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EUROPEAN RAILWAY AGENCY

ERTMS UNIT

PRESENTATION REPORTOF ERTMS OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND RULES, VERSION 3

Reference: Document type: T

Version : 1.1

Date : 22/03/12

Edited by Quality review Approved by

Name D. LIGIER A. CHIAPPINI P. GUIDO

Position ERTMS Unit Project Officer ERTMS Unit Quality Manager ERTMS Head of Unit

Date

&

Signat.

Presentation report of ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules version 3 PAGE 1 OF 26


1. AMENDMENT RECORDVersion Date Section number Modification/description Author(s)

1.1 22/03/12 Draft version 2 ERA



2. TABLE OF CONTENTS1. AMENDMENT RECORD.............................................................................................................2

2. TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................3

3. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................6

3.1 Purpose of the document...................................................................................................6

3.2 Scope and field of application............................................................................................6

3.3 ETCS related differencies between operated system versions X = 1 and X = 2...............7

3.4 Modification of the GSM-R harmonised operational rules.................................................8

3.5 Validation process.............................................................................................................8

4. REFERENCES, TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................9

4.1 Reference documents........................................................................................................9

4.2 Terms & abbreviations.......................................................................................................9

5. PRINCIPLES.............................................................................................................................10

OBSERVANCE OF SIGNALLING (5.1.3)..................................................................................10

WRITTEN ORDERS (5.1.4).......................................................................................................10

SPEED RESTRICTIONS IN SR (5.1.7).....................................................................................10

6. ETCS RULES............................................................................................................................11

PUTTING THE ETCS ON-BOARD INTO SERVICE (6.1).........................................................11

PREPARING A MOVEMENT (6.2)............................................................................................11

PERFORMING SHUNTING MOVEMENTS IN SH (6.3)............................................................12

ENTERING DATA (6.4).............................................................................................................12

RUNNING ON SIGHT (6.5).......................................................................................................13

DEPARTURE OF THE TRAIN (6.6)..........................................................................................13

RUNNING IN SR (6.14).............................................................................................................14

PASSING A RADIO HOLE (6.30)..............................................................................................15

ENTERING AN OCCUPIED TRACK SECTION WITHIN A STATION (6.31)............................15

PERFORMING A TANDEM MOVEMENT (6.32).......................................................................15

REVOKING AN AUTHORISATION FOR ERTMS TRAIN MOVEMENT (6.33)..........................16

TAKING MEASURES IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY (6.34)........................................17

PROPELLING IN RV (6.36).......................................................................................................17

ROUTE UNSUITABILITY (6.38)................................................................................................18

AUTHORISING THE PASSING OF AN EOA (6.39)..................................................................18

RESPONDING TO A TRIP (6.41).............................................................................................19

MANAGING A TRACKSIDE MALFUNCTION (6.42).................................................................20

MANAGING A FAILED LEVEL TRANSITION (6.46).................................................................20



MANAGING ABSENCE OF RBC INFORMATION (6.47)..........................................................20

MANAGING A RADIO COMMUNICATION FAILURE (6.48).....................................................21

MANAGING A FAILURE OF SELFTEST (6.49)........................................................................21

MANAGING AN NTC FAILURE (6.53)......................................................................................21

MANAGING A VBC (6.54).........................................................................................................21

7. GSM-R RULES..........................................................................................................................22

SELECTING THE GSM-R MODE (7.1).....................................................................................22

ENTERING THE FUNCTIONAL NUMBER (7.2).......................................................................22

SELECTING THE GSM-R NETWORK AT A BORDER CROSSING (7.3)................................22

PERFORMING A DE-REGISTRATION (7.4).............................................................................22

TAKING MEASURES IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY CALL (7.5)..........................................23

8. ANNEX A...................................................................................................................................24

9. ANNEX B...................................................................................................................................25

LIST OF ETCS OPERATIONAL TRAIN CATEGORIES............................................................25

10. ANNEX C............................................................................................................................27

TABLE OF REFERENCES TO NON-HARMONISED RULES...................................................27



3. INTRODUCTION

3.1 Purpose of the documentThe purpose of this document is to provide guidance on the harmonised ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules.

This document reflects the structure of the document “ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules”. For each comment the reference of the principle / rule is indicated in brackets.

3.2 Scope and field of applicationThe document “ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules” applies to systems based on Decision xxx of xxx 2012.

The allocation of figures to the ETCS operated system versions (X = ?) is defined in chapter 6 of the ETCS SRS.

The harmonised ERTMS Principles and Rules are written for ETCS levels 1, 2, 3 and transitions (ordered by trackside), between level 1, level 2 and level 3.

The scope of the document “ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules” is strictly limited to the indicated lines:

lines equipped with ETCS level 1 whether or not trackside signals or infill are present

lines equipped with ETCS level 2 whether or not trackside signals are present

lines equipped with ETCS level 3.

On level 1 lines with trackside signals and on level 2 lines with trackside signals it is inevitable to have additional non-harmonised rules because of the national signalling systems.

According to clause 2.6.7.1.7 of the SRS lineside signals are not foreseen to be used when operating in level 3; consequently the harmonised operational rules do not cover the level 3 implementation with trackside signals.

The links between ETCS and the national signalling systems (e. g. lines equipped with level 2 and level 1 with trackside signals, level 2 and level NTC etc…) are not part of the harmonised technical specification but application dependent. As a consequence the operational rules to be applied in some degraded situations on such lines cannot



be harmonised. Therefore any change to a fallback system from any level of ERTMS is not covered by the harmonised operational rules; this includes the change from level 2 to level 1.

If some of the indications displayed on the DMI are not compliant with the indications contained in the harmonised operational rules, the driver’s rulebook has to be adapted accordingly.

When a symbol displayed on the DMI does not require any reaction from the driver then there is no rule and the corresponding symbol does not appear in the document “ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules”.

The full list of operational text messages is covered in the rules as following:

when the train is tripped the text message is considered as to be additional information giving the reason for the trip; it is not relevant for the rules, it is part of the drivers’ training,

all other text messages appear in the respective rules.

As train integrity is not a harmonised function no harmonised rule is contained in the document to cover a train integrity failure.

The GSM-R voice radio operational rules are applicable on all lines equipped with GSM-R, whether or not these are ETCS lines.

3.3 ETCS related differencies between operated system versions X = 1 and X = 2

The operated system version X = 2 introduces the following modifications which have an impact on the harmonised operational rules:

new function Passive Shunting mode,

new function Limited Supervision mode,

new function level crossing not protected,

new function safe area,

new specification for the Non Leading mode,

harmonised text messages “SH request failed”, “RV distance exceeded” and “Trackside malfunction”,

track conditions for the power supply,

new function track conditions for sounding the horn

new function virtual balise cover.

As the definition of the operated system version is linked to the trackside the following terms are used in this document when the content refers exclusively to the on-board:

“baseline 2 trains” for on-board equipments able to operate with operated system version X = 1,



“baseline 3 trains” for on-board equipments able to operate with operated system versions X = 1 and X = 2.

The acronym STM is replaced with NTC when it refers to the level; this change does not impact any operational rule because the same symbol is displayed whatever is the baseline.

In addition some minor modifications have been taken into account e.g. the new names of some of the train data, the shape of some symbols displayed on the DMI…

The rule “managing a failure of self test” applies to baseline 2 trains only because the corresponding specification has been now removed from the harmonised specifications.

3.4 Modification of the GSM-R harmonised operational rulesThe rule for an emergency call has been harmonised.

3.5 Validation processThe initial set of rules was validated by:

checking the compliance with the technical system,

testing on real site and on the simulator,

detecting, discussing and closing all open points affecting the rules,

checking the rules from a safety point of view,

checking of the rules from a human factor point of view,

reviewing the rules during several sessions of the UIC platform,

checking the rules from a quality point of view,

checking the rules from the English language point of view.

A similar process has then been applied for the update of the operational rules.



4. REFERENCES, TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

4.1 Reference documentsTable 1 : reference documents

Ref. N° Document Reference Title

[1] ERA_ERTMS_ ERTMS Operational Principles and Rules version 2.1.7

4.2 Terms & abbreviationsThe definition of terms and the meaning of abbreviations used in this document are listed in the ERTMS Operational and Rules document [1].



5. PRINCIPLES

OBSERVANCE OF SIGNALLING (5.1.3)It must be reminded that in addition to this principle the driver shall respect all indications of danger as defined in non-harmonised rules. This rule is not specific for ERTMS, therefore it is recommended to have it as part of the Appendix B of the OPE TSI.

WRITTEN ORDERS (5.1.4)Written orders are a common method of dealing with failures and external conditions. The rules described build upon this method of communication and adapt them for effective use.

According to the OPE TSI appendix C (section introduction), the decision to use written orders is up to the IM. If a written order is issued by the signaller, the driver always has to write down the information at standstill (section 1.2.2.2).

SPEED RESTRICTIONS IN SR (5.1.7)The dedicated document/computer medium refers to the list of modified elements as specified in section 4.2.1.2.2.2 of the OPE TSI.



6. ETCS RULES

PUTTING THE ETCS ON-BOARD INTO SERVICE (6.1)As the data view in baseline 2 trains does not display the Radio Network Identification, RBC Identification and RBC phone number, the only way to have these data displayed is to re-enter the level. In baseline 3 trains this data is displayed.

As there is no action required for ETCS from the driver regarding SL there is no need for an operational rule.

SB cannot be selected by the driver (SRS 4.4.7). The only way to have the on-board system again in SB is by closing and re-opening the driving desk.

Because there is no action required from the driver for an “end of mission” procedure there is no need for an operational rule when leaving the cab. To restart the train from the other cab, the rule ”Putting the on-bord system into service” applies.

PREPARING A MOVEMENT (6.2)A cold movement detection function is available for baseline 3 trains in order to facilitate the start of mission procedure. The fitment of the train with a cold movement device is however optional.

In levels 2 and 3, the automatic call to the stored RBC id/phone number is replaced by a 3 options choice in baseline 3 trains. The driver has the possibility to choose between:

using the last stored RBC contact information

using the EIRENE short number

fully re-validate/re-enter the RBC contact information.

In levels 2 and 3, without communication session (6.2.4), when the driver selects “start”:

in baseline 2 trains the on-board remains in SB; the only possibility to manage such a degraded situation is to press “override” in order to get SR,

in baseline 3 trains, SR is directly proposed to the driver who has to acknowledge.

In order to avoid the issuing of two different written orders, in case a train is authorised to start in SR and to pass the first ETCS stop marker, the signaller delivers only written order 07 which includes the authorisation for passing the EOA (contained in written order 01).



PERFORMING SHUNTING MOVEMENTS IN SH (6.3)The new mode “passive shunting” is added to avoid the drawbacks of the start of mission procedure when performing shunting movements with changes of the driving desk. The rule contained in section 6.3.4 and the second bullet point of section 6.3.5 applies to baseline 3 trains only because of this new function.

The text message “SH request failed” has been introduced for baseline 3 trains.

ENTERING DATA (6.4)The function “train preparer” is used in the rule because, depending on the railway undertakings organisation, entering data can be performed by somebody who may not be the driver.

Taking into account the importance of these data for the global level of safety of the system, the objective is to reduce the amount of data entered manually to a minimum.

For a trainset in normal cases, the train data is normally stored onboard in order to avoid mistakes with data entry procedure.

Train data must be entered or confirmed before the driver can select “Start”.

Some train data is not entered/changed/validated by the train preparer: “axle number”, “list of national systems available on-board”, “traction system(s) accepted by the engine”.

The following train data is identified with different names:

deceleration datafor baseline 2 trains / brake parameters for baseline 3 trains,

axle load for baseline 2 trains / axle load category for baseline 3 trains.

The “additional data for the available STMs” are requested by the SUBSET-026 / SUBSET-035.

The operational rule does not refer to the data “loading gauge” because it is implementation dependent.

Section 6.4.2 applies for all data (train data and additional data) except for adhesion factor for which rule “changing of adhesion factor” applies.

Regarding the rule contained in section 6.4.3a), the possibility to be requested by the on-board to modify and / or validate the data applies to baseline 3 trains only.



RUNNING ON SIGHT (6.5)The rule applies when the driver has to run on sight also for operational reasons (e.g. observing the catenary on request…).

DEPARTURE OF THE TRAIN (6.6)ETCS does not control all conditions that must be met before a train is allowed to depart. Neither train preparation, check of door closing process nor departure time are controlled by the system; therefore these conditions must be controlled by the crew. Only the trackside conditions that must be met before the train is permitted to depart can be transmitted via ETCS as far as an FS or OS MA is issued.

The analysis below shows that all cases of departure after an exceptional stop are covered by an operational rule.

a) Circumstances that can lead to an exceptionnal stop:

brakes are triggered automatically:

o Trip,

o Service Brake,

o Emergency Brake,

brakes are triggered manually:

o by the driver,

o by passengers,

EOA,

by rule:

o e.g. ETCS stop marker,

o written order.

b) There is no need for a rule because all situations above are already covered by other rules:

train trip: rule “Responding to a trip”,

awakening: rule “Putting the onboard system into service”,

emergency stop: rule “Responding to a trip”, or rule “Taking measures in event of an emegency”,



revocation of MA: rule “Revoking an authorisation for train movement”,

time out: rule “Responding to a trip”, or rule “Authorising the passing of an EOA”.

RUNNING IN SR (6.14)In order to avoid the driver having to change the national value “max permitted distance to run in SR” it should be at least sufficient to cover the longest distance between two consecutive ETCS stop markers.

The implementation of the trackside shall be done in such a way that drivers are not normally required to change the national value “maximum SR speed”.

In case the requirements of the two paragraphs above cannot be fulfilled non-harmonised rules apply.

PASSING A RADIO HOLE (6.30)This rule refers to a train running in a level 2 area in a section where radio coverage is not foreseen. The ETCS on-board has received the corresponding information in advance; as a consequence the T_NVCONTACT supervision is inhibited in that area.

ENTERING AN OCCUPIED TRACK SECTION WITHIN A STATION (6.31)It is assumed that in planned situations the driver is informed about the circumstances (by means of the timetable or other means).

This rule works for entering an occupied track section within a station in OS or in SH. The driver shall apply the rule for the appropriate mode.

The signaller must give the driver additional information about the situation in case of unplanned movements on the occupied track.

In case of degraded mode (override…) non-harmonised rules apply.

PERFORMING A TANDEM MOVEMENT (6.32)The harmonised rule is intented for use with baseline 3 trains only because of the improvement of the function; a protection is added to enter the Non Leading mode only



if the locomotive is coupled to another one (by means of an electrical input via the train interface).

Regarding baseline 2 trains the movement with a traction unit in NL is judged particularly unsafe because the engine in NL is free to move as soon as its driver has selected this mode (the entry into the non leading is not protected), and there is no control of this action; it is possible that the driver selects Non Leading even though the corresponding locomotive is not coupled to another one. For the performance of tandem movements with baseline 2 trains a non-harmonised shall be produced.

REVOKING AN AUTHORISATION FOR ERTMS TRAIN MOVEMENT (6.33)In level 1 with trackside signals considering the fact that an MA could be displayed on the DMI and the next trackside signal could be at stop aspect, it is suggested that the procedure as described in Written Order 03 is used to ensure that the driver will not restart.

In level 2 it may be possible to revoke a given MA by using special procedures between on-board equipment and RBC, the co-operative shortening of an MA or by sending a conditional emergency stop order.

There are situations where an MA has to be revoked, i.e. taken away before a train has used it. These situations are listed below. The distinction between two groups of revocation is made:

situations in which the MA will be revoked without pre-conditions. These are dangerous situations or, where allowed, when a wrong route is set. In these situations trains should always be immediately stopped, that means that emergency brake shall be applied. Only in cases where stopping the train might lead to an increase of danger should the MA not be revoked.

to make new traffic arrangements. These are situations in which the MA will only be revoked when it is certain that the train is at a safe distance before the new EOA (because the train shall be stopped there by applying the normal service brake). When the train is not able to stop, the MA shall not be revoked. This condition can be fulfilled:

o when the train has not yet reached the point where it has to start braking to respect the shortened MA or

o when the train is at a standstill.

The check if the conditions mentioned above are fulfilled can be done:

by the automatic ETCS function “co-operative shortening of MA” or



by the signaller according to non-harmonised rules, i. e. watching the representation of the train on his panel,

by the signaller by asking the driver to confirm that the train is at a standstill.

This rule does not apply in case a train has been tripped (rule “Responding to a trip”).

The cases to be covered by non-harmonised rules in level 2 include the following:

the co-operative shortening of MA is not possible,

the train is running in SR.



TAKING MEASURES IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY (6.34)In emergency situations (such as obstacles on the track, fire, landslide, broken catenary, etc) all trains already in the relevant area shall be stopped immediately, except in cases when stopping the trains might increase the danger.

The order to stop the trains in emergency can come from:

the signaller informed by an external source,

a trackside equipment (detector, etc),

anybody along the track.

Trains are tripped because of the use of emergency stop order in level 2 or level 3, and because they have passed the new EOA in level 1 after the MA has been shortened by the signaller (i.e. a signal has been revoked).

In level 1, when a signaller is informed of an emergency situation he shall apply non-harmonised rules to protect the trains; the corresponding actions can lead to a revocation of a movement authority by setting a signal at danger.

In level 1, for trains that are not tripped, the signaller can use the ETCS Written Orders 03 and 04.

When the signaller revokes the emergency stop order the text message ”Emergency stop” disappears.

Even if an unplanned temporary speed restriction is implemented after an emergency situation, trains running in SR may not receive this temporary speed restriction via ETCS. That is why it is necessary to issue temporary speed restriction orders to trains running in SR, if the temporary speed restriction speed is lower than the maximum speed for SR.

PROPELLING IN RV (6.36)The way the driver can trigger the transition to RV is rolling stock implementation dependent.

Regarding section 6.36.3, the text message “RV distance exceeded” has been harmonised for baseline 3 trains.



When the driver closes the driving desk the on-board system exits RV (transition to SB).

ROUTE UNSUITABILITY (6.38)The use of this function is implementation dependent; as a consequence no harmonised rule has been produced.

AUTHORISING THE PASSING OF AN EOA (6.39)This rule covers the general case of passing an EOA except for the case described in section 6.2.4 of the rule “preparing a movement”.

In level 2, the reliability of ETCS and of other means of communication allows us to consider as very rare the case that the driver does not receive a new MA and at the same time is not able to contact the signaller. The train has to remain at a standstill until a new MA is available or the signaller has been contacted and has authorised the driver to pass the EOA.

In case the override function is not active any more due to a time out or over passing the permitted distance (e.g. when it takes longer to restart with a long and heavy freight train or when the train has come to a standstill a longer distance from the signal), the driver is authorised to activate the override function as often as necessary to pass the EOA for which he has received the authorisation to pass. This should also help to avoid tripping a train. This is a training issue.



RESPONDING TO A TRIP (6.41)It is necessary to separate the use of the emergency brake in case of trip (no brake release is possible in trip mode) and other cases of using the emergency brake (without trip). This rule deals only with cases of trains having been tripped.

The following situations have been identified:

in FS or OS, (unauthorised) passing EOA or LOA, loss in the supervision of radio link, balise linking error or revocation of MA (action of timeout in level 1),

in SR, if the train passes a balise that is:

o not in the list of expected balises or,

o in the list but is passed in the wrong direction or,

o giving “Stop if in SR” information,

or the train exceeds the maximum distance for SR,

in SH, if the train or shunting movement passes the border of the shunting area if such an area has been defined by a list of expected balises or by balises containing “Stop if in SH” information,

incompatible ERTMS/ETCS system version detected in all modes except NP, SF or IS,

unconditional Emergency Stop in all modes except SN, UN, TR, RV, PS, SH, NL, NP, IS, SF or SL.

Regarding the special case in SRS 5.11.4.1.1 we consider this to be one of the cases of loss of radio communication covered by the rule “Managing absence of RBC information”.

The rule applies also for a trip in SH, even if as a general principle all communication for shunting is verbal only. The trip is a special situation that should always be handled in the same way. Furthermore it is important to be consistent with the case of performing a shunting movement in FS.

Section 6.41.4 covers the case a shunting movement is tripped when passing the border of a shunting area; because the traction unit has left the shunting area it will not be possible to go back to SH (as there are no train data available there is no possibility to restart the movement as a train).



MANAGING A TRACKSIDE MALFUNCTION (6.42)The text message “Trackside malfunction” has been harmonised for baseline 3 trains.

MANAGING A FAILED LEVEL TRANSITION (6.46)As the data view for baseline 2 trains does not foresee the display of the Radio Network ID, RBC ID and RBC phone number, the only way to have these data displayed is to re-enter the level.

Section 6.46.1 applies when the transition took place but no MA valid beyond the transition point was received on-board. The last sentence applies only in case of mixed levels area when the signaller could ask the driver to enter another level linked to a national system.

Section 6.46.2 and 6.46.3 apply when the transition does not take place when passing the transition point; if the transition did not take place it means that both information for the announcement and the transition itself were missed.

MANAGING ABSENCE OF RBC INFORMATION (6.47)This rule applies in situations when no information is received from the RBC in a level 2 area (and the service brake/emergency brake is triggered due to expiration of T_NVCONTACT).

This rule is based on the following:

T_NVCONTACT is not active in SR mode,

in case of loss of communication, after a certain period of time, the on-board system may trigger the service brake/emergency brake or trip the train.

When the train reaches a standstill, the previous MA is shortened to the current location; but, if the communication is re-established while braking, the symbol disappears, the brake command is automatically released and the MA is still available onboard.

MANAGING A RADIO COMMUNICATION FAILURE (6.48)A radio communication failure is defined as:

failed radio communication establishment,

loss of an existing radio communication,



outside announced radio holes.

MANAGING A FAILURE OF SELFTEST (6.49)This rule applies to baseline 2 trains only.

MANAGING AN NTC FAILURE (6.53)The harmonised rule is intented only for use with operated system version X = 2. The non-harmonised rule (and drivers’ training) shall make the distinction between the different following situations:

the NTC is in use,

the NTC will be used during the journey,

the NTC will not be used during the journey.

MANAGING A VBC (6.54)This rule applies to operated system version X = 2. The way the IMs request from the drivers to manage a virtual balise coverage shall be described in a non-harmonised rule. This rule shall take into account both, the setting and the removing of a VBC.



7. GSM-R RULES

SELECTING THE GSM-R MODE (7.1)The cab radio always shows the last operational configuration.

ENTERING THE FUNCTIONAL NUMBER (7.2)Precondition for successful communication is a completed registration with all GSM-R train data: train identification (category, RU, ...) and train running number.

In each network, a train running number is unique.

SELECTING THE GSM-R NETWORK AT A BORDER CROSSING (7.3)After successful network selection by the driver the registration is performed automatically without any additional driver action.

PERFORMING A DE-REGISTRATION (7.4)In all cases when a train is cancelled during the journey this is an end of mission and a train deregistration has to be performed.



TAKING MEASURES IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY CALL (7.5)The operational rule referring to the emergency call takes as assumptions the following:

the operational situations in which a performer shall trigger the emergency call are covered by non-harmonised rules,

the harmonised rule starts from the moment an emergency call is received,

the first action of all the drivers after receiving an emergency call is to do everything in order to reduce potential consequences,

in such a situation all concerned drivers are listening to the communications, avoiding to speak unless they have to give new relevant elements,

the controller communicates with drivers to provide additional instructions or information,

after receiving an emergency call the actions performed by the controller shall be part of the non-harmonised rules,

only the controller can revoke an emergency call,

only the controller can decide when to resume normal operation,

no special rule is needed for non stopping areas and safe areas.



8. ANNEX A

The following lines contained in some written orders:

"is exempted from running on sight",

“set SR speed to … km/h”,

“set SR distance to … m”,

are optional, this means that if never used in a country, the forms used in that country do no need these lines.



9. ANNEX B

LIST OF ETCS OPERATIONAL TRAIN CATEGORIESAnnex B has been created in order to list the different operational train categories.

Each ETCS train shall belong to one of the harmonised ETCS operational train categories.

The operational train categories are derived from the combination of the type of train (passenger, tilting passenger), the type of brake (P or G) and the cant deficiency values. They are identified thanks to labels which simplify the train data input.

The introduction of a new operational train category (TILT 3) for baseline 3 trains and the possible confusion with the axle load categories lead to the revison of the labels compared to baseline 2 trains:

train baseline 2 trains baseline 3 trains

passenger trains A1 PASS 1

A2 PASS 2

A3 PASS 3

tilting passenger trains B1 TILT 1

B2 TILT 2

TILT 3 (new)

B3 TILT 4

B4 TILT 5

B5 TILT 6

B6 TILT 7

freight trains with P brake C1 FP 1

C2 FP 2

C3 FP 3

C4 FP 4

freight trains with G brake D1 FG 1

D2 FG 2

D3 FG 3

D4 FG 4



If the train does not receive from track side the specific SSP corresponding to one of the train categories, the situation will be managed by the on-board as following:

a baseline 2 train will always consider the basic SSP of the line,

for a baseline 3 trains there is an extra feature regarding the “Cant Deficiency” SSPs: the train will select the “Cant Deficiency” SSP with the highest Cant Deficiency value below the value of its “Cant Deficiency” train category.



10. ANNEX C

TABLE OF REFERENCES TO NON-HARMONISED RULESAll references to non-harmonised rules which are contained in this list are not pending on the technical harmonised functions of ERTMS; they all are linked to the national systems (operational rules, interlocking...), implementation choices and procedures (e.g. shunting...) which are not harmonised and therefore out of scope of the set of harmonised operational rules for ERTMS.

This list must help:

to check the existence of the corresponding non-harmonised rules,

to take care about the interface between the harmonised rules and the non-harmonised rules.


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