village governance rumayya

Upload: rumayya-batubara

Post on 04-Apr-2018

218 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    1/22

    Decentralization &

    Quality of Local Governance in Indonesia

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    2/22

    Research Question

    How does the impact of decentralization on

    local governance quality in Indonesia,

    especially at village level?

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    3/22

    Indonesia Big Bang Decentralization Reform

    History

    Economic, social and political crisis 1997/98

    Severe inter-regional inequalities A threatened national unity

    East Timor independence in 1999

    June 1999: first free and fair elections (legislative)

    August 1999: Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999 passed

    Fully implemented in 2001

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    4/22

    Dimension

    Fiscal (more on spending than expenditure)

    Administrative (function) Political (local election)

    Local council & district head

    First direct election in 2005

    Indonesia Big Bang Decentralization Reform

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    5/22

    Imbalanced Fiscal Decentralization

    Source: Eckardt & Shah (2006) based on data of 294 Indonesias local governments in 2005

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    6/22

    Source: Akita and Subkhan (2004)

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    7/22

    Source: Akita and Subkhan (2004)

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    8/22

    What have been done

    Growth (Pepinsky & Wihardja 2011) --> Neutral

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    9/22

    What have been done (cont.)

    Inter-jurisdictional competition (del Granado et al. 2008

    Yardstick competition and expenditure spillover effect

    Not tax competition

    Public goods and service provision (Chowdury et al. 2009;2010; Simatupang 2009; Skoufias et al. 2011; Sjahrir & Kis-Kastos 2011) health, education and infrastructure

    Improvement in outcome and deliveries/availability Responsiveness and preference matching increased

    No evidence in local capture

    Fiscal decentralization matters more than politicaldecentralization

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    10/22

    What have been done (cont.)

    Corruption (Henderson & Kuncoro, 2004; 2011)Politics matters

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    11/22

    However

    Most study is using district level data

    Governance and political economy aspects is

    under-researched

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    12/22

    Why governance?

    The puzzle behind public spending & outcome

    Cross country (Rajkumar & Swaroop 2008)

    Indonesia (Sumarto et al2004; Suryadarma 2012)

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    13/22

    Why governance?

    The puzzle behind public spending & outcome

    Cross country (Rajkumar & Swaroop 2008)

    Indonesia (Sumarto et al2004; Suryadarma 2012)

    Definitionthe institution by which authority is exercised and public

    resource are managed... (de Mello & Barenstein 2001)

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    14/22

    Why governance? (cont.)

    Measurement

    World Bank

    voice & accountability, political stability,

    government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule

    of law, control of corruption.

    Political Risk Services Group

    corruption, bureaucratic quality, rule of law, risk ofexpropriation of property.

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    15/22

    Why village?

    Policy planning and implementation

    Ex: Poverty program

    Targeting

    Disbursement

    Unique nature of village governance in

    Indonesia

    Urban village (Kelurahan) Appointed Leader

    Rural village (Desa) Elected leader

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    16/22

    Related works

    Elected vs. Appointed Leader

    Mu & Zhang (2011) public resource distribution

    Election and accountability

    Martinez-Bravo et al (2011) policy change in

    favour of voter preferencere-election incentive

    Leaders characteristics

    More educated leaders generate higher growth

    (Besley 2011)

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    17/22

    Data

    Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS).

    A longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey.

    4 waves:

    IFLS1 (1993), IFLS2(1997), IFLS3(2000), IFLS4(2007). Representing 83% of the population in 1997.

    13 provinces from 27 provinces in 1997.

    312 communities in rural and urban.

    IFLS1 7,224 households and 22,000 individuals. Re-contact rate above 90% in each wave.

    Individual household community.

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    18/22

    Descriptive Statistics

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    19/22

    Village leader selection methods 1997/2007

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    20/22

    Village Fiscal Autonomy

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    21/22

    Corruption change 2000/07

  • 7/31/2019 Village Governance Rumayya

    22/22

    Empirical Model

    GQ = f ( LSM, FA, PE, POV, X)

    GQ = change in governance quality; LSM = change in leader selection method;

    FA = change in fiscal autonomy;

    PE= a group of political economy variables (voterbehaviour/characteristics and leader education);

    POV= initial poverty rate;

    X= a group control variables.