if need be. But using the slogan of “protecting the Russian world” to rationalize the feasibility of using military force outside Russia is unrealistic and counterproductive. Which does not mean, though, that Russia should refrain from the use of military force outside its national territory to counter obvious threats to its key interests.

Lastly, while turning towards the rising world of the Southeast the strategic orientation towards restoring and advancing neighborly relations with the European countries should be preserved. Recreation of the system of European security on the old basis is impossible. Promotion of the widest possible pragmatic cultural, economic, scientific, educational and humanitarian cooperation is the issue of the day. In relations with NATO, professional discussions among the military over ways to maintain peace and prevent conflicts will be useful, but the same can hardly apply to the just-started restoration of the political dialogue within the Russia-NATO Council; such debates proved either useless or often harmful in the past.

It might be sensible to preserve the OSCE for the period of uncertainty and turbulence, but the organization should be re-oriented mostly towards the upgraded and expanded “first basket”—that for security—aimed at preventing and settling conflicts, drafting joint policies in the struggle with terrorism and in cooperation to maintain border security, at controlling immigration from neighboring regions, and at fighting cybercrime.

In relations with Europe for the coming decades it will apparently make sense to proceed from the understanding it is no longer a model to follow and  still more so, not a threat. It is a close culture and a partner in economic and humanitarian interaction. We have drifted apart for the time being, but a new rapprochement  is desirable and apparently possible.

The Ukraine and other similar crises should in the long term be addressed on the basis of agreed permanent neutrality and merger in new formats of cooperation and security. In the first place, Eurasian.In view of the new realities, above all, China’s movement westward, the stake should be put on replacing Russia’s failed unilateral European geopolitical integration by Eurasian one, by transition from the aborted Greater Europe project towards Greater Eurasia or, in the long term, even towards a

Community of Greater Eurasia from Singapore to Lisbon. The purpose of relations with the United States is to firmly prevent it from taking dangerous actions, particularly so during the period of adjustment to the new realities, and to create incentives that might make it give up its revolutionary democratic messianism. It will be most important, though, to push ahead with a long-term policy of cooperation in settling crises and preventing them from turning global. The main instrument here must be proactive, including multilateral, dialogue to prevent shaking international strategic stability loose.

We reiterate once again that number one task of Russia’s foreign policy, just as of Russia’s overall strategy, should be to ensure early exit from the development crisis, which the country is experiencing today and which endangers its long-term positions in the world and its sovereignty. Foreign policy is to help mobilize society, and not distract it from the main goal of economic, scientific and technological revival. It should help develop the country along the promising track for the coming 5-10 years—the southeastern on, and not let it be distracted to other projects, either costly or promising little or no return.

Россия и США готовятся к звездным войнам

Ролик об этой пусковой

установке преподносится в Интернете как шпионская видеозапись опытного образца ракеты «Нудоль». Кадр из

видео с сайта www.news-front.infoИнтернет-портал Washington Free Beacon со ссылкой на источник в Пентагоне сообщил, что 25 мая с космодрома Плесецк был осуществлен испытательный пуск ракеты дальнего перехвата перспективной системы противоракетной и противокосмической обороны А-235, предположительно создающейся в рамках опытно-конструкторской работы (ОКР) «Нудоль».В своей статье «Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile», опубликованной на веб-ресурсе freebeacon.com, один из ведущих военных обозревателей Билл Герц, почему-то назвал эту ракету противоспутниковой. Может быть, она такой и станет, но в данном случае ни один спутник в космосе не пострадал, следовательно, запустили именно противоракету. Пресс-секретарь Пентагона подполковник Мишель Балданса отказалась от комментариев.Американские специалисты связывают программу «Нудоль» с системой противоракетной обороны Москвы и созданием ракетного комплекса дальнего перехвата. Стрельбовый комплекс 14Ц033 с командно-вычислительным пунктом 14П078 и РЛС 14Ц031 разрабатывается по ОКР «Нудоль» в качестве компонента системы ПРО А-235.Бывший сотрудник Пентагона Марк Шнайдер предупреждает о российской противоспутниковой угрозе. «Система GPS широко применяется во многих системах нашего оружия и хорошо показала

себя в условиях низкой и средней интенсивности обычного конфликта, – сказал он. Потеря GPS в результате антиспутниковой атаки приведет к ухудшению точности наведения оружия и, по существу, к сокращению всех наших возможностей».О том, что спутники стали уязвимой частью американской армии, говорилось и в докладе военной разведки, представленном в конгрессе США в феврале 2015 года. В нем отмечается, что «военная доктрина России определяет космическую оборону в качестве жизненно важного компонента национальной обороны, а российские лидеры открыто утверждают, что российские Вооруженные силы имеют противоспутниковое оружие и проводят исследования в этой области». Шнайдер подчеркнул, что угроза для американских спутников усугубляется недостатком у США средств противодействия российским спутникам.

Случайно или намеренно, испытания «Нудоль» состоялись накануне ежегодных стратегических учений Schriever Wargame 2016 на базе ВВС Максвелл (Монтгомери, штат Алабама). В ходе учений, в частности, проверялась степень интеграции всех сил и средств по ведению операций в киберпространстве и космосе. В ходе учений отрабатывались действия по противоракетной обороне, отражению кибератак, а также орбитальных боевых спутников. Противником была обозначена Россия. «Мы должны подготовиться к кризису или конфликту, которые могут распространяться в космическом пространстве», – сказал журналистам представитель космического командования полковник ВВС Майк Энгл. Официальный представитель космического командования Джейсон Алтек отказался признать, что противником была обозначена Россия. «Я могу сказать вам, что это был глобальный сценарий», – сказал он. На вопрос, удалось ли «победить» Россию, он также отказался отвечать, сославшись на засекреченность таких деталей. Сценарий учений охватывал зону Европейского командования и включал полный спектр угроз через различные операционные среды.