Vii Language in use

Contents8.0 Introduction

8.1 Speech Act Theory

8.2 The Theory of Conversational Implicature

8.3 Post-Gricean Development

8.0 Introduction “You are beautiful without glasses”. Speaker’s meaning, utterance meaning, contextua

l meaning, whose interpretation depends more on who the speaker of the sentence is, who the hearer is, when and where the sentence is used., namely, it depends on context.

Pragmatics: the study of lg in use. Pragmatics =meaning-semantics

8.1 Speech act theory

John Langshaw Austin: How to Do Things with Words (1962).

Could you pass me the salt? --Yes, I can. --Sure, of course. Is the speaker speaking or doing things, to be

more exact?

8.1.1 Performatives and constatives Performatives: sentences which do not describe thing

s and cannot be said true or false, the utterance of which is the doing of things.

--I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth--I bequeath my watch to my brother.--I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.--I promise to come tomorrow.--I apologize.--I declare the meeting open. Constative: the description of what someone is doing.--I pour the liquid into the tube.I am now sitting in front of you and lecturing on Pragmati

cs.

A. (i) there must be a relevant conventional procedure, and

(ii) the relevant participants and circumstances must be appropriate.

B. the procedure ,must be executed (i)correctly and (ii) completely.

C. very often, (i) the relevant people must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, and (ii) must follow it up with actions as specified.

Felicity conditions for performatives

Austin soon realized that condition only apply to some cases.

There are cases which do not need such conventional procedures

--instead of saying “I promise.” we can also say“I give my word for it.” or “You have my word.” The so-called constative can also be infelicitous.-- 中国的皇帝是个网球运动员。 is exactly as infelicitous as saying“ 我明天借给你 10 亿美元” When you have n

o money at all

Separating performative from constative on grammatical and lexical criteria.

Typical Performative:

-- First person singular subject

--Simple present tense

--Indicative mood

--Active voice

--Performative verbs But there are counterexamples:

--You did it.(I find you guilty)

--Pedestrians are warned to keep off the grass.

--Thank you. Therefore, there is no clear line between performative and co

nstative, which led Austin to abandon this distinction

8.1.2 A theory of illocutionary act As Austin abandoned the distinction betwe

en performative and constative, he made a fresh start from the ground up and began to explore: in what sense to say sth is to do sth, and came up with three acts, namely, locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act.

Locutionary act( 发话行为 ) When we speak, we move our vocal organs

and produce a number of sound, organized in a certain way and with a certain meaning. This act is called locutionary act.

“Hello!” What did he do?

Illocutionary act （施为性行为）

In performing a locutionary act, we shall also be performing some other act, such as asking a question or giving confirmation. That is, when we speak, we not only produced some units of lg with certain meanings, but also make clear our purpose in producing them, the way we intend them to be understood, or they also have certain forces. This is illocutionary act.

What does he mean by “greeting’? Therefore, there is a force carried with the locutionary

act, namely, the illocutionary force, which is equivalent to the speaker’s meaning, contextual meaning, or extra meaning.

perlocutionary act （取效行为 ) There is always some consequential effects of a l

ocution upon the hearer. That is, by telling sb sth, we are changing the hearer’s opinions or ideas, or influencing them in one way or another. This is what we cal perlocutionary act.

Perlocutionary act may not necessarily be the intended effect of the hearer.

你的裙子很漂亮。 你这衣服质量挺好的。

8.2 The Theory of Conversational Implicature

Herbert Paul Grice: the proponent of the theory of conversational implicature

8.2.1 The cooperative principle

Grice noticed that in daily conversation people do not usually say things directly but tend to imply them.

还没死呢。 Then he explored the question how people man

age to convey implicature, which is not explicitly expressed.

Cooperative principle There is regularity in conversation. “Make your conversational contribution such

as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice 1975:45)

To specify the CP further, Grice introduced four stages of maxims as follows.

Four maxims Quantity Quality Relation Manner

QUANTITY

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange)

2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

--Where did John go?

--To the library.

QUALITY Try to make your contribution one that is true.

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.

2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

--He is a brave person.

--Do you know where the National Library is?

--Yes.

RELATION Be relevant

--Mary is really an annoying person.

--I totally agree. She is also troublesome.

MANNER

Be perspicuous.

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.

2. Avoid ambiguity.

3. Be brief

4. Be orderly

--Would you like a cup of coffee?

--Yes, please.

--Thank you, but I prefer a cup of tea.

8.2.2 Violation of the Maxims People do not always follow the maxims.

Sometimes they will violate them. However, although the speaker may violate

some maxims, on a deeper level, the CP is still upheld.

QUANTITY QUALITY RELATION MANNER

Violation of Quantity--Where did John go?

--To the library. At least he said so when he left the room

It implies that the second speaker is not sure if John went to the library or not.

Violation of Quantity He is made of iron. The speaker implies that he is very brave

or very cold

Violation of Relation--“ 刚才那个人简直是胡言乱语”。--“ 天气不错，哈。” The speaker implies that the conversation may

not be continued.

Violation of Manner I veto I-C-E C-R-E-A-M-S. (ambiguity) 他发出了一系列声音。 （ prolixity)

8.2.3 Characteristics of implicature

Calculability: Cancellability (defeasibility): Non-detachability: Non-conventionality:

Calculability: Implicatures are calculable, that is, they ca

n be calculated on the basis of some previous information.

－今晚去看电影吗？－我明天有考试。

Cancellability (defeasibility): As the presence of a conversational implicature

relies on a number of factors, if any of the factors changes, the implicature will also change.

--John has three cows. （ 2 ， 3 ， 4 ）--John has three cows, if not more. （ 2 ， 3 ，

4 ）--John has at least three cow.

--John has only three cows.

Non-detachability: It means that a conversational implicature is attached t

o the semantic content of what is said, not to the linguistic form.Therefore, it is possible to use a synonym and keep the implicature intact.An implicature will not be detached, separated from the utterance as a whole, even though the specific words may be changed.

--John is a genius.--John is a mental prodigy.--John is an enormously intellect.--John is a big brain.--John is an idiot.

Non-conventionality: Conversational implicature cannot be decid

ed by the semantic meaning of the individual word.

--John is a genius.

--John is a mental prodigy.

--John is an enormously intellect.

implicature vs. entailment--John has three cows.--John has some cows.--John has some animals.--John has something.--Entailment is part of the conventional meaning, b

ut there is no way to work out an entailment on the basis of the CP and the context.

--Entailment is constant in all contexts and is determinate, while implicature is indeterminate, which varies with context.

Conversational implicature

It is a type of implied meaning, which is deduced on the basis of the conventional meaning of words together with the context, under the guidance of the CP and its maxims.

8.3 Post-Gricean Development

1. Relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson) 2. The Q- and R-principles (Laurence Horn) 3. The Q-, I-, and M-principles (Stephen Levin

son)

8.3.1 Relevance theory

Dan Sperber & Deirdre Wilson (1986): Relevance: Communication and Cognition

Principle of relevance: Every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.

Communication is not simply a matter of encoding and decoding, it also involves inference. But inference has only to do with the hearers.

Ostensive communication: For the speaker’s side, communication can be seen as an act of making clear one’ intention to express something. This is the ostensive act.

Every utterance comes with a presumption of the best balance of effort against effect. The effects achievable will never be less than is needed to make it worth processing.and the efforts required will never be more than is needed to achieve these effects. In comparison to the effects achieved, the efforts needed is always the smallest.

That is to say, of all the interpretation of the stimulus which confirm the presumption, it is the first interpretation to occur to the addressee that is the one the communicator intended to convey.

--John has a big cat.--John has a tiger.--John is a bachelor.--John holds a bachelor’s degree.

8.3.2 The Q- and R-principles

Laurence Horn,1984: Towards a New Taxonomy for Pragmatic Inference: Q-based and R-based Implicature.

1988: Pragmatic Theory Principle of Least Effort (George Kinsley Zipf)

--The force of unification: speaker’s economy, one word for all meanings

--The force of diversification: hearer’s economy, every meaning is clearly expressed.

Hearer’s economy:--QUANTITY 1: Make your contribution as informative as is

required (for the current purpose of the exchange)--MANNER Be perspicuous.1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity.Speaker’s economy: --Quantity 2: Do not make your contribution more

informative than is required--QUALITY Try to make your contribution one that is true.1. Do not say what you believe to be false.2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.--RELATION Be relevant--MANNER Be perspicuous.3. Be brief 4. Be orderly

The Q-principle (hearer-based)

--MAKE YOUR CONTRIBUTION SUFFICIENT (cf. Quantity 1)

--SAY AS MUCH AS YOU CAN (given R) The R-principle (speaker-based)

--MAKE YOUR CONTRIBUTION NECESSARY (cf. Quantity 2, Relation, Manner)

--SAY NO MORE THAN YOU MUST (given Q)

Q-principle--Some of my friends are linguists.--Not all of my friends are linguists. R-principle(infer more)--Do you have some money? 1988: Q-based principle: a hearer-based economy for the

maximization of informational content: concerned with the content (the speaker supplies the sufficient information)

R-based principle: a speaker-based economy for the minimization of form:concerned with the form (the speaker uses the minimal form, so that the hearer is entitled to infer that the speaker means more than he says)

Some further investigation The unmarked form is used for a stereotypical, unmark

ed situation (via R-principle), while the marked counterpart is used for the situation left over (via Q-principle).

--Black Bart killed the sheriff.--Black Bart caused the sheriff to die.--Lee stopped the car. --Lee caused the car to stop. Therefore, “the use of a marked (relatively complex an

d/or prolix) expression when a corresponding unmarked (simpler, less “effortful) alternate expression is available tends to be interpreted as conveying a marked message (ne which the unmarked alternative would not or could not have conveyed)

8.3.3 The Q-, I- and M-principles Pragmatics and the Grammar of Anaphor: A Partial

Pragmatic Reduction of Binding and Control Phenomena (1987)

Contrast between semantic minimization and expression minimization:

Semantic / content minimization is equivalent to semantic generality. The more general terms are more minimal in meaning, while the more specific terms are more maximal in meaning.

That is, to stop a car means to stop a car in a typical way, while to cause the car to stop means to stop the car in a rather not normal way.

Semantic minimization has to do with the I-principle, expression minimization has to do with the M-principle.

Heuristics (2000) Heuristic 1: what isn’t said, isn’t.(Q-Heuristic) Heuristic 2: what is simply described is stereot

ypically exemplified.(I-Heuristic) Heuristic 3: what’s said in an abnormal way, is

n’t normal; or Marked message indicates marked situation.(M-Heuristic)

Q-heuristics (Grice quantity 1) Scalar implicatures--Some of the boys came.--Not all the boys came. <all, some> Clausal implicature--If eating eggs is bad for you, you should give up omelet

s--Eating eggs may be bad for you, or it may not be bad fo

r you.--Since eating eggs is bad for you, you should give up om

elets. <(since p, q), (if p, q)>

I-Heuristic: one need not say what can be taken for granted.

--John turned the key and the engine started.--John unpacked the picnic. The beer was warm. M-Heuristics: what is said simply, briefly, in

an unmarked way picks up the stereotypical interpretation; if in contrast a marked expression is used, it is suggested that the stereotypical interpretation should be avoided.

--Bill stopped the car.--Bill caused the car to stop.

Summary Speech Act Theory--Performative-constative --Felicitous condition--Locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary acts The Theory of Conversational Implicature--Cooperative Principle (Quality, Quantity, Relation,Mann

er)--Violation of maxims--Characteristics of implicature Post-Gricean Development--Relevance theory--Q-and R-principles--Q-, I- and M-principles