THE NYAYA – VAISESIKA THEORY OF MIND:

A CRITICAL STUDY

FINAL REPORT OF MINOR RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMISSION

BY

MANJUSHA SINGHA MAHAPATRAASSOCIATE PROFESSOR IN PHILOSOPHY

VIVEKANANDA SATABARSHIKI MAHAVIDYALAYAMANIKPARA, JHARGRAM

WEST BENGAL2017

01 Acknowledgements

Content Page

01. Acknowledgements

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02. Abbreviations 03

03. Methodology 04

04. Objective 05

05. Chapter-I IntroductionTheory of mind advocated by Different system Of Indian Philosophy.

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06. Chapter-II Nature and status of substantially of mind as proposed by different Nyaya – Vaisesika philosopher’s beginning from Kanad, Goutama.

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07. Chapter-III Self and Mind the two distinct internal substance as established by the Nyaya Vaisesika view.

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08. Summary 35

09. Conclusion 37

10. Social Contribution

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11. References 44

12. Bibliography 45

Acquiring knowledge is the main goal of human being and for this reason we are here. This project presents a discussion on mind. In every sphere of life, in every work mind is a necessary factor and every knowledge mind has a great importance. It plays a central role in cognitive process.This project presents a discussion of the concept of mind in both Indian and western perspective. Specially in Indian philosophy and particularly in Nyaya - Vaisesika Philosophy.I have the honour to take this opportunity to thank the involved persons Institutions related to this project.First, The university Grants commission and its Easter Regional office, Kolkata for financial assistance extended towards me for conducting the study and complete this Minor Research Project.I sincerely acknowledge the valuable advice by my respected teachers: professor Tapan Kumar Chakraborty - formar professor of Jadavpur University, Professor Uma Bandyopadhayay of Calcutta University.I’m also thankful to Dr Papia Gupta – Associate professor of Vidyasagar University for the co-operation regarding the project. I am thankful to my colleague Dr.Chittaranjan Das - Associate professor of Vivekananda Satabarshiki Mahavidyalaya for inspiring me from the beginning. Mithu Phaujdar - Assistant professor of Vivekananda Satabarshiki

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Mahavidyalaya was also encouraging me for the completion of the project.I am very much thankful to our college library and librarian Suvendu Kar. I also mention other Libraries that is Central library Vidyasagar University National University, departmental library of Jadavpur University and also Department of philosophy and life – world of Vidyasagar University.

It is my proud privilege to pay respect to my parents to give moral boost in every phase of the study. I also pay my gratitude to the principal of this college Dr. Uma Bhoumik. I’m also thankful to the faculty and all staff members, colleagues of my college for their co-operation and for proving an academic environment. I am also thankful to minis trial staff of the college specially, Kundan Mallick, and Debabrata Acharjyya. I also offer my blessings to my student Pradip and my children Ankit, Ayan and Asmita for their co-operation.

ManjushaSingha Mahapatra

Department of philosophy Vivekananda Satabarshiki Mahavidyalaya Manikpara, Jhargram, West Bengal.

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Abbreviations:TS: Tarkasamgraha of Annanbhatta ed by Gopinath Bhattacharya.TSD: Tarkasamgrahadipika of Annanbhatta ed by Gopinath Bhattacharya.NS: Nyaya SutraNSB: Nyaya Sutra Bhasya.

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Methodology :

I have prepared this Minor research project by following manner.

i) I have given a general survey of the theory of mind advocated by different systems of Indian philosophical books and journals.

ii) I have discussed the nature and status of substantiality of mind as proposed by different Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers beginning from Goutam, Vatsayan, Kanada and Prasastapada.

iii) I have discussed my opinion regarding this topic as conclusion.

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Objective

I have described briefly the concept of mind in Indian philosophy. In this connection I have also stated the western concept of mind. In the tradition of western philosophy they differentiate Mind and Body in one hand and equate Mind with self on the other hand. ‘mind’ and ‘self’ have no different status for example the German word ‘Mind’ is generally translate as ‘spirit’ or ‘self’. Hegel also uses the word ‘mind’ to refer the spiritual side of the universe and which in the Indian philosophy is called as paramatman. But I would like to establish the concept of ‘mind’ or ‘self’ has different ontological status. To me it is justified and it is a realistic approach. Self is the knower, a permanent immaterial substance. Mind is also an internal (substance) states an instrument of knowing felling etc. So mind plays a different role. It plays a major role in cognitive and physical process. I have tried to focus particularly Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophical system as they have discussed clearly in comparisons to other system of Indian philosophy- First, they proved the existence of mind through the help of inference and then they discussed different activities of mind.

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Nyaya-vaisesika particularly Nyaya darsan have elaborately and very rationally explained the role of Manas. These two systems of Indian philosophy have a realistic approach. I have only mention that mental peace, liberation is the ultimate goal to all the system of Indian Philosophy . In Nyaya system role of mind in Shraban, Manan and Nitidhyasana the required steps of apavarga has emphasized.

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Chapter 1: -

IntroductionTheory of mind advocated by different systems of Indian Philosophy:

In Indian philosophy mind or manas is different from self and as a separate entity from self, it has been treated from different angles by different thinkers.

In the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad Manas or mind has been granted as subtle sense organ i. e an instrument of knowledge with physical basis.In the Chhandogya Upanishad also manas is a subtle matter common to almost all the systems of Indian philosophy. It also states that manas being material is described as that which governs the sense organs. The indriyas—five senses of action (karmendriyas) and the five senses of knowledge (jnanendriyas) work under the control of manas, the central or internal sense organ. These are dependent on manas for their functioning. It is only when the manas is in conjunction with the sense organ that is possible to have any perceptual knowledge. In the Chhandogya Upanishad again we find mind conceived as that which not only directs the sense organs but also something superior to them.

Pravakar Mimamsa states, the existence of mind by pointing out that the qualities of self such as buddhi, pleasure, pain etc would never became manifest but for the activity of mind. The contact of mind along with other five sense organs of perception constitutes the six sense organs. The internal sense not only acts as the co-ordinations for the function of the other external senses, but also is the only way of perceiving mental states such as pleasure, pain etc. They recognise mind as atomic and active. Mimansa view of mind resembles that of the Nyaya Vaisesika view.

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According to Bhatta-mimamsa, mind is the instrumental cause of perception of pleasure and pain.

Yoga system supplies the psychological culmination of the Samkhya metaphysics. The word `psychology’ is used here in its original connotation which is the science of the soul. The person on the self that is bound up prakriti must find its release and the process of release is describe as Yoga. The ontological belives of Yoga have there besis in the metaphysics of Samkhya. The most important tenet of the Samkhya and the Yoga is the guna theory. There are three fundamental characteristics which are seen in everything experienced and they are sattva, tamas and ragas. Prakriti is defined in Samkhya sutras as primal matter which is the state of equipoise of sattva, tamas and ragas,( sattva ,ragas and tamasam samyavastha prakriti).Primal matter or prakriti is nothing else but these three. In the Samkhya–Yoga philosophy mind is a psychic matter and predominantly static.

Samkhya thinker’s holds mind is dual in nature. It is eleventh Indriyas the five jnanendriya and five karmendriya; Mind is an indriya like the others but peculiarity is that among the organs of cognition it is an organ of cognition for it perceives the sense of pleasure and pain etc; and among the organ of action for it acts like the other karmendriyas as the cause of knowledge. To the Samkhya-Yogo, mind is a product of unconscious prakrti, the ultimate material cause in its process of evolution. So mind is unconscious by nature. It is neither atomic, nor all-pervading but has medium magnitude.

According to almost all Buddhists a person is a collection of ayantans (items) consisting of five sense organs namely –sight(caksus), hearing(sotra), touch (tvac),taste (rasana),smell(grana), five motor organs namely speech(vak), grasping(tvac), excretion(payu), generation(upastha), manas and buddhi. But all of them are momentary. Hence a person is a set of twelve series of momentary entities,

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both inner and outer, buddhi is included in the inner aggregates (antarasamudaya) and it refers to both alayavijnan and pravrttivijnan. Our ego is explained in terms of alayavijnan, our experience, such as red, blue, pleasure, pain etc. But both of them togetherly build ‘’my experience’’. As regards the relation between them has been compared with the undercurrent of a river and pravrttivijnan with its waves. Hence the relation between them would be causal. As a particular wave depends on both the undercurrent and other waves, so a particular pravrttivijnan would depend on alayavijnan and other pravrttivijnans which are its upakaris. Bauddha view of mind is that it is a stream of momentary cognitions. To the Bauddha, it seems, equates mind with self or consciousness and considers that it is nothing but a stream of momentary bodily states and mental states like cognition.

The Advaita Vedanta view is that, mind or antakarana is like everything a product of maya. The Advaita Vedanta agrees with modern psychologists and says that mind is just totality of conscious states and process.

According to Advaita Vedanta the mind is called’antahkarana’ and it is material in nature. It is composite entity made of five subtle elements namely earth, water, fire, air and ether (akash). An antakarana has four aspects viz, buddhi (the function which ascertains whether an object is favourable or unfavourable to the subject.) ahamkara (the ego.) Citta (the faculty of memory and recollection.) and manas (the internal sense

organ.) According to them the antahkarana is the ultimate product of Cosmic ignorance (maya). Vedanta view of manas bears a close correspondence to its metaphysical out look. The main theme of all Advaitic literature is that, ultimately, there is nothing other than self that is real. The self Brahman the ultimate reality. The whole manifested unmanifested world of things and ideas is the imagination of the mind of the cosmic self. According to Samkara, from the standpoint of sense organ mind is internal. It is also stated that manas along with

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buddhi, ahamkara and citta is an instrument of knowledge. It is necessarily unconscious having medium dimension.

The ancient materialistic school the carvaka do not subscribe to the existence of self mind. Carvaka equates mind with body. As body is a bi-product of four material elements, so also is the mind.

The Nyaya vaisesika systems lend themselves to be considered a unit. Since their theories of manas are to a large extend similar. Both system reflect the ideas of manas that are given in Upanishads. In Upanishad manas is not and cannot be considered the same as soul or Atman. This idea is strengthened by logical arguments, and irrespective of their metaphysical theories they consider mind cannot be identified with the self who is the knower. The Nyaya vaisesika has given special emphasis on the concept and reality of mind as a necessary cognitive instrument.

The Nyaya vaisesika system have stated that manas is material, atomic, one and unconscious. It is the instrument of knowledge, an internal sense organ and resides in the body.

Manas figures last in the Vaisesika enumeration of substance. It is customary to translate Manas as mind. But the term mind in modern philosophical idioms stands either for psychical states or for that which has these states. The Vaisesika term Manas, however stands for neither. It is therefore preferable to retain the Sanskrit term Manas rather than emply an emprecise forgein equivalent.

According to Vaisesika manas or mind is the ninth dravys or substance. Dravya is one of the categories of padarthas recognised in their system. Padartha literally is one that provides meaning to a pada or a word. To them substance is that which has qualities and action. The very first quality is the capacity for conjunction. Manas as internal organ which is not pervading comes in to contact with the material cause of cognition. Manas which is atomic in size and one for each persion, so it

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must possess the quality of distinction. It is the fact that manas is material like any other material object, it possess priority posteriority and speed.

It is the vehicle of memory, all affections of soul such as knowing feeling and willing which are generated by the connection of manas with the Atma, the senses and object. It is the intermediate link which connects the Atma with senses and thereby produces the affections of knowledge, feeling, willing. With each connections of soul with manas we have separate affection of soul or Atma. And thus our intellectual experience is conducted in a series, one after another not simultaneously.

Nyaya philosophy is primarily concerned with valid knowledge or yathartha jnana and the means of receiving this knowledge is called pramanas. In the language of Nyaya philosophy valid experiencial knowledge is called prama that can be received through pramanas. Since the system analyses the nature and source of knowledge both valid and invalid is also referred to ‘Annikshiki’ which means science of critical study. The valid knowledge which is prama can be received through Pratksha, Anumana, Upamana, Sabda pramanas. In every knowledge manas has a great importance, it plays a central role in cognitive process. In fact no knowledge is possible without ‘Atma mana samyoga’ for example in perception (pratyaksa) the mind is attached with particular sense organ, that is ‘eye’. The process is like this –Atma is connected with manas, which is connected with particular indriya and that particular indriya is attached with object. And finally we perceive the object. It is to be noted that in Nyaya philosophy manas is recognized as ‘Antarindriya’. It directly knows pleasure, pain, desire, cognition etc.

Gangesa in his ‘Tattvacintamoni’ enumerates six senses, the traditional five and the mind.

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In the sphere of invalid knowledge mind also act as inevitable part for example doubt or Samsaya is nothing but the state in which the mind wevers between conflicting views regarding a single object. In Tarka Samgraha, Annambhatta has defined this substance manas as’’ the organ that is a condition for the direct awareness (upalabdhi) of pleasure etc.’’ 2*`By etc’ is to be taken other mental states such as pain, cognition, desire, aversion, and volition. It cannot be denied that pleasure, pain etc are directly cognized and some organ or indriya has

got to be postulated for this direct cognition quite as much as in the other cognitions like vision audition etc. this organ of direct cognition is other than the recognized external organs and is described as Manas. It is not the same thing as mind understood as the subject of cognition: it is the organ which helps the subject to have his cognition. It may be urged that this definition might have been simplified by the omission of the term organ and that Manas might have been more simply defined as a condition for the direct awareness of pleasure, pain etc. But as Nilkanta points out, the omission of the phrase organ (indriya) from the definition would have made it too wide. Like Manas, the relation of the manas with pleasure etc is also necessary condition for the direct awareness of pleasure, pain etc. This relation is thus as much covered by the proposed definition as the organ itself. But surely the relation of the Manas to pleasure, pain etc is not accepted as Manas. The insertion of the term organ in this definition removes this difficulty; for though the relation between Manas and pleasure, pain etc is a condition for direct awareness of pleasure etc it is yet not organ for such awareness.

It is to be noted that in his TSD on TS, Annambhatta proposes a new definition of Manas, which runs thus Manas is an entity which is devoid of touch quality but which is endowed with action. This definition is faultless; for it covers

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none of the eight other substances noticed so far. The first four starting with Earth are endowed with both touch-quality and action; the last four are endowed with neither. It is only the Substance called Manas that is endowed with action but not with the touch-quality.3*(TS-18)

Annambhatta’s second definition as given in TSD is superior to the first one as given by him in TS on account of its simplicity;--remarked by Nilkanta*. The TS definition is given in terms of “pleasure”(sukha), “direct awareness”(upalabdhi),”condition”(sadhana), and “organ”(indriya); the TSD definition is given in terms of “touch-quality” (sparsa),”absence”(rahitatvva) and “action”(kriya). The latter is thus simpler in point of definiens-structure (laksana-sarira).

Next in TS Annambhatta speaks of the numerical infinity of Manas. There is an infinite number of substances called Manas. According to TS, since one Manas is uniformly associated with one soul, Manas is infinites in number. TSD explains that since there is a plurality of souls and since one Manas is required for one soul the Manas –substances have as much plurality as the Soul-substances.

Annambhatta now in TS states that Manas is atomic in character and eternal. The atomic character of the substance Manas is according to its magnitude. It is furnished in TSD. ** 4

Regarding the proof of existence Nyaya-Sutra states “non-simultaneity of cognition is the indicative of mind”. ***5

Simultaneously knowledge cannot be produced. Feeling of simultaneity is due to the rapidity of transition of internal sensory with Manas. Beside this, Smriti, Anuman etc are also indicative of mind.

14The Prasastapad Bhasya on Vaisesika Sutras gives reasons for the existence of Manas. Along with the Naiyayikas they cite non-simultaneity of cognitive knowledge as the first reason. Secondly the arising of reminiscences on remembered experiences, whilst the organ through which the original impression entered is indicative. For example perception of the colour of an object also brings about the perception of smell.

Conclusion:- In Indian Philosophy mind or manas is something distinct from self or Atman. It is subtle in nature, it is not gross matter. The beginning of such conception of mind is to be found in the Vedas themselves. In the Vajasneya-Samhita, the concept of mind is a psychical entity is fully discussed.

This text of Samihita describes a continuous discourse on the nature of mind. In the very first verse of this collection it is stated that mind as something different. It is not a gross physical sense-organ for then, it cannot be conceived as going out of the body, nor it can be the soul or self for the same reason. In the third verse of the same we find the threefold division of mental activities;- intelligence, feeling and resolution and the description of mind as that which is responsible for all accomplishments. It is that which gives continuity and meaning of life, for it is capable of holding together the past, present and future. In this collection we can also see a comparison by using the chariot and say that the mind of a man is like the controlling principle in the wheel of the chariot and the will of man is like the good charioteer who controls the horses with the veins. This simile is found again in Upanishads. From these verses it became evident that even in this ancient text, the physical and epistemological functions of the mind where recognized and acknowledged.

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Indian Philosophers, by and large, remain non-materialists. They have treated consciousness as a natural phenomenon. Hence, they have not tried to reduce it to something else. This also may be due to the fact that Indian Philosophers have emphasized certain values such as liberation (moksa). Since liberation is related to the mind. The process of liberation cannot be possible without the existence of mind. Consciousness (one of the features of mind) which is not identified with brain-states is indispensable for realization of liberation.

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Chapter 2:Nature and status of substantiality of mind as proposed by different Nyaya- Vaisesika philosopher’s begning from Kanad, Gautama.

In Vaisesika-Sutra Kanad declares that the allpervading substances the self and akasa (ether) is not present in the mind, therefore, is atomic. Prasastapad’s Bhasya that all knowledge arises because of the contact between the soul and the object through manas, is the non-herent cause of cognition. If both manas and Atma were all-pervading, then there would be simultaneous cognition of all objects, which is not the case. Hence the reason must be one of the two, either the self or the mind, must be all pervading or atomic. Self is all pervading. Hence mind cannot be all pervading, but can only be atomic.

Another important factor that arises out of this discussion is the substantiality of manas. As it has already been stated, substance is that in which qualities in here. Manas has qualities. The very first quality by implication, is the capacity for conjunction. Manas as the internal organ which is not all-pervading, comes in to contact with the material cause of cognition. Hence, being the bearer of qualities, Manas is a substance. Manas which is atomic and one for each person, therefore by implication it must possess the quality of disjunction or separation. What can achieve conjunction can also achieve disjunction. So these are the qualities.

From the fact that manas is corporal or material, it has been already stated that like any other material object, it possess priority, posteriority and speed. If manasnis material, then like material object it must be an object of touch. But Sridhara maintains that manas cannot be touched—as there is an absence of touch in it. It is like the self which cannot be touched, though material like the body. Still mind proudeces by conjunction cognition of all things. How the Vaisesika can

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conceive of such a position it is difficult to understand. That which is atomic (I. e., whothout parts) and that which is beyond the reach of touch, how such a manas can come into conjunction with the material object is not explained. The whole theory of knowledge of the Nyaya Vaisesika schools is based on sannikarsa—the relation of either samavaya or samyoga established between object, manas and self, and this is not possible unless the constituents of the relation have parts and can be touched.

Activity—especially of the type where it brings about the experiences of something other than itself—is a quality of manas. Since manas reveals several objects quickly, so as to cause the illusion of simultaneity, it is said that manas moves very quickly.

After so describing what manas are, the Naiyayikas and the Vaisesikas proceed to determine what is not. The Bhasya on Vaisesika Sutra, 111, 22 says,” It must be regarded as unconscious; as otherwise the whole body would be the common ground (of experience sensations).”

This proves that mind is not conscious. It is not, and cannot be the cogniser. The internal organ does not possess consciousness, for if it were so, then the soul and the mind, each cognizing in its own right, would make the sense organs and the body, the common ground of their activities. But this is not so. The activity or inactivity of the body indicates always a single purpose, hence mind cannot be conscious.

Several objections are raised against this position. Sridhara in his Nyaya Kandali begins by raising the objection consciousness may be a quality of the mind, for the unification of the sense-cognitions such as “I saw the colour, perceive the taste, and am feeling the touch”, is made possible by the mind which is eternal. But the reply states that this is only a difference of names .What the Vaisesika calls soul, the opponent designates as mind. That which is the substratum of consciousness is called soul by the Vaisesika and mind by the others .But if mind were the cognizer ,

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them it would not need the instrument of cognition, for cognizing and all perceptions can occur simultaneously, since the objects of perceptions wood be all present simultaneously .Memory and recognition are the distinct marks of consciousness . These characteristics are, therefore, for the self not for the mind. If mind were to be both an organ of perception as it undoubtedly is_ and conscious, them the function of perception and memory would be constantly active. It has been pointed out that mind being a single entity cannot being about any remembrances , whether simultaneously or successively .Simultaneous memory is not possible since mind is atomic and single and cannot act in more than one way at a particular point of time. Also, once a memory is brought out, there is nothing else to bring about, and this does not mean that mind is an instrument of memory is not present. Again memory cannot be brought about successively because ,them, remembrances would be going on ad infinitum and the importance of the instrumentality of the mind fades way .But if mind ware to function through other organs, it would be same as Atamana . If we supposed mind to be an abode of knowledge, it cannot be an instrument of knowledge also. ``mind is not conscious, because it is an Instrument of consciousness, like a jar’’, says Sridhara in his Nayaya kandali.

But the objection is raised that the mind is the doer or the agent, not the instrument. This is not accepted. For the experience of anything we require an instrument. Similarly, for the experience of pleasure and pain there must be some internal instrument. The character of an

instrument is that it is something that is being employed by the others for their own purpose. In this sense, it the self that makes use of the mind for cognitive purposes. So mind is only an instrument. The same idea more or less is given in Nyaya Sutras. Here it is established that mind is different from soul, and that cognition (Buddhi) is a quality of the soul and not the mind.

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We have now to explain what these schools mean by buddhi or cognition. The word buddhi is said to be the same as jnana (cognition), darsana (perception), uplabdhi, (apprehension ), bodha (understanding), pratyaya (cognizance), adhyavasaya (astertainment).*6

*(Nyaya Bhasya 3, 2, 3)

The burden of the commentary on 3, 2, 3 is a prove the fact that belongs to an intelligent agent cannot said to belong to an instrument. If it is said that consciousness belongs to the instrument mind, then the Bhasykara maintains that it becomes imperative to establish the nature of this “conscious person”. If this conscious person is the internal organ mind then it is this that is the cognizer, and buddhi as a quality, is that which makes things known. A things knows or cognizes when it has knowledge or obtains knowledge for itself. But a thing is made known only by an instrument. An instrument only serves the purposes of another. So it is the soul or mind according to the opponent, that knows, and buddhi is that which makes things known. Buddhi ascertains and mind cognizes and hence buddhi is a quality of the mind.

But the Naiyayikas, in reply to this argument, show that ascertaining cognizing are one and the same thing as stated in Nyaya Bhasya 3,2,3.If this were not so, the seer, the hearer, the thinker, all would be so many distinct persons. This fact is not the case, and hence it proves that there must be a unity of ascertainment or cognition cannot be the same as the ascertainer and cognizer. What is sought to be proved here is that buddhi or jnana is a quality of soul or Atma and not of the mind. It is clear from the above discussion of the Bhasya that mind is considered as internal organ or antakarana.

‘Manas’ figures last in the Vaisesika enumeration of Substances. It is customary to translate ‘Manas’ as ‘Mind’ in modern philosophical idiom stands either for

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psychical states or for that which has these states. The Vaisesika term Manas however stands for neither. It is therefore, preferable to retain the Sanskrit term ‘Manas’ rather than employ an imprecise foreign equivalent.

Now what ? According to the Vaisesikas it is a Substance (dravya) in the sense of an entity that has in it one or more of the qualities (gunas) recognized in the school. In TS, Annambhatta has defined this Substance as ‘the organ that is a condition for the direct awareness (upalabdhi) or pleasure etc.’ By ‘etc.’ is to be taken mental states like pain, cognition, desire, aversion and volition. It cannot be denied that pleasure, pain etc. are directly or immediately cognized and some organ or ‘indriya’ has got to be postulated for this direct cognition quite as much as in the case of other such cognition like vision, audition etc. This organ of direct cognition is other than the recognized external organs and is described as ‘Manas’. It is not the same thing as the ‘Mind’ understood as the subject of cognition: It is the organ which helps the subject to have his cognition. It may be urged that this definition might have been simplified by the omission of the term ‘organ’ and the ‘Manas’ might have been more simply defined as ‘a condition for the direct awareness of pleasure, pain etc.’ But, as Nilakantha points out the omission of the phrase ‘organ’ (indriya) from the definition would have made it too wide. Like Manas, the relation of the Manas with pleasure etc. is also a necessary condition for the direct awareness of pleasure, pain etc. This relation is thus as much covered by the proposed definition as the organ itself. But surely the relation of the Manas to pleasure, pain etc. is not accepted as Manas. The insertion of the term ‘organ’ in the definiens removes this difficulty for though the relation between Manas and pleasure, pain etc. is a condition for the direct awareness of pleasure etc, it is yet not an ‘organ’ for such awareness.

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It is to be noted further that in his TSD on TS, Annambhatta proposes a new definition on Manas, which runs thus: ‘Manas is an entity which is devoid of touch-quality but which is endowed with action’. This definition is faultless ; for it covers none of the eight other substance noticed so far. The first four staring with Earth are endowed with both touch-quality and action: the last four are endowed with neither. It is only the Substance called ‘Manas’ that is endowed with action but not with the touch-Quality. Nilakantha remarks that Annambhatta’s second definition as given in TSD is superior to the first one as given by him in TS on account of its simplicity. The TS definition is given in terms of ‘pleasure’ (sukha), ‘direct

awareness’ (upalabdhi), ‘condition’ (sadhana), and ‘organ’ (indriya): the TSD definition is given in terms of ‘touch-quality’ (sparsa), ‘absence’ (rahitatva) and ‘action’ (kriya). The latter is thus simpler in point of definiens-structure (laksana-sarira). These two point concerning the definition of Manas are to be found in the following page of Nilakanthi “manah-samyogadyativyapti – varakenendriyatva – ghatita – mulokata-laksana – peksaya laghu laksanam aha ‘sparsa-rahitatve sati iti”.

TS next speaks of the numerical infinity of Manas. There is an infinite number of substances called ‘Manas’. How is that to be known with certainty ? According to TS, since one Manas is uniformly associated with one soul, Manas is infinite in number. TSD explains that since there is a plurality of souls and since one Manas is required for one soul the Manas-substances have as much plurality as soul-substances.

TS next asserts without giving any reasons that Manas is atomic in character and eternal. The reasons are furnished in TSD. The TSD argument is like the following: As a substance ‘Manas’ must have some magnitude. That magnitude is either the smallest one or a medium one or the largest one. It is to be noted that the smallest magnitude is exemplified by that of the Element-atoms, the medium one by

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perceptible Substances and the largest magnitude by Substances like Akasa, Dik, Time and soul. The author of TSD proceeds by examining each one of the three alternative possibilities regarding the magnitude of Manas. He first takes up and examines the second alternatives, viz, that Manas is endowed with a medium magnitude. But he finds it unacceptable for the reason its ‘having a magnitude’ would entail the difficulty of its non-eternity. TSD does not however furnish any ground for this statement. But the ground can be easily imagined like the following:-

A thing having a medium (madhyama) magnitude is one that has parts. But such a thing is one that has come into being through a combination of parts. But, again, it must be admitted that such a thing is perishable, for there are instances for and no instances against such admission. If now to be of a medium magnitude is to be thus perishable or non-eternal, it would be true no less of Manas than of other substances. In other words, Manas would have to be recognized as perishable or non-eternal substance. But that would be a difficulty, according to TSD.

Annambhatta then takes up the third alternative viz, that Manas is of the largest magnitude. There is no implausibility about this suggestion. Manas is a Substance which is devoid of touch-quality and other such substances (e.g. Akasa, Dik, Time, Soul) are, to be sure, possessed of the largest magnitude. In other words, it may plausibly be urged that the substance ‘Manas’ is as ubiquitous as say, the soul. Annambhatta however, does not find it possible to accept this alternative. His difficulty is cryptically expressed in the TSD. Statement: “If Manas were ubiquitous, then because of the absence of the ‘a-samavayi-karana’, viz, the conjunction of soul and Manas, there would be the difficulty of non-emergence of cognition”. To explain, It is an accepted tenet with the Nyaya-Vaisesika school that for every positive effect (bhava-karya), there must be an ‘a-samavayi-karana’. Cognition as a positive effect

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must then have its ‘a-samavayi-karana’. According to the Nyaya ddoctrine, the ‘a-samavayi-karana’ of an effect like ‘cognition’, is constituted by the conjunction of the soul with Manas. But such a ‘conjunction’ would not be possible, according to Nyaya-Vaisesika thinkers, if Manas were an all-pervasive substance like the soul; for, as Nilakantha points out, ‘conjunction’ between two ubiquitous substances is not admitted in the school (vibhudvaya-samyoganavyupagamat). And if it is not possible to point to any other entity which could serve as the ‘a-samavayi-karana’ of an effect like cognition, it would have to be admitted that an effect (here ‘cognition’) can emerge without an ‘a-samavayi-karana’. But that is impossible. It is to be admitted, therefore, that the conjunction between the soul and Manas cannot be one between two all-pervasive substance; one of the two substance must be a ubiquitous substance, the other substance involved in the conjunction which is ‘a-samavayi-karana’ (viz, Manas) cannot be ubiquitous. In other words, Manas cannot be substance with the largest magnitude.

It is to be noted, here, that the above conclusion is based on the assumption that there cannot possibly be a conjunction between two ubiquitous entities. But why? What would be the harm if one were to admit a conjunction of two ubiquitous substances like the soul and Manas? In reply TSD points out if Manas were to be accepted as a ubiquitous substance, then it would not be possible to account for the phenomenon of dreamless sleep. To explain, according to the Nyaya account, dreamless sleep is a state of unconsciousness. So the emergence of that state can be explained by the absence of something which is necessary

for the emergence of consciousness. Now, according to the Nyaya theorist, one of the necessary condition for the emergence of a state of consciousness is the conjunction between the Soul and Manas. But if that conjunction were to be admitted as obtaining between two

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eternal substances like the Soul and Manas, then that conjunction would be a perpetual one. Again, if such conjunction were perpetual, then there could not be any time when the soul would be devoid of consciousness. This means that the soul would have consciousness even in the state of dreamless sleep. But, according to the Nyaya doctrine, the state of dreamless sleep is a state of total unconsciousness. Therefore, it is concluded that the conjunction between the Soul and Manas cannot be a conjunction between two substances which are equally ubiquitous. It is, therefore, the other substance, viz, Manas, which has got to be admitted as non-ubiquitous. It has been shown before that Manas cannot be a substance with a medium magnitude. It has just been proved that Manas cannot be a substance with the largest magnitude. Two of the three alternative possibilities mentioned before thus get ruled out. The remaining alternative, therefore, viz, that Manas has the smallest magnitude holds the field. In other words, Manas is atomic in its character, which is just what is claimed is TS. Manas is an eternal (nitya) substance. Annambhatta remarks in TSD that it is only on this theory of Manas being a substance with the smallest magnitude that the phenomenon of an unconscious state like dreamless sleep can be satisfactorily explained. The atomic character makes it possible for Manas to have or not to have the specific relation (of conjunction will the soul) which determines the emergence or the lapse of consciousness. When the Manas has the relation, there is the emergence of consciousness; when it does not have it, there is the lapse of consciousness as in dreamless sleep. This relation or its absence is, again, connected with the entry or otherwise of Manas into the ‘puritat-nadi’. When the atomic Manas enters the ‘puritat’, it loses its specific relation to the soul, and the result is the laps of consciousness. When, again, Manas comes out of ‘puritat’, it regains its specific relation to the soul and the result is the emergence of consciousness.*7

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It is to be noted, however, that according to the Nyaya doctrine, the soul is an all-pervasive substance and that before it is in conjunction with everything having a magnitude lesser than the larges. The conjunction of the soul with the atomic Manas cannot thus be anything occasional even when the Manas enters the ‘puritat’. It must be a permanent feature of reality. But if it were something permanent, then its product would also be something perpetual. In other words, there could never be a state of unconsciousness like that of dreamless sleep.

This difficulty can be avoided in two ways. It may be held that though the conjunction of Manas with the Soul is a permanent feature of reality, yet the soul’s conjunction with Manas inside the ‘puritat’ is different from its contact with Manas outside the ‘puritat’. It may then be held that the specific relation of Manas to the Soul, which is postulated as a condition for the emergence of consciousness, exists only when Manas remains outside ‘puritat’. This is one way.

The other way is to hold that though the Soul’s conjunction with Manas is a permanent feature, yet it is not the only general condition for the emergence of consciousness. There is another general condition and that is the conjunction of Manas with ‘tvak’ or the organ for the sensation of touch. In dreamless sleep there is loss of consciousness not because there is no conjunction of Manas with the Soul but because there is no conjunction of Manas with ‘tvak’. It is held on this view that the organ of touch pervades the entire body minus the ‘puritat’. There is no resulting paradox as on the former view. The reason is that the organ of touch does not pervade the entire universe like the soul but that it pervades only the entire body minus a certain portion known as ‘puritat’.

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It is to be remarked that this second theory is the one adopted by Visvanatha, the author of Siddhanta-Muktavali and that the first one is that accepted by Annambhatta, the author of TSD.

Conclusion:

Both the Nyaya Vaisesika systems have arrived at the conclusion that manas is material, atomic, one, and unconscious. It is an instrument of knowledge, an internal sense organ and resides in the body. The

Vaisesikas designate manas as a sense organ definitely and this is tactily accepted by the Naiyayikas.

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Chapter III: The position of self and mind - The two distinct internal substances

Permanent self and it’s Existence According to Nyaya-Vaisesika thesis self is a permanent, immaterial substance to which non-physical internal state like cognition belong. In Goutam’s Nyaya-Sutra it is state that “Desire ,aversion, volition, pleasure pain and cognition are the signs of self”.

A part of Goutam means, as uddyotkara points out, is that with the help of desire and so forth, the self may be distinguished from everything else desire and so on are the unique character of the self and are not possessed by anything else. In other words selves have desire and so on. Such unique characters are accepted by the Nyaya as identifying characters. Desire and so forth are each an identifying character of the self and provide a ground for application of the character of self. Another significance of desire and so forth being sign is that they provide the grounds from which the existence of an immaterial substance may be inferred. Vatsyana explicity says that self is not perceived so the grounds for the existence of the self become a natural concern. Uddyotkara does not say here that the self is imperceptible. He observes that the existence of self is known from authoritative source

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(agama)*8. By offering the sign Goutama has shown that its existence can also be proved through inference. Thus the self is knowable from more than one source. Uddyotkara does not mention perception as a source of knowing the self and since he does not criticized Vatsyayana for holding that the self is imperceptible. There is a debate amongst the Naiyayikas whether self is perceptible or not. But not regarding the existence of self. In short Naiyayikas try to establish that self is a permanent entity. Then they try to establish this permanent entity is a substance (Dravya). Finally they try to prove that this permanent substance is immaterial. The Buddhist has rejected to standard Hindu commitment to a permanent and unitary self and state that the self is an aggregate of internal states. These states are each fleeting and transitory and are in a continual flux.

In this Hindu view when I say I am happy I distinguish myself from my happiness which is something belongs to me but is not the same as me. For I would say that I’m bad, which implies that I am different from my sadness which too is something that belongs to me but is not the same as me. Neither my happiness nor my sadness can be same as me.

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The Buddhist counters that this would be a problem if the self were an entity different from these states and the same entity were identified with two or more incompatible states. But the Buddhist thesis is that there is no such entity over and above the internal state. So the question does not arise since the existence of the self as the self same owner of the internal state is rejected , this Buddhist position is describe as the no-self theory. Some Buddists speak in particular of an aggregate of five Skandhas a seats of sufferings:“1. Rupa or Nature, which comprises the sense and their objects2. Vijnana or Cognition, Which comprises both self- consciousness (alaya vijnana) and consciousness of objects (Pravrtti vijnan).3. Vedana a feeling, which comprises pleasure and pain arising out of the interface of the first two called nature and cognition.4. Samjna or name , which comprises cognition featuring names.5. Samskara or disposition, which comprises attachment, avulsion, pride, high spiritedness, merit and demerit promoted mainly by feeling (vedana)”.*9

All the fine skandhas are in a state of flux with the previous states being causally connected with the succeeding states. As long as the

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causal connection is not interrupted, we have a flowing stream (Santana) if internal states. The following stream is the ground of personal identity. There is no need for the Hindu posit of permanent self to account for personal identity.To refute this theory Vatsyayana says that memory is inexplicable

without a permanent self- Vatsyayana lays down three undisputed facts about remembering something.

1. One cannot remember what has not been seen.2. One cannot remember what has been by some one else.3. One can only remember what one has seen before.

It follows that one who has seen before and one who remembers now should be the same entity. It proves that this same entity is something over and above the internal states. The Nyaya holds that there are material as well as immaterial substances and neither is reducible to the other. There are many kinds of material substance, such as Earth, water and Moon. But there is only

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one kind of substance serves as the substratum of consciousness and is called the Self a (atman). The Vaisesika makes the self an object of yogic perception*10

The self and the Inner sense organ manas Self cannot be identified with any one of the external Sense organ or their aggregate, self also cannot be identified with the inner sense organ (manas) either. The inner sense is not perceived. Like the self it too is inferred. There are two reason for admitting an inner sense. First , consciousness is unifunctional, Goutama claims, in the sense that two or more cognition acts do not take place at the same time. Inspite of having ample opportunities for performing several cognitive acts at a time we do not. Thus one may be sitting on a chair at the same time reading a book, having a clock ticking away and so on. But it is not that, Goutama claims, all these perceptions of touching seeing and having take place at the same time. Rather they take place in very quick succession we do not often notice the succession and, sometimes, as when testing a sour and smelly fruit, several perceptions may seems to take place simultaneously. But in Goutama’s view these also are rapidly succeeding perceptions. One may object that the sensation of touching seems to go with the sensation of tasting and the like, and their shows that such sensations are simultaneous. The Nyaya philosophers

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disagree. It accepts that the organ of touch is involved in other external perceptions as well, so the sensation of touch may seem to accompany other perceptions. But even here, The Nyaya claims there is a temporal gap however small, between different sensation.

At any rate, the important thing is that we do not often notice more than one thing at a time in spite of having the opportunity to do so, that is, in spite of more than one external sense being activated at the same time. So Goutama infers that there is an inner, unperceived sense organ that is unifunctional and that also needs to be activated for any cognitions*11.The Nyaya philosophers admit that in some cases consciousness appears to be multifunctional with several things being attended to at the same time. Some Naiyayikas such as Raghunatha also think that consciousness is multifunctional and that the inner sense acts through multiple channels rather than a single channel. But many of them (Naiyayikas) side with Goutama and hold that consciousness is always unifunctional but moves at a blazing speed between successive states with infinitesimally small temporal gaps that escape our closet notice. This is analogous to the situation when many pages of a book appear to be pierced at the same time by a needle although the later can only go through one page at a time.

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The inner sense is also required to account for detachment or distraction. Thus one may be oblivious of pair in the foot because of being preoccupied with something else. The other main reason for admitting the inner sense is that we have internal perception of our cognitions and so on. Since these are internal perceptions without involvement of the external sense and since perception requires an instrument, the inner sense is inferred as the instrument of internal perception*12. It may be noted that each of the external sense organs has its proper object, for example the nose senses smell and so on. In the same way the inner sense too has its proper objects, namely, the internal states. The reasoning may be more formally set us as:

All perceptions require an instrument, for example, seeing colour and so on.The direct awareness of cognition is a perception.

Therefore, it requires an instrument, this instrument is either one of the external sense or an additional inner sense. But it is not one of the external senses (for internal perceptions may take independently of the external senses). Therefore, it is an additional inner sense the doctrine of an inner sense that is different from the self is not influential in western philosophy.

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To Nyaya the self is real substance having for its qualities desire. aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition. The Naiyayika proves the existence of self and the inner sense by means of Inference . For the Nyaya the self is a permanent immaterial substance to which non-physical internal states like cognition belong. Buddhist and Carvaka oppose to it .There is a connection between Indian western debate over the mind body problem and we can show that Nyaya position is well developed well articulated and defensible. The materialistic view that consciousness is property of the body is easily refuted. If it were a property of the body, it would exist in the various parts of the body and its material constituents which is not possible.

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SUMMARY

Mind is a very necessary factor in every activity in our life. In Indian philosophy mind is a cognitive faculty, an internal organ capable of any such activity as feeling and so on.

Philosophers, have distinguished between mind and matter as totally independent entities. Idealism holds that the world is a product of mind, dependent on experience. Bauddha Yogachanbad suggest there exists only mental world.

Materialistic philosophy equates Mind with body. They are not ready to accept a separate entity of Mind as we can not perceive it with our five external sense organ. Upanisads regarded as the fountain-head of all Indian philosophy accept mind or manas is a subtle matter and so it is almost common to all the system of Indian philosophy. In Indian Philosophy Mind is different from self. Pravakar Mimamsa states, the existence of mind by pointing out that the qualities of self such as buddhi, pleasure, pain etc. are the activity of mind. Bhatta Mimamsa, holds mind is the instrumental cause of perception of pleasure and pain.

According to Vedanta the mind is called ‘antakaran’ and it is material in nature. The Advaita Vedanta view is that, mind is antakaran is like everything a product of maya. The Advaita Vedanta agrees with modern psychologists that mind is just totality of conscious states and process.

According to Bauddha mind is a stream of consciousness not a subtle substance.

Yoga system states the psychological culmination of the Sainkhya metaphysics.

Sainkhya thinkers holds mind is dual in nature. It is eleventh Indriyas, the five gyanendriya and five karmendriya; mind is an Indriya like others but peculiarity

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is that it is an organ of cognition for it perceives the sense of pleasure, pain etc. To the Samkhya-Yoga mind is a product of unconscious prakriti, the ultimate material cause in its process of evolution.

Manas is a substance, it is atomic and part less in nature and can come into contact with one sense only at one time. Each self has a mind. Mind the organ through which the self comes into contact with the object. The existence of Mind is inferred from the fact that the self must perceive internal states cognition, desire etc. through an internal sense, just as it perceives of external objects, the mind is selective and active. We do not perceive color, touch, taste, smell and sound simultaneously, even though all our external senses maybe in contact with their related objects. Perception requires attention and attention is active turning of the mind towards the object of perception. Hence in perception the self must fix the Manas on the object of perception with which the external sense is already in contact. Mind, self are two different substances we cannot perceived these two substances. These are to be inferred.

According Nyaya-Vaisesika theory the self is a permanent entity and they try to be establish it. Then they try to establish this permanent entity is a substance. Finally they try to prove that this permanent substance is immaterial. Buddhist has rejected to a permanent unitary self and state that self is a aggregate of internal states.

Self cannot be identified with any one of the external sense organ or their aggregate, self also cannot be identified with inner sense organ Manas.

All the psychical and epistemological function of human being are caused by Mind. Obviously Mind is the Supreme controlling power of our every action.

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Conclusion

As a result of survey Nyaya-vaisesika philosophy certain features of emerge very clearly from theory of mind, Nyaya-vaisesika is not disrespectful towards matter. It accepts the reality of matter and gives pride of place when it is due. In this way it differs from such extreme positions as those of yogachara idealism or Adavaita monism as Berkleyan immaterialism. It suggests that matter does not ultimate exist. To a Yogachara idealist only particular conscious states are real and physical states unreal. But to the Nyaya both conscious and physical states are real, different form each other, and object of veridical awareness to an Advaita monist, matter has more than apparent ( Pratibhasika) reality, for it is granted empirical (Vyavaharika) reality. But it is still held to lack ultimate ( Paramarthika) reality, which is granted only to consciousness . This the Nyaya rejects and holds that both matter & consciousness are ultimately real. To a Berkeleyan immaterialist sensible things such as color or size are in the mind, the admission of a material substance is unnecessary. The Nyaya is wholly opposed to such a view. Color, size and so on, are not in the mind, according to the Nyaya, but belong to material substances, the admission of which is fully justified.

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Nyaya view also differs from Samkhya dualism . The samkhaya traces all our internal states back to the same source from which all material states evolve and holds that even internal states are devoid of consciousness .That is, in the Samkhya view even the internal state of cognition only appears to be conscious but is not really conscious. The Samkhya does recognize consciousness as an irreducibly different ontological principle but removes it as far as possible from our worldly lives. For consciousness or purusa is un changing , totally aloof, a mere witness and never an object of any awareness or an agent of any action. On the other hand Nyaya-Vaisesika , consciousness is an integral part of our everyday lives , our internal states, (except for merit, demerit and disposition ) are conscious and causally interact with our bodily states, which are unconscious. The interaction of bodily states and internal states is not a mystery as it is in Cartesian dualism, for the Nyaya-Vaisesika subscribe to a Hume-like view bat not exactly the Humean view that a casual condition is an invariable and contiguous antecedent of the effect. From this understanding of causation, there is no difficulty in accepting that a physical state may be the cause of an internal state and vice verse in the same that either may be the invariable and contiguous antecedent of the other. Further, both internal state and bodily states belong to two different substances each of which has extension (parimana) and both of which are in contact (samyogo) with each other. Just as the states of one physical substance can

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casually interact with those of another physical substance with which it is in contact, so also can the state of the body casually interact with the internal states belonging to the self with, which the body is in contact and vice versa.

The immaterial self is not solid (as bricks ar stone are). Western thinkers differentiate mind and body or one hand and equate mind with self on the other hand.* 13 If mind is pure body then the problem of will cannot be solved. It is pure self the problem of physical perception remains unsolved .These two mind and body as Ryle says do not lend themselves to disjunctive treatment. Indian Philosopher take a peculiar stand in the exposition of the nature of mind. It is different from the body, which is an outer entity. It is something internal but different from self and the brain. It is unconscious and just an instrument (karana) not only of perception external and internal but also of all other cognitions . The interaction of bodily states and internal states is not a mystery as it is in a Cartesian dualism. The great modern European Philosopher Descartes also a great mathematician and scientist developed a

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sophisticated dualism that accommodates the interest of religion and morality. Nyaya dualism too is attractive to religion as well as morality.

However, unlike Descartes, the Nyaya does not goes its dualism on such claims as that I think’ is in dubitable for many Nyaya philosopher our internal perception and self awareness though private, are still fallible. The nature of mind and its constituents have been agitating the mind of people for a long time. The literature on the subject in the western philosophy gives diverse point of view each conflicting with other. Often the point of difference centre’s round the relation between mind and body. So, theories which

are completely different from each other and which contradict each other have also been formulated. Either the mind is made subservient to matter or vice versa, in every case, As a result many problems of perception and will are still being debated. The basic difficulty arises because of the fact that all thinkers differentiate mind from body on the one hand and equate mind with the self on the other hand. Indian philosophers, from very beginning, have avoided this pit full by recognizing mind or manas as something distinct from self or the Atman, though partaking of its nature as intelligence through association with it. Since it is subtle in nature, it is not gross matter. 41

It is the mind which gives the continuity and meaning of life for it we can hold to get her the past, present and future. We can conclude is saying that all the psychical and epistemological functions of human being are caused by mind obviously mind is the supreme controlling power of our every action.

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Social Contribution

This project is related to Indian Concept of Mind. I have tried to establish that all the psychical and epistemological function of human being are caused by mind. Obviously Mind is the supreme controlling power of our every action. The importance of Mind i.e, psychology is increasing in present days. Stress & strain depression is a part of our life in modern complicated age. Mind takes a leading role in management of Stress, stain, depression and different mental disorder through counselling and other processes. The place of mind in the philosophical system of India is briefly discussed. The philosophies such as Vedas, Upanishads, six systems of philosophies (saddarshan) that Mind is of subtle Physical nature and that self is postulated as higher than mind in the hierarchy is being pointed out. Mind can be man’s own friend to elevate him or his foe debasing him. Modern neuroscience and the ancient materialistic school do not subscribe to the existence of self, mind an integrated approach extending. Beyond the Mind psychiatric case is suggested. Scientific and technological advances do not necessarily preclude a transcendent (spiritual) dimension to the total care.

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Every educational Institute needs a counselling cell. They act to balance the mental disorder. Beside this, Mind plays a great role in developing self knowledge and knowing others mind also plays a role in treatment of life threatening diseases. Finally, to achieve Mental peace, liberation mind has an Important role.

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References

1) Eneyclo pedia of India Philosophy-Karl H. Potter Page 93,Vol-(II)

2) Tarka Samgraha Dipika by Gopinath Bhattachaya page 105

3) TSD ed by Gopinath Battachaya4) N.S Nyaya Sutra 1/1/165) Nyaya Sutra Bhasya 3/2/36) TSD edited by gopinath Bhattacharyaya page 1087) TSD edited by gopinath Bhattacharyaya page 1098) Clarical India Philosophy Kishor kumar chkraborty page 589) Nyaya Kandali Sreedhas Acharjya page-19610) N.S 1/1/1911) N.S.B 3/1/1612) The concept of mind- Gilbut Hat--------------Ryle page-62

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