Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila EN BANCG.R. No. 157584 April 2, 2009 6. CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA of the 2nd District of Bataan, Petitioner,vs.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OFENERGY, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON CORPORATION, and PILIPINASSHELL CORPORATION Respondents.D E C I S I O N BRION, J.:

For the second time, petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (petitioner Garcia) asks this Court to examine the constitutionality of Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8479 (R.A. No. 8479), otherwise known as the Oil Deregulation Law of 1998) through this petition for certiorari.1 He raises once again before us the propriety of implementing full deregulation by removing the system of price controls in the local downstream oil industry – A matter that we have ruled upon in the past. THE FACTS After years of imposing significant controls over the downstream oil industry in the Philippines, the government decided in March 1996 to pursue a policy of deregulation by enacting Republic Act No. 8180 (R.A. No. 8180) or the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996."R.A. No. 8180, however, met strong opposition, and rightly so, as this Court concluded in its November 5, 1997 decision in Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy.2 We struck down the law as invalid because the three key provisions intended to promote free competition were shownTo achieve the opposite result; contrary to its intent, R.A. No. 8180’s provisions on tariff Differential, inventory requirements, and predatory pricing inhibited fair competition, encouraged monopolistic power, and interfered with the free interaction of market forces. We declared:R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be overstated.Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry.

After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.3

GARCIA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY211 SCRA 219 July 3, 1992Feliciano, J.:

FACTS:The President issued an EO which imposed, across the board, including crude oil and other oil products, additional duty ad valorem. The Tariff Commission held public hearings on said EO and submitted a report to the President for consideration and appropriate action. The President, on the other hand issued an EO which levied a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.ISSUE:Whether or not the President may issue an EO which is tantamount to enacting a bill in the nature of revenue-generating measures.RULING: The Court said that although the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills is within the province of the Legislative, it does not follow that EO in question, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measure are prohibited to the President, that they must be enacted instead by Congress. Section 28 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:“The Congress may, by law authorize the President to fix… tariff rates and other duties or imposts…”The relevant Congressional statute is the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines and Sections 104 and 401, the pertinent provisions thereof.

Political Law – First Emergency Powers CasesAraneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed

by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

7. ARANETA v. DINGLASAN84 Phil. 368 (1949)G.R. No. L-2044:J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN,Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSEP. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents.G.R. No. L-2756:J. ANTONIO ARANETA andGREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.G.R. No. L-3054:EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, vs. ELTESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido(eyng?).G.R. No. L-3055:LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OFCUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR,SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ANDINDUSTRY, respondents.G.R. No. L-3056:ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THECOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THEAUDITOR GENERAL and THEINSULAR TREASURER OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.Facts:

As the issue is of transcendental importance, technicalities or procedure, particularly petitioners¶ personality or sufficiency of interest and the question whether prohibition lies, was brushed aside.

Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President issued in virtue of the Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671) L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution in the Manila, CFI for violation of provisions of EO No. 62 (regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings) and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Respondents refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by EO No. 192 (aims to control exports from the Philippines) L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for awrit of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225(appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine Government during the period from July1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes) L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226(appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671 in their oral argument and memorandum (they rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect), constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted.Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is enact declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency, pursuant to Art.VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectivenessIssue:WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect.Held and Ratio YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period" as used in the Constitution means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency.It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view as the opposite would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full

knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either.

Political Law – First Emergency Powers CasesAraneta is being charged under violation of EO 62 which regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. Dinglasan is the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671. 3 other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055 which is an appeal by Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter, against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines; he is seeking to have permit. L-3054 is filed by Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury from disbursing funds [from ’49-‘50] pursuant to EO 225. L-3056 is filed by Barredo is attacking EO 226 w/c is appropriating funds to hold the national elections. CA 671 is otherwise known as AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act. All the petitioners aver that CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect hence all EOs passed pursuant to it had likewise ceased.

iSSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.HELD: CA 671 became inoperative ex proprio vigore when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the first regular session of Congress instead of the first special session which preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may “consider general legislation or only such subjects as he (President) may designate.” Such acts were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, “unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly.” Even if war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

Araneta v DinglasanG.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949Tuason, J.:

Facts:1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2. EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3. EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4. EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated

December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

8. Chiongbian vs. OrbosG.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995

CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W. ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District, Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental), ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga City) petitioners, vs.HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII, CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT; and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.

IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner, vs.HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

Facts:-Pursuant to article X sec 18 of the 1987 constitution, Congress passed Ra No. 6734 “the organic act for the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao” calling for plebiscite to be held in 23 provinces-4 provinces voted in favor of creating the Autonomous region and these are Lanao Del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. Hence, in accordance to RA NO ^&#$

THESE 4 PROVINCES BECAME THE ARMM.-On the other hand, With respect to the remaining provinces who did not vote in favor of creating ARMM.

Article XIX Sec RA 6724 provides; “That only THE PROVINCES and CITIES VOTING FAVORABLY INSUCH PLEBISCITE SHALL BE INCLUDED IN ARMM and the provinces WHO DID NOT VOTE FOR THEINCLUSION IN ARMM SHALL REMAIN IN THE EXISTING ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; PROVIDED, However, THE PRESIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION, MERGE the EXISTING REGIONS” -Pursuant to the authority granted by the above provision, then President Aquino issued EO NO 429“PROVIDING FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMM” Where in those who are not in favor inCreating the ARMM where transferred (provinces of a certain region to another) some of which are; a.misamis occidental, at present part of Region X will become part of REGION XI,………” -PETITIONERS, PROTESTED and Challenges the VALIDITY of EO 429 CONTENDING that THERE is NOT LAW WHICH AUTHORIZES THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE ALTERATIONS ON THEEXISTING STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENTAL UNITS in other words Reorganization. And that the AUTHORITY MERGE granted in RA 6724 DOES NOT INCLUDE the AUTHORITY to REORGANIZE even if it does not affect the apportionment of the congressional representatives. In addition, they contend that Article XIX SEC 13 of RA 6724 is UNCONSITTUIONAL for 1) it is invalid delegation of power by the Legislative to the President 2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.Issues:1. WON Article XIX sec 13 of RA 6724 is invalid because it contains no express standard to guide thePresident’s Discretion andWhether the power given fairly expressed in the title of the statue.2. WON the power granted authorizes not just to merge but even the reorganization of those who did not vote or not in favor to it.3. WON the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from ZAmoanga to PAgadian since it should be the acts of Congress. Ruling while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments (Article X sec 4 of the Constitution). The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are “mere groupings of contagious provinces for administrative purposes. The power conferred on the President is

Similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries”. 1. No, A legislative Standard NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED. May simply be GATHERED ORIMPLIED? Nor need it be found in the law challenge because it may be embodied in other statues on the same subject as that of the challenge legislation. And with respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grantTo the President in RA NO. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Exec Department to “PromoteSimplicity, economy, and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the services in the transition of public business.2.

No, while ARTICLE XIX sec 13 provides that “theProvinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the autonomous region shall remain in the existing administrative regions” this provisions Is subject to the qualification that the PRSIDENT MAY BY ADMINISTRATIVEDETERMINATION MERGE THE EXISTING REGIONS. This means that while non-assenting provinces are to remain in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with continuous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require.

9. Kuroda vs. JalandoniG.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

Political Law – Generality Accepted Principles of International LawKuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission due to the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.

ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?HELD: EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as part of the law of the land.

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner, vs. Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI,Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel MARGARITO TORALBA, ColonelIRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA, Major FEDERICOARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.\MORAN, C.J.

: (1949)\Nature: En Banc DecisionDoctrine:Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. Theyform part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to theconventions embodying them, for our Constitution has been deliberately generaland extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules andprinciples of international law as contained in treaties to which our government mayhave been or shall be a signatory.Facts:- A Military commission was empaneled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an actestablishing a national war crimes office and prescribing rules and regulationgoverning the trial of accused war criminals.- Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Armyand Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines from1943-1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed"to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutalatrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of theImperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war".- Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed prosecutors inbehalf of USA.- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as prosecutorsof Hussey and Port.- Kuroda’s

arguments were: (1)EO No. is illegal on the gound that ut wiolates notonly the provisions of our constitutional law but also our local laws; (2) MilitaryCommission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of theHague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not asignatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he ischarged with “crime” not based on law, national or international; and (3) Husseyand Port have no personality as prosecutors in this case because they are notqualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and theappointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our nationalsovereignty.

Issues/Held:(1) WON EO No. 68 is valid and constitutional? [Yes

it is a validbecause it is based on the generally accepted principles of international law whichform part of our laws.](2) WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventionsembodying them? [Yes, they form part of our laws.](3) WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case?[Yes, they can.]

Ratio:(1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution providesin its section 3, that- The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of nationalpolicy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the nation.In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international lawof the present day including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention andsignificant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the UnitedNation, allthose person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commissionof crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are heldaccountable therefor. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformitywith the generally accepted and policies of international law which are part of ourConstitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of hispower as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in thecase of Yamashita vs.

Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief isfully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial andpunishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of ExecutiveOrder No. 68.(2) Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of andare wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In fact,these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the UnitedStates and Japan, who were signatories to the two Conventions.Such rule andprinciples therefore form part of the law of our nation even if thePhilippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, forour Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scopeand is not confined to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government mayhave been or shall be a signatory.Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committedthe Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we wereequally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right andobligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries.(3) There is nothing in said executive order which requires that counsel appearingbefore said commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in thePhilippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commissionis a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of courtwhich govern ordinary civil court. Secondly, the appointment of the two Americanattorneys is not violative of our nation sovereignty. It is only fair and proper thatUnited States, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against hergovernment and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowedrepresentation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been anyrelinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United States Government which has yielded to us the trial and punishment of herenemies.---DISSENTING OPINION of Justice Perfecto

(1) Executive Order No. 68., is null and void because, through it, the President of the Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress andin the Supreme Court.EO No. 68 confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons chargedwith war crimes. It is clearly legislative in nature. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of any crime is exclusively vestedby the

Constitution in Congress. It also appropriates the sum of P700,000 for theexpenses of the National War Crimes office established by the said EO No. 68. Thisconstitutes another usurpation of legislative power as the power to voteappropriations belongs to Congress.It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial. This provision on proceduralsubject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution inthe Supreme Court.(2) Respondents suggest that the President issued EO No. 68 under the emergencypowers granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended byCommonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwelath Act No. 671. The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, because they ceased to have effect muchbefore Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsedupon the liberation of the Philippines from the Japanese forces or, at the latest,when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945. It hasnever been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation of legislative powers to the President beyond the emergency created by the war, as toextend it farther would be violative of the express provisions of the Constitution. EONo. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the fundamentalguarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law because it permitsthe admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person can afford toget acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused isguilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 185, L - 2662 March 26, 1949

Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a formerly a Lietenant-General of the japanese imperial army and commanding general of the japanese imperial forces in the philippines during a period covering 1943 and 1944 who is now charge before a military commission convened by the chief of staff of the armed forces of the philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the imperial japanese forces in the violations of the laws and customer of war.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for its acts committed in violation of Hague Convention and the Geneva convention because the Philippines is not signatory to Hague Convention and signed the Geneva only in 1947. He also challenges the participation of the two American attorneys in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorneys are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the executive order no. 68 is a ground for the violations of our provision of constitutions law and to our local law.

2. Whether or not Atty. Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port is allowed to practice the law professions in the philippines.

Ruling : The court holds that the Executive Order is valid and Constitutional.Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3 that ” The Philippines renounces war as an instruments of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of nation.”

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague and Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the U.N, all the persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing, or waging a war of aggression and commission of the crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws and customs of war of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefore. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order no. 68, the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which are part our Constitution.

On the second issue, the court ruled that the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our national sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the U.S which has submitted the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. The lest that we could do in the spirit of comity is to allow this representation in said trial.

The petition was denied.

Kuroda vs Jalandoni, 83 Phil. 195, L-2662, March 26, 1949Facts : Shigenori Kuroda, a former Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Imperial Forces of the Philippines was charged before a Military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He had unlawfully disregarded and failed to discharge his duties as a commander to control the operations of members of his command.Petitioner was duly prosecuted for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.Executive Order No. 68 provided the organization of such military commissions, established National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals.Attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert Port of the United States of America participated in the prosecution of the case in behalf of the United States of America.

Issue : Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional.

Held : This court holds that the Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional as provided in Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution, that-

“ The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

The participation of the two American attorneys although under our law, they are not qualified to practice law is valid and constitutional. Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by special law not by Rules of the Court, which govern ordinary civil courts. There is nothing in Executive Order No.68 which requires counsels need to be qualified to practice law in the Philippines. In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsels for the parties are usually military personnel.Under the doctrine of incorporation, although the Philippines was not a signatory of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, international jurisprudence is automatically incorporated in Philippine law, thus making war crimes punishable in the Philippines.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law, with jurisdiction over the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No 68, and having jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by having said petitioner in its custody, the court will not interfere with the due process of such Military Commission.Petition is denied with costs de oficio.

10. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of

international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.

“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.

“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.

“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes

and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

Due ProcessMark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez.ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one’s property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

11. Alih vs. Castro 151 SCRA 279 June 23, 1987

Facts:Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them.

Held:The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

Alih vs CastroGL. 69401

This case was in explaining Sec 3 of Art 2 of the 1987 Constitution regarding the supremacy of the civilians.

Facts;Zona was conducted by the men of Maj. Gen Castro in a compoud where petioners reside and conducted illegal search and thereafter seized guns from them. The order was carried on by his Castro's men with the contention that the petitioners are involved in the latest killing of the town's mayor Cesar Climaco.

Issue;Is the warrantless search and seizure legal?

Held;The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodia legis and declared that the operation conducted by Maj. Gen. Castro was ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a search warrant granted that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC also held the protection of the petitioner's human rights as stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding illegal search and seizure. The presumption of innocence of the petitioners should be observed and that they cannot be subjected to self-incriminating instances like paraffin tests, photographing and finger printing.

As penned by J. Cruz in this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government."

Alih vs. Castro CASE DIGEST 151 SCRA 279 June 23, 1987 Facts: Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger

–printing, paraffin testing and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were also confiscated. The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor. Issue: Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible as evidence against them. Held: The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis). However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incriminationapplies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “Theprohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of

physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of hisbody as evidence when it may be material.”

12. ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 151445) Case Digest

Facts: Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of “Balikatan-02-1”. They were subsequently joined by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand, claimed that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted in Mindanao.

The petitioners alleged that “Balikatan-02-1” is not covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US. Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine Territory.

Issue:Is the “Balikatan-02-1” inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?

Ruling:The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the US and it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise.

The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference.

Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of “Balikatan-02-1” joint military

exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call for the correction on its part.

The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.

LIM vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARYFacts:Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.” They are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to reaffirm.

On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise.

Issue:Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by the Visiting Forces Agreement?

Ruling:To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as

well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the aforesaid context.

It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the word .’activities” arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress, disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.

Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement.

13. MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940Doctrine: Social Justice LAUREL, J.:Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas

Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm

The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public

Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall

into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”

Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil 726Post under case digests, labor law at Wednesday, February 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic MindFacts: Pursuant to the power delegated to it by the Legislature, the Director of Public Works promulgated rules and regulations pertaining to the closure of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles for a year in prohibition against respondent-public officers. Among others, the petitioners aver that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon constitutional precept on the promotion of social justice to insure the well being and economic security of all people.

Issue: Whether or not the rules and regulation promote social justice.

Held: Yes. The promotion of Social Justice is to be adhered not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group.

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic force by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."