Nepal Company War or Anglo-Nepal war

Situation: Geo Strategic- Political

Lord Minto, the Governor General (1807-1872) had maintained a low profile in India, especially against the Gorkhas. His consideration had been due primarily to the fear of Napoleonic invasion of India in collusion with or without Russia. Later Franco-Russian threat had made the British do their worthless forays into Afghanistan and place forces in North West Frontier Provinces- a folly they realized too late to rectify. A bigger folly was, of course, their imagining a Franco-Nepalese alliance in India.

In 1813, the British thus far had secured six leading regions in India and remained contended with what Minto had taken over. These included: Mysore, Travancore, Baroda, Poona, Hyderabad and Oudh. But Gwalior, Indore, Nagpur, resented the British efforts and began to prepare to avenge their recent defeats. The weak and disunited Rajputs of Rajputana remained highly vulnerable. The Rajputs' vulnerabilities emanated from their dynastic ego and jealousy on whose account they had been nabbed one after another, by the Moghuls. The pindaris lid by Chitu and Amir Khan too hated the expanding power of the British. In Punjab, Ranjit Singh was growing powerful, though the British had attempted to quarantine him through the Amiratsar Treaty of 1809.

Lord Moira Who took over as Governor General and Commander-In-Chief Indian Army in 1813 was burning with the ambition of leaving an empire for the British and a name for himself. Fresh from the American War, he evolved a strategy to bite more pieces of land and humble the opposition into submission by either alliance or attrition. He wanted his name to be added to those British who grabbed the maxium territory in India. If he could not help retain it in America, there was a chance in India. it was thus to be his life's opportunity.

Gorkhas, besides the Marathas and the Sikhs were regarded as the third dangerous power the British had to contend with or defeat.

The growing Distrust

By late 1790s, the British received a surprisingly favourable situation: they had firm control over the Indo-Gangetic Valley of the Oudh Raj, though Marathas still had their sway over Delhi; the internal dissension in the Nepal Durbar was creating situation for its King to abdicate in favour of his infant son and proceed to Benaras. Here he would seek virtual security of the British and could be exploited. The British dreams for expanding trade with the Tartary and China over the Himanalyan regions, brightened up.1 Also, the house of Oudh was disintegrating and the British had exploited it as a treasure house or an alternative 'Bank of England' to meet their adhoc financial requirements.

For the British, at this stage, trade, in fact, the Sine-quo-non. The trade of East India Company to Tibet and China involved, in the west, a passage throught the Gorkha occupied Kumaon, Garhwal, the Punjab Hill States, and in the east through Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. These areas were seen as essential trade-corridors.2 In his efforts for trade, Warren Hastings had to infiltrate Bogle to Tibet in 1774 to explore the best possibility. The trading centres in Tibet were at Yatung, Lhasa, Shigatse, Gartok and Leh, in Ladakh, The traders of the Company knew fo " The great commerce which naturally ought to exist and which formerly did subsist between the vast Cis and Trans-Himalayan Regions."3 Territorial possessions, willy-nilly, was becoming essential by the British, for which Moira saw an overall favorable situation under development.

A ray of hove really signaled from within Nepal and it was no less than, as we said earlier, a frustrated King Rana Bahadur Shah in abdication, who was prepared to succumb to means and machinations that could regain his throne at Kathmandu, once again. And he did what the Afghan Kings ofter did. He signed a parallel treaty called " TREATY WITH RAJA OF NEPAL- 1801 1 Tartary denoted Northern Himalayan regions of Ladakh, and Tibet. British then had poor perception of geography. They mixed up Bhutan with Tibet and even the trade routes.2PRNW PP 65; Pemble PP86-873 Selection From Records of Government of Bengal XVII pp 12.

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BETWEEN MAHARAJA AND THE MOST NOBLE GOVERNOR GENERAL MARQUIS WELLESIEY".4 Such fraudulent a document it was that it raised shock waves in the Durbar. Fearing not only the demise of the Raja, the Durbar, under duress agreed to sign a similar treaty something like the treaty of 1792-93 which Kirkpatrick promoted.

Trade with Tibet and China was thought to be best provided through the Gorkha territories. although it later proved without adequate foundation. The Durbar saw the British efforts leading nothing but to colonization. With the characteristic British penchant for intrigues, subversion and embroidering threats, such as threat from China, the Franco-Russian threat, these, were hoped to provide better modus vivendi for trade. But the Nepalese trusted neither the British intentions nor encouraged their overtures.

Then followed Knox's5 much debated and much hated mission to Nepal as agent of the Governor General at Kathmandu. Knox's was, undoubtedly an undesirable mission. And little wonder that he was made to vacate the office within one year. The fundamental cause of war that followed had, in fact, its roots in the failed Knox mission. In 1767 a similar, though more hostile, mission of going to the aid Malla Raja by Kinloch, had already sowed sufficient seed of hatred and distrust for the Firingis amongst the Gorkhas. Vansittart recorded the Nepalese feelings that prevailed then: "Regarding throwing open the country to the Europeans, the Gorkhas have a saying with the merchants come the musket and with the Bible comes the Bayonet. They have always shown greatest objection to admitting any European into Nepal and they seem to consider that, were they to relax this rule, their independence, of which they are extremely proud, would shortly be lost".6

The Gorkha repugnance to call Europeans to Nepal was both from fear of their swamping the Nepalese trade and resorting to anti-national-tricks. It was, however only in 1800s that situation deteriorated. Kirkpatrick had noted. " Notwithstanding the narrow spirit which directs the commercial concern of this people the government affords on the whole, considerable protection to

4 Document on Treaties, Engagements & Sannads, Number XXIV. Rana Bahadur hob nobbed with the British to have himself 'reinstated to the throne'.5 Hasrat PP 208-209.6 Hand Book for Indian Army:Gurkha (1915) PP 42.

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foreign merchants." 7 He also remarked that the standard gold coin was 2 percent inferior to the Calcutta Mohr. The British began looking for shawl wool from Ladakh nad its being knitted by the Kashmiri weavers. Bogle and Moorcroft, as we saw, were sent for acousting the market and bringing the samples. The Sikhs of Ranjit Singh also were carrying out similar trade at the time.

Such fears-which prevailed-then saw Capuchin (Italian) missionaries being evicted out of Nepal as from Tibet. The repugnance that spread among the Nepalese for the Europeans resulted in the British image turning as tyrants and the biggest violators of human rights. For the Nepalese' three Ks, Kinloch Kirkpatrick and Knox, became the symbols of the British threat of Nepal.8 And events that followed, created ruptures irreparably.

The Economic Causes

The economic cause constituted the major cause of conflict with Nepal. The Treaty of Commerce was akin to the present from of GATT- General Agreement of Tariffs and Trades. The British made constant efforts to persuade the Nepalese government to allow them their trade through Nepal and through the Indian territories in their occupation. Form Kirkpatrick, the y moved to Maulvi Abdul Qader (1795) and later Knox (1801), but the Nepalese Durbar refused to budge an inch.

Added to the list of causes came the land-grab avarice, which brought the Gorkhas into India and which became the ambition of the British, as they saw a golden land laid before them. David Ochterlony, then an agent at Ludhiana grudgingly noted in 1811 his views on the Gorkha territorial control:" They are now in undisputed possession of the whole country from the Jamuna to Sultaj, extending to the north to the dependencies of the Empire of China with the exception of Kinnaur which the Raja of BAsahar had been allowed to retain."9 On 24 August 1814, he for example, noted of Dehra Dun as a " 7 Kirkpatrick PP 204; Pol Con Sep 21,1795, No 24.8 On threee 'ks": Moira's secret letter of 11 May 1815 addressed to Board to Directors said: " ..one of the objects of dispute which has given rise to war owes its remote origin to the consequences of Kinloch expedition, and the ulterior objectives of Kirkpatrick and Knox's missions were defeated by enemity and jealousy of party .. and its obstinacy presents only obstacles to pacification." See letter reproduced in Hasrat PP 149.9 Ludhina Agency Records Vol II PP 395; PRNW PP 65. Pemble PP 85. Problem with China assumed frictitious shape when Chinese bagan to see British expansion in India as threat to Tibet. The Nepalese troops in European

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potentially thriving entrepot for Trabs-Himalayan trade". and contemplated annexing Garhwal not so much with the view to revenue but for security of commercial communications with the country where the shawl wool is produced. Soon they got to know that Kumaon provided batter facility for trade with Tibet- China. Therefore, the annexation of these two areas became part of their strategic objectives. Out of such necessity for trade and its security, the British historians also saw the need for "preserving the moral nad physical energies of the parent country (through) the bales and mountains of the Indian Alps."10

While trade, indeed, was the major objective of the company, out of its, grew a concept of 'political safety', which ipso-facto meant a strategy of dissuasion and larger areas of occupation.

That, it was a flawed strategy is explained by PJ Marshal:11 "Political safety meant military preparedness. The military expenditure for 1761-62 to 1770-71 was 44 percent of the total spending of 22 million pounds. War and diplomacy rater than trade and improvement…most of the soldiers-would-be politicians and Governor Generals rarely understood. The political safety of Bengal was their first priority and they interpreted safety as requiring the subjugation of Mysore, the Marahas the Pindaris, Nepal and the Burmese".

This flawed perception, thus became the second major cause for the war.

The China Factor

The China factor also built up. The Nepleese had placated it as part of their psychological canard that a treaty alliance existed with China after the 1792 war. So effective was the Nepalese demonstration that the British also began to regard Nepal as vassal of China and that, an attack on Nepal would provoke China, Which it could ill-afford. Walter Hamilton records that in 1802 when Gott was deputed by Wellesly to examine the forest of Kumaon, the Gorkha commander expressed great apprehension as his arrival would be seen a provocation. He told him that the Emperor of China had threatened to uniform were also seen by the Chinese as the British troops in Nepal.10 History of Birtish India, VOL VIII by Mill PP 59-60.11 In the New Cambridge History of India-Vol 2 : Bengal The British Bridgehed Eastern India (1740-1828) Orient Longman 1987.

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depose the Raja of Nepal if he permitted the Europeans to explore his country. Whether deliberately planted or not, the British seemed to bite at the bait.12

This impression lingered on. But over a period of time as situation developed and intelligence improved, the British began to take limited risks in dealing with the Nepalese – Chinese friendship or alliance. Its best example is seen ( and we perforce jump the gun) in the directive that was given to General Marley, tasked to advance to Kathmandu in 1814-15. He was directed to inform the Chinese, if confronted, that "the British objective of operations was only punitive and not acquisitive."13 It is historically surmised that though the Knox mission was the great political affrontary of the time and that Kathmandu Durbar was in tatters, the British impulse to invade Nepal earlier, was prevented, to a large extent, by this imagined Nepalese-Chinese alliance.

The Territorial Disputes

The territorial disputes also built up to augment the hostility, anguish and vendetta:

Kheri, Sheoraj, Butwal. 22 villages near Rautehat- Jaunpur. Bhim Nagar in Morung. Villages near Pinjore.14

In these cases neither the Gorkhas nor the British could put up convincing cases of defence or legitimacy, and enquiries made by Young, Ochterlony and Bradshaw made no headway. The Gorkhas stuck obdurately to Sheoraj and Butwal, which though part of Palpa-Tansen, were contested by the British to be part of Oudh under their protection. So erroneous had been the impression that late historians like J Talboy Wheeler called it, " gradual absorption of the British territories by the Gorkhas." In consonance with this

12 Water Hamilton PP 103. Perhaps there is partial truth in it as form 1792 the Nepalese were obliged by the treaty to send 'quinquennial embassy' or tribute to China. But Nepal was never the vassal of China nor under its suzerainty.13 Pol Con 14 Sep 1816 No. 43; Pemble PP 7914 Ludhiana Records PP 197. The final excuse built up when 18 Policemen were killed in a Gorkha raid in a place below Palpa on May 18, 1814 . It provided the ultimate excuse of war to Moira, who was regarded as 'anxious to display his military talents'.

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thinking even political agents like William Fraser observed: "This power emboldened by a long course of success nad conquest had commenced a deliberate course of insult towards its (British) lower ministers which at length became absolutely necessary to Nepal."15

A case that then developed was one of the two robbers having plundered a house, use morally viable adjectives in their own defence and justification. The British usage of the Gorkha claims as "Inadmissible", and their ambitions as "insatiable thirst or ambition and limited power" , fitted into this theme. And the Gorkhas calling for an alliance with the Indiana states to throw the Firingis out, was no less.16

Moira, in his report to the Directors had described it as " Gorkha passion for war" and added that they " had an overwhelming opinion of themselves, so inaccurate were their notions of our resource."17 However, BD sanwal felt that " reasonable points in favour of the Nepalse government were kept aside and unnecessary emphasis was laid on the genuineness."18 Panderal Mooon was convinced that "the British claims were not in all cases indisputable." They, were, is fact, untenable.19

The root cause- even if an auxiliary root-of war between the Company and Nepal as Forbes said was due to the desire of the Barons of Nepal to extend their sway over the Zamindars; and, irrespective of what the British pipers might tell of the glory in the filed, it was the shareholder in London and Courts of Kathmandu that called the tune.20 The both set of the people were hell-bent to exercise their own so called rights.

The White Man's Superiority: A Psyche of 'Super-race'

There is an innate psychological urge among men and women- and also in races- to dominate the others. It has taken forms of colour, caste, creed religion, ethnicity and so on. The Jewish diaspora, the Aryan migration, the Europisation of the two Americas and Australia are some of the examples. In 15 Wheeler PP 472 and Fraser pp 3.16 Ludhiana Records PP 394-395.17 Hasrat reproduced at PP 257,18 BD Sanwal pp 133-141.19 Moon, Penderal PP 378 note-8.20 Forbes PP 346-47.

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the 19th Century, Europe gave this expression through trade and colonization by white races, then regarded as superior to the natives. Its effect, though not marked, nor admitted, needs to be seen in the context of Anglo- Gorkha War. Major General Rollo Gillespie saw the Gorkha challenge to the British supremacy as "Opinion is everything in such a country as India: and whenever the natives shall begin to lose their reverence for the English arms, our superiority in other respects will quickly sink into contempt. Forebeareance under repeated insults committed by those lawless marauders who acknowledge no law ! But their convenience unavoidably would hanve brought our national character into disrepute among the various nations to the east." It was this assumption of psychology of colonization that served the British rule. Most of the m tried to establish that this was not to be true. And a new twist as even the annexation of India by the British in the words of JH Batten (in 1815 official Report on the Province of Kemaon) opined that ".. finally peace and plenty would smile on the very plains invited to the land neither by Mohemmedans nor Hindus but by the Christians of a Western Atlantic Islands."

From this rose another need- the character and leadership in the Indians to defend themselves which the British found lacking. Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras said of it in1824: " It we pursue steadily in proper measures we shall in time so far improve he character of Indian subjects to enable them to protect themselves. "This very feeling continued as Filed Marshal Roberts C-in-C 1885-93 reflected: "Native officers and Eastern races however brave and accustomed to war do not possess qualities that make good leaders of men." Such views also led to the hatred for the Eurasians or the Anglo-Indians.

One thing about history is that while its larger cycles might be repeating themselves but they constantly discard and disprove hurriedly formed human theories. By 1945, it became clear that bravery was not the pre-serve of Whiteman lesser still of the self-styled martial people. The Gorkhas dicidedly broke this myth in the Anglo-Gorkha war. The fallibility of the British soldiers and arms was so distinctly prominent that in the wrds of "Edward Bishop as "recently as 1929 military historians avoiding the issue commented

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that the questions of Moira's columns redounded so little to our credit."21 But such complexion-oriented complexes then had deeper roots.

Envy also became the cause of clash with the Gorkhas. They were called " unpyincipled horde" and those who falsely " struck awe among various states." childish, it might appear, but it was true. The final cause was built by the May 18, 1814 incident in which a post below palpa was overrun by the Gorkhas. It hadeen worked out as the ultimate overt excuse by the British. It provided what Edward Thornton remarked as providing "anxious display of the Governor General's military talents."22 Then no amount of pleadings for sanity could prevent the British from entering into war. The Gorkhas had even offered to hand over the disputed villages to the British, if that was what could end the dispute and the war.

Failure of Diplomacy

Failure of diplomacy emerges as another cause. The main characters were, a brusque and ambitionus- Moira on the one hand and an inexperienced, though intelligent and patriotic Bhim Sen Thapa, as Prime Minister of Nepal, on the other. Moira had been prejudiced and jaundiced by people like Paris Bradshaw who saw the world being divided between the British virtue and others' vices. Then there was Ochterlony who suggested " to repel the present and prevent future aggression it will always be necessary to convince Amar Singh that his hills are not to us inaccessible and his forts impregnable."23

Despite entreaties from Bam Shah, Amar Singh and others, Bhim Sen Thapa also obdurately stuck to his stance, which though not very conciliatory, was dignified. The Gorkhas did every thing to prevent the war form breaking out which even Penderal Moon observed: " They had no desire for war themselves but were unwilling to be intimidated; and remembering how the British had been repulsed at Bharatpur, hoped to put up successful resistance in the mountain-fastnes."24 But Moira still chose to call it as the Gorkha passion for war. And to add to it, Ochterloney beefed up Moira's obsession by

21 Memoirs of Gillespie; Psychology of Colonization by Mannoni and Calibar; Theory of Social Change by Honewood.22 The Story of Gurkha, Bishop, PP 11.23 See Edward Thorntons. The History of the British Empire In India Vol IV, PP 336.24 Stiller The Rise of The House of Gorkha pp 332; and Ochterlony's letter of 13 July 1813,

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writing back to him: "The expulsion of the Gorkha power from the country between the Sutlaj and Jumna is a necessary measure against the government of Nepal." Among others who advised Moira-but were over – ruled against the war was H St J Tucker, Wellesley's old financial adviser who deplored the risk by saying: "What an opportunity for the Marathas, while we are knocking our heads against those mountain."25

Self over-Estimation

Over estimation of personal capabilities both by the Gorkhas and the British served as a good cause for the war. The Gorkhas, saw the British failures at Bharatpur (1805), the deceit adopted by the British to defeat and kill Tipu Sultan (1799), as examples of their moral bankruptcy, as against their own strength. This strength also emerged from the undue potential being given to the mountains that geographically defended Nepal from India. Bhim Sen Thapa declared: "The Chinese once made war to seek peace. How will the English be able to penetrate into our hills ? We shall on our exertions be able to oppose … our hills and fastness are work of God and are impregnable" 26

To that Moira added that the Gorkhas had inaccurate notions of his resources. It became a case of intimidation and muscle flexing.

Cause Summed Up

The basic cause for war was thus a greed to grab territory and power both by the Company and the rising Gorkha power. The Company needed it for trade and prosperity and the Gorkhas for power and sustenance. Both had found the Indian states weak and subservient. Therefore, there could not be any better situation for both of them of claim and counter-claim their so called rights to fight.

What added to the British belief that the Gorkhas were 'conquerable'? is the bigger question of the war. For, unless the vulnerability of na enemy is known, a state of deterrence is forced to maintain. It is only after own superiority is well established that a recourse to war is adopted. The capability of an adversary is estimated on what Duke of Wellington called: 25 Moon PP 378.26 Ibid PP 378.

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'One's ability to see the other side of the hill.27 The British intelligence, even by standard of those times, was superb. They had also hoped that their old stratagem of subversion would succeed if their military prowess failed. The instrument of propaganda too was expected to yield results.

Subversion tactics played a considerable part in this war both at preliminary stage and during the war. The British had made it a fine art of conquering not only the Gorkhas but all of India. In that they always targets. They repeatedly offered the temptations of Jagir to Amar Singh and pensions to others. To Bam Shah, their offers ranged from Governorship of Province of Doti to all other temptations. Though there were signals, albeit, wrong to and from Bam Shah, it was absolutely certain that he never bargained his loyalty to the British offers.28 In the list of subversions, every British official made deliberate attempt to either win over the Gorkhas or black-mail them. Part of this technique did succeed when fighting broke out.

The British ability to create cleft among the already divided Indian states and the non-existent Asian solidarity was another aspect. They hoped they will be able to effectively employ them in achieving their strategic aims. Through a 'Proclamation' they had offered adequate temptations to the rulers to restore their states to them . Similar gestures were made to some of the Gorkhas commanders who, in their view, were 'malcontent and dissatisfied' with Kathmandu. All this had also been fed to them though their adventurous lots such as Moorcroft and others.29

27 Gorkha. A History of Gurkhas, Tuker PP 78. Also see Pol Cons April 22, 1814, No. 43. Para 10; Prinsep 465-66.28 Generals & Strategists by the author. PP 16.29 PRNW PP 73, 142, 144-45, 207, 344, 711-712.

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Organisations and Tactics that Made Fighting Possible

The Gorkhas

The Regmi Papers place the strength of the Gorkha Army as 18,000 in AD 1800 which had mobilisational capability of 40,000. He lists out four battalions-Kalidaksh, suboorj (?), Sriath and Gorkh-and 36 companies, which were on the orbat of the army at Kathmandu. It is at variance with other records which show:

The strength of the force that took part in invasion of Kumaon-Garhwal in 1790-91 was companies.30

The British intelligence estimated the Gorkhas having 31 companies in 1805 with a strength of 8,040 which progressively increased to 10,000 in 1815 and 12,000 in 1819. They also accepted a mobilisational capability of Nepal at 57,000. This, obviously was the result of the Pajani system. Hamilton, more accurately, estimated the Gorkha strength in 1802 as 65 companies.

The Gorkha sources themselves have been confusing and mixed up as no credible records seem to have been maintained. Assuming Hamilton's information near accurate, it becomes clear that in 1814 the Gorkhas were upward of 65 companies which increased during the war to almost 120 companies . The assessment of the strength of the strength of the Gorkhas for the Anglo- Gorkha War was estimated at 12,000 lightly armed men whose deployment was appreciated as : West of Jamuna – 4,000; between Jamuna and Kali 2,000; East of Kali-6,000. Each of the Gurkha battalion was 600 strong with flint-locked rifles and their firing standards were good; they had 300 artillery pieces of 3-4 pounders mostly carried menslung .

While the tactical unit remained a company, the four battalions we mentioned were, in fact, ceremonial organizations, which were raised by General Amar Singh Thapa, the father of Bhim Sen Thapa, at Tansen Palpa and Kathmandu. 30 See Lieutenant Colonel Spaigt's Article Gorkha Expansion; M Scots report of 27 Dec 1814. The original Gorkha Battalions were Hanumandal. Singh Nath and Sri Nath. Also wee Sainik Itihas.

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These were experimental battalions, which Thapa raised to counter the growing British mance. He would later claim them to have achieved standards better than the British's .

The overall command and control system of the Gorkhas was based on their own and traditional system of commanders, which was partly monarchial and partly open to aristocracies and commoners. A credible effort to modernize their army. A Chautaria comprising the blood brothers of the Prince Regent or the King represented the monarchy. A subba and Kazi, for example, were both a judge, a Police officer and revenue collector, besides being a military commander. A Bhandar found a part of the twelve to fifteen-men-council. The team could be assigned military powers, if required. While a company was normally commanded by a Subedar, it was not uncommon to find a Captain to command either one unit or a number of units placed in a fort. Both Captain and Subedar represented the military leaders from the commoners.

A company had a norma strength of 160 with four Jamadars, one Major, equivalent to Havilder/Sergeant Major Adjutant, Kotiya (Quarter-Master) and the ranks and file. It also had a small band with local musical instruments. The artesens like blacksmith were also included. A company could then look like what is shown below.

Rank Number Fields Total Fields Khuwa (Salary)

Subedar 1 11 11 Rs 400Jemadars 4 6 24 220Major 1 4 4 25Adjutant 1 4 4 25Kotiya (QM) 1 4 4 25Rank & File 103Band 9Non Combatants

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EntolledNotes

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1. The Indian Currency and Nepalese currency were at variance even Then 400 Indian Rupees were equivalent to 700 Nepalese Rupees.

2. A Subedar was allotted 15 fields with yield of 100 muris (20 mounds). A Jemadar was allotted 7 fields.

3. A company had 3-4 Platoons, which could fight independently.

The family tree was :Company Headquarters

Fighting Platoons (3) Band Platoon (1)

Except the four battalions which were organized and dressed on the European lines, the other troops were dressed more informally than what are more authentically shown in the India Revealed: The Arts and Adventures of James and William Fraser 1801-35. They carried a flag of yellow cloth with a Hanuman in black, embroidered on it. 31

Bhim Sen Thapa was a far seeing man who saw the threat, to the areas of occupation and Nepal developing from the British. He visualized a deliberate militarization of Nepal and the occupied territories as the only solution to effectively contain their influence. The financial constraints, no doubt, could not improve or match their capability with the British; and they, therefore, remained what Hearsey wrote to Moira in 1813: "Their musketeers are infamous and their gun powder the same … flints are bad; they have little or no clothing and are very ill paid." This is further substantiated by Moira's report of June 1815 after the first Campaign .. "The Gorkha force was most part armed, clothed and disciplined in the imitation of our Sepoys". This was obviously tutored and manipulated and highly incorrect. However, his praise of the Gorkhas was true. The soldiers were known to be courageous, active, robust, obedient and patient under great privations as well as intelligent and quick of apprehensions. IN an earlier report he assessed the Gorkhas

31 William Fraser, Though a political agent, was an adventurer who helped raise an Irregular battalion under Martindell which provided very useful manpower for the eventual raising of the Gorkhas. Fraser's opinion of Gorkhas is worthwhile to quote: The Goorkhalis are a famous superior race in size and discipline and determination. They are said to run a steep acclivity …..

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differently, as he wrote : "Although weak in military skill, their men are towers of strength. Their officers spirited."32

The great Achilles heel of the Gorkhas was their logistics and aritillery. we have devoted adequate to them else where. The main characteristics of the Gorkha organizations lay in their being lightly armed, unencumbered by heavey weapons or equipment. A portion of their strength carried flintlocked muskets which provided lesser and often inaccurate fire. But their riflemen were known to be veryfine marksmen, who influenced the battle at critical moments by bringing down the key British appointments including their assaulting Generals. Their artillery was as great a hindrance as their logistics. Equipped with small calibred guns from 1.5 inch to 4 inchs, they could at best be used as antipersonal weapos.Their ability to batter a fort or emplacement was minimal. And it was this deficiency inter-alia that caused failures at Langurgarhi and Kot Kangra. What remarkable actually were the Gorkha ability to sense the direction of attack, produce integrated fire at the attacker with deliberate and coordinated fire control.It is this fire control and the critical lethality of their weapons (muskets,bow and arrows, use of missiles, panjis of browned bamboos and use of ground ), which made them formidable defenders. Combined with these were the sudden spoiling attacks with khukris, which bloodied the British and often routed their assaulting columns.

To Gorkhas, women were both wives and mothers as also fighters. some of them moved about dressed as men. The local women also joined them in fighting. besides nursing the wounded and the dying, they built walls, collected stones to be thrown as missiles. perhaps the first example of women joining the men in fighting a modern enemy is found in this war. speaking of the women's role at the battle of Kalunga,Kennedy, vansitart and fraser wrote of the Gokha women's valour; "During the assaults on the fort women were seen hurling stones and undauntly exposing themselves; and several of their dead bodies and 4 wounded were subsequently found amidst ruins of the fort".

32 See PRNW pp 258, The author of The History of the Bengal Artillery notes at PP2 the Gorkhali words of commands in French and their dress, being British. It showed the Gorkha keenness to imbibe the changes.

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Tactics are influenced primarily by the terrain one operates and fights in, the type of the enemy, and his techniques of fighting. The Gorkhas developed both defensive and offensive tactics. IN defence they followed principally the system of covering the rotes of movement of an enemy. They built forts; stockades provided depth to forts by throwing out a part of their strength in early warning role.

The defenses they occupied showed tactical brilliance. Their forts dominated all approaches and had layered perimeters of defenses. To protect themselves they created foxholes into which they moved when the main fort was heavily shelled. Their strong bunkers looked like dog-kennels to the British but they saved them form effects of shell. The Mongoloid looks of the Gorkhas scared the softer British officers and tightly uniformed sepoys. Their use of Panjis was as skilful as their use of internal moats.

In attack they divided themselves in columns often mutually unsupported. They fought close quarter battles where skirmish was the rule rather than exception. Their best examples of attack against the British were at Jaithak (Major Richard's Ludlow's Force) and at Parsa and Samanpur. The above tow examples are reproduced partly, in the illustrations.The Gorkha had developed a sixth sense for fighting both the defensive and offensive operations. With an uncanny eye for ground they compensated their deficiency in modern arms specially artillery with bravery combined with improvisation. Their natural hardihood enabled them to suffer privations uncomplainingly, turning the same as an enormous instrument of advantage to their meager logistics. In recent times only the Vietnamese of Ho Chi Minh compared with them in hardihood, improvisation and determination. And they proved, they were the best in the world.

The British Organisation and Tactics

The British have been a sea-faring and fighting nation. That was the tune all Europe played. They were quick to learn lessons of failures from the American War (1812-14) as also successes elsewhere. But the larger lessons of tactics and understanding of strategy came to them from Continental wars they fought and the introduction in 1803-1805 of a Light Brigade by Sir John Moore. Earlier, important changes had taken place in the organization in

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1796. Certain improvements in tactical drills had been brought about by Colonel David Dundas who advocated the Infantry drills in extended formations. Juibert give them the tactical idea of fire and movement and thus introduced the application of tactics, on a sounder footing.

As a result of organizational changes, the command, control and logistics of the field formations was also separated from policy planning. Of relevance to us is the allocation of threee battalions of artillery along with lascars (or Lascars) to the Bengal Army and European Infantry battalions (HM's Infantry) and Four regular battalions of Indian (Native) Cavalry. It was here that the single infantry battalion regiments were formed into two battalion regiments of which the Bangal Army had twelve. Each European Artillery had three battalions of five companies; the European Infantry each of the three regiments had ten companies; the Regular Native Cavalry had four regiments of six troops each and Native Infantry had 12 regiments of two battalions each. Every Native Infantry regiment had an establishment of 45 British officers, 2 British Sergeants, 40 Native officers, 200 NCOs, 40 Drummers and Fifers and 1600 Sepoys. The native battalion had two Grenadiers companies 33 One Light company and Seven Battalion companies. The battalion staff of the Native Infantry included Adjutant, Quartermaster and Regimental Sergeant Major and Quarter Master Sergeant, as the Senior NCOs. The European Artillery battalion had five companies each and mounted Rocket Artillery Troop. The Native Artillery had four troops and its officer commanding was a Major. The Corps of Pioneers had eight companies integral of the Bengal Army. Local Battalions, which were irregular battalions were also raised. Of interest were the Eastern (Rangpur) and local Battalions at, Ramgarh, Mizapur Champaran; Local Infantry Provincial Battalions at Burdwan, Chittagong, Dhaka, Murshidabad, Patna, Purea. The Hill Rangers were at Bhagalpur. Two Light Battalions were also available under command of Majors with 12 more officers and two Ensigns. They were designed to work as outflanking columns . The First battalion worked with Martindell's Division and the Second with Ochtetrlony's. Irregular Cavalry under J skinner and Gardner were located at Hansi and Khasganj. An Impressive Organisation by all Accounts. This organization was flexible and gave them the necessary punch. Brigades and divisions were formed out of the operational needs and their grouping was flexible. But

33 Gorkha history by Vansitart, Fraser and Kennedy saw them fighting at Kalunga.

17

the staff was milked from the units and in the absence of dedicated staff and permanent headquarters, command deficiency became evident as the war progressed. The officers picked up for ad-hoc headquarters were junior officers who could not influence the operational decisions of their commanders.

Expansion of the Bengal Army took place form 1814 when the strength of the Native Infantry regiments moved up to 30 and later two more were added. During the period, the HM's regiments were 8th (King's Royal Irish) Light Dragoons, 24th Regiment of Light Dragoons, 14th, 17th , 53rd, 67th, 69th and 78th

Regiments of the Foot.

The Concept of Irregulars-Mercenaries

The Europeans learnt that all regulars could not make up the requirement of troops. Besides, the regulars were expensive to train and maintain. The British caught on this idea of creating Irregulars from 1793-much later than the pajani system in Nepal. A Corps of Uhlans was the result. Such Irregulars could be equipped with Fusils rather than expensive Muskets.34 The Irregulars could be under the battle field control, and their light companies could be attached to be the regular battalions. Irregulars drew foreign emigrants, prisoners wanting to see adventure venture and deserters seeking clemency besides those who could plunder in uniform. Irregulars were created both by the Gorkhas (Rohillas, local men of occupied areas) and by the British. So comprising the riff-raffs they had on both sides Sikhs, Rohillas, Pindaris- any one, every one looking for quick money and adventure. It is right to say their deaths were as mysterious as their births. Their loyalties too varied according to the circumstance of success or the volume of plunder. Some Anglo Indian Soldiers of fortune like Hearsey, Gradner, Skinner, Hosdson Walter Reinhardt, Benoit La Borgne, Martine, Birch et at, took to raising these Irregulars, who through training, loyalty and camaraderie induced a very high sense of sacrifice in some of them. They, later were to become as effective units as the regulars. The Rangpur Irregular Battalion did extremely well in its operations under Captain Barre Latter,

34 Grenadier Company consisted of soldiers of exceptionally good height who could carry more weight and fight longer. They carried about 60 pound weight of arms and ammunition, especially Grenades.

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during the Anglo-Gorkha War. So did the Irregulars under Gardner, Nicolls and Ross.

In Europe, the Irregulars Cavalry were called as chasseurs-a-Cheval, and the Infantry as Fusiliers (or Fusiliers).35

British Leadership before War

This book endeavors to examine the leadership aspect later in reasonable details. Though their analysis is aptly done in the campaign specifically, however, certain knowledge on the British leadership of that time becomes necessary, even at this stage. Their leadership was generally poor, which affected not only operational efficiency of the units and formation but also the essential camaraderie between the Europeans and the Indians. As the British began to achieve results of consolidation, the discrimination of white men for the Indians grew. Such overtures were counter-productive to cohesiveness in units and coherence in the Army. The Commanders- in – Chief became responsible to bring about this degeneration which constantly reflected on the results achieved by the British whenever they faced stiff opposition, such as at Bharatpur (1805) and the Gorkha War. The old officers attributed this to lack of rapport between the senior and the junior British officers. One of the officers lamented in the Select Committee proceedings when he wrote; " Almost everyone in the Madras Army can talk of Lawrence, Clive or Coote but not one in a thousand can say who the C-in-C was."

This leadership was equally bad in the European units. John Pemble and Byron Farwell have poor opinion of them simply. They consider them as "wretched in quality".36 The Service conditions were equllly responsible for this rotten quality, where a soldier in the Company's service and the officers lingered on their ranks for unduly long period. It took an Ensign to become a Lieutenant six years; a Lieutenant to Captain, fifteen years; Captain to Major, twelve years; Major to Lieutenant Colonel, six years; from Lieutenant to Colonel, thirteen years. Thus it took 52 years for an Ensign to be a Colonel. It is no wonder that all their officers were old when they fought the War. Some

35 36

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of them had even gone infirm and senile, especially at the higher level of command.The age or overage was not the only factor that affected efficiency but also the poor pay that the junior officers got. By 1809 the British officers caused White Mutiny,37 the cause of which was the abolition of the tent contract, by Sir George Barlow, the Governor of Madras, where these officers ofter made hefty profits through Hawalas.

The moral side of the British conduct also effected the quality of the officers' leadership. Prizes and plundered at money became a distinct feature of any operation. For example, the wealth plundered at Tipu Sultan's palce at Seringpatam in 1799 was estimated at more than two million pounds which was given as prize money. The same have been the cases everywhere. Commenting on this aspect, Colonel Ferryman wrote: "Reference to prize money and plunder added zest to the soldiers' live .It was quiet in order and regulated by the government. However, private plunder, though carried out, were regarded as relic of barbarism and genrally denounced but was openly winked at."38

British Tactics39

Tactics is derived from Greek word Taktoc meaning distribution of thisgs arranged mechanically but as part of higher principles of war. This ill defined word has naturally undergone change over a period of time and now connotes the deployment of troops against the enemy with a view to defeat him. It takes into account the ground, the fire support and the manoeuvre. In Eurpoe, the British were exposed to war of movements and attrition but in India it turned out to be luxury, laxity and a boastful sense of superiority over the natives who failed to stand up to the British show of military power and invariably succumbed to subversion and intimidation. Little wonder, Kazi Amar Singh remarked in his 2 March 1815 letter that thus far the British had not been seriously opposed by any one in India. Notwithstanding the condition in India, the British had followed the tactics of skirmish and battering. The former was carried out by the Infantry and Cavalry, the latter

37 38 39

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was done by Artillery.40 David Dundas, as mentioned earlier, had evolved drills for close column and a system of echeloning involving two basic fighting units and Infantry battalion normally of eight companies and a horse cavalry regiment. The successful conclusion of a battle was to be achieved by a integrated volume of fire. This very tactics was adapted by the Indian units in form of attack being developed on the firing line and Reserve. The Firing Line again divided itself into skirmishers and supporters. This is illustrated.

This tactics failed to a large extent in the Anglo-Gorkha War. It had to be repeatedly modified, as we will see in the campaign studies.

Strategic Imperatives

British

By 1814 Moira's aims had been crystallized as three folds: show a big victory against the Gorkhas so as to indirectly convey the message of British Supremacy in India; to clear a trade corridor in the territories occupied by the Gorkhas; and, to build his own image as consolidator of the British gains in India. The victory against the Gorkhas was to act as a spring-board for compaign against the Marathas and probably against Ranjit Singh, beside improving trade in the north.

Some historians, such as Majumdar had described Moira's objective as ' to impose a limit on the military expansion of the Nepalese.'41 That does not stand the scrutiny of history. For, if it were so, all that Moira should have done was to capture Sheoraj and Butwal, combined with other insignificant enclaves of dispute. But for Moira the larger issue was trade and the corridor for its expansion to north. His aim, therefore, was: to defeat the Gorkhas in the areas of occupation including Sikkim and impose such terms on them as suited the British interest; and to chastise and humiliate the Durbar through military defeats on them. In concept, therefore, Moira's strategy was to capture territories and impose British will on the Nepalese.

40 41

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Of this larger strategic aim, emerged the military strategy and the doctrine. The choice of the areas were focused on the corridor for trade, the Valleyrs of Dun and Kyarda Dun. Further, adequate show of force was to be made against the Kathamandu Valley. And while the military operations were ensuing, the probable allies of the Gorkhas had to be weaned away and rebellions had to be caused in the hinter-land to the Gorkha occupied areas. It could be aided by the Rulers whose states were in possession of Gorkhas and so no. On the question of campaigning season, it had to be a dry season, immediately after the monsoons. In so far the question of a board front vis-à-vis a narrow front had to be decided for an area of 1600 Kilometers frontage. Objectives which were separated had to be handled by independent and strong forces. Alternatively, a concentration of force with impressive superiority had to be arranged . Militarily, it was seen that while the forme r would divide the Nepalese efforts, it would also result in lack of superiority at critical points and critical times. The effect of operations on the time schedule of the campaigning season also had to be considered.

Out of the deliberations, the British evolved the plan which we disus subsequently. Psychological operations of winning over the people of the occupied areas through various stratagems had to be dovetailed into the plan.42 In effect it implied that:

Whole of Kumaon and Garhwal, Basahar in Punjab hill states adjoining Tibet to be captured.43

Other areas to be freed of the Gorkha control. Military operations against Nepal to be progressed with a view to reach

as far as the Kathmandu Valley. Sikhs and Marathas were to be contained through alliance. The Chinese

were also to be assured that there was no permanent territorial interest of the British in Nepal and the manoeuvre was temporary.

Moira was fairly candid – and even boastful in his final report on stratagems of subversions and political expediency. In his 2 August 1815 report he wrote:

42 43

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" 114 with the operations of the troops it was my determination to combine a system of political arrangement, calculated to promote and secure the objects of the war. The basis of this system was to engage in our cause the expelled Chiefs of the ancient hill principalities reduced by the Goorkas and thereby to draw over to us their former subjects. The general tenor of my information led me to belive that the detestation in which the Goorkas were held by the inhabitants of the conquered territory, would induce them to avail themselves of so favorable an opportunity as would be presented, through the invasion of the Goorka dominions by a British army, to rise against their oppressors and exert their utmost efforts for the subversion of their power. It was my intention to employ the influence of their feelings in aid of our cause by engaging to exclude forever the poor of the Goorkas and to re-establish the ancient line of Princes under the guarantee of the British Government on no other conditions than that the exertions of the people and their Chiefs should be contributed in the way by which they could best promote the objects of the war. Either from habitual dread of the Goorkas, or diffidence of our success, occasioned by our failures in the early operations, this expectation was not generally realized."

The Gorkhas

The Gorkhas evolved primarily a defensive overture. In the occupied areas the troops were to fight through dissuasive operational art. At the home front, the enemy was to be kept at bay; and not allowed to cross the border. Adequate forces were to be concentrated at the expected points of convergence of the enemy. The border of Nepal thus became a Laxman Rekha or the limit of penetration for defense of Nepal, while flexible response was to be adopted in the occupied areas.

As commanders in situ were regarded the best judge of the terrain, the positions they chose to defend and abandon was their prerogative. But the overall strategies were worked out on two principles. Firstly, in occupied areas, space was to be traded for time and a mobile defence with lines of limit of resistance were to be selected. There was no control on battles from Kathmandu, though reinforcements were planned. Secondly, the defence of Nepal, was to be based on accepted border from where the enemy was to be raided, attacked and finally destroyed. In both contingencies operational art

23

was to be based on fighting battles around the well defended forts. Withdrawal from them to another set of defences was subject to the progress of the battle.

Diplomacy was to be used for achieving a negotiated settlement of the entire dispute with the British. The efforts at defusing tension and combat had to be explored through all means. Search for allies on the concept of an 'Asian Solidarity' had to be worked out constantly. Even the old enemies and doubtful friends had to be won over. He pleaded to the Tibetans Marathas, Rohillas, Sikhs, the Chinese for succour.44

It was a desperate effort in alliance, as except the Marathas, others were strange bed fellows. Ranjit Singh as we saw had been tied on to the British through the Treaty of Amritsar and he himself was watching the progess of the battle. Until the end of the campaign he seems to have regarded the Gorkhas as alien as the British, if not worse.

There are rare people who draw chestnuts out of fire for others. Ranjit Singh and the others of the Indian states who still existed, were least venturing to do that for Amar Singh in India. But even jumping the gun prematurely in this matter of alliance, one cannot resist quoting Pemble's observation that "had the Sikhs (of Ranjit Singh) and Marathas joined their strength to that of the Gorkhas, it is hardly debatable that the British would have been expelled from northern India".45 It would have definitely been for good. But the Indians lacked strategic foresight and consequently were nibbled at, and finally individually chewed-up. A golden opportunity was thus lost by India in defeating an invasion and consolidating under one banner.

Back home, Bhim Sen Thapa tried to raise the morale of his people and told them that the The British have taken Hindustan because no one had opposed them. And their power and resources had geatly increased and they intended to capture our territory. We shall have 22 lakhs people to expel them.46

The Gorkha Defensive Deployment44 45 46

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The Gorkhas streamlined their overall command in occupied territories.47

They occupied in varyig strengths the forts of Bhylee (Arki) subathu, Murni, Jaithak, Jagatgarh, Kalunga, Virat, Rowain, Tasksal, Taragarh (Nalagarh), Mustgarh, RAmgarh chain of forts, Rajgarh chain of forts including Malaun and forts in Almora and Garhwal. The Gorkhas were thus compelled to occupy larger number of forts and areas with lesser strength which seriously threatened their defensive capability. They needed to follow a pragmatic strategy of offering graduated and flexible response (stronger in the areas of British advance and thinner in depth). But wrong assumptions perhaps led them to following a uniform display of strength everywhere.

Preparation forward

Both sides began to work feverishly for the war from early 1814. The British, in fact, began their intelligence collection from the time Moira landed as Governor General and Commander-in-Chief. In that twin capacity he did not have to refer his preparations for war to any one. Along with intelligence began the psychological operations. The Gorkhas too were not inactive; they collected their vital information through various means and sources. However, they placed their reliance more on their 'valour' than the 'British discretion'. The British employed with finnese, the Kautilyan stratagem of Sam, Dam, Dand and Bhed.48

By 10 June 1814 instructions were issued to Rutherford to terminate all diplomatic transitions with Nepal. So was the nominal trade. The war had already begun on this date.49

The actual declaration of war against the Gorkhas is recorded as 1November 1814, though a decision had been taken eight months back and the war began from mid-October. As part of the overall strategy, four divisions of the Bengal Army were concentrated on four different axes stretched between Danapur (Patna) in the east to Banaras to Bilaspur to Meerut, on the west. ON both the flanks, two groups of Irregular forces operated in support of the 47 48 49

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main operations. ON the east, leading form the Jalpaiguri-Siliguri corridor to the fort of Nagri in Sikkim and on the west in Kumaon another group of Irregular forces operated. These forces worked under Major Barre Latter of the Rangpur Battalion with a force of 2400 men and Colonel Gardner (later Colonel Nicolls), respectively. Latter had Irregulars from Bihar and Oudh alongwith some local Gorkha settlers and a few Sikkimese. Under Gardner there were some Regulars mixed with Irregulars. Hearsey's force, comprised local Rohillas, Kumaonis, collected at Pilibhit for operations in the Kali Kumaon.

Plan of Operations

The strategic objectives of Moira finally worked out as : 1st Division (Div) under Major General Bannet Marley at Danapur, to

seize pass at Makwanpur, preliminary to advance to Kathamandu. 2nd Div under Major General John Sulivan Wood having concentrated

a Benaras was to secure Butal, thence Palpa and advance to Kathmandu where it was to link up with the 1st Div.

3rd Div under Major General Rollo Gillespie was to advance to Dehra Dun via Saharanpur and thence to Srinagar (Garhwal). He was to operationally control Ochterlonyu as he advanced upto line Nahan-Subathu.

4th Div under Colonel David Ochterlony to advance through Bilaspur to Ramgarh, Arki/Malaun-Subathu- Jaithak and to link with Gillespie's forces (where he would cease to be independent) for final march to Srinagar.

Thus began, what Sir George Nugent one time C-in-C, described. "petty warfare on the frontiers of the British territories which rarely lasted more than one campaign and which always ended successfully". It was also epected that Moira's foray into Kathmandu Valley would be over by the Christmas. Both of them were in for shock.

A Simple Comparison of Forces

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Before we proceed to analyse the operations as they developed, it is necessary to compare the two forces as objectively as possible, in terms of their strength, fire power, mobility, ability to reinforce, morale and fighting techniques.

Based on the British intelligence and assessment (which were generally over-estimated), the Gorkhas' strength was as given below:(a) Strength : 5,000-7000 in India.

10,000 in Nepal. (b) 5,200 muskets (fusils) were reported to be distributed at Nahan (1,600) Hindur (300) Basahar (500) Kumarsein (200) Subathu (500) Arki (2,000) miscellaneous (100). It does not include weapons and strength at Sringar and Kalunga. While the number of weapons did not exceed this figure, they were distributed all over. One among those Gorkhas carried a fusil; the others were armed with bow and arrows, Khukris, and swords, Weapons captured during war were to be used to the best advantage.

(c) Aritillery: 3 pounders-30-40 in India and Nepal.4 pounders-Arki, Rajgarh and Jaithak.1.5 pounders to 2 pounders-100 in India.

(d) The above strength of manpower, weapons and guns proved excessive and inaccurate. The British estimates were based on hear say more than correct assessments. However, these will still present a picture of the Gorkha strength.

(e) The strength given by Francis Hamilton in Nepal was also sketchy. He listed strength as: Palpa 1,200; Chisapani 200; Bonat 1,200.

The initial British strength, on the other hand, is correctly tabulated as follows:

(a) Cavalry-664.(b) Infantry- 4,061 (Europeans).

31,0008 (Natives).- final figure:52,180 17,111 (Irregulars).

(c) Dromderry – 200.Corps

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(d) Pioneers -843 .(e) Artillery – 3,628.(f) Private followers – 1,50,00 (Ochterlony's force had and logistic support. 42,134 followers alone.(g) Artillery Pieces – 106,

Field guns – 47, Howitzers – 20,Siege guns – 14, Mortars – 23.

In comparison with Gorkhas, the British had an absolute superiority in Cavalry, Pioneers and at least, the superiority of 10 times in Infantry and 100 times in Artillery. The Gorkhas, however, excelled in morale, fighting technique, mobility, degree of tenacity, offensive spirit and above all, their ability to sacrifice themselves for their cause.

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Kalunga: The Battlefield of Bal Bhadra Singh and Robert Rollo Gillespie

Such is the fame and terror of our swords and Khukris that Bal Bhadra with a nominal force of 600 destroyed an army of 3,000 to 4,000 English .. we are here in Rajgarh eager to meet the enemy. In his famous letter of 2 March, 1815 Kazi Amar Singh Thapa.

Preamble

Kalinga or Kalunga have been associated with epoch making battles of India. There are two such known names though not identical one in Orissa and another in the Dehra Dun Valley. In the former, Ashoka, (or Asoka BC320-230) is known to have defeated his adversary and caused such widespread slaughter that he wept for months after the battle. It metamorphosized his life and turned him into arighteous Buddhist King and his deeds justly added a cognomen of 'Great' to his name. Kalunga of Dun, created the legend of the Bravest of Braves for Bal Bhadra, a Gorkha defender of this non descript fort.

In the case of Kalunga of the Dun Valley, it was a different kind of scenario, yet strategically as important a landmark as the Ashokan Kalinga, It became a battlefield between two foreign invaders of India the Gorkhas of Nepal who had been in occupation of this area for the past decade and the Englishmen of East India Company on a mission of expansion into the Himalayas. History can never forgive Indians of That period who reduced themselves to that state of impotence which allowed the foreigners such a free hand, while they helplessly watched such developments. Some of them even joined one of the belligerents in total disregard to thir feelings or dignity or nationalism. There were two distinct effects of Kalunga: it set the British to rethink about their own strength and tactics and led accordingly to defeat the Gorkhas more by deceit than by raw bravery and they developed a grudging admiration for the Gorkha johnies which eventually led to the Gorkhas joining the Indian Army.

The Gorkhas in occupation of the Kumaon Hills since 1790 and Garhwal from 1804 and the Punjab Hill States thereafter, had entrenched themselves

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in various area. In the Dun Valley it was in the areas of Kalunga and Mohand Pass on the Sivalik That they took firm control. After a decade of the Gorkha invasion, the descendants of late Raja Pradyuman Shah (Sudarshan Shah) living in a state of poverty in Saharanpur and Faizabad invited the British to dislodge them from the areas occupied. Similar request went from the Chands now in asylum in Bareilly and the Oudh. Much effort had also been made by Harsh Dev Joshi, that enigmatic character who historians see both as a quisling and a replica of Duke of Warwickshire i.e., both a patriot and a pretender. He must have released his march of folly when he initially invited the Gorkhas to help him obtain the throne of Chands and he lost weatever he could have received otherwise. Notwithstanding his fear of the British, he thought them to be a better Devil than the Gorkhas. But there is no doubt that he became responsible for causing an historical disaster in Uttarakhand which spilled into Kohistan and brought about subjugation of the area.

Kalunga came to be seen by various writers and observers according to their own perceptions. Edward Bishop called it a "rickety wood and stone stockade".50 Walton Hamilton described it more aptly as he wrote: " A fortress in Garhwal, 26miles north of Haridwar. Latitude 30 degrees 20 minutes north; longitude 78 degrees 6 minutes east. A little to the north east of Kalunga are manu caves inhabited by a race of people nearly in a state of nature. These caves are low, narrow and are very dark having no aperture but entrance. The food of these troglodytes is rice of large gain." His earlier description was: "About 2.5 miles north east of Deyrha, 75 miles from Srinagar. Height 3,268 feet. A small miserable stone castle occupied by a Goorkha garrison. Celebrity only due to two bloody repulses experienced by the British in 1814".51

The history of HM's 53rd Regiment, however described Kalunga fort as of "excellent stone masonry, more formidable than it had been represented to be and not taken without a cannon". This Battalion had fought in the battle of Kalunga and suffered frightfully. Its description, therefore, could not be too far wrong. Colonel W Shakespear who visited the area in 1913 described it as follows: "Having consisted of irregular pentagon in shape crowning the highest point of the hill, a large stockade at the north end of the ride

50 Better to Die: The story of Gurkhas PP 17 and USI Vol XLII October 191351 Geographical Statistical and Historical Description. PP 641 and 71-72.

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overlooking the village of Lakhund, while another line of stockades covered east side of the ground towards the village side of Kalunga (non existent). This side being less steep and more easy to attack. On a small knoll the Nepalse had a small stockade. The walls of the main fort were of no great height and were at this time in an unfinished state. The entrance was through a wicket gate on the north east side."52

The importance of occupying defences over this feature is highlighted again by Colonel Shakespear: "The Nalapani fort of Kalunga guarded the chief route at that time from Dehra Dun to Tehri. It stood on a low lying hill overlooking Nalapani and the Song Valley, 3 miles east of Dehra". There were, indeed, bridal tracks over today's Mussoorie Chamba feature and another alternate route via Rishikesh-Chamba-Tehri. There now are only tell-tale marks. Even in 1913, Shakespear had found this site covered with thick jungles and lines of defences difficult to make out.

Kalunga 180 Years After

The road to Kalunga on which the author traveled is aligned through the Raipur Defence establishment to Tapowan, a small Arya Samaj temple complex on the dry nala bed. It climbs up through the old Nalapani village where the people draw water from an old cemented water reservoir. Some attributed it to have been made about the time the Gorkhas ruled the roost. Here I met a Gorkha Sadhu at Rudreswar Temple and NS Gureria who are regarded as authority on the Kalunga Battle. The Sadhu, said that as late as late as 1940 he had seen water there and the pipe lines to bungalow known as Zephyre Hall. The one time Superintendant of the Dun, F Shore and Lieut Fredrick Young had made the bungalow jointly. Like Kalunga fort, it has only the remnants left. According to Guleria, his grandfather was witness to the Kalunga scene. For our ground reconnaissance his ex-soldier son and his grandson joined me. Soon we were at the site of Kalunga.

Bal Bhadra Takes A Stand52 HM's 53rd's History PP 113; Shakespear's article in USI Journal Vol XLII October 1913.

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The Gorkah is a natural meson and is even an architect. Here in Kalunga they (the Gorkhas) had free labour available among the locals to dig, build embankment around the perimeters, help create the lake and so on. The lake which Gorkhas called Sagar Talao has distinct remains. As late as 1940s, says Guleria, there was water in t he lake, which even served as an irrigation channel to their dry fields in Nalapani. We trekked further up to the hill top whose northern, north-western faces are fairly steep. On its west and further north-east-east it tapers gradually. The northern face has sharp gradient, knife edged spurs and steep escarpments.

For defence and protection, the Gorkhas built a 'Stone and wood fort' on the highest point. Some reservoirs for water and magazines for weapons were also built up. Out of one such earthwork, which is flushed to the ground, we dug out stones and bricks cemented by quick lime. They are two centuries old, yet strong. On and around Kalunga Captain Bal Bhadra, a young man of 35 built a mini-town with lob houses, the rest house for officers, billets for men, leisure homes for local women, armoury, cook houses, cattle sheds, training areas and even play fields. Storage for grains and provisions were created. Most of his time was spent on improving a defensive wall that he built on the lower rim of the hill or on collecting revenue, rations and suppressing small resistance that the locals put up when they raised their voices to the Gorkhas taking away their mulching cows or young girls.

On such a jungle there would inevitably have been problem of water. Bal Bhadra found a water spring on the northern face of the feature. In October, which is immediately after the rainy season, the area is green; its undergrowth full and movement, difficult. The lake, however, must have been full of water.

Despite a lake and a water spring on the eastern slope, water remained a problem for the Gorkhas. It became their Achilles Heel everywhere from Kalunga to Malaun. In their initial assaults which invariably failed everywhere, the British succeeded only by staging a coup de grace for water points on lower heights and then laying siege to the defences of the Gorkhas.

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Kalunga is a helmet shaped feature with North-south wooded spread. In selecting Kalunga as a defensive position Bal Bhadra had shown not only a fine understanding of the gorund bout also of the likely threat that hel had to contend with form Tehri and from the south. Its north-western face have sharp gradients, virtually unassailable. To attack it, one had to reach the plateau either from the north or the south. The jungle clad Kalunga feature provided natural cover, all round view and domination of the area both by fire and observation. The wood provided the fuel and construction material.

Captain Bal Bhadra Kanwar deployed about 1,000 Gorkhas and Garhwalis in the Dun-Kyadrah Valleys that extened from Dun to Kalsi (Below Chakrata). His defences guarded the British ingress from the axes of Mohund pass, Timli Pass and Haridwar. His troops included lightly equipped troops at Mohund, Timli, the forts of Virat and the main strength being concentrated on Kalunga. His defences had to be co-ordinated with his movements to Srinagar and Sirmur. The strength which he had on Kalunga proper was about 600 and included 200 Gorkhas, the same number of Garhwalis and balance being women and children. At Virat there were 150 and the remainder were scattered in penny-packets for collection duties, manning the stockades on the two passes and for controlling the local villages.

In early 1814 Bal Bhadra had been visited by Amar Singh who had advised him to concentrate his force at Kalunga and carry out extensive improvement to the fort, ensuring that the water reservoir was protected. In his assessment, Amar Singh had asked Bal Bhadra to stock rations and provisions for a least 5 months when he thought situation should improve.

A man of ingenuity and of cool courage, Bal Bhadra set about improving the fort with his full might. And by Semptember, he had, constructed the fort though not totally made shell proof; built a perimeter of walls and created sufficient confidence among his force through training and indoctrination. The latter was done by him through religious service and drumming into his people that no one could defeat the Gorkhas. If the British were trying to wean away the locals, so eree the Gorkhas, specially in the valley where most of the Zamindars of Garhwal and Mahant decided to help him. He built up his intelligaence by employing the Sadhus and locals as much as possible. His concern in intelligence were largely the European Infantry, Cavalry and the

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large caliber guns which the British would employ against him. He also learnt the British technique of assault by personally visiting Bharatpur and understanding their technique of breaching the fort and Charging through the beach. Funneling through a breach was critical for an attacker, as it was for the defenders. He realized that he would have to plug it to prevent the attackers from 'flooding' the fort.

Secretly, he began to build a moat inside the fort, to surprise the British. Along with it also came the idea of Panjis and Wicket Gates over which he could mount the guns in more destructive and lethal manner. All along he placed the musketeers who could fire their muskets upto 150 yards, then archers could shoot their arrows at the enemy between 35 and 75 yards. And if the enemy draw closer, there were small hard pieces of rocks to be hurled at them, with wooden catapults and by hands. For those who still got closer, the ultimate Gorkha weapon, the helavy weighted Khukris, the personal weapon of each Gorkha- man, woman and child- was there to finally contest the enemy at the close quarters.

The women joined the men in defence as actively as combatants. The western modern army who employed female folks as stretcher bearers or musicians, must have viewed these brave women with awe.

The small caliber artillery he had, were to be located on the ramparts where their solid and grape shots could engage at ranges upto 500 yards. He tried to move he larger caliber guns form Sringar but he had to contend with 2, 3 pounders and 6 smaller guns. He anticipated the local might desert and those who did not, might serve as a boon but they had to be watched and then only employed in sensitive points. He expected uprising in the Valley and his supplies being disrupted. But to Amar Singh he as sured that he will fight till his end or when orderd otherwise. Armar Singh promised him that reinforcements, to the extent possible, will be sent to him.

Rollo Gillespie Rolls into Dun

Situation had crystallized by May 1814. The war clouds had become darker and the possibility of it precipitating became imminent as the British provoked Gorkha retaliation on a police post soudth of Palpa in mid-May.

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The final mail was driven into the coffin of the Anglo-Gorkha peace immediately after this incident, when Lord Moira recorded his views: "The British Government has long borne the conduct of the Nepalese with unexampled patience.. But forbearance and moderation must have their limits .. the British Government having been compelled to take up arms in defence of its rights, its interests and honour ….. "To this Bhim Sen Thapa countered by having said in April 1814 –" How will English be able to penetrate into our hills … our hills and fastness are formed by the hands of God and are impregnable." "His Father at Palpa also told everyone that the battalions he had raised were better than the Europeans'. A verbal propaganda and counter propaganda was at its pitch.53

We concentrate on Rollo Gillespie's 3rd Division (Div), leaving others on their march elsewhere, But first Gillespie himself. Gillespie had joined the King's Army and served in East India Company in Java and India. He had turned every expedition including the Caribbean venture as interesting examples both for notoriety and military virtue of those times. He fought with every man whose face he hated and he sepnt more than he earned living off the loans from the regimental contractors or even through false claims and other means which appeared fair only to him. But it must be said in praise of his military balour that he was brave like a tiger. In the Caribbean, as in Java and later in he Vellore Mutiny (1806), the British successes were mostly due to his bold leadership and resoluteness. He turned every situation to the advantage of the British.

He was rebellious, a small despot in so far military discipline was concerned and he could steal the affection of any brother officer's wife with almost impunity. Whenever in difficulty with the establishment, he saved himself by opting out of the present appointment for more adventurous assignments. But the British needed young officers like him on the model of Robert Clive or

53 Sunder Lal at PP 61 remarked that most of the locals of Garhwal were fighting for the Gorkhas. While some Khasi Zamindars like Jeevan Singh Helped the British, other were with the Gorkhas, most prominent of these being half the strength at Kalunga consisted to them. Even for battle at Kangra a large number of Kumaonis and Garhwalis were enrolled. Edund Candler, a contemporary historian mentions the particularly incredible spirit of the Garhwalis in employment of the Gorkhas at Kalunga. He wrote "without their help me Gorkhas could not have so obdurately stuck to their position against an enemy of superior strength and fire power." Similar tribute has been given in the history of Second Gorkha Regiment. It says: "It will be seen that a small force had actually been collected during November 1814 while Kalunga Fort was still defying and these were largely Garhwalis from Srinagar."

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else what they achieved, would have taken them an other century or perhaps never.54

Promotions came in his way and by the time the drum beating of the Anglo-Gorkha war was on, he had two crossed swords and a Subalten's pips on his shoulders making him a Major General. As a King's Officer though younger he superseded the Company's officers, David Ochterlony included. David was still a Colonel with almost double the Gillespie's service.

So here was Gillespie, General Officers Commanding 3 Div assigned to capture the Gorkha defences in the Dun. But as soon as this assignment was given to him he grew serious in tone as stories of Gorkha bravery and determination of their commander, traveled to him at Meerut and Saharanpur. He know it would be a grim battle. As he began traveling up, he wrote to a friend: "The summits are narrow .. Valleys extremely confined .. not a spot to be seen to afford room for one thousand men in the tents … neither yielding shelter to birds or air … not the bwast of the fields".

The Dun Valley was approachable via Timli, Mohand and Rishikesh/ Haridwar. In Gillespie's appreciation, he saw "The country… every yard a post and Gorkhalis are very warlike active people". He deduced he will have to move in several columns and he also had a premonition of a bad beginning and feared disaster. But like a good commander he kept on visualizing the battle for himself. His letter to a friend which he wrote, gives out his feelings besides the plan as it would take shape: "My force is rapidly collecting at Saharanpur. I expect to make them on Dun by about 23rd/24th

October or 1st November in order to support Ochterlony's attempt against Nalagarh and his eventual proceeding against Amar Singh. Lord Hastings (Moira) has in a great measure left movements of the Div to Myself. I am inclined to think he will find permanent undertaking more arduous and difficult than he imagines …."55

Gillespie's force was really strong. It had a British Infantry and Cavalry regiment each with a squadron of native cavalry, 16 pieces of artillery (later

54 Campbell Sketch reproduced by Hasrat PP 184 and PRNW 144.55 For details see Chapter on Leadership (Reflections).

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increased to 20) two Pioneer companies and 10 Native Infantry regiments (20 Battalions). The actual orbat ran :

8th Royal Irish Dragoons (Gillespie's won regiment).7th Native Cavalry; Skinners Horse (One squadron).HM's 53rd, Foot (Lieutenant Colonel Setbright Mawbey).1st , 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 16th, 17th 26th 27th Native Infantry.

Artillery. Two troops of Horsed Artillery (1st and 3rd) were allotted from Meerut to join the Div.

Pioneers. 5 and 6 companies with officers from Engineers.In addition there were 6,668 Irregulars, whose strength continued to increase as the operations advanced.56

In terms of relative strength, mobility, fire power and logistic capability, the ratio of force levels of the British when compared with Bal Bhadra's reckons at least 30 times. A true case of a Goliath versus David.

The Div having assembled at Saharanpur by 18 October 1814. Gillespie's plan for forward concentration and operation took shape.

Based on intelligence, he sent elements to carry out reconnaissance's in force to Timli Pass, Kasumri (Kheri) and Mohand Pass as they looked into Kydra Dun and Dun Valleys. On capture of these passes, the force was to advance and capture crossing places, ferries and fords on the Jamuna and the Ganges at Rampur Mandi and Rishikesh. Along with a troop of the Dragoons three companies of light Infantry were to move to Badshahibagh (Towards Paonta Sahib) to maintain surveillance over the crossing on the Jamuna and also act as a firm base for further movement of troops.

The rest of the Div divided itself into two large columns i.e., an advance group under Colones Mawbey and another under Colonel Carpenter, Mawbey's column consisted of 1,300 Infantry, 300 Cavalry and 5 guns which traveled over the path form Saharanpur to Kaumri over to Kheri Pass on the Shivalik and then descend into the Dun Valley and headed for

56 Memoirs of Sir Gillespie for TE Egerton (1816).

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Kalunga/Rishikesh. HM's 53rd with the exception of three companies formed part of column. The second column under Carpenter comprising 17NI, Horsed Artillery moved aong the Mohund to the areas of modern Clement Town and thence to Nalapani.

Gillespie followed the column to Timli and was in Badshaibagh to carry out his operational reconnaissance for the axis of Virat.

While the main force moved to the Valley a mixed force of Cavalry and Horsed Artillery was sent to Pinjore, the stronghold of the Gorkhas there being Mustgarh. This was to act as deception for both Gillespie and Ochterlony. See sketch giving out developments schematically.

Considering the overall merit of the plan, it looked a brilliantly conceived military plan which could offer several courses of action to beat the enemy decisively.

Mawbey was in Dun by October 22 and he set himself on carrying out reconnaissance. It soon ran into Bal Bhadra's early warning detachments near Nalapani, enroute Rishikesh and was driven back. Having achieved that, Bal Bhadra's men withdrew to the fort of Kalunga. Mawbey's reaction to the interruption of his early warning detachment assigned to move to Rishikesh near Nalapani by Bal Bhadra's marauding Gorkhas, was spontaneous and bold. The following morning leaving a rear party in the main camp which he established on the sahasradhara Road, he took a large force to the Table Top to intimidate Bal Bhadra.He deployed his five guns within 1,000 yards of the post and began to engage it without any effect. when a continuous gun firing produced no effect on the fort, he, according to the Dragoon's History " Summoned the Gorkhas to surrender". The message delivered at mid-night, received a courteous but firm reply from Bal Bhadra that it was not in his habit to carry on carry on correspondence at such an "unreasonable hour".57

The Dragoons who later suffered at hands of Gorkhas, had put it mildly. In fact, Bal Bhadra was angry at this misdemeanour and he conveyed so. A Gorkha when furious, behaves like Hindu God Lord Shiv, at his death dance. "That night", wrothe Francis Tuker, "a message offering terms came from

57 The Official Strength of Gillespie's Div was 17,000.

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British Command. Bal Bhadra remarking that he did not accept letter at that hour, tore it up." 58 The letter Tanta mounted to "summon to surrender", as Colonel Shakespeare calls it. When Bal Bhadra did not follow it with any other response, Mawbey sent a courier to Gillespie at Badshahibagh, for futher directions.

Gillespie had by then marched through the Timli Pass, got closer to Kalsi and Virat and on receiving the courier form Mawbey headed Kalsi and Virat and on receiving the courier from Mawbey headed straight to the main force. His plan earlier was to reconnoiter the axis Kalsi, Rumtum and Virat. But Mawbey's message changed the complex of the battle. In total fury, he moved along with detachments, to the area of Kalunga, putting Captain Campbell on his earlier task. He was good at writing. He wrote from the camp (Where now stands his memorial) to a friend, his last letter: "Me Voici-in the far farmed Dhoon- the Temple of Asia and the most beautiful valley it is; the climate exceeding everything, I have hitherto experienced in India. I received report that Mawbey failed …. You may imagine this check completely changed my plans and here I am with as stiff and strong opposition as ever I saw, garrisoned by men who are fighting pro arise et focis in my front and who have decidedly formed the resolution to dispute the fort as long as a main alive".

Gillespie, the hero of Vellore and Java was for the first time, seeing an enemy who would give not a quarter without taking adequate blood for it. So he wrote in the same letter to his friend: "The fort stands on the summit of an almost impossible mountain and covered with impenetrable jungle; the only approaches commanded and stiffly stockaded. It will be a tough job to take it but by first proximo I think I shall have it, Sub Auspice Deo." It was like Insha Allah of Mohammed at Battle of Badr !

By 24 October, Mawbey's guns began to fire on the Kalunga fort. Shells fell short or went overhead; a few landed on the 'Sagar Talao' and caused breaches. The lake began to drain out. The Englishman did not know of the damage then. Water began to dry but the spring at the north east had still

58 History of the Royal Irish Hussars (1693-1927) PP 370 and Tuker's Gorkha: A history of the Gorkhas; Shakespear PP 372. Of interest, the queen's Royal Irish Hussars, the descendent of the Royal Irish Hussars had Lieut Winston Churchill before the Boer war. He was to be come the world famous War time leader of Great Britain.

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good water supply to feed the garrison. Then there was no worthwhile artillery with the defenders to reply and neutralize the British guns.

In the meanwhile, Gillespie evolved his operational plan for a multidirectional attack on Kalunga on 30/31 October 1814. The columns were assigned task and organized:59

Column 1. under Colonel Carpenter. His force comprised four companies each of HM's 53rd and 15th NI and Light Companies 6th NI, whole of 7th NI under Major Wilson. Detachment of Pioneers were to Carry ladders. Golandaz and Laskars were grouped to provide gun support. Its objective was to attack frontally from the Table Land. It was to depart at 3.30 pm on 30 October.

Column 2. Under Captain John Fast. His force had three companies of 17th NI, one Light Company, whole of 27th NI, 16th Pioneers and Golandazs. It was to attack Kalunga from north after concentrating at Karsiali (Kursiali). Time to depart at 2 a.m. on 31 October.

Column 3. With a strength of 529 under Major Kelly that had components from 7th NI, Light Companies of 1st NI and 5th NI and 20th

Pioneers. It moved at 2 a.m. on 31 October. It was to develop its axis of attack from Lakhund.

Column 4. Under Captain John Campbell. With tow Granaders companies of 6th NI, one light company and 16th NI. Its task involved an assault from the Asthal axis. Like other outflanking columns it also moved at 2 a.m. on 31 October.

Reserves under Major Ludlow with four companies of 8th NI, detachments of 9th NI, balance of 6th NI with two Light Companies, and all the Cavalry.

The interesting aspects of the plan were the coordination of the assault and certain orders which Gillespie emphasized to his assaulting commanders (see foot notes). He wanted strict fire control, use of bayonet rather than fire, observance of strict silence on halting to fire or releasing when the assault began and all attacks to be simultaneous. Purely from tactical aspects the plan he evolved is easily a modern tactical concept of multi directional attack,

59 See PP 38-39 History of Bengal Artillery, giving out Excerpts fro the Orders of Gillespie given at the end of notes.

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attempting to crack a nut with a hammer. Good terrain intelligence and guidance by locals enabled Gillespie to plan it.

Nonetheless, the plan had discrepancies and it warranted a minute to minute coordination in the context of the battle as the final and most vital aspects of the plan were governed by one clause: As part of the plan five guns were to fire at 9 am 31 October and the attack by the three columns was to proceed after 120 minutes i.e. at 11 am. This timings had to be sacrosanct for both the commander controlling the whole operations that is Gillespie – and the outflanking columns of adhere to the plan of movement. It became vitally important as the columns moved out and thereafter there could be no control on their operations. The other flaw which he failed to take into account was the imponderables of war such as the weather, the terrain demanding more time for movement, the human factor of fatigue, the echoing effect on the acoustics of the gun due to the hilly terrain, besides the unpredictable reactions of the Gorkhas.

The Attack Gears Up

The artillery pieces were brought up on elephants and deployed during the night of 30/31 October under Major Pennington, assisted by Lieut Blair, the Engineer and Captain Byers, Gillespie's Aide-De-Camp. Gillespie by nature, a restless man, moved not only the guns but whole force of Ludlow and Kelly amounting to nearly 3,000. By the fall of the night he began to toy with the idea of surprising the Gorkhas from the Table Land and by the morning he had decided to advance the timings of firing of his guns by 60 minutes. Accordingly, they began their signal firing at 8 am , 31 October. The outflanking columns either ignored the firing or did not hear it. Bal Bhadra was prepared to stake any sacrifice to neutralize these 'wretched' guns. And he ordered his detachment deployed on the knoll close by to assault them. Some 50 men crawled around and charged at the firing guns. However, it caused several casualties to the Gorkhas and the survivors managed to retreat to the Fort. Lieut PC Kennedy whose guns were attacked by the Gorkhas, thought that the retreat of the Gorkhas further encouraged Gillespie to progress the attack.

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The First Assault

At 10 am Major John Ludlow was ordered to assault. Ludlow had under him dismounted Irish Dragoons that provided the advance guard of Carpenter and Ludlow's force. The two companies of HM's 53rd and whole of Carpenter's force, joined up the Ludlow force and organized the attack. The Dragoons60

led the attack followed by the HM's and Carpenter's force. In their élan the Dragoons pressed the attack and reached the out skirts of the fort where the Gorkhas were 'swarming' at the base of the walls. They engaged the on-coming Dragoons with their Khukris and within minutes, 88 Dragoons lay wounded with 4 dead. In his letter of 1 December 1814, Bal Bahadra wrote: "In this attack Ripu Darman was badly wounded but he still made to Srinager. Jamadar Mangal Rana killed three Gora (British) with his Khukri outside the fort. Acts of bravery of Subedar Vanu Basnait, Jang Singh Thapa, Jamadar Vijai Vir Gharti, Chandra Mani Rana saved the day. They also planned the evacuation of the fort." It is obvious that the Gorkhas would have vacated the fort even during October.61

As the assault went in, Gillespie accompanied by Lieut Colonel Westnra, Commanding Officer Dragoons, Major Stevenson, the Commisary General, William Fraser, the political agent and PC Kennedy, the gunner officer moved up to a vantage point from where they could observe the battle. The massacre of the Dragoons shook Gillespie and he tried to move the slowly crawling HM's 53rd and the Sepoys, forward. However, there was little enthusiasm from these ftoops as the walking wounded of the Dragoons returned bleeding the cursing.

Not disappointed at the dithering by Ludlow's column in the first attempt, Gillespie called the balance of HM's 53rd, from the camp and pushed them on the plateau. A mixed column of about 900 men consisting of HM's 53 rd

(including those who had reached the camp and they were moved up post haste) formed the second wave of the Ludlow and Carpenter force. Off they were pushed by Gillespie to teach a lesson to "recalcitrant Gorkhas." The 60 8th Light Dragoon was formed in 1693 as Irish Protestants. Changed to Light Dragoons in 1775. In Indai saw service at Agra. Laswari, Deeg. It also fought War in Afghanistan, Crim. See British Army Regimental Records, Badges, Devices etc. by Major JH Lawerence Archer.61 From Original Letters.

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HM's troops moved up- some running, some walking through the blackened rocks. Following them moved the Sepoys. UP the slope, as they Straightened themselves into assault formantion in the area of the plainer portion whrer stood the huts of the Gorkha village, they were confronted by some 150 Gorkhas. Their Khukris glistening against the rays of the October morning sun, they engaged the British troops in their ceremonials, knapsacks and long bayoneted riffles.

Before these troops could shake themselves up into an assault formation and the guns from rear could fire, the Gorkhas ran forward cruing their battle cry Ayo Gorkhali Ayo Gorkhali.. Behand them followed Bal Bhadra with his long sword and a flag stuck on a pole, bearing a massive Hanuman on a yellow cloth. Near him stood the band playing the tune of O Nepali Sar Uchali ( Ye Gorkhas keep heads high). The attacking Gorkhas swung their Khukris in high and low angles chopping heads and wounding more. Leaving the dead behind, the remaining attackers ran back.

This second attack also proved disastrous and left Gillespie fuming in anger, and inwardly quailing at the loss of the good name of the Europeans, who sometime back, he had boasted to be superior to the Orientals. It was now, he felt, the Europeans were at disrepute. He told those around him that HM's 53 rd

had let him down. He stopped the retreating rabbles and asked Ludlow and Carpenter to reform and get a hold on the troops. They were to be pushed forward and told to try the left side of the fort where the slope was gentle. They moved up but soon ran into the perimeter walls of the so called Gorkha village. Ladders were laid and men exhorted to climb up. When hesitation appeared on the men's faces Lieut Ellis climbed on one of the ladders.62 That got him a sniper's shot. He fell down and lay dying. Some men attempted to climb the two other ladders and having reached the wall, they saw Panjis and inner moat. They retracted, retreated with all others as the Gorkhas appeared from their right and left. They ran and did not stop until the water reservoir. "They are damned barbarians … bloody Goorkaas", said they, amidst the shouts of cursing and grumbling Most had thrown their muskets away.

Gillespie bit his lips and ground his teeth. By now Mawbey had joined him. Lieut Kennedy who was nearby with his horsed guns was told to take a dash

62 Nepal ko Sainik Itihas PP 392.

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forward, as far as possible, closer to the fort and take a direct shoot at the gate . The breach it would cause would enable the assaulting echelons to funnel into the Fort. He was also told to take on a Gorkha gun that was coughing sharpnels into the attackers.

Kennedy, in a fine dash, moved the horses forward to about 100 yards of the outwork protecting the gateway and to enfilade the wall upon that side. It was now 11.15 am and the marching columns had not yet got close by and were not visible. Getting mad about failure, as 21 had ben killed and 190 wounded, and nothing had been achieved, Gillespie decided to set in an unprecedented example of leadership by personally leading the assault wave.

While we pause for breath, as Gillespie did, we look for the first hand account of the final stage of the battle, most of its being taken from Kennedy's statement in the enquiry that met in Meerut, later:63

"An enfilade gun placed at an open wicket of the fort swept down many. Ensign was killed, Lieut Elliot was badly wounded, the troops then retreated. Ladders which were left among the huts which were the fire about this time.

Nothing was heard of the other columns. Gillespie, on receiving the report of the failure ordered forward three companies of the 53rd, which had just arrived and a battery under Captain Coultman with tow horse artillery guns under kennedy to blow open the gate … (it) reached within sixty or eighty yards of the bastion and a sharp musketry fire was opened on them. The Teneral accompanied by Colonel of Dragoons and his staff came up here and they went forward leaving Lieut Campbell to cover their advance. Passing through the village, the huts still burning and much impeded by the dead and wounded of the preceding columns, they came to a turn in the road in the full sight of the gate of the Fort, some fifty or sixty yards off.

63 History of Bengal Artillery PP 5; and reproduced in Nepal and East India Company, by BD Sanwal, PP 158-159.

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Lieuts Kennedy and Blane ran forward to select the position brought64 to 30 to 40 feet. But those who should have gone forward, wavered and the fire of the matchlocks and arrows told with effect upon the leading sub-divisions. In vain did the General respect his orders for the men to charge. The wooden bar across the entrance were broken by the fire of the gun and a party of stout Gorkhas rushed out. General Gillespie was frantic. Major Luidlow appeared at this juncture with several officers and Sepoys and was desired to attack to the right, where there was supposed to be an entrance; the horse artillery men were ordered to arm themselves with muskets to the dead. The supply was not a scanty one. And when this was done, the General with his sword in hand and a double-barrelled pistol in the other turned to Lieut Kennedy and the rest, exclaiming; Come on my lads, and now Charles (Kennedy), for the honour of the county Down.65

Only a pace or two forward he fell with a bullet though heart. So here was the eye-witness account of the charge of Gillespie, the brave, against a more braver people who in the words of Field Marshal SHFJ Menekswaw are the only "unafraid (fearless) brave people."66

With Gillespie also went Byre and Ludlow's Adjutant, O' Hara, who was wounded. Lieut Young and Kennedy rushed forward to retrieve Gillespie. Young's biography narrates that Gillespie died in his arms. The Dragoons' History records that the attack was abandoned and the remanents of the force retreated under Capt Campbell, who had arrived from his out flanking move by now.

The history of 53rd HM's describes the battle in their own way: "The two companies lost several men and Lieuts Young and Anstic severely wounded; three of the columns had not advanced and the messengers never reached their destinations … The ladders had been burnt alongwith the Gorkha huts 64 A near similar situation came in the Anglo-Sikh War 1845-46. Henry Smith's Brigade was surrounded by Sikhs near Mudki but failed to exploit advantage due to Lal Singh's "cowardice and incapacity". See history of Sikhs by JD Cunningham (1919) and Short History of Sikhs by Ch Pyne (1915); Dictionary of English History PP 979. Brig Sir Henry Smith had exhorted the Indian and British troops to unkeep the honour or the British arms. He had said. A British Army mustnot be foiled and failed this Army shall not be. It was 'victorious or die' for General Sir Hughes too. Sheer determination won the day. But not at Kalung.65 At the First Field Marsha Cariappa lecture at the Vigyan Bhavan on 26 October 1995, Sam had referred to the Gorkhas as being the most brave people.66 See History of King's Shropshire Light Infantry Regiment by Cannon Richard and Colonel W Rogerson. The 53 rd

now known as 53rd and 85th Foot. It also served in St Helena, while Napoleon Bonaparte was in exile there.

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and the storming party lost 15 killed and 75 wounded". There is a foot note to the narrative which suggests the state of morale of 53rd. "Gillespie had harangued the 53rd for turning up late and the tradition of the men were discontented and while holding the ground, would not advance … also these failures were because of feeling between the officers of two battalions that led to duels." 67 It vindicates the state of relationship that existed between the King's troops and the Company's troops. Not that it was a lcal problem but endemic. Sir George Nugent had warned the Government that " a secious deterioration in discipline and morale of the Army was being caused by severe over-taxation of its patience and resources". 68 The memory of White Mutiny, lingered on even in battle fields.

What the readers need to also appreciate is the excellent fire control Gorkhas had and their marksmanship and their cool courage. And yet after the battle got over, the survivors laughed, had their taut of drink and were back to their defences. Some even followed the retreating Mawbey's force and gave big smiles as if they had won a game from the British. They were such happy breed of men.

Gillespie's death was 'regretted' by Moira and the failure of Kalunga was regarded to deeply augment the loss which the Service and the Country had sustained by the "distinguished gallant officer who personally conducted It and whose conspicuous military talent must place him in the ranks of those officers whose exploits have done (pride) to the British name in India". Mawbey called Gillespie's death as "melancholy".69

It is here the British also got to know the Gorkha as an admirable soldier, individual and human being. Bal bhadra allowed them to collect their deads and wounded without mutilating them. It generated good feelings and gave a vent to chivalry, besides the gallantry.

Bal Bhadra was, indeed, generous to his enemy but he was not naïve to return their weapons. As the British retreated carrying away the body of Gillespie Campbell managed to retrive Kennedy's guns. But the dead and the 67 See Imperial Gazetteer Vol IV and Cambridge History Vol VI. White Mutiny was caused in 1809, due to discontentment among the European officers and troops. Detailed notes elsewhere.68 PRNW PP 465, and Ibid PP 467.69 Sandes P 235.

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seriously wounded lay in the battlefield. Bal Bhadra collected every bit of their arms, ammunition and even flages, The Gorkhas had been reequipped with better rifles along with the 150 reinforcement that trickled in, and were determined to fight with better resolve with the British muskets-against the British.

The Second Assault

Colonel Mawbey, according to Colonol Sandes, "sat down to bombard the Frot while Engineers and Pioneers cut the water channel which supplied water to the Gorkha camp. He demanded reinforcement of additional troops and battering guns before an attack could go in"70 He, however laid a cordon around the Gorkha defence, His 20 pieces of artillery continued to bombard the Gorkha positions. The constant harassing fire caused casualties nd fatigue. The re-inforcements of some 200-300 men which sat on the Saknyana Hill, tired to move in and about half the number infiltrated into the Frot.

Mawbey had fired 1,200 rounds of guns and mortars by 26 November.71 As to the actual attack on the Gorkhas, Mawbey dithered, despite more than 4000 combatants. In support of his non-activity he had been referring to Adjuant General's letter of 1 October which advised caution in the event of lack of wherewithal. Gillespie's death had shaken him, as all the others.

By 20 November 1/3 NI located at Moradabad was moved to Nalapani and so were the battering guns consisting of 4, 18 pounders under Captain William Battine and Captain Car Michael, the Engineer officer. By 24 th Mawbey's plan of attack of the second time began to take shape. On the same day, Bal Bhadra counter attacked the battery, which was beaten back .

Mawbey's plan was a simple one which is excerpted from Field Orders of 27 November (PRNW pp 466) reads: "Storming party consisting of Grenadiers companies, one company 53rd, new Light Company, under Major

70 History of Bengal Artillery PP 30.71 Based on the USI Journal of 1872-73. The actual casualties were one officer killed and 36 all ranks wounded. But their morale being very poor, most did not attempt an actual assault.

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Ingleby, The force to move with firelocks unloaded and carry the breach with the bayonet."

The British view of the battle is recorded better though 'peppered', in the history of 1/13 NI by Lieut General William Richards:

Amplifying on the battle principally, the history of 1/13 NI called the "Beach practicable, in fact, as a chronicled failure", For, only Lieut Harrington of 53rd

ascended the breach and was killed. It grounded the operations. More guns were then brought up. Lieut Edward hall built up a 12 pounder and Lieut John Luxford a 5.5 inch howitzer, which he tried to drag to the breach and was mortally wounded.

The Gorkhas also lost heavily but gave no sign of their weakening defences. Of their determination, Colonel Shakespear wrote: "This was our first stiff fight with the Nepalse, who here showed their grit and not only the men but their women too. For there was a number of the latter in the fort, and these true to the best traditions of their sex, helped man nobly, for they were seen at the asssults on the walls throwing heavy stones on our men".72 They were heard saying "Timiharu Sita Yudh Garne, Aru Ke Ho (Will fight you… and what else)". A similar story is given by William Fraser, where he says: "The defence was so desperate that I saw women actually throwing stones from the walls. I was hit in five place with stones besides the arrow wound across the throat."

72 Colonel Shakespear's Article at PP374 of the USI Journal.

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Bal Bhadra had made a counter-attack on the morning of 24 Movember. The advance of the force including 1/13 NI began until the gate of the breach where a deep trench with bamboo Panjis and offers of reconciliation stopped the battalion. The Gorkhas hurled every thing at the attacking column. Like trapped injured lion, they would not let any one come close by. 1/13 th was routed after two hours of contest. The attacking force was reduced to 70 from its attacking strength of 600. Moira was furious at the failure as it tarnished the image of the great fighters. Repeatedly reduced from aweful fire of artillery, greatly reduced in number for want of water and food, Bal Bhadra abandoned the fort and joined the reinforcement awaiting on Saknyana.

The second major failure at Kaunga led Mawbey back to his camp but he continued to fire his guns unabated. The casualties continued to increase. Earlier, Bal Bhadra had been planning to finally vacate the Fort but delayed it to the second assault by 27 November when the British had 755 casualties including 75 killed, 680 wounded. The Gorkhas had been reduced form their original strength of 600 to a mere 90 that he planned an abandonment which, we will discuss subsequently. But they had carried on the struggle as spiritedly as ever. Preferring death to surrender as observed by sundar Lal he decided to fight his way out through the besieging force.73

On 30th November, the gun fire and the flight of arrows from the fort ceased and when the British began to wonder about its cause and most cautiously walked into the fort. They found it abandoned except bodies of 180 killed, those dying and a few toddlers. Major Kelley, the officer incharge found the whole area of fort a slaughter house strewn with the bodies of dead and wounded and served limbs of those who had been torn into pieces by the bursting of shells. Those who yet lived piteously, called out for water. The stench of the place was dreadful and many of the bodies of those who had been killed, had been insufficiently interred. Penderal Moon saw "those two fruitless attacks costing casualties exceeding the total number of defenders a stigma to the British bravery."74 Even Lord Moira recognized the Gorkhas both as brave soldiers and humane enemy, who were entitled to being treated well. As to his consolation he thought, it will be some trifling consolation of the families and friends of brave heroes who have fallen before Kalunga that no man ever fought so bravely or fell more regrettedly than the whole lot of them did.75

A Panoramic View of Battle of Kalunga

"The bravery with which the Gorkhas fought here and routed the English is worth writing with a pen of gold. Gorkhas are unrivalled fighters. Had they

73 Sunder Lal PP63.74 Penderal Moon PP 378.75 Mawbey's Report to Lord Moira after the battle of Kalunga in which the British casualties for second attack were killed 4 officers, 27 Other Ranks and wounded 16 officers and 213 Other Ranks. So infuriated was Moira that he ordered the Kalunga Fort to be razed to he ground. The Fort was destroyed on 2 December 1814; also Mawbey's report to Lord Moira through Lieut Colonel Fegan dated 01 December.

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been wise rulers, it would have been excellence in something already creditable", so wrote BD Pande.76

In 1994, I had spent almost a month in researching in Nepal, where most of the part was spent in dusting off the old documents in the Royal Nepalese Archive and in persuading the Royal Nepalese Army Headquarters (Singh Durbar) to let me peruse their documents on this war. It was to see the other side of the hill and as Machiavelli felt, to, "encompass the vantage points of the Generals on both sides of the hill." I ran into a set of letters written by Bal Bhadra and others in their own hand which give the Nepalese side of story. While they can not obviously be fully reproduced for reason of space, the necessary aspects that give the Gorkha version are given below:77

Attack by Gillespie. The Gorkhas could observe the movement of the outflanking columns for attack on 30/31 October. Incredibly, it resembles every detail of the build up, movement and deployment for attack. The Gorkhas put British casualties at 8 Gora Sahibs including one General. The actual casualties were: Officers-killed 5, wounded 18; Others- killed 30, wounded 210. Among the senior Gorkha casualties included Subedar Chandravir Thapa, Nathu Ram, Daljit Kumar and Jamadar Daljit Shahi. They also included hundreds of men and their families and the Garhwalis.

Attack on 27-28. Extremely accurate information on build up to artillery, manpower and deployment are given in these letters. They say Mush or columns built up across Nagal, Dandagaon, Lashvan, Asthal, Nalapani and water source. The guns were deployed on Table Land (near wart source) and north end of the Fort. The attack developed along the Table Land from where the battering guns breached the fort wall. They also give details of British casualties including 40 killed and 348 wounded.

Evacuation of Fort of kalunga. The authentic story of this evacuation emerges from these letters. The evacuation of 84 men in fit condition was carried out between the night of 27 November and 29 November in three lots. ON night 27 November, 20 men with standards and treasury moved out. This party was in charge of Ripudaraman Thapa. He had

76 BD Pande (Eng) PP 370-71.77 Based on Captain Bal Bhadra's letter of December 1 of 1814; Ripu Darman Thapa's letter of December 4 and others, the manuscript of which are in the possession of the author.

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four boxes full of jewellery and treasures to cart. He ahd some walking wounded also placed under his charge for move to Srinagar. He halted at Gopi Chand Ka Tippa during the nights of 28 and 29 November, 44 including Bal Bhadra finally vacated the fort. The withdrawal took them to Srinagar and Nahan through the reinforcement companies on the top and the Kiryali. But the withdrawl of Bal Bhadra was throuth the village of Duwara to Chamba (or Chamuya) to Jauntgarh-Jaithak (Nahan).

The veracity of the statement is further confirmed from the British side as on 30 Npvember, on a tip off from locals, Ludlow moved and attacked Bal Bhara's party. Besides killing a Gorkha officer and wounding another Ludlow saw a Gorkha for the first time. The fear Gorkhas had created amongst the British was what Japanese had done to them in 1941-43. Besides they had only seen a Gorkha wounded soldier who walked up to them for treatment to his fractured jaw. It partially fits into the story produced by Edwin T Atkinson in the Gazetteer of the Himalayan Districts (pp 639-640): "The seventy (in fact 84) who escaped from the Fort were soon after joined by some 300 others who had been hovering about the neighborhood endeavoring to find a way into the fort …"

Re-inforcement

The letters also give the arrival of three companies from Nahan under Subba Chandra Vir thapa. These included Jwala Dal, Ran Jang companies. They concentrated on the high ground area of Kyarlie (Kiayali) village and managed to infiltrate about half the strength into the Fort. The letters give impression that Mlechha and Kalanal companies had moved out with their standards. They were perhaps the part of the troops who vacated the fort between 27 and 29 November.

Strength of Gorkhas in Kalunga. British records showed different version of Gorkha strength at Kalunga which varies between 1,000 and 1,500. The actual strength, (though confirmed by Amar Singh Thapa) can be worked out. Mawbey cremated 97 men and women on 1 December, he counted 90 already buried. The strength that vacated the fort was 84, Re inforcement of 150 was built up. Even if an additional

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number of 100 is given to it the strength does not go beyond 600. It must be remembered that of this, atleast 200 were Garhwali fighters and about 175 were the women and children.

Departing Scene. one of the letters of Bal Bhadra gives out his painful departure and leaving behind the wounded. But he had told them that the abandonment of the Fort by men who were fit to fight another day, compelled him to vacate the Fort and leave them behind.

Concluding Lines

Mc Muun compares Kalunga with Chittor when he writes, " After evacuation of the fort by Bal Bhadra it was like the scene of desolution of Chittor in 1533 when 32,000 Rajputs including 13,000 in their flower of Youth and beauty lay dead, through Jauhar and fight." The difference lay only in one thing. Whereas the Rajputs sacrificed themselves more due to fear of indignity, the Muslims would afflict to them, here in Kalungas Gorkhas had inflicted defeat on their mighty foe and yet came out dignified. They transcended the Rajput bravery.78

In the same context William Fraser passed the buck for failure on " The heat, impatience and impetuosity of poor General Gillespie as the principal cause of our defeat", But to the Gorkhas he was fair and said of them in the same vein: "The Gorkhas fought most bravely and resolutely and if they fight as well in the field, we shall have tough campaign".79

To Gillespie's blessed memory there is the tomb in Meerut, still in good shape. The Indian Army takes pride in maintaining it. The marble slab reads : "Vellore. Cornelles. Palumboung- Sir RR Gillespie. Djoc-Joc-arta. 31 October 1814 Kalunga."

Out of Kalunga emerged the image of the Gorkha which is well assessed by General Fredrick Young (also one who fought there), who in his

78 Martial Races of India by Lieut Gen Mc Munn PP 86.79 In India Reveled: The arts and Adventure of james and William Fraser (1801-1835). This book is not for sale in India.

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biography (pp44) wrote: "We may credit the tradition which says that, on abandoning his stronghold Bulbudhur, the Ghoorkha Leonid triumphantly exclaimed in the loud voice: To capture the Fort was a thing forbidden but now I leave of my own accord. Kalunga was never captured . It was entered when evacuated and then razed to the ground". 80 And all that the British could find in the Fort beside the dead and wounded, were 4 small brass and iron guns, 87 mounds of wheat, 109 mounds of paddy and some dal (pulses).81

The impression created by Bal Bhadra on his enemies was so indelible and benign that Colonel Mawbey in his final report to Lord Moira wrote: "It (the last defeat) is attributed to two causes: the first and principal of which was the heroic devotion of the enemy who persisted in manning the breach and bidding defiance to assailants … The second cause, the steep descent … Bal Budder was a brave soldier and humane enemy."

Out of these and several others rose the great tradition of the Gorkhas who since 1814 have continued to hold the great title of the Bravest of the braves.

Effects of Failure at Kalung

At the overall tactical level, the British accepted a sense of moral ascendancy of the Gorkhas over their fighting élan. The Gorkhas could not defeat them in the true sense of the word, but they damaged their military psyche for years to come. At the strategic leval, it forced Moira to abandon the planned advance to the capital of Garhwal and instead, adopted a complementary hook in coordination with Ochterlony's to Nahan. Capture of Virat and advance to Jaithak were a part of this changed strategy.

80 Young's Biography: Three Hundred years in Innishowen .. An Account of Family of Young .. IN referring to Bal Bhadra as leonid, Leonides or Leonide (pro-an-d-dez) he was symbolizing him with the radiance of a shooting star constituting star constituting a meteoric shower that recurs near the 15 th November. Timewise too Bal Bhadra's operations telescoped.81 The details of rations and other recoveries are given at PRNW PP 502.

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And then the caution it posed and the delay it caused to the British operations came out of it. The Divisions of Marley and Wood began to advance on 15 November but these were the advance guards alone. Their main bodies took their own time for one reason or the other. And consequently what were designed to be "Kathamandu by Christmas". became highly improbable. The overall effect of failure at Kalunga is described by the Board of East India Company, comprising G Nugent, NB Edmonstone and Arch Seton who wrote on 27 December 1814.

3. Your Humble Court will peruse with regret on account of the failure of the second attempt to carry the fort of Kalunga by assault on 27 November and of the serious loss which was sustained on the occasion. The result of the second attempt is considered by C-In-C to be so serious and to effect so deeply the public interest and the reputation of our arms. You will learn with satisfaction that three days after the assault the enemy evacuated the fort .. ..82

Atkinson summed up the British feelings with perfect and objective eulogy to Gorkhas of Bal Bhadra Kanwar as he wrote: " Whatever the nature of the Gorkhalis may have been found in other quarters. there was here no cruelty to wounded or to prisoners; no poisoned arrows were used, no wells or waters were poisoned; no poisoned arrows were used, no wells or waters poisoned; no rancorous spirit of revenge seemed to animate them, they fought us in fair conflict like men and, in the intervals of actual combat, showed us liberal courtesy worthy of more enlightened people." He further goes on to describe the humanity of the Gorkhas who, exhibited a strong sence of value of generosity and courtesy in warfare and also of his duty to his country, separating completely in his own mind private and national feelings from each other and his frank confidence in the individual of our nation, from the duty he owed his own, to fight against us, collectively. This was par excellence.

No other enemy so humiliatingly defeated has raised a memorial for his nemesis. This rare honour and distinction is only for Bal Bhadra and His

82 The last report of the Board of East India Company is available in PRNW at PP 443.

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600. It was qually in the words of GRC William to "palliate the disgrace" of the British reverses.83

The Memorial (Dehradun)

The Memorial, now derelict, still stands on the right side of Road Dehradun-Sahasradhara. It was here that Gillespie's headquarters was located during the operations.

Two white obelisks side by side crown the left bank of Raspana Ravine opposite Kalunga, one to the memory of Rollo Gillespie and those who perished with perished with him and the other a tribute to respect our gallant adversary and his brave followers. It reads:

British Side

Maj Gen Sir Rollo Gillespie Tps engagedLieut O' Hara 6th NI Det Horse & Ft ArtyLieut Gosling Lt Bn 100 Men 8th,Irish DragoonsEnsign Fothergill 17th NI HM's 53rd ; 5 Lt CoysEllis, Pioneers 1/6th NI, 1/7th NICapt Campbell 6th NI 1/13 NI; 1/17th NILieut Luxford Horse Arty 7th Native Cav and Risala of Cunnigham Skinner's Horse&NCOs & Men

Gorkha Side

This is inscribed as a tribute of respect for our gallant adversary Bulbuddr, Commander of the fort and his brave Gorkhas who were after wards while in service of Ranjit Singh, shoot down in their ranks to the last man by Afghan Artillery.

83 Memoirs of Dehra Dun by GRC Williams see British Rule in India PP 64.

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On the highest point of the hill above this tomb stood the fort of Kalunga. After two assaults on 31 October and 27the November…

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Operations Against Nepal 1814-1815: The Grave- Yard Of British Generals

"The British could not enter the man-made fort of Bharatpur. Our mountains are impenetrable."-Bhim Sen Thapa, Prime Minister of Nepal 1804-35.

An Ode To The Generals

Of Generals- the great British Generals,Martindell, John Sullivan and George Wood.Those assigned to capture Nepaul including Marley."Why fight?", said they "What could."

- best be obtained by parley

Grace be to their glory,But it must be said,As if in fable and,Good interesting story.The noble Generals of the British Army,That went conquering 'Goorkas of Nepaul'.Their battering guns with brass balls,And they all etched their names into fame's hall.With men forty thousands, elephants and battering guns,They marched through the jungles and streams,Where they sat over Scotch and cream,'Twas Jolly good picnic, 'nautch' and fun.Then they again marched to jungle and mountain tops.Marched down with lesser strength and flops,Destroying villages and abandoned forts and crops,And returned having fired great volleys and shots,Feeling glady and thoroughly gay, Firing their salvos,At poor Marquess of Hastings- Lord we pray,

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Who fleeced the 'Naobab Wazeir" for their pay.This is then story of these grand Generals,Fabulous who created journals,In support to protect their posterior,And history of their motives, ulterior.

Strategy For Operations Against Nepal

Moira devised a strategy that looked 'Continental' in Asia. He wanted to finish in one bold stroke the puny enemy as the Gorkhas were derisively called then and whom his officers and political agents used by different names: "barbarious but brave", 84 "the subject of a foreign state holding land in the dominions of the British Government",85 "an Asiatic Army with no gegular base, or transport, where each warrior carried his food, his kit (such as it is), his ammunition in this person and when he is defeated, he makes the best of his way to home and sets to tilling his filed".86

There are several aspects of the military operations that we saw in the causes of the war. They needed to be dovetailed into the overall strategy Moira evolved and the military plan he made. The assumptions that he made were based on material superiority and the British ability to disintegrate the Gorkha alliance and the overall superiority his force enjoyed visa-vis the Nepalese. His intelligence sources estimated an overall strength of the Gorkha armed men not in excess of 10,000 with flint-locked inferior weapons and a few hundred 2 inch and 3 inch cannons of doubtful capability, as against this he expected to march with about 45,000 to 50,000 regulars, with about the same number of Irregulars a cavalry that would envelop the Gorkha defences, an artillery that would hurl heavy shells and shots form distant places, a European and Native Infantry that would deliver coup de' grace in quick order. Then there would be a vast logistical base, that coped with the operations as they progressed.

84 Ochterlony's letter at PRNW, PP 275. The note read:"The Governor General has not overlooked the inconvenience for the subject of the foreign state (Nepal) holding land in the dominions of the British Government."85 Moira's letter of 8 August 1815.86 Remarked by Field Marshal Roberts of Kandhar many years later as C-in-Indian Army 1889-95.

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The economics of the war was the next, he assumed to be favouring him. There were "Treasures", as he called the Nawab of Lucknow (Oudh) and others under his protection like Raja of Patiala, who would raise the funds and 'barkandawzs' to fight the war to its end without draining the funds of the Company, or causing severe man power shortages. The Gorkhas in comparison were taken as paupers and incapable of raising more than a few thousand rupees.

The game of alliance, however strange bed-fellows they made, was the next factor he assumed to swing in his balance. Though temptations, bribery, reprisals and treaties with Sikhas, hopes of restoration of Rajas and of "a noble rule of law", they, the British, had already begun to gain the favor of an ill-informed public and the selfish Rajas whose sole cause and consequence of war was their personal aggrandizement. The British understood that they had become a "biddable people", as Hamilton called them.87

The divided lots of the Durbaris in Kathmandu, the ill-tereatment Bam Shah and even Amar Singh received at the hands of the Thapas at the Durbar, the intense Thapa-Pande feuds in Kathamandu and a general state of poverty among the Gorkha troops were the next set of factors that gave convocation to Moira's assumption of prevalence of low morale amongst the Gorkha troops, that his forces would fight. He thought they would cave in by the mere size of the British juddernaut.

So, therefore, he divised a military strategy of broad front, short intense war to "chastise the Gorkha" in Nepal and India by the Christmas of 1814. His plan, as we saw, was a widely separated four pronged offensive with flanking operations.

87 See Chapter on Gorkha Administration in Occupied Territories.

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Marley's Quest For Watered Down Operations And his Desertion

The operations in the west were marked with a high degree of zeal in collecting intelligence, subverting the loyalty of old rulers and Quislings like Harsh Dev Joshi, bribery and hollow promises to the locals. They had employed every source to gain intelligence to the maximum. It was a splendidly stage- managed show. And also, the objectives in the west were modest, well-measured and easily achievable. In the east, on the other hand, the objectives envisaged were ambitious, for whom intelligence were sadly lacking. The British had neither acquired good terrain going maps nor employed any worthwhile effort in feeding intelligence even when the operations got going. The agencies that the British trusted were shaky and they abandoned them at the slightest pretext. Information based on the reports of Colonel Kirkpatrick, though two decades old were tightly controlled and in any case, obsolescent and the British were much at loss to correctly evaluate the Gorkha strength in Nepal and their likely reactions.

So confused were the British about the Gorkha capabilities that Moira's directions to the Divisional commanders and the two flanking operational commanders i.e., Gardner (Kumaon) and Latter (Sikkim) were only general in nature. What, however, took precedence over strategic intelligence and operational requirements were the political arrangements which might or might not support the military operations. Undue importance was given to solicit support of " Raja Udai Practap Sigh, ex Raja of Makwanpur, Raja Tej Pratap Singh of Tanhue"; "endeavour to effect the overthrow of the power of Bhim Sen Thapa and deposition of the Raja of Nepal "; and, "subversion of Gorkhas in Nagri (Sikkim)" 88

Such arrangements therefore, lacked the hard and reliable information for planning ground operations by both Wood and Marley. Their plans were, at best, based on hearsay, speculations and little wonder, they went attacking in the euphemistic thin air.

88. Political Arrangements PRNW, PP 267-268.

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Marley's task was to occupy Hetouda (or, Hetoura) and capture the forts of Hariharpur and Makwanpur before proceeding to Kathmandu. He was given wide flexibility on his axis of advance between Rivers Rapti and Bagmati a 30-40 miles wide corridor, at its narrow limits.

His force comprising the Indian and the European artillery (868), HM's 24th/41st Wales (907), the three Indian battalion (1/8 NI, 1/12 NI, 1/25 NI, and two Granadiers and Light Companies alongwith a Pionner Company (276) totaled 7,989. An array of guns, howitzers and mortars made the ordnance that would support his operations and included 2, 18 pounder battering guns; 4, 6 piunders; 8, 42/5 Howitzers; 4, 3 piunders; and 2, 42/5 inch Mortars, 51/2 inch Mortars and 8 inch Howitzers each. (figures in bracket showing the strength)89

While issuing out directions to Marley on 6, November 1814 the commander-in-Chief had emphasized: "The service now entrusted to you is of particularly important nature. We are now about to engage in hostilities with a new power whose insolence and aggression have defied us to arms. The maintenance of the established renown of our country in Asia, the future wars of similar character will greatly depend on a speedy and successful issue to the approaching conest. Of all the operation in progress against Napaul none can more effectually contribute towards bringing such an issue than the accomplishment of important honorable part assigned to you in the general plan…. The expectation which the C-in-C and the Government entertain of success is high; an expectation which HE feels confident will not be disappointed"90

It was also said that the C-in-C had formed the highest expectation of a brilliant and rapid termination of war from Marley's operations.

The rest of the instructions played on his 'elan, dash and ability to manage the war. As the C-in-C felt that the Nepalese had sought the Chinese assistance, Marley was instructed that he should not suspend the operation; "whatever opposes you in the field must be considered as a Gorkha force…". and if confronted by the Chinese they could be told

89 Ibid PP 70190 PRNW, 214-215.

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that the British were on "punitive other than acquisitive," mission in Nepal.91

Marley planned to raise an Irregular battalion but could not muster one in time. His planning involved movement upto the Nepal border on the terrain by a force strong enough to drive in the Gorkhas operating in the area north to Tirhut to the border and then make a determined advance to Makwanpur-Hariharpur. It involved establishing a large firm base on the home side of the border and thence advancing astride the axes leading on to Makwanpur-Hariharpur. The operations are explained on the sketch.

An initial firm base was planned and was obtained under Lieut Colonel Paris Bradshaw, the Political Agent and Major Roughedge, who moved with a considerable force of more than 1,500 including a squadron of Gardner's Irregular's Cavalry and 3,6 pounders, By November-end, posts had been established from Prasa in the west to Bharharwa, the second after a bitter clash with the Nepalese commander Paras Ram Thapa. It resulted in the Nepalese losing 78 killed and 28 prisoners along with their Vakil Chandra Sekhar Upadhyaya.

Marley moved slowly to forward assembly area south of Bharharwa and waited for the battering train of the 18 pounders that had been ordered from Kanpur. They built up only a week before the Christmas. The battering train arrived at Lauton about the time when the Gorkhas were planning a reposte on the build up of the British.

On the ground, however the junior leaders (Captains Sibley and Blakney) assigned with the task of expanding the firm base had moved with boldness. With a disdain for the Gorkha capability which had been inspired from the easy success at Bharharwa under Major Roughedge, Captains Sibley and Blackey failed to adopt adequate defensive measures at Parsa and Samanpur, which they had occupied without resistance. On December 31 and January 1, the attack developed against them as given in the sketch. IN the din of the confusion there were only two gunners Lieut Matheson and Matross William Levy who fought till end. The 91 Quoted by Hasrat at PP 268 from The Campbell Sketch.

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History of Bengal Artillery records their bravery: "Lieut Matheson fought his one gun as long as he had ammunition. Matross William Levy, who, though wounded by a musket shot through one leg and one arm, yet gallantly continued to keep his station till the priming pouch was blown from his side, and his wounds. becoming too painful to endure, obliged him to sit down; and Silari, a gun lascar of the 42nd Company, who though wounded in both hand and foot continued along to assist Lieut Matheson to the last, and who seized and carried away with a silver spear, which the enemy planted close to the gun." 92

The casualties suffered by these two posts i.e., Parsa and Samanpur rose to 383-almost those suffered at the capture of Malaun. These shook Marley.

The Nepalese commander who swept these two posts also carried toe guns which continue to be displayed in the Royal Museum at Kathmandu.93

The events of failure in the west had also begun to influence the judgement of the commanders of the east. If Ochterlony could get over the inertia that had set in at Nehr in December, it was the energetic hands of his allies, the compactness of the area of his operation and the most reliable intelligence of Amar Singh he built through the intercepted mail. The Irregulars too helped him. In the case of Marley and as we will see even of Wood It was not so. The area of operation and the most reliable intelligence of Amar Singh he built through the intercepted mail. The Irregulars too helped him. In the case of Marley and as we eill see even of Wood it was not so. The area of operation law over a vast track over a terrain easily described as difficult, whose every mile would be contested by the Gorkhas for the defence of their country. Marley was watching it and became extra-cautious. The events of the New Year furter dampened his sprits.

The Gorkhas had selected their time of counter-attack ideally as during tthat period the British were known to be busy with their Christmas and New-Year celebrations. They expected lesser degree of vigilance in the

92 The History of Bengal Artillery, PP 26, 27.93 Perceval Landon confirm it so in his book Nepal (Vol I) 1928 (PP 264)

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forward posts. And it proved correct, as on 31 December when Shamsher Rana and Sarbjit Thapa attacked, they found both the posts lightly manned and their reactions sluggish. They were routed.

Its result was not only to effect Marley but those who had become allies of convenience, and strange bed-fellows. Raja of Bettiah's 1,000 Irregulars, who had been raised with difficulty, revolted .The Zamindars of the area, aware of the Gorkha wrath, until now sitting on the fence, weaned off their support, at least temporarily.94

The second effect which plagued Marley under the circumstance could portend self-imposed otacle to offensive. Like all his counter-partsm not sure of outcome of their operations, he began to "over-estimate" the Gorkha strength and capabilities opposite him; it had grown over the period of confrontation, about ten times more than earlier predicted. Despite this swollen strength of 10,000, he argued, his fighting strength was "inadequate" to beat the enemy. He demanded a reasonable supporting ration of two, if not three, to assure success.

He did not, however give up the mission; he only suggested a " Watering down" of his objective. Not Kathmandu. He told the Governor General to limit his final objective to Makwanpur. Alongwith that also went the demand for additional troops.95

Moira had already denuded all his cantonments in Bihar and Bengal of their strengths and built up Marley's force to a staggering strength of 12,000. The accretion to Marley's Division was brought about by diverting HM's 17th from the Gorkhpur Division, which gave him two Eurepean Infantry battalions, ten companies of Grenadiers and an extra battalion of Native Infantry from Tirhut. He also asked the British settler in the area to help Marley. Earlier, a large column of elephants had been coerced to be provided by the Wizir of Oudh to supports his logistic.

But there was that great but-bear, the dread of the Gorkhas which made him drag his feet. The History of Bengal Artillery records it:

94 Pemble, 224.95 PRNW, PP 278.

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"Though reinforced to a strength of 12,000 men and urged to action by the frequent letters of his Commander-in-Chief, he could come to no decision in his own mind but one, that he carried out … Histories tell of armies running away from their General's but there is on record of a General running away from his army, as General Marley did.. Oppressed by a sense of responsibility which he could not bear, he left camp (located at Binjara Pokhara) before daylight on the 10th February without notifying his intention, or making over his office to any one".96

Moira himself recorded his personal disgust of Marley; his report of 2 August 1815:

256. Marley uniformly formed the resolution of not advancing until he should be joined by the battering train which could not reach Bettiah until December.

257. It is impossible for me to acquit Marley of the gross neglect of taking measures of reducing the strength of them (Parsa and Samanpur..)

262. The number of enemy's strength calculated and easily blowed far excess of the enemy's population.

Moira's dream of taking his battle into the heart of Nepal failed by the abortive action of Marley. Colonel Sandes remarked of Marley's operation and his sack from command: "It was pitiful exhibition of irresolution and incompetence… under him fire-eating leaders (were) forced to remain inactive.."97

Captain B Latter who provided the eastern flank protection to Marley's operations by advancing to Morung and inciting uprisings against the Gorkha in Sikkim, felt dejected. In his 4 February 1815 letter he wrote: "It is subject of great regret to me that retrograde movement of General Marley's Amry renders it totally impracticable to afford any assistance to Sikkim Raja in his attempt on Nagree.

96 Also see The History of Bengal Artillery PP 29.97 PNRW, Moira's Report of 2 August 1815.

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Poor Marley ! Most historians wanted to strip him off his insignia of General's rank, some out of disdain, others for the heck of it. Francis Tuker in Gokrha: The sotry of the Gurkhas of Nepal (PP 80-81) found him 'compressed' under the weight of responsibility. And yet, despite his failure and desertion Marley was allowed to remain in service as Commandant of the Allahabad garrison. He died as a full General at Barrackpure on 14 June 1842-full 27 years later.

His one time Gorkha opponent, Bhagat Sigh, according to the British sources The History of Artillery PP 29 foot note) with similar acts of inertia, was said to have been paraded in petticoat in the Durbar !

The fact of Marley's removal need nevertheless to be put in right perspective. Moira, was not happy in sending him as a force commander, in the first instance. He had Major General George Wood, Marley's junior, in mind of the task but could not afford to supersede him for a field command. And when he came up with the suggested 'watered down' objective, he , at once decided to replace him before it was too late. It is only to be inferred that Marley left his command under total depression caused by his inability to accept the challenge of command and mobilize it more vigorously form attack on Nepal. To top it up, the news of his replacement obviously must have further depressed him. The British history is silent in putting on record the version of Marley anywhere which could clarify the position.

In the larger analysis, it was system failure on two accounts: the failure of the C-in-C to pickup the right type of the commander out of those available rather than assign important responsibility purely by the merit of seniority; and secondly, lack of confidence which Marley had in his command was really an endemic problem of that time. In the first case, mediocrity rather than meritocracy was the rule and in the second, the General Officers were picked up at the last minute to command division, of which they knew nothing but which they would soon lead into war. It was a total confusion worst confounded. Some of them who succeeded, had either served these formations earlier or were just plucky and even lucky.

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The Meandering George Wood

Major General George Wood who took over (from Marley), did not consider it suitable to take unnecessary risks. The miserable state of the force, its morale shaken, the coming summer, and the monsoon, the malaria to which local Tharus of the Terai alone were immune and not his troops, served his purpose of procrastination.But in order to cover himself, he began to interpret the new order Moira had passed to him for being speedily executed: "advance to Makwanpur". Not sure of himself, he queried Moira, "in view of advanced malarial weather, the objective should be, clearing the Gorkhas from Terai". This brought Moira's fury, as expected. Major General George Wood, humorously known to the British officers as "Tigher", was proving a jackal, if not a lamb. Moira's letter castigated him squarely as he fired his salvo from Calcutta: "When you were substituted for Major General Marley professedly that you might repair the mischief entailed by his inactivity I should have thought an unworthy impeachment of your character …" He told him of a recent success of the Irregular Cavalry; and by diverting HM's 17th Foot, into his Division, his hands had already been strengthened. And he should act quickly. " I should have lamented that you saw cause to forego what appeared a most advantageous opportunity…nothing of this sort is even the most remotely intimated by you … Do not deceive yourself. You neglecting to give me, your C-in-C, satisfaction on that point was no venial oversight. It was substantially culpable .. My selection of you for the command manifested, my opinion of your character and my personal dispositions towards you. I must not, however suffer my partialities of betray me into a parley with insubordination. I desire you as a soldier to say conscientiously how as you General ought to act in the case which I have detailed to you".98

It spurred George Wood to move at last. He struck down his camp at Binjara Pokhara on 3 march, 1815, moved to Baragarhi which Colonel Randhir Singh of the Gorkhas, fighting his mobile defence, had vacated 98 Military Engineers IN India by Sandes, PP 239.

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in favour of the defence of Hetaura. Roughedge destroyed the post. From here George's juggernaut moved to Saran by 9 March and thence to Janakpur. It was a combing operation of which he said, he had swept the eastern Gorkha territory.

And then he moved back to Bettiah and called off the campaign, as it was no more clinically possible to maintain the health of the troops engaged in operation. The impression he gave of himself to his command was that Cornet Hearsey of the Gardner's Horse called, " disagreeable and incapable old General".99

In no further mood to forgive their Divisional Commanders, HM's 24th

(or 24th /41st Royal Regiment of Wales) recorded their opinion of the two Generals, Bennet Marley and George Wood which its history recorded: "The 24th had the misfortune to be posted to the easternmost Division commanded by General Marley (and George Wood) who were not noted either for energy or initive ..". The Battalion blamed its own indifferent contribution to the war squarely on its Generals' incompetence. On George wood, they wrote specifically: "Having led his 24th, and Indian battalions on a hundred-mile trudge to no purpose other than burning a few abandoned Gurkha stockades, he retried to a camp near Bettiah".100

It was the total disgust of the troops, who are silent yet are the best judge of their commander and Generals. The British troops did not mince their words. Nor did the contemporary historian Penderal Moon who remarked mildly "Marley was unnerved by reports of the Gorkhas fighting qualities and by wild estimates of their numbers. Then of February 10 oppressed by sense of his incompetence, he suddenly, without warning and without handing over to any of subordinate, rode out of camp and left his army to look after itself."101

99 Enclosure with Moira's Narrative of War, letter of 2 August 1815, (PRNW, PP 718)100 Incompetence or irretrievable damages in war had resulted in removal of the senior Military commanders all over the world. In World War II, Wavell, Auchinleck and others had been removed BM Kaul became a casualty in the 1962 India-China war. In operation Desert-Storm, the US Air Force commander was sacked for a small aberration. Often military commanders have become scape-goat for failures of the politicians.101 Quoted from Pemble, PP 241.

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George Wood, the 'Tiger' in hibernation at Bettiah remained in command. He was to deploy his troops in the Terai providing David Ochterlony a larger firm base for his second invasion of Nepal.

John Sullivan Wood Goes Pegging

The Division under command Major General John Sulivan Wood was to advance to Butwal-Palpa with a view "to recover the Terraie of Bootwul and Sheoraj and afterwards to menace the enemy's frontier, creating a diversion in favour of the division advancing on Catmandoo, and of penetrating, if practicable, the hills, so as to occupy Palpa and Tonsein, the principal station and depot of the Goorkha in that quarter… After securing these objects, the further movements of this division is to be regulated by circumstances."

George Sullivan Wood's Division, as seen, was given as difficult a task as indeed to Marley operating further east. To enable him to carry out his task General Wood was allotted a fairly balanced force, that comprised : 8th Native Cavalry (Gardner's Horse); 5th Company 2nd Battalion and 3rd

Company 3rd battalion Artillery with of Pioneers along with a large number of followers and logistics commissariat. The combatants themselves mad about 5,000. Their details:Eighth Regiment Native Cavalry - 114(Later Gardner's Horse).

Artillery, European and Native - 457 2,18 pdrs 8/6 pdrs

5th company 2nd Battalion later 3rd company - 3,4 2/53rd Battalion added. in mors

2,4 2/4 in Hows

European Infantry (His Majesty's Seventeenth) – 958Native Infantry - 2,875Pioneers (8th Company Bengal Pioneers). - 90

Total - 4,494

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It is necessary to clarify that the language of Directive led to ambiguities and interpretations that became partly responsible for the failure of the operations. When the going got tough, the Generals found the ambiguities of orders as excuse for the achievement-short-falls. There is little of a divisional size operations in this sector except that Wood had a skirmish at Jitgarh, that dominated the western flank of Butwal-Sheoraj areas and over them, the axis leading to Palpa. And as failure came too easy, the operation became one of wild-goose chase by the General. First to look for another avenue of advance the subsequently, reacting to the Gorkha actions and rumours.

The chronological development of events of November 1814 February 1815, when constant, though disparagingly show movements took place are below:

The advanced guard troops under Captain Heathcote and Lieutenant Anderson commenced on 15 November, established the firm base by capturing the areas of Mynri (Myanri), Lotan and Nichaul-Pali. It was a good going and gave a flexible and suitable area for the main division to take off.

Under the then reliable guidance of the former Prime Minister of Palpa Kanaknidhi Tewari, Wood planned to march to Siura-Jitgarh-Niakot- with a view to bypass Butwal defence and brushing aside the minor opposition on this axis and assault Palpa from a lesser guarded flank.

Kanaknidhi, beside having remained a Prime Minister of Palpa, was a scholar and had helped Francis Hamilton Buchnan compile An Account of the Kingdom of Nepal and of the Territories Annexed To This Dominion By The House of Gorkhas (Published 1819). He was credited with good knowledge of the ground and because he had avowed to avenge the death of the Raja of Palpa Killed by Bhim Sen Thapa in 1806, he had joined the camp of the Firingis invading Nepal. He was, in a small measure, a 'Harsh Dev' of Nepal.

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Like Harsh Dev Joshi in Kumon, Raja of Nalagarh and other who helped Ochterlony, Tewari agreed to lead the main force up the hill train, he had recommended to Wood and which the latter had accepted. Moving at a snail's pace, Wood's force of about 10,000 including the followers and porters, snaked up the road to Siura where it encamped. HM's 17 th

Foot under Colonel Hardyman, led the advance, on 15 December when it moved cross-country. As the force arrived at Siura on 1 January Randhir Singh's column commanders Shamsher Rana and Sarbjit Thapa opposed them.102

By 3 January Kanaknidhi led the King's troops opposite Jitgarh Fort, its magnificently camouflaged and almost concealed stockade from view. It is here the HM's 17th and other in the advance, bore the brunt of the Gorkha ferocity. They, in fact, ran into a well laid gauntlet of fire. Within hours, Captain Hiat, the Brigade major was wounded, and Lieut Morrison having been wounded, succumbed to his injuries. Other casualties included 19 killed and 100 wounded. It also included a shell grazing to General wood. The enemy was thought to have almost three times casualties, though it was not even one tenth. But defenders of the stockade retreated to the Fort after inflicting casualties. Kanaknidhi too was killed in the melee, whose body was disposed off by Birbhanjan, before he allowed the British to collect their.103

The Fort commander, according to the Nepalese sources, was Birbhanjan Pande; though the British were told it was Wazir Singh.

What actually happened here, notwithstanding the British claim to having and overpowered the stockade, was the taste of a Khukri charge by Birbhanjan Pande against the HM's 17th and others. This pinned down Wood's attacking force.

One of the most dreaded fall-outs of Kalaunga, Jaithak and Ramgarh in the west was the terror of the Khukri wielding Gorkhas in full cry as pack of wolves. That reputation was, until then, intact and showing its full effect in the east. Wood was shaken-up through he still called it a 102 From History of the Family of Hearsays.103 Regimental History of 24th /41 PP 88 interestingly, the motto of this Regiment was akin to the Gorkhas' motto, both meaning rather death than be dishonoured.

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reconnaissance. But he passed the blame for failure at the stockade quickly to Tewari's treachery in misleading him. Prinsep remarked with the advantage of hindsight and tutoring by the Governor General: "The manoeuvre produced no result though attended with several casualties". 104 The main defences of the Fort on this day (3 January 1815) were intact. After consultation with Hardyman and others, Wood quickly appreciated, he would need much larger a force to tackle them and he became "determined to stop the fruitless waste of lives by sounding the retreat". Unfortunately like Marley and later George Wood, Sullivan Wood had neither good advisers nor could he himself remain "determined" to fulfil his mission, failures and blockages, notwithstanding. In case of both the Woods and Marley it was failure to "maintain the aim", as the Twentieth Centure military doctrine finally came to accept as the first and foremost principle of war.

As he vacillated, Wood, in an attempt to reconnoiter another avenue moved to Surajpur but stopped short of Tulsipur, on the western flank. He then retreated, changed his axis 180 degree out of phase and arrived at Bansi by 3 February. The pressure having been released from the Gorkhas, it was their turn to make bolder moves into Terai. They swooped to Tulsipur, Myanri, Siura, Pali, and down to Nichlaul in the east. Even Lotan was forced to be vacated, under the Gorkha Juggernaut.

Wood now made a north-easternly move to Sheoraj- the aweful place as he called it- to follow the tricks of a Ghenghis Khan and Nadir Shah. He destroyed the crops. encouraged his troops to pillage the hamlets and within 12 days he claimed to have destroyed 200 villages. The megalomaniac in John Sullivan Wood satisfied, he then thought of doing the same at Butwal but the extra-caution in him stopped when a small attacking force was caught crossing the Tenavi. He called off the whole operation.

General Wood's attacking force was back at Gorakhpur, form where it had started two months earlier. The image of the superior force 104 Moon, PP 378-79.

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"determined to chastise the Gorkhas" was fissured. Wood was sacked by the Governor General without remorse or fanfare. He in fact offered his resignation, but was sent to England, where, like Marley he too died a full General, the last of his honour being the Governor of Tower of London, an appointment that is customarily given to Generals whose services are immaculate, distinguished, and rewardable.The stigmas Marley and John Sullivan Wood received from their pusillanimous acts in evading the main tasks assigned to them, were perhaps washed away by Moira's own not too clean a record of this operation and more-. In 1823 he had to resign for financial bungling he had done in Hyderabad. The British system of justice had finally caught up with his misdemeanour and similar swindling off the Wizir of Oudh, whom he asked to finance his Anglo-Gorkha as a loan !

As Moira's leadership suffered, the British prestige at its nadir, emboldened not only Bhim Sen Thapa and his grinning Gorkhas but he would tell Moira that the Convention which he forced on Bam Shah and Amar Singh, were fraudulent which he will contest, politically and militarily. Had there been an organization like the United Nations, perhaps Bhim Sen would have sought it's help !

Nearer home, no one was impressed with either the British modern army or their ability to defeat a brave enemy like the Gorkhas. The subversion and fraud they used in Kumaon and the Punjab Hill States could not take them far into the Nepalese main land. It was this frustration Moira reflacted in his remarks to Colonel Nicholls, the Hero of Almora, through a General Order of the day:105

The success of Colonel Nicolls under the complicated difficulties presented by the country, the fortification by which the natural strength was assisted, and the obstinate resistance of a courageous enemy, should prove the superiority conferred by military science and a certainty that strenuous application of its principle must entail honourable distinction on a commander… It is only in unusual situations demanding readiness of resource and animated efforts that the difference between officer and officer can be displayed. And it ought to be always present to the mind of 105 PRNW, PP 712.

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ever military man that he who tries and fails had to plead those chances from which no operation in war can be secured; while he who contedts himself with urging difficulties, registers his own inefficiency (author's emphasis).

As happens in war, the Gorkhas symbolized third battle of Jitgarh-small and insignificant as it was as their important battle that prevented the British in 1815 from aggression against the main land. It was, in fact, an overall failure for Lord Moira; and the Gorkhas turned their border as de-facto Laxman Rekha, proving their hills impenetrable.

Effects of the First Campaign: An Analysis

"It is often outside the power of the General to act as he would have liked owing to lack of adequate resources and I think military history seldom brings this out. In fact, it is almost impossible without a detailed study which is often unavailable. For instance, if Hannibal had another twenty elephants, it might have altered his whole strategy against Italy."-Lord AP Wavell in a letter in a letter to BH Liddel hart, 1942.It is intended to discuss the implication of the aftermath of the first campaign, briefly. Moira never expected Gorkhas to capitulate so quickly after situation turned so dismal in November-December 1814 and continued to remain so, on the fronts of three fourth of his force.

The avalanche of the Gorkha defeat and the landslide of the British victories at Almora and Malaun turned the British extra generous, magnanimous to a limit that they let Gorkhas march off with honour. They realized their folly, when the Durbar began to refuse to ratify and Convention which Amar Singh and Bam Shah had signed in April-May. A second campaign thus became necessary to accept the ratification of the Convention. The government of the day in London and later the historians blamed Moira for showing extra generosity to the Gorkhas. Philip Mason, for example, wrote: "With the advantage of hindsight the Gorkha war was prolonged because we released Amar Singh Thapa when he surrendered".106 It is doubtful if the Durbar at Kathmandu could have made efforts to retrieve Amar Singh and his force, if the 106 Nepalko Sainik Itihas, PP 420 and PRNW, PP 524.

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British took them as prisoners. Even if it were to be so, the line of defences extending from Jaithak into Garhwal was still intact and it could have taken the British, the best part of the following year to carry on the struggle. In any case, the failure in the east justified Moira's action. Besides, he constantly feared that the strategic support from the Chinese and Nepalese alliance with the Marathas and Sikha could well have sprung another surprise for the British.

Abandoning an empire of 45,000 square miles of the occupied territory by the Nepalese was the matter of great pain to Amar Singh who rightly called it as having been built "over four generations of acquisition, dignity and dominion".107 The British too reasised that rubbing the Gorkhas beyond a point was not in their interest. Moira made the point clear when he wrote: "The procrastination of the Gorkhas in concluding a treaty is not to be wondered at. The subscribing to the loss of half their empire is a painful submission of a proud people." 108 Commenting on the situation HH Dodwell thought that the series of defeats of the British at the hands of the Gorkhas "Spread widely in the country and offered no small encouragement to the Peshwas. Ochterlony alnoe restored the lost prestige of his nation". 109 Similar was the observation of Moira who wrote in his diary "Ameer Khan (of the Pindari) has in his camp 30,000 fighting men, 125 pieced of cannons. it is clear that he is waiting in the hope of untoward events occurring to us in the Nepalese war; an expectation founded on the extravagant opinion, they entertain of the Gorkha power and the reverses we have already suffered in the context."110

Penderal Moon saw it in winder perspective and with an objectivity, rarely visible among the British historians except Edward Bishop. "The overall setback of the British and their defeats at Kalunga and Jaithak, the timidity of General Wood and desertion of General Marley had shaken the British self-confidence and gave rise to their enemies, wide 107 Birbhanjan is said to have told he British: " I have issued orders to my victorious troops not to molest your wounded men but any aggression will be severely punished". And of Kanaknidhi, Wood had written, " If he is with the enemy I have no dubt of his treachery".108 Wood's report at PRNW, PP 524 India no doubt of history of Bengal Artillery PP 25.109 From Article " The Operation Leading To Capture of Almora In 1815" by JC Powell-Price (obtained from the Gurkha Museum Winchester, England).110 A Matter Of Honour: An Account Of the Indian Army. Its Officers And Men by Philip Mason.

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hopes of strengthening their arms to drive them out. The Marathas, Scindias, Holkars and Peshwas, Amir Khan, the Nizam and Ranjit singh were unanimous in their design-though not united to do so. The Gorkha bravery and resistance sent waves of jubilation all over India nad indeed, sensation."111

Moon based his observations only on what Amar Singh Thapa had written in his letter of 2 March 1815. "If succeed", Amar Singh had said, " and Ranjore Singh with Jaspau Thapa and his officers prevail at Jaithak, Ranjit Singh will rise against the enemy. In conjunction with Sikhs, my army will descend into the plains, recover Dun; when we reach Haridwar, Nawab of Lucknow will take part in the cause."112 But do we not see lack of unity and vision among the Indians as their prominent failure ? These two had already become the cause of their earlier subjugation to the Muslims and the oncoming one to the English.

Sir Charles Metcalfe chastised the military for failure of intelligence estimates, as he wrote, " Before we came to contest, their power of resistance was ridiculed. Their forts are said to be contemptible, their arms are described as useless. Yet we find on the trial, they can deal out death among their assailants and stand to their defences". The Gorkhas had tought a lesson to the British, which nobody had so far done. And then the British began trumpeting the Saga of the true bravery of the Gorkhas. In Metcalfe's words:

We had never met with an enemy who showed decidedly more bravery and greater streadiness than our troops possess; it is imposible to say what may be the end of such a reverse of order of things. In some instance our troops. Europeans and Native, have been repulsed by inferior numbers with sticks and stones. In others, our troops have been charged by enemy sword in hand and driven for miles like a flock of sheep. In this war, we have numbers on our side and skill and bravery on the enemy side." He made the British command see the writing on the wall as he suggested. " Our power in India rests upon our military superiority. It has no foundation in the affections of our subjects. It

111 Original letter of Amar Singh Thapa is kept in India Officer Library.112 In moira's report of 2 Ausgust 1815.

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cannot derive support from the good will or good faith of our neighbors."

This very truth prevailed in India till 1946. The first campaign maimed, if not killed the myth of the British military superiority in India. They proved no match for the Gorkha bravery, the bravery of men of hills, who beat them in an alien land, far off form their own home land. Surrounded by allies-turned-enemy and fence-sitters, yet their bravery saw the day. It caused anxiety and fears to Moira, who agreed with Metcaffe that "to be failed in the struggle with the Gorkhas would be the first step to a speedy subversion of our power." By the end of 1815 he was all out for another confrontation-in order to reduce the lost prestige. And the stratagems he used were desperate.

I began the theme of operations in the East as "Graveyard of the British Generals". It turned out so not necessarily due to the lack of competence, mediocrity or a new battlefield milieu that the Anglo-Gorkha war offered. It was, in large sum, due to the psychological imbalance of most of the British Generals. They were not just attuned to fighting war, or even managing its complex character, which as Ochterlony realized and, called for "genius" in a man. The Gorkha commanders, on the other hand, bereft of a finesse were one who had known the face of the battle many a time and were mentally prepared to fight it out. If only resources matched their valour, they would have ruled Asia !

Psychology, has over the centuries rightly assumed important factor in selection, training and nurturing of military commanders. It took the British a century more to appreciate it.

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Kumaon: A Burden Of History: Without Almora There Could Not Have Been A

MalaunBefore the establishment of Almora town, the Katyuri Raja Baichaldev (whose capital was in Askot), gave it to a Gujrati Bhahmin. The development of Almora was done only by the Chands who made places for themselves and permitted habitation. They named it as Rajapur.

Towered by the mountains Kalimath, (6,414 fet), Shimtola (6,066 feet) and the massif of the Gannath, it is a beautiful town that has human life in the lap of nature.113

The Gorkhas, who occupied it from 1790 did little improvement to the town except re-building the Lalmandi fort, improving the Gannath temple and turning the are of Sitoli into a fortress. This has now been taken over as an establishment of Ministry of Defence. On capture on Almora in April 1815, the British re-designated Lal Mandi as Fort Moira and made it as the Headquarters of Kumaon Commissionary from where they began to control both Kumaon and Garhwal. Owing to the topographical similarities, cultural consonance, and political expediency, the idea of an integrated state of Uttrakhand demonstrates the historical feelings of the people of the region of Garhwal and kumaon.114

Without dwelving further into history we move to re-capitulate the plan of offensive against Gorkhas by the British in 1814. The 1st Division under Major General Marley had been given the task of seizing the pass at Makwanpur and advance on Kathmandu; the 2nd Division under Major General Wood was to move into Nepal through Butwal and cooperate with the 1st Division; the 3rd Division under Major General Gillespie was to initially capture Dun and thence to operate against 113 Hyder Young Hearsey was an Eurasian of the Hearsey family. He was trained by General M Perron who served with Scindias. An active adventurer who traveled to Tibet and then fought against the Gorkhas in Kali Kumaon.114 Earlier known as kurmanchal, kumaon fascinated Mahatma Gandhi. He wrote of it in Young India in 1929: "In these hills natural hospitality all men can do. The enchanting beauties of the Himalayas envelops you. Leaves nothing to be desired. I wonder whether the scenary of the hills and the climate are to be surpassed, if qualled by any beauty spot of the world."

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Srinagar or Nahan; and finally, the 4th Division under Ochterlony was to operate against the Gorkhas east of the Sutlaj and south of Bilaspur.

The indications of political agents working against the Gorkha citadels of Kumaon were that they lacked strength both in numbers and will power, could be subdued through determined advance and skirmish by the Irregualrs. As Gillespie's 3rd Division was expected to turn the flank of Kumaon by operating in Garhwal, the success could be further facilitated. William Gardner and Hearsey,115 116both energetic Eurasians had shown great degree of enthusiasm in intelligence collection and understanding the terrain of Kumaon. And both volunteered to raise and lead a corps of Irregulars against the defence of Bam Shah in Kumaon while Gillespie reduced the Gorkha defences in Dun and elsewhere.

Moira saw a good opportunity to work on the plan which formulated into a two-pronged advance to Almora. The column for Almora was placed under Gardner, who by now had been given an acting rank of Lieut Colonel and on the east Hearsey, being given an acting rank of Lieut Colonel and on the east Hearsey, being made a Captain, was to command the Irregulars through the Kali Kumaon. Hearsey was to eventually converge at Almora. Both had full local support from Harsh Dev Joshi- the so called Duke of Warwickshire of Kumaon-the man who earlier invited the Gorkhas but was now siding with the British in their over-throw.117

The Gorkhas had been in occupation of Kumaon fro almost a quarter century and their Governor Bam Shah had brought about considerable stability –if not prosperity-in Kumaon. Though an able administrator, he was distinctly a vacillating military commander. His own rapport with Kathamandu was poor and he was under relentless pressure from the British stratagems of dissension and subversion to support them in 115 The reasons why the British regarded Garhwal and Kumaon essential to their security have already been explained elsewhere. The passes of Thag La, Tsang Chak La, Mana, Niti, Tan Jung La, Kungribingri, Lipu Lekh etc provided easy entry into Tibet or Tartary. The region served as a trade corridor to China.116 Liet Colonel William Gardner. A King's officer. He had served Moira in Quiberon in 1795. Then acted as a free lance mercenary in India and became Hearsey's brother-in-law.117 Harsh Dev Joshi. Harsh Dev played his role continuously until this war, when he had joined Gardner in January 1815 to advise him to fight the Gorkhas. Gardner, to quote Pemble, 'was struck by the intelligence of Joshi and saw his utility'. The British made him a Tehsildar but he died in July 1815, lamenting and cursing every one. However, his sons were given a petty pension by the British, as a sop.

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surrendering the province of Kumaon or even as a bad case, defect to them. But under him their were very able military commanders which included his own brother Hasti Dal, then Governor of Doti province of Nepal, Captain Angad, Chamu Bhandari, Subedar Zabar Adhikari, Jasmardan Thapa, a Rohilla by name of Rengelu and his own son Nar Shah.

Two main factors assisted Moira to take the calculated risk of launching Irregulars into Almora. Firstly, the attitude to Bam Shah to British overtures for reconciliation, negotiation and even territorial adjustments including the other proclivity mentioned above. Secondly, the paucity of Gorkha regular troops in Kumaon since most of them had been diverted in from of reinforcements to Kalunga, Jaithak and the Punjab Hill States. Although Bam Shah was relying on Hastidal to defend the Kali Kumaon, and he had been assured by the Zamindars of Rudrapur of support in the Terrai, his denuding of troops, nonetheless became a temptation to Moira to let it be captured by Irregulars. In addition, the local Kumaoni had been weaned away by Harsh Dev Joshi who had unequivocally assured Gardner of more support and rebellion in the country side118 Accordingly, Moira agreed to the large scale employment of Rohillas, Pathans and the Kumanonis, Garhwali volunteers. And as Rohillas had knowledge of the country (through earlier invasions and trade), they were thought to be the better lots. The Pathans were expected to join for temptations of large sum of contractual money that the British were prepared to dole out. But they were neither trained nor blooded in battle.

In January 1815, Gardner and Hearsey combine were then sprung into action to concentrate their force in two separate areas i.e. Kashipur and Pilibhit. The forces that finally joined up were:

Gardner : 3,000 Irregulars. 2.6 Pounders

118 See BD Pande,pp 373 (English Version).

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Hearsey : 2,000 Pathans and 200 Kumaonis and two regular companies. He also had some Gorkhas.119

Lieut Colonel Gardner made steady progress. He left Kashipur on 11 February, arrived at Dhikuli, up the course of the Kosi. Bam Shah's early warning troops kept falling back. On 19 February, 1500 strong detachment of Gardner occupied Kath-ki-Nau feature, while another column was sent to Kotagarhi, Ukhaldhunga south of Bujan. It caused Sardar Angad's forward troops on Bujan to fall back to Kumpur, south of Chaubatia by 28 February.

Gardner kept up his movement along the Kosi, reaching Binakot, and occupied the twin features of Chamuna Devi and Kapina-ka-Danda (also known as Kathal-Lekh). In order to give a fight now, Sardar Angad, occupied the feature of Point 5983. But Gardner fully supported and accompanied by Joshi, found out from him that the 7,186 feet Syahi Devi feature was unoccupied and its occupation would help unseat Angad from forward positions. It worked. For, as Gardner placed a strong detachment with difficulty on the snow covered peak of Syahi Devi by 22 March and he himself occupied the large Katarmal feature (Sun God Temple located here), the Gorkhas were left with no option but to pull back to their main defences of Kalimath, Sitoli, Almora, Gannath and Sintola.

It is interesting to note how Colonel Gardner, an Eurasian incharge of Irregulars moved up along the kosi in the west and another Eurasian Hyder Hearsey from the east. Both were to converge at Almora to bring about a military defeat on Bam Shah. The sketch shows schematically the progress of Gardner's advance to Katamal. It was a true see-saw, stalking game. First the early warning troops of Bam Shah fell back until they blocked Gardner's advance through the Ranikhet route first by occupying Bujan and later Kumpur and Temple Hill (Point 5983). Gardner switched his axis to Binakot and occupiued Chamua Devi and later Syahi Devi. This made Angad Sardar to reel back to Sitoli and the main complex. Gardner then firmed in at Katrmal doing his

119 The information on Hearsey's operations are also contained in micro-films in the Army Museum London.

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reconnaissance and subversion before arrival on 12 April of Lieut Colonel Nicolls with artillery and regular battalions.120

We leave Nicolls at Katarmal and move to the Kali Kumaon to see the progress to Hearsey's column.

Hearsey's 2,000 Irregulars under Kalu Khan with two regular companies marched up audaciously along the western bank of the famous River Kali. Trudging along the jungle trail, they crossed the Timla Pass before descending into the 'man-eater' country of Champawat.121 The Gorkhas had deployed a thin screen of troops along the trail. Before Hearsey's column could snake its way up to the Lohaghat-Pithoragarh track, the Gorkha defences at Kautalgarh and Khilapati had to be overpowered. Hearsey occupied them and then based on the local intelligence, placed detachments on the three crossing places on the Kali. He had been tasked to demolish these bridge too.

The news of Hearsey's burly Pathans reached Hasti Dal, the Governor of Doti and the younger brother of Bam Shah. He decided to confront Hearsey. In a sharp attack on the morning of 2 April he overpowered the Pathans and the Kumaonis at Khilapati and captured Hearsey, by then wounded. An enraged Gorkha soldier was about to kill him when Hasti Dal intervened. He was made prisoner and his Irregulars ran away. He was then escorted to Almora. Before depatching him, Hasti dal told Hearsey that, " hired men do not give their lives for a cause".

Was it to repay the gratitude that Hasti Dal owed him when he spared the life of Hearsey, is difficult to say. But according to a "family story" Hearsey had earlier saved Hasti Dal from being killed by a wild bear. According to Hearsey's biography, in 1808 Moorcroft and Hearsey having traveled to Tibet were returning through Garhwal when they were intercepted by the Gorkhas at Srinagar and were accused of espionage. It was Hasti Dal who helped him to be released from the Gorkhas. It was thus a strange acquaintance-cum-friendship of Hasit Dal with Hearsey that was being enacted at Khilapati.120 Also see Pre- Muntiny Records Office of The Commissioner of Kumaon, PP 79; now located is regional Archives, Lucknow.121 Years later Champawat became famous for the story of Man Eater of Kumaon by Jim Corbett.

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Hasti Dal retook the fort of Kutalgarh by defeating Hearsey's Adjutant Mr Martindale, another free lance British seeking adventure. Martindale, however managed to escape with his Pathans and Kumaonis, who time and again, proved no match to the Gorkhas. The casualties suffered were 31 killed and 53 wounded.

A third and subsidiary force was also arranged to move in the centre of these two main forces. Its strength was 500 and its objective was to link up with Gardner's force. It reached Bhim Tal and then the Gorkhas never allowed it to move or link up.

What was admirable with the British logistics was the mail that moved to and from the field formations to Moira's roving headquarters. He had just been to Moradabad and thence Saharanpur. It is a Moradabad that he received the letters from Gardner and others which gave out the situation. Post-haste he appreciated the landslide that he would have to cross. If Kumaon was to be got, Gorkhas were to be chastised and if he were to keep his job as Governor General and C-in_C, he had to move fast. He saw Gardner going slow and being uncertain of tackling Bam Shah (If he offered full resistance). Gardner having known the prowess of the Gorkhas already from the accounts of the British failures and his own judgements, chose to avoid confrontation as far as possible and naturally went slow. He took a whole month on at Kapina-ka-Danda. He was not 'appreciated' by the Governor General fro the delay. IN fact, Moira was in a panic as well as anger and he decided to pick on Colonel Jasper Nicolls (14th Foot), Quarter Maste of the King's forces and one easily available to take on the task.122

Gardner's role need not be played down as Hearsey's, who divided his force and helped it get destroyed piecemeal. For, Gardner had moved his force with skill and caution better than Generals Wood and Marley in the east. And having got it into its firm base, deployed tactically so well that it could retain operational flexibility. He had a good firm base available and his intelligence was superb. The Syahi Devi feature however looked too far for deploying either a gun or influencing the 122 Nicolls rose to became C-in-C India. His records are kept in the National Army Museum, London.

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battle of Almora effectively. It nonetheless offered him no specific tactical advantage in later stages of battle; on the contrary it became a problem of logistic. It must be understood that the plan that Nicolls followed- and took the credit for success had been evolved by Gardner.123

On arrival of Nicolls the force level was increased substantially. Besides the Irregulars there built up ¼ NI (761), 2/5 NI (764), 15th NI (500), 27th

NI (1,500) and 2, 12 pounders, 6, 6 pounders and 2, 4 2/5 inch mortars under Lieuts CH Bell and RB Wilson. The entire strength rose up more than 7,000.

The plan Nicolls inherited from Gardner was to go in for Sitoli and Kalimath together before expanding to Almora; or go to Gannath and then roll down on Almora. The Gorkhas were now disposed off generally on Kalimath (150), Sitoli (200) under Sirdar Angad, Almora ( 250 distributed in pockets at Lal Mandi, Nanda Devi, Deep Chand Temple area and Haridungri- the site of present day cemetery), and Gannath (200) with a small reinforcement having moved from Doti under Hasti Dal on 6 April when he brought Hearsey to Nanda Devi fort. There were no guns with the Gorkhas and their overall condition is best narrated in the words of Bam Shah: "We holding Sitoli and Almora, inspite of some reinforcements brought by Hasti Dal, we are very much fewer in numbers. We are hard up for supplies, and having received no pay, men are tempting to go out and alienate the people." Bam Shah himself had decided to sell some of his jewellery to raise money to buy supplies and keep the Gorkhas from open rebellion and desertion. The overall morale of the Gorkhas was low.

Nicolls was hoping that Bam Shah would come around, and handover Almora and Kumaon to him without a fight . A fortnight was now spent in negotiations, which led to nothing, till on the 22nd April, according to

123 Much of the prejuidice against Anglo-Indians (Eurasians) also came in the way keeping Gardner in command. Besides being a case of injustice, it has corollary with World War II-situation in North Afrika Korps, he earned all the credit. Eurasian were grossty ill-treated by the British of those times almost all over the colonies. While in India Lord Moira called them 'Unconvenated' service', in Malaya they were known as Marginal Men. See Memoirs of Marquess of Hastings and Tales of the South Pacific (by James A Michner), Such a treatment arose from English psychology of 'Whiteman's Superiority', being lowered by the offsprings from the women of colured races in the colony.

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the British version, "crisis was produced by hasti Dal taking a strong detachment, and marching northward from Almora."

What were these negotiations about ? There are on records, instructions to Edward Gardner (brother of Leiut Colonel Gardner) the political agent, to open negotiations with Bam Shah from early 1814. Copies of Correspondence between Bam Shah and Sir E Colebrooke are also available in these records. All show an orchestrated and motivated plan to 'buy' Bam Shah. In the end Colonel Bradshaw informed Gardner that "although Bam Shah had broken negotiations, the British government will not disclose to the Nepal government his past acts". A clear case of Bam Shah's complicity, or indiscretion-or both as he was compelled to hob-nob with British agents; and also of the British attempts to blackmail him. Much of it has been explained by Gardner in his letter of 22 November 1814 placed at PNRW, PP 298-299.124

Even BD Pande called Bam Shah not only a disaffected man (which indeed, he was) but one who made " peace cheap" fro the British.125 The British temptation of offering to him the post of Governor of Doti after the ceasefire remained in the mind. The Durbar had also not had good relations with Bam Shah. Bhim Sen suspected him to not toeing his line and Bam Shah himself thought, Bhim Sen had little idea of diplomacy lesser still of statecraft as expected of a statesman Prime Minister of Nepal. What, therefore, lacked in Kathmandu, Bam Shah tried to do from Almora during the last few months of his Governorship when the war clouds hovered in 1814-1815. The British, expert in exploitative machinations, endeavored to engineer their strategies so as to make Bam Shah look suspicious in the eyes of his own people.

In response to Gardner's letters, Bam Shah finally wrote to him by dissociating himself from any future incrimination: " What you observe regarding the state of the roads and difficulties of intercourse.. You have alluded to my correspondence with Mr Rutherford.. My communications with that Gentle man were merely lamenting that the strict and ancient friendship between the two states should have been disturbed by trifling

124 Pre-Munity Records, PP 262.125 BD Pande, PP 394.

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altercations between Zamindars on frontiers of Palpa and Butwal. It is probably on this subject that you required me to send you a confidential person on my part… I will depatch a trustworthy person." Inspite of the non-ambiguous nature of Bam Shah's letter, the British continued to play on the point that somewhere, somehow he would prove slippery.

The controversy is put to its end by Campbell's notes: At a later period we offered Bam Shah and his brother (Hasti Dal), our protection and guarantees, in the event of their declaring themselves independent rulers of the Province of Doti. But like Amar Singh under similar circumstances, they scorned the idea of deserting in time of need of their lawful sovereign and native cournty.126

Both from the diplomatic angle and the military side the Gorkhas had to fight at Almora under great constraints. The Kumaonis had begun to desert by hundreds and the civilians were refusing to help them with provision s and intelligence. Instead, they were siding openly with the British and no movement of the Gorkhas was hidden. Their moves were reported as promptly to Nicolls for money and they themselves volunteered to guide the British columns.

As the battle indications built up by 20th April, Gorkhas began to read just their positions. It was rightly appreciated that by capture of the Gannath heights the British would not only be able to attack Almora easily from that direction but the Gorkha line of communications to Garhwal would be automatically severed. Though Bam Shah had a small detachment on Gannath he planned to send his brother with a larger possible detachment of men to take over the defensive responsibility. Hasti Dal, in the meanwhile instructed the detachment on Gannath to also expand its defences near the temple (today's government nursery) from where the gradient commences to the Gannath Temple. The stockade, in his opinion would have the advantage of water from the temple and it could be really well defended. The work on it had carried on for some time.

126 See Hasrat, PP187.

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Then a new move by Nicolls of a large force of more than 900 men to occupy a firm base near the stockade was learnt. (It had seven companies of 5 NI, % flank companies, 100 Irregular mostly the deserters from the Gorkha and 2, 6 pounders). This obviously was seen as danger to the small detachment of the Gorkhas in the area. Hasti Dal's move to this place was carried out when Bam Shah was told that " 2,500 men are in a stockade on the Fatehpur Hill (the general area of the Temple) and our communications with Bageshwar are threatened."127

Hasti Dal joined them on 22nd April with depleted companies of Taradal and Bhawanibaksh and was soon organizing the defence. The biggest treachery against the Gorkhas was done by the priest of local temple of Gannath who briefed Major Patton, the force commander that "the time of evening meal was most favourable for attack". The Gorkhas were taken by surprise and the contest was soon decided. After a short sharp fight, the Gorkhas suffered a loss of an officer and 32 men killed on the spot, while many were wounded including their leader Hasti Dal, who succumbed to his injuries before reaching Almora. The British suffered two killed and 26 wounded. Loss of Gannath dashed Bam Shah's hope to fight a protracted war.There are versions which are at variance with the present one128

Adequate proof exists that patton's force had been guided quietly by the priest and evening when the Gorkhas were in the process of eating their meals and had been fully surprised. In Hasti Dal, who was regarded as " a jewel of the Gorkha Commander", the loss for Bam Shah was both personal and military. For, Hasti Dal was the most valuable, active and enterprising officer and a man whose character was particularly amiable. His position now became like Amar Sigh's after the loss of Bhakti Thapa. After the Gannath action, Bam Shah had been left with just about 200 men and almora became an easy walkover for the British.

Bam Shah may have been a vacillating commander and even a suspect on account of hob-nobbing with the British, but he was a Gorkha who did not surrender tamely. He decided to fight it out in his own way.

127 Atkinson (The Himalayan Gazetteer, VOL II, Part II), PP 660-661.128 Other Records are also available at PRNW, PP 572, 573.

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Hearing of the success of Patton's action at Gannath, Nicolls immediately proceeded to attack Almora. The battle, a sharp and swift action of five hours on night 26/27 April saw the end of the Gorkhas in Kumaon. By this time, Nicolls had also been informed that Ochterlony had made a deep wedge in Amar Singh's defences at Malaun (Rajgarh). In his effort to subtly and covertly influence negotiations and military action, he had been telling Bam Shah that the Gorkhas had already lost the war. The British propaganda proved successful and convincing communication black-out, resulted. This was further aggravated by interception of dak all over.

Nicolls advanced on Sitoli via Hawalbagh then a treeless spur (unlike now a good jungle). 4 NI and Gardner's horde moved up and captured the two stockadge that made the defences of Sitoli Ridge. Sitoli opend the routes to Almora town-five of them as Nicolls papers make them out. These were perhaps to cemetery, Hiradungi, Kalimath and three small tracks to the down, its tow forts and the Palace/Temple. Now the geography of Almora is different. But the battle and names as they appear on sketch below would serve the purpose. The Nicoll papers that are housed in the India Office Library (UK) help explain the battle to some extent. Bam Shah's letter also shows details, though this letter had, obviously been written under duress as every thing had been lost by then and some of the statements in it are in self-defence as also British-tutored. It nonetheless helps to understand the battle from the Gorkha side of the story.

Briefly Sitoli was commanded by Angad. He could not defened it, inspite of extra ammunition having been sent with Bam Shah's son, Nar Shah. Kalimath defences were commanded by Bhandari Kazi and it had counter-attacked the advancing British echelons at Hiradungi (Cemetery). It caused some damage to the British as Lieut Tepley of 2/27 NI was killed and several were wounded.

The battle of the fort was fought on night of 25th April. It was pounded with mortars from 6 pm in the evening until next morning. The Gorkha detachment at Kalimath counter-attacked inflicting some casualties on the Indian Infantry. The battle was terminated at 9 a.m. when taking

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council from Captain Hearsey, Bam Shah sued for peace. A strange case of an evemy's counsel being heeded.

The casualties suffered by the Nicoll's force exceeded 200 in this easy, five hour battle against an opposition that was so feeble. The casualties actually took place due to the mix-up, and confusion of the night attack and self inflicted casualties by the British. It was said that the Gorkhas dressed as Rohillas attacked them. A Mongol could never look like an Indian Pathan or Muslim even in dream or darkness. But a reson had to be found, however cloudy.

The rest of the drama of negotiations is best narrated in the words of Atkinson:

The aritillery fire was continued until 9 a.m., when the Chauntra sent a letter under a flag of truce, supported by a letter from Captain Hearsey, requesting a suspension of hostilities and offering to treat the evacuation of the province on the basis of the terms offered to the Chauntra several weeks previously by Mr Gardner …. The Convention for the evacuation and surrender of Kumaon was signed on 27th April, 1815 by E Gardner, Bam Shah, Chamu Bhandari and Jasmardan Thapa… On the 29 th April Bam Shah and his Sardars paid a complimentary visit to Mr Gardner and Colonel Nicolls and were received with a salute of Nineteen guns…. The same evening Jasmardan Thapa on the part of Bam Shah came with an open letter that it might be forwarded to Amar Singh Thapa. Ranjor Singh and the other Sardars at Jaithak and Nahan advising them to endeavor to obtain for themselves similar condition and to withdraw their forces from the western hills to the east the Kali" (Emphasis by author).129

Bam Shah must share the aweful responsibility of destroying the Gorkha empire.130 in Kumaon.

On the British side there was miscarriage of justice when it came to give credit to Wolliam Gardner. The Governor General's last word on

129 For full text of Bam Shah's letter see Atkinson, Vol II, Part II, PP 665-666.130 Critical views on this campaign are also contained in an article by Powell Price (In possession of the author).

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Kumaon heaped all praise on Nicolls ignoring Gardner totally. He called Nicolls " a man of judgement of unremitting activity; of gallant promptitude, against obstinate resistance of a courageous enemy ..".

The British achieved their objective of obtaining a trade corridor through Kumaon, which ipso-facto was their strategic aim of the campaign. But that it would bring about a wind-fall was hardly expected. For, the cheapest victor at Almora provided them with the largest gain. It is a truism to say that while Almora became a burden of history fro the Gorkha, it paved the way to Malaun and th Treaty of Sagauli, for the British.

The Hiradungi Cemetry

The tombstones at the cemetery of Kirk and Tapley besides the remnants of the forts at Pithoragrah and Almoara, the terrain features alone are the war memorials and archives of this battle.

1. The tombstone of LieutenantsKirk and Tepley Both of the 2nd Battalion 27th Regiment Native InfantryNative InfantryThe latter was killed on the evening of the April 1815 on duty as an Advanced Post in the town of Almora. The former died on the 16th

May following a victim to zealous and continued extension in this final operations of the campaign.

2. The writings on the Fort Nanda Devi or Malla Mahal Almora. The Fort was erected by the Chand Rajas of Kumaon and strengthened by the Gorkhas and was captured by the British under Colnel Nicholls on the 26th April 1815. The convention for the surrender and evacuation of Kumaon was signed the following day (i.e. 27th April 1815).

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The Coming of the Gorkhas of the Indian Army

"Man is the first weapon of battle; Let us then study the soldier in battle; for, it is he who brings reality to it. Only study of the past can give us a sense of reality and show us how the soldiers will fight in the future".

-Ardent du Picq.

"Militrary History is a flesh and blood affair, not a mater of diagrams and formulas and rules; not of conflicts of machines but of men."- Field Marshal AP Wavell in Soldier and Soldiering.

When you look at an adversary you see him as an equal, inferior, and rarely as a superior. Looking at the adversary as an inferior has its hassles or lacunae. Under-estimation that inevitably results from looking at an adversary as an inferior, is fraught with dangers. It militates against the age old principle of war: never under-estimate your enemy, however insignificant.

Putting an adversary on equal footing has its pros and cons. That puts you on guard, always. Those who over-estimate their adversaries as superior also fall in the realm of error, as they began their assumptions on a totally wrong footing and hesitate to take bold decisions.

The British suffered from the myopia of under-estimating their adversary- the Gorkhas, as they had earlier done to against Hyder Ali or at Bharatpur. From 1792, when Kirkpatrick131 gave them an ideia of the combat qualities of the Gorkhas, until 1814, when they were about to engage in a clash of arms, the British saw Gorkhas in different colours

131 Interest in the Gorkha was raised for the first time by Kirkpatrik who visited Nepal ini 1792-93. He opened the veil of secrecy. Being a soldiers in the Indian Army.

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and shades. But it was always as an 'inferior' who needed to be chastised for lescence of arms and equipment. Among the British there were Moorcroft, serters like O' Brian and hosts of others, who came in contact with the British and gave their impressions of the Gorkhas. As a result, the Gorkhas were seen by the British "as tough as mountain goats", "simple but dangerous" who had won their battles without single gun and so on.

So, they began their wars with the airs of confidence, which transcended from Moira to last British officer who boasted of brushing-aside all opposition by the Christmas of 1814-in just two months. But as the war progressed, they began to curse themselves, their Sepoys and whole system. Ochterlony, who emerged as hero began to indirectly praise the Gorkhas as he said: "The company's Sepoys could never be brought to resist the shock of these mountaineers on their own ground."132 He had been a witness from a distance of the charge of the Gorkha Brigade under Amar Singh and Bhakti Thapa at Deonthal. And it left an indelible imprint on him. Still fresh with the memory, he wrote about it two days later: "At two thousand of the enemy on all sides of the post except Singe which more than a contest of two hours and death of Bhakti Thapa who led the attack, terminated in the total repulse and defeat of the enemy with very serve loss. Umer Singh in person was at musket distance with a stand of colours encouraging his men; and to mention the impetuous courage of the enemy is only to bestow the due need of praise on the conduct and valour of those who resisted on the most daring impetuous assault ever sustained."133

Ensign John Shipp of 87th HM's Regiment, himself a brave man, had found the Gorkhas of "unparalleled stadiness and bravery, who had no fear of death, though his comrades were falling thick around".134Others like Fredrick Young, who had become a prisoner of Gorkhas, was so

132 Ochterlony said when defeat stared hard at him at Ramgarh.133 See PRNW (1993 Publn) PP 529.134 Shipp formed part of HM's 87th Regiment and operated under Kelly at Hariharpur. His Memoirs PP 90.

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enamoured of their bravery and gentlemanliness that he volunteered to raise the battalion of Gorkhas when the time came.135 So were William Fraser136 and Ross 137 who considered them as "the most superior soldiers of the world". Stories of their bravery, chivalry, endurance, generosity spread as they humbled the massive, formidable British Army at Kalunga, Jaithak and Jitgarh. They emerged a phenomenon, living legends whose tales spread far and wide. Their "unerring lines often, disappeared into the smoke and wrath", as Dr RL Turner observed but their glory shone.138 and whose "only means of resistance consisted in personal gallantry", as Lord Moira grudgingly observed.139

The British recognized, they stood no chance in bravery to defeat them. Their strategy of subversion, deceit, dissension that had acquired a finesse made the simple, ill-informed Gorkhas to play into their hands and some of them decided to join their enemy's service, while the war was still being fought.140

Those were very strange times and the cult of mercenary was already a practice with most of the western and the oriental armies. The German Legion, for example, were in the service of the English king. This act of changing side was not regarded as an act of treason or failure of allegiance or even a symbol of disloyalty. Some Gorkhas operating in Jubal state, Garhwal and Malaun area with still larger component of the locals began to change side, with the hope that immediately after the war they would be able to enlist in the British Army. 141

135 See notes on Young in Kalunga, Jaithak and in Reflections.136 Fraser's India Revealed …. is an outstanding tribute to the Gorkhas.137 Ross led the Irregulars against Bilaspur and then was successful in sabotaging the outer perimeter of Kazi Amar Singh's defences at Rajgarh. Paradoxically he was assigned to raise the 1st Nasiri Battalion. 138 RL Turner said so in the Foreword of Dictionary Of The Nepali Language. The full text is: Uncomplaining you endure hunger and thirst and wounds and as last unerring lines disappear into the smoke and the wrath of battle, Bravest of the braves, most generous of the generous, never had a country a more fair friend than you. 139 Lord Moira not a Gorkha-lover but was turned into a Gorkha admirer in the end. See PRNW PP 734-35.140 The idea of causing defection of the enemy troops was first originated from Moira's letter of August 1814 where Fagan wrote: tendency particularly at the outset of the context to break up the enemy's force". See PRNW, PP 230-231. The triumph of this stratagem could be seen when, while Amar Singh and Bhakti Thapa were fighting for their survival on 15-16 April, a large number of Gorkha defected. See PRNW, PP 602-604, also see Chaudhari PP 74.141 References to Gorkha and other hill tribes joining the forces of Martindell and Ochterlony are contained in Ludhina Records, PP 454 and Atkinson's Himalayan Districts Gazetteer PP 671-672.

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The British interest in weaning away the Gorkhas from their masters and their own officers was part of an acknowledged stratagem of this war. For, given such similar resources, the Gorkhas too would have adopted it. But strangely, there grew a special fascination among the two sets of people. Bravery of the Gorkhas, simplicity, ability to remain loyal under all circumstance, if circumstances so demanded, led the British to believe that the Gorkhas could be easily disciplined. And if it worked out, the British would get an easy substitute for the plainsmen whose fastidiousness they saw, affected their performance. Although there was no truth in this statement.

The British admiration of the Grokhas had continued at every stage of battle. For instance, in the memorial they created for General Gillespie, they engraved their special tribute to "our gallant adversary". It was a typical case of human psychology …." If you can't beat an enemy you begin to love him." 142

The poker-faced Mongols who looked the same , who laughed the most in the midst of fire and whose anecdote of seeking treatment in the British camp and then returning to the Gorkha fort at Kalunga to fight the battle against t he same people, was agog in the British lines and all over the country. And then came something which is equally good about the British character best epitomized by the reply Young gave to the Gorkhas who had made him prisoner at their post. He had said: " I did not come here to run away. I came here to stop." The Gorkhas were so delighted to hear his reply that they told him: "You are a brave man we could serve under man like you." 143 Such instances created a battlefield rapport. It was also created out of their concern for each others' casualties on the battlefields, treatment in hospitals, observance of basic human rights of the prisoners and so on.

142 From the memorial at Dun. Simailar views are adequately given by Atkinson Vol II, PP 638-639.143 Quoted from 300 years In Innishowen ---------- An Account Of Family Of Young Of Culdaff, PP 109.

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Such acts by the Gorkhas were more remarkable in this war. Two brave people adopted each other as allies after having fought a fairly long war by the standards of those days in the Nineteenth Century.

Although it is slight digression, but one is reminded of the famous Captain Dove s, " I was Graf Spee's Prisoner" where he quotes the German officer remarking: "You English are hard. you do not know when you are beaten. The EXETER was beaten, but you did not know it ! When you fight brave men like that, you can not feel enemity, you only want to shake hands with them." Captain Patrick Dove wrote all the above after one of the first battles of World War II, where he having become a German prisoner was greatly impressed by their chivalry.

Even in World War II when general Erwin Rommel's Arika Korps played havoc into the British Eighth Army and tossed it between Egypt and Tunisia, a harried and normally anti-German-Churchill had praised Rommel. In one of the failures which, he was reporting to the Houe of Commons, he remarked of Rommel : " We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us and may I say, across the havoc of war, a great general." Earlier he had even cursed him by saying, "Rommel Rommel … is he an enigma ?"

There was thus no malice but mutual admiration, which climaxed on the occasion of Lord Moira allowing an otherwise defeated Amar Singh march out with his colours, bands playing and other honour.

The mutual admiration of the Gorkha for the British also arose from their common character qualities one of which being cheerfulness in adverse circumstance. Both are a happy breed of men, which William Shakespeare had attributed to the British (because he had not known the Gorkha) and CE Lucas Phillips had done so to the Gorkhas after compiling his list of Victoria Cross Winners.144

144 Victoria Cross by CE Lucas Philips. On the Gorkhas he wrote after compiling the book: " A happy breed of men… like many mountain races … " and "a grin is easily evoked in the worst of the weather or conditions."

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Human fascination apart, the British were shrewd and in their uncanny sense of statesmanship, vision of future strategy, they could see beyond their nose. When the war ended in India in May 1815, Amar Singh signed the Convention only in the most frustrating condition. The British could see that, though they had won the battle yet they had so far not won the war convincingly. Though it deprived the Gorkhas of their large tracts of territory in India, it had left no visible dent on the Gorkha psyche of honour or pride. Even Amar Singh told them so. And the short shrift of an operation at Makwanpur was regarded by the Nepalese government as an avenue for re-conciliation. The Nepalese government under Bhim Sen Thapa grew conscious of the challenge, and it began to repair the damage through added militarization.

Deeply concerned about the feelings of the independence and remorselessness that prevailed in Nepal after the signing of Treaty of Saguali, Campbell reported: " Her chiefs are not dependent on us, nor is she bound to ask, or we to give counsel and advice on any subject whatever. In short, Nepal is a free and independent state not according to the sprits of treaties which in India had an existence in name, but she is virtually and morally independent of the British power."145

Much of the worry of the British after the 1814-1816 wars was, therefore to devise the "measures to draw off the Gorkha militancy". Having seen the martial qualities in the Gorkhas and the determination of Bhim Sen Thapa and his government to continue to build the Nepalese Army, the British feverishly tried to explore various measures to contain the so called Nepalese militarism while, paradoxically they continued to bolster their own. Amongst the several measures, Sir Edward Paget, the C-in-C, saw this in "augmenting the Gorkha battalions in the British service by recruiting from the Nepal dominion".146 How he could have called Nepal as Dominion is difficult to ascribe except this being etymological error. Accordingly, Gardner was asked to examine the proposal. He promptly

145 See Hasrat, PP 185146 PP 229 The Campbell Sketches.

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suggested to "admit the Gorkhas into the ranks of our regulars of their being framed into separate corps".

Such developments continued but of immediate significance in May 1815, after the signing of Convention of Rajgarh was to utilize the services of the Gorkhas who had aided the British achieve their aims. In vindication, Moira wrote that "the whole of the Gorkha garrison of Maloun and Jeytuck, with the exception of those who marched away with Ummer Singh and his son, have taken service with the British Government and have since been joined by the garrisons of most of the forts of the interior. The total number amounts to less than 5,000 men. They have been formed into a corps fro service of hill territory, to be retained under our protection…..".147 In subsequent Paras he indicated that he had sanctioned the formation of three battalions of Gorkhas and certain numbers in Kumaon besides two Pioneer companies. This, he said he had done as, he apprehended that in case of his failure to employ them, they would "cast adrift, they having not either habits or means of industry, must through necessity repair to standards and range themselves in arms against us."

Thus were raised under the Governer General's Orders of 24 April 1815 the following battalions with designations:148

First Nasiri Battalion under command Lieut Ross. Also called as the Malaun Battalion. It became the foundation of the First Gorkha Regiment of the India Army.

The Sirmur Battalion under Lieut Fredrick Young. It became forerunner to the Second King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles.

The Second Nasiri Battalion under command of Lieut Macharg. Also called Malaun Battalion; this Battalion was disbanded in 1929 and all its Gorkhas over 6 year service were drafted into First Nasiri Battalion and the Sirmur Battalion.

The Kumaon Provincial Battalion. It came to be known as Kumaon Battalion and its First Commanding Officer was Baronet, Sir

147 See PRNW, PP 757-760. Also 873.148 Comments on dates of raisings of the Nasiris are also in Rajgarh.

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Robert Colquhoun. Later records also show it as Nazamat Battalion whose senior most Gorkha employee, was Jaikrishna Upreti. It eventually became the fore-runner to the present day Third Gorkha Rifles. By 1817, the foundation of the present Ninth Gorkha Rifles was also laid at Farukhabad. It however, underwent mind-boggling changes in designation and organization, as indeed all over Gorkha Regiments went through.

The first active campaign the Nasiris and Sirmuris were engaged was in Bharatpur in 1825-26. It became their battle honour, though awarded only after 40 years. But the Nepal Durbar did not accede to the British request of formally recruiting the Gorkhas in the British Army. The British, nonetheless continued to draw on the men who were smuggled into India by the recruiting parties. It is one of the reasons, that the Gorkhas remained as mercenaries as fear lingered on in the British mind whether they would be able to win over the confidence of the Nepalese Government. Edward Gardner, the Political Agent in Kathmandu aired his views : " .. Even on entering our service the Gorkhas would not separate themselves entirely from their native country however faithfully they might conduct." He visualized a "likely rupture in the Anglo-British relation" and suggested to tide over the problem by enrolling them as " mercenaries". It was the inspiration he was drawing from the contemporary arrangements already existing for the Gorkhas now in service with Ranjit Singh and with the state of Jammu and Kasmir.

Although GGO of 24 April 1815 had accepted the formation of the Nasiris and others, establishment was accepted only through the 7th

October 1815 letter and from Bengal GOVP of 24 August 1815. It was formalized as under.

Carrol's Bengal Military Regulations Vol II, 1817 Infantry, European and native.

Chap XII GOVP 24th August 1815

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284. The Right Honorable the Governor General having determined to embody and form into Battalions for the Service of the conquered Territories in the Hills, the Goorkha Troops, who came over to the British Arms, during the course of the Western Campaign; and having issued the necessary orders to that effect to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief; resolved, that the following Establishment of these Corps, as approved by the Governor General, be published in General Orders, together with the Regulations for their formation and organization. His Excellency the Governor General also determined and ordered that a Local Corps should be raised and formed for the service of the Province of Kemaoon, re-solved, that the Establishment of that Corps, as approved by His Excellency, be published in General Orders.

285. That the nusseree Goorkha, and those serving under Lieutenant Young, at Nahun, be formed into three Battalions of eight Companies, each Company of the strength hereafter detailed, the Battalions to be numbered and named as follows:

286. The Nusseres Goorkhahs to be formed into two Battalions and to be denominated the 1st and 2nd Nusseree Battalions. The Goorkhas under lieutenant Young, to form a third Battalion, and to be denominated the Sirmoor Battaion.

287. The Establishment of the Kemaoon Battalion to consist also of 8 Companies, each of the same strength and Establishment in every respect as that hereafter fixed for the Nusseree and Sirmoor Battalions, and to be composed of the Goorkha Corps, late under the command of Soubah Jyekishen, Natives of Kemaoon, and other classes of Hill men.

The establishment provided for the battalion headquarters included an European Commanding Officer, European Adjutant, two Surgeons, Sergeant Major, Quarter Master Sergeant, Drill Havildar and Drill Naik, Buggle Major and two Indian Doctors. The Company was commanded by a Subedar and had four Jemadars, 16 Havildars and Naiks, One pay Havildar and 120 Sepoys, thus giving a total of 141 Other Ranks. A

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band consisting of 19 Pippawallahs and musicians and 5 Artificers were also included. In essence it retained the shape of a company of the Gorkhas of the Nepalese Army than of the Indian.149

It took the Nasiris and Kumaon and Sirmur Battalions to convert themselves from the mercenary status to Green Jackets almost half a century and they were made regular Gorkha Battalions only after the Anglo-Sikh War.

The original three Gorkha Units were brought into the line in March in 1850, stemming from the recommendation made by Sir Charles Napier, C-in-C in October 1849. The Nasiri Battalion actually took the place of the 'insubordinate' or, mutinous 66th Bengal Native Infantry but the Sirmur and Kumaon Battalions kept their titles and were not allotted a number which was the usual practice of bringing a local or Irregular Corps into the regular line. A new Nasiri Battalion was raised to replace the one which had become the 66th Bengal Native Infantry. The asli Gorkhas, the genuine, came into service from 1850s.150

According to Napier the Gorkhas remained 'bravest of Native troops, they at the battles on the Sutledge displayed such conspicuous gallantry as to place them for courage on a level with our Europeans; and certainly they have a high military sprit, are fierce in war, of unsurpassed activity and possess great powers of enduring fatigue'. And continuing with the praise of the Gorkhas and their needs over the Sepoys, he further wrote: "If we are to adopt the Goorkha regiments into the line, abolish their limitation of service to the hills and give them pay and allowance as Sepoys. Now, said I, the time is come to win the Goorkha's heart by money and the red uniform which he longs to wear: and not alone the hearts of our Goorka soldiers, but those of all the Nepaulese soldiery, so 149 Recruiment. Some views are also included in PP Banskota's A History of The Gorkha Recruiment In The British Indian Army.150 Composition of the Nasiri and Other Battalions. It is erroneous to say that only the Gorkhas were enrolled in these battalions. In fact, the Gorkhas were not more than one fourth of the total strength. A nominal roll of Inter regimental Challenge Cup of the Gorkhas located at Almora (9GR) also raised in driblets from 1814, shows that of the total strength of 19, five alone were Gorkhas and others included Kumaonis, Muslims, Garhwalis and plainsmen. The purification of the Gorkha battalions took place in only 1850s.

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that in a war with that dangerous power, the enemy's Army will likely come over to us. However Goorkhas will fight Goorkhas readily. "No pay no Goorkha, and "the King of the Nepaul cannot, as to money, compete with the Company. We may thus set the Sepoys at defiance, if he behaves ill. The Goorkha will be faithful, and for low pay we can enlist a large body of soldiers whom our best officers consider equal in courage to European troops."151 Such feelings, as they came before the 1857 served the cause of Mutiny. However, to the Gorkhas it was a bonus. Their soldierly qualities added what the British called, friendliness, cheeriness and adaptability.152

As one concludes one is tempted to quote Florence Nightingale who wrote : "It has been said by officers, enthusiastic in their professions that there are three are three causes which make a soldier enlist viz, being out of work, in a state of intoxication, or jilted by a sweet heart."153 In the case of Gorkhas of Nepal, it has been the sound of the distant drums, the stories of Laures, the dreams of seeing the 'Seven Seas' in uniform and occasionally being in the din of war. And above all, having served a soldier's colourful life, to return to his mountains with large bundles of money a pension and a dignity which his profession alone gave him.

His dignity ofter arose from what Subedar Prem Bahadur Thapa of 1st

Nasiri told his Company Commander Captain John Burges after the Battle of Bharatpur in 1827:

"The English are as brave as lions; they are splendid Sepoys and are very-nearly equal to us."

I have heard the same thing told to me and my breed of Indian officers " If you prepare yourself well, train hard and lead us, we will accept you

151 From Chapple Papers in the Gurkha Museum, Winchester, UK.152 1891 USI Essay" Our Recruiting Grounds of the Future Indian Army by Lieut Col FG Gardner.153 Florence Nightingale in Notes on Matters Affecting Health. Efficiency and Hospital Administration of the British Army.

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as our brave leader." Soldiery and bravery are in the Gorkha blood, however mercenary he may be at heart.

Jaithak: Hoping for the Best

By 1 December 1814 the Dun Valley was silent and the Gorkha had moved out to the Hills. At the other extremity lay Kyarda, the gate-way to Nahan or the Sirmur State. But the area of Kalsi and the heights of Virat, with its prominent Fort, dominating it, also had to be cleared. The British moved cautiously and with the help of th local Jaunsaris, managed to evacuate the fort of Virat. Colonel Carpenter, who had been left behind to clear the two Valleys, wrote to Moira on the state of affairs after the Fort was cleared: "The inner fort is in very good repairs, of sufficient height to cover all sides … I think it extremely fortunate that the enemy quitted the place as we would have found greatest difficulty to bring on mortars from Calsie … ".154

It could we have turned out to be another Kalunga but for the decision of the Gorkhas to withdraw the garrison. The uprising of the local Jaunsaris and the order by Ranjore had made the Gorkha Subedar vacate it well in time, to fall back on Jaithak, or even Srinagar . The Jaunsaris were bribed Rs 700 fro their local resistance and refusal to supply the Gorkha garrison.

The Fort which had been renovated around AD 1000, was in excellent shape with a felt lining of two layers of stone walling, and a water filled moat. In 1993, when the author visited the site, he found

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it rather in a dilapidated condition. Mythologically Virat was ruled by King Virat and the legendary Pandav brothers with their common wife Drupadi and mother Kunti had stayed in disguise, in the capital Virat during their exile. The story goes that it was this formidable fort which prevented the Kauravs from defeating he King of Virat, when the secret of Pandav's whereabout was known. The formidability of this fort, was fully appreciated by Colonel Carpenter who was to clear it off the Gorkhas. He used the local dissenters among Garhwalis-Jaunsaris to cause a small but sizeable rebellion. by bribing them.

In this operation, Colonel Carpenter did not fail to praise the difficult work done by his commanders and troops, as he wrote: "The men of this detachment have suffered much from the nature of service and difficulty of procuring supplies since we left Calsie; I am happy to say they have borne every privation with great patience and the conduct of the whole detachment has been to merit my probation."

In the meanwhile, the change of command of 3rd Division brought Major General Gabriel Martindell who took over the formation on 20 December 1814, when it was still in the process of concentrating at Nahan. The Gokhas had moved to the fortress of Jaithak just in time.

Walter Hamilton described the fortress of Jaithak being 3 miles to the north of Nahan with a height of 3,600 feet, (IA) which are factually wrong as the height of Nahan itself is 3,092 feet as against Jaithak's height being 4,770 feet. It is also nearly 8 miles (13 Kilometres) from Nahan. From the Jaikhak heights, Nahan looks like a soccer or a dried-up lake. Conversely, Jaithak looks like an alongated peak on the horizon from Nahan. Its rims on both side are full of green deciduous forest. In 1814 the area must have been very dense, with just a few jungle trails, more water, wild-life and sparser number of villages.

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Nahan is nearly 26 miles, 43 kilometres from Paonta Sahib and Dehra Dun. The track alignment has been developed into a two-way National highway, Stretching from left to right, its silhouette looks as illustrated.

Though the Fort has been razed to the ground, the silhouettes of defences suggest their possible layout. An eye sketch of the same is enclosed as also the lithograph from William Fraser's Book.

Ranjore Singh's strategy like his father's on Nalagarh-Subathu axis or Bal Bhadra's in Nalapani (Kalunga), was based on two tactical considerations: first, until contact was made, full use of static defences, facilities of palaces, towns etc. were to be made; and second, attrition and delay, as preliminary to their eventual defeat, had to be caused on the British from forts and stockades built on tactically defensive pieced of ground. As a result of these considerations, Ranjore Singh had already made his defences on Jaikthak. This fort, with its tentacles of defences in stockadet built on tactically defensive pieces of ground. As a result of these considerations, Ranjore Singh had already made his defences on Jaithak. This frot, with its tentacles of defences in stockades stretching from Nauni/Jumpta to the Peacock Hill guarded the two major prominent axes leading to the main defences. He had taken adequate precautions to obtain the early warning on the move of British troops along the Jalal (also referred to as Giri) River or through the dense Barman Jungle. His troops had been deployed as far as Rampur on the Sutlej River, Kotguru, Bampta, Chaupal and Shai.

The readers will recall Moira's comments of June 1815 about the Gorkha defensive tactics. He wrote: "Their principal advantages consisted in the natural strength of country, their aptiuded for the special warfare and in the choice of position which they occupied and knowledge of country about to became the scene of war,

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enabled them to make with judgement." (18) True, the Gorkha's choice of defences and use of potential of the ground, combined with courage, made the difference everywhere. The defences they occupied showed tactical brilliance. Major Ludlow, had observed the "Dog Kennels, holes or caves like bears, beasts to retire into from effects of shells". Their defences, showed ability to think big and act tactically big and survive. And as they lacked modern rifles, they used their few flint match-locks ans cannons frugally and with dexterity, until they managed to acquire some of the British in the battle field.

General Martindell had been directed to capture Sirmur which involved clearing the Gorkhas from Jaithak and other places. His Division had been further authorized to raise an Irregular battalion, preferably under William Fraser, which could help to crumble the main defences speedily by operating in Jubal State. Thereater his Division was to advance to Srinagar Garhwal. He planned to drive to Jaithank and clear the areas of the Gorkhas.155

Martindell himself was the typical of second generation of the Company officers: old, cautious, fighting the Gorkhas with the lessons from the battles with the old enemies in the Indian plains. He was keen to also appy the matrix of his personal experiences of a war he fought in Bundel Khanda against the turbulent locals and Kalanjar in 1812; though his operations against the Raja of Rewa, a year later, brought him hardly any credit. By 1814 at 54, he was a civilian and living in Kanpur. But Moira coaxed him to rejoin active service as as relief of late Gillespie, there being available no suitable senior-officer-substitute, Paradoxically, Moira also wanted to give him another chance to prove himself.

By mid-December, Martindell planned to launch his tow pronged attack on Jaithak with fairly balanced columns under tow experienced Majors i.e., Major William Richard and Major John Ludlow. Richard's column consisted of a part of HM's 53rd, Light Infantry, 1/3 NI, Pioneers and 155

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detachment of guns; whereas Ludlow had full of 1/6 NI, part of HM's 53rd, 1, 6 pounder and 1,5.5 inch Howitzer and the Pioneers. 156

The tasks given to these two veterans were: to cut off water supply, and intercept communication; to shell the fort and inch forward to provide a firm base for the rest of the Division to build up form an attack on Jaithak. Ludlow's Baptisation of fire The advance of the columna began on night 26/27 December. Ludllow reached Jumpta Hill and was attacked by the Gorkhas. The Gunner's history records this actions in detail: "The difficult paths they had followed, and the pace kept up by the Infantry, caused the guns to be left in the rear; but the Grenadiers of the 53rd anxious, to atone for the failures at Kalunga, pushed forward before the native Infantry, could form up. When, close under the stockade, they were received with a sharp fire on both flanks and in rear, their ardour received a sudden check; and the Gurkhas issuing forth from their position in front, with shield, sword and kurki, they gave way before the dreaded charge of these brave mountaineers. The native Infantry, seeing the disorderly retreat of the Europeans, caught the contagion; their officers were too few to hold them in check and present a firm front and the panic spreading, as it ever does, rapidly carried the whole lot back to camp, losing 40 to Gorkhas as prisoners and several getting lost in the fout that followed."157

The sprightly counter attack had been launched by Jaspau Thapa, from his stockade at Jumpta and he drove Ludlow's men from all grounds they had gained. Prinsep narrated the scene with equal ardour as he wrote:

Jaspau Thapa, Ranjore's best officer was the Gorkha commandant here: the greater part of force at Jaithak had, on the first alarm, been collected within or behind the stockade out of sight of the assailants. Jaspau allowed the British to come close under the stockade, and then from either side, a little down the ridge, he pushed out parties round both flanks, who opened a fire on the Grenadiers from all quarters at once.

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Not having expected such a reception, the men were confounded and drew back; whereupon the Gorkhas, seizing the opportunity, charged them Khuris in hand… 158

There was stampede and before Ludlow could realize some of his troops had already arrived in Nahan. He followed, blaming and cursing them and also " burning himself with shame" for which he blamed his General for lack of European officers and unwillingness of his 'ragamuffin Sepoys' to face the Gorkha attack by Khukris. His blame fell squarely on 1/6 NI, though the 53rd faired as bas as they had done at Kalunga. 1/6 NI had been reduced into a totally ineffective battalion after this operation and in the words of Moira, the failure was due to "Ludlow's irretrievable error of attacking the stockade before he had formed his men."159 An obvious case of fault-line in Ludlow's character to morally except it as the principal cause of the failure.

Ranjore and his Gorkha chuckled with a glee and joked as they collected this 'gift' of arms and ammunition from the British. These 300 muskets offered them in their resolve to beat the enemy.

Richard's dilemma Richard's column moved over a 25 kilometre detour deliberately, up the slope from the right and was on the Peacock Hill immediately after the first light.160 he was attacked. In the words of Prinsep: "While the troops were speculating (on the likely action by the Gorkhas deployed near Peacock Hill) Ranjore Singh' drums beat to arms was hard; and at about One O'clock he paraded his whole force under the walls of Jythuk, preparatory to an attack. The mountaineers advanced boldly at first, but not being able to face a steady volley, they separated; and availing themselves with wonderful dexterity of every jutting tock or the like that afforded cover, kept up a continued irregular fire, charging every now and then, when there was any advantage to gain".161

158 159 160 161

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Richards managed to hold on to his ground through-out the whole day and requested Martindell for reinforcement of men and ammunition.

If Ludlow ignored to take his guns with his columns, Richard's chose to not even carry its full ammunition. His column had left with just the punch ammunition and rear column was tasked to bring the balance of 60,000 rounds. The rear column was ambushed by a Gorkha marauding column. This rear column was routed and forty of its personnel were taken as prisoners on the Giri. Such a large haul of ammunition and arms from the British strengthened Ranajore's defences.

While Richards precariously held to the ground he had occupied, he conveyed to his commanding General that he was no more in a position to hold it against more deliberate attack at night without supply of ammunition. Nor was he in a position to skirt around the feature from the right or left to move to a more vantage us point.

Martindell could observe much of the movements of Richards columns and he was also being fed information through the men trickling back to the camp who had escaped and were being regarded as missing. When some one from Richards' column gave him the news about the difficult position that Richards had been put at the Peacock Hill, he decided to order this column back, rather reinforce it . This became a grave tactical error, responsible for loss of this toe- hold on the Jaithak hill. It cost him the whole operation.

By 4 p.m. orders to retire were received by Richards. In this rearward movement Lieut Thackeray acted as rear guard commander for the safety of the main force, though Ensigns Wilson and Stalkart died. (6A) It was a status quo ante as far as Martindell was concerned.

Both the columns had large casualties with 32 killed, 105 wounded and 229 missing-almost one fourth of the force of the two columns with Richards launching strength being 16 officers and 677 Other Ranks and Ludlow's being 20 officers and 1,053 Other Ranks.

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An infuriated Moira admonished Martindell as he magnified his frustration: " Did you fell the nature of your command embarrassing to you, it would be incumbent on you to express it.. You are pledged to your country to aim with your utmost energy at the fulfillment of its objective."162

In vindication, Martindell wrote to Fagan from Nahan: "Taking into the difficulties of the country, the strength of the enemy's position and the obstinate manner they defended them I must reluctantly confess that I should not deem warranted to adopt further offensive measures until reinforced."163 And he further added that he had planned " with a double view of dispossessing the enemy of a strong position and cutting off his water supply". He however, ascribed failure of the operation to day-attacks by the two column. But consoled himself that the failure had "not tarnished the British arms". There was, a distinct fear psychosis among the British by now which percolated from the General to the Sepoy and was acknowledged by Moira when he said: "Still however something more decisive was wanting to restore complete confidence and many circumstance contributed at this particular juncture to lead to an exaggerated estimate of military character of the Gorkha nation."164

Later Penderal Moon summed up the feelings: "The British toops at tempting to storm one of the stockades that blocked the approach to it (Jaithak) were put to ignominious flight when the Gorkhas fell upon them with their Khukris: and the Sepoys coming up in support seeing the British troops, took to their hells and did not halt until Nahan. Martindell's force had lost by now one third of his number and further offensives were abandoned."165

The Gorkhas were now invincible and it took more prodding and goading of Martindell by Moira to act.162 163 164 165

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Moira, on his part reacted fast. By 31 December 1814 he placed six flank companies located at Dun at Martindell's disposal and also moved four companies of 1/27 NI located at Hansi.

Martindell's Inertia Martindell now tried to redue the fort by blockade but no such ground offered that advantage. Moira accused him of employing, ' tardy means' and even threatening him to be replaced by Ochterlony. However, Moira's threats could not materialize as Ochterlony himself was moving at a snail's pace near Ramgarh and the two other Generals, Marley and Wood, entrusted to invade Nepal, were doing no better.

Martindell's condition became pitiable as by now Ranjore Singh had established virtually a moral ascendance over him. Bal Bhadra had also joined Ranjore Singh with about 300 Gorkhas including the 84 survivors and others. This beefed up his strength and boosted his morale sky-high. Besides he managed to move a pair of guns from Srinagar and deployed them at Jumpta. His detachment at Chumalgarh, on the Jumana had captured Lieut Fredrick Young as a prisoner along with several others.

As situation developed, Martindell remained obsessed with two considerations to defeat the Gorkhas at Jaithak: One, to build up heavy guns on either of the flanks in order to batter the defences into submission or evacuation, as happened at Kalunga, eventually. Time was not the consideration for him. Of the two flanks, he saw better chance of develping th final attack on Jaithak from the left, that is from the direction of Nauni.

He began building up a track to move his guns fomr the left and concurrently move some Irregulars to the heights of Nauni, on which some regulars could also be built up. The track building was a laborious task but by 31 Janurary 1815 he had, at Nauni, under Lieut Col Kelley a force of 1,200 men. The weather however became foul and Kelley was taken sick and was forced to be relieved by Ludlow, a week later. Under

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Ludlow this force slowly and at a snail's pace, had reached Balck Hill on the north of Jumpta.

Willam Fraser, the Political Agent was directly reporting the situation to Moira and commenting on Martindell;s indecisiveness and incompetence. By February, Matindell was happy to see William Fraser raise and move an Irregular battalion to Jubal. He regarded it a good riddance! The Irregulars who were at Nauni also volunteered to accompany his force. It is here that some Gorkhas showed willingness to join the British Forces, after negotiations and peace.

To support further inching forward of the assaulting troops and fight a decisive battle, a mule track was progressed to move the British Corps d; elite, the 18 inch gun0 the last of the British secret weapon, that brought the Gorkhas out to see what tricks the British were upto. Prinsep recorded it : "The operation excited the astonishment of the enemy, who came out everywhere to see the wonder but made no attempt to prevent it". To the Gorkhas it was same spectacle every where- Kalunga, Ramgarh, Rajgarh or Jaithak. They enjoyed seeing their enemy. They continued to go foraging for supplies and fighting for every day of their existence. Here in Jaithak they were certain that the guns the British moved on their elephants would turn out to be their 'white elephant' . They waited to see their effect and then hoped to tumble them down the hill in a khukri charge!

Though the battle continued to rage, the stories of traditional Gorkha humanity and valour were agog. When conducting the withdrawal of Richards' column 40 men with a Subedar had been taken prisoner by Ranjore Singh's men. They were treated well and even tempted to enlist in Ranjore Sing's force. So the Gorkhas too were prepared to have their mercenaries !166

There were to be more wonders of the Gorkhas bravery and it was to leave indelible imprint on a young officer, Lieut Young, who we 166

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mentioned earlier, had been ordered to intercept the lines of communication of the Gorkhas at Chumalgarh on the Jumana.167 He had attempted to encircle a post. The Gorkhas post was of not more than 200 fighting men against more his 1,000 of his Irregulars. In Prinsep's words: "They decided to die bravely rather than surrender. Having thus prepared themselves, they advanced and delivering their fire, charged, sword (Khukri) in hand, the nearest post of the Irregulars. These unfortunately gave away immediately, and were pursued, in the utmost confusion to the next post, where the panic quickly spread; until the whole party to flight without attempting any resistance, inspite of the utmost efforts of Lieut Young to induce the to face the enemy."168

Young became their prisoner as was, Hearsey in Kumaon. It was here the Gorkha commander asked him as to why he did not run. His answer, "I have not come all this far to run" impressed the Gorkhas and won their herats, for ever as after the hostility, Young became one of the commanding officers of the Nasiri (Sirmur) Balttalions and a live long convert of the Gorkha cause.

So was the effort gaining ground with William Fraser who, when told by Martindell to increase the numbers of Irregulars suggested enrolling 500 of the Gorkhas caught in the melee of the ding-dong battle that was being fought at Jaithak and areas around.

By mid-march 1815 the heavy guns were moved further up near Black Hill and they began pounding the fort of Jaithak but there were only a few direct hits and the most of the shells went over the crest. Alongwith it Martindell started his encirclement operation combining his multi-directional advanceon the All Fools' Day. But of the Ludlow' force, when snow fell and temperature reduced to sub-zero with gale and sleet, the troops suffered miserably. Ludlow, nonetheless found them with "unexampled constancy". This happened when the Indian troops were on half ration, called the Free Half Rations and they were being acused of

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letting their British officers down. Lodlow, nonetheless found time to write his battle field letters' to his wife.

The damages done by the guns were being constantly repaired and the Gorkhas were re-constructing their defences, getting more reinforcements and above all, Bal Bhadra, the hero of Kalunga, continued to raise their morale. The British soon inched forward and occupied the Black Hill and the Peacock Hill. Richards, who had earlier moved up to Peacock Hill, made it in good time on 1 April and skirting around the feature moved to Panchul Punjab Ka Tibba, which in today's geography amouns to the feature marked as point 924 (4,050 feet), in the Survey of India maps.

The battle continued without any wiorthwhile efforts by the British to capture the fort through an assault and as Amer Singh Thapa gave up the contest at Rajgarh in mid-may, the Convention also applied to the Withdrawal of Gorkhas from Jaithak and areas around.

The five month campaign by Martindell's Division of 17,000 strength against an ill-armed, ill-equipeed and starving Gorkha garrison of not more than 1,000 men, women and children including 200 locals, demonstrated the total bankruptcy of the British Generalsihip here.169 For Martindell marked his time and hoped against best of his hopes that his Corps d' elite'. guns, would compell Ranjore Singh to raise the while flag or abandon the fort. He did neither. It is his elders Bam Shah, his father, Amar Singh, who unfortunately became instrumental in it. But for Martindell it was truly an Olympian patience.

War Memorial At Nahan

"VV m Mc Murdo Wilson, Ensign 2/26 NI.Killed on 27 December 1814

While crossing the retreat of Major Richards' ColumnOn height of Jeytuck, when Lieut Thackery and 57 men

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Were killed and wounded by a strong overpowering column of Ranjore Singh Thapa"

To this memorial the following perhaps be added:"For glory lights the soldier's tomb,

And beauty weeps the brave."-Joseph Rodman Drake on War grave in America.

To the credit of Jaithak and its brave defenders a few more lines must be added. Even if Martindell ventured assaulting Jaithak, with two live wire leaders-Ranjore Singh and Bal Bhadra-it can be said with firm conviction that a second Kalunga would have been created at Jaithak. Here itself the battle could have been moved to 1816 and the entire face of the campaign would have been changed.170

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Rajgarh of Malaun: The Decisive Battle.

General Situation

The Gorkhas with their strategy of westward expansion to Kasmhmir had in fact, done wonders and would have turned a miracle if their venture at the Kangara Fort had not been aborted by Ranjit Singh in August 1809. They still had domination upto Jutogh, Bakloh in the north and north east and Pinjore-Kalka on the southern tip. Their forts at Jutogh, Taragarh (Bakloh), Mustgarh (Pinjore) and Taksal (Kalka) made an outer perimeter in the Punjab Hill States. The inner line was equally fortified. Along the axis Ochterlony's operations progressed, the Forts of Nalagarh, Ramgarh, Tibu, Mangu, Rajgarh (Malaun) and its complex and so on, offered opposition at virtually every ten miles (16 Kilometres). The terrain was jungle covered, with rocky outcrops which, though not difficult, was new to the British. To Gorkhas, it was, nonetheless an ideal mountain country to fight in.

To recapitulate the tasks given to the force of Moira were:-1st Division at Danapur strength varying from 6,000 to 13,000 men, Objective: Kathmandu.2nd Division at Banaras- Strength about 3,000 to cooperate with 1st

Division against Kathmandu.3rd Division at Meerut-Strength 3,000 to 3,500. First objective Dun, afterwards to operate against Garhwal or against Nahan, or on the flank of the Gorkhas, should they retire before the advance of the 4th Division and in general to co-operate with that Division.4th Division at Ludhiana. Strength 6,000 to 7,000. objective: overpowering the Gorkha forces who held the Punjab Hill States. The principal task, according to Moira's own account to Ochterlony's Division, was the "reduction or dispersion of the Gorkha army commanded by Kazi Amar Singh Thapa and the expulsion of the Gorkhas from their conquests between the Sutlej and the Jamuna.171

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Ochterlony began his advance with a strength 3,513 of combatants; in less than two months it was augmented to 10,422 and his fire support by about two times. Inclusive of the followers and those that moved the logistics of the Commissariat it swelled to 19,300.172

It's composition:

One company European Artillery and two companies of Gun Laskars.Second Regiment Native Cavalry and one Rissala of Captain Skinner's Corps.2/1 NI; 1/19 NI; 2/19 NI (Six Companies ) commanded by Colonel Arnold.2/3 NI; Light Battalion formed to Light Companies of Division. 3rd and 4th Companies of Pioneers.

Artillery, Initially, the artillery, consisted of : 2,18 pounders, 2, 5.5 inch mortars, 2,5.5 inch howitzers, 2,4.5 inch mortars, 2,5.5 inch howitzers.

Ochterlony, as we mentioned earlier had orders to be placed under Gillespie as and when he cleared his line of operations. In actual fact, Gillespie had created much of history by advancing every bit of direction before Ochterlony could cross his start line for operations, Gillespie had traversed over the Shivaliks, across the Dun Valley, gone attacking the Bal Bhadra's Gorkhas and got killed.

Octhterlony had a different scenario to face when he began his advance on 1 November 1814 : he had indirectly the taste of the Gorkha prowess and he did not want to go the Gillepie way. NO cavalier style; no taking for granted the Gorkhas he once described, as "ill-disciplined, ill-equipped and with self- overestimation". Though he had move than the needed information on the "going" map of the terrain to Nalagarh, Ramgarh, Arki through hi agents including the Zamindars and the rulers of the states over powered by Amar Singh and Bhakti Thapa, as also by 172

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the Surgeon who treated Amar Singh's younger son Ram Das, he still made much of this deficiency. He blamed other intelligence gatherers like Moorcroft, Hearsey and Dr Rutherford for lack of it.

We have devote a separate chapter to logistic that the commissariat undertook to support all the four division, and the Half Scale of Rations the Sepoy of the Native troops were given. (It was to be half-a.ration free instead of full ration on payment). For Ochterlony, the two essential commodities of logistics were the Banjara bullocks (5,000), ponies and elephants. These animals were besides 9,000 followers, coolies and so on, whose strength continued to increase. The elephants did a remarkable job in hauling up the battering guns (18 pounders) over the tracks. The 3rd and 4th Pioneer companies made tracks all the way from Nalagarh to Ramgarh and Malaun. These tracks are still intact and one realizes the elephantine jobs the Pioneers did for enabling the move of skilful elephants which negotiated sharp bends and steep gradients not only in this area but to Jaitkhak and up the slope of Nepalese borders. These tracks must serve as sample of logistical planning and their durablility.173

The memoirs of John Shipp give us a vignette of the Herculean effort that was made to move the guns, crates of liquor, their tentage and the Mughale-Azam, the British re-created in the early stages of the war,-until the Gorkhas played havoc into their psyche of superiority and mood of out-on- a hunting mission.

Caputure of Taragarh Fort

Amar Singh had appreciated that Ochterlony might either follow a direct route over the country to Arki, his headquarters or the conventional axis Nalagarh,-Ramgarh,-Subathu. It meant the choice of axes as shown in the sketch attached. So, after the three day battering exercise by Ochterlony's guns on Taragarh Fort on 4 November 1814, 84 Gorkhas-

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half of them the local Hindureans-gave up thesesistance.174 On 5 November they were moved as prisoners to Ropar, to be brainwashed and converted into 'guides and scouts', another aphorism for spies and turncoats. Colonel WJ Hamilton quoting correspondence on the subject wrote: "The Gurkha prisoners were offered and accepted service with Ochterlony's force but in doing so discrimination was made between Gokha proper and hillmen in their service. The former were marched to Ludhiana as prisoners under escort of a troop of Cavalry, while the latter were enlisted and formed the original nucleus, gradually augmented by subsequent surrenders of the Gorkha element in the Indian Army."175

This is far from being true as the Gorkha prisoners were seduced to join the British forces operating against Amar Singh. Fagan, the Adjutant General wrote from Bamrauli Camp on 21 November: " The C-in-C approves your having assured the Subedar and the Gurkha prisoners of service at the rate of pay received from their own government."176 He asked Ochterlony to entertain Gorkhas and, encourage them to join the British in fighting against Amar Singh's Gorkhas.

Excited at the fall of Nalagarh and the fort of Taragarh on 5 November when Gillespie had died attempting the capture of Kalunga on 31 October, Ochterlony wrote to Fagan: "our progress will be slow but I trust it will be certain. I may not be harried into hurry… There will be tedious advance in the Alpine country." He offered his advice on change required in the British strategy after failures at Kalunga and said : "The character and the operations of war should be changed and instead of small detachments being employed 'our force should be concentrated on certain points, however tardy their progress, no one should move with out guns (however large the difficulties of move)." It is Ochterlony who suggested change of axis fro Mawbey's force. He suggested that "the whole force from Kalunga be employed at Kyarda Valley , (after Dun secured and siege laid on Nahan) and make an attempt on Jaithak, a measure which at least be far more cooperative (complementary) as to

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compell him (Amar Singh) to weaken his ground or central point by dending out reinforcements to both to the east and west". It was obviously personal interest , that mattered. such actions facilitated his operations.

Moira agreed to it. But Ochterlony had a 'siege within himself' when things went bad at Ramgarh.

Battle fro Ramgarh_Ochterlony's Turning Point

Amar Singh appreciated the rot it would set in Ramgarh, the next objective of Ochterlony, if similar stance was adopted by the defenders as shamefully done by those at Nalagarh. He moved to his tactical headquarters and redeployed defences at Ramgarh. He moved his strength from Subathu and Arki and maintained only small early warning detachments at Manju and Arki.

Amar Singh's strategy for fighting his old enemy Ochterlony took a specific shape : he decided to build up strength fro a decisive battle at Ramgarh, the hill ranges between the Gambar River and Gamrola River in coordination with his ally, Bilaspur and then plan his contingencies even for withdrawal to Subathu and line north east of it. The Rajas who had been dethroned by him during the period of consolidation had begun to change their colours and alliance with British. However, because of Shiv Datt Rai he was hopeful that the Raja of Bilaspur would continue to support him throughout the campaign.177

With these considerations, Amar Singh re-deployed adequate strength on the Ramgarh Ridge, (the fort, the eastern ridge i.e., Manju, Tibu, Jorjoru). Early warning elements were thrown up at Nehr and Ramshahr. ON the Rajgarh Ridge, the height and the forts/stockades were strengthened at Surajgarh, Jainagar, Malaun, Rattangarh and the other dominating areas. To ensure the safety of his communications with Bilaspur, adequate strength had been deployed to prevent the British 177

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infiltration. On assurance by Shiv Datta Rai, this responsibility was passed to Bilaspur who occupied defences from RAttangarh on wards.

He had barely 1,500 troops and with difficulty he managed to deploy 650 in Ramgarh area and the balance on the Rajarh ridge. The British estimate had placed his strength at about 4,000. The troops which defended Ramgarh complex were regarded by the British as " flower of the Gorkha Army" i.e., their corps d' elite.178

The Gorkhas had begun to experience an acute deficiency in manpower and weapons reserve. Bhim Sen Thapa promised to make available about 27 companies of the 40 that had been mobilized from the old soldiers. But only half of them would have their weapons. Some of them reached and some still enroute Kumaon had to join the retreating columns of Bam Shah and Amar Singh in May.

The mutual aid and reinforcement plan was nevertheless, put into effect and Amar Singh even managed to locate a mobile reserve of four companies under his younger son Ranbir, called Amar Virgati (The Squad of Martyrs ) which consisted of Amardal, Virdal and other two companies.179

Ochterlony planned his attack based on the intelligence and advice of the Raja of Nalagarh. He advanced to Goela, a low plateau at 2,700 feet, totally dominated by Ramgarh which was at least 1,000 feet higher. The road then –and-now follows the alignment of Goela-base of Ramgarh i.e., the present town of Ramshahr and then hugging the base of the fort, turns to a low defile made by Jorjoru feature on the left and Tibu-Mangu-Taragarh peak on the right. In between lies the plainer yet undulating Nehr plain that had good fields and several villages and now a school near which the grave of Lieut William exists. The defences of Amar Singh were based on this ridge which aligned itself generally in a north west-south easterly direction.

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Ochterlony was quick to realize the tactical mistake he had made by starting to take jump from a pt with no place to manoeuvre or acquire the needed momentum. He first moved to a ridge the thought, would place him on " an equal footing", vis-s-vis the objective i.e., Ramgarh. But he landed in a position that placed him in a quandary. For, lack of maps and detailed terrain intelligence, he ordered Colonel Thompson to take a group to eastablish a firm base on the feature Kahnani, the northern most tip of which Kot was located. While ordering him to occupy it, he told him : "Gain the position by day reaching within musket disteance but final judgement is yours". Later during the conduct of this operation Ochterlony behaved more like a political agent than a General, and wrote : " I directed Colonel Thompson to proceed to the right village of Kandree (Kahnani) .. Judging by the eyes and information of the country people, this attempt seem to promise success but I felt great anxiety and sent for Raja of Palsee. His informantion seemed to be so accurate and so conclusive as to induce me to postpone the attack."

The author's field survey in 1994, showed the ground difficulties. The 2 mile break in the ground between Ramgarh and Kot was sufficient to make and one believe that Ochterlony was planning a fool's errand and it must have caused sufficient laughter in the Gorkhali Camp at Ramgarh.

Thompson had insisted-without carrying out proper forward reconnaissance-on getting his guns up. So between 13 November and 20 November 7000 coolies and followers were employed to make the track and move the guns. And when the guns were fired from Kot, its shells landed in the nala below the fort. The sharp fall could not have been negotiated for forward movement. But Raja of Nalagarh and some of the local Zamindars came to Ochterlony's rescue. They offered him the choice of an achieveable plan and asked him to switch axis to Nehr. He also reacted fast and put the Sapper, Lieut Peter Lawtie on reconnaissance and survey.

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The Sapper did an excellent job. The History of Engineers places Lawtie on record : "The moving spirit of the British Army was quite a young officer-Lieut Peter Lawtie, Ochterlony's field engineer and Aide-de-Camp. No praise is too high for this Bengal Engineer. He carried out most daring reconnaissance, acted as the eyes of the force and was the right hand man of General in every way. Lawtie survived the massacre by the Gorkhas … Twice Ochtherlony issued orders for the assault on Ramgarh and twice he countermanded them on the strength of Lawties reports about the ground and enemy defences".180

Ochterlony's force concertrated in the Nehr plain by 24 November. Described as a 'turning movement' by the British historians, he was in great hurry to launch the attack. Preparations for it began in earnestness. By 26 November, a battery was moved up and was in the process of being constructed near Mangu under Lawtie with Ensign Symes, some Pioneers and 100 Sepoys. While this was in progess, the Gorkhas decided to eliminate it. A column with drums, trumpets and colours bore down on this party. The first taste of defeat came to Ochterlony here as the Gorkhas charge the breast-work with Khukris and swept the Sepoys down, mowing down three-forth of the strength. A 70 percent casualties where Lawtie saved himself by bolting out, the fastest, was frightening to Ochterlony.

Lawtie blamed himself, for not opening the cartridge boxes which could not be opened as the Khurki wielding Gorkhas like death god swarmed before them. Reinforcement was sent under Williams but it reached too late. And Williams himself was killed. Such was the shock wave and demoralization that the 41 killed and 34 wounded had been left at the breast work and could not be immediately retrieved.

Both for the Gorkhas and the British it was Kalunga repeated in bravery and magnanimity. The Gorkhas seem to imstil the same God's fear among Ochterlony and his force as they had done to Mawbey's and Martindell's. They showed sililar magnanimity to their foe and allowed 180

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the casualties to be removed a day later.181 But the arms and ammunition left behind became the Gorkha possession.

In 1995 while on another set of field studies at Nehr, Ramgarh etc. the author went in search of William's grave. The grave covered by foliage is located under a bayan tree. A group of little boys of the local school joined him in clearing the tomb stone of Williams off the foliae and mud. Then they pointed out to the author a young woman who slept near the tomb stone. She behaved as if she were deaf and dumb. For, no amount of noises could stir her out of deep slumber. Then a youngster touched her eardrum with a grass blade; she opened her eyes and began to look up alternately at the tomb and the author. She surprised him beyond imagination as she said in chaste Hindi "Mein to Gora William ki atma hun (I am the soul of Englishman Williams)." Greatly unexplained phenomenon this set him thinking could there be truth in it.182

27 November was unlucky for the Governor General and the Commader-in-Chief , Lord Moira, as the handful of the surviving Gorkhas (on this date, just about) sent the three thousand strong Mawbey's attacker at Kalunga reeling back for the third and the last time. So was is here in the Nehr plain. There was gloom in the British camp; some faint and expectant smiles among the indifferent rulers and allies of the Gorkhas: and rejoicingly high morale among the Gorkhas in India and Nepal.

A mightly British power was being tamed by a puny race, the Gorkhas of Nepal.

Depressed, in loss of self confidence, Ochterlony admitted failure on both the professional and personal accounts. He wrote to Lord Moira:

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Situated as they are I so not find myself at liberty at liberty to say that I could attack them with any certainty of success with even greater forces but without reinforcements I feel myself precluded even from making an attempt and I do not blush to acknowledge that I feel my mind inadequate to a command requiring great process of genius and so novel in its nature in all its circumstance.

He goes on further to support unassailability of the post form front, from lack of reinforcement, the poor type of ammunition and carriers. He even exaggerated the Gorkhas strength by three to four times. Ochterlony cursed himself for conveying impression to Moira of volunteering to lead a force against the Gorkhas. He differed from Mawbey and Martindell and even others only in one respect-he did not openly retreat from the battle field; he only carried out adjustment but very much proved, at the moment of the mettle that martindell or Marley were made of. They all were shaken up at this moment.

His earlier estimates which bordered on gross underestimation were substantially changed. He began to call them skilful and enterprising, hardy and brave, excellent in art and stratagem of mountain warfare, with defensive art of stockade. His own tactics began to border on 'turning the position', creating universal discontent'. To Ram Singh of Palsee, Sikha of Patiala etc. he began to plead for support. A desperate Ochterlony!183

In the words of Penderel Moon, "even Ochterlony who initially suggested a war earlier began to weigh it as most impolite measure we had attempted leaving aside all physical difficulties".184

Moira was in a dilemma and could not think of sacking him as hed had barely found a relief for Late Gillespie. However, when every thing was righted and set correct, Moira wrote in August 1815 "Maj Gen Ochterlony soon after projected another attack but intelligence of failure at Jevtuck which had occasioned high degree of confidence in the enemy and despondency in our troops made him widely forego the attempt"185

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He moved Thompson's battalion from Kahnani and then sat at Nehr awaiting responses from Moira, reaction of the Gorkhas, and support from the allies, who had been promised restoration of their rules. 186 He cursed O'Brien, the Irish deserter in the court of Sansar Chand Katoch at Kangra, for not coming with the promised 1,000 men reinforcement. But because Ochterlony had failed Sansar Chand in his travail when under assault by the Gorkhas and under humiliation by Ranjit Singh, Katoch maintained a discrete silence. O'Brien naturally could not have antagonized his protector. 187

But all did not let him down. The Raja of Nalagarh worked assiduously and through spies articulated the winning over of Raja of Bilaspur in favour of the new and rising British power, as against the fading out Gorkhas. Soon it showed effect and the BIlaspurians suddenly began to thin out of the Rattangarh Fort. They would, of course, watch further developments before totally abandoning it. The Nalagarh Raja was feverishly working on completing an Irregular battalion for Ochterlony, whose task he was trying to finalise. Lieut Ross had already been picked up as its officer commanding and like Young and Fraser on the west and Barre Latter on the east, his force was taking shape.

A past-master of intrigues and statecraft, though not much of a military commander, Ochterlony began to do what hurt the Gorkhas most: intercept their communications. In that his network of spies, including the Gorkha prisoners who knew al about the Gorkha habits and something about their deployment, played active part. He paid them handsomely and employed them in chanced attires to intercept thd dakias and harkaras of the Gorkhas by simply killing or bribing them. Interception of their letters especially of Amar Singh and Bakhatawar Singh gave him the most unadulterated intelligence.

This activity was, in fact, being coordinated by Moira's headquarters and there was constant feed-back from Kumaon, the eastern side and

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elsewhere. From Bam Shah's letter it was learnt that he was at the tethers' end; and he and his troops were in dire need of logistical support. Similarly, the various intercepted letters of Amar Singh began to suggest to him the strategy, his immediate opponent was about to follow. The letter, he intercepted is interesting from historical analysis and we reproduce its excerpts. It had contained clear change of plan in Amar Singh's overall strategy in that he moved from Arki to Malaun and began to develop his main line of resistance against Ochterlony astride the Rajgarh ridge and occupation of Ramgarh was only an adjunct to it.

Interception of the Gurkhali mail not noly served as an excellent mean of intelligence but in facilitating the evolution of plans to defeat Amar Singh Thapa's strategy. This letter of 27 November 1814 addressed to the King in Nepal made him change his plan for diverting his major offensive to Malaun. Fro, it contains most of the Gorkha manoeuvre and plans. It gave concentration of Amar Singh's force, move of families to Rajgarch and his reinforcement pattern. For any commander to be provided the full facts of the Other side of the Hill, as Duke of Wellington used to say, the battle is already won. Its translation in English reads:

By remaining in command of Raj Gurh (Rajgarh), our authority will be maintained, and our subjects prevented from forming conspiracies. On this account, after having made arrangement for battle in this quarter, I shall send him (Bhakti Thapa) back to Raj Gurh. I have written to Ranjore Singh and Jaspau to remain at Nahan, and not to send any more troops to my assistance, as the garrison of Nahan has already been greatly weakened by the detachment of the four companies above mentioned. In this place I have made every necessary arrangement. The armed population of Bhujjee, Kyoonthol, Bogul, and Khotee (Bhaji, Keonthal, Baghal, Koti) have been assembled and stationed at Byzhuttee, and the soldiers of Bhughat (Bagahat) have been posted at sulghaka thanah, in the room of the two companies Mow Buksh and Indur Dub (probably) Mabaksh and Indra Dev companies) recalled . I have written to Bal soonda Thapa to retain at Thummur the company of

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Pureth Kajee, and proceed himself to Mustgarh with four companies of Ummerul Byr Ghattee (Amardal, and Virgati) and the two of Bhugtee Thapa, By this arrangement, Timmul and Kooneear (Kunear) will be near. On the Ranpore (Rampur) mountain, my fortification is already constructed. The northern road will also be obstructed to the enemy to the south. The army of the enemy is posted in three division, and their supplies are derived from Pulasee: whether the latter will reach their army will depend upon the favour of Providence and your fortune. Fro myself, I am using every endeavor to obstruct their road and intercept their convoys of provisions, and shall hereafter report to you what may happen.

The readers will appreciate that Amar Singh had created a mobile reserve which was to be his force du frappe, consisting of four companies including Amar Dal and Virgati along with two more from Bhakti Thapa. It was to provide a force of about 1,000 men which cluld act as a decisive force under Amar Singh's youngest son Ranbir Thapa, who was to be assited by Kurbir Khatri.

The changed thrust of Ochterlony's operations to the Rajgarh ridge (Malaun) while the battle for Ramgarh was still carrying on, did not originate as a result of the so called strategic brilliance of Ochterlony, as contested by the British historicans and John Pemble eulogizing him with, "rich reserves of talent which were released by adversity and stimulated by solicitous attention of his superiors". It does not apparently take cognizance of the then- Ultra-device Ochterlony's mail interception offered him on a planter.

In a similar contemporary corollary, much of the strategic planning for offensive against the Afirka Korps at El-Alamein by General Montgommery had been impelled through the intelligence revelations of the Ultra Cipher Machine. The same can be said of the Russian Counter Offensive at Kursk, Russia, July 1943 as also the Americal Destruction of the Japanese Navy in 1944.

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Ochterlony was now given additional troops as reinforcements, adequate to make him awake from his depressions and put him on cheerful note so as to feel adequate to his command. The reinforcements included: HM's 53rd Infantry (less Grenadiers companies still working with Martindell); a squadron of Skinner's Horse;188 additional artillery i.e., 2 18 pounders, 2,8 inch mortars and 4, 4.5 Inch Howitzers. His beatings' helped and the force level rose almost double the original at 10, 422. He was spurred into activity.

Amar Singh Thapa, conscious of his limitations, based his defence on the basic principles of offensive defence, attrition of the enemy at every stage, and delaying the enemy's main offensive to the months of April-May (Chait0Vaisakh)- a period considered auspicious by the astrologers and for natural reason as the summer rains would commence and affect the operations of the British. Consequently, he thinned out his force from the Ramgarh Fort, strengthened Rajgarh complex and prepared to fight till the end to success. Amar Singh had hoped that Shiv Dutt Rai would keep the Raj of Bilaspur as a lasting ally. The latter having been restored to his rule by him was expected to remain loyal and help him adjust his position in the depth, in case situation so demanded.

The problem of keeping families in occupied areas by the Gorkhas precipitated their position. Amar Singh was complled, partilly, to abandon the Fort of Arki in order to ensure security of his families, his other strategic considerations, notwithstanding.189

As expected, Ochterlony adopted an operational plan which promised to be audacious. He changed his main thrust of attack to the Rajgarh Ridge; he adopted a containing and slower operation against Ramgarh; and he set a battalion of Irregulars under Lieut Ross to cut off Amar Singh's line of communications with Bilaspur, while the Raja of Bilaspur himself was set to be bought, through bribe and coercion.

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The battle that remained to be fought at Ramgarh became a set piece affair for Colonel Cooper who became responsible for consolidating his position with 2, 18 pounders in support. The History of Bengal Artillery narrates it briefly though not without serious flaw.: "Colonel Cooper ascended the Ramgarh ridge. Captain Webb, with his company, or a part of it, accompanied this detachment. The 18 pounders under Lieutenant Tennant were brought up with incredible labour, and a battery was opened upon Ramgarh which soon surrendered. Jorjoru capitulated at the same time. Taragarh (a second place of that name) on the llth, and Chamba on the 16th of March, were breached and taken. All were stone forts. The posts on this ridge having been thus successively reduced 'the detachment took up the position which had been assigned it before Malaon, on the 1st of April".190

The Gorkhas faced a situation where the defenders at Ramgarh had been gradually isolated. Lieut Lawtie had built the track of west of Jorjoru by 12 February and as the British line extended upto Tubu (see sketch), the post of Jorjoru was isolated, yet they refused to give up. Then between 12 and 16 February, Ramgarh Fort was subjected to battrerings by 2, 18 pounders which destroyed the eastern part of Fort (The fort has not since been repaired). The British now did the incredulous. They surreptitiously conveyed to the Gorkha commander that as situation was bad, they would be allowed to join Amar Singh's force with all their arms and ammunition. Similar offer was given to the Jorjoru post. The British version is quoted by Pemble with a twist: "The garrison of Ramgarh was permitted to march (out) to Malaun with all arms, colours, musical instruments, public and private property including cannons .. Jorjorau capitulated the same day".191

All the heavy equipment mentioned had already been taken to Malaun in mid-December after the build up of Ochterlony at Nehr. Amar Singh knew, having made the British deploy, they would attack in thin air

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while he built up on the Malaun ridge. What was left behind was a screen of the Gorkha troops, most of them being Irregulars and locals.

The near correct version is given by Hamilton, who wrote : "The detachment left at Ramgarh secured the surrender of the fort, without opposition on 16 February by bringing the heavy guns on to the ridge above, at close range, and during the next month three other fortified forts along the range, the furthest from Ramgarh, surrendered in succession, the majority of the garrisons enlisting into our service.".192

Subversion was thus playing a larger part. Earlier when Thompson managed to stick up at Mangu on December 28-29 against Gorkha counter-attack, another attempt was made to buy off Amar Singh. Hamilton records it : "After this success Ochtterlony communicated to Amar Singh Thapa an offer of the Governor General to confirm him and his family in their lands, worth about Rs 30,000 per annum, and to settle on him and his family Rs 24,000 more on condition that he surrendered his army and territory. In reply, Amar Singh Thapa declared his intention of resist to the last extremity."193

We move to Malaun, or Rajgarh. Malaun became a Plassey or Buxor for the British. It became a Waterloo fro the Gorkha. It turned history and created geography, that removed barriers.

Walter Hamilton descried Malaun as a stronghold located at 4,488ft., consisting of a line of fortified posts upon a very difficult and lofty ridge which projects itself in to River Sutlej.194

The author's field study suggests the fort still intact with the eastern parapets in deterioration. The two battering guns were still located inside the fort.195 It has beauty and grandeur seldom surpassed by other forts. The other forts and stockades including Rattangarh are gradually 192 193 194 195

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decaying. The Gorkha village of Malaun is intact as, indeed, the track laid by the Pioneers.

Malaun or RajgarhThe Second Story of the Bravest of the Braves

The battle for Malaun servers as the finest example in the whole of brilliant history of the Grokhas in virtually all aspects of history of warfare of the Nineteenth Century that were fought not only in India but the world over. In a scale diminutive to Waterloo (15 June 1815), it has lessons and repercussions that transcend beyond the visible spectrum:

Firstly, it brought out the best in tactics and strategy. Secondly, it also showed the darker side of battle and the morals of

the British. Thirdly, from this single battle, its implications proliferated to

strategic consequences then simply unimaginable. And in a lagre measure it proved what General Carl Von Clausewitz said and the world quotes continuously, "war is the continuation of government policy by other means."196

Fourthly, it showed the leadership at its good light at all levels. This battle also proved what Napoleon observed and Emil Ludwig quoted : "It is the political astuteness that makes military men as genius".197

And fifthly, it also gave the British a sulking, quailing neighbour Nepal; and importantly, it led to the beginning of the Gorkhas of the Indian Army, who, over a period of time, became its corps d' elite and what Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw called them as the wonder of the Indian Army.198

196 197 198

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It is not intended to comprehensively discuss in the historical exposition the small details of movements and operations . The emphasis is on larger issues of strategy, tactics and diplomacy.

As part of military plan, Moira was to use every possible measure to terminate the war on his terms. Militarily, he accelerated operations in the west further by moving Colonel Nicolls, the Quartermaster of the HM's forces in Bengal Army to replace the Eurasian, Gardner.

The ground configuration of the Malaun ridge of about 5 miles with average height of 4,500 feet rising from the Gamrola and Gambar, forms a tough country side. Deeply cut nalas, sharp escarpments, steep gradients, rocky out crops when they are not covered with thick jungles, are the main characteristics of this feature. Small village dot all along. The rain leave several streams full of water till about November but from December they dry up and then only a few perennial nalas serve the needs of the troops located on the ridge. Water becomes a problem during March-May when, again preliminary pre-monsoon showers begin to solve the water problem of the defenders.

Amar Singh made full use of the features and his defence stretched from Lag Hill to Rattangarh, a distance of over 6 miles (approximately 10 Kilometres). In commenting on the construction of the defence-work, Colonel Sandes said: "The Gorkhas had shown usual speed, ingenuity, their organization was perfect, their industry extraordinary and their designs well suited to the site."

The design of Amar Singh's battle on the Rajgarh feature pivoted on two basis premises : one, Bhakti Thapa, who had always been his right hand man, to guard the most vulnerable flank of Surajgarh. The lesser threatened and isolated fort Rattangarh could be left with Bilaspurians. However the hub of defenses on Malaun had to be guarded as the ground of tactical importance for the entire defences. He undertook to defend it himself. Two, reactions to destroy the British gusn and attacking force

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had to be swift and decisive. Unfortunately, deployment of Amar Singh favored the attackers.

The British records praise Lawtie, the Engineer and the surveyor who had made Ochterlony move from the ledge of Kahnani Kot to the Nehr plain. He was again pressed into service for intricate reconnaissance of the Rajgarh feature. His report showed that gaps existed in the extended Gorkha defences at Raila and Deonthal (I). He also found that the defenders of Rattangarh were a shaky lot, non-enthusiastic to fight and could perhaps be subverted. In so far the Gorkha defences around the Malaun village were concerned they were a rag-tag of people who could be exploited.

Octerlony's plan for attack became one of maneuver thrount infiltration into the gaps unheld by Amar Singh. Concurent with it, multiple prongs could be developd to cut the water supply and guns could be moved into the areas on both flanks from which support could be provided to the attacking echelongs at various stages of assault. A serious attempt had also to be made to subvert the loyalty not only of the Rattangarh fort but of the Gorkha defences outside the fort. The plan broadly worked out manifested in harassing Bhakti Thapa in his fort at Surajgarh and the Tipnu Spur on the extremities; locate sufficient troops at Raila and Deonthal; harry and harass Malaun Cantonment; and in concert with the military operation try and win over as many Gorkha commanders as possible.

He sent irregular under Lieut Rosss to the Bandela Heights, dominating Bilaspur and thus compelling the one time ally and staunch supporter of Amar Singh, to the British side.It showed effect, almost instantly as the 500 strong Bilaspurian troops at Rattangarh joined him. This came as a windfall. He then pushed another regular battalion under Colonel Thompson to join Ross. The result was that the british found Rattangarh as a firm base and Amar Singh had to readjust his defences on the Malaun Ridge. But he was not unduly concerned as he was fighting a battle on the ground of own choosing.

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Soon the battle of encirclement, infiltration and subversion began. Gradually, Amar Singh's position became so acute that his mail was being intercepted and his famous letter of 2 March 1815, beside the letter of November,, already mentioned, became Ultra to the British, By this time according to his own version, "all the Rans. Rajas, Thakuris had joined the enemy." with the advantage of Amar Singh's letter of 2 march and his increasing number of allies.' the constant flow of deserters, knowledge of ground and Amar Singh's defence, Ochterlony framed a plan that decidedly looked bold. He did what the modern tactics calls a multi-directional attack by adopting an infiltration technique. It remains one of the finest examples of the planning on a terrain as of the Malaun Ridge, against an enemy like the Gorkhas deployed on it. His plan which fructified after reconnaissance, consultations. subversion and military preparations, for two months since he concentrated opposite Malaun, took the shape of several columns moving to the ridge concurrently, on 14-15 April 1815. They were 199

Lieutenant Fleming was assigned to move from Palta to Raila

by night, and on reaching Raila, to show light as a signal to the other columns. He was to establish the firm base and act as the path finder.

Lieutenant Lidlie and Captain Hamilton to move from Lag Hill and Jai Nagar with their troops and concentrate at Raila on the morning of 15 April.

Major Innes, with a Grenadier battalion and two 6 pounders to move from headquarters at Battoh, on the morning of the 15 th, upon Raila.

Colonel Thompson with the 2/3 NI and two 6 pounders under Lieut J Cartwright, to move from Battoh, on the morning of 15th

up on the Second Deonthal (II) Captain Lawrie to move at the same time from Kali, upon the

same point. 199

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Captain Bowyer to leave Kali at the same time as Captain Lawrie, and, after crossing the Gamrola Rver, to diverge to the right and endeavour to penetrate the Malaun cantonment from the rear.

Captain Showers to move from Arnold's post at Rattangarh at the same hour, and endeavor to penetrate the Malaun cantonment, between the Kakri stockade and the fort.

Besides these, Lieut Dunbar, with a small body of regular and Irregular Sepoys, was intended to act as a support for the two last detachments.

Ross's force of Irregulars (including the Gorkha deserters) to go fro Narainkot.

The force that was committed to attack consisted of : Light Battalion (Grenadiers companies) 2/3 NI, 2/16 NI, with about 2,000 Irregular including 300 Gorkhas and 4,6 pounders, There were also available 2/7 NI, 1/19 NI, 2/19 NI, 1/9 NI, 2/1 NI, HM's 53 rd, Skinner's Squadron and the battering guns. The dispositions are better shown on the sketch.

This plan improved upon the concept of Rollo Gillespie's plan if several out flanking columns converging at one smaller objective , Kalunga over a dispersed area. Ochterlony's plan, on the other hand, aimed at concentrating several columns at different points form where they would work inward towards the main objective of the Rajgarh fort and these precluded the possibilities of a coordination – mix –up as tge columns were to act independently, if required.

soon these columns snaked up the Rajgarh feature. The object if this movement, as Moira's report of 2 August 1518 made out, was " to distract Amar singh's attention, and obtain an opportunity of establishing them selves on the height in such a manner as to break the continuity of his chain of ports, and to force him to confine himself to the fort of Malaun and his immediate outposts, while the footing obtained by the British troops on the ridge should afford means of operating directly against the fort ". this movement was carried out admirably. It was fitting into a classical maneuver, resulting in shifting the fire support means to a suitable flank.

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With this infiltration Bhakti's position at Surajgarh had been fully isolated. Bhakti Thapa and Amar Singh's worries began to increase but they could not ascertain the actual strength until the morning of 15 April, when Amar Singh called Bhakti Thapa to Malaun fort for consulation and a counter-attack. But Captain Shower's attack on the Tiphnu Spur had been beaten back. It was a rout.

The Charge of the Gorkha Brigade

Bhakti had to descend a thousand feet from Surajgarh to the Gamoral nala, traverse on a concealed goat-trail for miles to bypass the areas now humming with the enemy troops. It took his force thebest part of the day to do so. When he arrived at the Rajgarh it was late evening. The red ball of the sun was, nonetheless still on the horizon and post haste he was taken to a machan from where he could see Deonthal and the Tipnu Spur. Some men and animals could be seen on the Deonthal despite all measures taken by Thompson to conceal his build-up.

Back to the kazi's headquarters where stood an anxious but not in panic, Amar Singh. Bhakti was briefed quickly how the enemy had infiltrated into the gaps and alas, how the Gorkhas themselves vacillated in preventing them from arriving at those spots. There had been, he told Bhakti-the grandsire laxity in surveillance, actions and a callous disregard to prompt reporting. He was furious at some of the Subedars who, he thought, were either tired or faltering in their duties. The Bhardars who were also present for consultation and decision even suggested that the enemy's agents having been active, had perhaps managed to subvert the loyalty of a few. The Kazi was annoyed at that and rejected such allegations. " No Gorkha worth his name can ever do that", he told the gathering. He was however, unware of the undercurrents already eating into the vitals.

Bhakti intervened and asked the Kazi to decide on an early counter-attack preferably on both the sides, though the one for Deonthal must be

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launched without loss of time. He suggested a mid-night attack. The others thought a first-light attack would be better as it could be driven in with precision. Amar Singh was in agreement with Bhakti but then other difficulties propped up: the withdrawal of the troops to form the counter attack force would take time; the conveyance of the 3 pounders would need care; and finally, other matters such as the briefing of the troops, the final prayers in the temple of Lord shiv and Goddess Durga could not be forgotten. The H-Hour time was then agreed upon 4 a.m., April 16.

While others dispersed to get the arrangements going, the Kazi and the Grand-sire sat to think over the finer points of attack. They made contingency plans to go headlong or scoop astride the slopes from two or more directions. Bhakti wanted the Kazi to man the Fort and leave the counter-attack to him. The Kazi told him to leave that decision fro the moment.

By 2 a.m., the fort was scampering with activities. Some 400 men had assembled. There were also the band and the flagbeares of the Kazi. The women and the children were awake and helping the men draw their ammunition from the silos of the fort. Some girls and boys had dressed themselves in mens attire and were ready to march off with the attackers. They were, instead, told to get to the perimeter defences and be prepared to rush to the battle field to evacuate and treat the wounded. A batch of them fetched the water and found some Firingis nearby but they still managed to draw the water.

The slinging in of the guns had to be attended to. The Kazi himself saw them before they were ready.Soon the prayers began on an austere note and the Pandit, a Sarma from Nepal, put the holy Tika on all the commanders and men. The senior wife of the Kazi added another on the Kazi and Bhakti. The Kazi had decided by then to lead the counter-attack though the commander still would be Bhakti.

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For the garrison, it was time to also listen to the final words of the Kazi and the Grand sire. the Kazi spoke calling 16 April as the day of the promises to be fulfilled to the motherland, Nepal, "We must win or die in winning the battle" he told them. He sought a promise on that which resounded with Hun-Chha (Yes) from all. The grandsire, never too good at lecture, told the Kazi that he and others of the 400 had-lived only for this day'. It will be victory or death. He then asked the Kazi's wife, calling her a sister, to look after his son. She promised to look after hi as her own Ranjore. (Bhakti had lost his wife a few months back).It was 3.15 a.m. when the 400 marched out of the fort, to a slow but steady beat of a drum.

Deonthal is a flattish narrow rock-strewn extension of the Rajgarh, for nearly one and half miles. Pines and shrubs cover it well even now. A very prominent knoll still marks its ground feature. The British column under Thompson had taken position here on its reverse slopes. The battery of 6 pounters properly concealed, was located on the far-end of the feature.

With two India Battalions (23NI and 26 NI), the Grenadiers companies of the Light Battalions and some 1000 Irregulars including the prisoners and the deserters, the British strength swelled up to about 3,500 troops and weapons. And, against it ,was marching a puny force of 400 Gorkhas with just about 200 flint-locks and toy guns of 3 pounders.

It was around past 4 a.m., when Thompson was told that a faint drumbeat, perhaps of the enemy, could be hard some distance away. The British scrambled to a sort of a stand-to, clutching at their weapons and limbering up thir guns. Andrelin ran high in Thompon's veins and his heart beat could be heard by him. Others perspired in their positions, and prayed.

Gradually, as the radiance of the rising sun began to glow, showing the ground in silhouettes, the approaching lines of the Gorkhas too could be seen. So was the flag of the Kazi- the traditional yellow, carrying a black

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Hanuman. The drum-beat had died but the rustling files drew closer. Thompson waited.

Soon it was brighter and the Gorkha were hastily forming up. There was delay; and the longer they waited the better they would be seen. Amar Singh could be seen pushing the first wave forward. As the band played and the long crved brass pipes blowing the charge of Ayo Gorkhalsi could be hard. The first wave moved along the spine of the features almost into the guns. they cut their way through to the guns now belching sharpnels and shots into them. The Gorkhas killed and wounded in scores but only one man reached the gun to be killed at its breach. Their own 3 pounders were little use.

Ere long the second wave followed, the disappeared first. It touched only the fringes of the Thompson perimeter. Now the entire force of the British were firing in all sorts of directions and even killing their own colleagues. The wave pressed forward but gradually like the fury of flood over a rock, struck it to fall silent.

Bhakti who led the third and the final wave of the balance of the 400 changed his axis. He divided them into two columns through the slopes on either side of the feature and then scooped up to attack simultaneously. They were met by many of the Thompson's Granadiers who had taken defences on the midwaist lines of the feature. The Gorkhas cut through them to the guns but were mowed down as they charged in to the monsters vomiting sharpnels. Bhakti with his Khukri bristling in the sun made a desperate yet titanic surge at Cartwright's gun but a shot saw the hero's end.

The Kazi saw Bhakti go down as he and others charged the British. The Kazi wanted to also do the same with guard of ten men but was stopped from the Harakiri. They escorted him back to the fort.

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The famous counter attack by Bhakti Thapa was recorded from a vantage point of history by RP Ochterlony's the author of Sketches Of The Goorka War.

" A body of Gorkhas advancing to charge bears no resemblesce to a European column. Several huge trumpets putting up a harsh but stirring noise, set the multitude in motion who, except some carry shields, grasping each a matchlock in his left hand and a broad sword in his right, rush on, disregarding all regularity, very like a pack of hounds in full cry."

The purpose of history will also be served with a nuance, of course, if the version of Hamilton is reproduced : " At the first break of dawn 16 th

April, a desperate attack was made on the main, or central column, by 2,000 of the enemy headed by Bhagti Thapa, a leader distinguished for his headlong valour. And for two hours the fight raged at close quarters, Amar Singh Thapa being observed in person, with a stand of colour, encouraging his men within musket shot range. On our side equal bravery was displayed. Lieutenant Fireworker Cartwright of the Artillery fought one gun with the help of the one unwounded man of his detachment, while the other gun was manned by two lieutenants and two Sergeants of Pioneers. In spite of the impetuous courage of the enemy, they were at length repulsed, Bhagti Thapa and a host of men being slain. On our side 4 officers and 213 men were killed and wounded in this column during the 15th and 16th wounded, besides certain Irregulars, whose casualties are unrecorded."200

It was the Khukri charge and the battle cry of Ayo Gorkhali201, their last roar, that must have shaken their enemies. What a tremendous scene that would have turned lambs into lions ! The Gorkhas proved their valour before Deonthal whose slopes were covered with dead and dying. It was the charge of the Gorkha Brigade-perhaps the first one-with all its fury. As Bhakti was killed and Amar Singh with a dozen walking wounded

200 201

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struggled into the Fort, the standard of Hanuman fluttering on, shaken but still holding the standard of the Nepalese Army. He had on this fateful day lost his right hand man and each one of the Gorkhas, who had stood with him from the day he crossed River Kali in October 1790. All these brave men had laid their lives for his cause and the cause of their country.202

The euphemism of the Bravest of the Braves had been used by Napoleon for Marshal Ney, whose bravery during the retreat from Moscow in 1812 was one of the highest. "Brave les brave,' said Napoleon of him. The British then used this citation for the Gorkhas during and after the Anglo Gorkha war. Such was the bravery shown by this 74 year old Bhakti Thapa that the next legend of the Bravest of the Braves had been created on this day- 16 April 1815 at Malaun and it became the forerunner to the coming generation of the Gorkhas.

Ochterlony's concentration of force at Raila an Deonthal was commendable. Although it was Deonthal that took the brunt of Gorkha's counter-attack, Raila served as a lay back for Deonthal. As at Kalunga, it was artillery that saved the day for the British. Had the 6 pounders not been in position, it was certain that the entire force of Ochtherlony on the Rajgarh Ridge would have been thrown back as also happened on the two ledges of Jaithak. The credit from the British side must go to the artillery to save the day, in the battle.

Amar Singh was now hamstrung and isolated. He made a mincemeat of the column of 1/9 NI under Showers but his own flexibility was reduced to nil. Gradually the defenders of the outer perimeters gave in to bribery and temptation of service with the British. They now had a free and unscrupuless (though not wholly immoral) methods to plant disinformation, bombard the Malaun fort not only with shells but false propaganda, and drumming of the fallibility of a man called Amar Singh. The propaganda was disseminated through the Gorkha deserters

202

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and the British stratagems of Sam, Dam, Dand, Bhed were working marvelously. It was Kautily's best.

All this time the role of the Irregulars became very prominent. Lieut Ross at the head of 3,000 Irregular including Bilaspurians, Patials Sikhs, about 300 Gorkhas came to 'eat' into the loyalty of the Gorkhas deployed all round the Malaun Fort. They acted as important agent-du-provocateurs inciting active desertion. One such example which must be quoted is the letter of Ross to Ochterlony produced at PRNW PP 604.

It was not all. Disgustingly, the Gorkhas had already been brought into the battle against their own kinsmen and commanders, to whom they once owed full allegiance. Nonetheless, records must be allowed to speak for themselves. Enclosed in Vol II of PRNW at pp 590-92 Ochterlony's report of 17 April 1815, on the day after Deonthal, reads: "on the night of 14 April, two companies of Light Infantry under command Lieuts Fleming and Grant of 1/9 NI, 300 of Hindur Rajas household troops, 300 of Nusseeree Grokhas and about 300 of Mani Majra auxiliaries marched from the village of Pungul and at about 1 O'clock gained the post they were intended to occupy between Doab and Deonthal without opposition. " Later Moira also referred to it in his

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Narainkot, 3 May.

I have already reported the proposal I made to three Sardars, Randhoj Thapa, Narbir Thapa, Uri Mardan Thapa. Yesterday after noon I sent messenger to the height if they were inclined to acquiesce to those terms. Randhoj alongwith two Jemadars would desert during the night. I have told them I was about to ascend the height and that they should not fire on our troops. I ascended the summit without opposition. By this time the Grenadiers battalion was coming and other partiers of the enemy similarly called on and accepted our invitation (not offer resistance) and we gained their principal watering place. People at Narainkot showed inclination to join us and we gained the height."

letter of 2 August 1815 (PRNW, pp 704): "It may be proper to state in this place that the Goorka troops who deserted in the course of perations of Maj Gen Ochterlony were taken into our pay and formed an attached and useful corps". He puts the number of all such deserters at 4463.

Amar Singh hanged three (Jemadar Ajit Malla, Bhim Singh and one Kot Havildar) for abetting the British. But effect of his authority was on the decline (PRNW 587).

Deonthal remained with the British. It moved the fire power base of the British next to the fort. A road (which is still available on the ground) by which 18 pounders could be transported on elephants was constructed and batteries raised against Malaun. The occupation of Kumaon by the British by now had cut off all hopes of Amar Singh to defeat them. The British propaganda and subversion had wrecked the nerves of those under incessant attack, while Amar Singh got isolated. The final coup de grace was effected by the battering of the fort by 18 pounders and by eventual resigning by Amar Singh to his fate.203 He crird bitterly like a child and told his wife: "Distiny my dear, is batter than the man."

In the overall analysis a few aspects need to be commented upon : The British arm that finally caused the defeat of the Gorkha valour; the Generalship; the stage management of the battle.

It was the artillery that staked the claim to be called, the major war winning arm. While it may not necessarily be given the unique honour of winning the whole war, it certainly emerged as a corps d' elite. But for these guns no success could have been possible. The best boquet that the artillery received in this war, in a fitful manner is contained in the History of Artillery (pp 20-21) which records : "His Excellency has to offer the tribute of his applause to the intrepid gallantry of Lieut Fireworker Cartwright, who when the desperate perseverance of the enemy had left him with only one man unwounded, with that one man secured his gun; the other being manned with equal zeal and valour by 203

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Lieuts Armstrong and Hutchinson, and two Sergeants of the pioneers". He deserved a Victoria Cross.

The Infantry continued to show poor spirit most of whom were mortally afraid of the Gorkhas and their Khukris. They remained and Achilles Heel for the British. They behaved more like the Irregulars who panicked and fled at the sight of a Gorkha with unsheathed Khukri. The author of the Military Sketches of the Goorka War narrates how Lieut Lawtie, in the course of his reconnaissance, came suddenly on a post. He carried it; but the Gorkhas turned upon him; and his Sepoys, after firing away the upper layer of their cartridges abandoned the post and fled. Lieut Williams, who was moving to support was similarly abandoned by his men who were panic-struck, and fled without exerting themselves, Distrust further grew of the Indian Sepoys and European Infantry when news came of failures at Kalunga and Jaithak. In the end when fortune unfurled through heaven for the British at Rajgarh and almora, magnanimity of the senior officers tended to forget their infantry's marked weakness.

Who were responsible for failures of Infantry to show its traditional élan? The best Infantry in the world is so because of its officers; so is the worst. For, there is no other arm where leadership is at such a high stake as in Infantry. The failure of the British Infantry was thus a leadership failure of the British Army.

A whole chapter is devoted at the end to the analysis of leadership, where some of these leaders come up for scrutiny. At the outset, it may be said that for the British it was a Subaltern's war. The subalterns helped Ochterlony in every thing including providing technical guidance and tactical advice. The grea commodity of luck, no doubt showered fortune on the 61 year old General, to take the credit. But the actual contributor to the success of this war had been the junior officers.

But where Ochterlony's credit must rest-and it is irrefutable is in the art of stage-management for war. He proved excellent in it. Even when the

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fog of war-a common occurrence at higher levels attempted to over whelm him, he managed to pull the chest-nut out of the fire just before it burst.

In the Convention of 15 May 1815, rhetorics like "Amar Singh Thapa's high rank, character, bravery and fidelity", and Rajnore's gallant conduct at Jaithak", have been used liberally for permitting them to move out of their forts and vacating the rest of the territories. Amar Singh must, therefore, be remembered for his tenacity, personal bravery and impressing his enemy with so much awe that the latter honored him with "marching off with colours". It was, "the world turned upside down", of course, Lord Moira, who having himself been accorded such a nicety in the American war of independence though it a good parting gesture to a brave enemy and his son. It was afterall, in gratitude of a miracle by two Gs-the Gorkhas and God-that this campaign, in Prinsep's word, "which in January, promised nothing but disaster, finished in May by having in possession of the British, the whole tract of hills from Gogra to Sutlttj. It was all courtesy, the Gorkhas of Nepal whose band still sent playing Aey Gorkhali Sar Uchali and fired a volley of their muskets, they had captured at Nehr. While the small caravan trooped out of the Rajgarh there stood near the water point all those who had joined the Firingis waving at it. Some even said: Pheri Bhentuala (shall meet again). " In the battlefield", retorted one of Amar Singh's aides.

Such was the face of the battle and of those who fought it.

The gains for the British, being several, as it is, also was to result in something they had been looking for. In the words of General Sir George Chesney: "Lord Hastings administration was also signaled by the gain of tract of a country in the Himalayas from the Nepalsese ceded in 1815… a country more extensive than production but precious to English in India from its beauty and healthfulness." out of this territory came the hill stations of Mussoorie,' Lansdowne, Almora, Nainital, Ranikhet, Pithoragarh, and subsequently in 1830's, Darjeeling, Shillong etc.

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After Bam Shah gave up Almora-much as a result of the British deceit and cunning-Nicolls and Gardner persuaded him to write to Amar Singh to agree to the same. The number of few deserter, including Gorkhas from the outer permeters of Malaun, were magnified several times. At the behest of Ochterlony began a disinformation campaign from 16 April till 14 May that every one had joined the British. The fifth columnists and the dictated letter of Bam Shah added to Amar Singh's anxiety and indecisiveness. There were rumours. Deftly conveyed through some of the vacillating Gorkha commanders from the perimeter defences, that the goings at Jaithak were no good and that several seniors had become casualties. Though such news did not immediatedl set despondency in Amar Singh , it did. nonetheless, create a scene of gloom among the already suffering and wounded families, now herded in the western stronghold of the Fort.

Amar Singh's insoluble problem was a 'blindness' that had engulfed him. Interception of his letters, orders and communications clipped his wings. He was not certain how Bam Shah gave in at Almora and why he had asked him to do likewise. Finally, he seemed to absolve himself by inserting a remark: Signing the Convention on directions of chautaria. He was not sure of the fate of Ranjore Singh. The British canard made him dead to dying and his garrison having abandoned the fort of Jaithak. The new from Garhwal despite Bakhatwar Singh informing him of his having readjusted his defence across the Bhagirathi on Chandrbadna feature was blank. Instead he was being fed the planted news that Garhwalis had already recaptured the Gorkha forts. And although the Durbar had mobilized and sent him some 27 companies of the total 40, he was unaware of such a gesture.

But while the British creating a fog of war about Amar Singh is understandable as part of enemy's stratagem, the desertion of his own people in one or the other form is simply inexcusable. We know if Amar Singh had his way he would have thrown them over the Rajgarh cliff !

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By the 'Black' 13 May, Amar Singh, now reduced to mere 50 fighting men and about 150 women and children, was conveyed the message from Ochterlony that all honour will be given to him by the British, his safety ensured, if he signed the Convention. With tears flowing, Amar Singh signed the ignominious Convention of the 15th. It inter-alia included the provision for enlistment of the Gorkhas into the Indian Army. The para 5 reads : "All the troops in the 'service of Nepaul, with the exception of those granted to the personal honour of the Kajees Ummer Singh and Runjore Singh, will be at liberty to enter into the service of the British Government, if it is agreeable to themselves and the British Government, till Peace is concluded between the two States."

While 15 May really became a 'Black Day' for Amar Singh and the Durbar at Kathmandu, it became, a Red letter day for Ochterlony, Moira and the British, as on this day a new historical development had taken place: the Gorkhas of the Indian Army had found their roots.204 These however were a rag tag mostly of irregulars (Locals) and mercenaries on the service of the Gorkhas. The asli (or genuine) Gorkhas, as Bam Shah said, did not desert to join the British. The aslis returned to Nepal or sought employment with Ranjit Singh. It was 35 years hence that the real Gorkhas formed the First Gorkha Rifles of the Indian Army. Lord Moira was looking at the overall strategic gain which is summed up in Para 321 of his report dated 2 August 1815: "By possession of Kumaon, the Doons of Dyra and Kyarda of Nahan, Subathoo and Malown and passage of rivers … we have in the hills from Kali to Sutleje the whole of the country beyond it. It is an advantage of no small moment to have substituted in those regions such an order of things, instead of dominion of the people with the spirit which has shown faith in the Goorkhas. But we are now not only freed from that evil but are secure from the consequences which would ensure were Runjeet Sing or any ambitious and powerful chiefs to establish himself in the hills beyond Sutleje."

(By the courtesy of Chandra Bahadur Khanduri “ A rediscovered history of Gorkha”

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