visions of fission the demise of nuclear negative security ... · treaty of tlatelolco, discussed...

VISIONS OF FISSION

The Demise of Nuclear Negative Security

Assurances on the Bush Administration’s

Pentomic Battlefield

Charles P. Blair and Jean P. du Preez

For many years, non-nuclear weapons states have sought binding commitments from nuclear

armed states that they would not be the victim of either the threat or use of nuclear weapons*/

so-called negative security assurances (NSAs). The nuclear weapon states have traditionally

resisted granting such unconditional NSAs. Recent U.S. efforts to use nuclear deterrence against

the acquisition and use by other states of chemical, biological and radiological weapons,

however, have further exacerbated this divide. This article analyzes the historical development of

NSAs and contrasts U.S. commitments not to use nuclear weapons with the empirical realities of

current U.S. nuclear weapons employment doctrines. The authors conclude that NSAs are most

likely to be issued as unilateral declarations and that such pledges are the worst possible manner

in which to handle the issue of security assurance.

KEYWORDS: International relations; History; Arms control; Nuclear weapons; Nuclear

nonproliferation; Politics

This year marks a troika of critical nuclear anniversaries. Not only does 2005 mark 100 years

since the publication of Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity regarding convertibility of

matter and energy (E�/mc2), but commemorated as well is the grim 60-year anniversary of

the conversion of fissionable matter into nuclear energy upon the unfortunate inhabitants

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Rounding out this trinity is perhaps this year’s most significant

nuclear anniversary: 60 years of nuclear non-use, a tradition McGeorge Bundy termed,

fission’s ‘‘most important single legacy.’’1

Unfortunately, this non-use legacy is in jeopardy of soon becoming an ephemeral

episode to the nuclear age. Indeed, a growing number of vocal experts now foresee an

ominous not-too-distant future filled with dozens of newly nuclearized states, while others

dramatically assert that the nuclear destruction of a major U.S. city by terrorists in the

coming decade is ‘‘inevitable.’’2 What is not generally understood, however, is that

threatening this legacy as well are the nuclear weapon doctrines of the United States itself.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, targets of U.S. nuclear weapons did not usually

include non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) not aligned with the Soviet Union or China.3

Yet since at least the early 1990s, the United States has developed nuclear policies that

highlight the threat or use of nuclear weapons to deter the acquisition or use of chemical,

Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No 1, March 2005ISSN 1073-6700 print/ISSN 1746-1766 online/05/010037-34

– 2005 The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies

DOI: 10.1080/10736700500208561

biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons by NNWS and non-state actors.

With regards to the latter, terrorist networks like al-Qaeda are believed active in more than

60 different countries.4 Each one of those states, therefore, could theoretically fall within

the crosshairs of U.S. nuclear targeting. In brief, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons has

evolved from its broad Cold War mission of deterring ‘‘communist aggression’’ to a

present-day policy of deterring, preempting, and punishing CBRN proliferators and

terrorists.5

While such a posture will likely bestow nuclear weapons with a permanent status in

the post-Cold War era, and while it likely hastens the day that nuclear weapons are once

again used, it also exposes a ‘‘fundamental disharmony’’ in U.S. nuclear policy.6 For

example, in 1995, hoping to bolster the nonproliferation regime by convincing signatories

of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to extend its duration

indefinitely, the United States provided so-called ‘‘negative security assurances’’ (NSAs). In

effect, these promises said that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against

NNWS party to the NPT unless such a state attacked the U.S. with the support of a nuclear

ally. Based largely on those ostensible assurances, the NNWS agreed to an indefinite

extension of the NPT, yet within months the Department of Defense (DOD) updated sub-

rosa plans that called for nuclear strikes on certain non-nuclear states not aligned with any

nuclear power in response to assaults on U.S. interests employing chemical or biological

weapons (CBW), and even in cases of overwhelming conventional assault.7

The absence of legally binding NSAs has generated increased concern among many

NNWS given new U.S. nuclear policies that include the potential use of nuclear weapons

against NNWS. In recognition of this concern, the 2000 NPT Review Conference (RevCon)

acknowledged that legally binding NSAs would strengthen the nonproliferation regime

and called upon the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 RevCon to make

recommendations on this issue. Despite several proposals towards this end, no such

recommendations were made. If the 2005 RevCon fails to reach consensus on a final

document, one of the leading reasons will likely be disagreement over NSAs.

This article analyzes such nuclear doctrinal disharmonies specifically as they relate to

NSAs.8 In doing so it first reviews the historical evolution of NSAs. Second, it examines de

facto U.S. nuclear policies since the end of the Cold War, specifically what they imply about

nominal U.S. non-use commitments. Finally, it explores the future of NSAs, concluding that

their prospects are doubtful in a world where the United States is increasingly predisposed

to the preemptive and retaliatory use of nuclear weapons against NNWS and non-state

actors that putatively threaten U.S. interests.

History of Negative Security Assurances

States seek NSAs because earlier attempts to ‘‘ban the bomb’’ failed. As early as 1946,

senior U.S. officials advanced an international agreement in which ‘‘no nation would be

the legal owner of atomic weapons.’’9 Largely because of growing Cold War tensions,

these efforts failed, and by the fall of 1949 President Harry S. Truman abandoned any hope

for international control of atomic arms, embracing instead the belief that nuclear

weapons ‘‘should form the backbone’’ of U.S. strategic planning.10 With the emergence of

38 CHARLES P. BLAIR AND JEAN P. DU PREEZ

the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, an early form of

security assurances did arise as these newly aligned countries availed themselves of the

benefits of a nuclear ‘‘umbrella’’*/the extension of the super-power nuclear arsenal

as a deterrent to others. But this arrangement left many so-called ‘‘non-aligned states’’

out in the cold, and they continually sought ‘‘a binding commitment from the weapons

states that they would never use nuclear weapons against a country that did not have

them.’’11

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and NSAs

It was not until the mid-1960s that the non-aligned states would find a realistic venue from

which to pursue such goals. Sobered by the French nuclear test of 1960, the Cuban

Missile Crisis, alleged clandestine nuclear technology transfers to the Israelis,

and the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, Soviets and American negotiators began to make

headway on a treaty addressing the proliferation of nuclear weapons*/the NPT. The

non-aligned states, sensing that their security interests could be addressed in such a

treaty, successfully backed United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 2153, which

called on the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the forum from which the

NPT was being negotiated, ‘‘to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear

weapons powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use,

nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their

territories.’’12

With West Germany’s nuclear status fully in mind, the Soviets were the first to act on

this proposal.13 In 1966, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin put forth a treaty clause ‘‘on the

prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear state parties to the treaty,

which have no nuclear weapons in their territory.’’14 Such a proposition*/one that would

have allowed Soviet nuclear targeting of West Germany unless the Americans withdrew

their nuclear forces*/was rejected by the United States.15

The following year, in a similar vein, the U.S. NPT negotiators privately asked

their Soviet counterparts if they would be willing to accept NPT language (based on the

Treaty of Tlatelolco, discussed below) pledging ‘‘not to use or threaten to use nuclear

weapons against parties observing a treaty commitment not to acquire nuclear

weapons.’’16 Citing the presence of nuclear weapons in West Germany, the Soviets

declined.17

Unable to reach a consensus that would have allowed for NSA language in the NPT,

the nuclear weapon states (NWS) adopted the position that the pursuit of security

assurances be addressed, ‘‘in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside

the non-proliferation Treaty itself but in close conjunction with it.’’18 Consequently, the

NPT opened for signature with a text devoid of nuclear non-use commitments. However,

the NNWS were able to address their security considerations, in part by returning to the

more idealistic ‘‘ban the bomb’’ language found in early Cold War proposals; Article VI of

the NPT pledges the NWS to end the nuclear arms race and negotiate eventual total

nuclear disarmament.

DEMISE OF NUCLEAR NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES 39

United Nations Security Council Resolution 255

Action taken ‘‘outside the non-proliferation Treaty’’ has come to mean, inter alia,

resolutions by the UN Security Council. To date, two United Nations Security Council

Resolutions (UNSCR) have been issued vis-a-vis security assurances. The first came on June

19, 1968, when the Soviets, Americans, and British adopted UNSCR 255, which pledged

that nuclear aggression against any NNWS party to the treaty would require immediate

action by the UN Security Council.19 This assurance*/a so-called ‘‘positive security

assurance’’ because it is a commitment to come to the assistance of an attacked victim*/

fell short of the expectations of the non-aligned states and their pursuit of NSAs. However,

other promises of nuclear non-use, unrelated to the NPT or the Security Council, would

lead the way for further action.

The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco

The Cuban Missile Crisis did more than provoke action on a nonproliferation treaty.

Concerned by the Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba, the leaders of several

Latin American and Caribbean nations successfully negotiated a treaty declaring their

region of the world ‘‘free’’ of nuclear weapons (discussions for such a treaty had begun

with Costa Rica in 1958). This agreement, a so-called nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ),

was formalized in the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco.20 Having a clear interest in keeping Latin

America and the Caribbean free from nuclear weapons, the United States was supportive

of the idea, eventually signing and ratifying a treaty in which it committed itself, ‘‘not to

use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties.’’21

However, the United States attached an ‘‘understanding’’ to its non-use pledge.

Specifically it took into account a Soviet-assisted attack in the region: ‘‘The United States

would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was

assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the contracting Party’s

corresponding obligations under [the] Treaty.’’22 Still, despite this caveat, such qualified

negative security assurances, together with the positive assurances of UNSCR 255, gave

the non-aligned states momentum as they continued to pursue their own legally binding

NSAs.

Their first formal opportunity came in 1975 at the NPT’s first RevCon. At the end of

the conference, the 91 member parties issued a Final Declaration which gave countenance

to the positive security assurances of UNSCR 255, and touched upon NSAs as it urged ‘‘all

States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, to refrain, in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force

in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.’’23

The United States Issues Its Second NSA Pledge

Hoping that if it partially mollified such calls it could expand NPT party membership, in

1978 the United States issued its second NSA pledge.24


The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapons state

party to the NPT or any comparable international binding commitment not to acquire

nuclear explosive devices, except in case of an attack on the United States, its territories,

or armed forces, or its allies, by such state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated

with a nuclear-weapons state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.25

Not surprisingly, while welcoming in principle such a declaration, the non-aligned states

were far from sanguine about its actual language. Specifically, they balked at the

exceptions that allowed the United States to employ nuclear weapons against an NNWS if

that state was somehow aligned to an NWS, regardless of whether or not the latter was

even aware of the attack. Despite this exception, the unilateral declarations of 1978 were

seminal: They represented the first U.S. nuclear non-use promise to non-nuclear NPT state

parties.

The Conference on Disarmament in the 1980s

Throughout the 1980s, the non-aligned states, dissatisfied with qualified unilateral

assurances by the NWS, sought a separate treaty ‘‘with promises to non-weapon countries

of nuclear non-use that had no exceptions.’’26 The forum for much of this effort was the

Conference on Disarmament (CD). Unfortunately, for two reasons, the CD was unsuccessful

in negotiating such a treaty.

First, India and Pakistan were members of the CD, yet, just as they are today, both

remained outside the NPT and therefore had not disavowed the possession of nuclear

weapons. To many NPT parties, inclusion of non-NPT states as beneficiaries of NSAs would

have been contrary to the spirit of the NPT and would have given both India and Pakistan

incentive to remain outside of it.

Second, the CD is a body that requires consensus in order for a decision to be

formalized. Lacking an agreement between these non-NPT members on the one hand, and

CD members that were party to the NPT on the other hand, no progress could be made.

With the internecine CD deadlocked, it would take an event as major as the

dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War to bring about a

second U.S. nuclear non-use pledge to NNWS parties to the NPT.

The End of the Soviet Union and New NSAs

As Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine became independent states in 1991, there was

considerable concern over the fate of Soviet nuclear weapons within their territories. In

order to convince these ‘‘born nuclear’’ states to renounce their nuclear arsenals, transfer

these weapons to the Russian Federation, and join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states,

new and more robust NSAs were negotiated in the multilateral form of so-called

‘‘Memorandums of Understanding.’’27 The wording of these understandings closely

paralleled the assurances given by the United States in 1978 by Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance.28


However, these assurances were unique in that they further narrowed the conditions

under which NSAs could be nullified. Specifically, the understandings prohibited the use of

nuclear weapons against these states if they attacked an NWS while allied with an NWS

that was ignorant of, or did not support, the attack. In other words, if ‘‘Ukraine ultimately

joined NATO and later attacked Russia without NATO involvement, Russia could not use

nuclear weapons on Ukraine without violating the agreement.’’29 Naturally these pledges

led to further calls by other NNWS for more ecumenical and extensive NSAs.

UNSCR 984 and the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference

Indeed, the non-nuclear weapons states were in a strong position to bargain for stronger

assurances at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, where state parties met to

determine whether or not to extend the treaty’s duration. Acting just prior to the

upcoming review conference, and hoping to ensure the NPT’s indefinite extension, the

NWS issued unilateral pledges that, in some cases, were updated. The United States, for its

part, narrowed its 1978 qualifications by issuing a declaration that resembled those made

to the ‘‘born nuclear’’ former Soviet republics. However, the United States included a

crucial qualifier to such assurances by adding that parties to the NPT must be in compliance

with their obligations under the treaty, ‘‘ in order to be eligible for any benefits of adherence

to the Treaty.’’30 Such a declaration was a significant expansion of U.S. exceptions to its

1978 NSAs.

Following these unilateral declarations, the UN Security Council issued its second

resolution on security assurances. UNSCR 984 ‘‘took note with appreciation’’ the negative

security assurances made by the NWS in their respective statements (thus, going beyond

UNSCR 255, which had only acknowledged NWS positive security assurances).31

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference

Subsequent to the unilateral NWS statements and UNSCR 984, the 1995 Review and

Extension Conference convened. While recently made NSAs were repeated, the United

States offered them in a zero-sum stratagem: They would be ‘‘available to non-nuclear NPT

parties only if they extended the NPT (author emphasis).’’32 In other words, if the NPT were

allowed to expire, any security assurances would also expire. Faced with such a prospect,

the NNWS voted to extend the treaty indefinitely. However, stunned by this ultimatum,

the conference broke down and was unable to come up with a final declaration. Instead, it

issued three ‘‘decisions,’’ the second of which*/‘‘Principles And Objectives For Nuclear

Non-Proliferation And Disarmament’’*/addressed the issue of NSAs by stating ‘‘that

further steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States party to the

Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the

form of an internationally legally binding instrument.’’33

Although trenchant criticism followed these 1995 developments, it has been

strongly argued that the United States did create, through UNSCR 984, the ‘‘first real

politically binding commitment on both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ security assurances.’’34

Thus, they represent the strongest security assurances to date.35 For its part, the United


States recognized, ‘‘it is hard for some states to accept the proposition that our word is our

bond, ’’ and asserted that it had, ‘‘tried to wrap these commitments in a context and a

framework and a set of statements, with the Security Council resolution as an over-arching

umbrella . . . in a way that makes it clear that we are [guaranteeing] negative security

assurances . . . (author emphasis)’’36 As will be demonstrated shortly, however, such

commitments have continually been effaced, first by the Clinton administration, and

then by the Bush administration.

The 2000 Review Conference

Acting on the 1995 conference’s suggestions regarding legally binding NSAs, South Africa,

at the 1999 PrepCom to the 2000 RevCon, offered a proposal for a draft protocol to the

NPT on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWS

parties to the treaty.37 The protocol*/which was to be solely in the context of the NPT*/

was unique in at least three regards. First, it incorporated both the negative and positive

security assurances that the NWS had given in UNSCR 984. Second, it identified who would

be offering the assurances*/the NWS*/and who would be receiving the assurances*/the

NNWS. Third, it qualified the assurances with the same language the United States had

with its unilateral 1995 Review and Extension Conference declaration by stating that, ‘‘The

States receiving the security assurance provided for [shall be] in compliance with their

obligations under Article II of the Treaty.’’38 All together, the South African ‘‘Draft Protocol’’

was a paragon for a protocol to the NPT establishing legally binding NSAs.

Despite the South African proposal, the 2000 RevCon took no measures toward its

realization. Placing its hopes in the 2005 RevCon, the Final Document of the 2000

conference put forth that, ‘‘The conference agrees that legally binding security assurances

by the five [NWS] strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The conference calls

upon the [PrepCom] to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this

issue.’’39

PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference

Despite the 2000 RevCon’s request, no formal NSA recommendations were recognized by

the PrepCom. At the 2002 PrepCom, the Chairman’s Summary noted that NSAs were a

‘‘key basis for the 1995 extension decision’’ and ‘‘should be pursued as a matter of

priority,’’ and that, ‘‘a view was held that the issue of security assurances [was] linked with

the fulfillment of the Treaty obligations.’’40 The 2003 PrepCom saw the New Agenda

Coalition (NAC) submit a working paper that included a draft protocol on security

assurances to be added to the NPT that mirrored the 1999 South African Draft Protocol.41

The Chairman’s Summary of the 2003 PrepCom reflected in part the belief that

‘‘security doctrines have included the potential use of nuclear weapons.’’42 In this light,

Iran submitted a working paper on NSAs as well. Focusing on the ‘‘new doctrine of a

certain nuclear state,’’ the Iranian paper called for new NWS statements reaffirming their

1995 commitments, a new UN Security Council resolution ‘‘underlying unqualified security


assurances,’’ and the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD to negotiate

‘‘unconditional’’ and ‘‘legally binding’’ security assurances.43

Concerns over NSAs by the NAC, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United

States and others reached an ominous crescendo at the 2004 PrepCom. The NAC called

upon the NWS ‘‘to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security

assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security

assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties.’’ Such assurances could either be in

the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the NPT, or as a protocol to

the treaty.44 So, too, South Africa once again called for legally binding NSAs.45 The NAM

proposed a negotiating mechanism for NSAs within the NPT context by calling for the

establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of the 2005 RevCon on the issue

of security assurances.46 Iran again reminded the PrepCom that the development of ‘‘mini-

nukes’’ and the nuclear targeting of NNWS (discussed below) ‘‘would be in contradiction’’

to the 1995 U.S. unilateral statements and UNSCR 984.47

The U.S. response to these efforts foreshadows its position on NSAs at the

forthcoming 2005 RevCon. By asserting that ‘‘the very real nuclear threats from NPT

violators and non-state actors’’ eclipses the ‘‘relevance of non-use assurances,’’ the United

States hopes to steer attention away from NSAs, placing the spotlight instead on the

activities of Iran and North Korea.48 In doing so, the United States hopes to distance itself

further from commitments undertaken in the Final Declaration of the 2000 RevCon.49 The

reaction by the U.S. delegation to the 2004 PrepCom Chairman’s Summary stated that ‘‘We

did not, do not, and will not agree as stated in the Summary ‘that efforts to conclude a

universal, unconditional, and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-

nuclear-weapon states should be pursued as a matter of priority.’’’50

In sum, the struggle for NSAs*/especially with current developments*/is a

Sisyphean one. Twenty years followed the atomic bombings of Japan before Cold War

rivals found mutual benefit in seriously negotiating a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Even

then, the relative interests of the superpowers allowed for only UNSCR 255 (1968), which

contained only positive security assurances and a treaty wholly devoid of negative security

assurances. Still, qualified NSAs were first afforded to a NWFZ in the Treaty of Tlatelolco,51

and 10 years later, in 1978, the United States made qualified NSAs to the NNWS party to

the NPT.

In 1995, following unique assurances made to three former Soviet republics, all the

non-nuclear state parties to the NPT were offered these more ecumenical NSAs. Here,

however, the United States added that states must be in compliance with their obligations

to be eligible. UNSCR 984 acknowledged these pledges, and they were offered to the

NNWS on the condition that they extend the duration of the NPT indefinitely.

Despite expectations that the treaty’s extension would lead to legally binding NSAs,

several NAC draft protocols, and other efforts by non-aligned states, none have been

forthcoming. Indeed, the 2004 PrepCom revealed that U.S. perceptions of the American

security environment post-September 11, 2001, obviated ‘‘any justification for expanding

NSAs to encompass global-legally binding assurances.’’52 Thus, it would appear that the

zenith of NSAs*/vis-a-vis their ability to ensure genuinely nuclear non-use against

NNWS*/passed years ago. That is if NSAs can be said ever to have had the potential to


restrain the United States from actually employing nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states.

Such an assumption, explored next, is questionable at best.

Negative Security Assurances and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Following theCold War

Just as Cold War rivalries prevented the NPT from being seriously negotiated until the

1960s, so too has the Janus-faced nature of U.S. nuclear policy left treaty members without

legally binding NSAs from the United States ever since. Because ‘‘nuclear policy is

grounded in plans for the execution of war,’’ NSAs have had little effect on those tasked

with the design and operational plans for the use of nuclear weapons.53 Indeed, regardless

of declared U.S. policy, be it ‘‘massive retaliation,’’ ‘‘flexible response,’’ ‘‘nuclear war-

fighting,’’ or ‘‘non-use against NNWS,’’ every administration since World War II ‘‘has sought

to develop technologies and plans to make nuclear weapons usable for military

objectives.’’54

The post-Cold War American pursuit of these ‘‘technologies and plans’’ can be

explored as an interrelated triad. First is the function of the national weapons laboratories,

specifically their proposals to create new nuclear weapons with expanded missions.

Second, is the critical role of the military, and its belief that the diminishing threat of Russia

is being transposed by ‘‘a new series of threats on the horizon,’’ creating a nuclear

targeting map consisting of ‘‘fewer but more widespread targets.’’55 Third, are the pro-

nuclear policymakers who have overseen and encouraged these developments in the

hopes of strengthening deterrence by ‘‘holding at risk’’ those things most valued by

America’s new enemies. As will be shown, present at every level lies a pervasive belief that

NSAs are a ‘‘mistake.’’

Mini-Nukes and Bunker-Busters

The national weapons laboratories have played an early and enduring role in challenging

the belief that nuclear weapons were only of benefit in deterring the use of other such

weapons and, consequently, their actions have been essential in redefining the role of

nuclear arms. One of the earliest open-source examples of these efforts was a symposium

held at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in June 1988*/more than three years

before the end of the Cold War. Entitled ‘‘The Future of Nuclear Weapons: Debating the

Future,’’ this conference gathered hundreds of luminaries in the nuclear field to ‘‘consider

the future of nuclear weapons.’’56 Two of the conference’s conclusions are especially

noteworthy.

First, some participants foresaw new nuclear missions. ‘‘If hostile regional states

acquire nuclear or chemical-biological weapons,’’ they noted, ‘‘the United States may need

to revise its nuclear doctrine and forces specifically to deal with the issue raised by

such proliferation.’’57 Second, the conference specifically addressed the issue of nuclear

technologies. Noting that a growing number of Soviet and other ‘‘hard to kill targets’’ were

increasingly becoming immune to destruction via ‘‘existing nuclear systems,’’ the

conference encouraged the development of warheads ‘‘designed to penetrate the ground


before they detonated.’’58 Revision of both of these issues*/nuclear doctrine and

technology*/would find an increasingly wide audience as fear of the Soviet Union began

to wane while concerns over so-called ‘‘rogue’’ states grew.

Taking the findings of the 1988 LANL symposium to another level, two LANL

scientists published a seminal article entitled, ‘‘Countering The Threat of The Well-Armed

Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons.’’59 Writing just months after the

Gulf War of 1991, the authors, Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard III, proposed that

‘‘lessons’’ of the recent Iraqi conflict necessitated a new generation of nuclear weapons.

They argued, in essence, that Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated

the ‘‘self-deterring’’ nature of U.S. high-yield nuclear forces. Had Iraq used chemical

weapons against Coalition forces, would the United States have responded with multi-

kiloton (-kt) nuclear weapons? The answer, according to Dowler and Howard, was no. The

solution to easing such ‘‘potential squeamishness by the Commander in Chief’’ was an

array of new, less destructive nuclear options.60

Low-yield nuclear weapons existed long before the early 1990s. Dowler and

Howard’s proposed nuclear weapons, in terms of their explosive yields and battlefield

missions, were a military reality throughout much of the 1950s and 1960s.61 What made

their recommendations seminal was that, unlike previous generations of low-yield nuclear

weapons, they advanced warheads that would be employed against rogue states armed

with CBW or overwhelming conventional enemy forces, not masses of nuclear-backed

Soviet troops pouring through Fulda Gap.

In short, Dowler and Howard argued that, ‘‘While Washington may not consider

using a 9-megaton (-mt) nuclear bomb to counter a chemical weapons attack . . . a small

nuclear weapon could be employed for exactly that circumstance.’’62 Their arguments

resonated far beyond Los Alamos.

STRATCOM’s 1991 ‘‘Reed Report’’

Having recently discarded global conflict with the Soviet Union as ‘‘the principle planning

and programming paradigm for the U.S. armed forces,’’ the defense community eagerly

responded to new justifications for its nuclear weapons infrastructure. In January 1991, just

as U.S.-led military forces were poised to liberate Kuwait, then-Secretary of Defense

Richard Cheney issued a Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) calling for the

targeting of ‘‘potential proliferators’’ with nuclear weapons.63 Cheney would publicly

follow up on this in a 1992 DOD report arguing for nuclear responses to ‘‘regional

threats.’’64 Such recommendations made it into the Single Integrated Operational Plan*/

SIOP-93*/creating ‘‘the first overall nuclear war plan formally to incorporate Third World

[weapons of mass destruction] WMD targets.’’65

In response to Cheney’s NUWEP, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) was

tasked with a ‘‘Strategic Deterrence Study.’’66 This study*/widely referred to as the ‘‘Reed

Report’’ after the group’s chairman, Thomas C. Reed*/argued for a ‘‘Nuclear Expeditionary

Force’’ to be used against non-nuclear ‘‘Third World targets.’’67 A harbinger to the nuclear

policies of the current Bush administration, the report advocated the reassignment of non-

strategic nuclear weapons into a ‘‘first-use’’ weapon ‘‘should U.S. forces face an enemy


armed with WMD, one possessing superior conventional forces, or the threat of

‘impending annihilation (author emphasis).’’’68 ‘‘It is not difficult to entertain nightmarish

visions,’’ Reed warned Congress while testifying in 1992, ‘‘in which a future Saddam

Hussein threatens American forces abroad, U.S. allies or friends, and perhaps even the

United States itself with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. If that were to happen,

U.S. nuclear weapons may well be a resource for seeking to deter execution of the

threat . . . .‘‘69 Arguing that NSAs were obsolete, Reed continued, ‘‘We are not comfortable

with the . . . suggestion that a nation can engage in any level of chemical or biological

aggression and still be shielded by an American non-nuclear pledge.’’70

Clinton Takes the White House

The election of President Bill Clinton in 1992 initially revived the hopes that with the Cold

War over, the United States could earnestly begin dismantling its massive nuclear arsenal

while renouncing its first-use policy. Indeed, legislators effectively curtailed lingering

enthusiasm from the previous administration over new nuclear weapons and their use

against NNWS. Most significantly, Congress attached a provision to the FY1994 Defense

Authorization Act*/the so-called Spratt-Furse Amendment*/which prohibited research

and development that could lead to the production of nuclear weapons with a yield below

5 kt.71 Just how serious the administration itself was about NSAs would soon be seen, as in

the following year the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was

scheduled to be released.

The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review

The first NPR since the end of the Cold War was accompanied by high expectations.72

Presented with the genuine opportunity to create a ‘‘nuclear tabula rasa,’’ then-Secretary

of Defense Les Aspin and Assistant Secretary of State Ashton Carter sought to reexamine

every feature of U.S. nuclear targeting policy and strength requirements.73 With the Soviet

threat gone, STRATCOM expected the worst from the Clinton team. Declassified records

indicate that STRATCOM prepared for an ‘‘uphill battle’’ as it sought to protect its preferred

massive force levels, targeting preferences, and funding.74

Mindful of the NPT regime in general, and the aforementioned U.S. 1978 NSAs

specifically, Carter battled with STRATCOM over the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent

to CBW.75 Accompanied by Dr. Stephen Fetter, Carter maintained that nuclear weapons

could only deter the use and acquisition of other nuclear weapons.76 ‘‘No meaningful

contribution,’’ Fetter passionately added, ‘‘was likely to come from nuclear weapons in

deterring chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.’’77

However, with Defense Secretary Aspin poised to resign and with a continual lack of

direct leadership by President Clinton himself, Carter and Fetter were soon outmaneuv-

ered by STRATCOM despite ‘‘heated debates.’’78 Convinced that due to the de jure

elimination of its chemical and biological weapons the U.S. had only nuclear weapons to

deter WMD use, STRATCOM concluded that:


To counter this threat [of WMD] the U.S. should not rule out the preemptive first use of

nuclear weapons . . . .79 Those who argue that biological and chemical threats can always

be safely deterred without requiring the last resort of U.S. nuclear forces must bear the

burden of proof for their argument. Until they make a compelling case that nuclear force

is not necessary for successful deterrence, it is not in the nation’s interest to foreswear

the uncertainty as to how we would respond to clear and dangerous threats of other

weapons of mass destruction.80

Ultimately, Carter and Fetter failed to sufficiently ‘‘bear the burden of proof’’ to

STRATCOM that either the nonproliferation regime, or the awesome conventional forces of

the U.S. military, could deter the acquisition and possible use of WMD against the United

States and its interests. Consequently, the NPR’s final conclusions were made in an

atmosphere almost entirely devoid of White House input.81 The 1994 NPR thus gave

nuclear weapons a critical role in deterring (and possibly preempting) non-nuclear

weapons states armed with CBW.82

In sum, despite the Clinton administration’s public portrayal of reducing the role of

nuclear weapons, the 1994 NPR reaffirmed U.S. anathema to NSAs. NNWS were now clearly

being targeted.83 Moreover, White House claims of continuing the ‘‘disarmament process’’

belied the reality that STRATCOM was keeping its massive force structure, backed by the

old Cold War triad and a capability to fight a protracted nuclear war (a policy initiated by

President Jimmy Carter in 1980).84

As mentioned in this article’s introduction, representatives gathered for the 1995

NPT Review Conference unaware of the NPR’s conclusions. While the Clinton administra-

tion was able to get an indefinite extension to the NPT as a quid pro quo for negative

security assurances to the NPT’s non-nuclear weapon state parties, in the year that

followed the allegedly earnest indefinite extension deal, the United States would

secretively continue to elaborate and justify exceptions to its recently given NSAs.

STRATCOM’s ‘‘Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence’’

Encouraged by a lack of leadership or guidance from the White House in the formulation

of the 1994 NPR, and bolstered by the sweeping Republican victories in the 1994 mid-term

elections, STRATCOM sought to dictate U.S. nuclear policy further. Not surprisingly, in its

classified and seminal 1995 study entitled, ‘‘Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,’’

STRATCOM took issue with the recent NSAs given at the NPT Review and Extension

Conference. Conducted by STRATCOM’s Strategic Advisory Group (SAG),85 the study’s final

report noted that:

It is easy to see the difficulty we have caused ourselves in putting forward declaratory

policies such as the ‘‘Negative Security Assurances,’’ which were put forward to

encourage nations to sign up for the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is a mistake to single

out nuclear weapons from the remainder of other WMD without making the tie between

damages (or potential damages) that the U.S. would find unacceptable from the threat or

use of any of these weapons.86


Expanding on the ‘‘mistake’’ of NSAs, the report foreshadowed what would become

the current Bush administration’s policy of ‘‘preemption.’’

It is, however, crucial that the level of our commitment to the things we value be

unfaltering, and that the adversary have little doubt of this. Without saying exactly what

the consequences will be if the US has to respond, whether the reaction would either be

responsive or preemptive, we must communicate in the strongest ways possible the

unbreakable link between our vital interests and the potential harm that will be directly

attributable to anyone who damages (or even credibly threatens to damage ) that which

we hold of value. Thus, it is undesirable to adopt declaratory policies such as ‘‘no first

use’’ which serve to specifically limit U.S. nuclear deterrence goals without providing

equitable returns (author emphasis).87

Moreover, through this ‘‘responsive or preemptive’’ strategy, the report sought to

continue the Cold War threat of ‘‘national extinction,’’ to any adversary that threatened

U.S. interests*/a precursor to the current policy of ‘‘regime change.’’

[U.S. nuclear policy must] create the fear of extinction �/ extinction of either the adversary’s

leaders themselves or their national independence, or both . . . . In the context of non-

Russian states, the penalty for using [WMD] should not be just military defeat, but the

threat of even worse consequences (author emphasis).88

Thus, by 1996 it was clear that U.S. nuclear policy was poised to abandon completely

its recent NSA pledges as it sought to embrace STRATCOM’s finding and recommenda-

tions. As will be discussed shortly, what finally made this development public were

dramatic developments with Libya and its alleged underground chemical laboratories.

Rogues and the Modification of the B61-11

The 1994 NPR was seminal not only because it recommended the nuclear targeting of

NNWS, but because it was also the first high-level nuclear doctrine to propose that certain

underground (non-nuclear) targets were only vulnerable via nuclear strikes.89

In the beginnings of what would eventually become a decisive report in 2001, STRATCOM

identified the threat ‘‘of deeply buried facilities’’ in rogue states.90 Enacting the

recommendations of the 1994 NPR, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision

Directive 30 (PDD-30),91 which instructed the Department of Energy (DOE) to ‘‘modify’’

existing nuclear weapons to better ‘‘hold at risk’’ such facilities.92 Specifically, the nuclear

B61-7 gravity bomb was to be customized into an ‘‘earth-penetrating weapon’’ (EPW),

thus fulfilling the mission earlier identified by the 1988 LANL symposium.93

The modified bomb*/dubbed the B61-11*/would be a ‘‘normal’’ warhead that

STRATCOM commander General Eugene Habiger described as modified with a ‘‘case-

hardened steel shell that [would have] the capability of burrowing quite a ways

underground.’’94 It would employ a ‘‘dial-a-yield’’ (DAY) design, enabling it to have a

yield range of 10 kt (and lower, some reportedly as low as 0.3 kt) to 340 kt, and would be

deployed for use with the B-2 bomber.95


By December 1996, the B61-11 was completed and ready for potential employment

(it would enter production in 1999).96 The unusually ‘‘aggressive schedule’’ that produced

the B61-11 emanated directly from U.S. trepidations over alleged illicit chemical weapons

factories. Of specific concern was Libya’s underground site near the town of Tarhunah,

which housed, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed, a massive nerve gas

manufacturing plant.97 Conclusions by the Pentagon that conventional munitions and

existing nuclear options would prove ineffective against the facility led to the search for

weapon alternatives and, thus, the rapid development of the B61-11.

The Libyan ‘‘crisis’’ came at a difficult time for the Clinton administration. Following

South Africa’s ascension to the NPT in 1991, rapid progress had been made in the

formulation of an African NWFZ*/the Treaty of Pelindaba. The treaty was opened for

signature on April 11, 1996, the same day CIA Director John Deutch publicly ‘‘revealed’’

Tarhunah.98 Fully aware that the treaty would commit it not to use or threaten to use

nuclear weapons on the continent (Protocol I), the United States nonetheless signed the

treaty along with 43 African countries.99

That same day, however, National Security Council (NSC) official, Robert Bell,

stated that the treaty, ‘‘will not limit options available to the United States in response

to an attack by [a treaty party] using weapons of mass destruction.’’100 Less than

two weeks later, Harold Smith*/assistant to the secretary of defense for atomic

energy*/told defense writers at a breakfast meeting that the Tarhunah site could not

be destroyed with conventional weapons but that, ‘‘by the end of the year, the United

States would have a nuclear warhead based on the B61 that would be able to do the

job.’’101

Facing a public relations crisis over these inconsistencies, top Clinton officials

once again sought refuge in U.S. long-standing ambiguity over nuclear policy. Accordingly,

on May 7, 1996, DOD spokesman Kenneth Bacon quoted then-Secretary of Defense

William Perry as saying, ‘‘In every situation that I have seen so far, nuclear weapons

would not be required for response. That is, we could have a devastating response without

the use of nuclear weapons, but we would not forswear that possibility (author

emphasis).’’102 The arms control community responded with a vigorous campaign to

expose this new caveat to U.S. NSAs. Wrote former NPT negotiator Ambassador George

Bunn:

A new exception to U.S. non-use pledges would undermine the U.S. leadership role

in international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 1995 non-

use promise was solemnly made by the United States, Britain, France, and Russia in order

to secure the support of non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties for making the treaty

permanent. If the United States now says it can set aside its non-use declaration

whenever necessary, some beneficiaries of the promise may argue that they have been

deceived and that, because of the resulting possibility of nuclear attack by the United

States . . . their supreme national interests are threatened and withdrawal from the NPT is

permissible.103


Such warnings fell on deaf ears during Clinton’s tumultuous second term. Rather

than abandoning the policy of targeting putatively CBW-armed NNWS with nuclear

weapons, the Clinton White House made it official*/though classified*/policy.

Presidential Decision Directive 60

In November 1997 President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive*/PDD-60. This

top-secret document, elements of which were leaked, reversed for the first time the

Reagan-era policy of prevailing in a ‘‘protracted nuclear war.’’104 Yet while dropping this

outdated Cold War strategy, PDD-60 reaffirmed the 1994 NPR and the mission of the B61-

11 by broadening the conditions under which the United States would consider retaliation

with nuclear weapons to include the use of CBW against the U.S. or its interests.105

Moreover, in a sign of just how far the Clinton administration was allowing itself to be

moved away from targeting restraints, PDD-60 reestablished China for targeting inclusion

in the SIOP.106

Once again embracing the policy of ambiguity first embodied in the NPR three years

earlier, the Clinton administration took great pains to ‘‘clarify’’ the broadened PDD-60

NUWEP policies that were leaked. Contradicting earlier reports, Robert Bell claimed that,

‘‘this PDD reaffirms explicitly, virtually verbatim, [NSAs made] during the extension of the

Non-Proliferation Treaty.’’107 Despite Bell’s statement, it was clear to many that what PDD-

60 actually ‘‘reaffirmed’’ was that NSAs given to the NNWS*/most recently at the 1995

Review Conference*/were hollow.

Clinton’s Nuclear Legacy

In sum, the nuclear weapons establishment, led in part by STARTCOM, had now

successfully attached the fear of CBW*/and the concomitant nuclear targeting of

NNWS*/to all major unilateral nuclear policy doctrines of the Clinton years. As the 2000

election approached, it was clear that any hopes for a truly progressive reassessment of

the U.S. nuclear posture following the Cold War had been lost. While the recommenda-

tions for new nuclear weapons*/like those made by LANL’s Dowler and Howard*/were

still being kept at bay by the Spratt-Furse Amendment, Clinton had approved the

development of the B61-11 and its ‘‘bunker-busting’’ assignment. Moreover, policy-

guiding documents like the 1994 NPR, STRATCOM’s ‘‘Reed Report’’ and ‘‘Essentials of Post-

Cold War Deterrence,’’ and PDD-60 ensured that the U.S. nuclear arsenal’s purpose had

transformed itself from its anti-communist Cold War mission to one of deterring and

punishing CBRN proliferators.

Consequently, whoever won the election*/vice-presidential candidate Al Gore or

Texas Governor George W. Bush*/the next president would inherit an immense nuclear

infrastructure whose budget now exceeded Cold War spending levels.108 Distracted by

personal issues, outmaneuvered by STRATCOM, and overwhelmed by bureaucratic inertia,

President Clinton had helped to further institutionalize U.S. disregard for its NSAs. His

successor would take this attitude to entirely new levels.


NSAs and the Nuclear Policies of the Bush Administration

It can be argued that, in many ways, the Bush White House simply took the nuclear

postures of the Clinton era to their next ‘‘logical’’ level. However, what would make the

Bush administration able to effect the most dramatic changes in U.S. nuclear policy since

the 1940s is the degree and atmosphere in which it would carry on its predecessor’s

policies. It would do this in two broad ways. First, not content with the ‘‘bunker-busting’’

capabilities of the B61-11, the Bush administration would pursue an ambitious program of

new and modified nuclear weapons. This would include low-yield types, necessitating

lawmakers to revoke the Spratt-Furse Amendment. Second, fully abandoning any Cold

War concept of deterrence after the events of 9/11, the administration would make

preventative war and regime change official U.S. doctrine; policies that would include an

explicit threat of nuclear force on NNWS.109 In doing so, it would publicly repudiate the

NSAs made in 1978 and 1995.

This section explores two critical Bush-era documents which, when taken together

as a whole, reveal the latest and most extreme vitiation of NSAs to date. The pivotal 2001

DOD/DOE study, the ‘‘Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets,’’ and the 2001 Nuclear

Posture Review rationalized and prioritized an entirely new nuclear outlook for the United

States. Subsequent to reviewing these documents, this study explores congressional

actions taken to actualize their recommendations. In sum, this section documents the

emergence of another exception to NSAs. Not content with only an ability to deter and

respond to the use of CBRN with nuclear weapons, the United States would now threaten

to preempt non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear weapons if they were suspected of

developing CBRN capabilities.

Renewed Concerns Over Underground Targets

Within months of taking office the Bush administration was presented with a joint DOD/

DOE study of far-reaching consequence.110 Released in July 2001, The Report to Congress on

the Defeat of Hardened and Deeply Buried Targets revisited issues embodied in the 1996

crisis over Libya’s Tarhunah site and concerns over the ability of ‘‘the United States to defeat

hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) and stockpiles of chemical and biological

agents and related capabilities.’’111 The report continued the Clinton administration’s broad

theme of equating the threat of CBW with that of nuclear weapons. Specifically, it echoed

the 1994 NPR by concluding that many of the underground facilities that supposedly

housed WMD were susceptible to destruction only via nuclear weapons.112

However, the report went further than any other Clinton-era open source document

by concluding that many HDBTs were invulnerable to all current nuclear weapons*/

including the newly modified B61-11. Consequently, by noting that ‘‘There is no current

program to design a new or modified HDBT Defeat nuclear weapon,’’ the report implied

that future programs could, in part, move forward only with the repeal of the Spratt-Furth

Amendment.113

The report reflected the U.S. government’s concerns that had been mounting

throughout the 1990s, not just isolated matters like Libya’s Tarhunah chemical plant. Its


conclusions were the result of three general developments: (1) ‘‘lessons’’ from Desert Storm,

(2) advances in burrowing technology, and (3) perceived underground production and

storage of WMD.

First, potential adversaries, it was generally anticipated, would learn the messages

offered by the 1991 coalition bombing of Iraq with regards to future construction of

underground facilities. Indeed, the 1990s saw a proliferation of HDBT*/most of which

were designed to be secure from the types of conventional attacks visited upon the Iraqis

in 1991. While HDBTs were generally rare outside of the territories of the superpowers and

their respective allies during the Cold War, by 2001 U.S. government studies had

concluded that ‘‘rogue nations’’ had ‘‘over 10,000 potential HDBTs worldwide’’ with more

than 1,400 believed to be securing WMD, ballistic missiles, or command-and-control

facilities.114 It was asserted, moreover, that many of these facilities were built at depths

that made them immune not only to conventional munitions, but also to attacks with

relatively high-yield nuclear weapons.115

Second, intelligence analysts noted with mounting concern technological advances

that increasingly allowed states to dig with speed tunnels and bunkers of immense depth,

sophistication, and strength. Furthermore, these technologies were allowing not only for

facilities of depth but, just as importantly, access tunnels of great length and complex

directional formation.116

Finally, there was an increasing consensus among military and civilian analysts

after 1991 that such facilities were being used to manufacture and store CBRN.117

Moreover, the military*/along with its scientific colleagues from the weapons

laboratories*/generally believed that conventional munitions and current nuclear

capabilities would not, ‘‘be able to directly access [neutralize] the WMD materials’’ within

such underground networks.118

In sum, by the end of the 1990s, key governmental agencies were concluding that the

number of HDBTs globally was growing and, moreover, such facilities could not credibly be

held at risk with conventional munitions or current nuclear capabilities.119 In no small part,

these conclusions helped lay the foundation for the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

Conceptualized for the most part prior to the events of 9/11, the 2001 NPR nonetheless

sought to redefine U.S. nuclear requirements in ‘‘hurried post-Sept. 11 terms.’’120 With

regard to NSAs, it is critical to examine three of its conclusions. First, the NPR addressed

critical conclusions of the Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried

Targets. Under the heading ‘‘Initiatives for Nuclear Weapons Programs,’’ it called on the

NNSA to explore:

Several nuclear weapons options that might provide important advantages for

enhancing the nation’s deterrence posture: possible modifications to existing weapons

to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating

weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and

deeply buried facilities; and [new] warheads that reduce collateral damage.121


The NPR went on to request that the NNSA reestablish ‘‘advanced warhead concepts

teams at each of the national laboratories and at headquarters in Washington.’’122

Warheads incorporating ‘‘additional yield flexibility’’ and allowing for ‘‘reduced collateral

damage’’ meant that the advanced concepts teams at LANL, Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) would return to their work

exploring low-yield (less than 5 kt) nuclear weapons. Such research had been nominally

banned in 1994 by the Spratt-Furse Amendment.

Low-yield EPWs were only part of the Pentagon’s strategy to defeat HDBTs. High-

yield weapons were also envisioned because, for the ‘‘defeat of very deep and larger

underground facilities, penetrating weapons with large yields would be needed to

collapse the facility.’’123 Thus, the NPR used the findings of the Report to Congress on the

Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets to advance (1) an earth penetrating low-yield

nuclear weapon*/the so-called ‘‘mini-nuke’’ and (2) a high-yield ‘‘ Robust Nuclear Earth

Penetrator’’ (RNEP)*/dubbed the ‘‘bunker-buster.’’124

Second, in addition to promoting new nuclear weapons, the 2001 NPR called on the

Pentagon to, ‘‘draft contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons’’ against at least

seven countries.125 These targets included not only China and Russia, but NNWS like Iran,

Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.126 Thus, despite claiming that it represented a dramatic

shift away from reliance on nuclear weapons*/the same twist that the Clinton White

House had used with the 1994 NPR*/the reality of the 2001 NPR was that it ‘‘significantly

expanded [the] planning doctrine for nuclear wars.’’127

Finally, the NPR clarified Clinton-era ambiguities over exceptions to negative security

assurances, by calling for the employment of nuclear weapons, ‘‘in retaliation for the use of

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons,’’ or even ‘‘in the event of surprising military

developments.’’128

In short, the 2001 NPR called for the development of modified and new nuclear

earth-penetrating weapons, an expansion of cases in which the United States would

consider using nuclear weapons, and nuclear ‘‘contingency plans’’ against NNWS.

Consequently, less that two months after its release to Congress, Undersecretary of State

for Arms Control and Nonproliferation John Bolton made it clear that the United States no

longer felt itself bound by any of its NSAs. Observing that the ‘‘idea of fine theories of

deterrence work against everybody, which is implicit in the negative security assurances,

has just been disproven by Sept 11,’’ Bolton revealed that the administration is ‘‘just not

into theoretical assertions that other administrations have made [the 1978 and 1995

pledges].’’129

Congress Acts to Enact the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

Beginning with the FY2003 budget, the Bush administration*/with the strong support of

U.S. weapons laboratories*/requested $45 million for the RNEP ‘‘study’’ over a three-year

period.130 Specifically, the funding would be directed toward a ‘‘Phase 6.2-6.2A Cost and

Feasibility Study’’ of the RNEP.131 Furthermore, the study produces all the necessary data

for Development Engineering*/Phase 3*/and a subsequent ‘‘full-scale development

decision.’’132 In 2002 Congress went ahead and fully funded $15 million for the RNEP for


FY2003. However, in November 2003, after an acrimonious debate, Congress cut the RNEP

funds for FY2004 from $15 million to $7.5 million.133 Worse still, from the administration’s

perspective, Congress cut all funding for the RNEP for FY2005*/$27.6 million had been

requested.134

Repeal of the Spratt-Furse Amendment

The Bush administration has fared slightly better in realizing the NPR’s call for ‘‘mini-

nukes.’’ In FY2004, Congress agreed to fully fund the $6 million request, under the rubric of

‘‘Advanced Concepts.’’ In doing so, Congress repealed the decade-old Spratt-Furse ban on

low-yield nuclear weapons.135 The NNSA was quick to act on this removal of what it

termed a ‘‘vague and arbitrary limitation.’’136 In a letter to the heads of the weapons

laboratories, NNSA Director Linton Brooks called on weaponeers to, ‘‘take advantage of

this opportunity to ensure that we close any gaps that may have opened this past decade

[the decade of Spratt-Furse] in our understanding of the possible military applications of

atomic energy.’’137

Some in Congress were incensed by this letter and its perceived ‘‘unbridled

enthusiasm for new nuclear weapons.’’138 In a January 2004 letter to Brooks, Ranking

Minority Member Peter J. Vislosky (Democrat-Indiana) and David L. Hobson (Republican-

Ohio), chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the House

Appropriations Committee (the subcommittee that handles the NNSA’s actual budget)

lashed out at Brooks. ‘‘We took you at your word that you were willing to redefine the

scope of the Advanced Concepts work to address our concerns [voiced in budget hearings

prior to repealing Spratt-Furse]. Unfortunately, it is now apparent to us that those were

hollow assurances and that the NNSA is determined to charge forward with unrestricted

efforts on advanced nuclear weapons concepts.’’139 The two congressmen*/both with

considerable power over the NNSA’s budget*/ominously concluded that, ‘‘Although we

find your actions unhelpful, they are at least instructive in gauging the actual intent of the

Advanced Concepts work proposed by the administration; we will view future proposals

from the Department [DOE/NNSA] with this memorandum in mind.’’140 As with the RNEP,

congress subsequently cancelled all FY2005 funding for Advanced Concepts*/the

administration had requested $9 million.141

Future Budget Request to Enact the 2001 NPR

Despite these recent funding setbacks, the NNSA’s desire ‘‘to close any gaps’’ by

implementing the NPR are still evident in the Bush administration’s future budget

proposals. Stung by Congress approving only half of its requested $15 million for

FY2004*/and denying it all together for FY2005*/the administration is considering

moving control of the RNEP and Advanced Concepts budget out of the domain of the

Energy and Water Subcommittee and into a ‘‘separate subcommittee that allocates

funding for the Defense Department.’’142 With such a shuffle, the administration could

likely ensure that the NNSA meets its projected $145 million RNEP budget for FY2007.143 If

those trends continue, by 2009 the NNSA hopes to have completed 15 percent of the


RNEP’s 6.4 warhead lifecycle*/Production Engineering.144 Thus, early in the next decade

the RNEP will be one step away from ‘‘First Production.’’ Moreover, by 2009 the

administration hopes to have enlarged the Advanced Concepts budget to nearly $30

million.145

In Sum: The Bush Administration and Negative Security Assurances

The Bush administration clearly places enormous importance on the perpetuation and

modernization of U.S. nuclear forces. Equally apparent is that this quest reflects the

‘‘interests of traditional power structures and the defense-orientated sectors of the U.S.

economy.’’146 While documents like The Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hardened and

Deeply Buried Targets and the 2001 NPR may reflect these ‘‘traditional interests,’’ it is

difficult to overemphasize the radical nature of the Bush administration’s vitiation of NSAs

and simultaneous pursuit of new nuclear weapons amid a foreign policy that holds

preventative war as one of its main pillars.

Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has written that at only two

other times in U.S. history have such historically significant military policy changes

occurred. The first, he contends, was the debate that raged shortly after the Revolutionary

War over congressional approval of a regular peacetime army. Second, was the three-

decade debate over the U.S. military role in Europe, a debate that initially saw rejection of

entry into the League of Nations but eventual congressional approval of the North Atlantic

Treaty.147 Today’s debate is in essence one over how the United States will respond to the

‘‘inevitable diffusion and diversification of weapons of mass destruction, percolating

global turbulence, and increased fear of terrorism.’’148

To date, it would appear that part of America’s answer to such bleak developments

lies with a renewed embrace of nuclear weapons. In a general sense, this is not a new

development*/throughout the Cold War the United States closely identified its existential

security through its nuclear prowess. What has changed, dramatically so, is just what the

United States expects from its nuclear arms. Building on momentum that began at least as

far back as 1988, former presidential administrations championed the notion that the post-

Cold War mission for nuclear weapons should be to combat the proliferation of CBRN. The

Bush administration gladly embraced this makeover. However, galvanized by the events of

9/11, it crafted policies that not only viewed the threat of nuclear weapons as effective

deterrents to the use of CBRN, but also now foresees actual battlefield uses for nuclear

weapons against NNWS as a component of the War on Terror and policies emphasizing

counterproliferation and ‘‘regime change.’’

Conclusion: The Future of Negative Security Assurances

Currently, there is little left of NSAs to dismantle. As was detailed earlier, in February 2002

the current administration made it clear that it no longer felt bound by any pledges and,

subsequently, noted it that there is no ‘‘justification’’ for legally binding assurances.149

Thus, the United States ‘‘has clearly decided to walk away from the concept of NSAs that

have for more than 30 years been central to the deal embodied in the NPT.’’


These grim NSA policy reversals, however, pose a quandary for U.S. policymakers.

For if the United States has any hope of irreversibly dismantling North Korea’s nuclear

program, if it desires to truly forestall Iranian nuclear aspirations, and if it expects to avoid

a nuclear ‘‘tipping point’’ that ushers in dozens of new nuclear states, it will need to shed

much of its unilateralism and work to improve the health of the international

nonproliferation regime. Because of its unique global security role after the end of the

Cold War, it is reasonable that the United States seeks, ‘‘more security for itself than most

other nations require.’’150 Unfortunately, the United States has concluded that this security

is best attained though a capability and commitment to employ nuclear weapons on

NNWS. What this unilateral approach guarantees is not more security but less. As states

deal with their own security considerations they will determine, as North Korea seems to

have done, that those needs are best actualized by having nuclear weapons of their own.

The 2005 Review Conference will thus be a critical test for the newly elected

administration. If the conference fails to produce a final document, the acrimonious

debate over NSAs will likely be a leading reason. Ironically, at a time when many NPT state

parties and allies of the United States are increasingly concerned about attempts by the

current U.S. administration to continue its research and possible development of new

types of nuclear weapons that will clearly be designed to target non-nuclear weapon

states, the United States at the 2004 PrepCom emphasized that ‘‘the end of the Cold War

has further lessened the relevance of non-use assurances from the P-5 to the security of

NPT NNWS, particularly when measured against the very real nuclear threats from NPT

violators and non-state actors’’ and that ‘‘legally binding assurance sought by the majority

of states ‘‘has no relation to contemporary threats to the NPT.’’151 What the United States

does not recognize by this statement is that the ‘‘very real threats’’ to its security are in

part generated by its own nuclear weapon policies.

Whether or not the 2005 RevCon adopts a final document that contains some form

of agreement on the future of NSAs, the need for legally binding security assurances will

continue to be*/as it had been in 1970*/central to the security of NNWS. The challenge

to these states, in particular to the strongest proponents*/the Non-Aligned Movement

(NAM)*/would be how to initiate tactics at the conference to ensure that past agreements

recognizing the relevance of legally binding negative security assurances are not

undermined. Although yet unclear how strong their resolve will be, there is a general

expectation that the NAM state parties, in particular, will emphasize the need for

constructive debate on this critical issue. Given the Kuala Lumpur Heads of States Summit

Declaration,152 it can be expected that the NAM state parties will insist*/as they did prior

to the 2000 RevCon*/on the allocation of a specific time for considering NSAs through

the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee I. Since such a body would

create an environment in which to consider concrete proposals, including those on a

legally binding protocol to the treaty, it has already been strongly opposed by the United

States and at least three other NWS. This disagreement could have an impact on the

RevCon’s program of work, and potentially could lead to a deadlock, even before the start

of the conference.

It is against this backdrop that the NPT state parties need to consider how to address

the legitimate security requirement of NNWS that have forgone the nuclear weapons


option in good faith and that have remained in full compliance with their treaty

obligations. To this end, the pursuit of legally binding NSAs could take one of five forms:

1. A draft protocol to the NPT could be proposed, as was done by the NAC. It is,

however, highly doubtful that such a protocol, at least in the near future, would be

enacted.

2. Another resolution, similar to Resolution 984 (1995) could be a way for the NWS to

address the concerns of the NNWS. It is doubtful, however, that the UNSC could agree

on any NSA that went beyond the Resolution 984. It is furthermore likely that the

NAM and other NNWS will reject another UNSC resolution as yet another ploy by the

NWS to preempt any progress on NSAs within the NPT context.

3. A treaty emanating from the CD could be an option. Several proponents of NSAs have

already opposed this idea given the implications of India’s, Pakistan’s, and Israel’s

involvement*/both in receiving and potentially offering NSAs.

4. NSAs could be considered in the context of NWFZs. The United States, in particular,

has stressed that NSAs issued in accordance with NWFZs would be the only

acceptable approach. However, in addition to their nonuniversal essence, NWFZs are

a poor instrument for insuring NSAs for a least two reasons. Assurances not to use

nuclear weapons against ‘‘zonal powers, as given by the nuclear powers are not

unconditional.’’ It is also important to note that only the NWFZ Treaty of Bangkok

‘‘calls for action in the event of violation of the obligations assumed by the nuclear

powers.’’153

5. Unilateral security assurances are the most likely way states will give and receive

assurances in the near future but also represent the worst possible manner in which

to handle the issue of security assurances. Ironically, the North Korean crisis has

provided new fodder for the debate over negative security assurances. All signs

indicate that the Bush administration, as it seeks a solution of the Korean crisis, has

offered the North Korea NSAs in exchange for that state’s de-nuclearization.154

Offering a nuclear nonaggression pact as a reward to a state that has been in

noncompliance all along could cause serious political problems and further

jeopardize the long-aspired goal of non-nuclear weapon states that are in good

standing. Many NNWS will almost certainly object that security assurances rightfully

belong to those who have given up the nuclear weapon option*/as opposed to

those who are still keeping their options open. Many states have already pointed out

that by giving NSAs to a state that currently possesses nuclear weapons, the United

States would signal to would-be proliferators that the way to extract assurances

against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is to threaten to use or develop nuclear

weapons of their own.

Regardless of how legally NSAs are to be formulated, it would therefore be important

to recognize that such assurances offered within the context of the NPT, as opposed to

another forum, would provide a significant benefit to NPT parties and would serve as an

incentive to those who remained outside the treaty, or those who may consider leaving the

regime. As such, security assurances should be granted only to states that have forgone the

nuclear weapons option and not to those who are still keeping their options open. They


should therefore not be applicable to non-NPT parties who are aspiring to acquire or

develop nuclear weapons in contravention of the treaty. Security assurances granted to

NNWS inside the treaty will emphasize the basic principle that security is guaranteed by the

nuclear nonproliferation regime and not by nuclear weapons. This would strengthen the

regime and confirm the validity of the NPT and its indefinite extension. Legally binding

security assurances linked to the NPT would build confidence among NPT state parties,

addressing concerns over possible scenarios in which some NWS may consider using

nuclear weapons. It would also provide incentives to states outside the NPT.

The types and application of such assurances will also need to be taken into account.

While all NNWS to the NPT should be potential beneficiaries of negative security

assurances, such assurances would only be applied to NPT states that are in full compliance

with their treaty obligations and could in certain circumstances be qualified. Moreover,

consideration could be given to extending negative security assurances only to those states

that are in good standing with all their nonproliferation and disarmament obligations*/

that is, with no intentions to pursue any type of WMD or related delivery system.

NOTES

1. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 587.

2. See Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point:

Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institute Press,

2004), and Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New

York: Times Books, 2004).

3. In the early 1980s, however, the United States did target some ‘‘third-world’’ countries as

insurance against such states taking advantage of the United States after a general

nuclear war with the Soviet Union. Nuclear Futures: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass

Destruction and U.S. Nuclear Strategy, The British American Security Information Council

(BASIC) Research Report 98.2, March 18, 1998, p. 9.

4. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London: Oxford

University Press, 2004), p. 378.

5. For a review of the role of nuclear weapons during the Cold War see, for example, The

Harvard Study Group [Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffman, Samuel P.

Huntington, Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Scott D. Sagan], Living with Nuclear Weapons

(Toronto: Bantam Books, 1983), pp. 133�/60.

6. BASIC, Nuclear Futures, p. 8.

7. Hans Kristensen, ‘‘Targets of Opportunity: How Nuclear Planners Found New Targets for

Old Weapons,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist 53 (Sept./Oct. 1997), pp. 22�/8.

8. Although all nuclear states have, at one time or another, played a role in the

development of NSAs, this study focuses largely on NSAs vis-a-vis the United States.

9. A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy (Acheson-Lilienthal Report),

Department of State Publication #2498, March 16, 1946, p. 53.

10. Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic

Books, 1989), p. 34.


11. Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, The Nuclear Barons (New York: Holt Reinhart and

Winston, 1981), p. 300.

12. Developments Regarding Positive and Negative Assurances Since the 1995 Review and

Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Background Paper Prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations, 2000 NPT RevCon

Document NPT/Conf.2000/6, March 21, 2000, p. 8.

13. George Bunn, ‘‘The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear

Weapon States,’’ Nonproliferation Review 4 (Spring�/Summer 1997), p. 2.

14. George Bunn and Roland M. Timerbaev, ‘‘Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear-Weapon

States,’’ Nonproliferation Review 1 (Fall 1993), p. 11.

15. George Bunn, ‘‘Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances for Non-

Nuclear-Weapons States,’’ Lawyers Alliance for World Security (LAWS) (1993), p. 4. At the

time of the Kosygin proposal the United States, beginning in March 1955, had deployed

thousands of nuclear warheads*/17 different types*/in West Germany. see Robert

Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, ‘‘Where They Were,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists 55 (Nov./Dec. 1999), pp. 29 and 66.

16. Bunn, ‘‘Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation Security Assurances,’’ p. 4.

17. Ibid.

18. The Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom took this position. France

and China were the other two nuclear powers at that time. The former abstained from

the Security Council Resolution. China’s seat at the UN was held by Taiwan at the time of

the NPT’s formulation negotiations. Both joined the NPT in 1992. 2000 NPT RevCon

document NPT/Conf.2000/6, p. 3.

19. UN Security Council Resolution 255, June 19, 1968. Specifically, the NWS pledged that ‘‘to

ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, they will

provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-

nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a

threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.’’ Only three NWSs were a part of

the resolution: The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. France was

not yet a party to the NPT, while Taiwan held the Chinese seat.

20. Jozef Goldblat, ‘‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,’’ Nonprolifera-

tion Review 4 (Spring/Summer 1997), pp. 18�/32.

21. These assurances, eventually ratified by all five NWS, are contained in Additional Protocol

II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The United States signed Protocol II on April 1, 1968 and

ratified it on May 8, 1971. Treaty for the Prohibition of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty

of Tlatelolco. The United States signed Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the

Caribbean, B/http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf�/.

22. Bunn, ‘‘The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances,’’ p. 5, and Protocol II of the

Treaty of Tlatelolco, B/http://disarmament2.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf�/.

23. The 1975 NPT Review Conference Final Declaration: Review of Article VII and the Security

of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, B/http://cnsdl.miis.edu/npt/dec1/dec1.htm#VII�/.

24. These declarations came at The Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the

UN’s 27th plenary meeting on June 30, 1978, B/http://disarmament.un.org:8080/

gaspecialsession/10thsesprog.htm�/.


25. Statement of United States Secretary of State Vance: U.S. Assurance on Non-Use of

Nuclear Weapons, June 12, 1978, B/http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/vance78.

htm�/.

26. Bunn, ‘‘The Legal Status of U.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon

States,’’ p. 6.

27. Belarus joined the NPT in 1993 with Ukraine and Kazakhstan following in 1994.

28. Issued jointly by the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States,

these were ‘‘Memorandums on Security Assurances in connection with the Republic of

Kazakhstan’s/Ukraine’s/Belarus’ accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons,’’ Dec. 5, 1994. For the complete texts of these memos see Emily

Bailey, Richard Guthrie, Darryl Howlett and John Simpson, eds., Programme for

Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), Briefing Book Volume II: Security Assurances ,

No. 8 (2000), pp. 5�/7, B/www.ppnn.soton.ac.uk/bb2/Bb2secK.pdf�/.


States,’’ p. 7.

30. For the full texts of all the NWS unilateral security assurances see Bailey et al., PPNN

Briefing Book Volume II: Security Assurances .

31. United Nations Security Council Resolution 984, April 11, 1995. For the full text see

B/http://cnsdl.miis.edu/npt/npt_4/unsc984.htm�/.


States,’’ p. 8. Emphasis added.

33. Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, 1005 NPT

RevCon document, NPT/CONF.1995/32(Part1), Annex, Decision 2, Para. 8, B/http://

disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec2.htm�/.

¯34. Jean du Preez, ‘‘Security Assurances Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear

Weapons: Is Progress Possible at the NPT Prepcom?’’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies

(CNS) Story of the Week, March 2003, p. 5, B/www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/index.htm�/.

35. It also bears remembering that France and China were not party to UNSCR 255 (1968), so

UNSCR 984 represents the first time security assurance declarations made by all the NWS

have been jointly acknowledged.

36. Interview with the Hon. Lawrence Scheinman, Assistant Director, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, May 1995. Susan B. Welsh, ‘‘Delegate Perspectives on the 1995

Review and Extension Conference,’’ Nonproliferation Review 2 (Spring/Summer 1995),

p. 15. Emphasis added.

37. Draft protocol on the prohibition of the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons against

non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear

weapons, Working paper submitted by South Africa, 1999 NPT PrepCom document, NPT/

CONF.2000/PC.III/9, May 11, 1999.

38. NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9. Article II of the NPT states: ‘‘Each non-nuclear-weapon State

Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever

of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons

or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire

nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any

assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,’’


Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nulcear Weapons (NPT), Article II, B/http://disarma

ment2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html�/.

39. Para. 2 under ‘‘Article VII and security of non-nuclear weapons States,’’ Final Document of

the 2000 NPT Review Conference, B/http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/finaldoc.

html�/.

40. Chairman’s factual summary , 2004 NPT PrepCom document, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/

WP.27, Para. 27, May 10, 2004, B/http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/344/

47/PDF/N0434447.pdf?OpenElement�/.

41. Security Assurances: Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of Brazil, Egypt,

Ireland, Mexico, Sweden, and South Africa, as members of the New Agenda Coalition

(NAC), 2004 PrepCom document NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.11, May 1, 2003, http://

disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/2005/PC2-listofdocs.html.

42. Jean du Preez and Emily Schroeder, ‘‘2003 NPT Preparatory Committee: ‘Business as

Usual?’’’ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) Research Story of the Week, May 7,

2003, B/www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/030507.htm�/.

43. Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Negative Security Assurances, Working Paper

submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran. May 5, 2003, B/http://disarmament2. un.org/

wmd/npt/2005/PC2-listofdocs.html�/.

44. Working paper by the New Agenda Coalition, New Agenda Coalition substantive

recommendations to the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT

Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/11.

45. Statement by the Republic of South Africa, In the General Debate (Item 4) of the Third

Session of the Preparatory Committee For the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to

the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, April 26, 2004,

B/www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/safrica26.pdf�/.

46. Working paper by the Non-aligned Movement Position paper on the final outcome of the

third session of the Preparatory Commission Submitted by the Non-Aligned States and

other States parties to the Treaty, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/43.

47. John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, ‘‘Fiddling While Rome Burns? The 2004 NPT PrepCom,’’

Nonproliferation Review 11 (Summer 2004), p. 127.

48. Statement by United States Delegation , 2004 NPT PrepCom document NPT/CONF.2005/

PC.III/WP.28, p. 3, May 10, 2004, B/http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/344/

35/PDF/N0434435. pdf?OpenElement�/.

49. Rebecca Johnson, ‘‘Report on the 2004 NPT PrepCom,’’ Disarmament Diplomacy No. 77

(May/June 2004), B/http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77npt.htm�/.

50. Statement by the United States at the 2004 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for

the 2005 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28.

51. Similar qualified assurances would be elements of subsequent NWFZs. See Center for

Nonproliferation Studies: Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations &

Regimes , B/www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm�/.

52. NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28, p. 3.

53. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal , p. 6.

54. Ibid. p. 5.


55. U.S. Strategic Command, ‘‘History of the United States Strategic Command, 1 June 1992�/

31 Dec. 1992,’’ Top Secret, [n.d.] 1993, p. 13. Partially declassified and released under the

Freedom of Information Act. Quoted in Hans M. Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform

in the 1990s,’’ Working Paper, The Nautilus Institute, March 2000, p. 11.

56. ‘‘The Future of Nuclear Weapons,’’ Los Alamos Science , No. 17 (Summer 1989), p. 12.

57. Ibid. p. 16. Emphasis added.

58. Ibid.

59. T. W. Dowler and J. S. Howard III, ‘‘Countering The Threat of The Well-armed Tyrant: A

Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons,’’ Strategic Review (Fall 1991).

60. Bromley, Grahame, Kucia, ‘‘Bunker Busters,’’ p. 33.

61. The U.S. Army’s ‘‘Davy Crockett’’ was an ‘‘atomic-bazooka’’ with a yield of .01�/.02 kts,

whose targets included fortified positions and command posts. Moreover, it was seen as

a projectile that would ‘‘force an enemy to disperse its forces.’’ Retired between July 1967

and early 1971, the Davy Crocket used W54 warheads. Weighing just 51 pounds and fired

from recoiless rifles, this was the lightest nuclear weapon ever deployed by the United

States. Ironically the final atmospheric test at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) was a W54.

Detonated on July 17, 1962 it was observed by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and

presidential adviser General Maxwell D. Taylor. See Chuck Hansen, The Swords of

Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945 , Vol. II (Sunnyvale, CA:

Chukelea Publications,1996), pp. 40�/3; Stephen Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit (Washington,

D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 1998), pp. 156�/7. See also, U.S. Department of Energy,

Nevada Operations Office, United States Nuclear Test: July 1945 through September 1992

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 2000), p. 24.

62. Ibid. The ‘‘nine-megaton weapon’’ alternative referenced is the B53. The oldest and

highest yield nuclear weapon in the U.S.’s arsenal. Designed and developed by Los

Alamos and Sandia between the late 1950s and early 1960s, its massive blasting power,

coupled with ‘‘unique fuzing and parachute options,’’ made the B53 the U.S.’s initial

choice for destroying deeply buried targets. Accordingly, its original mission was against

Soviet command bunkers but its inability to ‘‘dig’’ deep (other than producing a

massively wide crater) made it impractical against today’s deep bunkers. Robert Norris,

‘‘The B61 Family of Bombs,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 59 (Jan./Feb. 2003) pp. 74�/6.

See also, Bromley, Grahame and Kucia,‘‘Bunker Busters,’’ p. 43.

63. William M. Arkin, ‘‘Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed: Nuclear Policy in the

Clinton Administration,’’ Federation of American Scientists Public Interest Report, (Sept./

Oct. 1994), p. 7, B/www.fas.org/faspir/pir1094.html�/.

64. Kristensen, ‘‘Targets of Opportunity,’’ and Bromley, Grahame, Kucia, ‘‘Bunker Busters,’’

p. 33.

65. Hans M. Kristensen, ‘‘Nuclear Futures,’’ p. 10.

66. Strategic Air Command (SAC) was renamed STRATCOM in June 1992. In 1960 the Joint

Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) at SAC developed the first Single Integrated

Operation Plan (SIOP)*/the blueprint for U.S. targeting in the event of a nuclear conflict

with the Soviets and/or China. But even earlier*/throughout the 1950s*/SAC had

considerable power over pre-SIOP nuclear targeting choices under the leadership of the

zealous and highly disciplined General Curtis Lemay. see David Alan Rosenberg, ‘‘U.S.


Nuclear War Planning, 1945�/1960,’’ in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic

Nuclear Planning (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 35�/56.

67. Bromley, Grahame, Kucia, ‘‘Bunker Busters,’’ p. 33. See also, William M. Arkin and Robert S.

Norris, ‘‘Tinynukes for Mini-Minds,’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48 (April 1992),

p. 24�/5.

68. Arkin and Norris, ‘‘Tinynukes for Mini-Minds.’’ Emphasis added.

69. As quoted in Arkin, ‘‘Agnosticism When Real Values Are Needed.’’

70. Ibid.

71. Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Authorization Act Prohibition on Research and Development of

Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session Section 3136.

72. For an excellent overview of the 1994 NPR see Janne Nolan, ‘‘The Next Posture Review?’’

in Harold A. Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and

De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 1999),

pp. 243�/83.

73. Janne Nolan, ‘‘Preparing for the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review,’’ Arms Control Today 32

(Nov. 2000).

74. STRATCOM was alarmed when its background check on Carter revealed ‘‘a less than

favorable long-term outlook for nuclear weapons’’ and long-term visions of ‘‘complete

denuclearization.’’ Hans M. Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s’’

Working Paper, Nautilus Institute, March 2000, p. 7.

75. ‘‘Unlike the military officials [STRATCOM], Carter correctly suspected that a stated nuclear

deterrence role in WMD scenarios could have [a] negative impact on the NPT regime,

regardless of whether the U.S. was legally bound by its Negative Security Assurances.’’

Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reforms in the 1990s,’’ p. 15.

76. Ibid. pp. 13�/14.

77. USSTRATCOM Memo, NPR Report #8, Working Group #5, Nov. 4, 1993, p. 2. Both

documents partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. As

quoted in Ibid, p. 14. Declassified documents from the NPR’s Working Group #5, ‘‘The

Relationship Between Alternative Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy,’’ can

be found at the Nautilus Institute’s FOIA Documents, B/www.nautilus.org/archives/

nukestrat/USA/Npr/WG5.html�/.

78. Ibid.

79. Department of Defense, ‘‘Listing, Group 5*/Relationships Between US Nuclear Postures

and Counterproliferation Policy, Formal STRATCOM Answers as of Nov. 22, 1993,’’

pp. 12�/13. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information

Act. As quoted in Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reforms in the 1990s, p. 14. Emphasis

added.

80. U.S. Strategic Command, ‘‘Nuclear Forces; Post 1994,’’ July 12, 1994, p. 2. Released under

the Freedom of Information Act. As quoted in Ibid. pp. 15�/16.

81. ‘‘By delegating authority for a sensitive and complex undertaking to working groups

largely made up of mid-level officials in the Pentagon, the outcome was practically a

foregone conclusion.’’ Nolan, ‘‘Preparing for the 2001 NPR.’’

82. ‘‘U.S. policy regarding the future use of nuclear weapons against Third World states was

left in the hands of a small nuclear cabal that [had] been agitating since the Gulf War to


revive war-fighting strategy to counter weapons of mass destruction.’’ Arkin, ‘‘Agnosti-

cism When Real Values Are Needed.’’

83. These new ‘‘targeting requirements’’ were not reflected in the SIOP. Rather they came

under the rubric of the ‘‘Strategic Reserve Force’’*/a force of over 1,000 warheads held in

‘‘reserve’’ to ensure that no country could take advantage of a depleted U.S. nuclear

arsenal following a massive exchange with Russia. Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy

Reforms in the 1990s, p. 11.

84. Presidential Directive (PD) 59*/Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP)*/was

signed on July 25, 1980. Among other things it emphasized the capability to fight and

‘‘prevail’’ in a prolonged nuclear war with the Soviet Union. President Reagan reaffirmed

this policy in Oct. 1981 with National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 13. Ball, ‘‘Toward

a Critique of Strategic Nuclear Targeting,’’ p. 17.

85. For a description of SAG, see the Nautilus Institute, Nuclear Strategy Project, ‘‘U.S Nuclear

Strategy and War Planning: Advisory Groups, the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG),’’

B/www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/advisory/sag.html�/.

86. U.S. Strategic Command, ‘‘Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,’’ [no date, probably

late 1995]. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act. The

Nautilus Institute, Nuclear Strategy Project, B/www.nautilus.org/nukestrat/USA/Advisory/

Essentials95.txt�/.

87. Ibid. Emphasis added.

88. Ibid.

89. Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,’’ p. 15.

90. U.S. Strategic Command, Nuclear Posture Review slides, Update Briefing, 3 Dec. 1993,

slide 7. Secret. Partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Quoted in, Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,’’ p. 15.

91. ‘‘PDD/NSC-30: Nuclear Posture Review Implementation [Sept. 1994],’’ Presidential

Decision Directives �/ PDD Federation of American Scientists, B/www.fas.org/irp/

offdocs/pdd30.htm�/.

92. Greg Mello, ‘‘The Birth of a New Bomb, Shades of Dr. Strangelove: Will We Learn to Love

the B-61-11?’’ Washington Post , June 1, 1997. Some contend that the B61-11 is a new , not

a ‘‘modified,’’ nuclear weapon. ‘‘While producing the B61-11 apparently did not involve

modifications to the ‘physics package’*/the nuclear explosive itself*/there is no

question that the bomb provides a new nuclear capability.’’ Ibid.

93. In the 1950s there were two earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) in the U.S. arsenal: the

Mark 8 and the Mark 11. Both had a yield of about 25 kt and were, ‘‘able to penetrate up

to 22 feet of reinforced concrete, 90 feet of hard sand, 120 feet of clay, or five inches of

armor plating.’’ The only other warhead given an ‘‘earth penetrating’’ moniker was the

W86 which was developed in the 1970s but cancelled in Sept. 1980. Up until the

introduction of the B61-11, the de facto nuclear ‘‘bunker buster’’ was the B53. However,

even after the B61-11 replaced the B53 in active service in Jan. 1997, the B53 stayed on in

the U.S. arsenal as a component in the ‘‘hedge’’ stockpile. Norris, ‘‘The B61 Family of

Bombs.’’

94. As quoted in, ‘‘Bunker-Busting Bomb Prompts U.S. Discord,’’ Defense News , Feb. 24�/

March 2, 1997, B/www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/bunker.htm�/.


95. Robert Nelson, ‘‘Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons,’’ Federation of American

Scientists, Public Interest Report 54 (Jan./Feb. 2002), B/www.fas.org/faspir/2001/v54n1/

weapons.htm�/.

96. Mello, ‘‘The Birth of a New Bomb, Shades of Dr. Strangelove.’’ Technically therefore, in

1996 the B61-11 reached ‘‘Phase 5: First Production,’’ and by 1999 was at ‘‘Phase 6:

Quality Production and Stockpile.’’ For an explanation of the warhead life-cycle phases

see, Department of Energy, Department of Energy’s 2002 Budget Request to Congress,

National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 2, B/www.mbe.doe.gov/

budget/02budget/weapons/dsw.pdf�/.

97. Tim Weiner, ‘‘Huge Chemical Arms Plant Near Completion in Libya, U.S. Says,’’ New York

Times , Feb. 25, 1996, p. 8; Bromley, Grahame, and Kucia, ‘‘Bunker Busters,’’ pp. 39-40;.

Arkin, ‘‘Nuking Libya.’’

98. Goldblat, ‘‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment,’’ p. 25; Arkin, ‘‘Nuking

Libya.’’

99. Protocol I of the Treaty states: ‘‘Each Protocol Member [which includes the U.S.]

undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive devise against: (a) Any Party

to the Treaty,’’ B/www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/pelindab.htm�/.

100. Remarks by Robert Bell at White House press briefing, April 11, 1996. As quoted in

George Bunn, ‘‘Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?’’

Arms Control Today 26 (May/June 1996), p. 7.

101. It had been Smith, acting in conjunction with STRATCOM’s 1994 NPR preparations, who

had first revived alternatives to the B53 in Oct. 1993. Mello, ‘‘The Birth of a New Bomb,

Shades of Dr. Strangelove.’’

102. Quoted in Ibid. Emphasis added.

103. George Bunn, ‘‘Expanding Nuclear Options: Is the U.S. Negating Its Non-Use Pledges?’’

104. ‘‘PDD/NSC 60: Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy Guidance Nov. 1997,’’ Presidential

Decision Directives �/ PDD Federation of American Scientists, B/www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/

pdd60.htm�/.

105. ‘‘Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear War’’ Washington Post , Dec. 7, 1997,

p. A1, B/http://abomb.physics.lsa.umich.edu/214/other/news/nuclearwarpolicy.html�/.

106. Kristensen, ‘‘U.S. Nuclear Strategy Reform in the 1990s,’’ p. 10. China had been removed

from the SIOP in 1982.

107. ‘‘Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine’’ Arms Control Today

27 (Nov./Dec. 1997).

108. In constant 1998 dollars, between 1948 and 1991 the U.S. annually spent an average of

$3.6 billion to produce and service its nuclear weapons stockpile. In 2000, almost ten

years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the NNSA had an annual Weapons

Activities budget over $4.5 billion. For Cold War averages see Schwartz, Atomic Audit . For

the FY 2000 DOE Weapons Activities budget see Department of Energy, Department

of Energy’s 2000 Budget Request to Congress, Weapons Activities , (Washington, D.C:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), p. 8, B/www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/00budget/

weapons/weapact.pdf�/.

109. This policy of ‘‘preemption’’ is best documented in:


1. The White House, ‘‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America,’’ Sept.

2002, B/www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf�/.

2. The classified NSPD 17 (issued on Sept. 17, 2002). For leaked excerpts see Nicholas

Kravel, ‘‘Bush Approves Nuclear Response,’’ Washington Post , Jan. 31, 2003.

3. The White House ‘‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,’’ Dec.

2002,B/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf�/. This docu-

ment contains portions of NSPD 17 and codifies the NPR’s recommendation to remove

Clinton-era ambiguities over how the U.S. might preempt or respond to the use of

CBRN. It states that, ‘‘The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the

right to respond with overwhelming force*/including through resort to all of our

options */to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends

and allies.’’ Ibid. p. 3. Emphasis added. In NSPD 17 the phrase ‘‘including through resort

to all of our options’’ read ‘‘including potential nuclear weapons.’’ Kravel, ‘‘Bush

Approves Nuclear Response.’’ Emphasis added.

4. U.S. House Policy Committee U.S. Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign

Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, ‘‘Differentiation and Defense: An Agenda for the

Nuclear Weapons Program,’’ Feb. 2003.

110. The creation of the report was congressionally mandated in 2000: ‘‘Requirements of the

Floyd D. Spense National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-

398, Title X, Subtitle E, Section 1044).’’

111. Department of Defense / Department of Energy, Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard

and Deeply Buried Targets (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001),

p. 18.

112. The report emphasized the destruction of HDBT (as opposed to neutralization, through

destruction of entrances and exits for example) far more than the 1994 NPR. This was due

to a greater emphasis on the annihilation of supposed CBW agents within the bunker (in

situ )*/so-called ‘‘Agent Defeat.’’

113. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets , p. 18.

114. ‘‘Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],’’ Global Security Organization Website, Jan. 8, 2002

B/www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/DOD/npr.htm�/. It should be noted that

China, North Korea and the former Yugoslavia developed HDBTs during the Cold War as

well.

115. With current technologies, for ‘‘the shock to reach down to 1,000 feet with enough

strength to destroy a hard target in dry rock, the warhead would require a yield

significantly larger than 100 kilotons.’’ Sidney Drell, James Goodby, Raymond Jeanloz, and

Robert Peurifoy, ‘‘A Strategic Choice: New Bunker Busters Versus Nonproliferation,’’ Arms

Control Today 33 (March 2003), online. Emphasis added.

116. The boring machines used to dig the ‘‘Chunnel’’ (the tunnel beneath the English Channel

linking France and Great Britain) were able to go 50 meters per day into solid rock.

Boston’s ‘‘Big Dig’’ included boring a 16-foot diameter tunnel (at a depth of 200�/400 ft)

for 17 miles. While it is debatable that these exact technologies are available or

affordable to ‘‘rogue’’ states, their existence does demonstrate one extreme of what is

possible. See Lt. Col. Eric M. Stepp, USAF, Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military


Operations , Occasional Paper No. 14, Air War College Center for Strategy and Technology

(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, May 2000), p. 6, 9, B/https://research.

maxwell.af.mil�/.

117. See Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets ; Michael A. Levi,

‘‘Fire in the Hole: Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Options of Counterproliferation,’’ Carnegie

Endowment of International Peace, Non-Proliferation Project, Global Policy Program, No.

31 (Nov. 2002), pp. 22�/5.

118. Report to Congress on the Defeat of Hard and Deeply Buried Targets , p. 14.

119. Ibid. See also, ‘‘Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],’’ Global Security.org, Jan. 8, 2002.

120. William Arkin, ‘‘Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,’’ Los Angeles Times , March 10, 2002.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. ‘‘Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],’’ Global Security.org, Jan. 8, 2002.

124. In addition to the RNEP and low-yield weapons the NPR added a third category of new

weapons. Hoping to destroy or neutralize CBW agents housed in HDBT, the NPR called

for an ‘‘agent defeat’’ program*/‘‘thermal, chemical, or radiological neutralization of

chemical/biological materials or storage facilities.’’ As quoted in, Arkin, ‘‘Secret Plan

Outlines the Unthinkable.’’ For scientific arguments that challenge the efficacy of agent

defeat nuclear weapons, and indeed demonstrate that they compound the problem of

agent dissemination, see Michael May and Zachary Haldeman, Effectiveness of Nuclear

Weapons against Buried Biological Agents (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2003).

125. ‘‘Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],’’ Global Security.org, Jan. 8, 2002.

126. At the time North Korea was still a member of the NPT.

127. Arkin, ‘‘Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable.’’

128. Ibid.

129. ‘‘‘Negative’’ Security Assurances’ No Longer Supported, Bolton Says.’’ Global Security

Newswire, Feb. 22, 2002, B/www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2002/2/22/4p.html�/. See

also, Arms Control Today Interview with Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and

International Security John R. Bolton. ‘‘A New Strategic Framework: Detailing the Bush

Approach to Nuclear Security,’’ Arms Control Today 32 (Jan./Feb. 2002), B/www.

armscontrol.org/aca/bolton.asp�/.

130. The RNEP study calls for the involvement of three weapons laboratories. LANL and LLNL

currently have ‘‘red teams’’ ‘‘competing’’ in RNEP modifications. SNL, which is responsible

for the non-nuclear components of U.S. nuclear weapons, is involved in the design of a

new ‘‘bomb case involving high-strength casting of the bomb around a very heavy

ballast.’’ ‘‘The Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator: A More Usable Nuclear Weapon?’’ Nuclear

Watch New Mexico, July 2003, B/www.nukewatch.org/facts/nwd/RNEPFactSheetLow-

Res.pdf�/; Department of Energy, Department of Energy’s 2003 Budget Request to

Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile

Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2002), B/www.mbe.doe.gov/

budget/03budget/content/weapons/dsw.pdf�/. Of the three main budget categories

under the NNSA’s Total Weapons Activities*/Directed Stockpile Work (DSW); Campaigns;

and ‘‘Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF)’’*/RNEP funding is under the

rubric of DSW. For the FY04 budget request for DSW see Department of Energy’s 2004


Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program,

Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

2003), B/www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/04budget/content/weapons/dsw.pdf�/; for FY05

see Department of Energy’s 2005 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security

Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2004), B/www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/05budget/content/

weapons/dsw.pdf�/.

131. Department of Energy, Department of Energy’s 2003 Budget Request to Congress, National

Nuclear Security Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work. For an

explanation of the warhead life-cycle phases see Department of Energy, Department of

Energy’s 2002 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security Administration,

Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2001), p. 2, B/www.mbe.doe.gov/budget/02budget/weapons/dsw.pdf�/.

132. Christopher E. Paine, ‘‘Countering Proliferation or Compounding It? The Bush adminis-

tration’s Quest for Earth-Penetrating and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons.’’ The Natural

Resources Defense Council, May 2003, p. 21, B/www.nrdc.org/nuclear/bush/abb.pdf�/.

133. ‘‘Congress Cuts Funding and Limits Research on New Nuclear Weapons,’’

Friends Committee National Legislation, Nov. 6, 2003, B/www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?

item_id�/588&issue_id�/48�/.

134. Matthew L. Wald, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Money Is Cut From Spending Bill,’’ New York Times ,

Nov. 23, 2004, p. 22; Department of Energy’s 2005 Budget Request to Congress .

135. James C. Dao, ‘‘Senate Panel Votes to Lift Ban on Small Nuclear Arms,’’ New York Times ,

May 10, 2003, p. 2.

136. Letter dated Dec. 5, 2003, from Linton F. Brooks, Administrator National Nuclear Security

Administration, to Los Alamos National Laboratory Director Pete Nanos; Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory Director, Michael Anastasio; and Sandia National

Laboratory President C. Paul Robinson, B/www.fcnl.org/pdfs/nuc_memo.pdf�/.

137. Ibid.

138. Letter dated Jan. 22, 2004 from Ranking Minority Member Peter J. Vislosky and David L

Hobson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, to the

Honorable Linton F. Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration,

B/www.fcnl.org/pdfs/lettertobrooks.pdf�/.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Wald, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Money Is Cut From Spending Bill.’’ Cancelled as well was the

entire $30 million request to aid in shortening the preparation time required to carry out

a nuclear test, and all but $7 million of the $29.8 million asked for in erecting a new

facility to fabricate plutonium pits. David Ruppe, ‘‘Congress Cancels Funding for New

Weapons Research,’’ Global Security Newswire, Nov. 22, 2004, B/www.nti.org/d_news-

wire/issues/2004/11/22/80551298-a9a6-4233-98fc-8e7bf0aab2b4.html�/.

142. David Ruppe, ‘‘Bush Administration Could Seek to Bypass House Committee Chairman on

Nuke Research Funding,’’ Global Security Newswire, Dec. 17, 2004, B/www.nti.org/

d_newswire/issues/2004/12/16/53147ff9-f353-4276-8c02-e1a65c4b0236.html�/.


143. Department of Energy’s 2005 Budget Request to Congress, National Nuclear Security

Administration, Weapons Program, Directed Stockpile Work , pp. 63�/9. B/www.mbe.doe.

gov/budget/05budget/content/volumes/Volume_1.pdf�/.

144. Ibid. p. 63.

145. Ibid.

146. Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership (New York: Basic

Books, 2004), p. 18.

147. Ibid. p. 24

148. Ibid. p. 25.

149. Statement by U.S. Delegation, NPT/CONF.2005/PC.III/WP.28, United States Statement,

May, 2004, p. 3.

150. Brzeniski, The Choice , p. 25.

151. Ibid.

152. The Final Document of the XIII Conference of Heads of State and Government of the

Non-Aligned Movement NAM, Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 2003 stated ‘‘that pending the total

elimination of nuclear weapons, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional, and

legally binding instrument on security assurances should be pursued as a matter of

urgency, and that legally binding security assurances to NNWS parties to the NPT would

strengthen the regime.’’ It also emphasized that specific time for deliberations on security

assurances should be allocated in addition to time for nuclear disarmament and the 1995

resolution.

153. Goldblat, ‘‘Nuclear Weapons Free Zones,’’ p. 31.

154. See, for example, ‘‘Washington Consults With Allies on Security Assurance for North

Korea,’’ Global Security Newswire, Sept. 8, 2003, B/www.nti.org�/.
