· web vieweighth amendment claims asserted against lscc warden joseph p. meko and kdoc...

APPENDIX B: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY -WESTLAWNEXT(UNEDITED FINDING, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDED)

1. IMPROPER USE OF THE RESTRAINT CHAIR CAUSING PAIN, INJURY OR WEAKNESS OF A BODY PART

Robert PEOPLES, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. Karl VONMUTIUS et al., Defendants.C/A No. 1:08–3977–CMC–SVH. | Sept. 21, 2010.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionDefendants Von Mutius and Brighthart's motion for summary judgment is denied as to the claimed use of excessive force which allegedly occurred after Plaintiff had been removed from his cell and prior to his placement in the restraint chair, and granted as to all other claims. A pretrial conference will be held at 2:00 p.m. on October 7, 2010, in Courtroom # 2, Matthew J. Perry, Jr., United States Courthouse, 901 Richland Street, Columbia, South Carolina.Defendants Nunnally, Williams, Cox, Selby, Palmer, and Smith are granted summary judgment, and these Defendants are dismissed from this matter with prejudice.Defendant Norwood is dismissed from this matter without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (or for temporary restraining order) is moot.Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or in the alternative to strike (Dkt. # 92, filed Dec. 3, 2010) is denied.Plaintiff's motion for a ruling on summary judgment and/or in the alternative to strike Defendants' answer is moot. The court defers Plaintiff's motion to compel (Dkt. # 127, filed May 10, 2010) until the pretrial conference as set.

Louis ALDINI, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Dustin L. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.No. 3:07–cv–183. | Jan. 8, 2011.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionThe Court finds there is no genuine dispute of material fact on the remaining claims against Defendants Leopold and Kaczmarek and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 55) is granted.

Andre Peter TOWNSEND, Plaintiff, v. Calvin ANTHONY, Warden et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 0:03-2528-RBH. | July 24, 2006.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims, and that these claims bedismissed. To the extent Plaintiff has intended to assert any state law claims, those claims should

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be dismissed, without prejudice. This will allow any such claims to be dealt with in state court. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 387 U.S. 715 (1966), and its progeny.

Yassin Haythame MOHAMAD, Plaintiff, v. Michael C. BARONE (Superindendent) et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–316 E. | April 30, 2012.


CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 50] is GRANTED. An appropriate Order follows.AND NOW, this 30th day of April, 2012, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 50], and for the reasons set forth in the Opinion entered contemporaneously with this Order after review of the record and briefs and exhibits filed in support and opposition thereto, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

David PARDUE, Plaintiff. v. SGT. GLASS, et al., Defendants.No. 05-5004. | Sept. 25, 2006. PRETRIAL MOTION: PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionTherefore, I recommend that defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) be denied.The parties have ten days from receipt of this report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely written objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff(s), v. LARIMER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al., Defendant(s).Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–REB–KLM. | Sept. 2, 2008. PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that(1) Nurses Hoffman and Hauge's Motion be GRANTED;(2) Nurse Bruntz's Motion be GRANTED; and(3) County Defendants' Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.The Court summarizes its Recommendation as follows:(4) Defendants LCDC, Nurse Bruntz, Nurse Hoffman, Nurse Hauge, Russell, Hooper, Sanzone, Daniels, Gregory, Traylor, Cates, Vanderslice and Unknown Nurses be dismissed;(5) Claims II(a), II(b), IV(b), X & XII be dismissed; and(6) Claims III, IV(a), IV(c), V & VI proceed as discussed as against Defendants Burgess, Harris, Esters, Nail, Kerr, Sims, Meeks, Moll, Farabee, Vanfleet, Harteker, Pugliese, Martinez, Santos Romero, Armentrout, Somoyer, McHugh, Purrier, Kiahtipes and Darling.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties shall have ten (10) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file

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specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (10th Cir.1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.1996).

Corey Jawan ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. Cpt. T. CLARK et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:12–cv–00502–JMC. | June 18, 2013.


Conclusion and RecommendationBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 132, be denied, and Defendant Aiken's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 148, and the Lieber Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 149, be granted and that this case be dismissed.IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.1. Because the Court has considered matters outside of the pleadings, the undersigned is considering the motion as one for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).2. Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975) (requiring the court provide explanation of dismissal/summary judgment procedures to pro se litigants).3. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim on his cellmate Pierre Livingston's behalf, the undersigned finds that this claim must fail. See Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625–26 (4th Cir.1981) (a prisoner cannot act as an advocate for other inmates).4. Defendants assert Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies as an additional ground to support a grant of summary judgment. Defendants, however, did not submit sufficient documentation to support this argument. Therefore the undersigned does not address this ground in the Report and Recommendation.

Tracy RHINE, v. CITY OF MANSFIELD, TEXAS, et al.Civil Action No. 4:11–CV–076–Y. | March 21, 2013.


ConclusionTherefore, the defendants' motion to strike plaintiff Rhine's November 16, 2012 Response (doc. 63) is GRANTED only in that sections II and III of that document will not be considered by the Court in reviewing and ruling upon the motion for summary judgment.Furthermore, the motion for summary judgment filed by the remaining defendants (doc. 54) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Tracy Rhine shall take nothing on her remaining claims raised in this suit against defendants Carolina Ellison, Leslie Jackson, and Edward Cervantez, and all such claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Jessie PILLETTE, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF OTSEGO et al., Defendants.No. 06-CV-10536. | Feb. 27, 2007.

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PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICTConclusionFor the reasons stated above, I suggest the Defendants' motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment be granted and that all Defendants are entitled to dismissal of all claims against them because Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence supporting the elements of his Eighth Amendment claims, First and Fourteenth Amendment claim, and because he has failed to support his state law tort claims with any evidence undermining state governmental immunity. I also suggest that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint be denied as justice does not require it since any amendment would be futile.

Deputy SEDILLIO, Deputy Titus, and Deputy Poole, Defendants.Civil Action No. 06–cv–02329–EWN–KLM. | March 20, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that summary judgment be granted in Defendants' favor and that Plaintiff's case be dismissed without prejudice for his failure to properly exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1997e and Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.13 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's case against Defendant Poole should be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m).14 Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties shall have ten (10) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned.A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the recommendation by the district judge, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (10th Cir.1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.1996).

Abu B. KARGBO v. James O’MARA et al.Civil No. 11–cv–130–SM. | Dec. 22, 2011.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT AND PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD

Conclusion1. The motion for appointment of counsel (doc. no. 10) is denied, without prejudice to Kargbo's filing a new motion in this case seeking such relief, if any exceptional circumstances arise in the future that would warrant the appointment of counsel.2. The motion to amend the complaint (doc. no. 9) is granted.3. The clerk's office is directed to prepare and issue summonses for the following officers at the Hillsborough County Department of Corrections: Sgt. C. Brown and Officers Meurin, Plumpton, and Caisse. The clerk's office shall forward to the United States Marshal for the District of New Hampshire (the “U.S. Marshal's office”): the summonses; the complaint (doc. no. 1); the Report and Recommendation issued on this date; and this Order. Upon receipt of the necessary documentation, the U.S. Marshal's office shall serve process on each defendant. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3).

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4. Defendants are instructed to answer or otherwise plead within twenty-one days of service. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(1)(A).5. Kargbo is instructed that all future pleadings, written motions, notices, or similar papers shall be served directly on defendants by delivering or mailing the materials to them or their attorney(s), pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b).

Randolph BETHUNE, Plaintiff, v. Sherry LACHICA, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 08–5738 (RMB/KMW). | Docket Nos. 76, 84. | April 18, 2012.

PRETRIAL MOTION: PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionFor all these reasons, Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED. Counsel is directed to contact the Court's Deputy Clerk to schedule a trial date in June 2012.

Janice M. HALL, Plaintiff v. WARREN COUNTY REGIONAL JAIL, et al., Defendants.No. 1:09-CV-00098. | Jan. 14, 2010.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kentucky State Police's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Defendant Warren County Regional Jail's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. All claims asserted against Warren County Regional Jail and Kentucky State Police are hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Janice M. HALL, Plaintiff v. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF WORKERS’ CLAIMS, et al., Defendants.No. 1:09–CV–00098. | Feb. 23, 2010.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, Defendants Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims, James L. Overfield, Tara Aziz and John Mann's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.An appropriate order shall issue.

Patrick DAVIS, Plaintiff v. Cert Officers Barclay BANTA, at al., Defendants.No. 5:12–CV–146–MTT–CHW. | May 21, 2012.


ConclusionPLAINTIFF'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FILING FEEPursuant to provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in the event Plaintiff is hereafter released from the custody of the State of Georgia or any county thereof, he shall remain obligated to pay any balance due on the filing fee in this proceeding until said amount has been paid in full; plaintiff shall continue to remit monthly payments as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Collection from the plaintiff of any balance due on the filing fee by any means permitted by law is hereby authorized

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in the event plaintiff is released from custody and fails to remit payments. In addition, plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal if he has the ability to make monthly payments and fails to do so.SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 21st day of May, 2012.Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate when a more carefully drafted pro se complaint might state a claim. Duff v. Steub, 378 F. App'x 868, 872 (11th Cir. Apr.29, 2010

Arnold Lorenzo PAIGE, Plaintiff, v. Alan CLONINGER, et. al., Defendant.No. 3:06CV335-03-MU. | Aug. 10, 2006.


ConclusionNOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).Footnotes1. The Court that it is well acquainted with Plaintiff and notes that Plaintiff was being housed in Gaston County due to a scheduled trial before this Court on Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Mecklenburg County (See 3:00cv535.) Because Mecklenburg County was the Defendant in that lawsuit, Plaintiff could not be housed in Mecklenburg County. Gaston County agreed to house Plaintiff, a federal inmate, while in Charlotte for his trial. Plaintiff's case settled and Plaintiff was awarded damages. While the settlement documents were being prepared, this Court was contacted by the United States Marshall's Service who was responsible for transporting Plaintiff and arranging for his housing while in Charlotte. The Marshall's Service explained to this Court that officials from the Gaston County Jail had contacted them and explained that Plaintiff had become very difficult while in Gaston County custody and that Plaintiff had been excessively complaining that because he was a federal inmate he was entitled to special treatment while in county custody and if he did not receive it he was threatening the sue the jail employees during his stay. Gaston County was aware that Plaintiff's case had settled and asked the Marshall's service to inquire with this Court how soon Plaintiff could be transported back to U.S.P. Allenwood in Pennsylvannia.2. The claims against Defendant Alan Cloninger therefore can only be construed as claims under a theory of supervisory liability. As an initial matter, the Court notes, that the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Additionally there is no allegation that Mr. Cloninger instituted any official policy that any other defendant was following which caused Plaintiffs alleged constitutional deprivations. Therefore, there is no basis upon which to attach supervisory liability to Mr. Cloninger. Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir.1982). Defendant Cloninger is dismissed from this case.3. The Court has reviewed the grievance Plaintiff filed related to the alleged assault and notes that Plaintiff only included Defendant Rush and Doby in his grievance. With respect to Defendant Doby, Plaintiff alleged only that he need to see a nurse, but not that Defendant Doby participated in the assault. Therefore, it appears that Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies as to Defendants Doby, Shed, Morris, Lail and John Doe. See Grievance, attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Ex. A.)4. Additionally, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's grievance filed as an exhibit to his Complaint and notes that Nurse Jane Doe's failure to provide medical care after his alleged assault is not included in such grievance. As such, it appears that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Nurse Jane Doe. See Grievance attached to Plaintiff's Complaint as Ex. A.)

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Darrin GRUENBERG, Plaintiff, v. Capt. GEMPELER, et al., Defendants.Case No. 09–C–455. | Sept. 30, 2010.


ConclusionFor the reasons given above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All other pending motions are DENIED.3 The case is DISMISSED.

Matthew Tazio REDMON, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE et al., Defendants—Appellees.No. 10–11070 | Non–Argument Calendar. | Feb. 10, 2011.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionFor the reasons given above, we affirm the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without prejudice and the district court's denial of Plaintiff's motions for the appointment of counsel.AFFIRMED.Parallel Citations2011 WL 476601 (C.A.11 (Fla.))

Mario Antonio JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Eric WATSON et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. CV209–162. | Dec. 10, 2010.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT Conclusion Based on the foregoing, it is my RECOMMENDATION that Movants' unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's claims against Movants bedismissed.SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.Footnotes

Nathan L. ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants v. Jason R. SLARB, et al., Defendants-Appellees.No. 07COA042. | Decided March 11, 2008.

APPEAL: DEFENSE VERDICT

Conclusions38. We find the trial court’s analysis to be correct. Although appellee’s acts may be within the definition of negligence, there is no proof of any wanton or reckless acts in the record. 39. The sole assignment of error is denied.40. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Ashland County, Ohio is hereby affirmed.

David A. JOSEPH, Sr., Plaintiff, v. MERCER COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.

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No. 3:12 CV 0847. | Dec. 3, 2012.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionAccordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Mercer County Commissioners and MCADC are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff's claims regarding excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious dental needs are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

Glenn D. ODOM, II, Plaintiff v. Larry CRANOR et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:13CV–P8–R. | June 21, 2013.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's official-capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants White and Wood and all claims against Defendants KDOC and Grief are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff claims under the PAMII, ADA, and RA and his claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.The Court will enter a separate Scheduling Order governing the development of the claims that have been permitted to proceed.

Rodney BOOMER, Plaintiff v. Sgt. Harry LEWIS, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:06–CV–0850. | April 1, 2009.


Recommendations.Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the motion (doc. 462) for summary judgment filed by the Pocono Mountain Police defendants be granted in part and denied in part. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendant Lamberton as to all of the plaintiff's claims against him. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of the remaining Pocono Mountain Police defendants (defendants Lewis, Smelas, Lutz, Rice, Robson and Stapleton) as to the plaintiff's due process medical claim. It is recommended that summary judgment be denied as to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against defendants Lewis, Smelas, Lutz, Rice, Robson and Stapleton.It is recommended that the motion (doc. 456) for summary judgment filed by defendants Zaloga and Fox be granted.It is recommended that the motion (doc. 453) for summary judgment filed by defendants Donate, Columbia, Walsh and Yavoroski be granted.

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It is recommended that the motion (doc. 449) for summary judgment filed by defendants Prime Care Medical, Inc., Sprague and Bunting be granted.It is recommended that the motion (doc. 466) for summary judgment filed by defendants Checho, Shaffer and Morieko be granted.It is recommended that the motion (doc. 459) for summary judgment filed by defendants Pike County Correctional Facility, Lowe, Romance, Kumburis, Lastarza, Campos, Gattuso, DeMarco, Francis, Schwartz and Shappert be granted in part and denied in part. It is recommended that the claim(s) against the Pike County Correctional Facility be dismissed. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Lowe and Romance as to all of the plaintiff's claims against them. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Gattuso, Campos and Lastarza as to the plaintiff's claim regarding his housing assignment. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Gattuso, Campos, Schwartz and DeMarco as to the plaintiff's claims regarding cleaning his cell and the stripping of his cell. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Gattuso, Campos, Schwartz and DeMarco as to the plaintiff's claims of verbal harassment. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Kumburis and Lastarza as to the plaintiff's due process claim regarding his disciplinary hearing. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendant Francis as to the plaintiff's retaliation claims regarding the filing of misconduct charges and criminal charges against the plaintiff. It is recommended that the motion be denied as to the plaintiff's retaliation claims against defendant Shappert based on the filing of misconduct charges and criminal charges against the plaintiff. It is recommended that summary judgment not be granted in favor of defendants Francis and Shappert as to the plaintiff's excessive force and retaliation claims based on the alleged assault. It is recommended that summary judgment not be granted in favor of defendant Campos as to the plaintiff's claim regarding the use of the restraint chair. It is recommended that summary judgment not be granted in favor of defendants DeMarco, Campos and Kumburis as to the plaintiff's claims regarding the use of a chemical agent.It is recommended that defendant Maritato's motion (doc. 516) for sanctions be denied.Finally, it is recommended that the case be listed for trial on the remaining claims.

Rodney BOOMER, Plaintiff v. Sgt. Harry LEWIS, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:06–CV–0850. | Sept. 9, 2009.


ConclusionNOW, THIS 9th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2009, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge J. Andrew Smyser (Dkt.545) is ADOPTED IN PART.2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of PrimeCare Medical, Inc., Patti Bunting, and William Sprague (Dkt.449) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff.3. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Lackawanna County Prison and defendants Columbia, Donate, Walsh, and Yavorski (Dkt.453) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff.4. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Fox and Zagato (Dkt.456) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff.

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5. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Pike County Correctional Facility and Defendants Campos, DeMarco, Gattuso, Kumburis, Lowe, Romance, Schwartz, Francis, and Schappert (Dkt. Entry 459) is GRANTED IN PART. The Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to the excessive force claim filed against Defendants Francis and Schappert, the retaliation claim filed against Defendant Schappert, and the claim pertaining to the use of a restraint chair against Defendant Campos. In all other respects, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Entry 459) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Pike County Correctional Facility and Defendants DeMarco, Gattuso, Kumburis, Lowe, Romance, and Schwartz, and against Plaintiff.6. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department and Defendants Lamberton, Lutz, Rice, Robson, Smelas, Stapleton, and Lewis (Dkt. Entry 462) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff.7. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Checho, Shaffer, and Moreiko (Dkt.466) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff.*18 8. The Motion for Sanctions filed on behalf of Defendant Maritato (Dkt.516) is DENIED.8. A telephonic scheduling conference with counsel for the remaining Defendants (Francis, Schappert, and Campos) and Plaintiff shall be conducted on Wednesday, October 21, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. The Clerk of Court shall make the appropriate arrangements for the conference call.

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Tom HOGAN and E.R.C., Inc.Error! Hyperlink reference not valid., Defendants.No. 06 cv 4029. | Sept. 28, 2007.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionThe Court is aware the defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 96). However, as the Court has given Mr. Davis until October 15, 2007, to disclose his expert witnesses. The Court feels that ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment is premature.IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED:1. Plaintiff's pro se motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 37) is hereby denied.2. Plaintiff's pro se appeal (Docket No. 43) of U.S. Magistrate Zoss' Order Re: motion for miscellaneous relief (Docket No. 39) is hereby denied.3. Plaintiff's pro se motion for certification of a class action and for appointment of counsel to represent the class (both motions contained in Docket No. 44) are each herebydenied.4. Plaintiff's pro se appeal (Docket No. 70) of U.S. Magistrate Zoss' Order Re: motion to compel (Docket No. 68) is hereby denied.5. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 96) is hereby held in abeyance until after the deadline provided to plaintiff for filing his expert witnesses has passed.

Jimmy DUNCAN, Plaintiff, v. Lieutenant Jack LANGESTEIN, Corporal Travis Guess, NN Wade, Officer Fincher, Officer Henly, Sgt. Franklin Jones, and Nurse NFN Moore, Defendants.C/A No. 8:07-0268-MBS. | Jan. 14, 2008.


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ConclusionWherefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry # 16) be DENIED and Defendants' Motion to Strike (Docket Entry # 16) be GRANTED; and the Plaintiff's Motions for Injunctive Relief (Docket Entry # 14), for a Temporary Restraining Order (Docket Entry # 27), and for a Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry # 30) be DENIED.FURTHER IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Stay the Proceedings and Compel Discovery (Docket Entry # 22) be DENIED as moot.IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Charles CHATMAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al., Defendants.No. C 08-0050 MMC (PR). | Aug. 28, 2008.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred.The Clerk shall close the file.IT IS SO ORDERED.

Frederick HUNTER, Plaintiff, v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.No. 3:10cv328/LC/CJK. | Dec. 19, 2011.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionIt appears beyond doubt that plaintiff's constitutional claims of false imprisonment, excessive force and inadequate medical care are time-barred, and that plaintiff's double jeopardy claim against the defendants lacks an arguable basis in the law.*3 Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED:1. That this cause be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.2. That the clerk be directed to close the file.

Danielle Janae CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–127. | Aug. 11, 2010.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionIt is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Rustin and Paige (Doc. 42) be granted in part and denied in part as stated above. Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her Complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified above.*4 In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules for Magistrates, objections to this Report and Recommendation are due by August 25, 2010. Failure to timely file objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.

Terry FULLER, Plaintiff, v. Officer COCRAN et al., Defendants.

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No. 1:05-CV-76. | July 27, 2005.


ConclusionPlaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED as MOOT [Court File No. 4].A judgment will enter.Footnotes1. Although the Court would typically issue a show cause order against a non-responding party, as the Court is dismissing this case, it would be a waste of judicial resources to issue a show cause order.2. “The grievance that I filed against Defendant Marcus Cochran [sic], was for the reasons of using excessive use of force against me, and then subjecting me to cruel and unusual punishment by placing me in a strip cell for (3) days without any clothes, hygienes [sic], bed mattress, or bed material, such as blankets or sheet” [Court File No. 7, at 3].3. The Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits monetary relief for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a showing of physical injury. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). A physical injury must be more than de minimis to support a claim for mental or emotional suffering. Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir.1999), modified by, 216 F.3d 970 (11th cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1065, 121 S.Ct. 2214, 150 L.Ed.2d 208 (2001). Fuller alleges he experienced pain and suffering when the defendant choked him and his wrists were nearly bleeding from the handcuffs. It does not appear that plaintiff has alleged more than de minimis injury, thus, his claim for monetary damages appear to be barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)

Mario Antonio JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Tommy GREGORY et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. CV209–162. | Feb. 24, 2010.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionAfter an independent review of the record, the Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, to which no objections have been filed. Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is adopted as the opinion of the Court.Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Tommy Gregory, Larry Hamilton, Josh Baker, and Officer Fontanez are DISMISSED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and1915A(b).

Mark Raymond COFFELT, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Keith LOVIN et al., Defendants.No. 2:09CV21–03–MU. | April 2, 2009.


ConclusionTHIS MATTER comes before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff's Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed March 19, 2008. (Document No. 1.)Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 19, 2008 after arguing with Defendant Officer Rex Cable he was handcuffed and taken to a holding cell. Once in the holding cell, Defendant Rex removed the cuffs and slammed Plaintiff to the floor. Defendant Officer Hoper came into the room and instructed Officer Cable to place Plaintiff in the restraint chair. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made the straps

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so tight on his wrists that his hands turned purple. He contends that the straps were so tight on his ankles that his ankles were numb by the time the toe straps were removed and the straps were so tight around his stomach that he could hardly breath. Plaintiff contends that as a result of the excessive force used against him by Defendants, he had a blown blood vessel in his left eye and injured his right knee and experienced mental anguish.Sheriff Keith LovinAlthough Sheriff Lovin is named as a Defendant to this matter, Plaintiff does not allege that he was involved in the excessive force or even that he knew about it. Because Plaintiff does not specifically allege that Sheriff Lovin was in any way involved in the assault against him, or knew about the alleged excessive force by Officers Cable and Hooper, there is no valid cause of action against Sheriff Lovin and he is dismissed from the case. Moreover, the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).Officers Cable and HooperWhen officials are accused of using excessive force, the proper inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,1033 (2nd Cir.1973)). In addition, a plaintiff alleging an excessive force claim is also required to allege something more than a de minimus injury. Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir.1994).A plaintiff cannot merely rely on “conclusory allegations” and “must present more than naked allegations” to survive dismissal. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir.1989) and Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (0 Cir.1994). While a state may not hold and physically punish an individual except in accordance with due process of law, there is a de minimis level of force with which the Constitution is not concerned. Riley v. Dorton, 115 F .3d 1159, 1166 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that a pretrial detainee claiming excessive force must show more than a de minimis injury). Taking all of Plaintiff's allegations as true, the “excessive force” he describes in his Complaint does not rise to the level of a Constitutional claim because he does not allege anything more than a de minimis injury as is required.1 Plaintiff has not stated a constitutional claim; therefore his claim must be dismissed.

Paul CROW v. Baker CORPPER, et al.Civil Action No. 10–1779. | Jan. 24, 2013.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionFor the above-assigned reasons,IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [docs. # 71, 72] be GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE,. In the alternative, it is recommended, based on the entire record of the evidentiary hearing, that Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and F.R.C.P. Rule 72(b), the parties have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. A courtesy copy of any objection or response or request for extension of time shall be furnished to the District Judge at the time of filing. The District Judge will consider timely objections before he makes a final ruling.

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A PARTY'S FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICE SHALL BAR AN AGGRIEVED PARTY, EXCEPT ON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR, FROM ATTACKING ON APPEAL THE UNOBJECTED–TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ACCEPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE.

Lisa SALAS, as parent and next friend of Orlando Salas, Plaintiff, v. Matthew BRIGHAM et al., Defendants.No. CIV 08–1184 JB/RLP. | Oct. 6, 2010.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionThe Court will not exercise its discretion to order either party to pay the costs and fees associated with briefing these motions. The dispute had merit for both sides. For this reason, the Court will deny both parties' requests for costs and fees associated with the briefing.IT IS ORDERED that: (i) Defendant Marisa Bee's Motion for Leave to File a Sur-response (Doc. 122), is denied without prejudice to her renewing the motion if necessary; (ii) Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment or, in the Alternative, Other Sanctions for Discovery Violations and Memorandum in Support (Doc. 101), is denied in part and granted in part; and (iii) Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants for Unfair Discovery Tactics (Doc. 133), is denied in part and granted in part.Footnotes1. The Defendants contend that the Court should summarily deny L. Salas' Second Motion for Sanctions, as she did not seek the Defendants' concurrence in her sanctions motion as rule 7.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of New Mexico requires. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions Against Defendants for Unfair Discovery Tactics at 13, filed August 5, 2010 (Doc. 161)(“Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Sanctions”). Although L. Salas did not seek concurrence on her Second Motion for Sanctions, the Defendants filed a response in opposition of the motion and appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2010 to argue against the motion. The Court therefore is aware that the Defendants oppose the motion and will address the merits of the motion instead of summarily dismissing it on procedural grounds.2. Carol Holland is a nurse at CCJDF.3. The Court grants L. Salas' request to re-depose material witnesses at the Defendants' expense because BBC produced the audit reports after she had conducted several depositions. L. Salas was thus unable to question these witnesses about the audit reports. Although the Court bases its ruling on BBC's delayed production of the audit reports, the Court finds that L. Salas may ask the witnesses about the urination incident, even though the incident was not alleged as a basis for recovery in the Amended Complaint.

Landon M. PRICE, Plaintiff, v. Richard K. JONES, Sheriff, et al., Defendants.No. 1:12–cv–360. | Jan. 29, 2013.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT plaintiff's motion to amend (Doc. 16) is GRANTED and plaintiff's motion for witnesses (Doc. 5) is DENIED. Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT plaintiff's motion for default judgment (Doc. 18) be DENIED.

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Chadrick FULKS v. James METTS, Sheriff/Lexington County, et alC.A. No. 2:06-0980-PMD-RSC. (Restraint cuffs too tight)


ConclusionAccordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, it is recommended that summary judgment against the named defendants in their individual capacities be denied, that summary judgment against the named defendants in their official capacities be granted, and that the third cause of action be dismissed for lack of any injury. The plaintiff's motion to amend to substitute A. Richbourg for John Doe # 1 should be denied, and both John Doe defendants should be dismissed.

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2. IMPROPER MONITORING OF THE SUBJECT CAUSING PAIN, INJURY OR WEAKNESS OF A BODY PART

Eric David SEALES, Plaintiff, v. MACOMB COUNTY et al., Defendants. Civil Case No. 03-40336. | Sept. 29, 2006.

PRE-TRIAL: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionI recommend, for the reasons stated above that Jasen Stabley, Ted Stabley, Hill, Gierke, and Whitehead's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. Accordingly, the claims against Macomb County insofar as it pertains to actions by these Defendants should be DISMISSED. I further recommend that Defendant True's motion for summary judgment should be DENIED and that Defendant Macomb County's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED as it pertains to True's alleged assault.

John D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Steve McKILLUP, et al., Defendants. Civil No. 05-275-JPG. | Jan. 22, 2007.

PRE-TRIAL: PLAINTIFF UPHELD Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this cause is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral. Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed of any change in his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven (7) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Frederick HUNTER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF SHELBURNE et al., Defendants.No. 5:10–CV–206. | Sept. 19, 2012.

PRE-TRIAL: DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 60) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.

Daniel CINCOSKI, Appellant, v. RICHARD, Dr., Grimes Unit, Arkansas Department of Correction; et al.

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http://www.westlaw.com/Search/Results.html?query=advanced%3A+OAID(5016564635)&saveJuris=False&contentType=BUSINESS-INVESTIGATOR&startIndex=1&contextData=(sc.Default)&categoryPageUrl=Home%2FCompanyInvestigator&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem

http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS636&originatingDoc=I387f5344acb811dbb38df5bc58c34d92&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)

http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=42USCAS1997E&originatingDoc=I387f5344acb811dbb38df5bc58c34d92&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)

No. 11–1064. | Submitted: May 12, 2011. | Filed: June 9, 2011.


ConclusionWe also conclude, however, that Cincoski presented claims under the Eighth Amendment in which he did not challenge the disciplinary proceedings, and these claims were not barred by Heck. Specifically, Cincoski claimed in his amended complaint that the denial of his requested medication was in itself unconstitutional; that the conditions of confinement during suicide watch were unconstitutional; that the denial of personal hygiene items led to extreme pain, for which medication was denied; and that at some point he had no access to water in his cell. He provided further details of these claims in additional filings, and attempted to expand on the claims at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. Although defendants moved for summary judgment on Cincoski's claim that he was denied adequate medical care, they did not respond to the allegations about the allegedly unconstitutional conditions. We express no opinion as to whether summary judgment might be warranted on any of these claims, but we note that a case resolved through summary judgment does not count as a strike. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (prior case counts as strike if it was dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim).**2 We grant Cincoski leave to proceed in forma pauperis. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Matthew R. DYE, Plaintiff, v. Chief Deputy Barry VIRTS, et al., Defendants.No. 03–CV–6273L. | Sept. 28, 2004.


ConclusionDefendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt.# 9) is granted

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3. EMOTIONAL HARM CAUSED FROM USE OF THE RESTRAINT CHAIR (I.E., PTSD)

Mohammed AL–ADAHI, et al., Petitioners, v. Barack H. OBAMA, et al.,1 Respondents.Civil Action No. 05–280 (GK). | Feb. 10, 2009.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the fact that Petitioners cannot satisfy one of the pre-requisites to the granting of a preliminary injunction, namely, that there is a substantial [l]ikelihood of success on the merits, far outweighs all other considerations. Accordingly, their Renewed Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 234] is hereby denied.

Alex D. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Thierry NETTLES et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 1:11–1479–TLW–SVH. | Sept. 20, 2012.


ConclusionFinally, in light of the foregoing, the Court notes that even had it found that a constitutional rights violation occurred in this case, the five individually-named Defendants, all of whom were officials of the Lieber Correctional Institution, would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, given that their individual conduct in this case did not violate “clearly established constitutional or statutory rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). While Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir.1996), does address the issue of restraining an inmate, in part, it differs significantly from the facts of record before this Court.For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declines to accept the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Docs. # 38 and # 45). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. (Doc. # 31).

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4. CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN GENERAL

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff(s), v. LARIMER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al., Defendant(s).Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–REB–KLM. | Sept. 2, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that(1) Nurses Hoffman and Hauge's Motion be GRANTED;(2) Nurse Bruntz's Motion be GRANTED;(3) County Defendants' Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.The Court summarizes its Recommendation as follows:(4) Defendants LCDC, Nurse Bruntz, Nurse Hoffman, Nurse Hauge, Russell, Hooper, Sanzone, Daniels, Gregory, Traylor, Cates, Vanderslice and Unknown Nurses be dismissed;(5) Claims II(a), II(b), IV(b), X & XII be dismissed; and(6) Claims III, IV(a), IV(c), V & VI proceed as discussed as against Defendants Burgess, Harris, Esters, Nail, Kerr, Sims, Meeks, Moll, Farabee, Vanfleet, Harteker, Pugliese, Martinez, Santos Romero, Armentrout, Somoyer, McHugh, Purrier, Kiahtipes and Darling.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties shall have ten (10) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions.Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (10th Cir.1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.1996).

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Gregory HARRIS et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–CMA–KLM. | Feb. 27, 2009.

COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD, $10,000 ConclusionBased on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that:1. Judgment shall enter in favor of Plaintiff Charles Lee Kettering, and against Sergeant Michael Esters, on Claim IV in the amount of $10,000.00;2. Claim IV shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as asserted against Defendant Deputy Clyde Meeks and Defendant Deputy Robert Moll; and3. Claims III, V, and VI shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as asserted against all remaining Defendants.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 05-3040. | July 28, 2008.

PLAINTIFF UPHELD, $7207

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ConclusionFor the reasons stated, I recommend that judgment be entered in Griffis' favor in the amount of $7207 against Former Sheriff C.E. “Chuck” Medford. This amount represents $7 nominal damages for the days spent in lock-down and $600 per day for the twelve days spent in the restraint chair. I further recommend that Former Sheriff C.E. “Chuck” Medford be required to pay to the Clerk of Court the $350.00 filing fee that has been assessed against Griffis pursuant to the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Upon payment of the filing fee to the Clerk of Court, any sums that have been collected on the filing fee from Griffis' prison account should be refunded to Griffis' account. *30 The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

Norman Joe LANGFORD, Plaintiff, v. GRADY COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al., Defendants.Case No. CIV-08-0389-F. | Nov. 17, 2009.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth, it is recommended that:(1) the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Shane Wyatt [Doc. # 87] be granted in part and denied in part;(2) the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Bill Daughtery and Larry McGill [Doc. # 88] be granted in part and denied in part;(3) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Kieran McMullen and Jack Porter [Doc. # 155] be denied;(4) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Chris Angel and John Mosley [Doc. # 157], construed as a motion for summary judgment, be granted;(5) the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Grady County Detention Center [Doc. # 143] be granted; and(6) Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery [Doc. # 165] be denied.NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECTThe parties are advised of their right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of this Court by October 13th, 2009. See Local Civil Rule 72.1. The parties are further advised that failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir.1991).STATUS OF REFERRALThis Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred in this matter and terminates the referral.

Bruce THOMAS, Plaintiff, v. Roger MULCH, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 09–936–GPM. | May 19, 2010.


Conclusion

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Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve upon Defendant or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon that attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by this Court. He shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendant or his counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.Defendant is ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).Pursuant to Local Rule of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois 72.1(a)(2), this cause is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed of any change in his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven (7) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Plaintiff's failure to comply with this Order will result in this action being dismissed for failure to comply with an order of this Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see generally Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir.1997); Johnson v. Kamminga, 34 F.3d 466 (7th Cir.1994).

Michael De ANGELIS, Plaintiff v. Officer Steve BEAUDOIN et al., Defendants.Civil No. 04–cv–456–SM. | Jan. 22, 2008.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (document no. 127) is granted. The motion to dismiss filed by Superintendent O'Mara and Lieutenant Sullivan (document no. 138) is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted to the extent movants seek the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against them without prejudice. In all other respects, it is denied.The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this order and close the case.

Allen Jerome SUPPLES, Plaintiff, v. Charles ADAMO, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–1141. | June 30, 2011.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 44) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Adamo and Porada are granted summary judgment with respect to all claims against them.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Fanno, Russo and Struthers are granted summary judgment only with respect to their involvement in Defendant Rhodes's use of OC spray on Plaintiff.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that summary judgment is granted to all Defendants on Plaintiff's due process claims, First Amendment claims, and in their official capacities.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' motion is DENIED in all other respects.

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Jessie PILLETTE, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF OTSEGO et al., Defendants.No. 06-CV-10536. | Feb. 27, 2007.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, I suggest the Defendants' motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment be granted and that all Defendants are entitled to dismissal of all claims against them because Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence supporting the elements of his Eighth Amendment claims, First and Fourteenth Amendment claim, and because he has failed to support his state law tort claims with any evidence undermining state governmental immunity. I also suggest that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint be denied as justice does not require it since any amendment would be futile.

Shakita PERDUE, Plaintiff, v. UNION CITY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.No. CIVA 1:05CV00753 MHS. | Aug. 28, 2006.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Tremata Anthony's motion for leave to file excess pages [# 104]; GRANTS defendant Union City and Individual City Council Member's motion for summary judgment [# 110]; GRANTS defendant Sgt. Anthony's motion for summary judgment [# 112]; GRANTS defendants Dr. Musso, GCH, and Nurse Adams' motion for summary judgment [# 113]; GRANTS plaintiff's motion for leave to file excess pages [# 124]; GRANTS defendants Dr. Musso, Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, and Nurse Adams' motion to strike [# 129]; and STRIKES (1) plaintiff's response in opposition to defendants Dr. Carlo Musso, Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, and Cathy Adams' Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 122], (2) plaintiff's response in opposition to defendant Tremata Anthony's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 121], (3) plaintiff's response in opposition to defendants Union City, Georgia, Ralph Moore, Alisa King, Helen Turner, Barbara Bohanan, Shirley Jackson, and Edward Ski Saxby's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 123]; and (4) plaintiff's statement of material facts in dispute in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 125]. This action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

In the matter of Warren LILLY, Jr. Wisconsin Department of Corrections, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Warren Lilly, Jr., Respondent–Respondent.No. 2009AP1420. | Submitted on Briefs Feb. 15, 2011. | Opinion Filed Aug. 18, 2011.

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING OVERTURNED

ConclusionWe reverse and remand the circuit court's revised order terminating forced feeding and enjoining forced feeding and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.Order reversed and cause remanded with directions.

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Willie WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Vincent COLLIER, Cpt.-Supervisor; Officer Jackson; Lieutenant Randle, Defendants-Appellees.No. 08-6759. | Submitted: June 8, 2009. | Decided: July 22, 2009.

APPEAL: COMBINATION LOWER COURT RULING UPHELD IN PART/UPHELD IN PART

ConclusionWe accordingly vacate the district court's orders granting summary judgment to Collier and Jackson and denying Williams's motions for discovery of photographs and medical records, affirm the remainder of the district court's orders, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we remand for further proceedings, we deny as moot Williams's motion in this Court for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court, and argument would not aid the decisional process.AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.Parallel Citations

Miguel R. CASTILLO, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. NURNBERG, and A. Patino, Defendants.Cause No. 3:12–CV–525. | June 14, 2013.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the Court:(1) GRANTS Miguel R. Castillo leave to proceed against Sgt. Nurnberg in an individual capacity, for monetary and punitive damages, for restraining him in an Emergency Restraint Chair, for hindering his breathing, for choking him, and for leaving him in the Emergency Restraint Chair for hours in violation of the Eighth Amendment;(2) GRANTS Miguel R. Castillo leave to proceed against A. Patino in an individual capacity, for monetary and punitive damages, for tasering him while he was restrained in an Emergency Restraint Chair and for leaving him in the Emergency Restraint Chair for hours in violation of the Eighth Amendment;(3) DISMISSES all other claims;(4) DIRECTS the clerk to transmit the summons and USM–285 for Sgt. Nurnberg and A. Patino to the United States Marshals Service along with a copy of the complaint and this order;(5) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of process on Sgt. Nurnberg and A. Patino; and (6) ORDERS, pursuant to42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Sgt. Nurnberg and A. Patino respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND. L.R. 10–1(b), only to the claims for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

Mohammed AL–ADAHI, et al., Petitioners, v. Barack H. OBAMA, et al.,1 Respondents.Civil Action No. 05–280 (GK). | Feb. 10, 2009.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the fact that Petitioners cannot satisfy one of the pre-requisites to

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the granting of a preliminary injunction, namely, that there is a substantial [l]ikelihood of success on the merits, far outweighs all other considerations. Accordingly, their Renewed Emergency Motion [Dkt. No. 234] is hereby denied.

Alex D. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Thierry NETTLES et al., Defendants.C/A No. 1:11–1479–TLW–SVH. | Aug. 24, 2012.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Defendants' motion for summary judgment be denied.

David PARDUE, Plaintiff v. Sgt. AUGUSTINE, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 05-5004. | June 12, 2007.


ConclusionCurrently before the Court is the plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Doc. 85) and Motions to Extend the Time to File Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Docs.86, 88). The Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as follows with respect thereto:1. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in this civil rights action on April 11, 2007, concluding that plaintiff's confinement in a restraint chair violated his constitutional rights. The Magistrate Judge recommended that a judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $1,500.00. (Doc. 83.)2. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion seeking to compel defendants to provide him with “a complete list of the names and incident reports of inmates who were restrained in the restraint chair from the dates of January 1, 2002 through January 1, 2003.” Plaintiff states that defendants have only provided him with “95 pages o[f] a 289 page incident report which contained some of the names of some of the inmates who were restrained during the specified time period.” (Doc. 85 at pg. 1.) Plaintiff asserts that he needs the complete report to assist him in preparing his objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff seeks an extension of time to file his objections after he receives the report.3. Defendants respond that plaintiff received the full list of inmates placed in the restraint chair. According to Defendants, the remainder of the 289 page report consists of records of other uses of force and contains no further information regarding placement of inmates in the restraint chair. (Doc. 87.)4. Upon due consideration, it appears that all relevant pages of the incident report have been provided to plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff's Motion to Compel (Doc. 85) is DENIED.Plaintiff's Motions to Extend (Docs.86, 88) are GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff shall have ten days from receipt of this order within which to file his objections to the Report and Recommendation.

Abdel FATTAH, Plaintiff v. Mary SABOL, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:CV–10–1607. | Sept. 14, 2011


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Recommendation. Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that all of Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendants DHS Deportation Officers Wildner, Quinlan and Graham be dismissed with prejudice since they are time barred. It is also recommended that all of Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendant Dr. Becotte and Defendants Sabol, Buono, Miosi, Decker, Mitra, Klienman and Sallemi which arose during his confinement at YCP from June 17, 2008 through July 25, 2008 be dismissed with prejudice as time barred. Further, it is recommended that Defendant DOC Secretary Beard and Defendant Nurse Lamas be dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, it is recommended that Defendants Evans and March, as well as Defendants Yeager and Sutton, be dismissed with prejudice. It recommend that Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim and ADA claim (Seventh Cause of Action) be dismissed with prejudice as against all Defendants. Thus, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action be dismissed with prejudice. Finally, it is recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed with his Eighth Amendment constitutional claims under § 1983, i.e. denial of proper medical care claims and conditions of confinement claims (First and Third Causes of Action) only as against SCI–Rockview officials and staff, namely, Defendants Rackovan, Somich, Granlund and Dr. Symonds.

John D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Steve McKILLUP, et al., Defendants.No. 05-cv-275-JPG. | Sept. 15, 2008.


ConclusionTherefore, for the reasons set forth above it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 16) be GRANTED, that this action be DISMISSED, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have ten (10) days after service of this Recommendation to file written objections thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir.2004); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 598 (7th Cir.2003).

David Tyrone HILL, Plaintiff, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 1:11 CV 874. | Aug. 11, 2011.


Conclusion Accordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

Janice M. HALL, Plaintiff v. WARREN COUNTY REGIONAL JAIL, et al., Defendants.No. 1:09-CV-00098. | Jan. 14, 2010.


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ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Kentucky State Police's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Defendant Warren County Regional Jail's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. All claims asserted against Warren County Regional Jail and Kentucky State Police are hereby dismissed with prejudice.



Conclusion NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Darrin GRUENBERG, Plaintiff, v. Capt. GEMPELER, et al., Defendants.No. 09-C-455. | June 10, 2009.


ConclusionTHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

IT IS ORDERED that the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff's prison trust account the balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to twenty percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding payments to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the U.S. Marshals Service shall serve a copy of the complaint, a waiver of service form and/or the summons, and this order upon the defendant pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. Plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting to make such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(b). The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is $8.00 per item. The full fee schedule is provided in 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). Even though Congress requires the court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service when an impoverished person is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, Congress has not provided for these fees to be waived, either by the court or the U.S. Marshals Service.

*3 IT IS ORDERED that the defendants shall file a responsive pleading to the plaintiff's complaint.

IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the warden of the institution where the inmate is confined and to Corey Finkelmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7857, Madison, Wisconsin, 53707-7857. Plaintiff is hereby notified that, from now on, he is required, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a), to send a copy of every paper or document filed with the court to the opposing parties or their attorney(s). Plaintiff

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should also retain a personal copy of each document. If plaintiff does not have access to a photocopy machine, plaintiff may send out identical handwritten or typed copies of any documents. The court may disregard any papers or documents, which do not indicate that a copy has been sent to each defendant or to their attorney(s).

Plaintiff is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.

In addition, the parties must notify the clerk of court's office of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties.

Nothing in this order or in § 1915A precludes a defendant from moving to dismiss any claim identified in this order or potentially existing in the complaint if the defendant disagrees with my analysis or believes I have overlooked something during my screening.

Darrin GRUENBERG, Plaintiff, v. Capt. GEMPELER, et al., Defendants. Case No. 09–C–455. | Sept. 30, 2010.


ConclusionFor the reasons given above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All other pending motions are DENIED.3 The case is DISMISSED.

Raymond P. BOIVIN, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Lt. Donald BLACK, Defendant, Appellant.No. 99–2085. | Heard Aug. 2, 2000. | Decided Sept. 5, 2000.


ConclusionWe need go no further. For the reasons elucidated herein, we hold that PLRA § 1997e(d)(2) applies to nominal damage awards and that, as applied, the statute does not offend the Fifth Amendment because there is a rational relationship between the fee cap and a clutch of legitimate governmental purposes. Accordingly, we vacate the lower court's award of attorneys' fees and remand for the setting of a fee that comports with section 1997e(d)(2). Vacated and remanded. No costs.

Gary Donald COLLINS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jean SHIOMOTO, as Chief Deputy Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent. G047195 | Filed March 11, 2013

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING UPHELD

The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Gary Donald Collins’ driving privileges for his refusal to submit to, or failure to complete, a chemical test for blood alcohol content (Veh.Code, § 13353, subd. (a)(1)). Collins sought an order from the trial court, via a petition for peremptory writ of mandate, directing the DMV to set aside the suspension. Collins appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying his petition. Collins argues he did not refuse a chemical test of his blood alcohol

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content and law enforcement officers used unlawful force against him in obtaining the chemical test. None of his contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment.

Leonard G. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey BEARD; et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 10–284. | May 22, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

Mark WHALING, Plaintiff, v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 08–210 Erie. | Feb. 4, 2010.


ConclusionIT IS ORDERED that Defendants Hillkirk and Patty Doe's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [22] be, and hereby is, GRANTED. Inasmuch as said motion was previously converted by the Magistrate Judge to a motion for summary judgment, JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of Defendants Hillkirk and Patty Doe and against Plaintiff Mark Whaling. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed on behalf of the ECP Defendants [25] be, and hereby is, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: (1) said motion will be DENIED as to the Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim asserting cruel and unusual punishment relative to the Erie County Prison Defendants' utilization of the restraint chair; and (2) said motion will be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's state law claims inasmuch as Defendants are entitled to immunity from such claims under Pennsylvania's Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8541, et seq. , and none of the statutory exceptions to immunity apply to such claims; and *2 (3) said motion will be GRANTED in all other respects. Inasmuch as the Magistrate Judge previously converted said motion to a motion for summary judgment, JUDGMENT is hereby entered in favor of the Erie County Prison Defendants and against Plaintiff Mark Whaling as to all claims, save Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim asserting cruel and unusual punishment relative to the Defendants' utilization of the restraint chair. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Baxter dated November 30, 2009[29] is adopted, in part, as the opinion of this Court to the extent set forth herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the terms of this Order supersede those set forth in this Court's previous order of February 3, 2010, and the Court's Order of February 3, 2010 is hereby VACATED.

Mark WHALING, Plaintiff, v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 08–210 Erie. | June 22, 2010.


Conclusion

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AND NOW, to wit, this 22nd day of June, 2010, upon consideration of the ECP Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Amended Memorandum Judgment Order [34] dated February 4, 2010, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said motion is GRANTED inasmuch as this Court has considered the Defendants' motion [25] for a summary judgment relative to the Plaintiff's remaining § 1983 claim based on the Defendants' assertion that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, however, that the ECP Defendants' request for substantive relief is DENIED, as the Court finds that the Defendants have failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning this affirmative defense.

Craig Allen COOK II, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Bill MARTIN et al., Defendants–Appellants.Nos. 03–2446, 03–2461. | July 27, 2005. | Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov. 8, 2005.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Kenneth J. FLETCHER, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Robert K. VANDYNE, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 2:07–CV–325. | Oct. 2, 2009.


ConclusionWHEREUPON, Defendants' Motion in Limine Regarding Other Uses of Taser, Doc. No. 62, is GRANTED; Defendants' Motion in Limine Regarding Testimony, Documents, and Other Evidence Related to Asphyxiation and Injuries to the Groin, Doc. No. 63, is GRANTED; and Defendants' Motion in Limine Regarding Plaintiff's Claims Regarding Alleged Comments by Deputy Erin Fuller, Doc. No. 64, is GRANTED.

Anthony MANN, Plaintiff, v. Lt. C. FAILEY, et al., Defendants.C/A No. 0:11–2232–RMG. | March 6, 2013.


Conclusion As set forth above, the Court agrees with and adopts the R & R (Dkt. No. 180) as the order of the Court except for the Magistrate Judge's recommendation regarding Plaintiff's claim arising from placement in a restraint chair following his forced removal from his jail cell on August 23, 2010. (Dkt. No. 180 at 20–21, pt. B.3.vi.). Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 113).

Romus ATKINS et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF ORANGE et al., Defendants.No. 01 CIV. 11536(WCC). | June 3, 2005.


Conclusion

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For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to preclude plaintiffs' expert testimony is denied. The partial summary judgment motion of the individual corrections officers is granted in part and denied in part. All claims against the following defendants are hereby dismissed without prejudice: Donna Dominick, David Serrano and Vincent DiChairo. All claims against the following defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice: Michael Zappolo, Kathleen Ferreri, Michael Andricut, Daniel Figueroa and Richard Russell. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend the Complaint within ten days from the date of this Opinion and Order to replead the failure to intervene claims with particularity to make it clear against which defendants these claims are asserted. The summary judgment motion of defendants Chris Ashman and the County of Orange (the “County defendants”) is granted and all claims against the County defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Lastly, defendants' motion for severance is denied as moot.

Eric David SEALES, Plaintiff, v. MACOMB COUNTY et al., Defendants.No. 03–40336. | March 22, 2005.


ConclusionPlaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery [Docket # 24] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant shall provide discovery as set forth herein within 14 days of the date of this Opinion and Order.

Randy L. VALENTINE, Plaintiff v. Ofc. D. RICHARDSON et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 4:05-cv-00485-HMH-TER. | Aug. 18, 2006.


ConclusionORDERED that Moving Defendants' motion for summary judgment, docket number 56, is denied.

Randy L. VALENTINE, Plaintiff, v. Ofc. D. RICHARDSON et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 4:05-485-HMH-TER. | Jan. 7, 2008.


ConclusionBased on the above stated reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion filed by the defendants for summary judgment (document # 102) be GRANTED. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that any outstanding motions be DENIED based on the above reasons.

Patrick W. LARKINS, Plaintiff, v. Warren Police Officer Ryan PYLACK et al., Defendants.No. 08-11075. | March 10, 2009.


ConclusionFor the reasons discussed above, this Court:

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(1) DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's assault and battery claim as to Officer Pylak, and GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's assault and battery claim as to Officer Ballinger; (2) GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's false imprisonment and false arrest claims; (3) DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim as to Officer Pylak, and GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim as to Officer Ballinger; (4) DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 claim, with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim Plaintiff stated in his complaint.

Loydale KIRVEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CURRY COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al., Defendants-Appellees.No. 09-2026. | Aug. 4, 2009.

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING UPHELD IN PART AND OVERTURNED IN PART

ConclusionTherefore, the district court's judgment dismissing Mr. Kirven's complaint is AFFIRMED, except that the dismissal is without prejudice. Mr. Kirven's application to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal is GRANTED, see 1 R. Doc. 63, but he is reminded that he remains obligated to continue making partial payments until his appellate filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). Parallel Citations

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD et al., Defendants.No. 05-3040. | June 13, 2007.


ConclusionThe motion to compel and motion for sanctions (Doc. 133) is denied. Defendants have indicated they have provided the plaintiff with all medical records in their possession. The proper way to obtain medical records in the possession of third parties is by requesting the issuance of subpoenas pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is directed to file a motion requesting the issuance of Rule 45 subpoenas and provide the court with the following information in the motion: (1) the name of the doctor providing treatment; (2) the address or clinic name, city, and state; and (3) the approximate dates of treatment.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD, et al., Defendants.No. 05-3040. | Sept. 20, 2007.


Conclusion For the reasons stated, I recommend the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of Dr. Theresa Farrow and Dr. Donald Clay (Doc. 84) be granted and all federal claims against them be

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dismissed with prejudice. To the extent the complaint can be read to be asserting supplemental state law claims against them, I recommend that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

Clarence Earl EGAN, Plaintiff, v. Officer LYNN, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 1:09-CV-1009-ID. | Feb. 19, 2010.


ConclusionAccordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 1. The motion to dismiss filed by the defendants be GRANTED to the extent the defendants seek dismissal of this case due to the plaintiff's failure to properly exhaust an administrative remedy currently available to him at the Coffee County Jail. 2. This case be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) for the plaintiff's failure to exhaust an administrative remedy presently available to him at the Coffee County Jail.

It is further ORDERED that on or before March 5, 2010 the parties may file objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon the grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.1982) . See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir.1982) . See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981, en banc ), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Carroll LEWIS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF SEDGWICK COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant.Civil Action No. 97–1483–WEB. | April 25, 2001.


ConclusionJudgment as a matter of law must be granted when the evidence fails to support the necessary elements of a claim under the governing law. In this case, the evidence was simply insufficient to show that Sedgwick County was deliberately indifferent to the use of excessive force against detainees at the Detention Facility, or that such indifference by the county was the cause of the violation of plaintiff's rights. Because these are necessary elements for a claim against the county

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under § 1983, the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff must be vacated, and judgment as a matter of law must be entered for the county.

Accordingly, defendant Board of Sedgwick County Commissioner's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Docs.148, 150) is hereby GRANTED; defendant's motion for new trial (Doc. 159) is DENIED as moot; the judgment previously entered in favor of plaintiff on January 22, 2001, is hereby VACATED; and it is ordered and adjudged that plaintiff Carroll Lewis take nothing on his claims and that the action be dismissed on the merits, with each party to bear its own costs. The clerk of the district court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. IT IS SO ORDERED this day of April, 2001, at Wichita, Ks.

James B. SCRUGGS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Clare County Sheriff’s Deputy Michael COON, Defendant.No. 06-10222-BC. | May 17, 2007.


ConclusionAccordingly, it is ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment [dkt # 14] is GRANTED, the plaintiff's federal cause of action, count four of his complaint, is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and the remaining state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Kevin E. MAYS, Plaintiff, v. Todd STOBIE, et al, Defendants.No. 3:08–CV–552–EJL. | June 1, 2011.


ConclusionBeing fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby orders: 1) Defendants Donald Blair, City of Lewiston, Mike Rigney, Todd Stobie, Donald Blair's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 107) is DENIED as to the excessive force claim and GRANTED as to all other claims raised in the Second Amended Complaint. The claim for excessive force related to the first incident shall proceed to trial against the responding officers (Rigney, Stobie, Blair as well as Deputies Hilderbrand and Rodriguez). Claims against the City of Lewiston are dismissed. 2) Defendants Jody Brown, Dale Buttrey, Nez Perce County, Jacob Gunter, John Hilderbrand, Jaclyn Martin, Jack McGee, Gabe Richardson, Joe Rodriguez, Jamie Romer, and Rick Smith's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 109) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The excessive force claim against Deputies Hilderbrand and Rodriguez shall proceed to trial. All other claims raised in the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed.

Michael D. BATEY, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALLEGAN et al., Defendants.No. 1:00–CV–450. | March 14, 2002.


ConclusionThe Court grants defendants' motion for summary judgment (dkt.# 25) and dismisses, with prejudice, plaintiff's first amended complaint. The Court will enter an order consistent with this opinion.

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Garland Andrew HORN, Plaintiff, v. Mr. CLAUEAU, et al., Defendants.No. 1:07cv669 (GBL/TRJ). | Nov. 30, 2007.


Conclusion For the above reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any of the named defendants in claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Accordingly, those claims and attendant defendants will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). An appropriate Order shall issue.

Richard K. REVELY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF HUNTINGTON, a municipal corporation, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:07–0648. | Feb. 26, 2009.


Conclusion Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence to support his claims against Defendants Parsons and Greene. For the reasons explained above, the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Larry Parsons and V.L. Greene (Doc. 86) is GRANTED. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Opinion and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.

Terrence Tiran HAGGINS, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. Garry MANIGAULT, Defendant.C.A. No. 4:08–161–HMH–TER. | Feb. 10, 2009.


ConclusionORDERED that Sgt. Manigault's motion for summary judgment, docket number 39, is granted

Donald JENNINGS, Petitioner v. Health Care Administrator TRETINICK et al., Respondents.No. 73 M.D.2011. | Submitted June 24, 2011. | Decided Jan. 4, 2012.


ORDERAND NOW, this 4th day of January, 2012, upon consideration of Donald Jennings’s pro se complaint and the preliminary objections to the complaint, this Court dismisses Donald Jennings’s complaint without prejudice. This Court grants Donald Jennings leave to file an amended complaint which complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure within thirty days of the date of this order. The amended complaint, should Donald Jennings file one, shall not contain counts pertaining to defendants who are part of the action which was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County or pertaining to Dr. Herbik and Dr. Long, who each received a judgment of non pros in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County.

Glenn D. ODOM, II, Plaintiff v. Joseph P. MEKO, et al., DefendantCivil Action No. 12–CV–109–HRW. | July 9, 2013.

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https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1000546&cite=28USCAS1915A&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_3fed000053a85


Conclusion Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED as follows: 1. The motion to amend the complaint [D.E. No. 10] filed by Plaintiff Glenn D. Odom, II, is GRANTED, and the Clerk of the court shall docket D.E. No. 10 as an “Amended Complaint;” 2. Odom's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims asserted against LSCC Warden Joseph P. Meko; LSCC Sergeant “Barker;” unknown members of the LSCC Cell Entry Team; LSCC “Nurse Faith;” the unknown LSCC 2nd Shift Licensed Nurse Practitioner; and LaDonna Thompson, KDOC Commissioner, in their official capacities, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 3. Odom's claims asserted against all of the named defendants pursuant to(a) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (b) Title 42 U.S.C. 10841 et seq., “Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals;” (c) Title 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the ADA; and (d) Title 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Rehabilitation Act, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 4. Odom's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims asserted against LSCC Warden Joseph P. Meko and KDOC Commissioner LaDonna Thompson, in their individual capacities, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 5. Odom's request for injunctive relief is DENIED as MOOT; 6. The defendants listed as Sergeant “Barker” and Nurse “Faith” must respond to Odom's Eighth Amendment claims asserted against them under § 1983 in their individual capacities; 7. Odom must identify any unknown John and Jane Doe Defendants (as to the members of the CET and the unidentified Second Shift LPN defendant) and have them served within 120 days after the date of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, or his claims against them will be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 8. The Clerk of the Court shall forward by certified mail, return receipt requested, one copy of the complaint [D.E. No. 1] and amended complaint [D.E. No. 10] and this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the Office of General Counsel for the Kentucky Department of Corrections, Frankfort, Kentucky. General Counsel shall have 20 days from the date of entry of this order to complete and file a notice of waiver of service against any or all of the named defendants. If a waiver is not filed within 20 days, the Clerk shall SUBMIT the record for consideration; 9. The answer to the complaint shall be filed no later than 60 days after the notice of waiver of service is filed. However, if service is required as to any defendant, the Court will enter an order directing the United States Marshals Service to effectuate service of process and the answer(s) must be filed no later than 20 days after service of process; *8 10. Odom shall keep the Clerk of the Court informed of his current mailing address. Failure to notify the Clerk of any address change may result in a dismissal of this case; and 11. For every further pleading or other document Odom submits for consideration, he shall serve upon each defendant, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon each attorney, a copy of the pleading or other document. Odom shall send the original papers to be filed with the Clerk of the Court together with a certificate stating the date on which he mailed a true and correct copy of his document to each defendant or their counsel. If a District Judge or Magistrate Judge receives any document which has not been filed with the Clerk or which has been filed but does not include the certificate of service of copies, it will disregard the document.

Nathan Charles GRIGGS, Plaintiff v. DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.

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Civil No. 1:CV-06-0823. | Oct. 26, 2007.


Conclusion

AND NOW, this 26th day of October, 2007, it is ordered, based on Dauphin County Defendants' representations as to further discovery that will be made, and its other responses to the motions, Plaintiff's motions requesting that discovery be ordered (doc. 55 and 58) are denied.

Frederick HUNTER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF SHELBURNE et al.No. 5:10–CV–206. | Sept. 19, 2012.


Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 60) is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED.

Davon BURKE Plaintiff v. CAMPBELL COUNTY FISCAL COURT, et al. DefendantsNo. Civ.A. 06-CV-191-DLB. | Dec. 11, 2006.


ConclusionAccordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: (1) Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (2 The Court certifies that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir.1997); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949 (6th Cir.1997). (3) Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order in favor of the respondents.

S.L.S., by her next friend Nina HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. DETROIT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.Civil Action No. 08–14615. | Oct. 7, 2011.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Court orders Defendant to respond in writing with full and complete answers to interrogatories 1, 3, 4, 6–8, and 10–13 consistent with the answers provided in the joint statement, if Defendant provided an answer in the joint statement, within 30 days of this order. The Court denies Plaintiff's motion to compel with respect to interrogatories 9 and 14. The Court orders Plaintiff and Defendant to mutually agree upon a time to inspect the alleged restraint chair within thirty days after the district court's order on the motion to dismiss, if necessary. The Court denies as moot and without prejudice Plaintiff's motion to compel depositions. And the Court orders Defendant to comply with Plaintiff's requests for production or state that no documents exist as

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provided by Defendant in the joint statement, and in accordance with the Local Rules within 30 days of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for costs associated with filing this motion is denied. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a) (5)(C) NOTICE TO THE PARTIES Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the parties have a period of fourteen days from the date of this Order within which to file any written appeal to the District Judge as may be permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Carol Ann AGSTER at al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE et al. No. 04-16786, 04-16844. | Argued and Submitted June 23, 2005.* | Decided July 20, 2005.


ConclusionThe judgment is AFFIRMED as to the deputies and Lewis; REVERSED as to Sheriff Arpaio.

Kimberly DICKERSON v. Rob REARDON, et al. Abdel FATTAH, Plaintiff, v. Mary SABOL, et al., DefendantsCivil Action No. 3:10–1607. | March 23, 2012. (1) The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 25) is ADOPTED. (2) All claims against the following Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice: Mary Sabol; Jeffrey Beard; Thomas Decker; Deputy Warden Buono; Joseph Sallemi; Kelly Mitri; Jennifer Miosi; Jesse Wildner; Brendan Quinlan; Mark Graham; Matthew Klienman; Dennis Becotte; Corrections Officer Yeager; Corrections Officer Sutton; Corrections Officer Evans; Corrections Officer March; and Nurse Somich. These Defendants are DISMISSED from the action entirely. (3) Plaintiff's Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Causes of Action against Defendants Rackovan, Somich, Granlund, and Dr. Symonds are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff may proceed with the First Cause of Action (Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claim) and Third Cause of Action (Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim) as to these Defendants. (4) Plaintiff is granted twenty-one (21) days to amend the Amended Complaint to allege exhaustion of Plaintiff's administrative remedies. (5) This case is RECOMMITTED to Magistrate Judge Blewitt for further proceedings.

Rodney BOOMER, Plaintiff v. Sgt. Harry LEWIS, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:06–CV–0850. | Sept. 9, 2009.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the Motions for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department Defendants (Dkt.462), the LCP Medical Defendants (Dkt.456), the LCP Officers (Dkt.453), the PrimeCare Defendants (Dkt.449), and the PCCF Nurses (Dkt.466) will be granted. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the PCCF Defendants (Dkt.459) will be granted in part. Specifically, the motion will not be granted on the claim of excessive force brought against Defendants Francis and Schappert, the claim arising from the use of the restraining chair brought against Defendant Campos, and the retaliation claim brought against Defendant Schappert.8 Finally, Defendant Maritato's Motion for Sanction (Dkt.516) will be denied. An

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appropriate Order follows. ORDER NOW, THIS 9th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2009, for the reasons set forth in the foregoing Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge J. Andrew Smyser (Dkt.545) is ADOPTED IN PART. 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of PrimeCare Medical, Inc., Patti Bunting, and William Sprague (Dkt.449) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff. 3. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Lackawanna County Prison and defendants Columbia, Donate, Walsh, and Yavorski (Dkt.453) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff. 4. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Fox and Zagato (Dkt.456) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff. 5. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Pike County Correctional Facility and Defendants Campos, DeMarco, Gattuso, Kumburis, Lowe, Romance, Schwartz, Francis, and Schappert (Dkt. Entry 459) is GRANTED IN PART. The Motion for Summary Judgment is denied as to the excessive force claim filed against Defendants Francis and Schappert, the retaliation claim filed against Defendant Schappert, and the claim pertaining to the use of a restraint chair against Defendant Campos. In all other respects, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Entry 459) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of the Pike County Correctional Facility and Defendants DeMarco, Gattuso, Kumburis, Lowe, Romance, and Schwartz, and against Plaintiff. 6. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department and Defendants Lamberton, Lutz, Rice, Robson, Smelas, Stapleton, and Lewis (Dkt. Entry 462) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff. 7. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Checho, Shaffer, and Moreiko (Dkt.466) is GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in their favor and against Plaintiff. *18 8. The Motion for Sanctions filed on behalf of Defendant Maritato (Dkt.516) is DENIED. 8. A telephonic scheduling conference with counsel for the remaining Defendants (Francis, Schappert, and Campos) and Plaintiff shall be conducted on Wednesday, October 21, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. The Clerk of Court shall make the appropriate arrangements for the conference call.

Ahmed Zaid Salem ZUHAIR, Petitioner, v. George W. BUSH, et al., Respondents.Civ. No. 08–0864 (EGS). | May 1, 2009.


Conclusion

To the extent that this Order conflicts with any Order issued in this case on April 30, 2009, this Order supersedes the previous Order. Pursuant to the motions hearing held in open court on April 30, 2009, and upon consideration of a number of motions and pleadings pending before the Court, the oppositions thereto, and the replies in support thereof, and based on the Court's continuing efforts to provide the Petitioner with a timely resolution of his pending habeas corpus petition, while at the same time respecting and protecting any compelling national security interests, it is hereby

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ORDERED that the government's ex parte motion for reconsideration regarding the government's obligation to produce certain exculpatory evidence related to the allegations withdrawn from the factual return is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that the government shall produce all discovery it has agreed to produce to the Petitioner, specifically, RFP Numbers 1–6, 8–10, 17–22, 26–42, 47, and 48. It is further ORDERED that the information responsive to those discovery requests shall be produced on a rolling basis, but that production shall conclude by no later than May 30, 2009, the date suggested by the government. The Court accepts counsel's representations that the government is *71 working in good faith to provide the relevant discovery as quickly as possible. It is further ORDERED that the government shall conduct a search of all reasonably available databases and sources of information for exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence pertaining to all fact witnesses relied upon by the government in its factual return. The search must include the databases referenced in Mr. Terry Henry's March 27, 2009 Declaration, and any additional reasonably available databases or sources where the information would likely be found. The production must also include any exculpatory and/or impeachment information discovered by the government attorneys while preparing the factual return and while litigating habeas corpus petitions filed by other detainees at Guantanamo Bay, as well as any evidence discovered during the ongoing review of Guantanamo cases ordered by President Obama on January 22, 2009. Exculpatory evidence includes, but is not limited to, evidence that casts doubt on a speaker's credibility, evidence that undermines the reliability of a witness's identification of the petitioner, and/or evidence that indicates a statement is unreliable because it is the product of abuse, torture, and/or mental or physical incapacity. It is further ORDERED that the exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence regarding the government's fact witnesses shall be produced by no later than May 30, 2009. In order to carry out the Court's judicial obligations to determine the lawfulness of Petitioner's detention, the Court must evaluate the credibility and reliability of the government's evidence relied upon to justify his detention. The government filed its factual return in August 2008, which included information from several fact witnesses. The government was ordered to produce exculpatory evidence in October 2008. There have been countless discussions, motions, and orders pertaining to the production of exculpatory evidence since that time. Moreover, some exculpatory evidence pertaining to these fact witnesses has been produced in other habeas cases. Therefore, it is reasonable to require the production of all such information by May 30, 2009. It is further ORDERED that with respect to RFP Numbers 11–15 and 43–45, the government shall certify to the Court by no later than May 30, 2009, that an appropriate official(s) with the requisite understanding of the law and facts pertaining to this case has reviewed the unredacted documents and determined that there is no additional information in the documents that is relevant to Petitioner's case. Any relevant information shall be produced to the Petitioner's counsel by no later than May 30, 2009. It is further ORDERED that by no later than May 30, 2009, the evidence requested in RFP Numbers 16, 23–25, and 49 shall be produced or made available for inspection if it is in the government's possession. It is further ORDERED that any remaining RFPs are DENIED without prejudice subject to a motion for reconsideration setting forth the specific reasons that Petitioner believes the requested information is critical to a merits determination and, if appropriate, a proffer as to why the Petitioner has a good faith basis to believe such evidence exists. Petitioner is cautioned that any such motion will almost certainly result in a delay of the merits hearing date established by this Order. It is further ORDERED that any motions for reconsideration of this Order shall be filed by May 8, 2009, responses by May 13, 2009, and replies by May 15, 2009. It is further

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*72 3 4 5 ORDERED that the procedural and legal framework for the merits hearing will be as follows: 1. The government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner's detention is lawful. 2. There will be a rebuttable presumption of authenticity as to any statements or documentary evidence the government presents if the government establishes that the presumption is necessary to alleviate an undue burden presented by this particular case. Petitioner will be afforded an opportunity to rebut the presumption. 3. Upon the request of either the Petitioner or the government, the Court may admit and consider hearsay evidence that is material and relevant to the legality of the Petitioner's detention, if the movant establishes that the hearsay evidence is reliable and that the presentation of evidence in compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence would unduly burden the movant or pose an unwarranted risk to national security. The party opposing admission will have the opportunity to challenge the credibility of, or weight to be accorded, such evidence. 4. As for the structure of the merits hearing, the government will go first, because it bears the burden of proof, followed by the Petitioner, and the government will be afforded the opportunity to put on a rebuttal case. Because counsel has more familiarity with the merits hearings that have been done in other cases, the Court welcomes their suggestions for conducting a hearing under these unique circumstances. 5. Petitioner will not have access to classified portions of the hearing. However, the parties are directed to structure their presentation of argument and evidence to afford the Petitioner access to non-classified portions of the hearing to the greatest extent possible. Petitioner will be afforded the opportunity to testify, if he so chooses. The Court Security Office is directed to work with counsel and the appropriate agencies to ensure that counsel have a secure line of communication with their client at all times during the proceedings. It is further ORDERED that pursuant to the hearing on April 30, 2009, the Petitioner is directed to file a pleading on the scope of authority by no later than May 8, 2009, addressing the government's revised definition of an enemy combatant, Judge Walton and Judge Huvelle's opinions on this issue cited during the hearing, and any other relevant points and authorities. The government's response shall be filed by no later than May 15, 2009. The Petitioner's reply shall be filed by no later than May 20, 2009. It is further ORDERED that a Merits Hearing is scheduled for June 30, 2009 at 10:00 a.m. Any additional motions shall be filed by no later than noon on June 8, 2009, all responses by noon on June 15, 2009, and all replies by noon on June 18, 2009. The government's witness and exhibit lists shall be filed by June 8, 2009, and the Petitioner's witness and exhibit lists shall be filed by June 15, 2009. It is further ORDERED that upon consideration of the evaluation and report submitted by Dr. Emily Keram on April 29, 2009, in which Dr. Keram identifies certain medical reasons that the use of the restraint chair during enteral feedings is detrimental to Petitioner's health, and in view of the fact that for more than two months Petitioner's feedings have taken place in a hospital *73 bed, the government shall provide notice to the Court if at any time the government intends to resume use of the restraint chair during Petitioner's enteral feedings, and articulate the reasons for that decision.

Jasen BARKER, Plaintiff, v. Andrew GOODRICH, et al., Defendants.No. 2:07-cv-946. | Jan. 4, 2010.


Conclusion

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For the following reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment (# 61) is granted. This case is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of all defendants.

Michael Tyrone McCULLON, Plaintiff, v. Thomas BROUSE, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:10–CV–1541. | Sept. 7, 2012.


Recommendation Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 114.) be GRANTED and, in light of this recommended disposition of the Defendants' motion, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that McCullon's motions in opposition to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs.124, 136, 152.), which are actually simply responses in opposition to that motion, be denied as moot. The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Lou VALLARIO, Sheriff of Garfield County, Colorado, in his official capacity; Scott Dawson, a Commander in the Garfield County Sheriff’s Department, in his official capacity, Petitioners, v. Clarence VANDEHEY et al., Respondents.No. 08-502. | Feb. 4, 2009.


ConclusionWe offer a few additional comments to guide the district court on remand. Respondents' pleadings are, in many instances, plagued by generalities. For instance, Respondents rely heavily on the fact that Rule 23(b)(2) was intended to facilitate civil rights cases to justify class certification here. See Plaintiffs' Amended Motion to Certify Class at 13-14. No doubt exists that Rule 23(b)(2) was intended, in large part, “to enable civil rights class actions,” Shook II, 543 F.3d at 610, and that district courts have certified classes of prisoners “broadly challenging” the conditions of their confinement. Shook I, 386 F.3d at 970. But the simple fact that Respondents bring such a suit does not establish that they have satisfied the provisions of Rule 23. See Shook II, 543 F.3d at 610; see also E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys. Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405, 97 S.Ct. 1891, 52 L.Ed.2d 453 (1977).

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In every case, the district court must conduct a “careful certification inquiry,” Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.2005), to ensure “the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” See Anderson v. City of Albuquerque, 690 F.2d 796, 799 (10th Cir.1982). For it is the district court's superior ability to deal with the intensely practical considerations informing class certification decisions, which justifies

vesting it with substantial discretion to make these determinations in the first instance. See Trevizo, 455 F.3d at 1163. As such, we emphasize that the district courts must decide each case “on its own facts,” taking into account whatever practical and “prudential considerations” apply to the matter at hand. Id. Only if the district court is convinced that the requirements of the federal rules are satisfied may it certify a class. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 2003 Amendment advisory committee note (“A court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”). We also caution the district court against giving undue weight to Respondents' claims that they will be unable to obtain judicial review of Petitioners' jail practices absent certification of their requested class. See Class Certification Order at 23 (“The danger of mootness ... cuts in favor of class certification here.”). Respondents retain the ability to institute a damages action against Petitioners for the unconstitutional harms they allegedly suffered in their care. See Shook II, 543 F.3d at 610; see also Green, 108 F.3d at 1300. While not affording Respondents the whole-sale injunctive remedy they currently request, an action for damages would allow a court to review the constitutionality *1270 of Petitioners' policies. See Shook II, 543 F.3d at 610. Damages actions also provide substantial incentives for public officials to modify their future conduct. See id.; Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 932 (4th Cir.1991). Accordingly, the district court should view Respondents' bald assertions in this regard with some skepticism. With these observations, we GRANT the petition for review and REMAND for the district court to reconsider its class certification order.

KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in result. I concur in the result. I agree with the court that this case requires us to remand for clarification to be sure that the district court had an accurate view of the facts with regard to Respondents' claims of inadequate psychiatric care. However, I write separately to indicate my understanding of how district courts should negotiate the complex analysis required under Rule 23 for class certification while avoiding a consideration of the merits under the PLRA. In Shook v. El Paso County, we reversed a district court's denial of class certification in a similar case because the court “prematurely focused on whether the court could ultimately fashion a remedy that satisfied the strictures of [the PLRA],” rather than engaging in an analysis that specifically addressed the factors required under Rule 23. 386 F.3d 963, 972 (10th Cir.2004) (Shook I ). In a second iteration of Shook v. El Paso County, which affirmed a district court's denial of class certification in an opinion issued after the district court's opinion in this case, we further elaborated on the analysis required. 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir.2008) (Shook II ). Specifically, we stated that, “Rule 23(b)(2) authorizes an inquiry into the relationship between the class framed in the complaint and injunctive relief requested.” Id. at 614. Essentially, a district court is “required to consider whether the remedies the class sought applied equally to all cases pending within the class.” Shook I, 386 F.3d at 971 (citation and alterations omitted). This analysis necessarily requires district courts to walk a fine line between permissibly assessing whether the relief requested could alleviate the complaints of the class as a whole and

impermissibly assessing the merits of the case under the PLRA. “In other words, while a district court may not evaluate the strength of a cause of action at the class certification stage, it must consider, without passing judgment on whether plaintiffs will prevail on the merits, whether

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remedying the harm alleged can be done on a class-wide basis in conformity with Rule 23(b)(2).” Shook II, 543 F.3d at 612; see also Maj. Op. at 1267. The court now warns against an “end-run” around Rule 65(d), and explains that “[i]njunctions simply requiring a defendant to obey the law are generally too vague to satisfy Rule 65(d).” Maj. Op. at 1267 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While this is no doubt correct, I am concerned by this court's suggestion, as well as the dicta in Shook II, 543 F.3d at 605, that apparently seeks to impose significantly more than is called for under Rule 23(b)(2) upon those seeking class certification. The rule merely requires pleading facts that would reflect “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief ... is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). It is up to the district court to construct an appropriate order after hearing the evidence and neither Rule 23(b)(2) or Rule 65(d) impose any “specificity requirement” *1271 on the moving party other than as above noted. In any event, as discussed, Shook II, which clarified the extent to which a district court must inquire into whether the relief requested is appropriate, was decided after the district court opinion in this case. Because the trial judge did not have the benefit of Shook II, it appears that he felt unnecessarily constrained from making any inquiry into the mechanics of the injunction requested, and because the Respondents did not provide such information, I concur in the result that this case be remanded for clarification as to whether the injunctive relief requested would alleviate the various complaints alleged. Footnotes1. Respondents also raise several claims under Colorado law, which we do not discuss here. 2. Respondents contend that the use of the belt (1) unduly terrorizes inmates, thus inflicting unconstitutional punishment, (2) that a lack of deputy training in regard to the belt puts inmates at an unjustifiable risk of serious harm, and (3) that requiring inmates to wear the belt violates inmates' liberty interest “in being free of ... restraint and terror.” 3. As part of the general restyling of the civil rules in 2007, the rules committee deleted Rule 23(f)'s explicit reference to the court of appeals' discretion in determining whether to grant a petition for interlocutory review. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 2007 Amendment advisory committee note. The committee notes make clear, however, that this “omission does not in any way limit the unfettered discretion established by the original rule.” Id. 4. Our approach to Rule 23(f) relates most closely to those articulated by the D.C. Circuit in In re Lorazepam and the Ninth Circuit in Chamberlan. 5. See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint at 34 (“As a matter of policy, ... Defendants restrict the ability of indigent prisoners to receive mental health care.”); id. at 51 (“Pursuant to the practice and policy of the Defendants, indigent prisoners with serious mental health needs are regularly denied their right to appropriate mental health care delivered by qualified mental health professionals.”); id. at 82 (stating that the Constitution requires Petitioners to “provide appropriate care and treatment for prisoners with serious mental health needs, even when the prisoners have no money”); see also id. at 52 (noting that the jail has a contract with Colorado West Regional Mental Health Center “to provide mental health services to prisoners at the jail”); id. (explaining that “an indigent prisoner cannot obtain care from any mental health professionals at Colorado West unless” the jail's medical staff “determines that it is necessary”). 6. Respondents argue they need not give content to the equitable relief they request, citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979), which states that “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established.” But this statement does not stand for the broad proposition Respondents suggest. In Califano, the Court merely explained that, provided “a class action is otherwise proper,” the fact that a resulting injunction is nationwide in scope does not automatically establish a violation of the principle that equitable relief should “be no

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more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.” 442 U.S. at 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545. In the instant case, unlike in Califano, questions remain as to the propriety of class certification and the geographic scope of any resulting injunctive relief is not at issue. Thus, the statement on which Respondents so heavily rely is clearly inapposite. 7. This error is striking in light of Petitioners' repeated assertion that the district court lacked the capacity to provide Respondents with their requested relief. Although the Prison Litigation Reform Act does not inform class certification analysis under Rule 23, see Shook I, 386 F.3d at 971, “Rule 23's requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III constraints.” Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 613, 117 S.Ct. 2231; see also Prado-Steiman, 221 F.3d at 1280 (noting that any “analysis of class certification must begin with the issue of standing”). Redressability remains an integral part of constitutional standing. See Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, 518 F.3d 1217, 1224 (10th Cir.2008). Thus, plaintiffs are always required to demonstrate that their alleged injuries are “apt to be redressed by a remedy the court is prepared to give.” Latino Officers Ass'n v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.1999); see also Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir.2002) (“[C]onstitutional standing requires a court to ask not only whether an injury has occurred, but whether the injury that has occurred may serve as the basis for a legal remedy in the federal courts.”). The district court could have addressed some of Petitioners' remedial concerns on this basis. See Gail v. United States, 58 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir.1995) (acknowledging that notice pleading, under the rules of civil procedure, emphasizes function over form).

Cedric GLAZE, Plaintiff v. Bobby MAY, Sheriff, St. Francis County Detention Center; et al., Defendants.No. 2:09–cv–00113–BSM–JJV. | Sept. 7, 2010.


ConclusionIn conclusion, the Court finds no dispute of material fact concerning Defendants May, Jones, Smith, Scott, and Getchell; therefore, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff's claims against them. However, for the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Defendant Futrell should be denied. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that: 1. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 67) with regard to Defendants May, Jones, Smith, Scott, and Getchell, be GRANTED and that the action against them be DISMISSED with prejudice. 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 67) with regard to Defendant Futrell be DENIED.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. STATE of Arkansas et al., Defendants.No. 4:09CV00033 JLH. | April 7, 2010.


ConclusionNothing in this Opinion and Order should be construed as discounting the seriousness of the issues. The decisions to be made are important—important enough to wait a few more months so that they can be based on all of the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, the United States' motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED. Document # 42. The defendants' motion to strike is DENIED as moot. Document # 49.

Gary BANKS, Appellant v. Lt. Mark MOZINGO et al.

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No. 10–2259. | Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action | Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 31, 2011. | Opinion filed: April 18, 2011.


ConclusionAccordingly, we conclude that this appeal does not present a substantial question, and we will affirm the decision of the District Court. Banks's motions to clarify the appeal process, and for the appointment of counsel, for legal property, and access to the DOC law library, are denied.

Brady HICKS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. TARRANT COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al.No. 07-11292 | Summary Calendar. | Sept. 1, 2009.


ConclusionAccordingly, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. Hicks's motions to expedite his appeal in accordance with 5th Cir. R. 27.5, to order the appellees to preserve evidence, and to tax costs to the losing party are DENIED.

Perry L. DUNNAM, Plaintiff, v. Dee ANDERSON, Sheriff, Tarrant County, Texas, et al., Defendant.No. 4:06-CV-777-A. | Feb. 29, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons discussed above, the court concludes that the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants should be granted. The court ORDERS that all claims and causes of action asserted by plaintiff against defendant in the above captioned action be, and are hereby, dismissed with prejudice.

Joseph H. COTTON, Plaintiff, v. Correctional Officer Jason DONNER, et al., Defendants.No. C 06-0862 MJJ (PR). | Docket Nos. 10, 16. | March 30, 2007.


ConclusionIn light of the foregoing, the Court hereby orders as follows: 1. For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to defendant Donner, and DENIED as to defendants Enrico, Ainsworth, Fulton and Hevia. 2. As plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment or to defendant's prior motion to dismiss, and has not filed a document in this matter since a change of address notice filed over one year ago, it is unclear whether he wishes to proceed with the action. Accordingly, within thirty days of the date this order is filed, plaintiff shall notify the Court as to whether he intends to prosecute this matter, and also whether or not he wishes to have counsel appointed to represent him in this matter. Plaintiff is hereby advised that his failure to timely notify the Court of these matters will result in the dismissal of the above-titled action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to

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Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This order terminates Docket Nos. 10, 16 and all other pending motions.

Michael PARKER, Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS ROBINSON, et al., Defendants.No. CV-04-214-B-W. | Dec. 10, 2007.


Conclusion1. It is therefore ORDERED that both the objected-to and unobjected-to portions of the Recommended Decision are hereby AFFIRMED. 2. It is further ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 81) be and hereby is DENIED.

John STINCHFIELD, Jr., Petitioner, v. Michael BUDGE, et al., Respondents.No. 3:05–cv–0185–KJD–RAM. | Dec. 13, 2010.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Second Amended Petition is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no Certificate of Appealability shall issue in this matter. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.

Norman SANDLIN, Plaintiff, v. B. HALL, et al., Defendants.No. 4:05CV3135. | April 24, 2006.


ConclusionTHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED: 1. That Filing No. 19, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, is granted; 2. That the plaintiff's complaint and this action are dismissed without prejudice; and 3. That a separate judgment will be entered accordingly.

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 4:05cv3238. | Oct. 17, 2006.


IT IS ORDERED: 1. That Filing No. 90, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, is denied; 2. That Filing No. 91, the plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, is granted, and if they have not done so already, the defendants shall deliver the records listed in Filing No. 91 to the plaintiff by October 31, 2006; 3. That Filing No. 95, the plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents, is granted in part, in that the plaintiff is entitled to conduct discovery without leave of court by serving the requests directly on the attorney for the defendants;

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4. That Filing No. 97, the plaintiff's renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, is denied; 5. That Filing No. 102, the plaintiff's Motion for copies of the record for use on appeal, is denied as moot; 6. That Filing No. 109, the plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Review, is granted in that review has been conducted; 7. That Filing No. 126, the plaintiff's Motion for Depositions, is granted in part and denied in part; the plaintiff has a right to conduct depositions upon written questions, but the motion is denied at this time, without prejudice to the filing of a properly supported motion to compel the depositions; 8. That Filing No. 132, the plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order, is denied; 9. That Filing No. 147, the plaintiff's Motion to Strike his Affidavit (Filing No. 141) which he miscaptioned and filed in the wrong case, is granted; the Clerk of Court shall strike Filing No. 141, as the plaintiff requests; 10. That Filing No. 148, the plaintiff's Motion in Limine, is denied, without prejudice, as premature; 11. That Filing No. 152, the plaintiff's Motion for Trial Date, is denied; however, a Schedule for the Progression of this Case is set forth above; 12. That Filing No. 155, the plaintiff's Motion for Hearings on All Pending Motions, is denied; 13. That Filing No. 156, the plaintiff's Motion to Recuse De Novo, is denied; and 14. That pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), this decision is not a final and appealable order until after entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and rights of the parties.

Hakim Malik WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. PAXSON, Captain, Pulaski County Jail, et al., Defendants.No. 4:09CV00060 BSM/JTR. | March 27, 2009.


Conclusion 1. Pursuant to the screening function mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A: (1) Defendant Talley be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, because Plaintiff has failed to state a viable due process claim against him; and (2) Plaintiff be allowed to PROCEED with his excessive force claims against the remaining Defendants. 2. The Court CERTIFY, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal from any Order adopting this Recommended Partial Disposition would not be taken in good faith. 3. The Clerk be directed to prepare a Summons for Defendants Paxson, Green, Hendrix, Burnett, Jackson, Miller, Bangs, Bennett, Blankton, McKeever, and Morgan, and the U.S. Marshal be directed to serve the summons, Complaint, and Amended Complaint on them without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor.

Telly ROYSTER, Plaintiff, v. BEARD, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–1150. | Feb. 28, 2011.


For the reasons set out in this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 83) be granted with prejudice in part, granted without prejudice in part to Plaintiff's ability to file an amended complaint with respect to certain claims, and denied in part. It is recommended that Plaintiff's claims should be disposed of in the following manner.

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1. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims with respect to his confinement to a hard cell and a self-contained cell should be dismissed without prejudice; 2. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims with respect to the use of a spit hood and his mere placement on a food loaf diet should be dismissed with prejudice; 3. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims with respect to his confinement to a hard cell and a self-contained cell, as well as those relating to the mere imposition of a food loaf diet, should be dismissed with prejudice; 4. All claims against Defendant Beard should be dismissed with prejudice; 5. All of Plaintiff's state tort claims, with the exception of Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against Defendant Myers, should be dismissed with prejudice; and 6. All claims against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice. In accordance with the Magistrate's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules for Magistrates, objections to this Report and Recommendation are due by March 14, 2011. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.

Christopher T. PHELPS, Plaintiff, v. Gary TYNER, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 07-cv-290-MJR. | March 13, 2008.


Conclusion

Plaintiff is ORDERED to serve upon defendant or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon that attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by this Court. He shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to defendant or his counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court. *3 Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this cause is REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for

further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral. Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed of any change in his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven (7) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

Renee R. BARNES, Petitioner, v. Sheri DUFFEY, Warden, Respondent.No. 1:09 CV 909. | Nov. 12, 2010.


Conclusion and Recommendation Following review of the Petition and applicable law, Petitioner has not demonstrated that she is in custody pursuant to a judgment of the state court which resulted from a decision contrary to or

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involving an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or was the result of a decision based on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the evidence in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S .C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Further, Petitioner has not established any error causing a denial of fundamental fairness or cause to hesitate due to the probability of actual innocence. Finally, there has been no demonstrated need for an evidentiary hearing. The undersigned therefore recommends the Petition be denied and dismissed in its entirety.

Gregory L. LILLY, Plaintiff, v. Will SMITH, et. al., Defendants.No. 05-1383. | Feb. 28, 2008.


1) The defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. [d/e 39] The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendant in accordance with this order. The parties are to bear their own costs. This case is terminated. 2) If the plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues the plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 24(a)(1)©. If the plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $455.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. Furthermore, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, the plaintiff may also accumulate another strike under 28 U.S.C.1915(g). *6 3) The agency having custody of the plaintiff is directed to remit the docketing fee of $250.00 from the plaintiff's prison trust fund account if such funds are available. If the plaintiff does not have $250.00 in his trust fund account, the agency must send 20 percent of the current balance, or the average balance during the past six months, whichever amount is higher; thereafter, the agency shall begin forwarding monthly payments from the plaintiff's trust fund account to the clerk of court each time the plaintiff's account exceeds $10.00 until the statutory fee of $250.00 is paid in its

entirety. The filing fee collected shall not exceed the statutory filing fee of $250.00. 4) The plaintiff must notify the clerk of the court of a change of address and phone number within seven days of such a change. Release from incarceration does not relieve the plaintiff of his obligation to pay the filing fee in full. 5) The clerk is directed to mail a copy of this order to the plaintiff's place of confinement, to the attention of the Trust Fund Office.

Mark SHOOK and Dennis Jones, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF EL PASO et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 02–cv–00651–RPM. | June 28, 2006.


ConclusionORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for class certification is denied

Jimmy DICKERSON, Plaintiff, v. Ms. Doris FRANKLIN, Defendant.C.A. No. 6:07-334-RBH. | April 2, 2007.

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Recommendation It is recommended that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice under the “three strikes” rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

David Lee GARNER, Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA CARE CENTER, Defendant.Civil Action No. 3:07-3653-TLW-JRM. | Sept. 9, 2008.


RecommendationAccordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez, supra; Neitzke v. Williams, supra; Haines v. Kerner, supra; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n. * (4th Cir.1993), replacing unpublished opinion originally tabled at 993 F.2d 1535 (4th Cir.1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh, supra; Todd v. Baskerville, supra, 712 F.2d at 74; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [the court shall review, as soon as practicable after docketing, prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to any grounds for dismissal].

Jerry S. LINDSEY, Appellant v. Phil SHAFFER, Head Counselor et al..No. 10–4139. | Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect, | Possible Dismissal Pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or Possible Summary Action | Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 Jan. 13, 2011. | Opinion filed: Feb. 11, 2011.


ConclusionAccordingly, we conclude that there is no substantial question presented by this appeal, and will thus summarily affirm the District Court's order granting summary judgment to all defendants. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

Stephen PROCTOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF POTTAWATOMIE, et al, Defendants.No. CIV–07–654–M. | May 27, 2009.


Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the Board's Motion for Summary Judgment [docket no. 29].

Janice M. HALL, Plaintiff v. KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF WORKERS’ CLAIMS, et al., Defendants.No. 1:09–CV–00098. | Feb. 23, 2010.


CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Kentucky Department of Workers' Claims, James L. Overfield, Tara Aziz and John Mann's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. An appropriate order shall issue.

Melvin KNIGHT, Plaintiff, v. Floyd MURPHY, Steven Cmar, and John R. Walton, Defendants.Civil Action No. 12–984. | Aug. 21, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6) is DENIED. AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and Rule 72.C.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of issuance of this Order to file an appeal to the District Judge, which includes the basis for objection to this Order. Any party opposing the appeal shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the notice of appeal to respond thereto. Failure to file a timely notice of appeal will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.

Demajio J. ELLIS, Plaintiff, v. Lt. Russell OLMSTEAD, Defendant.No. 3:11–CV–232. | Sept. 15, 2011.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the Court: (1) GRANTS the plaintiff leave to proceed against Lieutenant Russell Olmstead in his individual capacity for compensatory damages for using excessive force against him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) DISMISSES all other claims; (3) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of process on Lieutenant Russell Olmstead; and (4) ORDERS Lieutenant Russell Olmstead, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), to respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. Ind. L.R. 10.1, only to the claim for which the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

Tony Harold MOORE, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 7:11–cv–00119. | March 15, 2011.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, I vacate the March 14, 2011, opinion and order, grant plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the complaint without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff may refile his claims at the time of his choice. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this memorandum opinion and the accompanying order to the plaintiff.

Terry D. TILMON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Steve PRATOR et al., Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 03-31071 | Summary Calendar. | May 7, 2004.


ConclusionWe hold that a prisoner who has been convicted but has not yet been sentenced has the same status as a sentenced prisoner for purposes of analyzing whether the prisoner has a liberty interest in having certain procedural protections apply before being punished in connection with prison disciplinary proceedings. Because Tilmon was a convicted prisoner, he had no liberty interest implicated by his confinement in a punitive cell for eight hours pursuant to Sandin v. Conner. The district court did not err in dismissing Tilmon's action for failure to state a claim. Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir.1998). AFFIRMED.

Karen CARTER, Plaintiff, v. The COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., Defendants.No. C 05-3974-JF (RS). | April 28, 2008.

COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD, $108,290

Conclusion1) Plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages is denied; 2) Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied; and 3) Plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs is granted in part; Plaintiff is awarded the sum of $108, 290 as and for attorney's fees and costs.

Brent JACOBY, Plaintiff v. BALDWIN COUNTY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 12–366–CG–C. Dec. 28, 2012.8-9 hours in chair with mace on face not washed and no medical care


Conclusion

After due and proper consideration of all portions of this file deemed relevant to the issues raised, and there having been no objections filed, the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) is ADOPTED as the opinion of this Court.

It is ORDERED that defendants Baldwin County and Sergeant Scott are DISMISSED with prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because the claims against each are frivolous. This action will proceed as to all remaining claims. DONE and ORDERED

Shaker AAMER (ISN 239), et al., Petitioners, v. Barack H. OBAMA, et al., Respondents.Civil Action Nos. 04–2215 (RMC), 05–1504(RMC), 05–2349(RMC). | July 16, 2013.(in chair to have feeding tube placed for hunger strike)


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ORDERFor the reasons stated in the Opinion issued simultaneously with this Order, it is hereby ORDERED that the motions for preliminary injunction filed by Petitioners Shaker Aamer, Nabil Hadjarab, and Ahmed Belbacha1 are DENIED.

Arquincy Lee CARR, Plaintiff v. Sheriff David BETH, et al.No. 10–C–1017. Feb. 16, 2011. (hosed in chair – could not breathe)


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket # 3) be and hereby is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to consolidate cases (Docket # 10) be and hereby is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to file amended complaint (Docket # 15) be and hereby is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for injunction/temporary restraining order (Docket # 17) be and hereby is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court document that this inmate has brought an action that was dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court document that this inmate has incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Kenosha County Sheriff or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff's prison trust account the $344.50 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment accordingly. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the Kenosha County Sheriff and to Corey F. Finkelmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7857, Madison, Wisconsin, 53707–7857. I FURTHER CERTIFY that any appeal from this matter would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) unless the plaintiff offers bonafide arguments supporting his appeal.

Abdul BROWN v. Jeffrey BEARD, et al.No. 09-2616. (taser and mace while in chair)No. 09–2616. Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 4, 2010.Filed: March 22, 2010?

APPEAL: LOWER COURT’S RULING OVERTURNED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF

ConclusionFor these reasons, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Brown's motion for relief from its entry of summary judgment. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's order of May 23, 2009, and remand. On remand, the District Court is directed to grant

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Brown's Rule 60(b) motion, consider his opposition brief, and conduct such other proceedings as may be required. We acknowledge the difficult task that the District Court has faced in managing this pro se litigation.9 In light of our ruling, the District Court may wish to revisit Brown's request for the appointment of counsel.

Willie Lamar YOUNG, Jr. v. Jeffery A. BEARD, et al.Civil Action No. 3:07–2266. Feb. 11, 2011placed in chair to force feed via feeding tube for hunger strike


ConclusionFor the reasons elaborated above, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT: (1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment, (Doc. No. 166), be GRANTED, and (2) The only remaining claim, claim [F] at paragraphs 53 to 62, the excessive force claim against defendants Eberling, Goodman, Grove and Paige under the Eighth Amendment, be set down for trial in accordance with a schedule set by the trial judge.

Alfredo Yero PORRO v. Stanley BARNES, et al.No. 10–6002. Nov. 9, 2010. (tasered while in chair)


Mr. Porro won a significant judgment against Mr. Lovett, the individual who tasered him. With this result, no party to this appeal has any quarrel. We hold only, as did the district court, that Mr. Porro has failed to adduce evidence suggesting that Messrs. Barnes or Bryant also bear legal responsibility for the violation of his constitutional rights. The judgment of the district court is Affirmed.

Aaron M. GRAY v. Rick ROSE, et al.Civil Action Nos. 2:08–CV–251 (tasered while in restraint chair)Civil Action No. 2:08-CV-251. July 21, 2008


ConclusionIt is therefore RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss, Doc. No. 12, be GRANTED and that plaintiff's motion in opposition, Doc. No. 21, be DENIED. If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within ten (10) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part thereof in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). Response to objections must be filed within ten (10) days after being served with a copy thereof. F.R. Civ. P. 72(b). The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation.

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Talal AL-ZAHRANI, et al. v. Donald RUMSFELD, et al.Civil Action No. 09-0028 (ESH). (placed in chair to force feed with tube feeds for hunger strike) Feb 16 2010?


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motions to dismiss and the United States' motion to substitute. A *120 separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Patrick C. LYNN v. Ray ROBERTS, et al., Defendants.No. 11–3073–JAR. (Beaten while in chair) Aug. 22, 2011.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days in which to submit an affidavit in support of his IFP motion that complies with the foregoing Memorandum and Order, and to submit his complaint upon court-approved forms that have been fully and properly completed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Referral to Chief Judge Vratil and for Urgent Orders (Doc. 7) is denied. The Clerk is directed to transmit § 1983 forms to plaintiff.

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5. CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS- NOT GIVEN FOOD/WATER

Bradley J. QUINN, Plaintiff, v. Craig ADAMS, et al., Defendants. No. C08-5279 FDB. | Oct. 17, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above the Court should GRANT Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt.# 14) and Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Dkt.# 9) should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) . Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on October 17, 2008, as noted in the caption. DATED this 29th day of September, 2008.

Justin JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. Roger MULCH and Ms. Connaway, Defendants.Civil No. 09–971–GPM. | June 4, 2010.


ConclusionIn summary, the complaint does not survive review under § 1915A. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Jackson is advised that the dismissal of this action will count as one of his three allotted “strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Brent JACOBY, Plaintiff, v. BALDWIN COUNTY, et al., Defendant.Civil Action No. 12–0197–WS–M. | May 22, 2013.


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that the motion for summary judgment of Defendants Baldwin County, Carr, Crull, Mack, McCall, Sherman, and Wasdin be granted, that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, and that Plaintiff's action against these Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. The instructions which follow the undersigned's signature contain important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Sevan KAYAIAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al., Defendants.No. 1:06-cv01634-LJO-SMS PC. | Feb. 27, 2007.


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https://a.next.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?findType=L&pubNum=1004365&cite=USFRCPR72&originatingDoc=I6aa812ee9f7611ddb6a3a099756c05b7&refType=LQ&originationContext=document&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)






ConclusionAccordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, filed November 14, 2006, is GRANTED;2. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; 3. The Clerk's Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form; 4. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff shall file an amended complaint; and 5. If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the court will recommend that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Donnie D. WHITE v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.No. 11–cv–543–JPG. June 22, 2012. (states no food while in chair)


ConclusionIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to Plaintiff's retaliation claims in COUNT 4, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for Defendants EVANS, MURRAY, BLACKMON, and SULLIVAN: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant's place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require that Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, with respect to a Defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, the Defendant's last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants (or upon defense counsel once an appearance is entered), a copy of every pleading or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed a certificate stating the date on which a true and correct copy of the document was served on Defendants or counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk or that fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court. *10 Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter is REFERRED to United States Magistrate Judge Frazier for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs under § 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

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notwithstanding that his application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A). Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give security for the same, the applicant and his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into a stipulation that the recovery, if any, secured in the action shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court, who shall pay therefrom all unpaid costs taxed against Plaintiff and remit the balance to Plaintiff. Local Rule 3.1(c)(1) Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 7 days after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)

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6. CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS – FORCED TO URINATE OR STOOL IN RESTRAINT CHAIR DUE TO NO BATHROOM BREAKS

Herbert J. BLAKENEY, Appellant v. DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON et al.No. 05-1980. | Submitted Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) Oct. 20, 2005. | Decided Dec. 8, 2005.

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING UPHELD IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS

Conclusion

Blakeney fails to present a dispute over a genuine issue of material fact. The appeal is patently frivolous. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Appellant's motion for appointment of counsel on appeal is denied as moot. Parallel Citations

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER COUNTY, NEBRASKA et al., Defendants.No. 4:05CV3238. | Sept. 17, 2007.


Conclusion The Court has given Davis ample time and opportunity to develop a claim, and he has been unable to come forward with facts to show that there are any genuine issues of material fact that remain to be decided. Davis has completely failed to establish his claims, and the Court concludes that all the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 205) is granted in all respects; 2. The Complaint, Amended Complaint, and all claims in this action that have been asserted by the Plaintiff Jerome Davis against the Defendants, including Defendant Matthew Vincentini, are dismissed with prejudice; and 3. A separate judgment will be filed.

Bruce M. DAMORE, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Robert E. UNTIG, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09-2778 (DMC). | Dec. 2, 2009.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's excessive force claim asserted against defendant CO Cole will be allowed to proceed at this time. However, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, in its entirety, as against the defendants, Untig, Armeno, DiMarco, and Rome, for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). An appropriate order follows.

Darrin GRUENBERG, Plaintiff, v. Capt. GEMPELER, et al., Defendants.Case No. 09–C–455. | Sept. 30, 2010.

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Conclusion For the reasons given above, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. All other pending motions are DENIED.3 The case is DISMISSED.

Frederick HUNTER, Plaintiff, v. ESCAMBIA COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.No. 3:10cv328/LC/CJK. | Dec. 19, 2011.


ConclusionIt appears beyond doubt that plaintiff's constitutional claims of false imprisonment, excessive force and inadequate medical care are time-barred, and that plaintiff's double jeopardy claim against the defendants lacks an arguable basis in the law. *3 Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED: 1. That this cause be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 2. That the clerk be directed to close the file.

James SHRUM and Josh Malcolm, Plaintiffs, v. Adriel RIKER and Sonya Troutt, Defendants.No. 3:11–0938. | May 10, 2012.


RECOMMENDATION For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that all of Plaintiff Malcolm's claims in this matter be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.3 Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has 14 days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have 14 days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any responses to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within 14 days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), Reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111, 106 S.Ct. 899, 88 L.Ed.2d 933 (1986). ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2012.

Michael Anthony DAILEY, Plaintiff, v. DOIZAKI et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 12–cv–02798–BNB. | May 14, 2013.


ConclusionAccordingly, it is ORDERED that the Complaint and Claims One, Four, and Five, as specifically set forth above against Defendants Doizaki, Patty Kelly, Brewer, B. Mott, Bandcroft, and Dr. Jason Grope shall be drawn to a district judge pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1 and to a magistrate judge. It is

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FURTHER ORDERED that Claims Two and Three are dismissed without prejudice because the habeas corpus claims may not be raised in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the claims for damages are barred by the rule in Heck. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's attorney/client interference claim will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to assert an actual injury and that his conspiracy claim will be dismissed with prejudice as insufficient. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Grayson Robinson and Perea are dismissed with prejudice as improper parties to this action.

Arquincy Lee CARR, Plaintiff v. Sheriff David BETH, et al.No. 10–C–1017. (urinated on self as denied bathroom- in for 3 hours)


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docket # 3) be and hereby is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to consolidate cases (Docket # 10) be and hereby is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to file amended complaint (Docket # 15) be and hereby is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for injunction/temporary restraining order (Docket # 17) be and hereby is DENIED AS MOOT. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and hereby is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court document that this inmate has brought an action that was dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court document that this inmate has incurred a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Kenosha County Sheriff or his designee shall collect from the plaintiff's prison trust account the $344.50 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from the plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court enter judgment accordingly. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the Kenosha County Sheriff and to Corey F. Finkelmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7857, Madison, Wisconsin, 53707–7857. I FURTHER CERTIFY that any appeal from this matter would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) unless the plaintiff offers bonafide arguments supporting his appeal.

Abdul BROWN v. Jeffrey BEARD, et al.No. 09-2616. (Vomited and stooled on self)

APPEAL: LOWER COURT’S DECISION OVERTURNED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF

Conclusion

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For these reasons, we conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Brown's motion for relief from its entry of summary judgment. Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's order of May 23, 2009, and remand. On remand, the District Court is directed to grant Brown's Rule 60(b) motion, consider his opposition brief, and conduct such other proceedings as may be required. We acknowledge the difficult task that the District Court has faced in managing this pro se litigation.9 In light of our ruling, the District Court may wish to revisit Brown's request for the appointment of counsel

Peter A. DIMMITT, Jr. v. Alfred OCKENFELS, et al.No. 03–170–P–DMC. | March 9, 2004. (stooled and urinated on himself)


For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is DENIED; the motion to strike filed by the Rockland defendants is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are GRANTED; and the Knox defendants’ motion for sanctions is DENIED.

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7. CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS - NO MEDICAL CARE WHILE IN RESTRAINT CHAIR

Rodney BOOMER, Plaintiff v. Sgt. Harry LEWIS, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:06–CV–0850. | April 1, 2009.


RecommendationsBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that the motion (doc. 462) for summary judgment filed by the Pocono Mountain Police defendants be granted in part and denied in part. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendant Lamberton as to all of the plaintiff's claims against him. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of the remaining Pocono Mountain Police defendants (defendants Lewis, Smelas, Lutz, Rice, Robson and Stapleton) as to the plaintiff's due process medical claim. It is recommended that summary judgment be denied as to the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against defendants Lewis, Smelas, Lutz, Rice, Robson and Stapleton. *20 It is recommended that the motion (doc. 456) for summary judgment filed by defendants Zaloga and Fox be granted. It is recommended that the motion (doc. 453) for summary judgment filed by defendants Donate, Columbia, Walsh and Yavoroski be granted. It is recommended that the motion (doc. 449) for summary judgment filed by defendants Prime Care Medical, Inc., Sprague and Bunting be granted. It is recommended that the motion (doc. 466) for summary judgment filed by defendants Checho, Shaffer and Morieko be granted. It is recommended that the motion (doc. 459) for summary judgment filed by defendants Pike County Correctional Facility, Lowe, Romance, Kumburis, Lastarza, Campos, Gattuso, DeMarco, Francis, Schwartz and Shappert be granted in part and denied in part. It is recommended that the claim(s) against the Pike County Correctional Facility be dismissed. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Lowe and Romance as to all of the plaintiff's claims against them. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Gattuso, Campos and Lastarza as to the plaintiff's claim regarding his housing assignment. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Gattuso, Campos, Schwartz and DeMarco as to the plaintiff's claims regarding cleaning his cell and the stripping of his cell. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Gattuso, Campos, Schwartz and DeMarco as to the plaintiff's claims of verbal harassment. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendants Kumburis and Lastarza as to the plaintiff's due process claim regarding his disciplinary hearing. It is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of defendant Francis as to the plaintiff's retaliation claims regarding the filing of misconduct charges and criminal charges against the plaintiff. It is recommended that the motion be denied as to the plaintiff's retaliation claims against defendant Shappert based on the filing of misconduct charges and criminal charges against the plaintiff. It is recommended that summary judgment not be granted in favor of defendants Francis and Shappert as to the plaintiff's excessive force and retaliation claims based on the alleged assault. It is recommended that summary judgment not be granted in favor of defendant Campos as to the plaintiff's claim regarding the use of the restraint chair. It is recommended that summary judgment not be granted in favor of defendants DeMarco, Campos and Kumburis as to the plaintiff's claims regarding the use of a chemical agent. It is recommended that defendant Maritato's motion (doc. 516) for sanctions be denied.

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Finally, it is recommended that the case be listed for trial on the remaining claims.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD et al, Defendants.Civil No. 05-3040. | Feb. 7, 2007.


Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the motion to compel (Doc. 83) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth above. The Carroll County defendants are directed to provide the information specified above to the plaintiff by March 1, 2007. This information includes a date upon which he can expect to receive the video-tape being reproduced by a third-party. The motion for an emergency evidentiary hearing (Doc. 97) is denied.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD et al., Defendants.Civil No. 05-3040. | Jan. 9, 2008


OutcomeCurrently before the court are the following motions: (1) the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 152), denied; (2) the plaintiff’s motion for relief (Doc. 166), granted in part and denied in part; (3) the plaintiff’s motion for order for judicial notice (Doc. 171), denied; and (4) the plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. 175), denied.

Jimmy DUNCAN, Plaintiff, v. Lieutenant Jack LANGESTEIN et al., Defendants.C/A No. 8:07-0268-MBS. | Jan. 14, 2008.


ConclusionWherefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry # 16) be DENIED and Defendants' Motion to Strike (Docket Entry # 16) be GRANTED; and the Plaintiff's Motions for Injunctive Relief (Docket Entry # 14), for a Temporary Restraining Order (Docket Entry # 27), and for a Preliminary Injunction (Docket Entry # 30) be DENIED.

FURTHER IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's Motion to Stay the Proceedings and Compel Discovery (Docket Entry # 22) be DENIED as moot. IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Charles CHATMAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al., Defendants.No. C 08-0050 MMC (PR). | Aug. 28, 2008.


Conclusion

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For the foregoing reasons, the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred. The Clerk shall close the file.

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8. TOTAL TIME TOO LONG IN CHAIR

David PARDUE, Plaintiff v. Sgt GLASS, et al., Defendants.No. 05-5004. | Jan. 29, 2008. 13 hours

COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD - $1500

ConclusionI therefore recommend that judgment be entered in plaintiff's favor in the amount of $1500 against Sergeant Emily Glass Augustine and Tim Helder in his official capacity as Sheriff of Washington County. Sheriff Tim Helder should be substituted as the current Sheriff of Washington County in place of Sheriff Steve Whitmill and it should be noted on the docket sheet that the claims against Sheriff Helder are official capacity claims. All claims against Deputy Robert Taylor and Deputy Logan Crain or Crane should be dismissed.

Mark WHALING, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 08–210 Erie. | May 27, 2011. 152 hours


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' [Partial] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 48] be granted. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and excessive use of force (unrelated to the use of the restraint chair), as well as any attempt to resurrect or re-state his retaliation claim, his Monell claim against Erie County or ECP, or his claim for punitive damages, should be dismissed. In addition, Defendants Parks and Ricci should be dismissed from this case.It is further recommended that the remaining allegations of the Second Amended Complaint [ECF No. 47] remain intact to the extent they clarify and support Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim related to the ECP Defendants' use of the restraint chair, which should be the only surviving claim in this case. The ECP Defendants should be ordered to file a response to the surviving portions of the Second Amended Complaint within twenty (20) days of the issuance of the final Order pertaining to this Report and Recommendation.

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Gregory HARRIS et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–CMA–KLM. | Feb. 27, 2009. 18.5 hours

COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD - $10,000.00

ConclusionBased on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that:1. Judgment shall enter in favor of Plaintiff Charles Lee Kettering, and against Sergeant Michael Esters, on Claim IV in the amount of $10,000.00;2. Claim IV shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as asserted against Defendant Deputy Clyde Meeks and Defendant Deputy Robert Moll; and

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3. Claims III, V, and VI shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as asserted against all remaining Defendants.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 05-3040. | July 28, 2008. 11 days off and on

PLAINTIFF UPHELD - $7207

ConclusionFor the reasons stated, I recommend that judgment be entered in Griffis' favor in the amount of $7207 against Former Sheriff C.E. “Chuck” Medford. This amount represents $7 nominal damages for the days spent in lock-down and $600 per day for the twelve days spent in the restraint chair. I further recommend that Former Sheriff C.E. “Chuck” Medford be required to pay to the Clerk of Court the $350.00 filing fee that has been assessed against Griffis pursuant to the terms of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Upon payment of the filing fee to the Clerk of Court, any sums that have been collected on the filing fee from Griffis' prison account should be refunded to Griffis' account.

Yassin Haythame MOHAMAD, Plaintiff, v. Michael C. BARONE (Superindendent) et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–316 E. | April 30, 2012. 24 hours


ConclusionPlaintiff, Yassin Haythame Mohamad (“Plaintiff” or “Mohamad”), an inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), filed this pro se civil rights action against certain supervisory personnel at the State Corrections Institute at Forest (“SCI–Forest”) complaining of alleged violations of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in conjunction with a planned use of force and his subsequent placement in a restraint chair for twenty-four hours. Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50). For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.

Avon Slay GRADY, Plaintiff, v. McArthur HOLMES, et al., Defendants.No. CV406-123. | Aug. 30, 2007. 44 hours


ConclusionBefore the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment, doc. 31, and plaintiffs response. Doc. 41. For the following reasons, defendants' motion should be GRANTED.

Gilbert GUERRA, Appellant, v. Gene DRAKE et al., Appellees.No. 03-3137. | Submitted: June 4, 2004. | Filed: June 10, 2004.

DEFENSE VERDICT: APPEAL DISMISSED

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ConclusionThe Court of Appeals held that:(1) refusal to subpoena additional witnesses was not abuse of discretion, and(2) refusal to award punitive damages was not abuse of discretion under facts.Affirmed.

Norman Joe LANGFORD, Plaintiff, v. GRADY COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al., Defendants.Case No. CIV-08-0389-F. | Nov. 17, 2009.


ConclusionSummary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity should be entered in favor of Defendants McGill and Daughtery as to the individual capacity claim raised in Count I of the Second Amended Complaint alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement based on Plaintiff being fed sack lunches for a three-day period from November 17 through November 19, 2006. Summary judgment should be denied as to all other individual capacity claims brought against Defendants McGill and Daughtery in Count I. In addition, summary judgment should be denied as to all individual capacity claims brought against Defendants McGill and Daughtery in Counts II and III of the Second Amended Complaint. Further, summary judgment should be denied as to Plaintiff's official capacity claims brought against these Defendants.Summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity should be entered in favor of Defendant Wyatt with respect to all individual capacity claims raised in Count I of the Second Amended Complaint and the claim raised in Count III of the Second *1247 Amended Complaint related to use of the restraint chair following Plaintiff's December 2007 suicide attempt. Summary judgment should be denied as to all other individual capacity claims brought against Defendant Wyatt. In addition, summary judgment should be denied with respect to Plaintiff's official capacity claims brought against Defendant Wyatt.The Motion to Dismiss of Defendants McMullen and Porter should be denied. As set forth above, Plaintiff has brought only official capacity claims against these Defendants. Plaintiff's official capacity claims against these Defendants should proceed.The Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Angel and Mosley, construed as a motion for summary judgment, should be granted and judgment as a matter of law should be entered in favor of these Defendants.The Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Grady County Detention Center should be granted and the Detention Center should be dismissed as a defendant in this lawsuit.Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery should be denied.In addition, the Court reiterates that no dispositive motion has been filed on behalf of Defendant, The Grady County Criminal Justice Authority, a public trust.

John Edward PRIGMORE, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Bruce BRYANT et al., Defendants.C/A No. 4:09–2849–GRA–TER. | April 26, 2010.


ConclusionAccordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned

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case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324–25, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

Joe MACKEY, Jr., # 200508932, Plaintiff, v. ANDERSON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al., Defendants.C/A No. 6:06-1180-GRA-WMC. | June 6, 2007.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for default judgment is DENIED and plaintiff's motion for discovery is DENIED as moot.

Michael Layne ODOM, Plaintiff v. Jimmy BANKS et al., Defendants.No. 5:11CV00260 DPM/HDY. | Dec. 13, 2011.


Conclusion1. The motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Stephen Humphrey (docket entry # 16) be GRANTED, Plaintiff's claims against Humphrey be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Humphrey's name be removed as a party Defendant.2. Humphrey's motion for leave to file a reply brief (docket entry # 33), and motion for a protective order (docket entry # 36) be DENIED AS MOOT.

Mark Daniel CROWLEY, Plaintiff v. Patrick LUNDSFORD et al., Defendants.No. 4:12CV00271 JMM/HDY. | Jan. 22, 2013.5 or 6 days

PRE-TRIAL: PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT Defendants' motions for summary judgment (docket entries # 64 & # 67) be DENIED.

Mark Daniel CROWLEY, Plaintiff v. Patrick LUNDSFORD et al., Defendants.No. 4:12CV00271 JMM/HDY. | May 11, 2012.


Conclusion1. Plaintiff's claims regarding the conditions of his barracks be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.2. Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Marvell and Shellnut be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Marvell's and Shellnut's names be removed as party Defendants.3. Plaintiff be allowed to proceed with his claims involving the alleged assault and use of the restraint chair.

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Larry M. HOLMES Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Neil WILLIAMSON et al., Defendants.No. 11–CV–3230. | July 28, 2011.9 hours


Conclusion1) Pursuant to the Court's merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states the following federal constitutional claims:a) First Amendment claim of retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights; and,b) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims based on the conditions of confinement at the Jail, the alleged humiliating strip search, the alleged nine-hour placement in a restraint chair without breaks, the alleged threats against Plaintiff, and the alleged intentional dissemination of the addresses and phone numbers of Plaintiff's family to other inmates.2) At this point, the case proceeds solely on the federal claims identified in paragraph one above. See CDIL–LR 16.3(C)(“At any time a Case Management Order is issued by the court defining the remaining claims in the case, the case will proceed solely on those claims ... except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown, or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.”).3) This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge for entry of a Prisoner Scheduling Order directing service and setting a Rule 16 conference.4) Defendants shall file an answer within the time prescribed by Local Rule. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Case Management Order.

Larry M. HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. Neil WILLIAMSON et al., Defendants.No. 11–CV–3230. | Dec. 17, 2012.9 hours


Conclusion1) The motion for summary judgment by Defendants Brents, Durr, Strayer and Williamson is granted (d/e 65). Defendants Brents, Durr, Strayer and Williamson are terminated.2) Supplemental summary judgment motions are due February 28, 2013.3) The final pretrial conference is rescheduled to August 12, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. by personal appearance of counsel.4) The jury trial is rescheduled to September 3, 2013 on the Court's trailing trial calendar. The actual date for the trial will be determined at the final pretrial conference.

Nathan Charles GRIGGS, Plaintiff v. DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:CV-06-0823. | July 6, 2007. 2 hours


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ConclusionAND NOW, this 6th day of July, 2007, it is ordered that the motion (doc. 26) to dismiss of defendant Dennis Stewart is denied.

Nathan Charles GRIGGS, Plaintiff v. DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:CV-06-0823. | Dec. 7, 2007.2 hours without 15 minute release


ConclusionAND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2007, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 63) and the record, and based on the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ordered that:1. The individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;2. Judgment is entered in favor of Dennis Stewart, Russell Hewitt, Jason Hammer, and Manny Rose, and against the Plaintiff.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD et al., Defendants.No. 05-3040. | June 13, 2007.300 total hours over the course of a 33 months


ConclusionIn this case, a review of the file demonstrates the plaintiff has been able to successfully engage in discovery, has filed several motions to compel when he felt that defendants were less than forthcoming in their responses, and he has filed numerous other pleadings seeking a variety of measures from the court. Plaintiffs documents have included citation to the applicable rules. It is clear to the court that the plaintiff has been able to adequately investigate his case and the court believes he will be able to prepare his case and present his claims at an evidentiary hearing. The motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 124) is denied.The motion to compel (Doc. 124) is denied. The court will not make the defendants copy and produce for the plaintiff fifty-five blank video tapes. Counsel for the defendants has represented as an officer of the court that these video tapes contain no footage. In the event an evidentiary hearing is scheduled, defendants will be directed to bring all ninety-four video tapes to the court with them.The motion (Doc. 126) is denied. However, the Carroll County defendants are directed to provide the plaintiff with any existing diagram showing the floor plan of the jail that was located at 210 West Church Street. Plaintiff should be provided with the diagram by June 29, 2007. The court notes the plaintiff has already been furnished with thirty-eight video tapes allegedly depicting the inside of the jail that may be utilized at any hearing.The Carroll County Defendants filed a motion (Doc. 129) seeking up to and including May 23, 2007, to respond to plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, motion to compel, and motion for summary judgment. The motion for an extension of time (Doc. 129) is granted. The response filed on May 23, 2007 (Doc. 132), will be considered to have been timely filed.The motion to reconsider (Doc. 130) is denied. As set forth in the court's May 4th order (Doc. 125), there is simply no basis for the undersigned to recuse or for a change of venue.Plaintiff's motion is denied (Doc. 131). This is a civil rights case in which the plaintiff contends his

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federal constitutional rights were violated. It is not this court's role to investigate crimes.The motion to compel and motion for sanctions (Doc. 133) is denied. Defendants have indicated they have provided the plaintiff with all medical records in their possession.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Chuck MEDFORD, et al., Defendants.No. 05-3040. | Sept. 20, 2007.300 total hours over the course of a 33 months


ConclusionFor the reasons stated, I recommend the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of Dr. Theresa Farrow and Dr. Donald Clay (Doc. 84) be granted and all federal claims against them be dismissed with prejudice. To the extent the complaint can be read to be asserting supplemental state law claims against them, I recommend that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims.

Bruce M. DAMORE, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Robert E. UNTIG, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09-2778 (DMC). | Dec. 2, 2009.22 hours


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, plaintiff's excessive force claim asserted against defendant CO Cole will be allowed to proceed at this time. However, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, in its entirety, as against the defendants, Untig, Armeno, DiMarco, and Rome, for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

David E. HILL, Plaintiff v. Lieutenant SCAMPONE, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:CV–11–1553. | Sept. 5, 2012.24 hours

DEFENSE VERDICT

Conditions of Confinement*8 Plaintiff also contends that his placement in ambulatory restraints for approximately twenty-four (24) hours constituted an unconstitutional condition of confinement. Defendants conclude that during the several hours that he was in restraints, the Plaintiff was not subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. See Doc. 14, p. 13. They further claim entitlement to qualified immunity. As previously mentioned, the United States Supreme Court, in Farmer described the standard for determining deliberate indifference as follows:

[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment ... unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.

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Farmer, 511 U.S at 837 . Thus, to succeed on such a claim, the prisoner must show: (1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) that the defendant was “aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists”; (3) that the defendant actually drew this inference; and (4) that the defendant deliberately disregarded the apparent risk. Id. The United States Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 480–84, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), reasoned that “[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct” is expected as part of an inmate’s sentence. Id. at 485. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals applying Sandin has found no merit in a procedural due process claim presented regarding disciplinary custody placement. See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 150–51 (3d Cir.2002) (because prisoners can reasonably anticipate transfer to disciplinary custody, placement in segregation as a disciplinary sanction did not implicate a protected liberty interest). In Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3d Cir.2000) the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a claim involving the placement of a prisoner in a restraint chair for eight (8) hours following a disturbance. The Court found that those circumstances did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. A subsequent ruling, Camp v. Brennan, 54 Fed. Appx. 78, 81 (3d Cir.2002) similarly concluded that the restrain of a prisoner on a table for two days while shackled and clothed only in a blanket did not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Following those decisions, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737–38, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) wherein it recognized that handcuffing an inmate to a hitching post for seven hours in a standing position, with his shirt off, subject to sunburn and scorching heat, without water or bathroom breaks while subject to taunting by correctional officers presented an Eighth Amendment violation. During the one day period, medical records submitted by defendants show that Hill’s restraints and his vital signs were regularly monitored. Thus, he was not subject to the extreme conditions presented in Hope.

Patrick LYNN, Plaintiff, v. Correctional Officer MADDOX, El Dorado Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.No. 11–3073–JAR. | March 28, 2012.26 hours


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 31) is granted, and Plaintiff shall file his Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies and adheres to the directions set forth herein by April 26, 2012.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all defendants named in the original complaint, with the exception of “(FNU) Maddox, CO2,” are dismissed from this action and all relief is denied as against these defendants, without prejudice.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32) is granted, and the time in which Plaintiff may respond to defendants' motion is hereby extended to and including April 26, 2012.

David E. SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant Michael KANE; Deputy Hedlund; Deputy Michael; Officer

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Secrest; and Officer Dennis, Defendants.No. 3:07–CV–477–RJC. | Dec. 9, 2010.8 hours (2 hours 28 min according to defendants)


ConclusionAfter careful review of the pleadings and evidence, including multiple sworn affidavits, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Hedlund, Michael, Secrest, and Dennis are not credible. Defendants, on the other hand, have persuasively shown a lack of evidence to support Plaintiff's case, in response to which Plaintiff has failed to convince the undersigned that triable issues do exist—such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff. See Boggan v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 545, 547 (W.D.N.C., 2000). Plaintiff has been unable to “set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.In addition, the undersigned is satisfied that pursuant to Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010), the force applied by these Defendants on October 17, 2007, was applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” and not “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Shauntez T. HAIRSTON, Plaintiff, v. Brenda COLE, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 08–cv–569–MJR. | July 6, 2009.150 hours over 7 days


Further, this entire matter is hereby REFERRED to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties consent to such a referral.

Samuel Harold STAEVEN, Plaintiff, v. Dennis KOEKEN, et al., Defendants.No. 09-C-82. | March 6, 2009.>5 hours


ConclusionTHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Plaintiff may proceed with a Fourteenth Amendment claim against all defendants based upon the allegation that plaintiff was subjected to excessive force when he was picked up and had his face slammed to the floor while he was handcuffed, and for the use of a stun gun against him. Plaintiff may also proceed with a claim against all defendants that he was impermissibly punished by being restrained in a chair for over five hours and confined to a segregated cell overnight. All other claims are dismissed.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2), that the U.S. Marshals Service shall serve a copy of the complaint, a waiver of service form and/or the summons, and this order upon the defendants. Plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(b). The current fee for waiverof-service packages is $8 per item. The full fee schedule is provided in 28 C.F.R. § 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). Although Congress requires the court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Marshals Service

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fees are not considered court fees, and Congress has not made any provision for these fees to be waived by the court.IT IS ALSO ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the Brown County Sheriff and Corporation Counsel, as well as to the director of WRC and to Corey Finkelmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Wisconsin Department of Justice, P.O. Box 7857, Madison, Wisconsin, 53707-7857.

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Gregory HARRIS et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–CMA–KLM. | June 18, 2009.18.5 hours


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:1. That Defendant Michael Esters' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (Doc. # 361) is DENIED.2. That Defendants' Rule 54 Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (Doc. # 363) is DENIED.

David MOODY, Plaintiff, v. (FNU) CORY, et al., Defendants.No. 09–3254–SAC. | Jan. 11, 2010.14 hours


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days in which to submit a certified statement of his inmate account for the six months immediately preceding the filing of this complaint.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within the same twenty (20) days plaintiff is required to file a “Supplement to Complaint” containing additional facts that are sufficient to state a claim of federal constitutional violation.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's “Motion for Substitution” (Doc. 3) is denied and his request for court to deny withdrawal (Doc. 5) and the Notice of Withdrawal (Doc. 4) are frivolous and warrant no relief.*5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

David A. JOSEPH, Sr., Plaintiff, v. MERCER COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.No. 3:12 CV 0847. | Dec. 3, 2012. 3 hours


ConclusionAccordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Mercer County Commissioners and MCADC are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff's claims regarding excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious dental needs are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

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Shauntez HAIRSTON, Plaintiff, v. Nicole WALKER, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 07-704-DRH. | Dec. 4, 2007.20 hours

PRETRIAL: DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionIn summary, Plaintiff's complaint does not survive review under § 1915A. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff is advised that the dismissal of this action will count as a strike under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).IT IS SO ORDERED.

John D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Steve McKILLUP, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 05-275-JPG. | Jan. 22, 2007.


Accordingly, the Court is unable to dismiss any portion of the complaint at this point in the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Kimberly DICKERSON v. Rob REARDON, et al.Civil Action No. 6:11–cv–1628. | Oct. 3, 2012. 4-6 hours, several occasions


ConclusionAs noted above, plaintiff has again apparently requested appointment of counsel. [Doc. 22] For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Order denying her first request for appointment of counsel [Doc. 16], her second motion for appointment of counsel must be and is DENIED; and,IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff's civil rights complaints be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous and for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Leonard G. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Dr. KAHN, Psychiatrist; et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 11–380. | Feb. 21, 2012. 20 hours


ConclusionBased on the discussion above, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Khan (ECF No. 23) be denied and that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Vishdal (ECF No. 34) be denied.

Norman SANDLIN, Plaintiff, v. B. HALL, et al., Defendants.No. 4:05CV3135. | April 24, 2006.

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12 hours


ConclusionTHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:1. That Filing No. 19, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, is granted;2. That the plaintiff's complaint and this action are dismissed without prejudice; and3. That a separate judgment will be entered accordingly.

Telly ROYSTER, Plaintiff, v. BEARD, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–1150. | Feb. 28, 2011. 7-8 hours


ConclusionFor the reasons set out in this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that Moving Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 83) be granted with prejudice in part, granted without prejudice in part to Plaintiff's ability to file an amended complaint with respect to certain claims, and denied in part. It is recommended that Plaintiff's claims should be disposed of in the following manner.1. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims with respect to his confinement to a hard cell and a self-contained cell should be dismissed without prejudice;2. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims with respect to the use of a spit hood and his mere placement on a food loaf diet should be dismissed with prejudice;

3. Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims with respect to his confinement to a hard cell and a self-contained cell, as well as those relating to the mere imposition of a food loaf diet, should be dismissed with prejudice;4. All claims against Defendant Beard should be dismissed with prejudice;5. All of Plaintiff's state tort claims, with the exception of Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim against Defendant Myers, should be dismissed with prejudice; and6. All claims against Defendants in their official capacities should be dismissed with prejudice.

Abdiyyah BEN ALKEBULANYAHH, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Respondent.C.A. No. 6:10–2976–MBS. | Jan. 21, 2011. >5 hrs


ConclusionThe court adopts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and incorporates it herein by reference. The complaint is dismissed without prejudice and without issuance of service of process as to Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections. Process shall issue for service on the remaining defendants.

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David E. HILL, Plaintiff v. Harley LAPPIN, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:CV–11–319. 8 hours


ConclusionAny Bivens claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities is precluded by sovereign immunity. Second, the Amended Complaint fails to establish that personal jurisdiction exists with respect to Defendant Lappin. Entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Lappin and Norwood on the basis of lack of personal involvement is appropriate. Based upon the undisputed facts, especially the submmitted videotape evidence, Defendants request for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claims of excessive force, denial of medical care, and issuance of a meritless misconduct charge will be granted. Finally, defendants' request for qualified immunity will be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claim of being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. An appropriate Order will enter.

David E. HILL, Plaintiff v. Harley LAPPIN, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:CV–11–1609. 8 hours


ConclusionBased upon the Court's discussion as to the lack of evidence presented by Defendants regarding Hill's surviving claims, disposition of defendants' qualified immunity request will be dismissed without prejudice as premature.*12 Finally, in light of this Court's conclusion that Hill's claims regarding the alleged use of excessive force and the implementation of four point restraints should proceed, Plaintiff's motion requesting a continuance to obtain discovery regarding those events will be dismissed as moot.In addition, Defendants' motion requesting entry of a protective order relieving them of their obligation of responding to Plaintiff's discovery pending resolution of their dispositive motion will be denied as moot. Defendants shall respond to any outstanding discovery requests within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. An appropriate Order will issue.FN13FN13. It is additionally noted that Plaintiff has filed prior unsuccessful civil rights actions which raised similar claims that Hill's head and neck were twisted during cell extractions and he suffered injury due to his placement in overly tight ambulatory restraints. See Hill v. Lappin, et. al., Civil No. 3:CV–11–319. It is troubling that Plaintiff has raised repetitive claims of suffering the same injuries.

Brian R. CHANDLER, Plaintiff v. Kane County JAIL, et alNo. 01C5789. 3 days


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Kane County is dismissed from this action. Chandler's claim as to lack of medical care for a torn tendon is

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dismissed as time barred. Defendants Collins, Buldak, Bailey, Dahlke, and Flowers remain in this action and the claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs will proceed. Chandler's motion for leave to amend instanter is denied as unnecessary. Defendants are given 20 days to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint.

Brent JACOBY, Plaintiff v. BALDWIN COUNTY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 12–366–CG–C. 8-9 hours


ConclusionBased upon the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that that Defendant Baldwin County and Defendant Sergeant Scott be dismissed with prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because the claims against each are frivolous. This action will proceed as to all remaining claims.

Perry Drake GILMORE, Plaintiff v. Ronaldo D. MYERS, et al. C/A No. 5:10–2663–CMC–KDW. Time not defined


ConclusionDefendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and this matter is dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1375 n. 11 (11th Cir.2008) (noting that district court's dismissal without prejudice on summary judgment motion proper where “neither party has evidenced that administrative remedies at [the correctional facility] are absolutely time barred or otherwise clearly infeasible.”).

Abdul BROWN v. Jeffrey BEARD, et al. No. 09-2616. 8 hours


ConclusionThe Court of Appeals held that:(1) motion to alter or amend judgment was properly construed as motion for relief from judgment, and thus was timely filed, and(2) denial of inmate's motion for relief from judgment was abuse of discretion.Dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Patrick C. LYNN v. Ray ROBERTS, et al., Defendants.No. 11–3073–JAR. Aug. 22, 2011.26 hours


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No ruling, paperwork is bad and need to refiled to be considered

ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days in which to submit an affidavit in support of his IFP motion that complies with the foregoing Memorandum and Order, and to submit his complaint upon court-approved forms that have been fully and properly completed.

Toussaint DAVIS v. William CHAPPLE, Chief Deputy, et alNo. 07-cv-321 (GTS/DRH). 16 hour


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 43) be:1. DENIED as to all claims involving the continued administrative segregation, full restraint orders, and excessive force; and2. GRANTED as to all other claims and judgment should be granted in all respects to defendants Stock, Jane Doe, and Heim and those defendants terminated from this action.

Donnie D. WHITE v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.No. 11–cv–543–JPG. | June 22, 2012.3 to 4 days


IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that COUNTS 1, 2 and 3 fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus are DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendants ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT of CORRECTIONS, RANDLE, WALKER, TAYLOR, NAVARRO, SHICKER, ELYEA, ANGUS, KALOWOSKI, GARNETT, HARTLINE, OSMAN, HOUSTON, VINYARD, ADAMS, COUCH, DUNN, HAMBRY, KERR, KLEIN, BASKIN, RHODES–BUSHUR, LARRY, MASON, STEVENS, PEPPERS, POWERS, WILLIAMSON, ROBERT C. JONES, LINDA ELLIS, BRYANT ELLIS, RAMSEY, CASTEEL, BONIFIELD, TANNER, ELDERS, MARKEL, MOORE, AHRENS, GUETERSLOH, MEDLIN, HILL, HART, GEORGE, QUALLS, WALKER, BUTLER, HUMBLE, WATSON, LESLIE, BARD, JESSE MONTGOMERY, McCANN, FREY, HINSLEY, LAMBERT, EDDIE JONES, DILLON, JOHNSON, MONTI, HALLAM, ROPER, MARKEL, SMITH, CHANDRA, KHAN, KACHIGIAN, CALIPER, CLOVER, WALTON, SHERRY MONTGOMERY, ROBERTSON, HAMBY, HOOVEN, SIMPSON, SWINK, CASTLE–WATKINS, FISHER, FORNEAR, KWASNIEWSKI, GAYLA SCHAFFER, NATASHA SCHAFFER, JORDAN, MOORE, MELTON, WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC., UNKNOWN PARTY, and BARTLEY are DISMISSED from this action without prejudice.

The PEOPLE v. Tony Domingo LEENos. A084117, A097097. 7.5 hours


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ConclusionDefendant was convicted in the Superior Court, San Mateo County, No. SC42582A, of failing to register as a sex offender. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Petition for review was granted. The Supreme Court transferred the appeal with directions to vacate affirmance and reconsider case. Defendant then petitioned for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal, Ruvolo, J., held that: (1) erroneous failure to instruct that a conviction for willful failure to register as a sex offender requires actual knowledge of the duty to register was harmless; (2) prosecutor's closing argument was not a comment on defendant's silence; (3) defendant failed to raise a reasonable doubt regarding competence to stand trial; (4) his eight-year sentence was permissible; and (5) attorney did not render ineffective assistance.Judgment affirmed; petition denied.

David Preston PARDUE, ADC # 93335 v. Larry NORRIS, Director, Arkansas Department of CorrectionNo. 5:06CV00184 JMM/JTR. 13.5 hours – awarded $1500 for this specifically

DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petition and Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket entries # 2 and # 33) be DENIED, and that this case be DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE.

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9. INAPPROPRIATE USE OF CHAIR – USED AS A FORM OF PUNISHMENT RATHER THAN SAFETY

Michael LEDGER, Plaintiff v. Ryan LeVIERGE et al., Defendants.Civil No. 06–cv–411–SM. | Aug. 7, 2008.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION DEFENSE VERDICT AND PLANTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionFor the reasons given, defendants' motion for summary judgment (document no. 20) is granted in part and denied in part. The case remains on track for trial on all three counts, subject to the exclusion of plaintiff's placement in the restraint chair as a basis for liability.

Adam C. PUGH, Plaintiff, v. Ms. EVANS, et al., Defendants.No. 5:11–CT–3239–D. | June 20, 2012.


ConclusionIn sum, the court DENIES Pugh's motions for appointment of counsel and transfer to Central Prison [D.E. 2, 3] and DISMISSES Pugh's complaint [D.E. 1] as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Clerk of Court shall close the case.

Kevin MCBRIDE, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Kim CLARK, et al., Defendants.No. 04-03307-CV-S-REL. | March 8, 2006.


ConclusionBased on the above findings of undisputed facts and the law as discussed in section V, I find that there remain no genuine issues of material fact, that Defendant's actions did not constitute excessive force, and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this ground. Furthermore, based on the findings of undisputed facts and the law as discussed in section VI, I find that there remain no issues of material fact and that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment only in her individual capacity on Plaintiff's battery claim.Therefore, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Brandon BLACKMON, Plaintiff, v. THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 05–1029–MLB. | Jan. 17, 2007.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION DEFENSE VERDICT AND PLANTIFF UPHEALD

ConclusionDefendants motions to dismiss are denied in part and granted in part. Defendant Masterson's motion to dismiss is granted (Doc. 47).7 Defendants Sutton, Tyson and Fitzjarrald' s motion to dismiss is denied (Doc. 47). Defendant Taylor's motion to dismiss is denied (Doc. 54). Defendants Guiterrez and Hittle's motion to dismiss is denied (Doc. 65).

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A motion for reconsideration of this order is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position or the facts or applicable law, or where the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider and advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F.Supp. 1172 (D.Kan.1992). Any such motion shall not exceed three pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed three pages. No reply shall be filed. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Gregory HARRIS et al., Defendants. Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–CMA–KLM. | Feb. 27, 2009.

COMBINATION DEFENSE VERDICT AND PLANTIFF UPHEALD $10,000.00;

ConclusionBased on the foregoing, the Court hereby ORDERS that: 1. Judgment shall enter in favor of Plaintiff Charles Lee Kettering, and against Sergeant Michael Esters, on Claim IV in the amount of $10,000.00; 2. Claim IV shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as asserted against Defendant Deputy Clyde Meeks and Defendant Deputy Robert Moll; and 3. Claims III, V, and VI shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as asserted against all remaining Defendants.

Paul Junior SUTTON, Plaintiff v. Major Gary TURNER et al., Defendants.Civil No. 4:09–cv–04051. | Feb. 16, 2011.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: PLANTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionFor the reasons stated, I recommend that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) be denied. The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

Corey Jawan ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. Cpt. T. CLARK et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:12–cv–00502–JMC. | Jan. 28, 2013.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, this court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [Dkt. No. 161]. It is therefore ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 85] in the above-captioned case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

Corey Jawan ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. Cpt. T. CLARK et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:12–cv–00502–JMC. | June 18, 2013.

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ConclusionBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 132, be denied, and Defendant Aiken's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 148, and the Lieber Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 149, be granted and that this case be dismissed.

Baxter Felix VINSON, Plaintiff, v. Sharonda SUTTON et al., Defendants.C/A No. 0:10–847–CMC–PJG. | Jan. 18, 2013.


ConclusionTaking the facts in the light most favorable to Vinson, he cannot establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment as a matter of law with regard to defendants Poiletman or Sutton and, therefore, summary judgment should be granted for these defendants. However, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Vinson's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Walls, McCullough, and Sherman, and therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate as to these defendants. Accordingly, the court recommends that the SCDC Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and that the Medical Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part.

Kody HASTINGS, Plaintiff, v. W.C. BORNE, et al., Defendants.No. 3:11–CV–2528–N–BH. | Jan. 29, 2013.


ConclusionThe defendants' summary judgment motion should be GRANTED, and all of Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice on the basis of qualified immunity.

David B. CRACE, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Amanda EFAW, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 2:09–CV–551. | Sept. 10, 2012.

DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionThis Court has jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this action. 28 U.S.C. § 1343. The Court is vested with jurisdiction over the parties. The Court concludes that, for the reasons stated supra, plaintiff has failed to establish his claims against defendants Slack and Blake. Specifically, the Court concludes that the force used by defendants against plaintiff during the booking process was reasonable, was not excessive and did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of defendants.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Felix DAMON, Petitioner.No. 70070-2.* | Argued March 29, 2001. | Decided June 14, 2001. | As Amended July 6, 2001.

PLAINTIFF VERDICT (Restrained during trial)

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ConclusionGenerally, a defendant has the right to appear at trial free from restraints unless the trial court properly determines that restraints are required. We conclude that the trial court in this case abused its discretion by failing to enter factual findings sufficient to justify the use of the restraint chair. The improper use of the restraint chair violated Damon's right to have the jury presume that he was innocent. In addition, we conclude that the error was not harmless because Damon has proven that the restraints influenced the jury's verdict. Moreover, we conclude **423 that Damon presented a viable diminished capacity defense, and the untainted evidence was not so overwhelming as to require a guilty verdict. Thus, we reverse *696 the decision of the Court of Appeals and reverse Damon's conviction.

Stephen PROCTOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF POTTAWATOMIE, et al ., Defendants.No. CIV–07–654–M. | Feb. 25, 2010.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Trust's Motion for Summary Judgment [docket no. 30] as follows: (A) The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages and as to Foote and Proctor's claims, and (B) The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment as to the remaining plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims.

Gregory L. LILLY, Plaintiff, v. Will SMITH, et. al., Defendants.No. 05-1383. | June 25, 2007.


ConclusionThe defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. [d/e 27]. The plaintiff's claim involving the use of the restraint chair is dismissed. All of the defendants remain in the case. The plaintiff's surviving claim is that the defendants' violated his constitutional rights when they used excessive force and failed to protect the plaintiff from the use of excessive force. The plaintiff must inform the court in writing within two weeks of this order whether he still intends to pursue this litigation. If the plaintiff does not respond within this time period, his case will be dismissed for failure to prosecute with due diligence. See Fed. R.Civ. P. 41(b).

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER COUNTY, NEBRASKA et al., Defendants.No. 4:05CV3238. | Sept. 17, 2007.


ConclusionThe Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 205) is granted in all respects; The Complaint, Amended Complaint, and all claims in this action that have been asserted by the Plaintiff Jerome Davis against the Defendants, including Defendant Matthew Vincentini, are

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dismissed with prejudice; and A separate judgment will be filed.

Eunice M. SPEARS, et al., Plaintiffs v. Michael COOPER, et al., Defendants.No. 1:07–CV–58. | March 30, 2009.


ConclusionHaving carefully considered the parties' submissions and evidence in the record, and for the reasons stated above, the Court will take the following action:The Court will GRANT summary judgment to all individual Defendants on Plaintiffs' excessive force claim, based on qualified immunity. The Court will GRANT summary judgment as to all but one of the individual Defendants on Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claim, based on qualified immunity. The Court will DENY Officer Matthew Ruth's claim for qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claim.The Court will GRANT summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs' excessive force claim, and will DENY summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs' deliberate indifference claim with respect only to Officer Ruth. As to all other Defendants, the Court will GRANT summary judgment on this claim.The Court will GRANT summary judgment to the City of Cleveland on Plaintiffs' failure to investigate and discipline and failure to train theories of municipal liability, but will DENY summary judgment on Plaintiffs' “no transport” policy theory. The Court will GRANT summary judgment to Bradley County on Plaintiffs' jail medical clearance policy theory and on Plaintiffs' EMS transport policy theory. The Court will DISMISS Bradley County as a municipal defendant.The Court will GRANT summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1985 claim and § 1983 failure to intercede claim and will DISMISS those claims.The Court will GRANT summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state law claims for negligent training and supervision and malicious harassment, and their claim under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and will DISMISS those claims. Lastly, the Court will GRANT summary judgment on Plaintiffs' state law claims for assault and battery, negligence, loss of consortium, and malpractice. The Court will DISMISS those claims, except that regarding the individual Defendants, the dismissal is without prejudice to refile in state court.

David PARDUE, Plaintiff. v. SGT. GLASS, et al., Defendants.No. 05-5004. | Sept. 25, 2006.


ConclusionTherefore, I recommend that defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 22) be denied.

Brandon BLACKMON, Plaintiff, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 05–1029–MLB. | June 29, 2012.


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Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 283) is granted in part and denied in part. Defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding Blackmon's claims for violations of state regulations is granted against all defendants. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims of excessive force against all individual defendants is denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Blackmon's claim against Taylor for failing to perform an appropriate assessment and his claim against Taylor and Fitzgarrald for failing to transfer Blackmon to the Shelter is granted. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Blackmon's claim against Taylor and Fitzgarrald for failing to provide adequate mental health care is denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Blackmon's claim against Sutton for failing to immediately place him in the Shelter in January 1997 is granted. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Blackmons' claim for failing to protect Blackmon from harm by transferring Blackmon to the Shelter at a later date is denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims against Sedgwick County is granted. Blackmon's motions for partial summary judgment against all defendants are denied (Docs.268, 270, 272, 274, 276).A status conference will be held on September 10, 2012, at 1:30 p .m. The trial will be held on September 25, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. Counsel must file any Daubert challenges on or before July 31. The responses must be filed by August 21. No reply is necessary. All motions in limine must be on file by August 31. The responses will be due on September 12. All proposed jury instructions and voir dire must be filed by September 14. A motion for reconsideration of this order is not encouraged. The standards governing motions to reconsider are well established. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position or the facts or applicable law, or where the party produces new evidence that could not have been obtained through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Revisiting the issues already addressed is not the purpose of a motion to reconsider and advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise available for presentation when the original motion was briefed or argued is inappropriate. Comeau v. Rupp, 810 F.Supp. 1172 (D.Kan.1992). Any such motion shall not exceed five pages and shall strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau v. Rupp. The response to any motion for reconsideration shall not exceed five pages. No reply shall be filed. The page limits will not be extended for any reason. This case has been briefed enough. It is now time to prepare for trial or to reach a settlement.

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 4:05cv3238. | Oct. 31, 2006.


ConclusionFiling No. 161, the defendants' Motion to Reconsider, is granted insofar as the defendants are relieved of the obligation to produce any records relating to the race or ethnicity of inmates subjected to the emergency restraint chair at the Lancaster County Jail. This Memorandum and Order does not relieve the defendants of their duty to cooperate in discovery in any other respect. Filing No. 165, the plaintiff's Response and Motion to Hold the Defendants in Contempt and for Sanctions, is denied.

Michael PARKER, Plaintiff, v. Douglas ROBINSON, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 4-214-B-K. | May 22, 2008.

DEFENSE VERDICT

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ConclusionThis is a troubling case that raises many disturbing issues about the policies and practices of the Maine State Prison, ranging from its grievance policy to its use of the restraint chair in inappropriate circumstances. It is also a case that gives one a very real sense of the frustrations and unbelievably difficult situations that prison guards face every day. Michael Parker behaved in a foolish way to get attention because he had been treated poorly regarding his evening meal; but, he then set in motion a chain of events which led to his own humiliation, discomfort, and injuries. The corrections officers were frustrated by Parker's conduct and that frustration might have impacted the way they handled the situation, but, after a careful review of the evidence, I conclude that they did not cross any constitutional line when they removed Parker from his cell and took him to the restraint chair. Indeed, the videotape, in large measure, supports the defendants' contention that they behaved in a professional and competent manner in accordance with the established practices and policies. Parker's pro bono counsel has presented Parker's case with superlative competence and care. However, in the final analysis these three officers cannot be found to have violated the Eighth Amendment because of their conduct on the evening of April 16, 2004. I direct the clerk to enter judgment for the defendants.

Christopher BELTRAN, v. James O’MARA, Jr. et al.No. 04-cv-071-JD. | Dec. 20, 2005.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss Beltran's claims without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (document no. 19) is granted as to Count V in its entirety; as to Count IV except insofar as it arises out of the alleged withholding of toilet paper from Beltran; and as to Count II insofar as it arises out of Beltran's placement in the restraint chair on January 29, 2004. The motion is otherwise denied. The defendants' motion for summary judgment (document no. 18) is granted as to Count IV insofar as it arises out of the alleged withholding of toilet paper from Beltran but denied as to Count II. The motion is otherwise denied as moot.

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff(s), v. LARIMER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al., Defendant(s).Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–REB–KLM. | Sept. 2, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, the Court RECOMMENDS that (1) Nurses Hoffman and Hauge's Motion be GRANTED; (2) Nurse Bruntz's Motion be GRANTED; and (3) County Defendants' Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.The Court summarizes its Recommendation as follows:(4) Defendants LCDC, Nurse Bruntz, Nurse Hoffman, Nurse Hauge, Russell, Hooper, Sanzone, Daniels, Gregory, Traylor, Cates, Vanderslice and Unknown Nurses be dismissed;(5) Claims II(a), II(b), IV(b), X & XII be dismissed; and(6) Claims III, IV(a), IV(c), V & VI proceed as discussed as against Defendants Burgess, Harris, Esters, Nail, Kerr, Sims, Meeks, Moll, Farabee, Vanfleet, Harteker, Pugliese, Martinez, Santos Romero, Armentrout, Somoyer, McHugh, Purrier, Kiahtipes and Darling.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties shall have ten (10) days after

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service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147–48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir.1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412–13 (10th Cir.1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.1996).Djeto BERISHAJ, et al., Plaintiff(s), v. CITY OF WARREN, et al., Defendant(s).And Steve Gjonaj, et al., Plaintiff(s), v. City Of Warren, et al., Defendant(s).Nos. 04-70998, 05-71476. | July 26, 2006.

Karl HIPPELE, Plaintiff, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.No. 09–80089–CIV. | Aug. 9, 2010.


ConclusionBecause the record lacks evidence that Armor violated Hippele's constitutional rights by executing an unlawful policy or custom, summary judgment will be entered for Armor on Hippele's § 1983 claims. Because Armor had no duty to care for Hippele while he was housed in the mental health unit, summary judgment will be entered for Armor on Hippele's negligence claims. Even if the evidence indicated that an unlawful policy or custom of Armor caused the alleged constitutional violations, and even if Armor owed Hippele a duty of care, the court, in the alternative, would conclude that insufficient record evidence supports the claims that Hippele injured himself (Counts VIII and IX) or that guards restrained and beat him (Counts X and XI). Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:1. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc's motion for summary judgment [DE # 59] is GRANTED2. Plaintiff Karl Hippele's request for oral argument [DE # 82] is DENIED.3. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 58(a), the court will enter final judgment by separate order.

Adam BURKE, Plaintiff, v. GARFIELD COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants.Civil Case No. 08–cv–00140–LTB–MEH. | July 13, 2009.


ConclusionAs such, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, I conclude that Defendants have met their Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 burden of showing Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in that he did not file legally sufficient grievances for the two incidents that form the basis for his complaint here and, thus, the PLRA compels that Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. See Jones v. Bock, supra, 549 U.S. at 221 (ruling that any claims not exhausted must be dismissed).ACCORDINGLY, I GRANT the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc # 46] filed by Defendants, Garfield County Sheriff's Department and its Sheriff, Lou Vallario, in his official capacity and a Commander, Scott Dawson, in his official capacity. As a result, I DISMISS the claims filed against them by Plaintiff, Adam Burke.

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John P. O’MEARA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH et al., Defendants and Respondents.No. G031856. | (Super.Ct.No. 01CC12640). | Jan. 11, 2005.

DEFENSE VERDICT: APPEAL DENIED

ConclusionThe judgment and attorney fee award in favor of Huntington Beach are both affirmed. Respondent will recover its costs on appeal.

Alex D. TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Thierry NETTLES, Major, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 1:11–1479–TLW–SVH. | Sept. 20, 2012.


ConclusionFor all of the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declines to accept the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. (Docs. # 38 and # 45). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED. (Doc. # 31).

Joe MACKEY, Jr., # 200508932, Plaintiff, v. ANDERSON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER et al., Defendants.C/A No. 6:06-1180-GRA-WMC. | June 6, 2007.


ConclusionWherefore, based upon the foregoing, this court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted. Furthermore, it is recommended that the plaintiff's motion for default judgment be denied.

Michael Layne ODOM, Plaintiff v. Jimmy BANKS et al., Defendants.No. 5:11CV00260 DPM/HDY. | Dec. 13, 2011.


ConclusionThe motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Stephen Humphrey (docket entry # 16) be GRANTED, Plaintiff's claims against Humphrey be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and Humphrey's name be removed as a party Defendant. Humphrey's motion for leave to file a reply brief (docket entry # 33), and motion for a protective order (docket entry # 36) be DENIED AS MOOT.

Abu B. KARGBO v. James O’MARA et al.Civil No. 11–cv–130–SM. | Dec. 22, 2011.


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The court, in an Order this date, has directed service of certain excessive force claims asserted against Sgt. C. Brown and Officers Meurin, Plumpton, and Caisse and certain equal protection claims asserted against Brown, Meurin, and Plumpton. The court should dismiss all of the other claims asserted in the complaint (doc. nos. 1, 8, 9, and 12). Included within the order of dismissal should be all claims asserted against: the HCDC; James O'Mara; Lt. Riley; Sgt. Gordon and Sgt. Antilles; and Officers Adam, Barbera, Davis, Fitzpatrick, Michaud, Richard, and Ross; and the equal protection claim asserted against Officer Caisse.

Shakita PERDUE, Plaintiff, v. UNION CITY, GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.No. CIVA 1:05CV00753 MHS. | Aug. 28, 2006.


ConclusionAccordingly, the Court grants defendants' motions for summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendant Tremata Anthony's motion for leave to file excess pages [# 104]; GRANTS defendant Union City and Individual City Council Member's motion for summary judgment [# 110]; GRANTS defendant Sgt. Anthony's motion for summary judgment [# 112]; GRANTS defendants Dr. Musso, GCH, and Nurse Adams' motion for summary judgment [# 113]; GRANTS plaintiff's motion for leave to file excess pages [# 124]; GRANTS defendants Dr. Musso, Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, and Nurse Adams' motion to strike [# 129]; and STRIKES (1) plaintiff's response in opposition to defendants Dr. Carlo Musso, Georgia Correctional Health, LLC, and Cathy Adams' Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 122], (2) plaintiff's response in opposition to defendant Tremata Anthony's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 121], (3) plaintiff's response in opposition to defendants Union City, Georgia, Ralph Moore, Alisa King, Helen Turner, Barbara Bohanan, Shirley Jackson, and Edward Ski Saxby's Statement of Material Facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 123]; and (4) plaintiff's statement of material facts in dispute in regard to defendants' motion for summary judgment [# 125]. This action is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Allen Jerome SUPPLES, Plaintiff, v. Larry McCONAHY, Ms. Rhodes, Mr. Fanno, Mr. Russo, and Mr. Struthers, Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–1141. | May 7, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Policies (Doc. 72) is DENIED, in part, and DEFERRED until trial, in part.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence Relating to the Alleged Failure of Non–Parties to Conduct a Disciplinary Hearing (Doc. 74) is GRANTED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion in Limine to Exclude 2007 Grievance (Doc. 77) is DEFERRED until trial.

Arquincy Lee CARR, Plaintiff, v. David BETH et al., Defendants.No. 11–CV–363. | Jan. 9, 2013.

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PRE-TRIAL MOTION: HELD DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Beth, Leiting, Gerena, May, Carrao, Haney, Willstead, Bernhardt, and Rae's motion for summary judgment (Docket # 81) is granted.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Hauck's motion for summary judgment (Docket # 95) is granted.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is dismissed.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Cyrus Nelson PLUSH, II, Appellant.No. 25700-9-II. | Aug. 17, 2001.


ConclusionAppeal denied

Mark WILLNEFF, Plaintiff, v. MACOMB COUNTY et al., Defendants.No. 08–cv–12407. | Jan. 5, 2011.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, the Court will:1. Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment;2. Dismiss all claims arising out of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;3. Deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all Eighth Amendment claims against Officer Yunker;4. Grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all Eighth Amendment claims against the County.All Defendants except for Officer Yunker are dismissed from the case. The remaining claims are the § 1983 claim arising under the Eighth Amendment, and the state law claims contained in Counts III and IV of the Amended Complaint

Abdel FATTAH, Plaintiff v. Mary SABOL, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:CV–10–1607. | Sept. 14, 2011


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that all of Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendants DHS Deportation Officers Wildner, Quinlan and Graham be dismissed with prejudice since they are time barred. It is also recommended that all of Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Defendant Dr. Becotte and Defendants Sabol, Buono, Miosi, Decker, Mitra, Klienman and Sallemi which arose during his confinement at YCP from June 17, 2008 through July 25, 2008 be dismissed with prejudice as time barred. Further, it is recommended that Defendant DOC Secretary Beard and Defendant Nurse Lamas be dismissed with prejudice. Additionally, it is

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recommended that Defendants Evans and March, as well as Defendants Yeager and Sutton, be dismissed with prejudice.It recommend that Plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claim and ADA claim (Seventh Cause of Action) be dismissed with prejudice as against all Defendants.Thus, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action be dismissed with prejudice.Finally, it is recommended that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed with his Eighth Amendment constitutional claims under § 1983, i.e. denial of proper medical care claims and conditions of confinement claims (First and Third Causes of Action) only as against SCI–Rockview officials and staff, namely, Defendants Rackovan, Somich, Granlund and Dr. Symonds.

John D. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Steve McKILLUP, et al., Defendants.No. 05-cv-275-JPG. | Sept. 15, 2008.


ConclusionTherefore, for the reasons set forth above it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute (Doc. 16) be GRANTED, that this action be DISMISSED, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

David Tyrone HILL, Plaintiff, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 1:11 CV 874. | Aug. 11, 2011.


ConclusionAccordingly, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

Carroll W. LEWIS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. The BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SEDGWICK COUNTY, KANSAS, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 01-3158, 01-3172. | Jan. 14, 2003.

DEFENSE VERDICT APPEAL APPROVED

ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law for Sedgwick County is AFFIRMED, and the matter is REMANDED for reconsideration of its award of costs.

David WILHOLD, Plaintiff, v. Kris GEBKEet al., Defendants.No. 04-CV-0586-MJR. | Sept. 1, 2005.


ConclusionThe Court hereby DENIES Defendants' “Motion to Dismiss Counts III and V of Plaintiff's Complaint” (Doc. 9).

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David WILHOLD, Plaintiff, v. Kris GEBKE et al. Defendants.No. 04-CV-0586-MJR. | March 9, 2006.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Gebke's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20). Summary judgment in favor of Gebke is GRANTED as to Wilhold's Fifth Amendment claims in Count II. Summary judgment is DENIED as to the balance of Gebke's motion.

Edward William WALLACE, Sr., Plaintiff, v. L.T. HANRATTY, et al, Defendants.No. 3:08CV350-RV/AK. | Feb. 18, 2010.


ConclusionEven assuming that Defendants overlooked these grievances, as did Plaintiff when he filed his complaint, Plaintiff is required not only to initiate the grievance process, but to exhaust it, that is he must take the process to the highest appeal level.In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motions (docs. 37 and 38) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's amended complaint (doc. 13) be DISMISSED for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e).

Thomas WATERS, Plaintiff, v. Officer L. JACKSON et al., Defendants.C/A No. 4:08-cv-02898-GRA. | Feb. 19, 2010.


ConclusionBased on the evidence before the court, plaintiff has failed to show that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Accordingly, it is recommended that defendants' (document # 27) motion for summary judgment be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Nathan Charles GRIGGS, Plaintiff v. DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:CV-06-0823. | Dec. 7, 2007.


ConclusionAND NOW, this 7th day of December, 2007, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 63) and the record, and based on the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ordered that:1. The individual Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted;2. Judgment is entered in favor of Dennis Stewart, Russell Hewitt, Jason Hammer, and Manny Rose, and against the Plaintiff.

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Lee Andrew MITCHELL–PENNINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth McGOVERN, et al., Defendants.No. 09–3106–SAC. | July 6, 2009.


ConclusionIn order for plaintiff to elevate his allegations to a federal constitutional violation cognizable in federal court, he must provide additional facts that support a constitutional claim of excessive force. Plaintiff will be given time to submit a “Supplement to Complaint” in this case containing additional facts to support a claim of federal constitutional violation in accord with the foregoing Order. If he fails to submit a “Supplement to Complaint” within the time allotted by the court, this action may be dismissed without prejudice and without further notice.

Abdul BROWN, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 05-969. | Feb. 26, 2007.


ConclusionThus, because the plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth defendants are barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and even if this were not the case, the record demonstrates that his constitutional rights have not been inappropriately abridged, it is recommended that their motion for summary judgment be granted.

Abdul BROWN, Plaintiff, v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 05-969. | April 12, 2007.


ConclusionThus, because the plaintiff's claims against the Commonwealth defendants are barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and even if this were not the case, the record demonstrates that his constitutional rights have not been inappropriately abridged, it is recommended that their motion for summary judgment be granted.

Abdul BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey BEARD et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 07-637. | Feb. 20, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. no. 16) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, it should be denied as to Plaintiff's claims regarding his placement and confinement in the SMU and granted as to Plaintiff's claims that Defendants put chewing tobacco in his food and spread a rumor that he was a “snitch.”

Abdul BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey BEARD et al., Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 07–637. | March 21, 2011.


ConclusionBecause the evidence which is included in the record is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment will be granted as to this claim as well. An appropriate order follows.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Alter Judgment (ECF No. 92) is GRANTED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 87) and Judgement in favor of Defendants (ECF No. 86) are VACATED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 63) is GRANTED EXCEPT as to Plaintiff's claim that Defendant Johnson used the EBID after he was fully restrained and incapable of being a threat.

Patrick DAVIS, Plaintiff v. Cert Officers Barclay BANTA et al., Defendants.No. 5:12–CV–146–MTT–CHW. | May 21, 2012.


Filing fee not completed, proceedings cancelled.

Myron A. MANIER, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. COOK et al., Defendants.No. CV-04-0444-CI. | Oct. 4, 2005.


Conclusion1. Plaintiff's Motion for injunctive relief (Ct.Rec.50) is DENIED AS MOOT.*1289 2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dismissal (Ct.Rec.27) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint and claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.3. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide a copy to Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants. Judgment shall be entered for Defendants and the file shall be CLOSED.

Rickey Nelson SAWYERS, Plaintiff, v. Dominick DEROSE, Leonard Carroll and Elizabeth Nichols, Defendants.Civil No. 3:12–CV–1395. | Aug. 7, 2012.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICTNo ruling, paperwork is incomplete and need to refiled to be considered. See Dawn Marie

ConclusionFed.R.Civ.P. 20(a)(2). Sawyers' Complaint does not contain any allegations that indicate that his claims for relief stemming from the occurrences on April 30 and June 22 are related in any way or that a question of law or fact common to Defendants will arise in this action. Having noted these deficiencies, in the interests of justice to Sawyers as a pro se litigant, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), he will be granted the opportunity to file an amended complaint in this action within twenty-one (21) days.

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David E. SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant Michael KANE et al., Defendants.No. 3:07–CV–477–RJC. | Dec. 9, 2010.


ConclusionAfter careful review of the pleadings and evidence, including multiple sworn affidavits, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants Hedlund, Michael, Secrest, and Dennis are not credible. Defendants, on the other hand, have persuasively shown a lack of evidence to support Plaintiff's case, in response to which Plaintiff has failed to convince the undersigned that triable issues do exist—such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff. See Boggan v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 86 F.Supp.2d 545, 547 (W.D.N.C., 2000). Plaintiff has been unable to “set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.In addition, the undersigned is satisfied that pursuant to Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct. 1175 (2010), the force applied by these Defendants on October 17, 2007, was applied “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” and not “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the “Motion For Summary Judgment Of Defendants Hedlund, Michael, Secrest and Dennis” (Document No. 39) be GRANTED.



ConclusionHere, while Plaintiff contends that he told the nurse of the assault and his subsequent pain, there is no evidence to suggest that Nurse Doe had reason to know that Plaintiff's pain was a serious medical need. Nurse Doe's failure to examine Plaintiff in the restraining area when he complained of pain, amounts to negligence at most. Negligence in the context of a medical claim is simply not sufficient to state a claim for relief. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). Furthermore, given that Plaintiff sought medical treatment two days later for his back pain, but includes no information as to what if anything was done for his pain lends credence to the conclusion that his injury was de minimus at most. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief as to Defendant Nurse Jane Doe and she is therefore dismissed.NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is Dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

James GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. John KIRBY et al., Defendants.No. 12–CV–3249. | Oct. 23, 2012.


Conclusion1) The merit review scheduled for October 29, 2012 is cancelled.2) Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a constitutional claim against Defendant Carey for excessive force. This case proceeds solely on the excessive force claim.3) By November 1, 2012, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint in this case regarding the excessive

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force claim against Carey, if Plaintiff seeks to name additional defendants who were personally involved in the alleged excessive force.4) Plaintiff's other claims and the other Defendants listed in his Complaint are not properly joined in this case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue claims other than the excessive force claim, Plaintiff must file a “motion to sever” by November 12, 2012, explaining which additional claims he seeks to pursue in separate cases. The Court will then open a separate case for each additional claim, direct Plaintiff to file a separate Complaint in each additional case, and assess a filing fee for each additional case. If Plaintiff does not file a motion to sever, the Court will dismiss, without prejudice, all of Plaintiff's claims and all of the Defendants, except for Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Carey.

Patrick LYNN, Plaintiff, v. Correctional Officer MADDOX, El Dorado Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.No. 11–3073–JAR. | March 28, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 31) is granted, and Plaintiff shall file his Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies and adheres to the directions set forth herein by April 26, 2012.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all defendants named in the original complaint, with the exception of “(FNU) Maddox, CO2,” are dismissed from this action and all relief is denied as against these defendants, without prejudice.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 32) is granted, and the time in which Plaintiff may respond to defendants' motion is hereby extended to and including April 26, 2012.

Michael Dewayne HASTINGS, Plaintiff v. Bobby MAY, Sheriff, St. Francis County Jail; et al., Defendants.No. 2:09–cv–00187–BSM–JJV. | Nov. 26, 2010.


ConclusionIT IS, THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 31) be GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part;2. Defendants' Motion be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Bobby May, and that Defendant May be DISMISSED;3. Defendants' Motion be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendants in their official capacities, and with respect to the access to the courts and denial of visitation allegations;4. Defendants' Motion be DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's medical conditions, failure to protect from other inmates, and retaliation allegations against Defendants;5. Defendants' Motion be GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's failure to protect from injury from fight between former guard and inmate;6. Defendants “John Does, County Commissioners, St. Francis County” be DISMISSED for Plaintiff's failure to serve, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m); and7. An Evidentiary Hearing on the remaining claims will be scheduled by separate

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John RUTHERFORD, Plaintiff, v. Robert HINES, Administrator et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 2:11–cv–3139–DCN–BHH. | Jan. 31, 2013.

Anthony L. MANN, Plaintiff, v. Lt. C. FAILEY et al, Defendants.C/A No. 0:11–2232–RMG–PJG. | Feb. 1, 2013.


ConclusionFor the above reasons, the court recommends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part, and this matter be set for trial with regard to Mann's Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Wilson and Simmons for the August 23, 2010 denial of the opportunity for decontamination from chemical munitions.

Tonya MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. STEPHENSON, Muskingum County Sheriff, et al., Defendants.No. 2:06-cv-283. | Jan. 9, 2008.


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-Excessive Force Claim (Doc. # 108), DENIES Plaintiff's Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-Employer Liability (Doc. # 109), and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Motion for Summary Judgment by Muskingum County Defendants (Doc. # 111). Specifically, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion with regard to Plaintiff's claims of excessive force based on the alleged tasering and kicking incidents and GRANTS Defendants' motion in all other respects.

Dustin ZIMMERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. Craig SCHAEFFER, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:06-CV-1893. | March 7, 2008.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief will be dismissed, and it is unnecessary to reach the issue of class certification on that issue. An appropriate order will issue. s/Sylvia H. Rambo. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:(1) Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief are DISMISSED for lack of standing; and(2) Plaintiffs' motion for class certification (Doc. 24) is DENIED AS MOOT.

Dustin ZIMMERMAN, et al., Plaintiffs v. Craig SCHAEFFER, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:06-CV-1893. | Aug. 17, 2009.


ConclusionIn accordance with the foregoing memorandum of law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:(1) Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted in part and denied as follows:(a) Defendants' motions are GRANTED with respect to Sassaman's claims against Defendants

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Schaeffer, Bilger, and Chambers and Burns' claims against Weaver, Bilger, and Chambers(b) Defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 81, 84, 87, and 90) are GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages against Defendant Mifflin County and Defendant Zook in his official capacity;(c) Defendants' motion for summary judgment against Burns (Doc. 87) is GRANTED with respect to Burns' claim of excessive force arising out of his initial cell extraction and restraint;(d) Defendants' motion for summary judgment against Burns on his state law IIED claim is GRANTED;(e) Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended complaint to conform to the evidence adduced during discovery as to the allegations by Plaintiff's Zimmerman and Sassaman against Defendant Weaver(f) In all other respects, Defendants' motions (Docs. 81, 84, 87, and 90) are DENIED.Robert PEOPLES, Plaintiff, v. Sgt. Karl VONMUTIUS et al., Defendants.C/A No. 1:08–3977–CMC–SVH. | July 30, 2010.

Jonathan Andrew GORDON, Plaintiff, v. TYGART VALLEY REGIONAL JAIL et al, Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:12cv34. | Feb. 4, 2013.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that:(1) the Motion to Dismiss filed by the TVRJ (Doc. 11) be GRANTED and the complaint it relates to it be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) the Motion to Dismiss filed by Lisa Wamsley (Doc. 16) be GRANTED, and the complaint as it related to her be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to obtain service: (3) the plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment (Docs. 22 and 27)10; and (4) the plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and Judicial Notice (Doc. 31) be DENIED; and (5) this case be CLOSED AND STRICKEN FROM THE ACTIVE DOCKET.

Jonathan Andrew GORDON, Plaintiff, v. TYGART VALLEY REGIONAL JAIL et al, Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:12–CV–34. | March 1, 2013.


ConclusionUpon careful review of the record, it is the opinion of this Court that the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation [Doc. 37] should be, and hereby is, ORDERED ADOPTED for the reasons more fully stated therein. Further, the Plaintiff's Objections [Doc. 38] are OVERRULED. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment [Docs. 22 & 27], as well as the Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions and Judicial Notice [Doc. 31] are hereby DENIED.Furthermore, Defendant Tygart Valley Regional Jail's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 11] is hereby GRANTED, and Defendant Tygart Valley Regional Jail is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as a party defendant to this action. As such, this Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Tygart Valley Regional Jail. Additionally, Defendant Lisa Wamsley's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16] is hereby GRANTED, and Defendant Lisa Wamsley is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as a party defendant to this action. As such, this Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Lisa Wamsley. As a final matter, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk that this case be closed and stricken from the active docket of this Court.

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Larry Darnell MOSLEY, Plaintiff, v. BLACK HAWK COUNTY, IOWA et al., Defendants.No. C00–2024 MJM. | Oct. 4, 2001.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionDefendants' motion for summary judgment is Denied.James Howard HUDDLESTON, III, Plaintiff, v. Jimmy JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 06–00475–CG–B. | July 17, 2009

David Alan THOMAS v. Sheriff Pat BURNETT, et al.Civil Action No. 6:09cv130. | April 2, 2010


Conclusion28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires that as soon as practicable, district courts must review complaints wherein prisoners seek redress from governmental entities or their employees. Section 1915A(b) requires that upon review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint or any portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.The term “frivolous” means that a complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or fact; a complaint is legally frivolous when it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325-7, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if as a matter of law, it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338, (1989), citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); see also Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir.1995).In this case, all of Thomas' claims except for his assertions that (1) he was choked, placed in a restraint chair which was then tipped over, and left there for 45 minutes to an hour, and (2) he was denied soap and toothpaste for an extended period of time, lack any arguable basis in law and fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Consequently, all of his claims except for these two may be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). See generally Thompson v. Patteson, 985 F.2d 202 (5th Cir.1993). It is accordinglyORDERED that all of the Plaintiff's claims except for his claims that (1) he was choked, placed in a restraint chair which was then tipped over, and left there for 45 minutes to an hour, and (2) he was denied soap and toothpaste for an extended period of time be and hereby are DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. It is furtherORDERED that all of the Defendants in this lawsuit except for Lt. George Flowers and Officer Burns are hereby DISMISSED from the lawsuit with prejudice. The dismissal of these claims and parties shall have no effect upon the remaining claims and parties in this lawsuit. Finally, it isORDERED that the dismissal of these claims and parties shall not count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

BIG TOWN NURSING HOME, INC., Appellant, v. Howard Terry NEWMAN, Appellee.No. 4960. | Nov. 19, 1970. | Opinion after Filing of Remittitur Dec. 3, 1970.

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PLAINTIFF VERDICT APPEAL SUPPORTED Appellee having filed remititur of $12,000 (nursing home falsely held plaintiff).

However, from this record, we are of the opinion that the verdict and judgment of the trial court is excessive in the sum of $12,000., and that this cause should be reversed for that reason only. Appellee is *198 given 10 days from this date in which to file a remittitur of $12,000. Rule 440 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835; World Oil Co. v. Hicks, Tex.Com.App.Op.Adopted, 129 Tex. 297, 103 S.W.2d 962; Caswell v. Satterwhite, Tex.Civ.App. (NRE) 277 S.W.2d 237. If such remittitur is filed within 10 days, the judgment of the trial court will be reformed and affirmed.Reversed and Remanded.

Opinion After Filing Of Remittitur[5] Appellee having filed remititur of $12,000., as suggested by former opinion of this court, the judgment of the trial court is reformed in conformity with such remittitur, and as reformed is affirmed in the amount of $13,000. All costs of appeal are assessed against appellant.

Jonathan Lee CHILDS, Plaintiff, v. Barry HASTON, Sheriff, et al., Defendants.No. 3:11–CV–75–CAR–CHW. | Aug. 12, 2011.


ConclusionAccordingly and in light of the liberal construction this Court is required to give pro se pleadings, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated an excessive force claim against Sergeant Chris Turman. This claim will be allowed to go forward. For the reasons stated above, however, that the Court finds that Plaintiff failed to state cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Officer Jane Doe, Sheriff Barry Haston, Undersheriff “John Doe,” Jail Administrator Major Mike Thompson, or Sergeant Steve Green. It is thus RECOMMENDED that these claims and Defendants be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 1915A(b)(1). It is further RECOMMENDED that any Eighth Amendment claims based on a denial of medical care and the newly added Defendant “Medical Doctor” likewise be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim.

Larry M. HOLMES Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Neil WILLIAMSON et al., Defendants.No. 11–CV–3230. | July 28, 2011.


Conclusion1) Pursuant to the Court's merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Plaintiff states the following federal constitutional claims:a) First Amendment claim of retaliation for Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights; and,b) Fourteenth Amendment due process claims based on the conditions of confinement at the Jail, the alleged humiliating strip search, the alleged nine-hour placement in a restraint chair without breaks, the alleged threats against Plaintiff, and the alleged intentional dissemination of the addresses and phone numbers of Plaintiff's family to other inmates.

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2) At this point, the case proceeds solely on the federal claims identified in paragraph one above. See CDIL–LR 16.3(C)(“At any time a Case Management Order is issued by the court defining the remaining claims in the case, the case will proceed solely on those claims ... except in the Court's discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown, or pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.”).3) This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge for entry of a Prisoner Scheduling Order directing service and setting a Rule 16 conference.4) Defendants shall file an answer within the time prescribed by Local Rule. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Case Management Order.5) The merit review scheduled for August 29, 2011, is cancelled as unnecessary.

Larry M. HOLMES, Plaintiff, v. Neil WILLIAMSON et al., Defendants.No. 11–CV–3230. | Dec. 17, 2012.


Conclusion1) The motion for summary judgment by Defendants Brents, Durr, Strayer and Williamson is granted (d/e 65). Defendants Brents, Durr, Strayer and Williamson are terminated.2) Supplemental summary judgment motions are due February 28, 2013.3) The final pretrial conference is rescheduled to August 12, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. by personal appearance of counsel.4) The jury trial is rescheduled to September 3, 2013 on the Court's trailing trial calendar. The actual date for the trial will be determined at the final pretrial conference.

Terrence T. HAGGINS, Plaintiff, v. NFN BURT et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 4:07-931-HMH-TER. | March 12, 2008.


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that the defendants' motion for summary judgment (documents # 61) be GRANTED; the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (document # 71) be DENIED; and the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed.Further, it is recommended that the plaintiff's motions to strike the defendants' summary judgment motion (document # 70) and to compel discovery (document # 78) be DENIED as moot.

Abdiyyah Ben ALKEBULANYAHH, Plaintiff, v. Captain Thierry NETTLES et al., Respondent.C.A. No. 6:10–2976–MBS. | July 13, 2011.


ConclusionPlaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (Entry 17) is denied. Plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's order denying his motion for appointment of counsel are overruled (Entry 50). Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Entry 27) is granted. Plaintiff's case is dismissed without

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prejudice.

Robert GREER, # R-14159 Plaintiff, v. Sgt. J. MCCURRY, et al. Defendants.No. 02 C 4326. | Aug. 5, 2003.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, the plaintiff's motion “to recognize” his amended complaint (# 40) is denied. The court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment (# 32) and denies the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment (# 31). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants. The parties are to bear their own costs.

Nicky L. SMITH, Plaintiff, v. CPT. Scott GIBSON, Defendant.Civil Action No. 10–cv–02559–REB–KLM. | July 18, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [# 36] be GRANTED, and judgment enter in favor of Defendant as to Plaintiff's single claim.

Donald JENNINGS, Petitioner v. Health Care Administrator TRETINICK et al., Respondents.No. 73 M.D.2011. | Submitted June 24, 2011. | Decided Jan. 4, 2012.


ConclusionAND NOW, this 4th day of January, 2012, upon consideration of Donald Jennings's pro se complaint and the preliminary objections to the complaint, this Court dismisses Donald Jennings's complaint without prejudice. This Court grants Donald Jennings leave to file an amended complaint which complies with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure within thirty days of the date of this order. The amended complaint, should Donald Jennings file one, shall not contain counts pertaining to defendants who are part of the action which was transferred to the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County or pertaining to Dr. Herbik and Dr. Long, who each received a judgment of non pros in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County.

Robert Shane ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. MISSOULA COUNTY et al., Defendants.No. CV 11–29–M–DWM. | March 22, 2012.


ConclusionFor the reasons above, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of all defendants as to all claims. IT IS ORDERED that the defendants' motions for summary judgment (doc. 10, 14) are GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.

Cecil ROARK, II, Plaintiff v. Tammy ROBERTSON, et al., Defendants.

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No. 5:10–CV–147. | Aug. 26, 2011.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.Defendants Robertson, Hollis, and Donahoo are hereby DISMISSED as parties to this action.

Davon BURKE Plaintiff v. CAMPBELL COUNTY FISCAL COURT, et al. DefendantsNo. Civ.A. 06-CV-191-DLB. | Dec. 11, 2006.


Conclusion (1) Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.(2 The Court certifies that any appeal would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir.1997); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949 (6th Cir.1997).(3) Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order in favor of the respondents.

Kevin SMITH, (aka Bar-None-Royal Blackness), Plaintiff, v. Jon E. OZMINT et al., Defendants. C.A. No. 0:07-3644-PMD-BM. | April 23, 2008.

DEFENSE VERDICT

CONCLUSIONIt is therefore ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons, that Defendants Esther Quattlebaum, Dennis Dunlap, J.C. Brown, Veronica Smith, Denise Cannarella, Henry McMaster, Robert Espisito, AEDEC International Inc., and H. Boatman are dismissed as party Defendants. It is further ORDERED that the following claims are dismissed without prejudice: Claims Two, Four, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Fourteen, Fifteen, Seventeen, Eighteen, and Nineteen.

Jonathan Lee CHILDS, Plaintiff, v. Chris THURMAN, Defendant.No. 3:11–CV–75 (CAR). | June 14, 2012.

PLAINTIFF VERDICT $5,041.00

ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment be GRANTED and that Plaintiff be awarded a sum of $5,041.00 in damages.

IN THE MATTER OF K.E.Y. II, A Juvenile.No. 05-98-00137-CV. | May 19, 1999.


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ConclusionHaving overruled appellant's two points of error, we affirm the trial court's order.

Nancy VELEY, Plaintiff, v. LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants.No. 2:11–cv–01284–RCJ. | Feb. 24, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. Naphcare is dismissed as a Defendant, though some claims remain against LVMPD.

Danielle Janae CAMPBELL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–127. | Aug. 11, 2010.


ConclusionIt is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Rustin and Paige (Doc. 42) be granted in part and denied in part as stated above. Plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her Complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified above.

Michael Anthony DAILEY, Plaintiff, v. DOIZAKI et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 12–cv–02798–BNB. | May 14, 2013.


ConclusionORDERED that the Complaint and Claims One, Four, a/nd Five, as specifically set forth above against Defendants Doizaki, Patty Kelly, Brewer, B. Mott, Bandcroft, and Dr. Jason Grope shall be drawn to a district judge pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1 and to a magistrate judge. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Claims Two and Three are dismissed without prejudice because the habeas corpus claims may not be raised in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the claims for damages are barred by the rule in Heck. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's attorney/client interference claim will be dismissed with prejudice for failure to assert an actual injury and that his conspiracy claim will be dismissed with prejudice as insufficient. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Grayson Robinson and Perea are dismissed with prejudice as improper parties to this action.

Marc A. SHOWALTER, Petitioner, v. David R. McKUNE, Warden, Respondent.Civil Action No. 08–3228–KHV. | Sept. 11, 2009.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be and hereby is OVERRULED.

Gernard CHESTNUT, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant James McCLENDON, et al., Defendants.

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No. 4:11cv305–WS/CAS. | Oct. 24, 2012.


ConclusionIn light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion to dismiss, doc. 47, be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants McClendon, Brantley, Lane, White, Kassees, Mack, Carr, and Brown, for the use of excessive force on April 26, 2011, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e), and the case should be REMANDED for further proceedings on the one surviving claim against Defendant McClendon for the use of force on August 12, 2010.

Jeffery T. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. David OWENS et al., Defendants.No. 05-1238. | Sept. 26, 2008.


ConclusionPursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. Rule 56(c), the Defendant's, Greg Allen, Melinda Fellner, Jamie Kessinger, McLean County Illinois, David Owens, Kenneth Pacha, Patricia Peifer, Tom Phares and Joseph Schapmire, summary judgment motion is granted [285]. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff. Any remaining matters are rendered moot and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs.

Jonathan WARE, Plaintiff v. Paulette ARNOLD, et al., Defendants.No. 3:10CV00070DPM/JTK. | May 19, 2010.


ConclusionIT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that plaintiff's allegations against defendants concerning food, shower, grievances, and verbal abuse, fail to state a claim for relief, and should be dismissed.

Jonathan WARE, Plaintiff v. Paulett ARNOLD et al., Defendants.No. 3:10–CV–00070–DPM. | July 19, 2010.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionWare may proceed against the defendants on the merits of his allegations concerning an improper lock down, conviction of a disciplinary without notice and a hearing, and the improper or unlawful use of a restraint chair.

Gregory G. BROWN, Plaintiff v. CRAWFORD COUNTY, et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 12–80 Erie. | Feb. 1, 2013.


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ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 8] is granted in part and denied in part as follows:1. The motion to dismiss Defendants CCCF and Crawford County is GRANTED and said Defendants are hereby terminated from this case;2. The motion to dismiss Defendants Lewis and Saulsbery is DENIED;3. Plaintiff's Fourth and Fifth Amendment excessive use of force claims are dismissed as improper, but Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment excessive use of force claims is DENIED; and4. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to file an amended complaint within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order for the sole purpose of identifying, with particularity, the claim(s) he is asserting against each individual Defendant, and the actions of each Defendant that give rise to such claim(s).

Cedric GLAZE, Plaintiff v. Bobby MAY et al., Defendants.No. 2:09–cv–00113–BSM–JJV. | Sept. 7, 2010.


ConclusionIn conclusion, the Court finds no dispute of material fact concerning Defendants May, Jones, Smith, Scott, and Getchell; therefore, they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff's claims against them. However, for the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to Defendant Futrell should be denied.IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that:1. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 67) with regard to Defendants May, Jones, Smith, Scott, and Getchell, be GRANTED and that the action against them be DISMISSED with prejudice.2. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 67) with regard to Defendant Futrell be DENIED.

Lee Robert McCOY, Plaintiff, v. Tracy S. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants.No. 06–3159–SAC. | Oct. 31, 2006.


ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to adequately plead full and total exhaustion on all claims raised in the complaint and for the additional reasons stated in the court's Memorandum and Order dated July 12, 2006, and herein.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of fees (Doc. 2) is denied as moot.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's repeated requests for waiver of the “Separate Motion Pleadings Requirement,” for telephone video-conference hearing, and for appointment of counsel (Docs.15, 17) are denied as moot; and that plaintiff's second motion for Extension of Time to File Response (Doc. 17) is denied due to his failure to show exhaustion.

Joseph Nathaniel MCKNIGHT, # 0285707, Plaintiff, v. NFN ANDERSON, Lieutenant at Florence County Detention Center et al., Defendants.No. 3:06-0986-MBS. | May 19, 2006.

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ConclusionAccordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process because the plaintiff has not utilize the grievance procedure available at the Florence County Detention Center

Juqan Demetrius MUHAMMAD, Plaintiff v. Grant HARRIS, et al., Defendants.No. 5:11–CV–00278–JLH. | Jan. 23, 2012.


ConclusionIT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Motions for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, which this Court construes as Motions for Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. Nos.5, 24), be DENIED.

Roger W. ANDERSON, Plaintiff, v. Julie LAWSON, Defendant.No. 3:10–CV–233 PS. | June 29, 2010.


Conclusion (1) GRANTS Roger W. Anderson leave to proceed on his Eighth Amendment claim against Julie Lawson in her individual capacity for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for housing him in unsanitary conditions by failing to provide adequate showers, clean clothing, clean towels, hygiene items, and proper bedding.(2) DISMISSES all other claims;(3) DIRECTS the United States Marshals Service, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), to effect service of process on Julie Lawson; and(4) ORDERS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2), that Julie Lawson respond, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and N.D. IND. L.R. 10. 1, only to the claim for which the pro se plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in this screening order.

Dell Layfette CARTER, Plaintiff, v. Gene ERVIN, Administrator; et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 3:06-1192-TLW-JRM. | May 17, 2007.


ConclusionAccordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process..

Renee R. BARNES, Petitioner, v. Sheri DUFFEY, Warden, Respondent.No. 1:09 CV 909. | Nov. 12, 2010.


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ConclusionFollowing review of the Petition and applicable law, Petitioner has not demonstrated that she is in custody pursuant to a judgment of the state court which resulted from a decision contrary to or involving an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or was the result of a decision based on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the evidence in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S .C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). Further, Petitioner has not established any error causing a denial of fundamental fairness or cause to hesitate due to the probability of actual innocence. Finally, there has been no demonstrated need for an evidentiary hearing. The undersigned therefore recommends the Petition be denied and dismissed in its entirety.

Glenn Tyree GILLEY, Plaintiff v. Danny ALLEN et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:13–CV–P185–S. | April 2, 2013.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, the Court will by separate Order dismiss Plaintiff's claims for injunctive or declaratory relief, against Defendant Allen, and against Defendant Reynolds in his official capacity. The Court will enter a Scheduling Order to govern the development of Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims against Defendant Reynolds for excessive force and retaliation. In allowing those claims to continue, the Court expresses no opinion on the ultimate merit of those claims.

Cory Gregory GABELMAN, Plaintiff, v. Roger WARE, et al., Defendants.No. 2:13CV00008 NAB. | April 18, 2013.


ConclusionIT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court's Order dated March 27, 2013, is VACATED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions are DENIED.

Dawn Marie BALL, Plaintiff, v. Supt. LAMAS, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:CV-09-0846. | Jan. 21, 2010.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICTNo ruling, paperwork is bad and need to refiled to be considered

Conclusion1. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order in accordance with the attached Memorandum. The amended complaint shall carry the same civil docket number (1:09-CV-0846) presently assigned to this matter. The Clerk of Court shall forward to Plaintiff a civil rights form complaint for her use in filing the amended complaint.2. The amended complaint must comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 20. Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint which complies with Rule 8, but fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a), the Court will dismiss all but the first count of the amended complaint.

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3. All pending motions filed by Plaintiff (Doc. Nos.4, 5, 10) are dismissed, without prejudice, to the refiling of said motions following the submission of an amended complaint in this action.

Jason Elijah GROCHOW, et al. Plaintiffs, v. Gary M. LANIGAN, et al., Defendants.No. 12–0332(MAS). | March 13, 2013.


ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(l), for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to file a motion to amend his Complaint to address the deficiencies, as set forth in this opinion. Any such motion shall be filed within 45 days. An order consistent with this opinion will be filed.

Dawn BALL, Plaintiff, v. Sup’t. LAMAS, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 1:09–CV–846. | Jan. 17, 2012.


ConclusionAccordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows: Ball's motion to amend her complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs. 50 and 53),should be GRANTED, but the Plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as to all claims set forth in this amended complaint, except the Eighth Amendment staff assault claims advanced by Ball. With respect to these Eighth Amendment staff assault claims only, the plaintiff's amended complaint should be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts on or before March 1, 2012, and the plaintiff should be placed on notice that the failure to complete this task will result in sanctions under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute.Jevon EVERETT, Plaintiff, v. NORT, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 10–561. (used to take finger prints)

Brian R. CHANDLER, Plaintiff v. Kane County JAIL, et alNo. 01C5789. March 25, 2002


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. Kane County is dismissed from this action. Chandler's claim as to lack of medical care for a torn tendon is dismissed as time barred. Defendants Collins, Buldak, Bailey, Dahlke, and Flowers remain in this action and the claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs will proceed. Chandler's motion for leave to amend instanter is denied as unnecessary. Defendants are given 20 days to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint.

Perry Drake GILMORE, Plaintiff v. Ronaldo D. MYERS, et al. C/A No. 5:10–2663–CMC–KDW.

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ConclusionHaving carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, [ECF No. 32], be GRANTED; Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, [ECF No. 46], be DENIED; and the complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice.

Garland SLADE v. WASHINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al. No. 2:05-CV-210. | July 31, 2007.


b) Sgt. Jenkins: This defendant, so plaintiff contends, pulled his hair, which hurt his neck, while plaintiff was strapped in a restraint chair. Plaintiff does not allege the date this claimed episode occurred or any other details surrounding the supposed incident. Thus, the allegation is conclusory and does not state a claim for relief. Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12. Even if the assertion is not conclusory, it fails to state an actionable claim for use of excessive force. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a federal detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir.2005). While the Eighth Amendment does not apply “until after conviction and sentence,” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 (1989), a pretrial detainee’s claim of excessive force is evaluated under an Eighth Amendment standard because both amendments offer essentially the same protections. Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 727-28 (6th Cir.2006). *5 An Eighth Amendment claim contains both an objective and a subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-36 (1994). The objective element of the claim requires plaintiff to show a “sufficiently serious” deprivation, id., at 834, (i.e, whether the force was “harmful enough”). Though plaintiff need not prove significant injury, see Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8-10 (“Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less that some arbitrary quantity of injury”), he must show more than minimal harm to satisfy this element of his claim. Id. at 8-9 (finding that Eighth Amendment allows minimal uses of physical force which are not “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The subjective inquiry is focused on whether the use of force constitutes punishment which, in turn, depends upon the officer’s intent (i.e., whether force was used in good faith to restore order or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm). Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. The first element is missing here. The harm alleged is that plaintiff’s neck hurt as a result of having his hair pulled.3 This reflects, at most, a de minimis injury. “There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition [of punishment] with which the Constitution is not concerned.” Ingraham v. Wright, 430 651, 674 (1977). See also Hudson v.McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (finding that “cruel and unusual punishment necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force”); Gavin v. Ammons, 1994 WL 117983,* 1 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 1994) (Pulling an inmate’s hair, though not necessary to maintain or restore order, was a de minimis use of force and not the type of conduct repugnant to mankind.) It is also worth mentioning that, when asked by the WCDC

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authorities whether any guard, save defendant Andes, had put his hands on him while he had been confined at that facility, plaintiff did not even recall the hair-pulling episode. [Compl., Attach. # 3, Grievance Appeal of Mar. 21, 2005 at 3.] This suggests that, perhaps, he too viewed this alleged use of force as de minimus. At any rate, plaintiff’s failure to establish the objective component of his excessive-force claim obviates any need for the Court to consider whether he has demonstrated the requisite subjective element. Since plaintiff has failed to show that his right to due process was violated by Sgt. Jenkins’ action, this defendant officer is DISMISSED.

Patrick C. LYNN v. Ray ROBERTS, et al., Defendants.No. 11–3073–JAR. (used for punishment – 26 hours) Aug. 22, 2011

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICTNo ruling, paperwork is bad and need to refiled to be considered

IT IS THEREFORE BY THE COURT ORDERED that plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days in which to submit an affidavit in support of his IFP motion that complies with the foregoing Memorandum and Order, and to submit his complaint upon court-approved forms that have been fully and properly completed.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Referral to Chief Judge Vratil and for Urgent Orders (Doc. 7) is denied.

Tashon SAMPSON v. Director Jon OZMINT, et al. Civil Action No. 9:09–3273–DCN–BM. Nov. 2 2010 and Nov. 30, 2010


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted, and that this case be dismissed.

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10. INAPPROPRIATE USE OF CHAIR – VIOLATION OF ESTABLISHED POLICY

Eric David SEALES, Plaintiff, v. MACOMB COUNTY et al., Defendants.Civil Case No. 03-40336. | Sept. 29, 2006.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionI recommend, for the reasons stated above that Jasen Stabley, Ted Stabley, Hill, Gierke, and Whitehead's motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. Accordingly, the claims against Macomb County insofar as it pertains to actions by these Defendants should be DISMISSED. I further recommend that Defendant True's motion for summary judgment should be DENIED and that Defendant Macomb County's Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED as it pertains to True's alleged assault.

Timothes STANFORD, Plaintiff, v. Gerald WOLTMAN, Sgt., DefendantNo. 3:95–CV–866RP. | Aug. 5, 1998.

DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionThe evidence demonstrates that when Sgt. Woltman responded to Officer Albright's call for assistance, Mr. Stanford was causing problems and there was a legitimate security concern and a demonstrable need to restore order. After Mr. Stanford was placed in the restraint chair, he continued to be verbally abusive. When Sgt. Woltman believed that Mr. Stanford was going to spit on him, he was justified in taking reasonable action to avoid that potentiality. In preventing Mr. Stanford from spitting on him, Sgt. Woltman apparently forced Mr. Stanford's head against the wall once, but the injury to Mr. Stanford was de minimus. Sgt. Woltman's actions were taken in a good faith effort to restore order and discipline, rather than maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, and applying the factors set forth in Whitley v. Albers to the instant case, the court concludes that Sgt. Woltman's actions did not violate Mr. Stanford's federally protected rights.For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiff Timothes Stanford should take nothing by his complaint against defendant Gerald Woltman, and directs the Clerk to enter final judgment in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.

Erik Lee PIERCE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SALEM et al., Defendants.Civil No. 06-1715-ST. | Sept. 19, 2008.

PRE-TRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionThe Honorable Janice Stewart, United States Magistrate Judge, filed Findings and Recommendation on July 8, 2008. The matter is before this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Both plaintiff and defendants have filed objections.When either party objects to any portion of a magistrate's Findings and Recommendation concerning a dispositive motion or prisoner petition, the district court must make a de novo determination of that portion of the magistrate's report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th

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Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920, 102 S.Ct. 1277, 71 L.Ed.2d 461 (1982).Having given a de novo review of the issues raised in the objections to the Findings and Recommendation, I find no error.Accordingly, I ADOPT Judge Stewart's Findings and Recommendation (# 72). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (# 34) is DENIED, and plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against Marion County (# 40) is DENIED.

Kevin SMITH, a/k/a Bar-None Royal Blackness, Plaintiff, v. Jon OZMINT, Director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, et. al., Defendants.C.A. No. 04-1819-PMD-BM. | March 20, 2007


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth above, the court ADOPTS the R & R's recommended disposition in full.It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgement as to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's state law claims are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice, so that Plaintiff may pursue these claims in state court, if he so chooses.*12 It is further ORDERED that all other Motions currently pending before the court are now MOOT and are DISMISSED.

Johnny CALLOWAY, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 4:06-3356-TLW-TER. | Sept. 26, 2007.


ConclusionIn light of the above analysis, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Answer and for Summary Judgment (Document # 5) be denied, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document # 6) be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims, and Plaintiff's state law claims be remanded to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.FN2FN2. If the district judge accepts this recommendation, all remaining pending motions shall be rendered moot.

Korell BATTLE, Plaintiff, v. Major Thiery [sic] NETTLES et al, Defendants.C/A No. 2:13–660–CMC–BHH. | June 5, 2013.Died from separate choking incident


ConclusionAccordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A[as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal].

Cindy McGOUGH, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Herman B. Tucker, deceased, Plaintiff, v. MARION COUNTY et al., Defendants.

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No. 5:06-cv-364-Oc-10GRJ. | May 14, 2008.


Conclusion(1) Defendants Ed Dean's, Fred LaTorre's and Paul Laxton's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 116), is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants Dean, LaTorre and Laxton and against the Plaintiff as to the Plaintiff's claims in her Second Amended Complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Counts III, X-XI), and as to the claims brought under the Baker Act, (Counts IV, VIII-IX). Summary judgment is also granted in favor of Dean, LaTorre and Laxton, and against the Plaintiff as to the Plaintiff's request for declaratory and injunctive relief. In all other respects, the Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 116), is DENIED;*18 (2) Defendant Prison Health Services' Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 119), is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Prison Health Services and against the Plaintiff as to all claims alleged against Prison Health Services in the Second Amended Complaint (Count XIV);(3) Plaintiff Cindy McGough's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 118), is DENIED;(4) Pursuant to the Plaintiff's Stipulations, (Docs.113, 115, 117), the Clerk is directed to enter judgment dismissing without prejudice all claims against Defendants Marion County (Counts I-II), Kevin Dahmen (Counts XII-XIII), Johnnie Gallemore (Count XV), Denise Fox (Count XVI), Dana Ewell (Count XVII), Anteneh Addisu (Count XVIII), Aaron Scroggins (Count IXX), and Albert Willison (Count XX);(5) The Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, (Docs. 44-46, 52-53, 57, 61, 89-90, and 107) are DENIED AS MOOT;(6) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants LaTorre and Laxton and against the Plaintiff as to Counts VIII-XI. The Clerk is further directed to withhold the entry of final judgment as to Sheriff Dean pending resolution of the remaining state law claims (Counts V-VII);(7) The Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance, (Doc. 169), is DENIED AS MOOT; and(8) A supplemental pretrial conference shall be scheduled by separate notice for June 18, 2008, and this case shall be set for trial during the term commencing June 30, 2008. The Parties are directed to file an amended pretrial statement within the time limits set forth in Local Rule 3.06(c).

Brady HICKS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Deputy PARKER et al., Defendant-Appellee.No. 08-11015 | Summary Calendar. | Sept. 1, 2009. (Assaulted by another prisoner while being left unattended in a restraint chair)


ConclusionThe Court of Appeals held that:(1) prisoner who only exhausted first step of county jail's two-step grievance procedure did not exhaust his administrative remedies as required to bring § 1983 action, and(2) prisoner's conclusory allegations stemming from adverse rulings were not sufficient to support finding that district judge was biased.Affirmed.

Brady HICKS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Deputy/Jailer LINGLE, Tarrant County Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee.No. 09-10426 | Summary Calendar. | March 17, 2010.

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ConclusionAccordingly, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. Hicks's motions to tax costs to the losing party and for the appointment of counsel are DENIED.

Brady HICKS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. Deputy/Jailer J. GARCIA, Tarrant County Sheriff, Defendant-Appellee.No. 09-11045 | Summary Calendar. | April 9, 2010.


ConclusionThe Court of Appeals held that prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies.Affirmed.

Glenn D. ODOM, II, Plaintiff v. Larry CRANOR et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:13CV–P8–R. | June 21, 2013.


ConclusionFor the reasons set forth herein, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's official-capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants White and Wood and all claims against Defendants KDOC and Grief are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff claims under the PAMII, ADA, and RA and his claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Shauntez HAIRSTON, Plaintiff, v. Nicole WALKER, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 07-704-DRH. | Dec. 4, 2007.

PRE-TRIAL (Preliminary Review): DEFENSE VERDICT

ConclusionIn summary, Plaintiff's complaint does not survive review under § 1915A. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff is advised that the dismissal of this action will count as a strike under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Michael PARKER, Plaintiff, v. Douglas S. ROBINSON, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 04-214-B-W. | Oct. 10, 2006.


Conclusion

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For these reasons I recommend that the Court grant judgment against the defendants on their affirmative defense asserting that Parker failed to meet the 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement.FN9 If the court accepts this recommendation I will issue a scheduling order to govern this litigation.

ESTATE OF Carl CLUTTERS, Plaintiff, v. Tim SEXTON, et al., Defendants.No. 1:05cv223. | Nov. 2, 2007.


ConclusionBased on the foregoing, the following claims of Plaintiff remain: (1) claim of denial of medical care based upon policy or custom prohibiting prescribed narcotics against the Defendants in their official capacity, which is construed as a claim against the County; (2) claim of failure to train against the Defendants in their official capacity, which is construed as a claim against the County; (3) claim of denial of medical care based upon delay in transporting Clutters to the hospital and failure to provide OxyContin against Defendants Slack, Jones, Williams, Van Keuren, and Efaw in their individual capacity; (4) claim of excessive force against Defendants Slack, Williams, and Van Keuren in their individual capacity; (5) claim of cruel and unusual punishment against Defendants Slack, Williams, and Van Keuren in their individual capacity; (6) claim of assault and battery against Defendants Slack, Williams, and Van Keuren in their individual capacity; (7) claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Van Keuren, Williams, Slack, Jones, and Efaw in their individual capacity; and (8) claim of wrongful death against Defendants Slack, Williams, and Van Keuren in their individual capacity.Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56) is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART;a. Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent that the claims brought against Defendants Sexton, Patterson, Malone, Stephens, Lawless, Sissler, Bowles, Bowman, and Milliston in their individual capacity for inadequate medical care are dismissed;b. Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent that the claims brought against Defendants Sexton, Patterson, Malone, Stephens, Lawless, Jones, Sissler, Bowles, Bowman, Efaw, and Milliston in their individual capacity for use of excessive force are dismissed;c. Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent that the claims brought against Defendants Sexton, Patterson, Malone, Stephens, Lawless, Jones, Sissler, Bowles, Bowman, Efaw, and Milliston in their individual capacity for cruel and unusual punishment are dismissed;d. Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent that all state law claims brought against Defendants in their official capacity are dismissed;e. Defendants Motion is granted to the extent that the claims brought against Defendants Sexton, Patterson, Malone, Stephens, Lawless, Sissler, Bowles, Bowman, and Milliston in their individual capacity for intentional infliction of emotional distress are dismissed;*21 f. Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff's claim for abuse of process is dismissed;g. Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages against the County is dismissed;h. Defendants Motion is denied in all other respects;2. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) is DENIED; and3. Plaintiff's claims against John Doe Companies, John Doe Sheriff Departments, John Doe Lawrence County Deputies, John Doe Government Entities, and John Doe Government Employees are hereby

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DISMISSED without PREJUDICE.

Lou VALLARIO, Sheriff of Garfield County, Colorado, in his official capacity; Scott Dawson, a Commander in the Garfield County Sheriff’s Department, in his official capacity, Petitioners, v. Clarence VANDEHEY et al., Respondents.No. 08-502. | Feb. 4, 2009.

PLAINTIFF UPHELD: APPEAL GRANTED

ConclusionThe Court of Appeals, Baldock, Circuit Judge, held that:(1) as a matter of first impression, interlocutory review from class certification is appropriate in “death knell” cases, to resolve unresolved legal issues involving class actions, or in event of manifest error;(2) District Court abused its discretion by misconstruing complaint as alleging that denial of adequate mental health treatment affected all inmates;(3) District Court abused its discretion by refraining from any consideration whatsoever of action's merits; and(4) District Court also abused its discretion by approving maintainability of action even though inmates had failed to define scope of injunctive relief sought.Petition granted; remanded.

PINAL COUNTY, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. PINAL COUNTY EMPLOYEE MERIT SYSTEM COMMISSION et al., Defendant/Appellee.No. 2 CA–CV 2004–0160. | July 25, 2005.

PLAINTIFF UPHELD: APPEAL REJECTED

ConclusionThe Court of Appeals, Pelander, C.J., held that the officer's termination was warranted.Reversed and remanded.

Arlen KLINGENBERG, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MINNEHAHA et al., Defendants.No. CIV. 11–4024–KES. | Feb. 28, 2012.

PLAINTIFF UPHELD

ConclusionORDERED that defendants' motion in limine number two as it pertains to precluding the introduction of the County's policies is denied.

ROBERT E. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HINDS COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; et al, Defendants-Appellees.No. 00-60098. | Summary Calendar | Nov. 3, 2000.

PLAINTIFF UPHELD – APPEAL REJECTED (What do we include from below?)

*1 …While Johnson has described a barrage of discovery he allegedly needed to obtain, he failed to demonstrate how that evidence would create a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claim

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that Hinds County had a policy or custom that caused the violation of his constitutional rights. Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 968 (5th Cir.1999) . Furthermore, Johnson has failed to demonstrate on appeal how he was prejudiced by the district court’s denial of his motion for additional time. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir.1986) . We have carefully reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs relating to this issue. Because of the discretion vested in the district court and because no resultant prejudice was shown, the district court’s denial of Johnson’s motion for additional time to respond to Hinds County’s motion for summary judgment is affirmed. Transamerica Ins. Co., 66 F.3d at 721; Fontenot, 780 F.2d at 1194 .

*2 Finally, because it appears that no relief could be granted to Johnson under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with his § 1983 allegations against the City, and because he failed to address the dismissal of his state law claims, the district court’s dismissal of Johnson’s claims against the City for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is affirmed. Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t, 958 F.2d 616, 618 (5th Cir.1992) .

Charles KAUFMAN, Appellant, v. THE STATE of Texas, Appellee.No. 13–01–507–CR. | Aug. 22, 2002. (not designated for publication).

PLAINTIFF UPHELD – APPEAL REJECTED

ConclusionA jury found appellant, Charles Kaufman, a Nueces County Corrections Officer, guilty of one count of aggravated assault, two counts of misdemeanor assault, and four counts of official oppression. The incident forming the basis of these convictions occurred at the Nueces County Jail after two suspects were arrested and taken to the jail. By four points of error appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated assault conviction, and he complains the trial court erred by limiting cross-examination of the State's expert witness and that the trial court erred by denying his request for ten peremptory challenges. We affirm.

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11. DEATH INVOLVING USE OF THE RESTRAINT CHAIR Pluma BEYER, Personal Representative and Administratrix of the Estate of Hazel Virginia Beyer, Deceased v. CITY OF JOHNSON CITY, TENNESSEE, et alNo. 2:01-CV-45. | Feb. 24, 2003.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionIn conclusion, a tragic accident occurred. It was unprecedented. It came about as a result of a well-intentioned and proper policy. No one involved had either the culpable mental state of criminal recklessness or actual knowledge that such an accident would or even could happen. This Court does not believe that the use of the chair posed a significant risk. But even if it did, “an officer's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Farmer, supra, 511 U.S., at 837. As a matter of law, the Court is of the opinion that there was no constitutional violation by either the municipality or the individual defendants. That being the case, the issue of qualified immunity is rendered moot.The Court also was presented with a motion [Doc. 52] from the defendants seeking to disqualify the plaintiff's expert witnesses. The Court, for purposes of the defendants' dispositive motions and this memorandum opinion, has considered the testimony of these witnesses. However, the opinions of these experts do not raise contested issues of material fact bearing upon the constitutionality of the conduct of the various defendants herein.Paradoxically, if the defendant had done nothing to protect Ms. Beyer from injuring herself and, like so many other despondent people, she had killed or injured herself, they could have been sued for deliberate indifference since they knew of her “known suicidal tendencies.” See, Rodgers v. Chapleau, 238 F.3d 423 (Table) (6th Cir.2002). They sought to protect her by the use of the restraining chair, which was neither cruel and unusual punishment, nor was it a manifestation of deliberate indifference to Ms. Beyer's needs. There was no constitutional violation, and defendants' motions will be GRANTED. An appropriate judgment will be entered.

Decelina BISHOP, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Kenneth Bishop, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dan CORSENTINO, Sheriff,et al., Defendants-Appellees.No. 02-1485. | June 9, 2004.

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT UPHELD

Discussion1 2 A district court's order refusing to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal is itself an appealable final judgment, Diamond v. United States District Court, 661 F.2d 1198, 1198 (9th Cir.1981), which this court reviews “only for abuse of discretion,” City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1045 (10th Cir.1994) . Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court's decision will not be disturbed unless the reviewing court has “a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir.1994) (citation and quotation omitted).

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3 4 The time parameters for filing notices of appeal are usually “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978) . In a civil case, the notice of appeal generally “must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (requiring a notice of appeal of a civil judgment to be filed within thirty days of judgment). The district court, however, may extend the time upon a showing of “excusable neglect or good cause,” if a party moves for an extension no later than thirty days after the appeal time has expired. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5)(A).25 6 The factors relevant to an excusable-neglect decision include “the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.” City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046 (quotation omitted). The time for taking an *1207 appeal should not be extended in the “absence of circumstances that are unique and extraordinary.” Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir.1974) (quotation omitted).7 The concept of good cause “take[s] account of a narrow class of cases in which a traditional ‘excusable neglect’ analysis would be inapposite.” Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 630 (1st Cir.2000). Good cause comes into play “in situations in which there is no fault-excusable or otherwise. In such situations, the need for an extension is usually occasioned by something that is not within the control of the movant.” Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee's note (2002 Amendments).8 Plaintiff's first motion for an extension of time demonstrates neither excusable neglect nor good cause. Counsel's need to review the record, consult with the client, and, where counsel deems it desirable to obtain an additional legal perspective, are typical prefatory steps common to the appeal process. These actions, which are within control of counsel, are expected to be completed within the thirty-day period prescribed by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1). It is laudable for an attorney to seek the advice of outside counsel in evaluating the merits of an appeal, but it is in no way extraordinary. Furthermore, in the absence of a ruling by the court, nothing prevented counsel from filing a timely notice of appeal and later dismissing the appeal if counsel concluded it should not be pursued. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the district court made a clear error of judgment in denying plaintiff's motion.39 The second motion for an extension of time submitted to the district court was filed after the appeal deadline, and it has even less legal force. This motion asked the district court to extend the appeal time because she could not afford the filing fee and needed an ifp ruling before submitting her notice of appeal.Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) sets forth the appropriate procedure for proceeding ifp on appeal. An appellant seeking ifp status must first file a motion in district court and if that motion is denied, may file in the court of appeals within thirty days after the district court provides notification of the denial. Id. Thus, plaintiff could have filed a timely notice of appeal without an accompanying filing fee, and, upon the district court's rejection of her request, asked this court for ifp status. On appeal, plaintiff provides no argument to support her claim that her desire to wait for an ifp ruling constituted good cause for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's second motion for an extension of time.10 Plaintiff also contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to proceed ifp on appeal. In the absence of a timely appeal, the issue is moot and we decline to reach it. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.Parallel Citations

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ESTATE OF Christopher A. MORELAND, Deceased by Gary R. Moreland and Linda Tuttle, Co–Personal Representatives, Gary R. Moreland, in his official and individual capacity,Linda Tuttle, in her official and individual capacity, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellees, Cross–Appellants, v. Erich DIETER et al., Defendant, Cross–Appellee.Nos. 03–3734, 03–3735. | Argued Sept. 30, 2004. | Decided Jan. 14, 2005.

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionWe conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 by admitting the videotaped interviews of the defendants and excluding evidence that the defendants were acquitted of criminal charges; also, the court's limiting instruction regarding this evidence was not inappropriate in any way. The defendants' Daubert challenge to Dr. Lustgarten's testimony was forfeited. The punitive damages awards against Dieter and Sawdon are not unconstitutionally excessive. We also conclude that summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claim against Sheriff Speybroeck was appropriate. We affirm the judgment against Dieter and Sawdon and the summary judgment in favor of Speybroeck. Affirmed.

J.V. PREYER, individually and as the personal representative of The Estate of Jerry Preyer, and on behalf of Jerry Preyer’s Survivors and the Beneficiaries of Jerry Preyer’s Estate, Plaintiffs, v. Sheriff Ron McNESBY, et al., Defendants.No. 3:08cv247/MCR/MD. | June 5, 2009

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionFor the reasons discussed, with the exception of Grice's motion, which is granted, the defendants' motions to dismiss are denied. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint, which should be submitted within twenty (20) days of the date of this order. As provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(3), after service of the second amended complaint the defendants shall have ten (10) days in which to respond. The court also lifts the stay in this case that was entered August 25, 2008. Given that this case has been pending since June 2008 and that it has been stayed for much of that time, the court expects henceforth to move forward quickly with discovery and dispositive motions.8 A revised, expedited scheduling order will be entered by separate order.The parties shall bear their own fees and costs.Accordingly, it is ORDERED:1. The motion to dismiss Count I of the amended complaint filed by Margaret Grice (doc. 84) is GRANTED.2. The motions to dismiss Count I of the amended complaint filed by Trudy Burden; Piotr Szmurlo, M.D.; Mary Davis; Lynn Laird; and Cabot White (docs. 82, 83, 86, 87, and 88) are DENIED.3. The motion to dismiss Count III of the amended complaint filed by Prison Health Services, Inc. (doc. 90) is DENIED, as moot.4. The joint motion to dismiss Count II of the amended complaint filed by Ronald Hankinson; David Phillips; Joseph Lamar Brazwell, Jr .; John Covotta; and Shaun White (doc. 91) is DENIED. As to Ron McNesby and Barbara Wertz, the joint motion to dismiss Count III is DENIED, as moot.

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5. Plaintiff shall have twenty (20) days from the date of this order in which to file a second amended complaint. As provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(3), after service of the second amended complaint the defendants shall have ten (10) days in which to respond.*11 6. Any requests by the parties for costs incurred in connection with filing their motions and/or response are DENIED.7. The clerk shall terminate the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Gregory (doc. 85).8. The docket shall reflect that Sheriff David Crosby has been substituted for former Sheriff Ron McNesby, in his official capacity only.9. The stay entered August 25, 2008, is LIFTED. Upon entry of the instant order on the docket the clerk shall refer this case to chambers for issuance of a revised scheduling order.

Robert REED, individually; Mattie Reed, individually; Robert Reed and Mattie Reed, as next of kin of Andron D. Reed, deceased; and Artavius Reed, individually, Plaintiffs, v. Lisa SPECK and John D. Rudd, Defendants.No. 3:09–cv–01223. | Jan. 12, 2012.


ConclusionFor all the reasons stated, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted as to all counts. (Docket Entry No. 148.) Plaintiffs' motion and amended motion for partial summary judgment will be denied. (Docket Entry Nos. 161–62.) Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiffs' motion will be denied as moot. (Docket Entry No. 170.) This case will be dismissed with prejudice.An appropriate Order shall be entered.

Robert REED, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Lisa SPECK, et al., Defendants–Appellees.No. 12–5172. | Dec. 11, 2012.


ConclusionFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.Parallel Citations2012 WL 6176846 (C.A.6 (Tenn.))

Carol Ann AGSTER, personal representative of the Estate of Charles J. Agster, III, deceased; Charles J. Agster, Jr., and Carol Ann Agster, surviving parents of Charles J. Agster, III, Plaintiffs, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, a public entity; et al., Defendants.No. CV-02-1686-PHX-JAT. | March 30, 2007.

PLAINTIFF UPHELD $2,389,006 ConclusionIT IS ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorneys Fees and Non-Taxable Costs (Doc. # 662) and Second Motion for Attorneys Fees (Doc. # 791) for a total award of $2,389,006.70 in attorneys' fees and $216,585.39 in non-taxable expenses.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING Maricopa County and the Maricopa Sheriff Defendants' Motion to Strike Second Motion for Attorneys Fees (Doc. # 796) and Defendants Maricopa County and

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Maricopa County Correctional Health's Motion to Strike Second Motion for Attorneys Fees (Doc. # 797).

Carol Ann AGSTER, personal representative of the Estate of Charles J. Agster, III, deceased, and as surviving parent of Charles J. Agster, III; Charles J. Agster, Jr., surviving parent of Charles J. Agster, III, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE et al., Defendants-Appellants.No. 04-16786, 04-16844. | Argued and Submitted June 23, 2005. | Decided July 20, 2005.

APPEAL: LOWER COURT RULING IN PART UPHELD/IN PART OVERTURNED

ConclusionThe judgment is AFFIRMED as to the deputies and Lewis; REVERSED as to Sheriff Arpaio.

Eugene M. SPEARS, individually and as Representative of the Estate of Christopher McCargo, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Michael COOPER, et al., Defendants.No. 1:07-CV-58. | Nov. 17, 2008.


ConclusionIn accordance with the above analysis, the Court RECOMMENDS:1. Defendants' motions to exclude the testimony of Dr. Steven C. Perlaky be DENIED (Court File Nos. 61, 78);2. Defendants' motions to exclude the testimony of Mr. Robert Vance be DENIED (Court File Nos. 63, 79);3. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. Phillip Keith's testimony be GRANTED IN PART as it pertains to Mr. McCargo's actual condition or the effects of the officer's treatment on Mr. McCargo, and DENIED IN PART as it relates to the relevant police procedures and policies and whether the officers' actions were in conformity with those procedures and policies (Court File No. 69);4. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. Robert Byrd's testimony be GRANTED (Court File No. 69);5. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. Gary Shaffer's testimony be GRANTED (Court File No. 69);6. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. R. Mike Worley's testimony be GRANTED (Court File No. 69);7. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. Keith Debow's testimony be DENIED (Court File No. 69);8. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. Danny Ray Smith's testimony be GRANTED (Court File No. 69);9. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Dr. James T. Newby's testimony be DENIED (Court File No. 69);10. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Dr. Richard Alan Berkman's testimony be DENIED (Court File No. 69); and,11. Plaintiffs' motion to exclude Mr. Richard Allen Collier's testimony be GRANTED (Court File No. 69).

Eunice M. SPEARS, et al v. Matthew RUTH et al.No. 09-5408. (in chair for 3.5 hours, then after release started to shake, spit up blood and went unconscious – then cardiac arrest and never recovered)


Conclusion

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Because the record as a whole does not support the inference that a reasonable trier-of-fact could find a causal connection between either Officer Ruth's actions or Police Chief Synder's no-transport policy and McCargo's injuries, we REVERSE the district court's denial of summary judgment to Officer Ruth and the City of Cleveland and REMAND for entry of judgment for the defendants.

Aimee REID v. C. Aaron ROVENSTINE, et alNo. 3:05-CV-126 RM.(cardiac arrest while in chair – died of delirium tremens)


Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgement [Doc. No. 37] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED with respect to the plaintiff's claims that Officers Tom Craft and Angela Waddle, in there individual capacities, and Sheriff Aaron Rovenstine and Nurse Jayne Stoops, in their official capacities, violated Mr. Reid's Fourteenth Amendment right to receive adequate medical supervision and care during his confinement. The motion is DENIED with respect to the plaintiff's claim that Nurse Stoops and Officer Steve Barnhart, in their individual capacities, violated Mr. Reid's Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Andrea JONES, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Terry Jones, and as Guardian Ad Litem for Terry Jones, Jr., a minor, and Francesca Jones, a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant,v. David DEVANEY, individually and as a corrections officer employed by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department; Jerry Keller, as Sheriff of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department; the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Defendants-Appellees.No. 03-15744. | Argued and Submitted June 16, 2004. | Decided July 1, 2004.

APPEAL: DEFENSE VERDICT

OpinionMEMORANDUM*

Plaintiffs, the estate of Terry Jones, his wife and his two children, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Nevada state law after Terry Jones died while being subdued by corrections officers at the Clark County Detention Center in Las Vegas, Nevada. Plaintiffs appeal from a jury verdict in favor of defendants, Corrections Officer David Devaney and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (the “Department”). We affirm. [1] The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of Jones’ prior arrests under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United States v. Danielson, 325 F.3d 1054, 1075 (9th Cir.2003) . Plaintiffs put Jones’ motive and intent at issue by arguing that he had been provoked by the officers at the jail and by presenting evidence about his non-violent demeanor when consuming alcohol. Plaintiffs also sought to highlight Jones’ close relationship with his family to establish damages, permitting defendants to present evidence to the contrary. See Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 686 (9th Cir.1998). Although the breadth of the documents admitted under Rule 404(b) was excessive, we cannot say that the error “more probably than not” tainted the verdict. McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir.2003) . [2] The district court also did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Devaney’s prior

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infractions. Only one of the three reprimands was for unnecessary use of force, and the circumstances and type of force there were unlike the allegations against Devaney here. See United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1269 (9th Cir.1989) . The district court could have allowed plaintiffs to inquire into *711 Devaney’s history of misreporting his encounters with inmates under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), but the exclusion of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1137 (9th Cir.2002) . The district court properly excluded evidence of the prisoner restraint chair because it was unavailable due to the need for training. Plaintiffs have not shown that the absence of a restraint chair amounts to deliberate indifference. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). The Department’s use of the restraint chair and the training on forced blood draws after Jones’ death were inadmissible subsequent remedial measures. See Fed.R.Evid. 407. The district court properly confined the testimony of plaintiffs’ police practices expert to admissible evidence and to issues of fact, see Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1065 n. 10 (9th Cir.2002), and did not err in denying plaintiffs’ motion to amend the pretrial order to substitute a new medical expert. Plaintiffs filed the motion and the medical expert’s report on the eve of trial, did not file a motion for a continuance and provided no good cause for the seven-month delay. See Quevedo v. Trans-Pac. Shipping, Inc., 143 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir.1998) . The district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of failure to discipline. Plaintiffs did not present evidence to establish that the Department had a longstanding practice or custom of inadequately disciplining its officers. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 919-20 (9th Cir.1996). Summary judgment was also appropriate on plaintiffs’ state law claim that the Department negligently trained and supervised its officers by not having the restraint chair available. The Department’s procedures limited use of the restraint chair to “trained personnel only,” and the timetable for training the officers and making the chair available was a discretionary determination. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 41.032; see also Univ. of Nev., Reno v. Stacey, 116 Nev. 428, 434, 997 P.2d 812 (2000). Considered as a whole, the jury instructions adequately defined, and instructed the jury on the necessity of, reasonable force. See Guebara v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir.2001) . Because the issue at trial was whether Jones died due to excessive force, the district court did not err in instructing the jury that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe Jones was in control of the automobile at the time of his arrest. Finally, plaintiffs’ claim that the district court was biased finds no support in the record. See Hansen v. C.I.R., 820 F.2d 1464, 1467 (9th Cir.1987) .

Trisha WAKAT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. H–05–0978. | Jan. 12, 2007.


After reviewing the arguments of the parties, the summary judgment record, and the applicable law, the court finds that the defendants' motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are well taken and should be GRANTED.

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Accordingly, defendant Gurol's motion for summary judgment (Dkt.94) is GRANTED with regard to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims.Defendants Montgomery County, Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, Guy Williams, and Thomas Gage's motion for summary judgment (Dkt.99) is GRANTED with regard to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims.Plaintiffs' state law claims under Texas state law as the survivors of and for the wrongful death of James Henry Mitchell (See Dkt. 24) are DISMISSED without prejudice to refilling in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction.Because the testimony of Lawrence Mendel, the plaintiffs' pathology expert, *772 and the plaintiffs' non-pathology expert played no part in the court's decision, defendant Gurol's motions to exclude their testimony (Dkts. 95, 96 & 97) are DENIED as moot.Plaintiffs' claims against John Does # 1–10 and Jane Does # 1–10 are DISMISSED without prejudice for the reasons stated above.Plaintiffs' motion for oral hearing (Dkt.118) is DENIED.

Trisha Lynn WAKAT, as Administratrix of the Estate of James Henry Mitchell, Amber Mitchell and Sharon Patrick, as next friend of Jennifer Mitchell and Stacey Mitchell, Appellants v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Texas, Appellee.No. 09–09–00188–CV. | Submitted Jan. 13, 2011. | Decided March 31, 2011.

APPEAL: DEFENSE VERTICT

The trial court did not specify the ground on which it granted summary judgment. When the grounds upon which the summary judgment motion was granted are not identified, we are required to affirm the summary judgment if any ground raised in the motion for summary judgment has merit. See Bradley v. State ex rel. White, 990 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.1999) . The trial court was authorized to grant the County’s summary judgment because the Mitchell family failed to demonstrate or raise a fact issue that any County employee used tangible property in a manner that caused Mitchell’s death. In the absence of a connection between the County’s use of tangible property and Mitchell’s death, the Mitchell family failed to affirmatively demonstrate the Legislature waived the County’s immunity from suit. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment without addressing the remaining grounds supporting the judgment.

Raymond D. STANFILL, Plaintiff, v. Cullen TALTON, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:10–CV–255(MTT). | March 29, 2012.

PRETRIAL MOTION: DEFENSE VERDICT ConclusionAll parties can agree that Stanfill's death was unfortunate, and that in hindsight; perhaps more could have been done. Hindsight, however, is not an appropriate lens through which to view the Defendants' actions. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Defendants violated Stanfill's constitutional rights. The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied, and the Houston County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is also denied.

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Carol Ann AGSTER, personal representative of the Estate of Charles J. Agster, III, deceased, and as surviving parent of Charles J. Agster, III; Charles J. Agster, Jr., surviving parent of Charles J. Agster, III, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARICOPA COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellants,No. 04-15466. | Argued and Submitted March 16, 2005. | Filed April 28, 2005. (died at hospital).


Conclusion 1. Jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is of final judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with a gloss admitting appeal of “a narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final.” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Such decisions must “conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). The present appeal meets these stringent conditions.2. The issue of the production of the mortality review is conclusively resolved. The issue is important: the statutory grant of the claimed privilege by Arizona and other states attests to its importance. If the matter is not resolved on this appeal, the document will influence the outcome of the trial, but it will be difficult to determine the difference it made. Therefore, we find jurisdiction to decide the dispute now.The Privilege. Arizona recognizes the privilege attached to peer review of “the professional practices within the hospital or center for the purposes of reducing morbidity and mortality and for the improvement of the care of patients provided in the institution.” Ariz.Rev.Stat. §§ 36-445, 36-445.01. But we are not bound by Arizona law, and the defendants deliberately chose the federal forum to litigate this suit.No case in this circuit has recognized the privilege. But we can create a new privilege as a matter of federal common law. A “public good transcending the normally predominant principle” disfavoring testimonial privileges may justify such creation. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The law of privilege is not frozen. The process of recognizing one is “evolutionary.” Id. (citation omitted). It is earnestly urged that the evolution has reached the point here that the protection of confidentiality in peer review in order to assure candor in the review has been recognized *1094 by most states. Weekoty v. United States, 30 F.Supp.2d 1343, 1348 (D.N.M.1998); Note, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey, 67 N.C.L.Rev. 179 (1988) .3. We are constrained by two considerations, one general and the other particular to this case. We must be “especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.” Univ. of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) . The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 granted immunity to participants in medical peer reviews, but did not privilege the report resulting from the process. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152. Congress amended the act in 1987 to state that “nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as changing the liabilities or immunities under law or preempting or overriding any State law.” Pub.L. No. 100-177, § 402(c). As Congress has twice had occasion and opportunity to consider the privilege and not granted it either explicitly or by implication, there exists a general objection to our doing so.4. The particular objection is that the privilege is sought to protect a report bearing on the death of a prisoner. Whereas in the ordinary hospital it may be that the first object of all involved in patient

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case is the welfare of the patient, in the prison context the safety and efficiency of the prison may operate as goals affecting the care offered. In these circumstances, it is peculiarly important that the public have access to the assessment by peers of the care provided. Given the demands for public accountability, which seem likely to guarantee that such reviews take place whether they are privileged or not, we are not convinced by the County's argument that such reviews will cease unless kept confidential by a federal peer review privilege. Accordingly, we are unwilling to create the privilege in this case.The State Law Claims. Where there are federal question claims and pendent state law claims present, the federal law of privilege applies. Fed.R.Evid. 501 advisory committee note; see also Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3rd Cir.1982) .AFFIRMED.Parallel CitationsThe County appeals

Carol Ann AGSTER, personal representative of the Estate of Charles J. Agster, III, deceased, and as surviving parent of Charles J. Agster, III; Charles J. Agster, Jr., surviving parent of Charles J. Agster, III, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. MARICOPA COUNTY et al., Defendants.No. 04-15466. | Argued and Submitted March 16, 2005. | Filed Aug. 29, 2005.


Conclusion Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Noonan, Circuit Judge, held that:1. Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over appeal, and2. No federal privilege of peer review protected mortality review.Affirmed.

Menciana B. MEIPPEN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Benites S. Sichiro, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. SPOKANE COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. CV-07-220-FVS. | June 25, 2009.


ConclusionA. Plaintiff's Motion to StrikeThe Court grants two parts of the plaintiff's motion to strike. The Court will not consider Nurse Dunphy's request for qualified immunity. Nor will the Court consider Spokane County's request for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff's deliberate-indifference-to-medical-care claim.B. Defendants' Summary Judgment MotionThe Court grants in part and denies in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court grants (1) the defendants' request to dismiss the “Doe” defendants, (2) the corrections officers' request to dismiss the plaintiff's allegation that they were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Sichiro's need for medical care by using force to subdue him, (3) Nurse Dunphy's and the corrections officers' request to dismiss the plaintiff's conspiracy claim, (4) Spokane County's request to dismiss the plaintiff's allegation that the Sheriff failed to enforce his use-of-force policies, and (5) Nurse Dunphy's and the corrections officers' request to dismiss the plaintiff's equal protection claim. The Court denies (1) the corrections officers' respective requests for qualified immunity with respect to the plaintiff's allegation that they used objectively unreasonable force in subduing Mr. Sichiro, (2)

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Deputy Petrie's request to dismiss the plaintiff's failure-to-intercede claim, (3) Spokane County's request to dismiss the plaintiff's allegation that the Sheriff failed to adequately train his deputies concerning the amount of force that they may use to control a pretrial detainee who is suffering from the DTs, and (4) the corrections officers' request to dismiss the children's familial association claim.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:A. The defendants' motion for summary judgment (Ct.Rec.76 ) is granted in part:1. All claims against the “Doe” defendants are dismissed with prejudice.2. The following claims against the corrections officers are dismissed with prejudice:(a) the claim that they were deliberately indifferent to Mr. Sichiro's need for medical care by using force to subdue him;(b) the claim that they conspired with Nurse Dunphy to withhold information concerning the force to which Mr. Sichiro was subjected; and(c) the claim that they deprived Mr. Sichiro of the equal protection of the law.3. The following claims against Nurse Dunphy are dismissed with prejudice:(a) the claim that she conspired with the corrections officers to withhold information concerning the force to which Mr. Sichiro was subjected; and(b) the claim that she deprived Mr. Sichiro of the equal protection of the law.4. The following claim against Spokane County and former Sheriff Sterk is dismissed with prejudice:(a) the claim that former Sheriff Sterk failed to enforce his use-of-force policies.B. The plaintiff's motion to strike (Ct.Rec.155 ) is granted in part.C. The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration (Ct.Rec.184 ) is denied as moot.D. The plaintiff's motion to expedite (Ct.Rec.187 ) is denied.IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this order and furnish copies to counsel.

Joyce CHRISTIE, on behalf of the ESTATE OF Nicholas T. CHRISTIE, deceased, Plaintiff, v. Mike SCOTT, et al., Defendants.Case No. 2:10–cv–420. | Jan. 9, 2013.

PRETRIAL MOTION: COMBINATION PART DEFENSE VERDICT/PART PLAINTIFF UPHELD ConclusionAccordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:1. The PHS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 166) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above;2. Sheriff Scott's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 167) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above; and3. The Corrections Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 170) *1330 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above.

Kelli Ann GRABOW, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kristina Prochnow, deceased, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MACOMB et al., Defendants.No. 12–10105. | July 3, 2013. (died at hospital).


Conclusion

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For the reasons stated above, Grabow's motion to compel was granted. Michigan's peer review privilege does not apply in this federal civil rights case. Nor is a peer review privilege recognized in federal common law or warranted in this case. While it may be that the evidence Grabow seeks to compel is inadmissable, that is not the issue before the Court. At this point, the information is discoverable.

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12. RESTRAINT CHAIR USED OR REFERRED TO, BUT NOT FOCUS OF CASE

Frederick HUNTER, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF SHELBURNE, et al., Defendants.No. 5:10–cv–206. | Nov. 14, 2011.

Marc Anthony SHOWALTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.No. 95,715. | Sept. 14, 2007. | Review Denied Feb. 12, 2008.

Roger Lee MINNIFIELD, Plaintiff v. Larry CHANDLER et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:07CV-P207-S. | Dec. 7, 2007.

Joseph L. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Zack ROECKEMAN, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 10–cv–179–DRH. | Sept. 28, 2010

Cory Gregory GABELMAN, Plaintiff, v. Roger WARE, et al., Defendants.No. 2:13CV00008 NAB. | Jan. 29, 2013.

R.R., a minorby and through Rochelle RICHARDSON, his guardian Plaintiffs v. Chad STAKE, et al., Defendants.No. 1:10–CV–1442. | March 13, 2012.

Nathaniel L. ADDERLY, Plaintiff, v. C.O. I FERRIER et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 07–507. | June 2, 2010.

Theodore J. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. Dustin SPEIGHTSet al., Defendants.No. 1:05CV863. | March 22, 2011.

Brian Keith BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. FIORAIANTI, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 08-1868 (JAP). | Nov. 18, 2009.

Gina SLONE, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Grady JUDD, et al., Defendants.No. 8:09–CV–1175–T–27TGW. | March 25, 2011.

William NUGENT, Plaintiff, v. LAS VEGAS METRO POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.No. 2:09–CV–00601–GMN–RJJ. | Sept. 22, 2010.

Alfred Yero PORRO, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY of Oklahoma, et al., Defendants.No. CIV–08–970–C. | Sept. 25, 2009.

Samuel Earl MURPHY, Plaintiff, v. COBB COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER, Defendant.Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-3149-TCB. | March 30, 2007.

Katherine M. CADY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Paul Victor Galambos III, Plaintiff v.CUMBERLAND COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.No. 2:10–cv–00512–NT. | Sept. 7, 2012.

Marvin SAWYER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. H. Lee NOBLE, et al., Defendants.Case No. 2:09CV00028. | April 28, 2010.

254

Steven A. CONWAY, Plaintiff, v. Robert HENZE et al., Defendants.No. 98-C-402-C. | May 9, 2000.

Jason Michael MUSSEHL, Plaintiff, v. Robert FLETCHER, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 06-2985 (MJD/JJG). | Feb. 1, 2008.

David BRUEDERLE, Plaintiff v. LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY METRO GOVERNMENT, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:05–CV–818–S. | Dec. 18, 2009.

Donald HARTMAN, Plaintiff, v. Dave DORMIRE, et al., Defendants.No. 06-4109-CV-C-NKL. | Jan. 11, 2008.

Seth Boone TEMPLES, Plaintiff, v. Shirley LEWIS, et al., Defendants.No. 7:04-CV-73 (HL). | Sept. 28, 2007.

Clyde L. OWENS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Glenn CAMPBELL; Captain Coe; Dr. Homer Gamble, Defendants.Civil Action No. 0:06-427-HFF-BM. | March 26, 2007.

Dwayne BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. D. HACKWORTH, et al., Defendants.No. 1:10cv693 (GBL/IDD). | Oct. 31, 2012.

Van Buren HINDS, Jr., Plaintiff v. Dan LANGSTON et al., Defendants.No. 3:07CV00091 WRW. | Jan. 30, 2008.

Carol SOLES, Personal Representative of the Estate of Aaron Frayer, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. INGHAM COUNTY et al., Defendants.No. 1:02–CV–423. | March 29, 2004.

Derrick Andre MYERS, Plaintiff, v. Amy JACKSON, CCS Nurse, El Dorado Correctional Facility, et al., Defendants.No. 11–3168–SAC. | Jan. 18, 2012.

Ronald BANKS, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey A. BEARD et al., Defendants.C.A. No. 06-253J. | Docket No. 180. | March 5, 2010.

David Bryant WICKS, Plaintiff v. Brenda SHELL–ELEAZER and Timothy R. Faloon, Defendants.Civil Action No. RDB–11–1570. | Sept. 22, 2011.

Steven M. ZERBE, Plaintiff, v. Sheriff Ken J. MASCARA et al., Defendants.No. 08–14107–CIV. | Feb. 20, 2009.

Mary C. ENGEL, Plaintiff, v. Michael BARRY, et. al., Defendants.No. 2:03-CV-2403-MCE-KJM. | April 24, 2006.

Anthony Joseph WILLIAMS v. Jeremy WALLACE, et al.No. 09–CV–0892. | June 10, 2010.

255

Arthur R. MOSELEY, # 199398, Plaintiff, v. NFN KING et al., Defendants.No. 3:05-0797-HFF-JRM. | Feb. 14, 2006.

Arthur R. MOSELEY, Plaintiff, v. NFN KING et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:05-0797-HFF-JRM. | Aug. 31, 2006.

Chastity DAVIDSON, in her individual capacity and as Administratix of the Estate of Anthony Dewayne Davidson, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF STATESVILLE et al., Defendants.No. 5:10–CV–00182–RLV–DSC. | April 26, 2012.

Robert R. REAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LAS VEGAS, et al., Defendants.No. 2:10–cv–01094–RLH–RJJ. | June 19, 2012.

Imori Cortez MUMFORD, Sr., Plaintiff, v. (fnu) KLINGELE, Defendant.No. 08–3079–CM. | May 14, 2009.

Sandra Travis HARDEN, Executrix of the ESTATE OF Maury Troy TRAVIS, Plaintiff, v. ST. LOUIS COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 4:04-CV-602 (CEJ). | Nov. 27, 2006.

Walter Page NOE, Plaintiff, v.State of WEST VIRGINIA et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:10–CV–38 (BAILEY). | July 29, 2010.

Shauntez HAIRSTON, Plaintiff, v. Thomas KNAPP et al, Defendants.Civil No. 08-303-GPM. | March 23, 2010

Otis FAUST, Plaintiff, v. Warden TAYLOR et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 0:07–cv–58–RBH. | July 22, 2009.

Otis FAUST, Plaintiff, v. Warden TAYLOR et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 9:07-0058-RBH-GCK. | May 9, 2008.

Rosalyn WITHERSPOON, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CENTRAL REGIONAL JAIL et al., Defendants.No. Civ.A.1:05CV29. | April 25, 2006.

Ronald Alexander ISGETT, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Kenny BOONE et al., Defendants.No. 8:11–CV–02783–CMC–JDA. | Feb. 1, 2013.

Ronald Alexander ISGETT, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Kenny BOONE et al., Defendants.C/A No. 8:11–02783–CMC–JDA. | Feb. 28, 2013.

Tammy Rene MILLMINE as Personal Representative of the Estate of Billy Frank Cornett, Jr., and in her individual capacity, Plaintiff, v. Major James HARRIS et al., Defendants. C/A No. 3:10–1595–CMC. | May 15, 2012.

Gabriel RANDOLPH, Plaintiff, v. Officer JEFFERY et al., Defendants.C/A No. 1:08–3492–MBS. | Sept. 10, 2010.

256

Shauntez T. HAIRSTON, Plaintiff, v. Brenda COLE, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 08–cv–569–MJR. | July 6, 2009.

Allen Jerome SUPPLES, Plaintiff, v. Charles ADAMO, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 09–1141. | May 28, 2010.

Esteban M. WEBER, # 279818, Plaintiff, v. Gwendolyn GATHERS et al., Defendants.No. C A 204-1563-24AJ. | May 22, 2006.

Sergio RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. CLARK COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 2:09–CV–98 JCM (RJJ). | July 22, 2011.

Ruth AROCHO, As Administratrix of the Estate of Enrique Rene Veras and Wadays Veras and Ruth Arocho as Parent and Guardian of Crystal Veras and Yashera Veras, Appellants v. COUNTY OF LEHIGH and Dale Meisel.Argued Dec. 13, 2006. | Decided May 3, 2007.

Jonathan WICKERS, Plaintiff, v. Paul GOUIN, Assistant Deputy Superintendent et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 07–12235–MBB. | March 3, 2011.

Scott Alan STANLEY, Plaintiff, v. Major Carl BENNETT, et al., Defendants.No. 4:05-cv-00300-MP-WCS. | Dec. 17, 2008

Stacie BLAKESLEE, Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 07-CV-1364. | Sept. 22, 2008.

Stacie BLAKESLEE, Administratix of the Estate of Robert Albert Young, Deceased, and as widow in her own right and on behalf of Kayla Jane Young, daughter of decedent, Appellant v. CLINTON COUNTY et al.No. 08-4313. | Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR34.1(a) July 7, 2009. | Opinion filed: July 14, 2009.

John Edward HAMMOND, Plaintiff, v. Major D. BUSH et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:08-3592-SB. | March 12, 2010.

William S. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Michael HILL et al., Defendants.No. 98–4229–DES. | Nov. 15, 2001.

Ronald HICKMAN, Plaintiff, v. Lt. Tracey A. JACKSON, et al., Defendant.No. 2:03CV363. | Aug. 3, 2005.

Howard T. LINDEN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Luke Devon Griffin, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WASHTENAW COUNTY et al., Defendants-Appellees.No. 04-1964. | Jan. 6, 2006. | Rehearing En Banc Denied May 4, 2006.

Cedrick Lee POLLARD, Plaintiff v. Joe BLUE et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 4:06–CV–P134–M. | Sept. 25, 2009.

257

Bobby THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. KIRKLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION MSU-B-1 OFFICERS et al., Defendants.C/A No. 2:04-1892-RBH. | March 21, 2007.

Louis ALDINI, Jr., Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Dustin L. JOHNSON et al., Defendants–Appellants.Nos. 09–3183, 09–3258. | Argued: Nov. 20, 2009. | Decided and Filed: June 29, 2010.

Robert Lee SINGLETON, Plaintiff v. Lieutenant Patrick RUMBAUGH et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 1:07–cv–2068. | Jan. 29, 2009.

William Lamonte BODNEY, Plaintiff, v. PIMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.No. CV 06–0015–TUC–CKJ. | Aug. 7, 2009.

Bradley Scott LONIELLO, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Frank CANARECCI, et al. DefendantsNo. 3:05-CV-363 RM. | June 20, 2005.

Benny STORMER, Plaintiff, v. Randy KOON, et al., Defendants.No. 1:08-CV-813. | March 30, 2010.

Brian Keith BRAGG, Plaintiff, v. Brian M. HUGHES, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 10–1261 (GEB). | Nov. 1, 2010.

William M. ESTRIDGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie WELDON et al., Defendants-Appellees.No. 00-6523. | Submitted Sept. 29, 2000. | Decided Oct. 25, 2000.

Ayotunji OLOWOFEYEKU, Plaintiff v. Sgt. PETRILL, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. WDQ–09–3051. | June 23, 2011.

STATE of Louisiana v. Craig FRANCOIS.No. 06-788. | Dec. 13, 2006.

Michael PARKER, Plaintiff v. Douglas ROBINSON, et al., Defendant.Civil No. 04-214-B-W. | Sept. 26, 2007.

Derrick SCOTT v. Robert DAVIS, et al.Civil Action No. 05-2024-P. | June 11, 2007.

ESTATE OF Nicholas D. RICE, Deceased, by: Rick D. RICE and Diane J. Waldrop Co–Personal Representatives, Plaintiff v. CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, a Missouri Corporation, et al., Defendants.Cause No. 3:06–CV–697 RM. | June 17, 2009.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Matthew G. RICE, Appellant.No. 30649-2-II. | July 20, 2004.

Trisha WAKAT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. H–05–0978. | Jan. 12, 2007.

258

Gary BANKS, Plaintiff, v. Lt. Mark MOZINGO, et al., Defendant.No. 1:08cv004. | Feb. 26, 2009.

Terrence T. HAGGINS, aka Terrence Tiran Haggins, Plaintiff, v.NFN BURT et al., Defendants.CA No. 4:07-931-HMH-TER. | Nov. 20, 2007.

Michael Lee AUSTIN, Plaintiff, v. Franklin J. TENNIS, et al., Defendants.No. 4:07-cv-1693. | Dec. 30, 2009.

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Patrick INGRAM, Esq., Defendant.No. 06-CV-4042-DEO. | Sept. 7, 2006.

Theodore W. SMITH, III, Plaintiff, v. Martin K. GREENWALD, et al., Defendants.No. 3:09cv00482. | July 1, 2011.

Nathan R. GONINAN, Plaintiff, v. Wendy JONES, et al., Defendants.No. C09–934–RAJ. | July 15, 2010.

Lynn MULKERN, et al., Plaintiffs v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY, et al., DefendantsNo. 00–382–P–C. | Nov. 30, 2001.

Kerry BOLLMAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, State.No. 2-08-089-CR. | May 14, 2009.

The ESTATE OF Brian PERRY, by its administrator Rodney W. Perry, and Minor Children JP, MP, and BP by and through their next friend Carl Perry, Plaintiffs, v. BOONE COUNTY SHERIFF et al., Defendants.No. 1:05-cv-1153-LJM-WTL. | March 12, 2008.

Matthew Michael KEATING, Plaintiff v. Sheriff Tim HELDER et al., Defendants.Civil No. 08–5243. | April 11, 2011.

John NEGRON, Plaintiff v. Kenneth RAMSEY et al., Defendants.No. 01 C 6254. | July 12, 2004.

ESTATE OF Mohammad Reza ABDOLLAHI, deceased, by and through Sina Abdollahi (a minor through his mother and guardian ad litem Parvin Ganji), as successor in interest et al.; Plaintiffs, v.COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants.No. CIVS022488FCDJFM. | Dec. 15, 2005.

Thomas SCHROEDER, Plaintiff, v. Tony GOTH, Mark Thompson et al., Defendants.No. 03–C–0299–C. | April 28, 2004.

Barbara GROTE as the Independent Executrix of the Estate of Anthony Brent West v.ANGELINA COUNTY.No. 9:09CV192. | March 22, 2011.

Craig DOWLING, Plaintiff, v. Steve KLEMENT, et al., Defendants.

259

No. 3:07–cv–163. | Aug. 27, 2010.

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Marc SHOWALTER, Appellant.No. 89,334. | Feb. 20, 2004. | Review Denied May 26, 2004.

STATE of North Carolina v. Misty White LONG.No. COA05–778. | March 7, 2006.

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Lisa Lyn O’HANLON, Appellant.No. A10–1873. | Sept. 26, 2011.

Don J. HERRINGTON, Jr., Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.No. 34A02–1008–CR–924. | Feb. 16, 2011.

Travis James HUSNIK, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Corporal ENGLES, et al., Defendants–Appellees.No. 12–1655. | Submitted Nov. 5, 2012.* | Decided Nov. 5, 2012.

Lindy HOLLGARTH, Plaintiff, v. Jerry DAWSON, et al., Defendants.No. 05-2125. | Sept. 19, 2007.

Jonathan Lee VERNIER v. Victor SALVADOR, et al.Civil Action No. 07-2116-LC. | July 30, 2008.

Jerome HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. Joseph SCHAPMIRE, et. al, Defendants.No. 09-1037. | July 7, 2010.

Randy L. VALENTINE, Plaintiff, v. Ofc. D. RICHARDSON et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 4:05-00485-HMH-TER. | Sept. 12, 2006.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. William Hohn BUSCH, Defendant and Appellant.D059923 | Filed April 18, 2012

Dexter Walter CAPERS, pro se, Plaintiff, v. DURHAM COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT et al., Defendants.No. 1:07CV825. | March 23, 2009.

Eddie B. SWANS, Sr., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Edward Swans, Deceased, Plaintiff,v. CITY OF LANSING, et al., Defendants.No. 5:96–CV–56. | Nov. 9, 1998.

Paul SHAUGHNESSY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. George VALVERDE, as Director, etc., Defendant and Respondent.No. D056588. | (Super.Ct.No. 37-2009-97306-CU-WM-CTL). | Feb. 1, 2011.

Timothy A. CARL, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MUSKEGON, et al., Defendants.No. 1:11–CV–94. | March 28, 2013.

Michael Tyrone McCULLON, Plaintiff, v. Thomas BROUSE, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:10–CV–1541. | Sept. 7, 2012.

260

Ira CLAYTON, Plaintiff, v. T. CLEMENT et al., Defendants.Civil No. 06-5426 (RMB). | Nov. 30, 2007.

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James A. CROCHIERE, Appellant.No. 97-1555. | Heard Oct. 10, 1997. | Decided Nov. 18, 1997.

Leonard G. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Dr. KAHN, Psychiatrist; et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 11–380. | Feb. 5, 2013.

Darin WINTERS, as personal Administrator of the ESTATE OF Donald WINTERS, Plaintiff v.ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES et al., Defendants.NO. 4:04-CV-00206 GTE. | June 2, 2006.

Ken YEO, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON COUNTY, Multnomah County, et al. Civ. No. 08–1317–AC. | March 24, 2011.

Tanya GREGOIRE, guardian for the person and estate of Brianna Alexandra Gregoire, a minor, and as personal representative for Edward Albert Gregoire, deceased, Appellant, v. CITY OF OAK HARBOR, a municipal corporation, et al. No. 58544-4-I. | Oct. 29, 2007.

Dawn Marie BALL, Plaintiff v. SCI MUNCY, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-0391. | Dec. 10, 2008.

Corey Jawan ROBINSON, Plaintiff, v. Cpt. T. CLARK; et al. C/A No. 5:12–502–JMC–KDW. | Oct. 24, 2012. (court request for video of chair placement).

Daryl UNDERWOOD, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al., Defendants.No. 07-14050-CIV. | May 27, 2008.

Kevin E. MAYS, Plaintiff, v. Todd STOBIE, et al. No. 3:08–cv–552–EJL–CWD. | Dec. 7, 2010.

Maurice GOODEN, Plaintiff, v. Michele RICCI, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 08–5321 (JAP). | Feb. 17, 2011.

Robert Lee WAFER, Plaintiff, v. Deborah NANSON, et al., Defendants.No. C08–0885–JLR. | Feb. 17, 2009.

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Toni C. HALE, Defendant–Appellant.No. 4–10–0949. | March 29, 2012.

Coty James MORRISON, Plaintiff v. Captain HARTLINE et al., Defendants.Civil No. 4:10–cv–04154. | Jan. 17, 2012.

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Kevin G. MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant.No. 23114. | Decided July 17, 2009.

261

In re CHRISTOPHER S., A Person Coming Under The Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER S., Defendant and Appellant.No. F041385. | (Super.Ct.No. 502768). | July 25, 2003.

James E. VAN HOUTEN, Plaintiff, v. HIXON, et al., Defendants.No. 06–3102–CM. | Oct. 11, 2006.

David B. CRACE, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Amanda EFAW, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 2:09–CV–551. | April 15, 2011.

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Samuel JONES, Defendant–Appellant.No. 95574. | Decided June 16, 2011.

Tonya MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. STEPHENSON, Muskingum County Sheriff, et al., Defendants.No. 2:06-cv-0283. | Sept. 19, 2007. (Discovery Request).

Tanya GREGOIRE, guardian for the person and estate of Brianna Alexandra Gregoire, a minor, and as personal representative for Edward Albert Gregoire, deceased, Petitioner, v. CITY OF OAK HARBOR et al., Defendants.No. 81253–5. | Argued May 26, 2009. | Decided Dec. 2, 2010.

Robert W. WOOTTON, Plaintiff, v. PIERCE COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.No. C12–5828 BHS. | May 22, 2013.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael Todd HINKKANEN, Appellant.No. 40509–1–II. | April 19, 2011.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lamar Benny DAVIS et al., Defendants and Appellants.No. C044562. | Superior Court No. 02F00117. | Sept. 25, 2007.

CH, by and through his grandparents and next friends, Travis and Linda WATKINS, Plaintiffs, v.Michael DVORAK, Elizabeth Hardtke, Eric Nelson, St. Joseph County Juvenile Justice Center, and St. Joseph County, Defendants.No. 3:08cv0379–AS–CAN. | Feb. 27, 2009.

Harrison ISOM, Plaintiff v. CITY OF ELIZABETHTOWN, Defendant.Civil Action No. 3:07–CV–431–H. | June 10, 2010.

Donnie D. WHITE v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.No. 11–cv–543–JPG. (states psych treatment while in chair)

Craig STOVER v. PIERCE COUNTY CORRECTIONS HEALTH CLINIC, et al. No. 37167-7-II. (Failure to place in restraint chair to prevent injury from seizure)

Melvin BALDRIDGE and Billy Joe Durden, et al. v. Bill CLINTON, et al. No. LR–C–83–1004. (excessive uses of restraint chair in general)

262

The PEOPLE v. Aaron Lashawn HARRISNo. C051904. (use of restraint chair in courtroom)

The PEOPLE v. Norman YARTZ.No. C064044. (use of restraint chair in courtroom)

The STATE of Ohio v. MURPHY, Appellant.No. CA2006–06–143 (use of restraint chair in courtroom)

COMMONWEALTH v. Michael SCIONTI.No. 10–P–828. (use of restraint chair in courtroom)

The PEOPLE v. Donyell Ladale BUTLERB236056 (use of restraint chair in courtroom)

Glenn D. ODOM, II, Plaintiff v. Larry CRANOR, et al., Defendants.No. 5:13CV–P8–R. | Civil Action No. 5:13CV–P8–R. | May 15, 2013.

Ronnie JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Brian KOZLOWSKI, et al., Defendants.No. 09–13563. | Feb. 14, 2011.

Brady HICKS, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant v. TARRANT COUNTY TEXAS, Defendant-Appellee.No. 08-10237 | Summary Calendar. | Sept. 1, 2009.

Raliza PASHOVA, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Scott GEIST et al., Defendants.Cause No. 1:09–CV–340 JD. | March 29, 2012.

Griffin B. BELL et al., Petitioners, v. Louis WOLFISH et al.No. 77-1829. | Argued Jan. 16, 1979. | Decided May 14, 1979.

Dee FARMER, Petitioner v. Edward BRENNAN, Warden, et al.No. 92–7247. | Argued Jan. 12, 1994. | Decided June 6, 1994.

Kevin MCBRIDE, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Kim CLARK, et al., Defendants.No. 04-03307-CV-S-REL. | March 8, 2006.

William Frank DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.No. SC06-1868. | Dec. 18, 2008. | Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 2009.

Kevin Jeremy LINN v. STATE of Arkansas.No. CA CR 03–476. | Dec. 3, 2003.

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert D. DAY, Defendant-Appellant.No. 2000CA00045. | Jan. 8, 2001.

STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lee Roy HUM, Defendant-Appellant.No. 00-0880. | April 27, 2001.

263

Willie C. ADAMS, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.No. 43A03–0808–CR–387. | April 21, 2009.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Rafael Alejandro NOGUEZ, Defendant and Appellant.No. A103380. | (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. 021731). | Nov. 18, 2004. | Review Denied Feb. 2, 2005.

Daniel BARNES, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.No. CA CR 05–959. | March 1, 2006.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Chad Allen GROTH, Defendant and Appellant.No. F054032. | (Super.Ct.No. F06902736-8). | Oct. 21, 2008.

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Renee R. BARNES, Defendant-Appellant.No. 88341. | Decided Aug. 9, 2007.

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Jay A. DAVIS, Defendant–Appellant.No. 2011 CA 15. | Decided March 23, 2012.

STATE of Louisiana v. Timothy Lee ELLIOT.No. 2000 KA 2637. | June 22, 2001.

STATE of North Carolina v. Shakur Abdul SHABAZZ, Defendant.No. COA04-1232. | July 19, 2005.

Michael L. YARIAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, State.No. 2-04-015-CR. | April 14, 2005. | Discretionary Review Refused Dec. 7, 2005.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles James CHATMAN, Defendant and Appellant.No. A093221. | (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC-46083A). | Oct. 29, 2002.

Adam GORDY, Petitioner, v. Anthony HEDGPETH, Warden, Respondent.No. CV 11–6512–GW (JPR). | June 26, 2012.

Anthony Eugene BROWN v. STATE.CR–01–1900. | April 28, 2006. | Rehearing Denied Aug. 11, 2006. | Certiorari Denied Oct. 12, 2007Alabama Supreme Court 1051687.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Curtis Shane THOMPSON, Appellant.Nos. 63241–8–I, 63709–6–I. | July 16, 2012. | Publication Ordered July 16, 2012.

Michael Tyrone McCULLON, Plaintiff, v. LT. M. SAYLOR, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 3:12–CV–445. | March 4, 2013. Ambulatory restrains. Restraint chair referenced.

Joshua E. WINGFIELD, Plaintiff, v. S.O.R.T. Sgt. CLARK, et al. Civil Action No. 11–cv–00630–REB–KLM. | Sept. 4, 2012.

Tonya MORRISON, Plaintiff, v. Robert J. STEPHENSON, Muskingum County Sheriff, et al., Defendants.

264

No. 2:06-CV-283. | Feb. 5, 2008. Discussed seeing a restraint chair and resemblance to an electric chair.

Kendrick C. STORY, Plaintiff v. Calvin KNIGHTON, Sheriff, Columbia County, Arkansas; et al. No. 07–CV–1032. | July 15, 2009. Referenced for compensation, leg restraints used.

LAURA T., Appellant, v. BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER et al., Appellees.No. 05–96–01505–CV. | Aug. 21, 1998.

Melvin Lee MOBLEY, III, v. B. HEADRICK, et al.Civil Action No. 2:08cv129. | Sept. 22, 2009.

Dexter Antonio SHEPPARD, Plaintiff, v. Warden Tim RILEY and Sgt. Derrick McBryar, Defendants.C/A No. 1:10–2424–CMC–SVH. | Nov. 4, 2011. (Was going to place in chair).

The STATE, Respondent, v. Freddie Eugene OWENS, Appellant.No. 26520. | Heard June 12, 2008. | Decided July 14, 2008. | Rehearing Denied Aug. 8, 2008. | Certiorari Denied Jan. 21, 2009.

Reginald PITTMAN, By and through his Guardian and Next Friend, Robin M. HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MADISON, State of ILLINOIS, et al., Defendants.No. 08–0890–DRH. | Sept. 27, 2011.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lamar Benny DAVIS et al., Defendants and Appellants.No. C044562. | Superior Ct. Nos. 02F00117 02F00240. | Feb. 27, 2006.

In the Matter of Jeffrey GLOSSON and Christopher Glosson, Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, Department of Human Services.Submitted Oct. 25, 2010. | Decided Nov. 17, 2010.

David Lee WOMACK, Plaintiff, v. Joseph V. SMITH et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 1:06–CV–2348. | March 2, 2011.

Gilberto RUIZ a/k/a Jesus Barriga a/k/a Jose Sanchez a/k/a Gilberto Lopez, Plaintiff, v. S. DAVIS, et al., Defendants.No. 09–2042–STA–cgc. | Sept. 7, 2010.

In re the Termination of Parental Rights to TRENTON M., a person under the age of 18. Rock County Department of Human Services, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Calvin M. M., Respondent–Appellant.No. 2010AP816. | June 24, 2010.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jacob Juan RIVERA, Appellant.No. 36686-0-II. | March 24, 2009.

Charles Lee KETTERING, Plaintiff(s), v. LARIMER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et al., Defendant(s).Civil Action No. 06–cv–01989–REB–PAC. | May 22, 2007.

Bronwyn ANGLIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF ASPEN, COLORADO et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 06-cv-01592-EWN-KLM. | Feb. 29, 2008.

265

John H. LEDDY and Jane Ruddell, v. TOWNSHIP OF LOWER MERION, Lower Merion Township Police Department, and Officer Michael Bedzela.No. CIV. A. 00–385. | Sept. 22, 2000.

Brian Lee FRIEDERICH-TIBBETS, Plaintiff, v. Captain Mike LARSON, et al., Defendants.No. C07-5209BHS-KLS. | June 4, 2008.

Brian FRIEDERICH-TIBBETTS, Plaintiff, v. Captain Mike LARSON, et al., Defendants.No. C07-5209BHS. | Aug. 21, 2008.

Moses MENEGBO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF INSPECTIONS AND APPEALS, Respondent-Appellee.No. 07-0170. | Dec. 28, 2007.

Steven S. BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Warden VOORHIES, et al., Defendants.No. 2:07-cv-13. | March 8, 2010.

Charles D. BARD, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant/Appellee.No. 2 CA–CV 2011–0149. | March 28, 2012.

Ray CERVANTEZ; Adeline Adrian; and Estate of Valarie Cervantez, Plaintiffs, v.GRAHAM COUNTY; Sheriff Preston J. Allred; Robert Palmer; Robert Navarette; and Timothy Graver, Defendants.No. CV–10–0419–TUC–CKJ. | March 11, 2011.

Bridgett Lavell ROBERSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.No. 10–10–00065–CR. | June 15, 2011.

Andy CARTER v. Warden Al STRAIN, et al.Civil Action No. 09-3401. | July 31, 2009.

Ishaiah BROWN, Plaintiff, v. Gary MERLINE, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 07-1643 (RBK). | June 18, 2007.

Ralph ROBBINS, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Larry CHRONISTER, in his personal and official capacity, Defendant–Appellant.United States of America, Intervenor.No. 02–3115. | April 4, 2005.

John Aaron VANDERBURG, Plaintiff v. HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, By and Through its BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; et al., Defendants.No. 1:08cv90–LG–RHW. | May 20, 2010.Leg shackled during trial, no restraint chair for next one

In re Personal Restraint Petition of Cecil Emile DAVIS, Petitioner.No. 70834–7. | Considered May 6, 2004. | Decided Nov. 4, 2004.

266

Jerome DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. LANCASTER COUNTY OF CORRECTIONS et al., Defendants.No. 4:05CV3238. | July 16, 2007.Permission to proceed with complaint only

Mark Daniel CROWLEY, Plaintiff v. Patrick LUNDSFORD, et al., Defendants.No. 4:12CV00271 JMM/HDY. | May 30, 2012.

Michael S. GRIFFIS, Appellant, v. Chuck MEDFORD et al, Appellees.No. 08-2892. | Submitted: Oct. 14, 2009. | Filed: Oct. 21, 2009.

Leonard G. YOUNG, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey BEARD; et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 10–284. | June 18, 2013.

Charles James CHATMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al., Defendants-Appellees.No. 08-17076. | Submitted Nov. 17, 2009*. | Filed Dec. 14, 2009.

Aaron L. JACOBS, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Cpl. Gregg OWEN et al., Defendants.No. 09–C–0406. | March 2, 2012.

Gabriel RANDOLPH, Plaintiff, v. Officer JEFFERY et al., Defendants.C/A No. 1:08–3492–MBS–SVH. | Aug. 3, 2010. (did not want to shave)

Thomas CENSKE, Plaintiff, v. CLINTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.No. 5:04-cv-107. | June 5, 2006. | June 27, 2006.

Kalvin YOUMAN, Plaintiff, v. Major M. WOOD, et al., Defendants.No. 4:10cv248–SPM/WCS. | Aug. 16, 2010.

Raymond P. BOIVIN, Plaintiff, v. Jeffrey MERRILL, et al., Defendants.Civil No. 97–177–B. | Aug. 12, 1999

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Benjamin JIMENEZ, Defendant and Appellant.No. C048815. | (Super.Ct.No. 03F06800). | Sept. 16, 2005.

Ronnie Jraun OTEMS, Jr., Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, State.No. 02–11–00488–CR. | Dec. 6, 2012. | Discretionary Review Refused Mar. 20, 2013.

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Jose Manual ACEVEDO, Appellant.No. 20237-2-III. | Dec. 26, 2002.

STATE of Washington, Respondent v. Felix DAMON, AppellantNo. 39952-7-I. | Sept. 7, 1999.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Adam GORDY, Defendant and Appellant.2d Crim. No. B214881. | (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA296668). | July 19, 2010.

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Victor BARRAGAN et al., Defendants and Appellants.

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No. C049845. | (Super.Ct.Nos.SF087807D, SF087807C). | Sept. 17, 2008.

Nathaniel FITZGERALD, ADC v. Richard BUSBY, Sheriff of Crittenden County; et al., Defendants.No. 3:09–cv–00154–DPM–JJV.

STATE of Vermont v. Larry WOOLBERT.No. 05–339. | April 2, 2007.

Michael WHITINGTON, Plaintiff, v. Lt. SOKOL, et al.Civil Action No. 06–cv–01245–EWN–CBS.

Henrique NIXON v. CORRECTION OFFICER LANCE DIEHM, et al.No. 99CIV9843KMW THK.

Paul T. WEBSTER v. CITY OF KENT, OHIO, et al.No. 5:10 CV 599.

James Lynn WRIDE v. FRESNO COUNTY, et al., Defendants.No. 1:05–cv–00486–AWI–SKO PC.

Tommie SMITH v.Sergeant Virgil NICHOLS.Civil Action No. 09–cv–01139–MSK–BNB.

Leonard Weston BYERS, Jr. v. Mike WHEELER, et al.Civil No. 07–1777–HO.

Felix ESPINO v. CITY OF CHULA VISTA, et al.No. 05cv2321 WQH (POR).

Robert Joseph BENGE v. Joseph SCALZO, et al.No. CV 04–1687–PHX–DGC (CRP).

Chadrick FULKS v. James METTS, Sheriff/ Lexington County, et alC.A. No. 2:06-0980-PMD-RSC.

Thomas Leon TAYLOR v. Sgt. T. LAPETTEC/A No. 0:11–327–TLW–PJG.

David E. HILL v. Harley LAPPIN, et al.Civil No. 3:CV–11–1609.

David BRUEDERLE v. LOUISVILLE METRO GOVERNMENT, et al.No. 11–5637.

Brent TEASLEY, et al. v. Nic FORLER, et al.No. 4:06-CV-773 (JCH).

STATE of Tennessee v. Jimmy Dewayne LENTZ.

268

No. M2006-01774-CCA-R3-CD.

Steven Allen SHAWLEY v. Brian COLEMAN, et al.Civil Action No. 09–1657.

Josh Randall RILEY v. The STATE of Texas.Nos. 03–10–00229–CR,

Kevin PARKER v. Lisa KRAUSE-HENGST, Deputy Sheriff, et alNo. 09-cv-436-vis.

UNITED STATES of America v. Brian BAILEYNo. 03–2632.

In the Interest of J.H., a Child.No. 2-04-031-CV.

Michael KANE v. David L. WINN, Warden, F.M.C. Devens, Defendant.No. CIV.A.03-40116-WGY.

Charles Robert CANTER III v. Martin O’MALLEY, et al.No. RWT 11cv918.

Milo A. JONES v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.No. 101,890.

Robert Earl SHOUSE, et al. v. DAVIESS COUNTY, KENTUCKY, et al.Civil Action No. 4:06CV–144–M.

David Kevin THOMSEN v. Dick ROSS, individually and as former Crow Wing County Sheriff, et al. No. 03–CV–1192JMRRLE.

Ron Stuart MARTIN v. VERNON PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE, et al.Civil Action No. 09–1248–LC.

Edward BROWN aka Edward Gee v. J.G. MRAVINTZ, Correctional Officer, et al.No. CIV A 04-30J

The PEOPLE v. Christopher J. THOMASNo. C044459.

The PEOPLE v. Greg FUHERNo. C046956.

Lewis Josh BARBERREE v. UNITED STATES of America.Nos. 8:09–cr–266–T–33MAP

Jules M. SINGLETON v. Lt. Donald WESTEN, Sgt. Jennines.

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Civil Action No. 5–12–cv–02226–JMC.

Jeffrey E. WALKER v. Officer JONES, et al.No. C 08–0757 CRB (PR).

Robert L. SMALL v. Joseph WHITTICKCivil Action No. 06–1363 (RMB/JS).

Brian PALADINO v. K. NEWSOME, et al.Civil Action No. 12–2021 (AET).

Misti CARDENAS v. CITY OF CRESCENT CITY, et al.No. C 08–4053 MHP.

Gary W. BARBOUR v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY, et al.Civil Action No. 11–1291.

Nathaniel L. ADDERLY v.C.O. I FERRIER, et al. No. 10–3636.

Erindira Esperanza GUZMAN–IBARGUEN, et. al. v. SUNRISE HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL CENTER, et al.Nos. 2:10–cv–1228–PMP–GWF

STATE of North Carolina v. James Joseph JAMES, Defendant.No. COA09-730.

Jimmy D. BRIDGES v. Tim GILBERT, et al.No. 07-1551.

Dustin ZIMMERMAN v. Craig SCHAEFFER, et al.Civil No. 1:06–CV–1893.

John Aaron VANDERBURG v. HARRISON COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI, et al.No. 1:08cv90–LG–RHW.

Angel Luis SANTOS v. J. CAUDLE, et al, Defendants.Civil Action No. 3:10–cv–1767.

Jela D. JONES, as Trustee for the heirs of Brenda Diane Jones, deceased v. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.Civ. No. 05-1249 (RHK/AJB).

STATE of Ohio v. Donald COMBSNo. 98CA137.

Pearl WILSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Phillip Wilson, deceased, et al. v. MARICOPA COUNTY, a public entity, et al.No. CV–04–2873 PHX–DGC.

270

Charles WILLIAMS, M.D. v. UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER OF SOUTHERN NEVADA, et al.Case No. 2:09–cv–00554–PMP–PAL.

Travis E. SMITH v. Allen County Sheriff Ken FRIES, et al.Cause No. 1:11–CV–237.

James Carl HIGGS v. Transportation Specialist SANFORD et al.Civil Action No. 5:07CV-P77-R.

Yvon WAGNER v. COUNTY OF MARICOPA, et al.No. 10–15501.

Adrian Tyrell EAGLIN v. Mr. James METTS, Sheriff, et al. C/A No. 0:08-2547-TLW-PJG.

Joseph BREELAND v. Sup’t John FISHER, et alCivil No. 3:12–CV–84.

T.R. O’CARROLL v. OKLAHOMA BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; et al.No. CIV–10–232–D.

George DALIE v. Correctional Officer Cory VOSS, et al.Civil Action No. 07–2097.

Curtis THOMPSON v. Officer BURACH, et al.No. C05–02064JLR.

Calvin ROUSE v. Doug WADDINGTON et al.No. C06–5183RJB.

Jeffrey E. SIMPSON v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,No. CRIM. 03–96–P–S, Civ. 5–125–B–S

James A. JOHNSON, Sr. v. S.C. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Director Jon Ozmint, et al. C/V No. 3:06-2062-CMC-JRM.

Sebastian RICHARDSON v. Thomas R. KANE, et al.No. 3:CV–11–2266.

ESTATE OF Mikal R. GAITHER, by and through Pearl GAITHER, Personal Representative, Plaintiff,v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 03–1458 (CKK). | Sept. 8, 2009.

Blake COMISKEY, Plaintiff, v. Sharon BROWN, Defendant.No. 07-2241. | July 14, 2009.

Oudia RIGNEY, as Administratrix of the estate of Paul Ray Rigney, Sr., Plaintiff v. Charles MARCUM,

271

individually, and in his official capacity as Clay County Jailer, et al. Civil No. 06-187-REW. | Oct. 11, 2007.

Lawrence Michael BORCHARDT v. STATE of Maryland.No. 55, Sept. Term, 2000. | Dec. 13, 2001. | Reconsideration Denied Jan. 4, 2002.

Mike DIAZ, Petitioner, v. A.W. CASTALAN, Warden, Respondent.No. CV 06-2434-FMC (RNB). | Dec. 30, 2008.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff v. State of ARKANSAS; et al., Defendants.Case No. 4:09CV00033 JLH. | June 8, 2011.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., Defendants.Civ. A. No. 92–33J. | July 27, 1995.

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