Community conflicts and armed militancy in Nigeria: Change and Continuity?

Introduction

Armed militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta has undermined the country’s oil industry (Paki & Ebienfa, 2011), shaped its politics (Aaron, 2015), and provoked debates on the essence of Nigeria’s nationhood (Osaghae, 1998). A strand of academic research has blamed poor development conditions in the Niger Delta for the emergence of this armed militancy (see Ibaba, 2005; Obi, 2009; Idemudia & Ite, 2006; Courson, 2011). This strand of research findings aligns with the views of community activists in the Niger Delta (Okonta & Douglas, 2003). It is also acknowledged by successive governments in Nigeria. However, scholars have called attention to the complex factors that led to the emergence of armed groups. In chronicling what he called “an (incomplete) history of insurgency” in the Niger Delta, Michael Watts noted:

…The militant groups themselves represented the intersection of two important forces. On the one hand, the rise of youth politics in which a younger generation whose economic and political prospects were stymied began to challenge both customary forms of chiefly power, and the corruption of the petro-state (whether military or civilian) (Watts, 2007: 652).

Watts’s argument is in line with the view of Ukeje (2001) who argued that the rise of youth politics fuelled the process of armed mobilisation against the Nigerian State and multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta. According to Ukeje (2001), youth violence could be seen as response to state’s neglect of social amenities, as well as political domination of the military in the region. Similarly, Omotola (2006) argued that the violence in the Niger Delta is fuelled by the radicalisation of the struggle for environmental security by local communities. This paper contends that while these arguments explain narratives of perceived marginalisation grievances used by armed groups in communities in the Niger Delta to justify armed mobilisation against oil companies, it is not sufficient explanation for the emergence of armed groups in the Niger Delta.

The argument advanced in this paper is that intra-communal violent conflicts involving youths, chiefs and other local leaders in the Niger Delta laid the foundation for the emergence of armed militancy in the Niger Delta. The use of violence in intra-communal interactions occurred within the domain of community politics. This community politics was largely a contest by local elites to control the communal resources of the communities. Therefore, the paper advances its argument by theorising the conflict in local communities as an elite competition for power.

The empirical evidence that supports the theoretical claim comes from fieldwork in two communities that experienced armed militancy in the Niger Delta. The communities studied for this are Peremabiri and Ologbobiri in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area, Bayelsa State (see figure 1). The research takes an historical approach while seeking out local explanations for the emergence of armed groups in the communities. Therefore, the research unearths historical accounts in communities. The field research in these communities in 2013, 2014 and 2015.

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During this period, respondents drawn from ex-militants, community chiefs, ordinary members of the community, Nigerian scholars and local activists were interviewed. The paper does not intend to compare these two communities. The empirical evidence gathered from the communities is meant to support the theoretical claim of elite competition as a driver of conflict in Niger Delta communities.

Figure 1: Map of Bayelsa State showing the location of Peremabiri and Olugbobiri communites

Elites and political power in Nigeria: theoretical framing of conflicts in local communities in the Niger Delta

Scholars studying political structures of society have a consensus that all societies have a small group of people called ‘elites’ who decide on the allocation of resources (see Putnam, 1976; Dahl, 2005; Edwards, 2014). Farazmand (1999) notes that actors who occupy “key positions in the political, economic, military, governmental, cultural, and administrative institutions and organizations are considered members of the elites” (p. 330). Their position as elites is not simply because they are institutions that govern, but because they occupy a place in institutions that governs which affects the outcomes of society (Farazmand, 1999). This is so because even in the most democratized society, few persons are elected to govern as representatives of the majority. As such, elites then become an inevitable group in any society (Dye & Zeigler, 1993).

The discussion on elites in western societies could focus on business, intellectual, religious and political elites. Elites also include those that hold traditional authority in Africa. Elites who hold traditional authority exercise political, judicial and religious powers in most traditional African societies. A good number of communities in Africa live under what has been conceptualised as dual authority (Holzinger, Kern, &

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Kromrey, 2016; Logan, 2009). This is a system whereby the state exists along side traditional institutions. The traditional institutions, unlike the state, derive its legitimacy from ethnic norms and customs (Zartman, 2000). This system also exists in Nigeria (Ekeh, 1975).

What is known (or at least what is often discussed) within the theoretical framing of elites in Nigeria is the political elites, both governing and non-governing, in relation to the state (see Lucas, 1994; Diamond, 1988; Sklar, 1965; Osaghae, 1995). The control of state power in Nigeria is crucial to the survival of the elites in Nigeria. This is because state power is dominant in the distribution of resources. The dominance of the state is often attributed to the oil boom of the 1970s (Lucas, 1994). The growing dependence on oil and less on other forms of production led to the centralisation of oil rents around the state. This centralisation led to competition for political power among elites whose aim was to have access to control the petro-dollars. Legislations such as the Petroleum Act of 1969 and the Land Use Decree of 1974 were enacted to transfer petroleum resources to the state. Thus, controlling the state meant the control of the main resource that forms the revenue base for the state. Diamond (1988) described this illicit accumulation of public wealth as a dominant character of the political elites in Nigeria. Other scholars, such as Richard Joseph, conceptualise this behaviour as prebendalism (Joseph, 1983; Joseph, 2014). This prebendal behaviour intensifies the competition for political power among elites. It is within this context that Claude Ake noted that “because everyone places the highest priority on controlling (power), political competition becomes immensely intense and unrestrained, indeed, Hobbesian!” (1997: 306).

This understanding of elite behaviour needs to be extended to communities where traditional authority exists. This paper takes on this challenge in the Niger Delta. The paper argues that elites in local communities do not behave differently from the elites that seek to influence and shape national politics within the Nigerian state. Instead, they equally sought to control communally owned resources such as land and public finance in ways that fuel violent conflicts. The violent conflicts that emerge as a result of this sought of competition contributed to the emergence of armed militant groups in the Niger Delta.

Elites in Niger Delta Communities: Chiefs, Community Development Committees (CDC) and Youth Associations

The traditional institutions of governance are recognised by state laws in Nigeria (Orewa, 1977). The state in many countries across Africa has created legislations that recognises the rights of traditional chiefs to govern their ethnic communities based on customary laws (Baldwin, 2016). Baldwin (2016) identified the governance roles of traditional chiefs to include enforcement of justice, policing, taxation, land allocation, population registration, and development project implementation. Traditional chiefs perform these different roles based on the constitutional provisions in different countries in Africa. There are three legislative lists in Nigeria’s 1999 constitution: the exclusive list, the concurrent lists and the residual lists. There are also three tiers of government: the federal, state (sub-national) and local government. Only the federal government can legislate on items in the exclusive list. The concurrent list contains items that can be legislated on by both the federal government and state governments. Items in the residual list can be legislated on by

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the federal government, state government and local government (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1999). Traditional chiefs and customary governance institutions fall within the residual list and is largely legislated on by local governments through ordinances and edicts. These ordinances and edicts vary in different local governments. Local governments use the ordinances and edicts to regulate traditional authority (Oyemakinde, 1977).

The difference in ordinances and edicts that govern traditional chiefs and customary authority in Nigeria reflects the diversity of cultures and traditions and number of local government in Nigeria. There are 774 local governments in Nigeria and at least 250 ethnic groups (United States Embassy in Nigeria, 2012). Each of these ethnic groups have their own unique traditional customs and authority (Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2013). In Nigeria, the relationship between traditional authority and the local government is complex (Tonwe & Osemwota, 2013). The local government, led by a local council chairman, is constitutionally recognised as superior to the traditional ruler of any ethnic group. Relations between traditional rulers and other forms of authority such as the local government is determined by political and religious factors (Baldwin, 2016). Local traditional rulers are also custodians of religious authority in some societies. This is especially the case in places, such as Northern Nigeria, where Islam is the dominant religion. The traditional rulers are known to influence and mobilise their subjects during election period. Although they do not hold state power, the political influence makes them important political figures within democratic societies (Baldwin, 2016).

Chieftaincy traditions are at the heart of traditional governance in communities in the Niger Delta. The leadership of communities is made up of chiefs and traditional rulers. There are different methods for one to become a chief. In some communities, chieftaincy is by a popular vote. While in most communities, chieftaincy is a matter of royalty. Leadership is hereditary in communities where royalty determines chieftaincy. Communities are divided into smaller sub-units. These sub-units are known as compounds. Among the Ijaws in the Niger Delta, these compounds are called “polo” or “pele”. The families are known as “wari”1 in Ijaw language. A family is made up of people with a common patriarchal ancestry. The families are the sub-units below the compound in the community. There are ruling families or “waris”. The head chief of each ruling house in an ijaw community constitutes what is known as the council of chiefs. The head of the council of chiefs in Ijaw communities is called the “Amayanabo” or “Amananaowei”.2 Men often occupy this position. This traditional chieftaincy is the custodian of customary systems of governance in the communities. This customary governance structure described here is the case for the Ijaw ethnic group. The structure described here is the most common among most ijaw communities in the Niger Delta. But it is also possible to find some variations across communities.

Since the 1960s, other forms of socio-political institutions alongside the traditional chieftaincy have emerged in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. One of such socio-political institution is the Community Development Committee (CDC). The CDC is an initiative

1 literally, wari means a house.2 This means “owner of the community”.

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within communities designed to facilitate infrastructure and human development. The CDC is specifically focused on the delivery of public goods. The CDC mobilise resources to build infrastructures such as school buildings, hospitals, toilets and markets. These resources could be sourced by taxing members of the community, or from donations from the governments. The CDC is also empowered to advocate and lobby oil multinational communities to implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects in communities in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. To facilitate the implementation of CSR projects, the CDC is empowered by the community to sign Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with multinational oil companies operating in the villages. The CDC does not focus on issues of culture and tradition, but on infrastructural and human development in the communities. Members of their communities often elect CDC members. Considering that the focus of this paper is on elites in local communities, it is worthy to state here that the position occupied by CDC members gives them the status of elites in local communities.

A third group that is important for this study is the youth groups in communities. The youths are traditionally considered as a work force which is mobilised to follow the instructions of the traditional chiefs or CDC. For example, youths are known to do the menial work when customary traditional festivities take place in a community. Youths are also mobilised by the CDC to implement building projects that require collective labour. Beyond these laborious functions in communities, youths also play a crucial role in community interactions with government and multinational oil companies in the Niger Delta. Youths are mobilised to protest against oil companies. Youth protests against multinational oil companies introduces new dimensions to the relationships between the communities and multinational oil companies in the area. Scholars, such as Ukeje (2001) have argued that the emergence of youths as actors in this relationship is as a result of the failures of the state and multinational oil companies to address the grievances of the state. But Ikelegbe (2001) argues this is also a manifestation of changing dynamics in community politics. This change is characterised by youths’ incursion into socio-political roles that were primarily performed by traditional chiefs and gerontocratic elites in communities.

The emergence of youths in the politics of oil in the Niger Delta and their demand for a place in the allocation of resources made them critical actors in communities. Also, multinational oil companies initiated specific programmes targeting youths as a way of demonstrating their commitments to human capacity development in the Niger Delta. The emergence of these youth groups in communities is akin to what Gauthier (2003) explained as the shaping of a new political generation in the affairs of communities. The rise of this new political generation also requires the establishment of a form of structure in communities. Formal youth groups, known as community youth associations were established as the political structures to coordinate youth involvement in community development.

The traditional chiefs, the CDC leaders and the youth leaders constitute the class that governs the community. These different groups have a role to play in resource mobilisation in the communities. While the role of the traditional chiefs and CDC leaders seem obvious, the role of the youth leaders comes under the place of advocacy and agitations targeting multinational oil companies. Youth led protests such as sit-ins at crude oil production platforms are effective means of compelling oil companies to negotiate with communities. The ability to enforce community protests

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in ways that affects oil production in communities increased the place of youths in community affairs. Thus, youth leaders are often involved when traditional chiefs and CDC leaders convene to take decisions on community action. This is because this action, especially when it is physical work or mobilisation for protests, would require the extensive participation of youths in the communities. The traditional chiefs, CDC leaders and youth leaders are, in essence, the governing elites of the communities within the sphere of non-state governance.

There is an established view that sees traditional leaders and institutions as essential to peacebuilding in village communities (Honwana, 1997). In some occasions, traditional institutions are subjects of contention. Making them the source of conflicts in communities. When traditional institutions become subject of contention, groups contesting for the control of these institutions battle among themselves. This makes communities unstable and impacts on the socio-political configurations of different communities where such contentions occur. This is common in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. This contention often happens in the Niger Delta as a result of the role played by community elites (as defined in this paper) in the allocation of resources in communities. In governing communities, local elites in Niger Delta, just as national elites, are in charge of managing rents. The competition that emerges in the quest to control rents thus defines the competition for power among local elites and those who seek to become elites in their community. The theoretical claim here is that the rent seeking character that is associated with national elites in Nigeria is also manifests in local elites in communities. The unbridled competition for power in communities’ fuel armed violence that contributed to the emergence of armed militant groups in the Niger Delta.

Competing elites, intra-communal conflicts and the emergence of armed groups

A historical perspective of the emergence of armed militant groups in the Niger Delta shows that groups do have different trajectories to participating in political violence (Ebiede, 2016). Armed militants have a history of violence that predates anti-state militancy that characterised the Niger Delta from 2005 to 2009. The groups in Bayelsa State have a history with internecine intra-community violence (Von-Kemedi, 2003). This is different from Delta State where the history is associated with inter-ethnic violence (Imobighe, 2002; Ukiwo, 2006; Ukiwo, 2007; Aghalino, 2009). The violence in Bayelsa and Delta States is also not exactly similar with Rivers State where armed groups are known to have a history of criminal violence (Best & Von Kemedi 2005; Joab-Peterside, 2007), electoral violence (Asuni, 2009; Ebiede, 2016) and inter-ethnic conflicts (Oruwari, Owei, & Jev, 2004). Violent actors are involved in a competition to become the governing elites in their communities in Bayelsa State. Therefore, the first form of conflict that comes under scrutiny here is the intra-communal violent conflicts involving indigenes of the communities studied.

Peremabiri

Narratives of violent conflicts in Peremabiri from local sources often begins from 1996 when dispute emerged in the community over the mismanagement of rents accruing from raffia palm planation in land belonging to the community by the traditional ruler

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and CDC of the community. According to this account, there was a community dispute over the composition of the leadership of the community. The “landlords” who extract sap from the raffia palm plantation sought to have a new leadership in the community. These “landlords” claimed that previous leadership in the community mismanaged the funds that accrued from land rents. Those that were in the leadership of the community resisted this. As a result, the landlords stopped paying rent to the existing leadership in the community. Attempts by the then leadership to collect rent resulted in violent confrontations and this led to the death of a member of the community. In retaliation, the family of the deceased killed the suspected murderer and some other members of his family.3 Although the police was called in, the matter was not resolved.4 The community had no commonly accepted leadership from then.5

Historical evidence shows that leadership dispute predates the disagreements over the collection of land rents in the community. This can be seen from the account on an online history blog published by a member of Peremabiri community:

It was during the reign of D.I Warisini that Shell arrived at Peremabiri in search of oil in 1963. Warisini II entered into ‘negotiations’ with Shell. The ‘negotiations were one sided, given that Shell came to the community waving a piece of paper from the federal government authorising it to explore and exploit hydrocarbons in its area of concession. This new relationship compromised the kingship and led to the dethronement of Warisini II by the community’s council of chiefs for corruption involving the sum of six pounds. The dethronement of King Warisini II commenced the free-fall of the traditional governing institutions and other support systems of Peremabiri (Obudigha, 2010)

This dethronement of traditional rulers did not end. Instead, several other traditional rulers that were installed in the community were dethroned as a result of corruption (Obudigha: 2010). When presented with the evidence of conflicts that predates 1996, community members respond that they often focus on events of 1996 because the actors that emerge in the conflicts starting from 1996 are still involved in the conflicts in the community up to the time of fieldwork for this research (2013). Community members hold divided views when responding to the evidence of conflict that predates the events of 1996. Two dominant views emerged. One was that Shell used “divide and rule” to manipulate the communities by bribing their leaders and putting the people against these leaders thus creating division in the community. The other view is that the traditional rulers saw the money paid by Shell as their own personal income because the community members did not play any particular role in bringing this money to the purse of the community. The first view is in line with what Watts (2004) calls “complex complicities” in the Niger Delta. It reflects how oil companies seek to penetrate state and social structures to enable them gain control of communities in the oil-producing region (Frynas, 1998). The perception that traditional rulers personalise communal funds demonstrates how community elites behave like national elites in Nigeria as conceptualised by Diamond (1988).

3 Interview with community member, Peremabiri, January, 20144 Interview with community member, Peremabiri, January, 20145 Interview with community member, Peremabiri, January, 2014

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The embezzlement of communal funds intensified the competition for power in Peremabiri in the 1990s. A major deviation from the past is that opposing groups within the community started using violence against each other. Disputes over the allocation of money is often responsible for communal disputes in Peremabiri. Arguments emerged among different community factions over the amount of compensation expected from Shell as a result of oil spill that occurred in 1997 in Shell’s Diebu Creek facility. This became a problem when in 1998 SPDC paid compensation to the community. Community members claimed that they had agreed on a higher compensation of US$2.2million6 from Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC). But “some chiefs from the community went behind the back of the community to collect a small compensation from SPDC and shared among themselves”.7 One community member explained this:

Shell refused to pay the compensation to the community and at the end of the day they paid 5 Million Naira… It was paid in lump sum, but not to individuals. But the community leaders at that time manipulated it, paid to some individuals and made away with the rest. And so a lot of agitations, some persons overthrew the government of the community.8

This view is in line with the findings of Von-Kemedi (2003) in his research on community conflicts in Peremabiri community. He found that the failure of the community leadership to transparently negotiate and manage the compensation funds from SPDC led to a legitimacy crisis in the community. The loss of legitimacy of the community leadership and the grievances of the community members towards Shell led other factions of the community to claim leadership and organise the community to stop SPDC’s oil production in the community. One Mr. Patrick Warri emerged as the ‘chairman’ of the community as a result of this (Von-Kemedi, 2003). Patrick Warri mobilised youths, appointed a CDC Chairman and handpicked elders to act as traditional rulers in the community. He used this new structure he created to mobilise the community to close down SPDC operations for 9 months.9 He did not go unchallenged. One Mr. Odoji Sokari, who was a CDC chairman and chief in the overthrown ‘community government’ remobilised youths in the community to confront the Patrick Warri led faction.10 The Odoji Sokari group was supported by traditional chiefs in the community that resided in Yenagoa, the capital of Bayelsa State. According to a community member, this “metamorphosed to the main Peremabiri crisis”.11 In the violent confrontation that ensued, Odoji Sokari succeeded in forcing Patrick Warri and his group out of the community. Some community members believe that Odoji Sokari had the support of Shell as his activities supported their operations.12

The Bayelsa State government attempted to resolve the conflict in Peremabiri by constituting a judicial commission of inquiry led by the Late Chief Justice Emmanuel 6 The currency reflects the value as at 1998.7 Interview with community chief, Peremabiri, January, 20148 Interview with community member, Peremabiri, January, 20149 Ibid10 ibid11 Interview with community chief, Peremabiri, January, 201412 Ibid

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Igoniwari (Oyadongha, 2001). But this commission did not conclude the work it was set out to do as many witnesses called to testify did not appear. It also did not make any formal report to to enable the government to issue a white paper on the conflicts. Thus, even though there was relative peace for a period, community elites involved in the conflicts could not return home as many feared that it would provoke another round of attacks either in revenge or challenging whatever leadership that emerges in the community.

Community members made reference to Paul Eris (also known as Ogun Boss) as an actor in the conflict that has remained dominant in the community since violence started in 1997. He belonged to a faction of fighters in the community that was aligned with Odoji Sokari. Paul Eris’s trajectory shows that he continued to be engaged in violence after he had left the community when the ‘Peremabiri crisis’ ceased in 2001. Paul Eris’s continuous engagement in violence is observed when he returned to the community during the height of armed militancy in the Niger Delta (2005 – 2009) to establish a militant camp in the community. He had previously served as a fighter with the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), a militant group led by Ateke Tom in Rivers State.13 However, he also claims membership of Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).14 This is not uncommon as MEND was a conglomerate of different armed groups in the Niger Delta. These groups acted independently and emerged as armed militants through different trajectories (Ebiede, 2016).

Respondents in the community claimed that Paul Eris’s first attempts to establish a militant camp in Peremabiri were initially resisted by other members in the community.15 In what seemed like a calculated response, he joined an already existing armed group in Diebu, a neighbouring community. However, he later killed the leader of this armed group (CHERD, 2008). According to Paul Eris, the leader of the group was a “sea pirate and criminal that was oppressing members of the community”.16 As such, he claimed to have acted in the interest of the community. However, it is known that he was part of the group in Diebu for a period of time. The space created as a result of the death of Prince Igodo enabled Paul Eris to establish a Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) militant camp in Diebu.17 Paul Eris returned to Peremabiri, his own community that had earlier expelled him, to establish another militant camp and recruit youths into his camp. This second attempt was not resisted. The general perspective in the community is that he was not resisted because he was well armed and prepared. This was how armed militancy arrived in Peremabiri community.

Olugbobiri

13 In a discussion with Paul Eris in March 2014 and December 2014, he explained that he first started out as a militant fighter with Ateke Tom, leader of the Niger Delta Vigilante in Okrika, Rivers State.14 Discussion with Paul Eris.15 Interview with community member, Peremabiri, January, 2014. 16 Paul Eris, public statement, 2014.17 Ogun Boss claims that he killed Prince Igodo because of the latter’s criminal activities. Several community members from Diebu community also share this view. However, some members of Peremabiri community share a contrary review. Their view is that Ogun Boss used Diebu as a means to return to Peremabiri as a militant leader. This could also be understood within the geographic location of militant camps in the Niger Delta. All militant camps are located in the communities of the militant leader in charge of a given camp. Thus, people do not establish or lead militant camps in communities other than theirs.

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Youths in Olugbobiri community were mobilised to disrupt the oil production of Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (NAOC) in January 2002. The youths demanded the full implementation of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) by NOAC. This duty was hitherto reserved for elites within the CDC of the community. The operation was successful as the youths took control of NAOC’s Tebidaba flow station facility. The company was forced to implement the MOU that included the construction of school buildings, public toilets, renovation of community health centres and construction of a jetty.18 In January 2003, some other youths in the community repeated this same attack. This time Nigerian army soldiers guarding the oil facility killed 13 youths from the community. Although youths who participated in this process claimed that they had gone to demand for renewal of the MOU, some community elders thought that they had gone to close the facility so as to get money from NAOC.19 The youths who led this process were not part of the community leadership. NAOC paid compensation to the community and the families of the 13 youths that died. However, the mobilisation of youths to disrupt oil production in the community created a crisis of leadership in the community.

NAOC accepted to revisit the MOU and it signed a new MOU with the community. The MOU had specific projects to be implemented. The community leadership was given the role of identifying contractors who would implement this project. As such, it became important that local contractors and groups had control of the CDC which nominates contractors to NAOC. This led to a struggle among community members to control the governance structures in communities. A community chief explained thus:

In 2004, we had the problem of Opubri chairman. You know when you elect a CDC Chairman; some people said the CDC Chairman will bring development to the community. And as per that, he will go to AGIP and then bring finance too, because there are percentages that are being paid to the CDC Chairman and the Council of Chiefs and the entire youth body. You know when someone wants to become a CDC Chairman, the other group will kick against it and say I will bring my own man and in short, the contractors who are moving between the communities and AGIP, they lobby these youths so as to bring them in as a contractor and they are indigenes. Then some other people too will hold meeting and bring maybe 1 million or 2 million naira so that we are going to give you the contract. For that reason, war broke out in the community and led to the killing of one boy in the community.20

The process of competition for the control of the community governance structure in Olugbobiri led to a violent conflict within the community. Youths involved in the second attack on NAOC claimed leadership of the CDC and Youth groups.21 Other members in the community resisted this. As a result, a confrontation ensued and this

18 Interview with community elder, Olugbibiri, February, 201419 Interview with community elder, Olugbobiri, February, 201420 Interview with community chief, Olugbobiri, February, 201421 Interview with community youth, Olugbobiri, October, 2014

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led to the death of a youth in the community. However, unlike Peremabiri where such death would have led to retaliation by other members of the community, members of Ologbobiri community reported the issue to the Police and the suspected youths were arrested and remanded in prison.22 They escaped from the Ahoada Prison in Rivers State in 2005 before their trial could be concluded.23

The youths involved in intra-community conflict in Olugbobiri joined the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in Delta State after their escape from Prison. Similar to Paul Eris, they returned to Olugbobiri community to establish two militant groups. One of the groups established was led by’ Africanus Ukparasia and another led by Joshua Mackiver. Unlike the case of Peremabiri, the community did not openly oppose the youths who returned to establish the militant groups in Ologbobiri. Instead, a community youth also followed Africanus Upkarasia as a representative of Ologbobiri to the Egbesu shrine for superstitious spiritual preparations for the group.24 Africanus Upkarasia gave monetary compensation to the family of the victim of the violence and also organized his burial after he returned to establish himself as an armed militant leader in the community.25

By 2008 the militant groups led by Paul Eris in Peremabiri and Africa Ukparasia in Ologbobiri had emerged as key groups operating in that area. Both groups expressed the narrative of grievances against the state and oil companies. As we will discuss below, their emergence as militant leaders equally changed the dynamics of leadership in their communities.

Armed militancy and the emergence of new elites in communities

The activities of MEND and other armed groups in the Niger Delta impacted negatively on oil production in the region (Ibaba, 2008). Although the Nigerian state adopted a military strategy to quell the armed insurgency, the state and oil multinationals also use patronage to moderate the violence of armed groups. Leaders of the armed groups became the point of reference when the state and oil companies seek to carry out activities in the village communities. Oil companies and the government sought to control the socio-political sphere in communities even though this sphere was experiencing a violent conflict. This control was an attempt to hedge the risk around the oil industry. This meant that multinational oil companies and state officials often have to interact with leaders of armed groups through informal means. Leaders of armed groups became a dominant force that allocates privileges and opportunities within these communities.

One observer of the Niger Delta region explained the dominance of armed militants in communities thus: “Militants in many communities are now in control of the power

22 Interview with community youth, Ologbibiri, December, 201423 Ibid. Although there were no newspaper reports to confirm this particular jailbreak, it is often common for members of armed groups to break out from Prison in the Niger Delta. Within this period, there was a jailbreak in Port Harcourt prisons and the Ahoada Prisons were the youths from Ologbobiri were held. See: http://allafrica.com/stories/200506210592.html 24 In a private conversation with one of the Egbesu priests, he told us that the egbesu power is often given to the community and not an individual. As such, for anyone to come to the Egbesu for power, he must come in the name of his community and for a good cause. There are rules to be kept if these powers must be used. Deviating from these rules, it is believed, will remove the potency of the powers. It is important to note that armed groups in the Niger Delta also depended on other forms of spiritual deities to prepare them for battle. 25 Interview with ex-militant, Ologbobiri, February, 2014.

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structure and political successions. They decide who becomes the chief, who becomes the CDC Chairman, and they are in control of the communities”.26 Following Farazmand (1999), it is clearly evident that armed militant leaders emerged as elites in their communities. Militant leaders influence the outcomes of events in their communities. Ordinary civilians in communities acknowledge the status of armed militants as elites. In an interview in Peremabiri, an elderly man in his 80s repeatedly described armed militants as “these elites, these uneducated elites in this community”.27 By becoming elites of their communities, these armed militants became representative of their communities in the relationship between the communities and the oil companies. This was either done directly or by proxies appointed into the CDC. In essence, they were controlling and influencing the outcome of governance within the communities.

This process of control and influence of community governance was seen in how armed militants sometimes sought to control the traditional chieftaincy institutions, the youth groups and the CDC. One community member explained:

Most worrisome was how the militants themselves and armed agitators encroached on community governance. There are villages here were an ordinary CDC election needs the endorsement of the militant leader to that community and because of the excessive use of force most people lost their lives in the process and also pitched communities against themselves. There is always this idea of power control.28

Another community member expressed a common perception shared by others:

You see, they’ve hijacked the leadership, they imposed people in the community. People that knew little or nothing about development were made CDC Chairmen. One of the most painful aspect is that they’ve gone ahead to destabilise the chiefs council that was regarded, that was seen as the pyramid of the community. They also hijacked that one and removed the traditional ruler.29

This process changed the nature of community governance in communities in the Niger Delta. Normally, issues within the communities are decided by these traditional governance systems. But with the emergence of armed militants in the community, militant leaders became a reference point of authority when issues that need communal decisions come up in these communities. In Ologbobiri, a company owned by Africa Ukparasia, AFRINUN Nigeria Limited, was awarded the contract to construct an internal road in the community in 2007. During fieldwork, it was observed that a houseboat owned by Eniebi Nigeria Limited, a company owned by Joshua Mackiver was used by the Nigerian AGIP Oil Company (NOAC) for its operation in the Azuzuama oil field.30 These companies owned by armed militant leaders are into legitimate businesses with NOAC, however, the means of having such patronage from NAOC is because of their 26 Interview with Nigerian scholar, January, 201527 Interview with community member, Peremabiri, December 2014.28 Interview with community chief, Yenagoa, November, 201429 Interview with community youth, Ologbobiri, October, 201430 NAOC use such boats to house security personnel guarding their facilities or to move equipment and materials in their facility.

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role in the control of the community governance. This evidence from the field research shows that while claiming to fight against state and transnational actors in the oil industry, armed militant leaders where also positioning themselves as capitalist actors in the value chain of the oil industry. This is a realm that was dominated by traditional elites and petro elites in Nigeria. But as Ugor (2013) and Iwilade (nd) explains, these armed youths used their agency in the conflicts to upend the oil dependent patronage system by asserting themselves into the system through the use of violence.

Post fieldwork events have shown an interesting link between the analysis so far and the perpetuation of armed militant leaders in community and state politics even after cessation of militant hostilities. The cessation of hostilities was made possible by a presidential amnesty by the late Nigerian President, Musa Yar’Adua in 2009. In spite of the amnesty, militants, particularly their leaders, remained dominant in community politics in Bayelsa State. This dominance was also extended to state politics whereby the candidates seeking to hold public office in the 2011 general elections relied on ex-militant leaders as key allies in the campaign process. Timipre Sylva, the then Governor of Bayelsa State in particular mobilised ex-militant leaders to give him an open endorsement for his re-election bid in 2011. Their endorsement was relevant to the Governor as it indicated that he had support from the grassroots that the militants claim to represent. Although the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), his party as at then, did not nominate him,31 the role of the ex-militant leaders was still visible in the elections in the community. This was more evident in the 2015 Governorship elections in Bayelsa State. Both Paul Eris and Africa Ukparasia supported Timipre Sylva against Henry Seriake Dickson (Odiegwu, 2015).32 The initial elections held on December 5, 2015 were declared inconclusive because of electoral malpractices that took place in Southern Ijaw Local Government Area (SILGA), the stronghold of both ex-militant leaders. A witness of the events in Oporoma, the headquarters of SILGA, gave the follow account:

We were going to the Local Government Secretariat. Africa (ex-militant leader) and his boys (ex-militant fighters) where on one side of the town and Joshua (ex-militant leader) and his boys (ex-militant fighters) where on the other side. Africa told Joshua and his boys to allow him to take the election materials. But they refused. It was not too long afterwards before Ogun Boss (ex-militant leader) and other Africa boys (ex-militant fighters) started shooting at Joshua Boys. Several persons were injured.33

The attacks described above were carried out by ex-militants against members of their communities in the course of elections. A political agenda brought two militant leaders to carry out a single action. The motivation for this shared political agenda emerged from their interest to retain influence in their different communities. For example, Paul Eris targeted members of his communities that opposed him in community politics. His attacks focused on one Mr. Progress Neverdie, the incumbent traditional ruler of Peremabiri (News Express, 2016). This attack occurred

31 Timipre Sylva decamped from the PDP to the APC in 2013.32 Henry Seriake Dickson was elected on the platform of the PDP during the 2011 elections. He maintained the party’s ticket in 2015. Timipre Sylva was the APC governorship candidate during the 2015 elections.33 Telephone Interview with election observer, 16 December 2015.

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because Paul Eris did not accept the leadership of the traditional ruler in Peremabiri. This shows that militant leaders continued to seek a place in the politics of their communities after they have participated in a peace process. They do this by using violence, a method they have tried previously in community politics, in the electoral process. Clearly, apart from interacting with oil companies as elites of their communities, ex-militant leaders are equally now in position to ensure electoral victory of their preferred candidates in their communities. This interest to facilitate the electoral victory of their preferred candidates is to ensure that they maintain positions of infleunce in their communities and state politics. This will ensure that the they are not displaced from the position they have claimed in the oil dependent patronage system.

Conclusion

The empirical evidence and analysis in this paper suggests that contentious relations in communities have contributed to the emergence of armed groups in the Niger Delta. The events that occurred in Peremabiri and Olugbobiri are not unique to these communities. Leadership tussles among youths in Rumuekpe in Rivers State laid the foundation for massive violence involving oil companies in the area (Social Action, 2009). Some violent events during armed militancy in Rivers State was also credited to disagreements between youths and elders over the distribution of rents from oil companies (Reuters, 2007). This shows that the events in the case study communities are part of wider socio-political processes in communities in the Niger Delta. The case studies show how community conflicts contributed to the emergence of armed militant groups in the region. It also explains how this sought of violence continues even after the cessation of militant hostilities against the state and multinational oil companies.

Theoretically, this goes beyond current understanding of elite behaviour as “prebendalism” in Nigeria. It is the upending of this prebendalism at the community level by violent actors who seek to assert themselves in Nigeria’s oil dependent patronage system. These actors use the platform of communities to achieve this goal and continue to struggle to maintain their position in communities. In both communities studied, armed groups have displaced local community elites that represented communities. It is important to note that this is not the case in all communities that experienced militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. But it is a reflection of the origins of the militants that emerged in the communities studied. The implication of this is that militants who emerged through communal conflicts will struggle to maintain their position as communal elites as this was one key factor that pushed them into conflict. The struggle to maintain their positons as elites in the community also means that contentious relations are likely to persist in such communities. The process discussed in these communities shows that the upper class in the Niger Delta now includes individuals who gained elite status as a result of their violent attributes. Such individuals will equally compete for political and economic privileges and opportunities like all others who emerged as elites by virtue of education, social class of families and individual career success.

The research here has also shown that intra-community conflicts where the state is not a direct participant could provide the foundation for anti-state mobilisation in communities. The conditions for anti-state protests depend on who emerge to be dominant in intra-societal conflicts. Where those who use armed violence to upend the class systems and structures in communities emerge as more powerful actors, they

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may equally use their newfound positions in communities to confront the state. This accentuates the need for the state to take decisive action on intra-communal conflicts to avoid the emergence of armed actors who may use their new found positions to confront the state if the emerge as dominant actors in communities. It is important to state that any state led action that seeks to resolve community conflicts need to be based on the rule of law for it to be sustainable.

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