vivarium - vol. 21, nos. 1-2, 1983

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Vivarium

Volume 21

1983

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8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXI

(1983)

С. H.

Kneepkens

The

Quaestiones

rammaticales

of

he

MS

Oxford, orpus

Christi

College

250: AnEdition

f

he

First

Collection 1

LeonardA.

Kennedy

Philosophical

cepticism

n

England

in the

Mid-Fourteenth

entury

35

PeterMack

Valla s

Dialectic n theNorth

Commentaryn Peter f painby

Gerardus

istrius

58

Olga

Weijers

Collège

une

nstitutionvant a

lettre

73

Review

83

KlausJacobi

Statements

boutEventsModal and

Tense

Analysis

n

Medieval

ogic

85

John ewell

Rationalismt the chool

of

Chartres 108

F.

Heinzer

Textkritischesu den

og.

Obligationes

arisienses 127

Joachim

ennebusch

Collatio

hilosophiae

ommendatoria

Aus dem

ntroitusu einer

Physikvorlesung

es 14.

Jahrhunderts136

Books Received 157

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


VivariumX

,

1

1983)

The

Quaestiones

rammaticales

f

the

MS

Oxford

Corpus

Christi

College

250:

An

Edition

of

the

First

Collection

C. H.

KNEEPKENS

Dr

Hunt

has

appended

a

list of

grammatical

quaestiones

preserved

on

ff.

30vb-33vb

of

the

MS

Oxford

Corpus

Christi

ollege

50,

at

the

end

of

the second partofhis studieson thecommentarieson Priscian in the

eleventh

and

twelfth

enturies.1

Apart

from

his

collection,

the

codex

contains

two

further

ets

of

grammatical

quaestiones

nd

notae on

ff.

51vb-53va and

ff.

60va-61vb

respectively.

This

contribution

rovides

a full

edition

of

the

first

et

of

quaestiones.

It

is

my

intention

lso to

edit

the

other

collections n

this

ournal.

A.

The

manuscript

MS: Oxford, orpusChristi ollege, 50' codex membrán.; s. XII/III;

61ff.2

The

mediaeval

whereabouts

of

this

manuscript

re

unknown.

It

is a

convolute

and

contains

several

tractsor

parts

of

tracts:

1.

ff. 1-1 r

an

anonymous

commentary

on

ps.

-Cicero,

Ad

Heren-

nium

inc.

<

V>t

ait

Quintilianus

in

rethoricam

plures

inuehi

soient

et

quid

indignissimum

est in

rethoricam

accusandam

uiribus

utuntur

rethoriceFor

this

commentary,

ee

J.

O.

Ward,

Artificiosa

loquentia

in

the

Middle

Ages,

Diss.

Toronto

1972,

part

II,

p.

310-429

(no.

29).

f. 17v

is

blank

1

R.

W.

Hunt,

tudiesn

riscian

n

he

welfth

entury

I.

The

chool

í

Ralph f

eauuais

in:

Mediaeval

nd

Renaissance

tudies,

I

(1950),

-56,

sp.pp.

55-6

reprinted

n:

R. W.

Hunt,

The

History

f

Grammarn

the

Middle

ges

Collected

apers

Edited ..

by

G.

L.

Bursill-Hall,

msterdam

980).

2

For

description

f

his

MS,

see

also

H.

О.

Coxe,

Catalogus

odicum

anuscriptorum

qui n ollegiisulisquexoniensibusodiesservanturvol.2,Oxford852,Corpushristi,

103-4,

nd for he

grammaticaltems,

.

L.

Bursill-Hall,

Census

f

Medieval

atin

Grammatical

anuscripts.

tuttgart-Bad

annstatt

981,

no.

192.10.

1

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


2.

ff.

18ra-24rb:

an

anonymous

tracton

logic

inc.

<Q>uoniam

nostre

integritas

doctrine

in

duobus con-

sisti in perceptionesignificantiumt in <in>quisitione

significatorum

..

The tract

s

a

compendium

of

a

larger

textbook.

t

is made

up

of

a

series of

theses,

each of

which is

subsequently

discussed

in

detail. There are

four

parts

to

the

tract

Parts

III

and IV are

transposed):3

I

De terminis

18rb-vb)

II

De

propositionibus

18vb-20ra)

III De

significatis

erminorum

20vb-24r)

IV De significatisropositionum20ra-vb)

(edition

in

preparation

by

L.M. de

Rijk)

3.

ff.

24va-28ra:

the

commentary

by

Simon

of

Doornik

on

the

ps.-Athanasian

Creed

inc.

<

A

>

pud

Aristotilem

rgumentum

st

ratio

faciens

fidem,

sed

apud

Christum

argumentum

est

fides

For this

commentary,

ee N.

Häring,

Commentariesn the

seudo-

Athanasian

reed

in:

Mediaeval

Studies,

34

(1972), p.

240.

4. ff.

28vb-30rb:

Beda,

De schematibus

t

tropis

acrae

cripturae

inc. < S > olet aliquotiens in scripturis rdo uerborum causam

decoris aliter

quam uulgaris

uia

discendi

habet

figuratus

inueniri

...

The text

has

been

edited

by

C.

B.

Kendall in:

Corpus

Chris-

tianorum, CXXIIIA,

Turnholti

1975,

142-171

5. f.

30rb:

a

grammatical

note on

the

nomina ividua

inc.

Diuiduum est

quod

a

toto

decendit

(/)

in

partes

For the

text,

see the

Appendix,

pp.

33-4

6.

f.

30va-b: a set of

rules on

accentuation

inc. Ad sciendum ea

que

de accentibus debent dici

quedam

preconsideranda

sunt

.

7. ff.

0vb-33vb:

the

first

ollection

of

quaestiones

rammaticales

dited

below

8. ff. 34ra-51va: the first

part

of

an

anonymous

commentary4

n

Priscian,

Institutiones

rammaticae

covering

the

text

of

I,

1

II,

22

3

I

owethe

nalysis

f

his

art

o Prof.

. M. de

Rijk,

eiden

University.

4

For

comment

n

the ntroduction

f his

ommentary,

ee R.

W.

Hunt,

The n-

troductionso heArtes*nthe welfthenturyin:Studiamediaevalianhonoremdmodum

Reverendi

atris

aymundisephi

artin,

ruges

948, 5-112,

sp.

pp.

101-2

reprinted

in

Hunt

980 cf.

bove,

n.

1).

2

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


inc.

<

О

> mnis traditiodoctrine

elebran

digna

aut

uocibus

fit

aut

scriptis

..

9. ff.51vb-53va: the second collection of quaestionesrammaticales

inc. Dicunt

quidam

quod

uocatiuus

nullus

potest

construi

um

uerbo

exigitiue.

Qui

Prisciano

uidentur contrarii

..

10. ff.

4ra-60va:

a

fragment

f

an

anonymous

commentary

n

Pris-

cian,

Institutiones

rammaticaecovering

the

text

of

XII,

1

XIII,

35,

the

books

on

the

pronoun

inc.

<P>ronomen.

Hie

incipit

duodecimus

liber

in

quo

et in

xiii°habet auctor materiam

pronomen

...

11. ff.60va-61vb:

the third

collection of

quaestiones

rammaticales

inc. Tu esdignus ui regas em ublicamQuinon referturd sup-

positum,

quia semper

trahitur

n

eandem

partem

orationis

cum

suo

antecedenti

В.

The

First

Collection

Although

the

quaestiones

f

the

first

ollection have

come down to us

without

ny

direct

ndication

as

to

authorship,

date

or

place

of com-

position,

some

general

remarks

on the

topics

can

be made.

There

are

good grounds forassigning the collection to the second part of the

twelfth

entury

nd to

the

intellectual nvironment

f

Paris.

In

the article

mentioned

above,

Dr

Hunt

has

pointed

to

the

ap-

pearance

of

the

names

of

William of

Conches,

in

the ninth

quaestio,5

and of

James

of Venice

and

his

commentary

n

the

Sophistici

lenchi n

the tenth

quaestio

6

(p.

27

below)

ес

consideratio

rocedit

ecundum

pinionem

agistři

illelmi

de

Conchis. redebat enim

uod

ius

partis

rationissset

emper

ictioom-

posita,

uius st

implex

ictio,

ui

per

ompositionem

diungitur

repositio.

t

hoc u

debat

ur

habere

Prisciano. nde tiam

cebat

quod

hec

uox

nuicem

oratiost.Sietdictiosset,ecundumum, umuicemitnomen,sset uoque

nomen,

uodcomponitur

x eo

et

prepositione,

cilicet

nuicem.

(p.

31

belowНес

constructiotonante

luiC

st

ncongrua,

tsi

pud

acobum

n

Comento

uper

lenchos

nueniatur

pluente

cciditerram

adidam

ieri

Since

William is referred

o

with

verbs

of the

imperfect

ense,

sc.

credebati

idebatur

nd

dicebat

we

may

assume that

he was

already

dead

by

the

time this

quaestio

as

composed.

Unfortunately,

we

do

not know

the

year

of

William's

death,

but

Jeauneau's suggestion

that

William

5

Op.

cit.n.

1,

p.

42.

6

ibid.,

.

43.

3

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


died

in

about

1 154

seems

veryplausible.7

This

allows

us

to

accept

1154

as the

terminus

ost

quern

or

the

composition

of

Quaestio

Xa.

But there re other,fairly ogent, ndicationswhich also suggest he

third

quarter

of

the

twelfth

entury

and

Paris.

As

I have

argued

elsewhere,8

he

opinion

adhered to

in

the

first

uaestio

s

to the

imper-

sonal

interpretation

f the

infinitive

egere

n

the

proposition

legere

st

agere

,

is

rejected expressis

erbis

y

master Robert

of Paris

in

his

Summa

on

syntax,

a

work

that

is

preserved

in the

manuscript

London,

BL

Harl.

2515,

ff.

l-27va

(inc.:

<B>reue

sit

quodcumque

laboras).9

Robert was active

as

a

teacher

in

Paris

in

the time

that

immediately

followed

the

period

of

Peter

Helias.

A furtherrgument n favourofthisperiodis suppliedbythestrong

doctrinal

conformity

hat can

be observed

between

quaestio

Va

and

the

work of Robert

Blund,

of

Lincoln,

who lived

in

the

second

part

of

the

twelfth

entury.

But

we

do not

know

exactly

where Blund

wrote his

Summa

preserved

in

the MS

London,

BL

Royal

2

D

XXX,

ff.79ra-

94vb

and

103ra-106vb).

He

may

have

done so

during

his

studies

at

Paris,

beforehe went nto the

service of the

Count

of

Flanders

and

got

involved

n the

quarrel

between the

Archbishop

of

Canterbury

nd

the

monks of

St

Augustine's,

or

afterwards,

while

resident

at

Lincoln,

when he taughthis nephew,John Blund.10

The

quaestio

eals

with the

problem

of

the

species

of construction f

the sentence

1

parcitur esperie*

Lucan,

Phars.

I,

734),

sc. whether

he

construction s transitive r

intransitive.

Both

the

Anonymus

of

the

quaestio

nd

Blund11

reject

the

division

of

the

transitive onstruction nto:

-

personarum

tantum:

'filius

ocratis

legit

-

actus tantum

:

llegendumest

irgilium

,

'par

itur

Hesperie'

- actus etpersonarum: 'egovideo ocratem1

7

cf.

Edouard

eauneau,

eux

édactions

es

loses

eGuillaumee

Conchesur

riscieni

n:

Recherchese

Théologie

nciennet

médiévale,

7

1960),

12-47,

sp.p.

212,

n. 2.

8

See

my Legere

si

gere :

he irst

uaestio

f

he irst

uaestiones-

ollection

n

he S

Oxford

CCC

250 in:

Historiographia

inguistica,

II

(1980),

109-30,

sp.

122.

9

An edition f

Robertus'ummas

forthcoming.

10

ee

L.

M. de

Rijk,

ogica

odernorum,

I, 1,

Assen

967,

p.

22-24;

55-7 nd

my

Robert

lund

nd he

Theory

n

Evocation,

n:

Acts

f

the Vth

uropean

ymposium

n

Mediaeval

ogic

nd emanticsLeiden-

ijmegen

979

Nijmegen

981.

11

For

the

Anonymus,

ee

below,

.

18;

Robert lund

rgues

s follows:

Blund,

.

80rb]

In

supradictis

utem

cceptionibus

tendum

st

hac

distinctione

uod

ransitio

dictionisum ictionet ecundumctus t ecundumersonasotestntelligi,rans-

itio ero

ictionum

antum

ecundum

ersonas,

ransitio

rationisonnisi ecundum

actum'.

4

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


This

division,

however,

was maintained

by

Robert of Paris

in

his

Summa

[f.22ra]:Constructioransitiuaiciturnqua actus stenditurransiréb una

persona

n

aliam,

el

n

qua

dictiones

ertinent

d diuersas

ersonas,

t

1

Socrates

uidet

latonem',

filius

ocratis

urriťНес constructio

filiiis

ocratis

urriťicitur

transitiua.

t bi st ransitio

ersonarum

t

non ctus Et licubi st ransitio

personarum,

bi

non

st

ransitio

ctus,

t

filius

ocratis'alicubi ctus st rans-

itio,

bi non st

personarum,

t

legereirgilium

,

'

est

egendum

usas',

parcitur

H

esperie'

The

Anonymus

and

Blund

propose

to

first ubdivide the constructio

into:

- dictioniscum dictione

-

dictionum

-

orationis.

As

far

as

the

constructioictionis

um

dictione

s

concerned,

the construc-

tion s

udged

to be

transitive,

c. ex vi

transitions,

ut

in

the case

of

con-

structiorationis

Blund and the

Anonymus

both

assigned

it to the con-

finium

between

transitive and

intransitive or

reciprocal

constructions.12

Textual and doctrinalconformity ith Blund also occurs in quaestio

Vila on the nominadividua

especially

in

the

case

of

the numeralia

distributiva.

he

author of

the

quaestio

raws a

parallel

with Silenus

in

order to account for he occurrence

of the nominative: the

distributiva

are

not

summoned,

though

ike

Silenus,

they

re are nevertheless

res-

ent and

obtrude

themselves nto the construction.Blund

employs

this

simile to

explain

the use

of

the relative noun

qui

in his

chapter

on

evocatio

13

[Blund,

.

94ra]

um

dicitur

ego

um

omo

qui

oquor'

ocnomen

ui

bi

st ercie

personeantum. on euocaturb aliquadictione. uodexdescriptioneius

quod

st uocari

perpendi

otest.

st

nim uocari

rahi d constructionem

rime

uel secunde

ersone.

ed non

ta

trahitur,

mmo e

ingerit

t

sillenizatt

ut

Sillenus,

uamuis

emo ocaretdest.

12

For he

Anonymus,

ee

below,

.

18;

Robert

lund

ays:

Blund,

.

80rb]

uod

hec

transitiuait

1

parcitur

ichi1

nobisnonuidetur.

ec enim

que

se habet d

transi-

tionem

t

d

ntransitionem.

i

enim

icatura Socrate

arcitur

ichi'

era rit ransitio.

Si autem

icatura me

arcitur

ichi'uera rit

eciprocatio.

nde um it

nconfinio

transitionis

t

ntransitionis,

otius

ecundum

os neutra eberetenseri

uam

rans-

itiua el ntransitiua.

13

For

he

Anonymus'

ords,

ee

below,

.

24.

Thanks

redue

to

E. Kellerman

.

Ed. M. A.

for

elp

with he ranslationf his

ext.

5

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


These

facts,

that s

the

death

of

William

of

Conches as

the terminus

post

the doctrinal

nd

even

textual

similarity

o Robert

Blund,

and the

oppositionby

Robert

of

Paris to a

view

held

in

the

first

uaestio

lead

one to

assign

thiscollectionto the

period

and the intellectual nviron-

ment

mentioned

above,

sc.

the

third

quarter

of the

twelfth

entury

n

Paris.

The

quaestiones

f the

first

ollection

mainly

deal with

topics

in the

domain

of

syntax

and its

borderland

with semantics.

Some

topics

apparently

belong

to

other

inguistic

reas,

e.g.

to

what

the

mediaeval

grammarians

used

to call

orthography,

f.

quaestio

Va,

but

actually

theyoftenoccur in a syntax context For instance,problemscon-

cerning

the

ae

diphthong

are

discussed

in the

chapters

7 and

8

of

Priscian's

Institutiones,

VII,

his first

ook

on

syntax;

the

¿-vocalis

s

frequently

sed

by

Robert

of Paris

in

examples

in

his Summa

n

the

constructio.

TEXT

The

Quaestiones

n

ff.30vb-33vb

QUAESTIO la

[f. 30vb]

Queritur

utrum

hec

dictio

legere

onatur

in ui nominis

tantum constructione

el tantum

significatione

el

et

significatione

t

constructione,

um

dicitur

legere

st

gere9

Si

ponitur

legere

n ui

nominis

significatione

t modo

significandi,

utrumque

non

potest

dici

4

legere

Virgilium

st

agere

uel

'

legere

modo

el

bene

st

gere

eoquod

huiusmodi

constructionem

ortitur

nfinitiuum

x

uerbali

significatione.

Et

item <cum>

possit

dici

4

legere

t

disputare

sunť cum sitconstansposse dici 4legeretdisputaresť ut loquamur de

attributo1

huius

propositionis

Socrates

egit

t

disputať

poterit

etiam

fortedici

Hegere

unť

idest

lectiones

sunt.

Quodsi

ponatur

egere

n ui nominis

significatione

t non

modo

signi-

ficandi,

similiter

osset

poni quilibet

huius

uerbi

modus,

ut

diceretur

'

lego

st

go

uel

aliquid

tale.

Si

uero

ponatur

in ui

nominis

constructione

antum,

quare

magis

dicitur

poni

loco

huius nominis

lectio

uam

alterius?

Postremo

si

ponatur

in

ui

nominis

constructione

t

significatione,

falsa est hec2 Hegerest gere9nisi lectio sit, et hec Hegerestbonům9et

hec

similiter

alsa

Hre

d

ecclesiam

stbonum9

nisi

quis

eat ad ecclesiam.

6

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


SOLVTIO. Infinitiuus

<

quandoque

> antecedit hoc

uerbum est

sequente

alio

infinitiuo3;

uandoque

antecedit

psum

ita

quod

imme-

diate sociatur infinitiuo ronomen aliquod possessiuum; quandoque

ita

quod

construitur4nfinitiuus

d

modum

uerbi

uel

cum oblico

ali-

cuius

casualis

uel

cum

aduerbio;

quandoque

antecedit

nfinitiuus

oc

uerbum

est

equente

nomine

adiectiuo

uel

participio.

Et

secundum

has

diuersitates

iuersa

constructionum dhibenda

sunt udicia.

Ilias

ergo

diuersitates

x

ordine

prosequamur.

Quando

sociatur nfinitiuus

nterueniente oc

uerbo

est,

ut

4

legere

st

agere9triplex

e

ingerii

significatio.

Potest

enim hoc

infinitiuum

egere oni

pro

hoc

nomine uerbali

lectio

ut sit sensus: lectioest actio; et falsa erit ocutio, nisi lectio sit.

Potest

etiam

fieri sermo

de attributo

huius

propositionis

4

Socrates

legiť

uel

alterius

propositionis,

ubi

legit

onitur

et

predicatur;

et erit

sensus:

'legere

st

gere9

idest hoc

attributum st

illud;

et est

propositio

falsa.

Item

potest

hic

infinitiuus

egerempersonaliter oni,

ut

constructio-

ne nominaliter

ponatur

et

significatione

erbaliter,

sicut

ponitur

hec

dictio

ledum,

um dicitur

4ectum

st9;

t

erit

hec

locutio

'legere

st

gere

nota

consecutionis,

ut

4

siquis

egit, giť

In primasignificatione oniturhoc uerbumlegereersonaliter tpro

aliquo

nomine

determinate,

pro

hoc

nomine lectio

cilicet.

In

secunda

ponitur

nominaliter t

in

designatione

attributi.

In

tercia

ñeque

ponitur

egere

ro

nomine

aliquo

determinate ес

pro

nomine

indeterminate, ed,

ut dictum

est,

impersonaliter

ponitur

et

uerbum

substantiuum

quod

sequitur,

similiter.

Quando

sociatur

pronomen

possessiuum

huic infinitiuo

egere

x

parte

suppositi,

ut cum dico

6

scire uum ichil

st9 unica

subest

significa-

tio,

hec:

tua scientia

nichil

est. Similiter

meum

egere

st

aliquid9

[f.

31ra mea lectio est aliquid. Infinitiuum nim sie positumremuerbi

supponit

tantum.

Cum

uero infinitiuo

diungitur

determinatio

uam5

exigit

infiniti-

uus ex

natura

uerbi,

ut

cum dicitur

legere

ene

st

liquid

uel

legere

modo

uel

legere

irgilium9

de

attributo

ermo est et

ponitur

hoc totum

perso-

naliter

egere

modo el

legere

irgilium

t non

infinitiuus

er

se.

Deinde

cum dicitur

ire d

ecclesiamstbonum9

'

legere

st

xpediens9

ó-

sito

et

quod

nullus

eat

ad

ecclesiam et

quod

nulla

lectio

sit,

prout

uere

sunt

orationes,queritur

de

natura

et

proprietate

arum.

Non

enim de

re uerbi

agitur

hac 4

legere

st

xpediens

el estbonum9 ee de re orationis

7

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


illa

'

ire d

ecclesiamstbonum6'

cum sintdue

orationes.

Sed

пес

de

attri-

butes

agitur. Quid

est enim attributum sse bonum

uel

expediens?

Ad hoc dicimus quod uere sunt orationes iste iuxta predictam

propositionem.

Et

licet ire

d ecclesiam el

legere onatur

ante

uerbum,

debet tarnen

equi

uerbum. Et hoc

totum

est

bonum el hoc est

xpediens

ponitur

oco

uerbi

impersonalis,

ut

sit idem

dicere

4

legere

st

xpediens

,

idest

expedit legere

uel

prodest

legere.

Similiter ire ad ecclesiam

st

bonum' idest

prodest

uel

decet uel

expedit

ire ad

ecclesiam.

Et

sunt

impersonales

ocutiones

et

uere.

Et

nota

quod

conuenienter

dicitur et

'legere

t

disputare

unť

et sic

4

legere

t

disputare

sť Sicuti

4

Socratem

egere

t Platonem

isputare

unt

uo

uera bene

dicitur,

пес tarnen deo diciturmale uel falso4Socratem

egere,

Platonem

isputare

st uerum.

Quesitum

est etiam utrum

bene

dicatur

'

cupituregere

Et si

bene

dicatur,

utrum

egere

ebeat

intelligi

nte

cupitur

el

non. Et

responsum

est sic: bene

et

conuenienter

dicitur

cupituregere'

Et si

impersonale

est

cupiturpost

ipsum intelligitur

egere'

t

si

est

passiuum,

ante

ipsum7

intelligitur egere.

Potest tarnen non sine ratione dici quod inconuenienter dicitur

'

cupituregere'

ut sit

cupitur

mpersonale,

cum tarnen

bene

dicatur

a

me

cupitur

egere'Legere

nim

cum

sit nfinitiuusmodus uerbi

personalis

et

careat

numeris

et

personis,

nusquam potestponi

uerbum

nisi

cum

de-

terminetur

i

persona,

unde etiam

impersonalitatis

ocabulum

a se re-

legauit

luolo

egere'

Hic

determinatur

uic infinitiuo

ersona.

Similiter

et

in

aliis huiusmodi constructionibus.

um

ergo

dicitur

cupitur

egere'

nichil

est,

unde

accipiat

personam.

Sed cum dico

'

a me

cupituregere'

attingit

is

persone

usque

ad

infinitiuum,

t

sic determinetur nfiniti-

uo persona, licet nterponatur ictioimpersonalis,sicutetiam,utmo-

do

utamur

similitudine,

rubreus

panniculus

suppositus

uitro rradiat

uitrum et

mittit

plendorem

ad

exteriora.

Et,

ut

domesticis

utamur

exemplis,

cum

dico

'ego

umhomo

qui

scribo' traducitur is

prime

per-

sone

in

appositum,

ut

ibi

euocet dictionem relatiuam

ad

predicatum.

1

attributiuo

S

2

et

dd.

MS,

sed el.MSC

3

alio

nfinitiuo]

ominediectiuo

MS

quandoque

alio

infinitiuo

SP

4

cum MS

5

quem

MS

6

hec

MS

1

aut

psa

MS

8

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


QUAESTIO

IIa

Queriturcum1uerba uoluntatiuaconstruantur um uerbis nfinitiui

modi,

ut cum dicitur

desidero

egere'

utrum

hoc uerbum desidero

ona-

tur

transitiueuel

absolute.

Si

dicatur

transitiue,

hec

contra.

Hoc

uerbum

in

hac

constructione

ponitur

ransitiue;

um accusatiuo

habet construi

t ex

natura transit

-

onis;

ergo

hic construitur

um

accusatiuo

uel cum habente uim

accu-

sai

ui.

Sed

non

cum

accusatiuo;

ergo

cum

aliquo

habente uim

accusa-

tiui.

Et ita hec

dictio

egere

onitur

n ui

accusatiui

uel habet

uim

accu-

sai

ui;

non

ergo potest

sequi

dictio cum

qua

construatur

ransitiue,

ut

dicatur 'egodesideroegereVirgilium Si cum habente uim accusatiui,

quare

hec

dictio

legere

onitur

n ui

accusatiui,

quare

hec dictio

legere

non

potest

recipere

accusatiuum

cum

quo

transitiue onstruatur.

Item.

Si uim

nominis

habet,

non

potest

recipere

determinai

onem

pertinenten

d

presens

tempus,

ut dicatur

4

ego

desidero

egere

modo'

Item.

'

Ego

desidero

appam'

''ego

esidero

egere'

Hoc uerbum desidero

transitiue

construitur um

u

traque

illarum

dictionum;

diet ones

ille

tantum

significant

iuersa;

ergo

conuenienter

dicitur

desidero

egere

t

cap am

,

'

legere

t

cappa

desidera

n>

tur me

Item.

'Ego

desiderosse' Ibi hoc uerbum esseponitur oco nominis;

ergo

substantiui

uel

adiectiui;

quia

non

subintelligitur

ec

apponitur

substantiuum,

ui

innitatur,

rgo

substantiui

t

in

ui accusatiui

casus;

[f.

31rb)

non

ergo

conuenienter

adiungitur

adiectiuum

in

nominatiuo

casu,

ut

'

ego

desidero

ssebonus'

Item.

Dicit Priscianusa

quod

uerba

infinitiuimodi

adiunguntur

uer-

bis

uoluntatiuis,

ut

quod

eis

deest,

ab

illis

assumant.

Cum

ergo

nullius

persone

sit

uerbum

infinitiui

modi2,

trahitur d

aliquam personam

ex

adiunctione

uerbi uoluntatiui

et

ita

eiusdem

persone

cum

uerbo

uoluntatiuo.

Quare

non construitur ransitiue um ilio.

Item.

'Desidero sse

bonus'

Ibi bonus

uocatur ab

hoc

uerbo esse

quare

iste

tres dictiones

desidero,

sse,

bonus

d eandem

pertinent

personam;

quare

non

est ibi

transitio.

Item.

'Desidero udere'

Cum hec

dictio ludere

im

habeat

nominis,

uidetur

quod

habeat

uim

nominis

uerbalis,

scilicet

huius lusum

uel

ludum.

Quare

idem erit desideroudere'

t 'desideroudum'

quod

falsum

est.

Multi enim uolunt

ludere,

qui

non uolunt

ludum et

econuerso.

Propterhoc dicimus quod hoc uerbum ibi non poniturtransitiue,

sed absolute.

Vnde

distinguendum

st

quod quedam

absolutio

genera-

lis

est et ita describitur:

bsolutio

st ccommodatio

eiuerbi

d subiectam

er-

9

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


sonam

ine

nsinuationeel

expressioneifferentie.

uic

absolutioni

opponi-

tur discretio.

Est

quedam

absolutio

specialis

et ei

opponitur

transitio.

Vtroque istorummodorum dicitur uerbum hic poni absolute. Tercio

modo dicitur

uerbum

poni

absolute,

idest

sine

determinatione ecun-

dum hoc

quod

absolutioni contraria est determinai

o.

Et

secundum

hoc

non

ponitur

absolute,

quia

hec dictio

legere

istit

uerbum,

sed

non

exhibet

ei

obstaculum,

idest

personam.

Ad hoc obicitur.

Hoc

uerbum

est

transitiuum t non

ponitur

hic

transit

ue;

ergo

improprie.

nstantia.

Hoc

nomen canis st

equiuocum

et non

ponitur

equiuoce; ergo improprie.

Falsum

est,

immo

magis

proprieponitur,

quando

non

ponitur quiuoce.

Vel

sic.

Criminor

igni-

ficai accionem uel passionem etc. Vel sic. Hoc nomenfelix st omnis

generis

etc.

Item.

4

Quid

desideratste?'. Hoc

interrogatiuum uid

ponitur

accusa-

tiue

ibi et

per

ipsum

fit

questio

de

persona

paciente.

Aliqua

dictio

respondetur,

que

significai

personam pacientem;

ergo

illa

est accusa-

tiui casus

uel

ponitur

oco accusatiui. Soluendum

per interemptionem

prime.

Non enim hec dictio

quid

construitur

um

ilio

uerbo,

sed cum

subintellecto,

cilicet

agere.

Et

ecliptica

est

oratio,

quia

deest hoc uer-

bum

agere.

ta

enim

in

aliis uidemus:

'

non

emper

eriet uecumque

inabi

tur rcus'^' subintelligiturerire

Item.

1

Desidero

egere

t

aliud

Et

copulat

ibi

aliquas

dictiones et

pro-

prie

ponitur;

ergo

consimiles.

Itaque

cum

aliud sit

accusatiui

casus,

oportet quod legere

im habeat

accusatiui.

Ad

hoc dicimus

quod duplex

est ibi

figura:

ex

eo

quod

simplex

est

ibi

relatio,

et

fit

tiam relatio

ad

subintellectum

gratia

huius nominis

lectionem

Est enim sensus:

'

desidero

egere

t

liud'

idest ectionemexer-

cere

et aliud exercitium sse. Instantia

argumenti.

Iste stmeus

eruus

t

illius etc.

.

Item. 'Istedesideratxercereectionem'Cum iste orationes dem

signifi-

cent et eodem modo ordinetur

uerbum

in

utraque

et ex

eadem ui

transitionis,

uidetur

quod

in

utraque

uel neutra

ponatur

uerbum

transitiuum.

Ad

hoc

dicimus

quod

neutra

est

transitiua nec

uerbum

ponitur

transitiuum

n hac uel in

ilia,

quia

semper respiciendum

st

ad

princi-

pālie

uerbum uel

ad

quod

ponitur

oco

principalis

uerbi;

quod

hie

patet

'

iste

egitVirgilium

,

similiter iste st

egensVirgilium'

Si

dicatur

legens

Virgilium

st ste' non est constructio

ransitiua,quia principale

uer-

bum,

scilicet

hoc

uerbum

est,

non

ponitur

transitiue.

10

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


De aliis

uerbis

queritur

utrum

eandem

uim

habeant

in

actiuo

et

in

passiuo. Quod

uero3 est

in

hoc uerbo

puto.

Cum

enim dicitur

puto

sse

bonus' 'putor ssebonus1,n eadem significatione onituruerbum.

De hoc

uerbo scio

mbigitur

utrum

n

eadem

ui

ponatur

in

actiuo et

in

passiuo,

cum

dicitur

4

scio

esse bonus1

'

scior

sse

bonus1 Non enim

sensus

est

i

scio

sse

bonus1

idest

scio

me esse

bonům,

sed scio

me

habere

officium oni.

Videtur

tarnen

pud

Horatium

ita

poni

'uxor nuicti

ouis

essenescis1Q.

idetur esse

sensus:

nescis

te esse

uxorem

inuicti ouis.

Ad

hoc dicimus

quod

improprie

ponitur

hie

hoc uerbum nescis.

Item.

Notandum

est

quod

impersonalia

uerba

actiue uocis

construuntur um

infinitiuo,

iue trahant

hoc

a

sua

origine

siue

non,

ut 4placetmichiegere1,decet isputare1

Verba

impersonalia

passiue

uocis

non construuntur

um

infinitiuo,

nisi

impersonalia

trahant

hoc a sua

origine,

ut

hic

4

ego

desidero

egere

'

desideratur

me

egere1

Et sic

exponitur:

desideratur

quod ego

legam.

Cum dicitur

desideratur

egere1

nullam

habet

expositionem, quia

legere

ibi

confuse

accipitur

et a nullo

trahit

personam.

Conuenienter

tarnen

hoc dicitur

4

desiderat

egere

,

quia origo

illius

uerbi

[non]

hanc

habet

const

uctionem.

f. 31va'

Item.

Queritur

cum

uerba

impersonalia

que

decendunt

a uerbis

que

construunturum

obliquis

aliis ab accusatiuo, et retineant onstructi-

onem

suorum

perfectorum,

ut

'

parco Hesperie1

4

parcitur

Hesperie

d,

'

abstineo

rarum1

4

abstinetur

me rarum1

quare

non similiter erba

im-

personalia

que

nascuntur a uerbis

que

construuntur um

accusatiuo,

obseruant

constructionem

orum.

Ad hoc

dicimus

quod

nulla auctoritas

hoc habet.

Si hoc enim

uerum

esset,

oporteret uod

infinitiuus

erbi

impersonalis

construeretur

um

accusatiuo;

quod

contra

Priscianume

est,

qui

dicit

quod

hec est diffe-

rentia

nter nfinitiuum

assiui

et infinitiuum

mpersonalis,quod

infi-

nitiuus

passiui

construitur um

accusatiuo,

infinitiuus

mpersonalis

non.

Vnde

si

addatur

infinitiuus,

ecesse est

intelligi

nfinitiuum

as-

siui;

quod

quidam

ita

soluunt

quod

hoc

dictum est

de accusatiuo

sequente.

Non enim

infinitiuus

erbi

impersonalis

potest

construi

um

accusatiuo

sequente.

Eodem modo

debent

assignare

differentiam,

t

Priscianus

assignat

conuenienciam:

utrumque

enim construitur

um

ablatiuo,

sed

unum

cum

ablatiuo

sequente

et aliud

cum ablatiuo

ante-

cedente.

Item. Locus a simili n his necessitatemnon habet, quod in aliis est

uidere:

hoc

aduerbium

similiteronstructionem

etinet

nominis a

quo

nascitur,

quia

construitur

um

datiuo

quemadmodum

hec dictio simi-

11

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


lis. Нес

dictio

plenus

onstruitur

um

genitiuo,

non

tarnen

duerbium

quod

ex

eo

nascitur.

a

Prise.

Inst.

gram.

XVIII,

40

b

Ног.

A. P. 350

c

Ног. С.

III,

27,

73

d

Luc.

Phars.

I,

734

c

Prise.

nst.

ram.

VIII,

59

1

utrum S

2

adiunguntur

modi

is

os.

MS

3

nonMS

QUAESTIO

Illa

Queritur

quot

sint

genera

nominum;

et secundo

querendum

utrum

ilia

dictio1

que

est

omnis

generis,

ponatur

in

omni

genere ubicumque

ponituruel nusquam uel quandoque in masculino, quandoque in fe-

minino

pro

diuersitate

ubstantiuorum;

ercioetiam uidendum

utrum

aliquod

genus

sit dubium

genus

uel nullum.

Dicit Donatus:3 est

reterea

rium

enerum

uod

omne

icitur olens illud

genus

quod

est

omne,

distinetum

sse

et

separatum

ab

aliis.

Et

Priscia-

nus dicit

b

omnianomina

unt

alia

exceptis

is

que

sunt mnis

eneris

el

eis

que

sunt

ommunis

eneris

nnuens nomina iuxta diuersitatem

ommunis

generis

uel etiam omnis a se

differre.

Item. Sicut

uerbum

dicitur

ommunis

generis,

quia significai

ccio-

nem et

passionem

et seruat actiuiet

passiui

constructionem,ta dicen-

dum uidetur

omnis

generis quod

cum

cuiuslibet

generis

dictione

habet

construi.

Sed obicitur. Felix

omnis

generis

est

in

singulari;

et

alterius

est

in

plurali;

ergo

est etheroclitum

n

genere.

Fallacia.

Нес res

fuitunius

et

fuit

lterius;

ergo

fuit

publica.

Item. Dicit

Priscianuscquod

omne

participium

omnis

generis

est;

quare

amatus

ta -tum.

SOLVTIO.

Ideo

dicitur

omnis

generis, quia

cum omni

genere

est

constructibile

Item.

In

diuersis

generibus

construunturhomo

t

felix

cum

dicitur

'istehomo st

elix'

ergo

uiciose;

uel

figura

ntercedit.

nstantia.

ť

Isteest

lecturus'. st construitur

um lecturuset

pertinent

d

diuersa

tempora;

ergo

uiciosa uel

figuratiua.

Et hec de

primo

capitulo.

Antequam

accedamus

ad

secundum,

uidendum est

quid

genus

mas-

culinum uel femininum.

Et

deinceps

facienda etiam

erit breuis

gene-

rum distinctio t

assignanda

diuersa

acceptio

huius

prepositionis

n,

cum diciturponitur ecdicciontaliueltaligenere. st itaque masculinum

genus proprietas

diccionis determinandi

irca rem masculinum

sexum

uel

habendi similem constructionem

um hoc habentibus.

De femini-

12

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


no et

neutro ad hune

modům tibi conforma.

Commune

genus

est

pro-

prietas

diccionis construendi

d

similitudinem

masculinorumuel femi-

ninorum nominum. Sic et de omni genereiuxtamodum suum intelli-

gendum

erit.

Porro illud notandum est

quod generum

aliud

complexum,

aliud

incomplexum:

tam

genus

masculinum

quam

femininum

uam

etiam

neutrum

implex

est2

genus

uel

incomplexum;

cetera

genera complexa

sunt,

commune scilicet et

omne.

Incomplexorum

aliud

artificiale,

liud naturale.

Naturalia

genera

sunt masculinum

et femininum

enus

dicente

Priscianod:

que

ola nouit

ratio

ature

tc.Neutrum

genus

artificiale

st ratione nuentionis.

Cete-

ra duo genera reperta sunt, ut similiterhabeant cum istis in modo

construendi: commune cum

masculino et

feminino,3

mne cum mas-

culino, feminino,

neutro.

Postremo sciendum

quod

cum diciturhoc

onstruiturum lio

n

mascu-

lino

enere

el

eminino

el neutroelcommuni

elomni hec

prepositio

n

po-

test

notare

causam

siue

autoritatem

uel

imitationem

uel

finem. Si

no-

tet n

causam,

dicendum4erit

quod

hec

diccio

felix

onstruitur

ntransi-

tiue

cum

hac diccione

posita

in

omni

genere.

Ex

eo enim

quod

omnis

generis

est

felix

conferì

ei sic

poni.

Potest

tarnen dici

quod

ibidem

ponitur n masculino genere, destad imitationemmasculini,ut notet

in

imitationem.Cum autem dicitur

hocnomen iuis

ponitur

n

masculino

genere

n

hac

constructioneciuis

pugnať,

notât

in

finem

uasi

ibi

ponitur

ad

designandum

masculinum

sexum. His uisis

quomodo

responden-

dum

sit huic

[f.

31vb obiectioni

patet.

Felix

autem

ubicumque ponitur

in

omni

aut

nusquam

in

omni aut

quandoque

in

omni

quandoque

non.

Si

ubique

in

omni,

ponuntur

ergo

hee dicciones

in

diuersis

generi-

bus

'

felix

homo' Si

nusquam

in

omni,

quomodo

est

omnis

generis?

Si

diuersitate

uppositorum

modo est

felix

masculini

generis,

modo femi-

nini,modo neutri,modo communis,cuius

generis

erit

elix

cum dici-

tur

4

et

sta

et

stud

st

elix

uel cum

1

et

ste t stud st

elix'

Ad

hoc dieimus

felixponi

in

omni

genere ubicumque

ponatur,

ut in

notet

causam. Sed

cum dicitur

et ste t sta et stud

uidet

e'

cum

se

sit

omnis

generis,

ibi adicitur

ei uel

ipsum

uel

ipsam

ut

dicatur

4

uidet e

ipsum'

Et si

ponitur

psum

in

quo genere?

Nos dicemus

quod

ibi

potestponi

ipsum

n

masculino

genere

priuile-

gio

et

autoritate

generis.

Et non

habebit

genus

de

substantia

significa-

tionis

repugnantesubiecto,

sed

ei

extrinsecus dueniet ut

accidens.

De ultima

questione

dicendum

quod

diccio

quedam

est dubii

gene-

ris;

nullum tarnen

genus

est

dubium,

ut iste est

incerte

mansionis,

nul-

13

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


la

tarnen

mansio est incerta.

Et

poterit

dici

quod

finis

est

et masculini

et feminini

generis;

пес tarnen

sequetur quod

sit communis

generis,

immopocius quod non sit communisgeneris.Et ideo dicitur sse com-

munis

generis,

quia

cum

dicitur

finis

sť

uel

aliquid

tale,

dubitatur

n

quo

genere

teneatur.

Nec

enim

inconueniens

est

quod

una

diccio sit

duorum

generum.

Vel

forte st

finis

unius

generis

tantum,

ed nescitur

cuius.

Ideoque5

dubii

generis

esse

perhibetur.

a

Donat.Ars

minored.

Keil,355,

16-7

ь

ubi

(

ubi

d

Prise. nst.

ram.

V,

1

1

diuisioMS

2

ergo

MS

3

omne cum

masculino t feminino

dd. MS

4

dandum S

5

ideo

uia

MS

QUAESTIO

I

Va

Queritur

utrum

hec

littera

sit uocalis

an

consonans

in hac diccione

huic.

Si

est

uocalis,

ergo

ibi sunt

due uocales.

Et si neutra

amittit

im su-

am,

ergo

ibi est

diptongus.

Sed

nulla

diptongus

bi

est,

ubi

и i.

Dicit

enim

Priscianusa

quod

non nisi

in

Greca

diccione est ui

diptongus.

Et

ita

hec diccio Greca

est. Si

altera

amittit

uim

suam,

pocius

uidebitur

quod и quam i. Nusquam enim inueniturquod hec uocalis i amittat1

uim suam. Si hec

uocalis

u,

hoc

obuiat Prisciano.

Ponit

enim

Priscia-

nusb certas litteras

post

quas

и amittat2

uim

suam:

post q

et

post

g

et

post

s. Nec

dicit

quod

alicubi и

amittatuim

suam

post

figuram

spira-

tionis.

Item.

Si

dicatur

i esse

consonans,

opponatur

de interiectione

hac

'ш'

Dicit Priscianusc

quod

hoc

pronomen

huic

ssumsit

с

ut

esset

ali-

qua

differentia

nterhoc

pronomen

huic

t

interiectionem

i'

quod

ui-

detur

falsum,

cum

alia3 fuerit

ifferentia

n hoc

quod

consonans

est

in

pronomineet i uocalis in interiectione.Est ergo inutilisilia additio

huius

consonantis c.

Item. Dicit

Priscianus^

quod

in

hoc uerbo

aio i est

duplex

conso-

nans.

In secunda

uero et

in tercia

persona

transit

n

uocalem,

quia

consonans

sequitur.

Est

ergo

argumentum

Prisciani: ibi

est consonans

post

i;

ergo

i transit

n uocalem.

Vt

ergo

utamur

argumento

Prisciani,

possumus

dicere:

hic

sequitur

consonans

post

i,

scilicet

huic

ergo

i

ibi

est uocalis.

Item.

Queritur

de

hac diccione

cui,

utrum

ibi sit

uocalis uel

conso-

nans. Si dicatur esse

uocalis,

cum neutra amittatuim

suam,

uidetur

quod

и

et

si hoc

est,

cum

précédât

elementům

representatum

er

hanc

14

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


figuram

4,

uidetur

debere

prescribi

hec

figura

autore

Priscianoe,

qui

dicit

hanc

figuram

uasi

nulla alia causa inuentam

esse,

nisi

prescriba-

tur

и amittenti5 im littere.

Secundum

hoc

nulla erit

differentia

nter

nominatiuum t

datiuum.

Si dicatur bi6

i

esse

consonans,

ergo

ponuntur

n

principio

sillabe.

Si

sit

consonans,

ergo simplex

uel

duplex.

Si dicatur

esse

simplex,

queratur

utrum

illaba

producta

sit

naturaliter.Et si hoc

est,

ergo pot-

est

sequi

uocalis

in

neutra. Si sit

ibi

duplex

consonans,

ergo

sillaba

producta

est

positione.

Et tunc

maxime

potest

sequi

uocalis.

Item.

Queritur qua

ratione

non

possit sequi

uocalis. Si

dicatur

quod

i

quamuis

sit

consonans,

tarnen

habet uim

uocalis,

queritur

quomodo

hoc ipsum intelligatur, trumdicendumsitquod quamuis consonans

sit

de

substantia

diccionis,

tamen

hic uocalis

sonat.7

Et sic hoc

est,

er-

go

due

uocales ibi

sonant;

ergo

uel

ibi est

diptongus

uel

aliqua

uocalis

amittit im

suam.

Si dicatur consonans

proferri

ed

uocaliter,

f.

32ra'

uidetur

probare

quod

i

consonans

sit duo soni.

Est enim

sonus

ille

qui

profertur

nte

с

in

hac diccione

huic,

t est

sonus ille

qui

sonat

in

hac

diccione

iubeo'y

rgo

i consonans

est duo

soni;

ergo

г est duo

elementa;

quod

falsum

est.

Item. Fiat

quidam

sonus ex his tribus

onis,8

qui

sonant

in

hac dicci-

one cui.Queritur quomodo debeat proferrilla uox?

Si eodem

modo

quo

modo

hoc nomen cui cum habeat

easdem litte-

ras

et

eodem modo

dispositas,

erit

dem sonus. Et ita

quoddam

nomen

erit

sonus

ille;

quod

falsum

est.

Item.

Cum dicitur

hecuox est

onsonans

queritur

utrum

proferatur

consonans

post

hune

terminůmhecuox.

Et

si hoc

est,

ergo per

se

prola-

tibilis est

consonans.

Si

dicatur

proferri

uocalis,

cum de eo

agatur

quod

demonstratur;

rgo

de

uocali

agitur

et

de

ea dicatur

esse

conso-

nantem;

ergo

locutio

tantum falsa

est.

Item. Si proferatur omenconsonantis,uidetur nconuenienter ic-

tum

quemadmodum

'iste

homo

ocrates urriť

SOLVTIO.

Dicimus

quod

in

hac

diccione huic est

consonans,

et

quamuis

assumsit

с causa

differentie,

amen in

hoc

est alia

differentia,

quod

i

in

interiectione st uocalis et

in

pronomine

consonans.

Sed ad

expressiorem

differentiam

dditur

pronomini

с sicut

quamuis

diffe-

rentia

it

n

uoce inter

liquando

t

aliquanto,

amen

ad

expressiorem

if-

ferentiam

cuitur

in

antepenultima

n

aliquando.

Item.

Queritur

de hoc

quod

dicit

Priscianus^

n

aio ais i

necessario

transit n uocalem, quia sequiturconsonans. Dicit Priscianus uult is

esse

dissillabum.Vnde

dicit i

in

uocalem

transiré,

quia

non

sequitur

15

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


consonane,9

ut

ex i

et

sillaba

efficiatur. st

ergo argumentum

Priscia-

ni

sic:

sequitur

s'

ergo

i

transit

n

uocalem.

Hoc

argumento

non

possu-

mus uti in hoc pronomine.Non enim sic sequiturс ut ex i et s sillaba

efficiatur.De hac

diccione

cui

dicimus

quod

i

est consonans.

Sed

si

inferatur:

rgo

ponitur

n

principio

sillabe,

instantia:

/est

muta;

ergo

naturali

sono

incipit

et

terminatur

n

uocalem. Et in

omnibus

illis

que

habent

exceptionem

possumus

instare.

Eodem

modo

instamus huic

argumento:

hec

diccio

cui desinit

n du-

plicem

consonantem;

ergo

potest equi

uocalis in metro. Et

notandum

quod quedam

dicuntur

dúplices

consonantes

et

spissitudine

oni et

po-

tencia,

ut X.

Sed

i dicitur

duplex

consonans

potencia

uel loci

occupaci-

one. Ibi enim ponimus i, ubi ponebantduos ii consonantes. Dicimus

autem

quod

ii non

potest

sequi

uocalis

im

metro,

quia

i

habet hic

sonum

uocalis.

Item.

Cum dicitur

hecuox est onsonans

dicimus

quod

profertur

bi

nomen

consonantis,

ut iuuet

precedentem

demonstrai

onem,

que

nimis

uaga

est;

et

tarnen

onueniens est

locutio.

Vbicumque

enim

fit

demonstratio

d

oculum,

oportet,

ut

idem

quod

demonstratur10

liquo

sensu

corporeo

percipiatur.

Vnde

cum

dicitur

istehomo demonstran-

do

Socratem,

non

oportet,

ut

proferatur

ius

nomen,

quia

uisu

perci-

pimus id quod demonstratur. ed cum dicitur hecuoxli est onsonans

cum

illud

quod

demonstratur,

nullo

sensu

corporeo

percipi potest

nisi

auditu,

oportet

quod

simul

proferatur

ius

nomen.

Dicit

PriscianusS

quod

habundancia

sillabe est

in

huiusmodi

diccio-

ne

huiuscemodi.

d hoc

opponitur

sic.

Нес

diccio

huiusce

liqua

diccio

est,

modi

st

alia

diccio.

Ex

his duabus fit

num

compositum

huiuscemo-

di.

Et

ita nichil habet hec uox

quod

non

habeat

ex

altero suorum

com-

ponencium.

Non

ergo

sie habundancia

est.

Item. Нес diccio huius st

aliqua

diccio, modi st alia diccio. Ex his

duabus

potest

fieri

hoc

compositum

huiusmodi.

t

potest

nterponi

hec

sillaba ce. Et ita erit

habundancia

in

huiuscemodi.

incopa

est,

ut

cum

dicitur

huiusmodi. i autem

dicitur

habundancia,

non est

sincopa;

nulla

enim

sillaba cuius additio faciat

habundanciam,

sua

absencia facit in-

copam.

Item.

Sicut

hoc nomen

paterfamilias

icitur

declinari,

quia

mouetur

in

fine

lterius

componencium,

sic uidetur

quod

in

huiuscemodi

it

para-

goge, quia

ibi est additio

fini

lterius

componencium.

SOLVTIO.

Dicimus

quod

ibi est

paragoge.

Dicimus etiam

quod

huiusce

liqua

diccio

est,

modi

2

lia diccio. Sed ex his

non

potest

fieri

16

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


una

diccio,

immo ex

his duabus htiius modi

t

interponitur

e13

illaba

et ita

est

habundancia,

que

habundancia

potest

dici

paragoge

[f.

32rb]

predictaratione.

Dicit

Priscianus*1

uod

ae

diptongus

quandoque

a

poetis

per

diere-

sim

profertur.

cribitur

per

a

et

i,

ut

4

aulai

in

medio ibabant

ocula

Bachi'x.

Quod

uidetur

falsum,

quia profertur

ic

tantum

diptongus;

quod

concludimus.

Quod

etiam

sic

probatur.

Si dicatur hic

pictai

ta

quod

non sit

dieresis,

profertur

antum

Greca

diptongus

et non

per

dieresim;

eadem rationi i

proferatur

ictai

diuisim,

diuisio

est tantum

Grece

diptongi.

Dicimus

autem hanc

locutionem

figurât

uam

14

esse

quam

dicit

Priscianus;

et

intenditdicere

quod

cum

ae

diptongus

raro

in sua uoce diuidatur,diuiditurquandoque per suam equipollentem

ut

in

ilio

exemplo.

Si

autem

queratur,

ubi diuidatur

in

sua

uoce,

hic

diuiditur

n

sua

uoce

'

tercia

ost

illam

successit enea

proles

hic minus eneus

esto' .

Si

queratur15,

ubi diuidatur

hic

diptongus

'narrt

aeripedem

artis

arasse

boues

dicimus

quod

non

diuiditur,

ut

ponitur

narr

t

pro

narrauit. el

possumus

dicere

quod ponitur

eripedemro

eripedem.

um enim

Virgi-

lius dixerit

fixerit

ripedem

uruam

pro

aeripedem

Ouidius16

illi

sic re-

pendens

dixit

aeripedes ro

eripedes.

a

Prise. nst.

ram.

,

50

b

cf. d.

,

37

c

Id. Inst,

e

nom. 3

d

Prise. nst,

gram.

,

1

e

Id.

I,

15

f

d.

X,

1

S

Id.

XVII,

4

h

Id.

I, 50;

XVII,

8-

9

1

Verg.

A n.

ll,

354

J

Ov. Met.

,

125

k

Ov. Her.

VI,

32

1

Verg.

Aen.

I,

803

1

admittat

MS

2

admittatMS

3

ana

MS

4

quod

MS

5

admittenti

MS

6

cui

suprascr.

S1^

7

finiat

MS,

sed orr.

MS1

8

ex ...

sonis

bis

pos.

MS

9

quia

...

consonans

is

pos.

MS

10

demonstrai S

11

est add.

MS

12

unum

MS

13

MS

14

significatiuam

S

15

dicatur

S

QUAESTIO

Va

Queritur

de

hac

constructione

par

itur

Hesperie

a

qualiter

hoc uer-

bum

parcitur

onstruatur um hac

dictione

utrum

transitiue

el

intran-

sitiue. Si transitiue

t

aliqua

est

constructio llarum

dictionum,

ergo1

transitiua.Si ita

est,

utrum2 ransitiua

ctus uel

personarum.

Transi-

tiua

personarum

non

est,

quia

ad

diuersas

personas

non

pertinent,

cum altera

sit

diet

o

impersonalis.

Ergo

est ibi

transito

actus;

ergo

ac-

tus ostenditur ransiré b una persona in alteram; quod falsum est.

Item.

'

Parcitur

ocratť

Licet

est transi

io

actus,

res

que

designatur

per

obliquum,

ostenditur sse

paciens,

et

ita

ab alia

persona

ostenditur

17

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


actus transiré

n

aliam.

Quod

falsum,

quia

uolo

ostendere

hac

locutio-

ne

quod ego

parcam

Socrati.

Propterhoc dicendum quod intransitiue onstruiturhoc uerbum

parcitur

um

hac dictione

Socrati.

t

oratio tantum

constat ex

imperso-

nali et

obliquo.

Quare

ille

obliquus

supponit

illi

impersonali.

Item. Parcitur onstruitur

um

obliquo

intransitiue

t

nascitur

ab

aliquo3

perfecto; ergo

perfectum

llius construitur ntransitiue um

obliquo.

Item.

'A

me

arcitur

et

4

parcitur

ocrati'

In

utraque

istarum onstruc-

tionum

ponitur

eodem

modo

parcitur

sed

in

altera

transitiue;

ergo

in

reliqua.

Item.

4

Parcitur ibť Hoc pronomensibiponitur bi reciproce; ergo

refertur

bi ad

aliquam

dictionem

positam

uel

subintellectam,

ed

cum

ibi non sit alia

dictio

quam

hoc uerbum

parcitur

refertur d illud

uer-

bum.

Ita

oportet quod

illud

uerbum uim habeat uerbi

excepte

accio-

nis.

Propter

hoc dicetur

quod

hoc uerbum

parcitur

onitur

um

illa

dic-

tione Socrati

sed

nulla

constructio st

inter llas

dictiones.

Ad

hoc obicitur. Accusatiuus non

potest

construi cum

hoc

uerbo

parcitur,

ta hoc uerbum

parcitur

um nullo

obliquo

construitur;

rgo

absolute

ponitur.

Ita

magis proprie

ponitur

bsolute

quam

transitiue.

Item. Нес dictio Socrati ignificairem pacientem; et tantumsunt

due dictiones n hac oratione

parcitur

ocratV

ergo3obliquus

construi-

tur

proprie

uel

figuratiue

um

ilio

uerbo. Si

figuratiue, igura

est

in

constructione

uel

in

locutione.

Non

poterit assignari que

figura.

Ita

proprie

construitur

t

ita

aliqua

est

constructio nter uerbum

et

obli-

quum. Propter

hoc

dicunt

quidam

quod

constructionum lia

transiti-

ua actus

tantum,

alia

personarum

tantum,

alia, et

actus

et

persona-

rum,

ut iste

legendum

st

Virgilium' parcitur

isperie

alia

personarum

tantum,

ut hec

'

filius

Socratis

egiť

actus et

personarum

hec

4

ego

uideo

Socratem'

Nobis non

placet

hec distinctio.

Dicimus enim

quod quecumque

est

transitiua

actus,

est

transitiua

personarum.

Vnde

distinguimus uod

constructio

orationis

dicitur

transitiua

propter

actum

tantum,

constructio

dictionis cum dictione

transitiua

tum

propter

ctum,

tum

propter

personam;

constructio

dictionum

inter se

dicitur transitiua

transitione

ropterpersonas4

tantum. Vnde dicimus

quod

constructio

istarumdictionum

parcitur, isperie

on est

transitiua,

uia

non

expri-

mit

transitionem,

ed

in

confinio

est transitionis

t

reciprocationis.

Omnis autem constructio udicanda est ex ostensione.

18

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Concedimus

tarnen

quod

hoc

uerbum

parcitur

onstruitur

ransitiue

cum ilio

obliquo,

transitiue,

dest

ex

ui

transitionis.

Multipliciter

cci-

piturdictionem onstrui ransitiue, destex transitione el in transita-

ne

[f.

32va]

uel

ad

transitionem.

Instandum est huic

argumento

hoc

uerbum

transitiue

onstruitur

cum

ilio

obliquo

et

aliqua

construction st inter

uerbum et

obliquum;

ergo

transitiua' Instantia.

'

Socrates

ogat

latoni ut

diligat

e'

In

extre-

ma

oratione

ponitur

e

retransitiue;

t

aliqua

est

constructio

llius ora-

tionis;

ergo

retransitiua.

a

Luc. Phars.

I,

734

1ergaMS 2 quareMS 3 quareMS 4 actusMS

QUAESTIO

Via

Circa hanc

constructionem o

michi ola mei

uper

Astianactis

mago

a

diuerse

sunt

questiones,

scilicet

quid

desit

in

hac oratione et

quid

cui

desit

et

de hac

prepositionequaliter

ponitur

bi utrum

per appositio-

nem uel

compositionem

t

de

illa totaliuoce

utrum

sit uox

significatiua

uel

non,

et si

hoc,

utrum

perfecta

uel

non,

et de

hac

interiectione et

de hac dictionesola.

De defectu

ta

senciunt

quidam

dicentes

quod

hoc uerbum

superes

bi

desit,

quia pars

eius deficit.

Quod

falsum

est,

quia

eadem

ratione ubi

est

defectus

illabe,

est defectus

dictionis.

Similiter

defectusdictionis

dicereturdefectus

orationis;

quod

falsum est.

Item.

Priscianus obuiat huic

sententie.

Dicitb

enim

quod

in

his sunt

illa,

in

quibus

deest

uerbum in

fine. Et

ponit

exemplum

lo

michi

ola

mei

super

tc.' Ita

habemus

quod

hoc

uerbum

es

deest

in

fine;

quod

concedendum.

Queritur

cui

desit.

Non

deest

illi

uersui,

quia

non

potest

addi huic

uersui,

ut crescat uel

decrescat.

Nec orationi

deest,

quia

definitaest

essencia

illius

orationis;

unde

si

adderetur,

fieret lia

oratio.

Deest

ergo

illi

dictioni

uper

si

ei

deest.

Quare

pocius

diciturdeesse ei

quam

hec

prepositio

uper

lli. Et ita

utrumque

uidetur

deesse.

Sequitur

de

prepositione ualiter

ibi

ponatur.

Ibi enim

per

appositi-

onem

uel

compositionem.

Si

per

appositionem,

ergo1

construitur

um

obliquo

ibi

posito

uel

subintellecto

uel

cum

aliquo

habente uim obli-

qui. Cum nullo obliquo ibi construitur, uia cum nullo istorummichi

mei

Astianactis

imago.

i

cum

aliquo

subintellecto,

ueratur

cum

quo;

non erit

inuenire.

Ponitur

ergo per

compositionem.

Sed

compositio

19

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


numquam

solitaria

est;

quare

ponitur

n

compositione

cum

alia

uoce;

quare

alia uox cum

ilia. Est enim

locus hic

a

relatiuis.

Si

enim

uox

ali-

qua cum alia componitur, t alia cum ilia, quemadmodum si ego sum

socius

istius,

iste

est

socius meus.

Sequitur

utrum oratio illa

sit

significatiua

necne.

Quod

sit non

sig-

nificatiua,

sic uidetur.

Partem enim habet hic

uoeem

non

significati-

uam,

scilicet hanc uoeem

super

quia

non

ponitur

ibi

significatiue;

quod

uidetur,

quia

non

ponitur

bi

in

ui

prepositionis, uia

neque per

compositionem

nec

per appositionem,

ut

probatum

est.

Ergo

si

non

significatiue

onatur,

et oratio non

significatiue

onetur, quemadmo-

dum

in

aliis uidetur.

SOLVTIO.

4

Bubacurriť īsta uox totalis non est significatiua, uia

quedam

pars

eius

non

est

significatiua.

i hoc est

quod

hec uox

'

o

michi

sola

mei

tc

non

est2

significatiua,

uia

non

profertur

ictio tota et

hoc

tantumcausa

metri,

uidetur

quod

scribi

debeat dictio

superes

licet

non

pronunciei

r,

quemadmodum

scribitur

m

in

hac

dictione circumamic-

tusy

ed

non

pronunciatur.

Si uox ilia est

significatiua,

um sit

oratio,

est

perfecta

uel

imperfecta.

Si

perfecta, ergo3

nichil

deest

illi;

quod

obuiat Prisciano. Si

imperfecta

est,

ergo4

non constituit

perfectum

sensum;

quod

falsum est.

Нес dictioо ibi ponituret est interiectio; rgo5admiratiuauel non.

Si

admiratiua,

ergo6

non

uocatiua;

ita non

ponitur

n

ui aduerbii uoca-

tiui.

Si

in

ui

uocatiui7

ponatur,

et ita hec

oratio sola

mago

n

ui

uocatiui

ponitur;

et ita hec dictio

imago

ocatiui est

ibi,

et

hec dictio

sola.

Sequitur

utrum

hec

dictio sola

ponatur

uocatiue et

quam

exclusio-

nem

faciat.

Si

uocatiue,

erit

sensus:

о

sola

imago

mei

Astianactis tu

superes

michi. Si

non

uocatiue,

ergo8

ponetur

bi sola

pro

solus t

is

erit

sensus:

o Yule tu solus

superes

michi

imago

mei

Astianactis. Et

ita

facit

socialem exclusionem.

Predictis ic respondendumest. In primisdicimusquod hoc uerbum

es ibi deest et

deest

huic

prepositioni

uper

quia

cum

ea

fedus

composi-

tions

inierat;

et non tenetur

bi

illa

compositio.

Nec

mirum. Verbum

deest ita

prepositioni,quia

etiam

prepositio

deest

uerbo,

ut

cum dici-

tur ruunt

ro

eruunt.

t

ita

prepositio rependit

uices suas uerbo.

Sequitur

de

hac dictione

super

trum

apponatur

per

appositionem

uel

compositionem.

Ad

hoc dicimus

quod

medium

ibi deest:

ergo per

appositionem

uel

compositionem.

Dicendum

enim esset:

ibi est

prepositio

t in

ui

prepo-

sitionis;

quod

negamus,

quod

sit in ui

prepositionis.

Habet enim ibi

uim huius uerbi

superes.

t

ex hoc

inproprie

ponitur.

De

illa

totaliuoce

20

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


dicimus

quod

est

significatiua.

Dicimus

et

am

quod

oratio ista

imper-

fectaest et non

plena.

Ponitur tarnen oco

plene

et

perfecte

rationis.

Vnde sic est exponenda autori as Prisciani, cum dicitc: deest enim es

uerbum ad

perfectionem

rationis,

idest

hoc

uerbum es

deficit;

ex

cuius

defectu euenit

quod

oratio

est

non

perfecta.

Habet

tarnen,

ut

diximus,

uim

perfecte.

Dicendum etiam

quod

о

potest

poni

siue admiratiue siue in ui ad-

uerbii uocandi.

Et si

admiratiue,

ut

dictum

est,

erit sensus: o Yule

tu

superes

sola

ymago

mei

Astianactis,

idest tu solus

superes imago.

Et

ita sola

ponitur pro

solus. Et ita alii

adiungitur

et aliud determinai

quod

similiter n aliis

uidemus:

nomen et

uerbum sole sunt

partes

ora-

tionis, dest nomen et [f. 32vb uerbum sola. Et alibi apud Lucanum

'

nam ola

futuri

Crassus ratbellimedius

mora^.

Sola

idest solus. Potest

etiam о

poni

in

ui aduerbii uocandi

et ita sola erit

uocatiui9 casus. Simi-

liter

t

imago.

t est

sensus: о

sola,

idest

mago

mei Astianactis

superes

michi,

idest о

imago

tu sola

superes,

idest

quod

non

Astianax.

a

Verg.

Aen.

II,

489

b

Prise.

nst.

ram.

VII,

5 cIbid.

dLuc.Phars.

,

99-100

1

quare

MS

2

uox

autem

MS

3

quare

MS

4

quare

MS

5

quare

MS

6

quareMS

7

aduerbii uocatiuiaduerbiinuocatiui S

8

quareMS 9nominatiuiS

QVAESTIO

Vila

Queritur

de huiusmodi diuiduis

multipliciter: rimum

de

significa-

tione,

secundo

de construct

one,

terciode

exigencia,

a

quo

habeant

re-

gi

in

constructione,

t

cum dicitur

4

isti

ncedentini1

quarto

de declina-

tone,

quinto

de

interrogatione,

cilicet

utrum

ad

aliquam

dictionem

in

interrogatione

ositam

habeant

responderi.

Antequam

uero de

significai

one discuciatur,

querendum

<est> in

tali

constructione,

n hoc

nomen bini1

n ui

aduerbii uel in ui

nominis

ponatur.

Quod

non

in

ui

aduerbii,

sic

potest

ostendi. Нес dictio bini

ortitur

accidencia

a

dictione casuali sibi adiuncta

et

ponitur

n

ui casualis dic-

tionis uel

aduerbii;

ergo

in

ui

casualis

dictionis.

Item. Нес dictio

bini

bi

ponitur

et

non determinai uerbum uel ali-

quid

loco uerbi

positum;

ergo

non

ponitur

duerbialiter

nec

significati-

one nec constructione.

Constat

ergo quod

ibi

ponitur

nominaliter.

Ergo

in

ui

nominis

substantiui

uel

adiectiui. Sed non

in ui

substantiui,

uia

si substantiue

21

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


poneretur,

onstrueretur

um

nomine

tarnmasculini

generis

quam

fe-

minini,

ut 'isti

ncedunt

ini 'iste

ncedunt

ini1

quod

falsumest. Restât

ergo quod in ui nominisadiectiuiponatur. Vnde habet significare li-

quam

proprietatem

n

existencia

uel

in

adiacencia.

Si

uero2

n

existen-

cia,

ergo per

se

ipsam

de se

ipsa potest

agi

in

locutione,

ut

dicatur

bini

sunt

bini'

sicut

dicitur

albedo st

albedo' Si

in

adiacentia,

ergo

illam

proprietatem

uam

significat,

abet

copulare.

Item.

A

generali

constructione

d

speciales

licet

descendere,

ut

que-

ratur sic.

Hoc

nomen bini

ignificat

liquam

proprietatem; rgo

quali-

tatem uel

quantitatem

uel relationem

tc. Si

qualitatem, ergo

ad

inter-

rogationem

factam

de

qualitate

conuenienter

potest

responderi.

Et sic

dicetur äquales nceduntsti ? bini term

Si

quantitatem,

ergo

continuam

uel discretam.

Sed

non

continuam;

quod

patet.

Non enim

significat orpus

uel

superficiem

el

lineam. Si

discretam,

ergo

numerum uel orationem. Sed

non

orationem,

ergo3

numerum.

Si

numerum,

ergo generaliter

uel

specialiter.

Si

generali-

ter,

ergo

eodem

modo

quod

hoc nomen numerus

ignificat

numerum.

Si

speciāliem ignificat

umerum,

nullus

alius est

numerus

quem

con-

ueniencius

significat

uam

binarium;

ergo

si

binarium,

conuenienter

dicetur de duobus

4

isti

unt

bini

Item. Si relationem, ut significat t relatioaccipitur n hac facúlta-

te

aut ut

in

dialetica. Sed

si

ut

in

gramatica,

ergo

habet

facere secun-

dam noticiam

de

re,

de

qua prius

sermo

precesserat,

cum

relatio,

ut

hic

accipitur,

sit

antelate

rei

significatio.

ed

<si>

ut

in

dialetica,

er-

go

est aliud

nomen

ad

quod

conuersim

reciprocetur.

Nomina

enim

ad

aliquid

in

respectu

dicuntur.

Constat

enim

quod

nec hoc nec

ilio modo

relationem

significat.

amen

dicit Priscianusa

quod

nomen

diuiduum

est,

quod

a duobus

uel

amplioribus

ad

singulos

habet

relationem

uel

plures

in

pares

números

distributos.

De

significatione

storumnominum dicimus

quod

significant

ro-

prietates.

Hoc

nomen

enim

bini

n hac constructione

isti

ncedunt

ini

significat

uandam

proprietatem,

cilicet

ncedere

ita

dispositi.

Ad

primum ergo

argumentum

sic

respondeo:

Hoc

nomen

aliquid

significat

ubstantiam;

ergo

ad

interrogai

onem factam

per

nomen

in-

terrogai

uum substantie

potest

responderi,

um

dicitur

4

quid

currit

ali-

quid

Non

enim

conueniens

est

responsio:

generalius

enim

semper

in

interrogatione,

iscrecius

uero

semper

in

responsione

poni

habet

ad

certificandumuerenti.Autoritāte ero Prisciani conuenienterdicitur

quod significat

elationem.

Sic

exponimus:

diuiduum

omen

st

quod

a

duobus el

amplioribus

d

singulos

abet

elationem

el

plures

tc.

habet

qui-

22

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


dem

relationem,

dest retrolationem

iue

recessum3,

ad

singulos

uel

plures,

quia

a

pluralitate4 uam proponit,

recedit

et facit

quasi

quar-

tamrelationem, dest recessumsiue decensumad singulossiue ad plu-

res

pluralitatesper pares

números

distributas.

Sequitur

de constructione.Hoc nomen

bini

construiturmediate in

hac

constructione um

hoc nomine

isti.

Significatio

uius

non

intelligi-

tur in

significatione

llius

nec

répugnât

significationi

llius.

Ergo

ex

eadem

parte

orationis

potest

construi cum

ilio.

Item.

6

Iste

dedit

ingulis ingulos

enarios

conuenienter dicitur. Hie

enim ex

duabus

dictionibus

singulos5

denariosntransitiue

onstructis

potest

fieri

ratio adminus

imperfecta;

rgo

lege

resolutionis

lli

duo

accusatiui in nominatiuos resolui possunt et uerbum actiuum <in

passiuum>

. Vnde

conuenienter

dicitur

singuli

denarii ati sunt lli ab

isto'

Item.

Apud

Ouidium

'

inde uis

uicibus

apiebant

ina

quietem

4 Ex hac

constructione

idebitur

posse

haberi,

quod

ex

parte suppositi

construi-

tur

hoc nomen

bina

cum hoc

uerbo

capiebant

quod

contra artem

est.

Ad hoc

dicimus

quod

hoc

nomen bini

emper

ex

parte appositi

debet

poni.

Et si

aliquando

ex

parte suppositi

ponatur

uel

causa metri

uel

alio

modo,

semper

redundat

in

appositum.

Instantiaprimiargumenti. 4Socrates st ramaticustmusicus' Isti6

[f.

33ra]

duo

nominatiui

gramaticus

t

musicus

mediate

construuntur um

hoc

nomine Socrates

t

significatio

nius non

intelligitur

n

significatio-

ne

alterius

nec

significationes

abent

contrarias;

ergo

immediate

pos-

sunt

adiungi.

Ad

secundum

de resolutione ic.

Dicimus

hee

dictiones

ingulos

de-

narios

rationem non

faciunt. Et

si

resoluantur,

am

alius erit

sensus.

Et

hoc

in

aliis

constructionibus idere

possumus,

ut in

istis

Jacio

e

doc-

tum' 'Jacio

ocratem

lbum

Jacio

emilitem1

Resoluantur enim

isti duo

accusatiui in nominatiuos. Et sic alter eorum eritex

parte

appositi,

alter ex

parte

suppositi.

Notandum etiam

quod

tria sunt

genera

adiectiuorum nominum.

Sunt enim

quedam

que

quandoque

construuntur

mediate cum

suis

fixis,

uandoque

inmediate,

ut

albus

gramaticus

musicus

t

similia.

Sunt alia

que semper

inmediate

cum

suo substantiuo uel ex

parte

appositi

uel ex

parte

suppositi

construuntur,

ut

hoc nomen

aliquod.

Conuenienter enim dicitur

4

aliquod

nimai

urriť

ť

uideo

liquod

nimai*

si enimdicatur aliquod urriťuel

4

aliquoduidetur'nichilest. Vnde eti-

am

socialia

dicuntur adiectiua. Non enim

sine

consorcio

alicuius

pa-

trocina

accedunt.

23

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Sunt item

¿dia

que

inmediate

construuntur antumet ex

parte

appo-

siti,

ut nomina

diuidua

bini,

terni t

huiusmodi.

Ad terciamrationemdicimusquod hoc nomen bini x parteappositi

construitur um

hoc uerbo

capiebant.

t

sic

est ille

uersus

intelligendus:

inde idest

eorum

luminum. Locutus

enim

erat

Ouidius

de

centum

oculis

Argi.

Et

ponitur

bi

aduerbium

pro

nomine

relatiuo.

Sequitur

de

exigentia.

A

quo exigatur

hoc nomen

bini.

Dicimus

quod

hoc

uerbum

incedunt

xigit

illud et

conferì lli

ibi

poni.

Sed non

sic

ponitur

et

mediante

quadam

proprietate

er

uerbum

innuitur,

ci-

licet

incedere

sic.

Sunt

enim

quedam

uerba

que

trahunt

post

se

nominatiuos

naturali-

ter,ut substantiuaet uocatiua, alia uero que non trahunt, ed7 si ap-

ponantur,

permittunt

icut

omnia uerba8

adiectiua.

Se enim

ingerunt

et

offerunt

n

constructione

huiusmodi

nomina,

ut

Sillenus

quamuis

nemo

uocaret,

adest. Eo

modo

habent

construi omnia

participia,

ut

4

proficit

egens ,

legit roficiens

Ponitur

autem hoc

nomen

ambo

partim

oco

nominis,

partim

oco

<ad>uerbi<i>

,

partim

participii,

<

partim

absolute

orationis.

In

ui

nominis,

quia

sua contrahit

ccidencia a

nomine;

in

ui

aduer-

bii,

quia quodam

modo uerbum

determinai,

scilicet

uantum

pertinet

ad hoc aduerbium sic in exemplo locutionis,cum dicitur incedentic

dispositi'

et in

ui

participii,

uia

tantundem fficit

n

hac

constructione

quam

facerethoc

participium

binati

el

conbinatisi

esset

in

usu;

abso-

lute

in

ui

orationis,

quia

huius

'sic

dispositi

De

declinatione

dicimus

quod

omnes

casus

suos habet

excepto

uoca-

tiuo

et

hoc

prohibente ignificatione.

Nullum

enim

nomen

diuiduum

uel

interrogai

uum

uel

distributiuum abet

uocatiuum. Et hac

ratione

non

potest

habere

uocatiuum,

quia

si

habere

,

cum

uocatiuus sit

pro-

prius

secunde

persone,

construeretur

um uerbo

secunde

persone,

ut

diceretur6bini urrite' taper conceptionem dditopronominesecunde

persone

ex

parte

subpositi

t

Î

diceretur uos

currite'

Si fiat

huiusmodi

argumentum:

hoc

nomen bini

habet

ablatiuum;

ergo

mediante

pronomine potest

construi

um uerbo

passiuo,

ut

dica-

tur

curritur

binis*

Fallacia

in

hoc

nomine

siqua.

De

interrogai

one

breuitur

dicendum

quod

nullum

interrogai

uum

9

est

inuentum d

quod positum

n

interrogatione

abeat

responden

nisi

hoc

nomen

quoti

si

sit

numerale

et

ordinale.

a

Prise.nst. ram.I, 31

b

Ovid.Met. , 6261

boniMS

2

sed

non

MS

3

sine ecessu

S

4

pluratione

S

5

et

del.

MS0

6

bis

os.

MS

7

si MS

8

nomina S

9

neutrum S

24

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


QVAESTIO

Villa

Quesitum est utrum hec totalis uox sit aliqua oratio, cuius hoc

nomen

Socrates

it

pars,

hec

scilicet hoc nomen

Socrates est

proprium

nomen'.

Dicunt

quia

quod

facit

nutus

corporis

demonstrationi

acte d1

ocu-

lum,

facitdemonstrationi

d

intellectum

omprolate

dictionis consor-

cium. Vnde

quemadmodum

nutus

corporis

non

est

de

aliqua

oratione,

similiternec

dictio

comprolata

in

predicta

oratione,

que

ibi tantum-

modo se

presentat,

ut demonstratio locum

habeat. Dicunt

autem

bene.

Et in

hoc

solo ab eis

dissentimus

quod

dicimus

ubique

fieri

demonstrationem d oculum, ubi excitatur quicumque sensus cor-

poreus,

ibi

uero

ad

intellectum,

ubi

ad

comprehendendum

rem

demonstratam olus sufficitntellectus.

Sed de hoc

alibi.

Huic

parti

huius

questionis

sie

obicitur.

'

Hoc nomen

Socrates

est

proprium'

Inter

partes

huius orationis

profertur

oc

nomen

Socrates t

iuuat

intellectum

rationis2;

ergo

est

pars

orationis

uel

pars

partis.

In-

terimimusmediam.

Non

enim

hoc

nomen iuuat

intellectum

rationis,

cum eadem sit oratio et

eiusdem

significationis,

osito

quod

de

hoc

nomine

Socrates

iat sermo.

Item. Cum dicitur4hoc nomen Socratis est nomen hec uox soloe-

cistica

est

neque propter

aliud nisi

propter

casuum

inconcinnitatem;

ergo comprolato

hoc

nomine

Socrates

n

nominatiuo

casu ceteris

dictio-

nibus erit

aliqua

ratio construendi nter

psum

et

aliquam

ceterarum

dictionum;

quare

erit

de

oratione.

Instantia. Ponatur

quod

iste nullum

sonum demonstret

t

dicat 'iste

onus

magnus

sť

inconuenienter

oqui-

tur nec

propter

aliud nisi

quia

non

demonstratur

onus;

ergo

si

[f.

33rb'

demonstret

onum,

erit

sonus de

oratione.

Neque

tamen

damus

quod

hec uox

'

hie

nominatiuus

Socratis st

nomennon sit

propter

liud

inconueniensnisi

propter

asuum

dissidentiam3.Non enim

habet uul-

tum

significandi.

Vnde etiam

male

dicitur: hec

uox

soloecistica

est.

Item.

Raciocinatur sic. Cum

dico 'iste

homo urriť

si addatur huic

uoci

hec uox asinus t

dicatur iste

homo sinus

urriť

fiet x

illis uocibus

una

uox,

sed

soloecistica.

A

simili. Cum

dico

'hoc

nomen

si

adiungam

hoc nomen

Socrateshuic uoci et dicam

'hoc nomen

Socrates est

proprium'

fiethoc

totum una uox.

Quero igitur

utrum

hec

totalis uox

'hoc

nomen

*

Socrates est

proprium

sit uox

significatiua

uel

non.

Si

uox

significatiua st, et complexa; ergo est oratio.

Item. Habetur

quod

alicuius

orationis

pars

est hoc nomen

Socrates.

Si

uox non

significatiua,

neque

soloecistica.

Qui

tamen

eam

profert,

parte

huius uocis uerum

significat.

25

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Et

nota

quod qui proferì

hanc

uocem,

ut huius

faciat

partem

hoc

nomen

Socratesnichil ea

significai.

Si

proferì

arn

certificans

er

hoc

pronomendemonstratiue, onuenienter oquitur; ergomelius oquitur

et

magis proprie, qui

profert

anc

uocem

'

hocnomen

st

ropriumquam

qui

profert

anc 'hoc nomen Socrates st

proprium

Vel

si soloecistica

est,

queratur

ut

possit

poni

concinne4.

Ad

hoc dicimus

quod

ex

hac uoce

4

hoc

nomen

st

proprium

et

ex hac

uoce

Socratesfïlcitur

uedam

uox

non-significatiua.

t caute circa hoc

est

respondendum.

Cum

enim dicitur

hec

uox 'hocnomen

Socrates

est

proprium

'

estoratio

,

falsitas

ocum

habet. Cum autem dico

4

hec ratio

4

hoc

nomen

Socrates

est

proprium

'est oratio

,

nugatio

incidit siue falsi

posit

o,

cum hec totalisuox non sit oratio.

Item.

Sit

quod

iste dicat

'hoc nomen

Socrates

est

proprium

et ille

dicat 'hoc nomen

Plato est

proprium

,

dicuntne isti idem uel non?

Nos dicimus

quod

diuersa dicunt

et de diuersis. Sed

queritur

utrum

diuersis orationibus

uel non. Si dicatur

quod

diuersis orationibus

agi-

tur de

diuersis,

non

poteris

assignare

nisi dicas

quod

hoc nomen Socra-

teset

hoc nomen Plato

sint

partes

istarum

propositionum

uel

partes

parcium.

Et

item

si

dicas

quod

isti diuersis

utuntur

rationibus,

quo-

rum unus dicit hocnomenst roprium, alius dicit hoc nomen Socrates

est

roprium

factademonstratione

d

idem,

non

poteris

ssignare

diffe-

rentiam,

nisi dicas

hoc

nomen

Socrates

sse

partem

huius

et non

illius;

quare

alterius istarum

hoc

nomen

Socrates

st

pars.

Dicendum

ergo

quod

eandem

propositionem

dicunt et

hii et illi.

Diuersa

tamen

signifi-

cant

propter

diuersas demonstrationes.

Ad alteram

partem.

Hoc nomen

homo est

ppellatiuum'

oniturhoc

pronomen

hoc

demonstratiuum

et demonstratiue

et

construitur n-

transitiue um

hoc

nomine

homo'

rgo per

ipsum

demonstratur

liquod

appellatumhuius nominis.

Item.

In hac oratione

ponitur

hoc nomen nomen

t

construitur

n-

transitiue um

hoc nomine homo nmediate ex

eadem

parte

orationis

t

non

sunt

sinonima6;

ergo

ibi

est

appositio.

Item.

Нее

dictiones nomenhomo in>

hac constructione

roprie

t

conuenienter

t

inmediate et ex eadem

parte

orationis

ponuntur;

utra-

que

est casualis

dictio

et intransitiue

diungitur

lii;

ergo

n

idemptita-

te accidencium.

Quodsi

hoc

nomen homo st

hic

neutri

generis,

eadem

ratione feminini

eneris

est,

cum

dicitur hecuox

homo est

liquiď'

si-

militermasculinigeneris,cum dicitur hic terminushomo est liquiď

Erit

igitur

masculini

et feminini

t

neutri

generis.

Secundum

hos

ed-

am totum Salterium

est

quedam

pars

cathegoricepropositionis.

Potest

26

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


enim

dici

'

hec

uox

beatus

uir 7

etc.

usque

ad

finem

est

aliquid

quod

forte

bsurdum

est.

Quesitum est etiam de hac constructione Ysaac interpretaturisus'

utrum

nomina

ponuntur

materialiter

uel

significatine,

trum etiam

uerbum

actiue uel

passiue

ponatur.

Quodsi

uerbum

ponatur

actiue,

cum sit

commune

quemadmodum

opinavi

falsa

est

locutio

aut

incon-

grua.

Quid

enim

est dicere

4

Ysaac

xponit

isus?

Si

ergo passiue

ponitur

et

construitur t cum

nominatiuo

antecendenteet cum

nominatiuo

se-

quente,

habet

uim

uerbi

substantiui

uel

uocatiui.

Item. Hic

ponitur

materialiter

el

significatine.

Quodsi

materialiter

ibi

ponitur

et

uerbum

passiue, poterit

fieri

xpositio

4

Ysaac

nterpretaturhocnomen 'risus'

quod

nichil

est.

Si uero

ibi

significatine onitur

et

uerbum

passiue,

poterit

ieri

xpositio,

ut dicatur

Ysaac

nterpretatur

oc

accusatiuo

risus' ;

quod

nichil est.

Dicimus

quod

nomina

ponuntur

nominaliter et

uerbum

passiue.

Sed

hoc

nomen

risus

ponitur

bi

et

ablatiue

et

nominatiue.

Ablatiue,

quia

instrumentum st

interpretationis;

ominatiue,

quia

in

tali

uoce

presentat

e

in

expositione,

ut

conformis it

expositio.

1

intellectum

dd.

MS,

sed

del.MSC

2

cum eadem

it oratio

dd.

MS,

seddel.

MS0 3dissidenteamS 4 inconcinneS 5 add.MS1 .m. 6 sinominia

MS

7

uix

MS

QVAESTIO

IXa

'

Socrates st homo

t

econuerso'

Нес

uox

econuerso

st uox

significatiua:

dictio uel

oratio?

Si diet

o,

ergo

aduerbium

uel

non

aduerbium.

Sic

ergo

hec

dictio

est

composita

ex

prepositione

t

dictione

casuali;

ergo

prepositio

edit

n

illam

partem

orationis,

cui

per

compositionem

oci-

atur. Si ilia est dictio casualis, ergo et composita. Sic enim uides in

ceteris:

adiungitur

huic

uerbo

legoper

compositionem

hec

prepositio

per

et

quod

inde

surget

uerbum erit.

Sic et

in

aliis.

SOLVTIO. Нес

consideratio

procedit

secundum

opinionem

ma-

gistři

Willelmi

de

Conchis.

Credebat enim

quod

eius

partis

orationis

esset

semper

dictio

composita,

cuius

est

simplex

dictio,

cui

per compo-

sitionem

diungitur

repositio.

Et

hoc

uidebatur

f.

33ua]

habere a

Pris-

ciano. Vnde

etiam

dicebat

quod

hec uox

inuicem ratio

est.

Si

et

dictio

esset,

secundum

eum,

cum

uicem

it nomen

esset

quoque

nomen,

quod

componitur x eo et prepositione, cilicet nuicem.

Sed

nos

sentimus

aliter. Et

quod

dicit

Priscianus

prepositionem

cedere

in

illam

partem,

cum

qua

componitur,

ic

intelligimus:

dest

ei

27

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


dictioni

obedit

et

famulatur;

sic

in

constructionem ictionis

omposite

innititur t iuxta Donatum

significationem

ius aut

complet

aut mutât

aut minuit. Illa autem dictio cui prepositiosociaturin compositione,

illa

dominatur

et eius

significatio otissimum

ttendit.Vnde dicit

Pri-

scianusa

quod

in

hac

dictione

absque

que

est sillabica adiectio.

Si

enim

compositio

esset,

eique

prepositio

iusque

in

compositione

principare-

tur

significatio.

Concedendum

igitur

llationem

argumenti,

ed

propter

liud

quam

alii,

ut ex dictis

iquet.

Item.

Нес dictio1

econuerso

st

aduerbium;

ergo

familiarius t

como-

dius

adherere

potest

uerbo

sine coniunctione

quam

interueniente

on-

iunctione,ut dicatur Socrates sthomo conuerso*

Item.

Нес

dictio

econuerso

omponitur

x

obliquo participii

t

prepo-

sitione;

ergo compositio

ilia

přecedit

n nominatiuo.

Instantia2

est

in

doctificatus

el

et am

in

projecto

Item.

Нес

uox

est

aduerbium,

scilicet

conuerso

ergo

potestcopulari

alii

aduerbio

per

copulatiuam

coniunctionem,

ut dicatur

1

Socrates

egit

et

econuerso

t bene'.

Propter

hec

immo et

propter

ueritatem

psam

dicimus

quod

hec

uox

econuerso

st oratio.

Sed obicitur.Нес prepositioe < in> hac uoce econuersoonstruitur

cum

ablatiuo;

huic

prepositioni

est

equipollens; ergo

ilia

loco huius

posset

poni

conuenienter.

nstantia. Interimenda st

media.

Vel

sic di-

catur:

in

hac circumlocutione

edum re

onitur

hoc

uerbum

ire'

ei

equi-

pollet

hoc uerbum

pergere'

rgo

et

ipsum potestponi

in ilia

circumlocu-

tione.

Item.

In

hac constructione

onitur

hec

casualis

dictio conuerso

n

ui

nominis

vel

participii;

sed

non in

ui

participii,

um cadat

ibi a

consig-

nificatione

emporis;

quare

in

ui nominis.

Ponitur

rgo

substantiue

uel

adiectiue. Sed non adiectiue, cum non ibi alicui posito substantiue

uel3 subintellecto

nnitatur;

quare

substantiue

ponitur.

Substantiue;

ergo

ad

ipsum

potest

fieri elatio. Instantia.

'

De

homine

oquitur

ste

qui

dicit homo urrit))y

Non

tamen ad

hunc

ablatiuum homineubstantiue

posito potest

fierirelatio.

Vel

sic.

'Iste est

doctior

olito'

Item. Ibi

ponitur

ubstantiue;

ergo

ei

potest diungi

aliquod

adiecti-

uum. Instantia.

Нес uox

siquo

est

aliquis

ablatiuus;

ergo

ei

potest

apponi

in

constructione

repositio.

Vel in eo

quod

est doctiorolito.

Item.

In

hac constructione

onstruitur

repositio

cum

ablatiuo sin-

gularis

numeri substantiue

posito;

ille ablatiuus habet

plurale

non de-

ficiens

n

aliquo

casu;

ergo

hec

prepositio

e

potest

construi

cum abla-

28

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


tiuo

plurali,

ut

dicatur

4

Socrates

st

homo t

econuersis'Fallacia.

4

Opus

est

michi ac

re' Non

tamen

potest

dici

4

opera

michi unt

hac

re'

Vel

in eo

quod

4

interest e

Sed

circa

signifìcationem rauior

erit

obiectio,

cum

dicitur

4

Socrates

est

homo t

conuerso;

rgo

omo

st

ocratesuel 'uter

ue

storumsthomo

ergo

homo st

uterque

storum'Нас

argumentatione xplicatur

aliquod

argu-

mentum: cum sola

propositio

uel

aliquid

explens

officium

ropositio-

ns sit

argumentum,

přecedit

propositio

uel aliud

constructionem

uod

est

argumentum

d

eam,

sed non hec

propositio

4

uterque

storumstho-

mo' est

argumentum

d hanc

constructionem homo

st

uterque

storum'

Quare

hec

oratio

4

econuerso

ibi

est

argumentum

d

eam

et ita hec

ora-

tio 4econuersosignificaiuerum uel falsum. Et si hoc est, significaiue-

rum

uel falsum

uppositiue,

sicut hec

4

Socratem

sse

hominem

,

uel

enun-

ciatiue sicut hec

propositio

4

Socrates st

homo' Si

suppositiue, significai

uerum uel

falsum;

et si hoc

est,

significare otest

hec

oratio

uerum uel

falsum

suppositiue4,

cum dicitur

4

Socrates st

homo

t

econuerso

rgo

ad

perfectionem

rationis

potest

ei

adiungi

aliquod

uerbum. Si enunciati-

ue,

significat

erum uel falsumet

prout

habet

significan

n

aliqua

pro-

position;

significai

rgo compositum

intellectum

parcium

constituti-

uum. Si enunciai hec

oratio

'econuerso'adde

hominem;

ergo

aliqua

pars constituitntellectumde homine; quod falsumest.

Ad hoc

dicunt

quidam quod

hec

uox econuersoon

est

significatiua;

hic

tamen

ponitur

ad

significandum.

Sed hec

responsio

non

soluit

questionem.

Ideoque

contrario

modo

soluimus dicentes

quod

hec uox

econuersoox est

significatiua.

n hac tamen

constructione

4

Socrates st

homo

t conuerso' ichil

significat,

ed

tantummodo

ponitur

ad innuen-

dum

quod

conuertatur

hec

propositio simpliciter

4

Socrates

sthomo'

Item.

In

hac constructione

Socrates

st

homo t

onuertitur'

onitur

hoc

uerbum

in

ui

uerbi;

ergo

ibi

est

personale

uerbum uel

impersonale.

Si

impersonale

est et

impersonaliter onitur

bi,

ergo

ibi

equipollet

huic

orationi

4

conuersio

it'

Quare

si

omnes taceant

preter

lium

qui

dicit

4

Socrates st

homo t

econuerso'mentitur

lle

qui loquitur.

Si

igitur

uer-

bum

personale

est

et

personaliter

positum,

exigit

sibi

adiungi aliquem

nominatiuum uel

aliquid

loco

nominatiui

cui

apponat,

uel

adiungen-

dum

exigit

subintelligi.

Quare

sensus

erit:

Socrates est homo

et

con-

uertitur,

dest

Socrates

est

homo

et

conuertitur

redicatio

storum er-

minorum

Socrates homo uel

conuertitur hec

propositio

4

Socrates st

homo' Si5 intelligenda st conuersiopredicationis,falsumeritquod sic

dicitur

4

Socratesst

homo t

onuertitur'Non enim

Socrates

predicatur

de

homine,

cum

non

predicetur

minus de

maiori. Si uero

intelligendum

29

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


est

de

conuersione

propositionis,

falsum est

ergo quod

sic

dicitur

4

bo-

nům

est

mancipium

t conuertitur'

Cum

enim

dicitur

4

mancipium

st

bonum' impedit f.33vb]uariatio termini onuersionem.Et item uera

erit

hec

4

omnis omo st

nimal

t

conuertitur

Conuersio enim

huius

pro-

positionis

fit

per

accidens.

Ad

hoc dicimus

<quod>

de

conuersione

propositionis

ntelligen-

dum

est. Tamen falsum

est

quod

sic dicitur

omnishomo

st

nimal

t

conuertitur'Non enim

dicitur

propositio

conuerti,

nisi conuertatur

simpliciter.

Ex his licet

colligerequod

falsa est

argumentatio

hec

4

Socrates

st

homo

et

econuerso;

rgo

omo st

ocrates'

non

enim

sequitur, quod

si conuerta-

turhec propositio4Socratessthomo lhomo stSocrates' cum nec etiam

sequatur

quod

si uera

est

hec

propositio

4

homo

stSocrates'

t

sit homo

Socrates,

et homo

sit

Socrates et

Socrates est

homo;

ergo

Socrates

est animal.

a

Prise.

nst.

ram.

IV, 44,

49

1

liq

add.

MS,

sed

del. MSC

2

ut

MS

3

adiectiue

dd.

MS,

sed

del.

MS0

4

sicut

ec ratio ocratemsse

hominem

el

nunciatiueicut ec

propositio

ocrates

est

homo

i

suppositiue

ignificai

erum

el

falsumdd.

MS

5

sedMS

QUAESTIO

Xa

In

hoc

uerbo

tonat

ntelligitur

ominatiuus;

et

non

est

ratio

quare

magis

intelligatur

ste

nominatiuus

Iupiter

uam

iste Saturnus

ergo

uterque

in

eo

intelligitur

el

neuter. Sed

falsum

est

quod

neuter;

ergo

uterque.

Non

ergo

definitus

n

hoc

uerbo

intelligitur

ominatiuus.

SOLVTIO. Neuter istorumnominatiuorum

n

hoc

uerbo

intelligi-

tur.

Dicitur tamen definitus

nominatiuus

intelligi

n

hoc

uerbo,

idest

definitum

uppositum

nominatiue. Et

distinguimus

ic:

in

uerbo

pri-me

persone

et certus nominatiuus et certum

suppositum intelligitur;

similiter

n

uerbo

secunde.

In

uerbo

tercie

persone

quod

est

excepte

actionis,

intelligitur

ertum

suppositum,

sed

non certus nominatiuus.

In

aliis

autem uerbis tercie

persone

utrumque intelligitur

nfinite.

Item.

In hoc

uerbo tonat

ntelligitur

efinitus

nominatiuus;

determi-

natur

ergo

per

figuram;

ergo

inconuenienter

i

adiungunt.

Fallacia.

4

Lego

Virgilium'

Etenim

in

hoc uerbo

lego ntelligitur

ic

nominatiuus

ego'

potest

tamen

secundum Priscianuma

ei

conuenienter ddi.

Item. Hoc uerbum tonat abet uel non habet plurale. Si caretplura-

li,

ergo

uel fortuna el necessitate. Si tamen

fortuna,

non

ergo

necessi-

tate.

Quare

potest

habere

plurale.

Si

uero

caret

plurali

necessitate,

r-

30

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


go

causa

significationis

el inconcinnitate

lementorum. Sed

non

in-

concinnitate

elementorum;

ergo

causa

significationis.

ed

hoc item

falsumest. Descriptioenimhuius uerbi tonarescilicet xcercere talem

actionem

pluraliter

otest ssignari aliquibus,

ut

dicatur celiexercent

a-

lem

ctionem

.

SOLVTIO.

Hoc uerbum tono abet

plurale.

Inueniturenim 4ntonu-

ere

oli

b

et

alibi

4

per

altum

onantes

upiter

git quos'c.

Sed obicitur: hoc

uerbum

est uerbum

excepte

actionis

et

habet

plurale

tonamustonatis

tonant.

uare

tonantst

uerbum

excepte

actionis.

Quod

quidem

uerum

est,

sed non in

hac uoce.

Item.

Hoc

uerbum tonat st

aliquod

uerbum,

cuius

unum

participi-

um est tonansQuare hoc uerbum tonat otestresolui in ipsumet uer-

bum

substantiuum,

ut

idem sit dicere tonat1 t

1

tonans sť Docet enim

Priscianus

omne uerbum

personale

posse

resolui

in

cognatum partici-

pium

et

uerbum

substantiuum.

Et

Aristotilesd icit

nichil aliud

esse

hominem

ambulare

quam

hominem

ambulantem esse.

SOLVTIO.

Conuenienter

quidem

potest

resolui hoc uerbum tonat

in

uerbum

substantiuum

t

cognatum

participium,

ed non

cum dici-

tur

tonat

er

se. Et refellimus ictum

argumentum

4

Socratesst ns'. Hic

non

potest

est

resolui.

Et item

4

Socrates st

magis

ustus

uam

ortis'

Hie

non

potest

hec oratio

magis

ustus1 esolui in

comparatiuum

et

fortis2.

4

Socratesst

magis

ustior

uam

orcior

lato . Hic

non

potest

comparai

uus

resolui

in

positiuum

et

magis

duerbium.

Item.

<In> hac constructione

4

dum

tonat,

luiť

ponitur

hoc

uer-

bum

absolute tonat

et sic

positum

notât

alteram

actionum

que

sese co-

mitare

ostenduntur;

huius uerbi adest

participiumpresentis

emporis;

ergo

ablatiuo illius

posito

participii, ui prorsus

casus est

absolutionis,

conuenienter

poterit

dici

4

tonante

luiť

SOLVTIO.

Нес constructio

4

tonante

luiť

est

incongrua,

etsi

apudIacobum in

Comento

super

Elenchos

inueniatur

4

pluente

ccid.it

erram

madidam

ieri

idest

dum

pluit,

ut notatur

uod

mos

Grecorum est abla-

tiuum

participii

quod

decendit

a

uerbo

excepte

actionis

ponere

per

se

et

absolute. Moriatur ita

argumentum

4

dum

Plato

disputât,

pse

curriť

Non

tarnendici

potest

4

Plato

disputât

pso

cúrrente'

Et

nota

quod

hec uerba

diescit,

duesperascit

erba

sunt

onge

alterius

nature

quam

hoc uerbum tonat. llis

enim

nullus

potest

ssociari nomi-

natiuus;

adeo

definitus

st nominatiuus

uerbi.

Item.

4

Et tonat t egit ocrates' Hic fit opulatio dictionum uel non.

Quod

dictiones

opulentur,

ie

uidetur

astruendum:

hac3

uocum

iunc-

tura

proferuntur

uo

uerba

preposita

et

interposita

oniunctione;

et

31

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


sequitur aliquis

nominatiuus;

ergo

res illorum

uerborum

ad

rem illius

nominatiui

referende

unt;

et ita

ibi est

copulatio

dictionum.

Fallacia.

4

LegoetSocratesurriť Dicendum est quod ibi copulanturorationes se-

cundum

quosdam

et

non est

assignare que.

Sicut

dicitur

uod

hec

pre-

positio

de construitur um

ablatiuo

casu,

in

hac

constructione

de

<(tui}

quoque

dubitauerunťest non

assignare

cum

quo.

Vel

pocius

dicendum

est

quod

hie

quedam

dictio

copulatur

orationi,

sed

que

uim orationis

habet.

Item. <In>

hac

constructione

4

incipit

onare

ponitur

hoc uerbum

incipit

t in

eo

intelligitur

efinitus4

nominatiuus;

ergo gratia

huius

uerbi tonare el

gratia

sui

ipsius.

Sed non

gratia

huius

infinitiui.

Non

enim infinitiuus ominatiuumexigit.Quare inhoc uerbo incipitntel-

ligitur

nominatiuus

definitus

ratia

sui

ipsius.

Quare

hoc

uerbum

inci-

pit

est

uerbum

excepte

actionis,

cum sit

tercie

persone.

Dicimus

quod

huic

uerbo

incipit

n

hac

iunctura uocum

hie

infinitiuus onare

onfert,

ut in eo

intelligatur

definitus

nominatiuus,

quemadmodum

et huic

pronomini

pse

onfert

oni

in

prima persona

hoc

pronomenego

ubau-

ditum,

hie scilicet

4

ipse

ego1

Item.

lTonať'

ergo

tonare est

uerum;

et

de

loue

est uerum

tonare;

ergo

quod

est

uerum,

est

uerum

de

loue. Et

ita

quod

est

uerum,

est

uerumde aliquo; quod rationiobuiat.

Dicimus

quod

tonare

st

enunciabile

et

ita

non est uerum. Et

interi-

mimus

primum argumentum

sic.

4pse

lego; rgo

psum

egere

st

uerum

Si tamen

daretur

quod

tonare st

aliquod

uerbum;

non

tamen dicen-

dum

quod

idem sit uerum de

aliquo;

et

tamen tonare

est uerum de ali-

quo,

sed aliter et aliter

tonare.

Item.

4

Socrates

onando

isputať

Hic non

bene dicitur.

nnuitur

nim

quod

dum

tonat,

Socrates

ipse disputât;

quod

est

mentiri

positione.

Etenim ablatiuus

gerundii

adiunctus uerbo hoc modo

semper

solet

ad

idem referri d

quod

refertur erbum, ut ibi '

frigidus

n

pratis

antando

rumpiturnguis

f,

dest dum incantatur.

Quodsi

ad

aliud

illud

tonando

referatur,

t

sit sensus:

Socrates

disputât,

dum

Iupiter

tonat,

sic

pote-

rit

dici

4

Socrates ormiendo

isputať

idest dum alius

dormit;

quod

tamen

locutio

non habet

significare.

a

Prise. nst.

ram.

II,

4

b

Verg.

Aen.

,

90

c

Ног. С.

I,

34,

7

d

Arist.

De

interpr.

1 b 9-10

c

Prise.

nst.

ram.

VII,

190

f

Verg.

el.

VIII,

71

1

fortis

S

2

iustusMS iustum SC

3

hancMS

4

intusMS

32

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


APPENDIX

[f. 30rb'Diuiduum estquod a toto decendit npartes. Sed diuiduorum

quoddam partitur

pluralitatem

n

singularitates,

quoddam

pluralita-

tem

in

minores

pluralitates.

Eorum

que pluralitatem

n

singularitates,quoddam

est diuiduum

tantum,

quoddam

collectiuum

et

diuiduum.

Eorum

que

tantum diuidua

sunt,

quoddam

uniuersale

est,

quod-

dam

duale.

Quod

uniuersale

est,

quandoque

cedit

in

particularitatem,

uando-

que

in

relationem,

quandoque

in

demonstrationem.

Cedit inparticulatitatem: uandoque aliam sequituruniuersitatem,

ut

'

omnis

homo

b

omnihornině

ifferť

idest omnis

ab

aliquo;

similiter

'

utrumque

b

utroque ifferť

idest

utrumque

ab altero. Nec mirum

si

uniuersitas cedit

in

particularitatem,

uia

est ubi

sequens

uniuersitas

negationem

habet et cedit

in

particularitatem,

t

neutrum

deriuatur,

idest neutrum ab

altero,

ubi etiam uniuersitas

duplex

dampnum

habet,

negationis

scilicet

et

uniuersitatis.

In

relationem,

ut

'

mouit

b omni

uisque

uam statione atem

a,

idest a

sua. Nullam

enim ratem mouet

quisque

ab omni stacione.

In demonstrationem edit, ut Ю matres udite ubi

queque

Latine b.

Dicit

Priscianusc

quod

ubi

poniturpro ubicumque;

st

ergo

sensus: ubi-

cumque queque

estis,

idest ubi uos estis.

Illud

quod

duale

est,

tripliciter

ollectiue

ponitur:

constructione t

significatione,

ignificatione

t non

constructione,

constructione

et

non

significatione.

Significatione

t

constructione,

t

apud

Ouidium

4

in

magnis

esi

rebus

uter

ue

sumus^.

Significatione

t non

constructione,

t

apud

Macrobium 'inter ibros

Piatonis

t

Ciceronis

uos

uterque

e re

publica

constituiťe idest

quos

illi

composuerunt.

Constructione

et

non

significatione,

t

'

artis t

ingenue

ultor

terque

sumusf.

Eorum

que

collectiua sunt et

distributiua,

uedam

determinata unt

secundum

numerum,

quedam

indeterminata iue

hec

siue

illa a

collec-

tione

ordiantur

et

terminům

ponant

in

distributione.

Determinata

sunt

secundum

numerum,

ut

ambo.

Quod

autem

totus

est circa continuamquantitatem,est ambo irca discretam. Vel:

'

totus

enim

totum

comprehendit

nec

partes relinquit.

Vnde non est uerum

1

totus ocrates st

Socrates el

totus Socrates

est

pars

Socratis'

sed

'

totus

33

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Socrates

stSocrates

el

pars

Socratis'

Similiter

non

est uerum

'

ambo sta

sunt

plura

uel ambo

sta sunt

unum'

sed 'ambo sta

sunt

plura

uel

unum'

Cum ergohoc nomen duotantum collectionemhabeat, uterqueantum

distributionem,

mbomedium est et ea ambo

omplecitur;

quare

collec-

tionem habet

cum distributione.

Indeterminatumest

secundum

numerum,

ut

singuli.

Hoc

duobus

modis

ponitur

<

in

> constructione

uandoque quod

modo aduerbia-

liter x

parte predicati,

ut isti

ncedunt

inguli

ita

dispositi; quandoque

ex

parte

subiecti

et

distributiue,

t

singuli

ominessunt omines'

in

qua

positione

idem

facit circa2 essentiam

communem,

quod

ambo

circa

determinatum.

Eorum

que

pluralitatem parciuntur

in minores

pluralitates,

que-

dam determinata unt secundum

numerum,

quedam

indeterminata.

Determinatorum

quedam

determinata

sunt

secundum numerum

quem

diuidunt,

quedam

determinata

sunt secundum

numerum

in

quem

diuidunt

siue

per quem.

Determinata sunt

secundum numerum

quem

diuidunt,

ut

uterque'

non

enim

quaternarium

excedit. Idem

etiam

determinatum

st

secun-

dum numerum

in

quem

diuiditur;

diuiditurenim

per

binarios.

Determinata sunt secundum numerumin quem diuidunt,ut bini

terni.Sed

non secundum

numerum

quem

diuidunt.

Quotcumque

enim

demonstrentur,

i

pares

sint,

potest

dici 'isti

comedunt

ini

uel

terni.

Indeterminatorum secundum3

numerum

quedam

simplicem

ha-

bent

collectionem,

quedam

duplicem.

Simplicem

ollectionemut

quilibet

n

plurali;

ex

eo

scilicet

quod

plurale

est. Omne

enim

nomen

plurale

collectionemhabet.

Duplicem

abet,

ut

hoc nomen

omnia

quia

unam

ex

eo

quod

est

plu-

rale,

aliam ex eo

quod

ea

quandoque

que

debentdistribui4,

olligit,

ut

'omnia

predicamenta

unt

decem'

idest

ea

que

sola sunt

predicamenta,

sunt

decern.

a

Luc.

Phars.

ll,

524-5

bVerg.

Aen

VII,

400

(

Prise.,

nst.

ram.

VII,

49

d

Ovid.

A.A.

V,

114

eMacrob. om.

, 1,

1

'Ovid.

E.P.

II, 5,

66

1

ut

singuli

omines

is

pos.

MS

2

secundum

umerum

S,

sed

сотт.MS

3

suntMS

4

distribuere

S

Nijmegen

Katholieke

niversiteit

34

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

1

1983)

Philosophical cepticismn England in theMid-Fourteenth entury

LEONARD

A.

KENNEDY,

C.S.B.

It

is

well

known

that,

in

the second

quarter

of the

fourteenth

en-

tury,

here

was

great

distrust

f

the

ability

of

philosophy

to arrive

at

certainty n themost importantmatters. For example, many writers

claimed

that

philosophy

can

not

prove

that

God

exists;

or that He is

omnipotent,

omniscient,

free,

or

unique;

or that the

human soul is

immortal.These

are difficult

oints

to

establish,

of

course,

and

it

may

not be considered

strange

for

philosophers

o

doubt reason's

ability

to

establish

them. But

the

philosophers

we are

writing

of went much

further. ome

weakened

confidence

in the

rightness

of

the

natural

moral order

by

saying

that

t

could be different

han

t

s;

that

God,

for

example,

could

have established

a moral order

in

which we would be

requiredto hate Him, or that He could establishsuch an ordernow.

Others

weakened confidence

n

our natural

knowledge

of the world

about

us

by

saying

thatwe cannot be certain

of

the

substantiality

f

the

physical

world,

or the

reality

f

what

appears

to be efficient

ausality.

It

is this ast

type

of

distrust

f

philosophy

with

which thisarticle

will

dead:

concerning

he

substantiality

f the

physical

world,

and the reali-

ty

of

what

appears

to be efficient

ausality.

And

consideration

will

be

limited

o

English

writers

f the decade

or two

before

1350

A.D. Other

writings

ave

dealt

with

this

subject

in

a more

general

way,1

but none

have shown in sufficient etail the extentof this

type

of

thinking

n

England,

though

much attention has been

given

to its

existence

in

Paris,

no doubt because

it

was censured there.

We

might begin by

studying

the

teaching

of

one of the Parisian

teachers

who incurred

censure,

Nicholas

of

Autrecourt

c.

1300

-

c.

1350).

In

his

second

letter

o

Bernard

of

Arezzo,

Nicholas reduced

all

certitude,

except

that

of

faith,

to the certitude

of the

principle

of

1D. Trapp,Augustiniánheologyj the 4th enturyin: Augustiniana,I (1956),

146-274;

.

Michalski,

a

Philosophie

uXIVe

iecle,

reprint)

rankfurt

969;

G.

Leff,

The issolution

f

he

MedievalutlookNew

York,

976.

35

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


non-contradiction

which

he

called

the

first

rinciple)

or

what can be

resolved

into it:

Tertiumorollarium.. estquod,exceptaertitudineidei, ulla st lia cer-

titude»

isi ertitudo

rimi

rincipii

el

ue

n

primumrincipiumotest

esolvi.2

And he

saw

clearly

that

it

cannot

be deduced

from he

first

rinciple

that accidents exist

in

substances

or

that

events

require

causes. As

Nicholas

put

it,

fromthe

known existence of one

thing

t cannot be

inferred,

with

evidence

reducible

to

the

certitude

f the

first

rinciple,

that another

thing

exists:

Ex eo

quod liqua

res

st

ognita

sse,

non

otest

videnter,

videntia

educta

n

primumrincipiumel ncertitudinemrimi rincipii,nferriuod liares it.3

Nicholas

applied

this fundamental

principle

to our

knowledge

of

efficient auses and

our

knowledge

of

substances.

As concerns

causes,

he

said

in his

letter o

Giles

of

Medonta that

the

first

rinciple

does not

entail

accepting

that

natural

causes will

produce

their effects

ven if

the

causes

are

unimpeded:

Nam,

emonstratis

mnibus

ue

sunt

equisita

d

effectus,

otero

ustinere,

ine

aliqua

ontradictione

ue

posset

nferriontra

me,

uod

ffectus

uiusmodion

erit.4

He admitted

in his

Universal

reatise

hat a certain

expectation

of

these

effectss built

up

by

experience,

but refused o call this

certitude:

Tertia ecima

onclusiost

uod

de scitis

er xperientiam

liomodo

uo

dicitur

sciri..

adamas ttrahit

errum,

abeturolum abitus

onjecturativus,

on

er-

titudo...

Esto

uod

liquid

it

roductum

t

n

pluribus;

on

st

amen ertum

an sicdebeat

sse

n futurum.5

Nicholas

applied

this ame

doctrine

o

our

knowledge

of

substances.

He saw

that it could

not be deduced from

the

first

principle

that,

because

appearances

exist,substancesexist; that s, that the existence

of one

thing

known

(appearances)

implies

the

existence

of

another

thing

substances).

According

to

him,

we do not see substances direct-

ly

(

ntuitive

.

Nor can

we reason to

their

xistence

with

certainty,

ince

the existence

of one

thing

cannot be

proven

with

certainty

romthe

existence

of another.

2

J

Lappe,

Nicolauson

utrecourt

Beiträge

urGeschichteer

hilosophie

esMittelalters

Band

VI,

Heft

,

Münster,

908,

*.

3 Ibid.9*.

4

Ibid.,

9V

5

J.

R.

O'Donnell,

Nicholas

f

Autrecourt,

n: Mediaeval

tudies,

(1939),

37.

36

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Et

deo

st

quia

de talire

substances]

abuissetoticiam

nte

mnem iscur-

sum

quod

nonest

verum,

um

non

ppareant

ntuitive...

Nec

sciuntur

x

discursu,

cilicetnferendox

perceptis

sse nte mnem

iscursum,

uia

ex una

renonpotestnferriuod lia res it. ..6

To

this

teaching

Nicholas allowed

one

exception;

he

said

he

could

know

his

own

soul.7

Possibly

he

thought

he had

direct

knowledge

of

t.

And

Nicholas did not

see

how

we

can have even

probable

knowledge

f

substances,

though

we can

of

causes,

because

probability

is

based on

past

certainty.

We

know

with

probability

that

our hand

will

feel

warm

ifwe

put

it

near

fire,

because

we are

certain t

did

in

the

past,

but we cannot

know with

probability

that

substances

exist

because we have never been certain thattheyever did.

...

quia

michi

uit

videns

liquando uod, uando onebam

manumd

ignem,

eram

alidus,

deo

probabile

st michi

uod,

si

nunc

ponerem,uod

essem

calidus. ed ex

regula upra

icta

equitur

uod nunquam

uit

licui videns

quod,

ositis

stis

ebus

pparentibus,

nte mnem iscursum

ssent

uedam

lie

res,

tpote

lie

ue

dicuntur

ubstantie.

giturequituruod

de

existentiaarum

non

habeamus

robabilem

oticiam.8

Having

established

that

we cannot

have

certainty

oncerning

auses

and

substances because

certainty

omes

only

fromthe

first

rinciple,

Nicholas added

a

second reason

why

we cannot be certain that

there

are causes and substances: we cannotbe sure thatGod's power is not

replacing

secondary

causes

or

substituting

or

substances.

Item,

ixi

pistola redicta

5th

Letter o

Bernard]

uod

nescimusvidenter

quod

liqua

ausacauset

fficienter

ue

non

itDeus.9

Nam

um

pparentibus

..

potest

sse

per liquam otentiam,

tpote

ivinam,

quod

bi

ubstantia

on it.10

If one

were

to

say

that we

could be sure a cause

or

a substance

is

there

provided

God

is

not

working

miracle,

Nicholas

was

ready

with

an answer:

Et, idicit

uod onsequentia

st videns,ddito d antecedens

uod

Deusnon

faciat

miraculum,

stud

eprobatur

ecunduma

que

dicta unt

n

simili

n

epistola

rima

d Bernardům.11

In

his

first etterto

Bernard,

Nicholas had

explained

that one could

argue

that,

f

one had

sight

f an

object,

he

could

be

certain t

existed,

provided

God

was not

acting

miraculously:

6

J.

Lappe,

econdetter

o

Bernard,

2*.

7

See

n.

15.

8

J. Lappe,

econdettero

Bernard,

3*.

9 Ibid.Discussiot eprobatiorrorumagistřiicolai32*.

10

Ibid.,

econdetter

o

Bernard,

3*.

11

bid.

37

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Sed

forsan

icetis..

quod,

icet x

visione on

ossit

nferri

biectumisum

sse

quando

isio

onitur

n

sse

causa

upernaturali

el

onservaturb

psa,

arnen

quando

posita

st

n

esse a

causisnaturalibus

recise,

oncurrente

nfluentia

generalirimigentis,unc otestnferri.12

But

Nicholas

responded

to

this

rgument

hat,

f

one

cannot be

certain

of a

conclusion without

using

an

antecedent

of

which

he is not

certain,

he

is not

certain of the

conclusion. If

he is not

certain

that a cause

is

present

or

that

substance

s

present

unless he

assumes that

God is

not

acting

miraculously,

he

cannot

be certainof

the

cause or

the substance

because he

cannot be

certain

that God

is not

acting miraculously;

his

would be

only

believed.

Nam, uando liquis on st ertus ealiquo onsequenteisimedianteliquo

antecedente

e

quo

an ita

sit icut

ignifcat

on st

ertus

videnter,

uia

nec

illud

stnotumx

terminisec

xperientia

ec x

talibus eductised antum

st

creditum,

alis on

st videnter

ertus e

consequente.13

Nicholas

thus,

forthe two

reasons

given,

remained firm

n

his con-

tention

hatwe

cannot

be certain

of

causes

or of

substances

except

our

own

soul).

And,

in

his fifth

etter o

Bernard,

he went

much

further

n

his

denial

of our

ability

to

know

causes. He

had

already taught,

as we

have

seen,

that

we do

not know

with

certainty

whether

particular

f-

fect s caused bya natural cause orbyGod. In hisfifthetterhe taught

that

we do

not know with

certainty

whether

particular

effect an

be

caused

by

a

naturali

ause.

Indeed,

there

s no

demonstration

y

which

the

existenceof

any

auses

might

be

demonstrated rom

he

existence

of

an

effect.

Nicholas's fifthetter

s not

extant,

but

he

refers

o it

in

his

letterof

defence:

Item,

ixi

pistola

redicta

uod

nescimusvidenter

uod

lia Deo

possint

sse

cause

licuius fTectus.

..

Item,

ixi

pistola

redictauod

nescimusvidenter

utrum

liquis

fTectusit

velesse

possit

aturaliter

roductus.

..

Item,

ixi

n

epistola redicta

uod

nulla

otest

sse

impliciter

emonstratio

ua

existentia

causarumemonstreturxistentiafTectus.14

Nicholas seems

to have

come

to the

conclusion that

causes,

like

substances,

are not

known

directly

but are

reasoned

to;

and

that,

accordingly,

not

only

are we

not certain

that a

particular

thing

has

caused

another

thing,

but we are not

certain that

there

are

causes

at

all.

This would

apply

to

divine

causality

also,

of

course. Then

causes

would be

like

substances: since we

have never been

certain of

their

12Ibid., irstetteroBernard,*.

13

bid.

14

bid.

Discussio

t

ерто

atió

rrorum

agistři

icolai

32*

-

33*.

38

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


existence,

we cannot

have even

probable

knowledge

of

them. But

Nicholas did not draw this

ast

conclusion.

He did, however,draw a finalconclusionresulting romhis theory

of

our

knowledge

of substances.

Apart

from

ur

soul,

as we have

seen,

we cannot

have

certain

or

even

probable

knowledge

of

the existenceof

material

substances;

this

means,

Nicholas

inferred,

that our

knowledge

of

mmaterial

ubstances,

such

as

God,

is

extremely oor,

since

they

are

less knowable

by

us than

material

substances are:

Ex

sta

egula

.. infero

uod

nunquam

ristoteles

abuit oticiamvidenteme

aliqua

ubstantia

lia ab anima ua. ... Et si de

coniunctis

on

habuit,

multo

minus

e

abstractisabuit oticiam

videntem.15

We

thus see that Nicholas of Autrecourt

aught

s

follows.As concerns

substances,

we

cannot be certain than

any

exist

except

our own

soul).

One reason

for

this

is

(a)

that

we do

not

experience

substances but

reason

to their

existence,

and this

reasoning

does not

have

certainty

because its evidence is not

reducible

to

that

of

the

first

principle.

Another reason is

(b)

that

God

might

be

miraculously allowing

accidents to

exist

in

themselves.

As

concerns

efficient

auses,

we cannot

be certain that

they

exist.

One reason for his s (a) that we do not have certainty hat4'effects'

require

causes,

since what

assurance we have of this

s

not

reducible

to

the

certainty

f the

first

rinciple.

Another

reason is

(b)

that

God

could

be

miraculously

dispensing

with

secondary

causes.

When

Nicholas's

teaching

was

censured

by

the Roman

Curia

in

Avignon

in

1346,

he did not

say

that

probable

knowledge

of

substances and causes

was,

though

not

as

good

as

certain

knowledge,

still

quite good.

As concerns

causes,

this

path

was

followed

by

his

con-

temporary,

ohn

of

Mirecourt,

a

Cistercian

at

Paris whose

statements

werecensured

by

the

University

fParis in 1347.

John

was

upbraided

for

aying

that t

cannot be

proven

with

evidence

reducible to the cer-

titude of

the first

rinciple

that

something

s the

cause of

something

else:

Non st

probatum

emonstrativex

propositionibuser

e

notis

t

evidentibus

evidentia

obis eductad

certitudinem

rimi

rincipii

uod

Deus

sit

..,

sicut

nec

liquid

sse

ausam

lterius...,6

15Ibid., econdetteroBernard,2*.

16

F.

Stegmüller,

ie

zwei

Apologien

es

ean

e

Mirecourt,

n:

Recherches

e

théologie

anciennet

medievale,

(1933),

6.

39

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


In his

defence

John

said

that

the

best

knowledge

is evident with the

evidence

of

the first

rinciple,

but

that

a lesser

knowledge,

based on

sense experience, still has an indubitable evidence; it is knowledge,

not mere

opinion:

Item

llorum

assensuum]

ui

sine ormidine

sunt]

..

aliqui

ero unt videntes

evidentia

otissima,

videntia

cilicet

rimi

rincipii,

liqui

videntia

aturali.

...

Evidentiautemnaturalis

st lla

qua

assentimusic

esse et sic esse

sine

quacumque

ormidinex

causis ecessitantibusaturaliterd assensum... Nec

ex hoc

equitur

uod

it e eis

liqualiter

ubitandum

lus

uam

de

primo rin-

cipio.

..

propter

oc

nolo

go

negare uin

haec int obis

videntia

t

cita,

on

tamen cientia

otissima.17

But Nicholas did not take

John's

course of

action.

And

his sarcastic

remarks about Aristotle n his lettersto Bernard and in his Universal

Treatise

ndicate that Nicholas did not

think

knowledge

based on sense

experience

is

of

much value

at all.

Having

shown that

Nicholas

of Autrecourtdenied

the

possibility

f

certitude

n

the

knowledge

of

substances

generally,

nd of

causes,

we

will

now

show

that

thissame

doctrinewas

taughtby

fivemen

teaching

in

England

about

the

same

time

as Nicholas

in

Paris,

or

a little arlier.

These

men,

in

order of the

dating

of

their

writings

we shall be con-

sidering,

are:

1. Richard

Fitzralph

?)

1328

2.

Robert Holcot

1332-33

3.

An

anonymous

Benedictine 1337-41

4.

John

Titleshale c.

1340-50

5.

Nicholas Aston c. 1345-50.

1. Richard

itzralph

?)

Richard Fitzralphwas a Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. He lec-

tured on the Sentences

n

1328

and

became a

Doctor of

Theology

in

1331.

He

was

Chancellor

of the

University

of

Oxford

1332-34,

and

Archbishop

of

Armagh

from

1346 until his

death

in

1360.

Though

the text

we shall be

discussing

is contained

in

a

copy

of

Richard's Sentencessome

uncertainty

xists

as

to its

authenticity,

ince

it

is found

in

a

question

existing

n

one

manuscript

only.18

Whether the

author of this text is Richard

or

not,

he teaches

that

one cannot

know

that there s a material substance other than one's

17

bid. 66-67.

18

G.

Leff,

ichard

itzralph...,

anchester

963,

86-191.

40

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


self.

Dealing

with

arguments eeking

to

prove

the existenceof

God,

an

objection

states

that

t

s

not

possible

to

argue

from

material substances

to God because one cannot knowmaterial substances.Just as, in the

Sacrament of the

Altar,

there

are

accidents

not

inhering

in

a

substance,

so,

in

the

physical

world,

perhaps

the

accidents

one

sees

do

not inhere

n

substances.

This could

be true

even

of

one's

own

body.

Quinto:

unc omo

osset

cire

emonstrative

x

cognitione

ubstantiarumen-

sibilium.

onsequens

alsum,

uia

nullus

otest

cire

liquam

ubstantiamen-

sibilem

xtra e

esse;

ergo

nec

potest

liquid

liud cire x

cognitione

llarum.

Assumptumrobatur

uia

nullus eit

trumacit

e

omnibus

pparentibus

icut

facitn

Sacramento ltāris

bi

sunt ccidentia

bsque

ubstantia

ensibili,

t

idem

otest

rgui

imilitere homine

uocumque

espectu

ui

corporis

roprii

quodnon ciat llud sse ubstantiam.uiahomo on eit isi xcognitioneen-

sitiva,

ed

n

lla

non

st

ertus

uia,

etsi mnia

ccidentia

n

pso

ta

manerent

sicut ccidentia

n

Sacramento

ltāris,

pse

ta

udicaret sicut

de suo

orpore

facit,

t tunc sset

eceptus.

rgo

nunc on st

ertus.19

In

answering

this

objection

the

author

claimed

that an

argument

for

the

existence

of

God can be

based on

the

existenceof

accidents.

But he

admitted

that,

in

this

life,

one

cannot be sure of the

existence of

material

substances,

though

he

thought

t

might

be

possible

for

per-

son to

know thathis

own

body

is a

substance,

though

sensation would

not be sufficient orthis; some demonstrationwould be required.

Ad 5 dicitur

uod

aliquis otest

omo

cire

x substantiis

ensibilibusive

ciat

ipsas

sse ive

non,

um

arnenciat

liqua

ccidentiaensibilia

sse. edde hoc

quod rgumentumetit,

umquid

liquis

otest

cire

liquam

ubstantiam

en-

sibilemxtra

e

esse,

dicitur

uod

non.

Et

hocdicitur e

viatore icut

robat

argumentum.

..

Sed de se fortassisomo

otest

cire

uod

corpus

uum

st

substantiaed

non

per

sensum

liquem,

icut

probat

rgumentum,

ed

per

demonstrationem

20

The author therefore

aught

doctrine imilar to thatof

Nicholas of

Autrecourt:we cannot

be certain

that material

substances

exist,

ex-

cept perhaps our own body. The author's reason for thisteaching is

not that

God

could be

miraculously ausing

accidents

to

exist without

substances,

but

simply

(c)

that

accidents

might

be

existing

without

substances,

as

the

accidents

of

bread and

wine do

in

the

Sacrament

of

the

Altar.

2.

Robert

olcot,

O.P.

Robert

Holcot

(c.

1290

-

c.

1349)

became

a

Doctor of

Theology

at

Oxford

in

1332,

and

in

the

followingyear

held

quodlibetal disputa-

19

n ibros

ententiarum,

.

1

in

Oxford,

riel

College, 5,

f. 1

va.

20

bid.

f.

2vb.

The text

asexfor xtra.

41

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


tions.21

n

them

he

asked

whether

t can

be

proven

for sure

that one

thing

can be

the efficient

ause of another:

Anposset robarividenteruodaliquarespossetsse ausa ffectivalterius

rei.22

His

answer

was

that

it

can

not. The

reason is

that

God

can

separate

any

two

things

which are

not

God

or

part

of one

another,

and

keep

them

in

existence

separately:

...

et

generaliter

x isto

principio

uod

puto

esse

verissimum:

eus

potest

separare

mnem

em

b

alia

que

non stDeus

ñeque

st

pars

ius

t

conservare

earn

n

esse ine

uacumque

lia re

que

nec

stDeus

nee

pars

ius.23

As

a

result,

God can

separate any

effect rom ts natural

cause,

so that

it is not

possible

to

know,

in the

case of

any

effect,

whether

t has been

produced

by

a

creature

or

the Creator:

Ergo

non

st

possibile

cire

n Deus

esset

causa

an creatura.24

God

can

also

separate

a

cause

from

ts

natural

effect,

o

that one can-

not

say

that

ffire s

brought

near

a combustible

ubstance

the

fire

will

burn

it:

Ergonon equitur:gnis st pproximatusombustibili;rgo omburit.25

Therefore

there

is

no

certainty

hat a

thing

is

the

efficient

ause

of

something; only

probability

s obtainable:

Ideo dico

n hocarticulo

uod

nulla

st

regula

d

probandum

ertitudinaliter

unam

em sse

ausam

ffectivam

lterius,

edtenetur

robabiliter.

..2б

Thus

we can

see

that Robert

Holcot

agreed

with Nicholas

of

Autrecourt

hat

we

cannot

be

certain

that

any

creature

s

the cause of

a

particulareffect r thatany

natural

cause

will

produce

its effect

when

conditions

are

right

or

t.

The

reason

for

his

s

(b)

that God

could

be

miraculously

nterfering

ith

secondary

causes.

21

R.

E.

Gillespie,

ratia

reata

nd

Acceptatio

ivina

n he

heology

f

obert

olcot.P.

(Xerox

University

icrofilms),

nn

Arbor

974,

8-29.

22

Determination

.

Ill,

M

(Lyons

515;

eprint

rankfurt

967).

hough

he

tatus

f

the

worksttributed

o

Holcot s

not

inally

ecided,

heres

no reason

o

doubt

he

authenticity

f his

uestion

f

heDeterminano

a

question

ntitled

Utrum

oluntas

humana

n utendo reaturis

it

ibera."

23

bid.

24 bid.

25

bid.

26

bid.

42

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


3.

An

anonymous

enedictine

An

anonymous

Benedictine,

known

only

as

Monachus

Niger,

com-

mented on the Sentencest Oxford or Cambridge between 1337 and

1341.

27

He

claimed that it

is not

possible,

by

natural

knowledge,

to

know substances

because,

if t

were,

it

could be

known when

bread is

present

in

the Sacrament of the

Altar

and when

it

isn't;

which,

of

course,

can not

be done. As a

result,

4

'philosophy

itself'

cannot

say

any

substance exists

n

nature.

According

to

Monachus,

no

substance

can be known

by

experience,

but

only by reasoning,

and,

as has

just

been

explained,

it is

not

possible

to

reason to the

existence

of

substance.

...

quia

naturaliter

ubstantia

ognosci

on

otest,

uia

sic

posset

n

Sacramento

Altāris

ognosciuando

sset bi

pañis

t

quando

non.Ex

ista

onclusionee-

quitur

lia:

quod

non

st

urum

hilosophicum

onere

liquam

ubstantiam

sse

in

rerum

atura.

robo

uia

nihil

onendum

aturaliter

isi llud d

cuius

notitiam

otest

uis

naturaliter

enire. ed ad notitiam

ubstantie

on

potest

quis

naturaliter

enire,

t

prius atet.

..

Sed

de nulla

ubstantia

otest

aberi

experientia.28

A

conclusion

is

established

by

4

'philosophy

itself',

Monachus

explained,

if

reason,

exercised

withoutrecourse to

faith,

s

forced to

admit such a conclusion:

Et voco

hie

purum

hilosophicumuod

homohabens

sum

ationist

bona

naturalia,

t

bonum

ngenium,

onum

ntellectum,

t

huiusmodi,

er

deduc-

tionem

naturalem

ircumscripta

ide

vel

secta

haberet

dicere istam

conclusionem.29

27

See

W.

C.

Courtenay,

damWodeham

Leiden

978,

1-95;

D.

Trapp,Augustinián

Theologyf

he

4th

entury

in:

Augustiniana,

I

(1956),

201-213,

35-239;

.

F.

Genest,

e

De

futuris

ontingentibus

e

Thomas

radwardinein:

Recherches

ugusti-

niennes,

IV

(1979),

68-271.

28

This ext rom onachus'sentencesIII, 1)may e foundnmyTheologyhe and-maiden

f

ogic

na

cornine:

ssue f

Aupustiniana.

29

bid. ince

he

dentity

f

Monachus

iger

s still

nknown,

t

may

e

helpful

o

mentionhat

his

eaching

oncerning

ubstanceasbeen

ttributed,

lmost ord or

word,

o

Richard

illingham.illingham

as Fellow

fMerton

ollege,

xford,

n

1344,

nd

till

n

1361 He

was

regent

aster f

Arts

n

1349.

He

became

Bachelor

of

Theology,

ut

his

Commentary

n

he

entences

as

not

een ound.

See

A. B.

Emden,

A

Biographical

egisterf

he

niversity

f

Oxford

o

A.D.

1500

I,

Oxford

957,

88-189).

It

is

not

possible

oweverhat

Monachus

as

Billingham,

ince

he

Commentary

f

Monachus

as

quoted

n

Gregory

fRimini's

ommentary

f

1342,

nd

Billingham

s

Commentary

ould

have

been

written uch

ater

han

that.

The

attributionf

Monachus's

octrine

o

Billingham

as

made

y

n

anonymous

riter

n

his

Commen-

taryn he irstookf heentencesVat. at. 86, .21ra).Anotheroctrinettributedo

Billingham

f.25ra),

owever,

havenot een

ble

o

find

n

Monachus's

entences.t

is

interesting

lso

that

Monachus

iger

s

mentioned

simply

s

"Monachus")

n

43

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


And,

of

course,

reason is

not

forced,

without

recourse

to

faith,

to

admit

the existence

of

substance.

Monachus was aware that we appear to have knowledge of

substance

because

we notice accidents

apparently

succeeding

one

another

in the same

subject.

It

seems

that

something

remains

un-

changed

while the accidents

are

changed.

Preterea,

aturalitert

experimentaliter

pparet

ccidentia

ibi

succedere

n

eodem ubiecto.

gitur

ubstantia

st

uia

non ransmutaturicut ccidentia.30

But

Monachus

thought

hat

this

s

an illusion.

The

truth

s

that some

accidents

are

more

4

'substantial'

than

others,

as hardness

is more

4'substantial' than heat or cold, but there s no substance.

Dico

quod

hec

consequentia

onvalet:

xperimentům

st

quod

aliquid

n

tali

transmutatione

anet

ixum;

gitur

xperimentům

st,

elnaturalis

eductio

st,

quod

llud it

ubstantia.

uia,

nter lia

accidentia,

liqua

unt olidiora

liis,

sicut

urities

uam

alor el

frigus.31

Monachus

was

intrigued

by

the

argument

that

there must

be

substances

if human

beings,

according

to

philosophy

tself,

ught

to

risk

death

to

save

their

ommunity.

Each

individual

n

the

community

seems to be a substance because accidents, such as courage and fear,

seem

to be

present

or absent

in

a

permanent

subject;

and

the

com-

munity

eems

to be substantial

for

he same

reason,

for ometimes

t

s

in a

good

condition

and sometimes

t

is not.

Ex hiis

rguo

ic:

philosophice

t

pure

naturaliter

ictandum

st

quod

aliquis

deberete

exponere

orti

ro

alvatione

ommunitatis;

gitur

atio

aturalisic-

tât

liquam

ubstantiam

sse,

t ex

parte

ortis

uia

accidens

st

uod

dest

t

abest

igitur

n

tali

preter

ccidentia

ic

mutabilia

portetliquod

ubiectum

manens

sse)

t tiam x

parte

ommunitatis

ue

aliquando

ene

alet,

liquan-

do

non

igitur

tc.).32

another

nonymous

ommentary

n

the entences

whichs found

n

the ame

odex,

ff.32-118.

his

Commentary

f.61v)

discusses

he

eaching

f

Monachus

oncerning

' 4

that han

which

greater

annot

e

thought,"

n

his

Commentary

III,

1;

Fribourg,

Bibliothèque

antonale

t

Universitaire,

ordeliers

s.

26,

ff.98va-99ra.

he

anonymous

ommentator,

ho eferslsewhere

ff.

3r,

8r)

o

Gregory

f

Rimini,

could

ave oundhis

material

n

Gregory's

uper

rimum

t

ecundumententiarum

Lib.

I,

dd.

42-44,

.

3,

a.

3;

reprint

f t.

Bonaventure,

.Y.

1955)

,

1

d.

From

study

of he eferences

n

these

wo

nonymous

ommentaries,

would

udge

oth

ere

rit-

ten n the1350's.

30

Sentences

III, 1,

n Fr

Cordeliers6),

f.

100

va,

corrected

y

Fl

Florence,

.N.C.

Ms. A. 3. 508).

31

Ibid.,

r

102

rb,

orrected

y

Fl.

32

Ibid.,

r 100

va,

corrected

y

Fl.

44

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Monachus did not

explain

how

the case

of

human

beings

is different

from

the

case of

other

4

'substances",

nor how

the case of

fear

and

courage is different rom hecase ofany other vice and corresponding

virtue. Neverthelesshe

seemed

willing

o

accept

the

argument

n

ques-

tion,

except

for

fatalflaw n it

discovered after

very

ong

discussion:

philosophy

tself oes

not

teach

thathuman

beings

should risk

death in

order to

save their

community.

Some

philosophers

taught

this,

but

they

were

nfluenced

y

a

non-Christian

eligion,

or

by

inordinate ove

of

their

ommunities,

r

by

erroneous

udgment,

or

by

the

desire to be

well

thought

of

by

the multitude.

They

wanted

to

be

famous after

death because

of

the

uprightness

hown

in

saving

many.

Potestgitur iciquodnonestpurum hilosophicumicere uodhomo a-

tionaliter

eberet

e

exponere

orti

ro

ommunitateed

quod

philosophi

oc

dixeruntx

alia secta

vel ex

affectionenordinata

uam

habueruntd com-

munitates

uas

vel x

erroneoudiciot

ffectionetili

ulgi uibus

udicaverunt.

Et

desidaverunt

ost

mortemabere

amam

ulgi ropterrobitatem

stensam

pro

alvatione

ulgi.33

Monachus s final

position,

therefore,

was

that

philosophy

cannot

know

substances.

And,

as a

result,

he

denied that t

can

know

causes.

One

can

know that

something

s moved

but,

since

one must know that

the apparent mover is a thing, a substance, and not an accident,

before

one can

say

that t

is

really

a

mover,

and one

cannot do

this

n

philosophy,

one

can

never

say

that

the

motion has a

cause:

Nec

probat

Aristoteles]

ure hilosophice

uod

mne

uod

movetur ovetur

b

alio,

uia

non

potest

aturaliter

robari

desse

movens,

icet

xperimentoossit

sciri

uod

liquid

movetur;

uia

non

otest robari

ovenssse ubstantiam

el

accidens,

uod

tamen

resupponitur

nte mnem

rocessum

hilosophicum.34

And,

Monachus

continued,

even

if

t

were

admitted

that

the world

consists

of

substances

with

their

accidents,

we can still

not

prove

by

philosophythat something is a cause. Even if an ' 'effect" always

follows ts

"cause",

we

cannot be

sure

it

is

caused

by

it. If a

rational

soul is

produced

when

the sun

acts,

we

cannot

say

the

sun

is its

cause.

And often he sun

acts

intensely

nd

yet

produces

nothing. Temporal

and local

contiguity

o not

establish

causality.

Alia

st

onclusio

uod

non

st

ure

hilosophicumonere

ausas

n

mundo

tc.,

positis

ubstantiist

accidentibus.

atet

uia

non

potest robari

liquid

sse

causam isi

uia

ad actionemalis

ei

equitur

liam em

e

novo

apere

uum

esse. ed sta

onclusio

on idetur:sta es

git

t

lia

producitur

e

novo;

gitur

33

bid.

Fr

102

rb,

orrected

y

Fl.

34

Sentences

III, 1,

n

the

oming

ssue f

Augustiniana.

45

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


producitur

d

actionem

ius. Vel:

igitur

stud st causa

istius.

uia

sic se-

quereturuod

olesset

ausa

stius

nime ationalis

uia producitur

uando

ol

agit.

Nec

potest robari

uod pproximatio

t ctio

ua facit

em e

novo

roduci

quia frequentergensnitituruantumotestttarnen ihil roduxit.35

It

cannot

be

argued,

Monachus

maintained,

that

firecauses

heat

because heat

always

follows

the

presence

of

fire. One

might

as well

argue

that

darkness

causes

fear

because

fear follows

t,

or

that blind-

ness

causes

timidity

because

timidity

ollows

t.

And

we know

that

darkness and

blindness

are not

things;

they

are

nothing.

They

therefore annot be

causes.

And,

similarly,

we

cannot be

sure thatfire

causes

heat.

Sed non equitur:xperimentůmst aloremoni nesse d presentiamgnis;

igitur

x

hoc

potest

robarignem

sse ausam

aloris.

uia experimentům

st

quod,

xistentibus

enebris,

omo

imett

horret;

gitur

x

hoc

potest

robari

quod

tenebre

liquid

ausant,

um

tenebre

ihil

int. t

eodem

modo stde

cecitate

ue

causat imiditatemn

ceco,

t

tarnen ihil

otest

ausare.36

It

thus is

clear that

Monachus

Niger taught

doctrines

quite

similar

to those of

Nicholas of

Autrecourt.

As

concerns

substances,

he held

that

we

cannot be certain that

any

exist.

The reason

is

(b)

that we

do

not

experience

substances,

and

cannot

reason

to

their existence

because

God

could

be

miraculously allowing

accidents

to

exist

in

themselves.

As

concerns efficient

auses,

he claimed thatwe

cannot be

certain

that

they

xist.

One reason for

his s

(c)

thatwe cannot be cer-

tain that

there are

any

substances

and

therefore hat

there are

any

4

'things'

to

be

causes. Another

reason is

(d)

that

regular

succession of

"cause" and

"effect"

is

no

proof

of

causality.

4.

John

Title

hale,

0.

Carm.

John

Titleshale

(d.

c.

1354)

became

a Doctor of

Theology

at

Oxford.37Of his writings nly two Determinationesre extant.38They

may

well

have been

composed

between 1340

and

1350.

John

denied

that

we can

know the

substantiality

f

the

world,

because

we cannot

be

sure that

what we sense

is

not

simply

a

species

ensibilis

a

sensory

representation

f a

physical reality.

John

distinguished

wo

kinds

of

evidence: a less certain

kind which

gives

only opinion

or

probability

fides

,

and a more certain

kind which

35

bid.

36 bid

37

A. B.

Emden, p. it.,

II

(1959),

1880.

38

Worcester

athedral, 65,

T. 6r-33r.

46

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


can be

used

for

proof

demonstratio).

n the case of a

thing

outside the

human

intellect,

by

sense

perception

ntuitus

the intellect an

know

by the more certainkind ofevidence that n object is appearing to it,

but

only by

the

less

certain kind of evidence what

he

thing

s.

Intellectusreatus

er

ntuitum

ercius

uam <per>

evidentiam

ue

nata st

facere idem

ognoscereotest uod

obiectum

st;

de

nullo

arnen

bsoluto

ibi

extrínsecoercius

uamper

videnciamidei

ognoscitur

uid

res

st

que

sibi

obicitur.39

The reason is

that the

intellect

cannot be

sure whether

t

sees an

object

or

only

an

object's

species

its

representation

n

the mind.

In

dreams

the

ntellect

irmly

elieves

it

sees

a

thing

nd

yet

sees

only

the

representation fthething.Therefore ensation is notsufficientroof

of what s known. This

proof

must be

obtained

by

the ntellect

hrough

some other means.

Et confirman

otestuperius

icta

er

hoc

quod

ntellectus,

ntuens

peciem

t

econtratens

utitur

sea

pro

biecto,

on

otestognitive

istinguere

n

videt

speciem

antum

uia species

lia

similem

silimen s]

ibi

representai

с

si res

ipsaquam species

lla

signifìcat

st

sibi

presens.

mmo ntellectusn

sompnis

firmiter

reditt udicat

iudicatur

s se videre em

uius

psa

st

pecies,

tnon

percipit

rrorem

uando

ic

utitur

pecie ro

obiecto

istincto

disticto s]

specie

psa,

t

unc

arnenolum idet

peciem,

uia

bi ola

pecies

erminât

ter-

minatur s]ntuitum.rgoper ntuitumantumtamenms]non ognoscitur

quid

es st

ue

quimj]

ibi

bicitur,

ed

ognoscitur

el

ognosciotest

b alico

intellectu

uid

est

res

que

sibi

obiciturt non

per

ntuicionem

antum;

ec

aliunde emonstran

otest.40

One

might

hink

hat,

since he has used

the

comparison

with

dreams,

John might

have

taught

hat

by

intuition he ntellect annot

be

certain

that

any

object

is

present

at

all

in

sensation,

but his

position

is,

as

indicated

above,

that one can

be certain

there is an

object;

what is

probable

is the nature of the

object.

He

fears,

not

that

representation

will be presentwithno object at all, but that a representationwill be

present

with

an

object

which

it

is

misrepresenting.

It

might

be

argued

that the

intellect

will

not be able to

demonstrate

anything

bout the

real world if

the

natures

of

the

things

n it

are

known

only by probable

knowledge:

Sed

contra

onclusionem

rguitur

ic:

quia,

data

onclusione,

equereturuod

nulla sset emonstracio

uia,

in omni

demonstracione

demostractione

s

,

quod

uid

st stmedium

emonstrandi.ed ntellectus

reatus

on

potest

er-

39Determinatio, f.26r.Nodoubt bsolutumused ynonymouslyith es ndobiec-

tum,

s contrastedith

pecies

means

thine:, substance,

n

tself.

40

bid.

47

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


cius

uamper

videntiam

ue

nata st

facereidem

ognoscere

uod uid

st ei

absolute.41

This argument s valid,John admitted, n so far as intuition f ob-

jects

outside the

intellect s

concerned. But

the

intellect s

able also to

know

tself nd to

have the

more certain

kind of

evidence

about

its

own

existence

and

nature. Based on

this,

and on

premises

per

se

nota

the

intellect an

achieve

demonstration,

which

is

firmer han

probability.

Pro

sto ico

uod

ntellectus

reatus

otest

ercius

ertificane se

quam

e alico

absoluto

ibi

xtrinseco,

t

deonon

equituruod

nulla

emonstracio

st.Potest

enim

ntellectus

reatus

pprehendere

e

esse

cercius

uam per

fidem,

t

demonstrare

t

ntelligere

e

ntelligere

ercius

uam

per

idem,

t

b lio ctu

el

noticia

otest

educere

onclusioneme

qua

certificatur

cercius

quamperfidem,uia perpremissaer enota elper ecognitantellectusreatusotest

habere

cienciam

onclusionis

irmiorem

uam

x

probabilibus

antum.42

In

addition

to the

argument

based

on

a

comparison

with

dreams,

John

argued

that

divine

interventionn the

course of

nature

was

possi-

ble.

God,

he

said,

could

make two

different

bjects

look the

same to

the

intellect

by having

similar

species

ppear

to

the

intellect.

The

in-

tellect

would then

not be able

to know for

ure that

they

are

different

things.

... quibuscumqueuobusobiectis atis,Deus posset por.ms]< facere

similem

silimem

ms]

apparere

apperere

ms]

ntellectui

reato t similem

[silimem s]

moverentellectumt

terminare

ntuitum.

rgo er

nihil,

er

nihil

eciam

ntrinsecum,

otest

ntellectus,

uibuscumque

bsolutis

emonstratis

quorum

trumque seipso

st

distinctum,

ognoscere

ercius

uamper

fidem

quod

psa

ibi biecta

ealiterntere non

unt dem.43

From

this

position

that a

species

may misrepresent

an

object

it

follows

that the

intellect

cannot

have

certainty,

concerning

objects

other

than

itself,

hat

one is not

the other:

Ex

qua

conclusione

equiturlia,

sta

cilicet:

uod

nulli

ntellectui

ntelligentipreciseualiteros ntelligimusro tatu ie liqua t bsoluta,uorumtrum-

que

ab

ipso

ipse

m¿]

sse

istinctum

distictum

s]

it,

otest

biici

uod,

ercius

quamper

videnciam

ue

nata

st acere

idem

antum,

ognoscat

a

numeraliter

distinguere.

atet

hec

conclusio x

priori

quia,

quibuscumqe

bsolutis

demonstratis

uorum

trumque

b

intellectu

st

distinctum,

ullus

ntellectus

potest

videncius

ognoscere

uod psa

non

unt

ealiter

dem ut

uod psa

unt

distincta.

uamquam

e

utroque

elde altero

ognoscere

otest

uia

[qui

m¿]

est,

edde neutroercius

uamper

videnciam

idei

ognoscere

otest

uid

st.44

41

bid.

42 bid.

43

bid.

44

bid.

48

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


This

is to

so

true

that

t holds

even if

one of

the

things

s God.

In this

life,

he

ntellect

annot

distinguish

etween

God

and

any

other

object,

at leastwithanycertitudegreater hanopinion. (This does not hold of

a

comparison

between

itself

nd

God,

however, because,

if it

were

God,

it would

be

aware

of its

divinity,

ince God

knows

that

He is

God.)

Igitur,

ercius

uam

per

videnciam

ue

nata

st ausare

idem,

ullusntellec-

ts

intelligensrecise

icud

os

ntelligimusro

tatu

ie,

ntuens

eum

trem

in

proprioenere, otest

nter os

cognitive

istinguere.

x

quibus

equitur

lia

conclusio:

uod

nullus

ntellectus

reatus

ntuens biectum

reatum

ibi

extrinsecum

ercius

uam er

videnciam

idei,

cilicet

ue

nata st acere

idem,

seit oc

non

sseDeum.Patet

x

prioribus.

..

Etdico biectumxtrinsecum

uia

intellectusreatusotest lus ertificane seipso uodnon st Deusquamde

adiço ibi xtrínseco

ertifican

otest,

uia,

i esset

eus,

et naturacirete esse

Deum.45

John

was so

convinced

of

his

position

that he claimed

that,

if the

intellectknows

in

heaven

as

it knows

in

this

ife,

ts

certainty

hat

it

sees

God

there s

only

as

good

as

the

opinion

it

has

concerning

objects

seen

in

this ife:

Ex hiiseciam t

superius

ictis

atet

uod,

si

intellectuseatusnon aliter

intelligat

uampro

tatu

ienatus st

ntelligere,

recise

videncia

ue

nata st

facereidem,ttantumertificature sua beatitudine.

atet ec

conclusiox

premissisuia ntellectuson st ercioresuabeatitudineuam st de]quid

illud st

uod

ibi

bicitur.46

John

thought

hat the intellect's

mode

of

knowledge

n

the next ife

is

the same

as

in

this

life.

Hence,

for

the

two reasons

given,

its

knowledge

of

objects

cannot

be surer

than

opinion.

He

thought

hat

the ntellectknows

by

faith

n

heaven,

not

by open

vision;

it

knows

by

a faith

uperior

to the faith

t

has

before

entering

heaven,

but

by

faith

nevertheless.

Ex hiispatet uod, icet ides atrie itperfeccioride ie,nontarnenxcedit

fidem

uin

st

fides,

el altem

on ercior

oticia

robabili

protali

¿].

..47

So

mistaken

could a human

being

be

that he could

think he was

happy

and

yet

be

wretched;

he could

think

he was

in

heavenly

glory

and

yet

be

damned

in hell.

Et

per onsequens

taret

uod

< creatura

esset

miserait arnen

rederei

uod

ipsa

sset

eata,

t

ex hac

quodposset

sse

uod

reatura

èàta

st

n

nferno

t

dampnatur

t

tamen

rederet

uod

psa

sset

n

gloria.48

45

Ibid.,

. 26v.

46 bid.

47

bid.

48

bid.

49

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Nicholas of Autrecourt

was not led

to

any

conclusion

more

likely

han

this

to merit

censure

from

cclesiastical

authority

John's positionwas softened omewhatbyhis sayingthatprobable

knowledge

is

knowledge,

scientia.

Natural

philosophy

and dialectical

reasoning

are

only probable,

but

they

are

sciences.

(To

say

that

they

are

probable

is

to

say

that,

though

they

are not

known

per

e and

are

not

demonstrable,

they

are

what

all

or

many people

think,

specially

the

learned.)

. nulla

onclusio

ogicalis

eu

philosophica

sset cita ialecticeel

philosophice

argumento

robabili

antum;

mmo,

ес

ogica

ес naturalis

hilosophia

sset

scientia;

t

equitur

uod

ola onclusio

emonstrabilis

el

proposicio

mmediata

esset cita.Consequensalsum.49

Et,

ne fiat

is

n

termino,

oco

robabile

..

ut

distinguitur

ontra emonstrabile

vel

per

e

notum,

t

tamen ale

uod

videtur

mnibusut

pluribus,

t maxime

sapientibus.50

But thisadmission

does

not suffice o remove the

great

distrust

f most

of our

knowledge.

It

simply

asserts

that

everyone,

including

the

learned,

can

be

mistaken.

And,

if

hey

an be

grossly

mistaken

ven

in

heaven,

how sure can

they

be

of their

probable knowledge

n

this ife?

We thus see

that

John

Titleshale's

teaching

concerning

our

knowledgeof substances was like that ofNicholas ofAutrecourt:we

cannot

have more than

probable

knowledge

of what

any

substance

outside

us is.

One

reason

for his s

(d)

that substances are

represented

to us

by

species

and we cannot

be

sure

that

species epresent

ubstances

as

they

are.

Another reason is

(e)

that

God

could make two different

substances be

represented

by

similar

species.

5. Nicholas

Aston

Nicholas

Aston

(c.

1317

-

c.

1367),

a

Fellow

of

Queen's

College,

Oxford,

became a Doctor of

Theology

in 1358 at Oxford, and was

Chancellor

of the

University

of

Oxford

from

1359

to

1361.

His

Com-

mentary

n the

Sentences

as

composed

probably

between 1345

and

1350.

51

Of

the

five

English

writerswe are

considering,

Nicholas

was the

most radical.

He

taught

that

God

can undo

the

past

so

that

t

never

ex-

49

Determinatio

I,

f. 27ra.

50

bid.f.27rb.51

W.J.

Courtenay,

damWodehamLeiden 978, 22,n. 14;J.L. Bender, icholas

Aston

A

Study

n

Oxford

hought

fter

he

lack

eath,XeroxUniversityicrofilms),

AnnArbor 979.

50

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


isted.

The reason forthis

teaching

was

Nicholas's conviction

that

the

contingent

ever

becomes

necessary.

Since what

is now

past

was

once

contingent,t s still ontingent.To say that thepast is necessarilypast

is to utter contradiction.

God

can

eternally

will

these

two

proposi-

tions to be true: "This does not exist'

and "It will

always

exist.'

Ad

primum

rgumentum

ico

uodpreteritum

ecessariosse

preteritum

on-

tradictionem

ncludit.

robatur: eus est

tante

otentie

icut

uit nte

rea-

tionem undi.52

Ad

octavum,

oncedo

amquam ossibile

uod

hoc

emper

rit t

tarnen um-

quam

rit

ta

quod

psum

st,

uia

Deus

potest

ternaliter

elie

stas

uas

pro-

positions

sse

veras: Hoc non st"

et "Hoc

semper

rit". ..53

Nicholas saw thatthisreasoning applies also tothepresent. fa con-

tingent

eing

exists

now,

it is

possible

for t not

to

exist now. It

can

be

and

not

be

in

this same

instant.

Ad

articulum

espondeo.

oncedo

uod,

uibuscumque

uobus

ontingentibus

demonstratis

epugnantibus,

xistentianius

ossibilitati

lterius on

épugnât,

ut: "Paulus

st

n

hoc

nstanti,"

t

"Potest sse

uod

non it n

hoc

nstanti."54

What

could make it

necessary

for

creature

existing

t

the

present

moment to

exist

now,

since

it is of

itself

contingent?

Certainty

no

creature ould do

so.

But,

if

God

were to do

it,

He

would

have

to

do it

necessarilyor freely. f He did it necessarily,we would have to ask

what

necessitated

God,

and

so

on,

and

encounter an

infinite

egres-

sion.

But,

if

He

did

it

freely,

He

could

freely

ndo

this

necessity.

And

so

there

can be

no

necessity

for

any

creature

to

exist at

the

present

moment.

Ettunc

ecessitasn

Deo volendillud

sse

sset Deo

vel b alio.

Non b

alio,

t

notum

st. Si a

Deo,

aut

ergo

ibere

necessitantee

pro

tali

nstanti

vel

necessario

ecessitantee

pro

ali

nstanti

dded

y

W'.

Si necessitantee

pro

ali

instanti,

rgo

sset

rocessus

n

nfinitum

n

talibus

ecessitatibus.i

libere e

necessitantee

pro

ali

nstanti,

ossetrgo

e

non

necessitare

ro

ali

nstanti,

t

per onsequensune on sset ecessitas.55

Indeed,

the

only

necessary proposition

is

"God

exists",

or some

proposition

onvertible

with

t.

Any proposition

dealing

with

creatures

is

contingent,

ince

creation s

free. So

every

creature s

indifferent

o

existence and

non-existence. No

creaturely

existence

is

necessary,

even

if

the

creature

has

already

existed

or

if t

exists now.

52

entencesart.

5;

W

(Worcester

athedral,

65)

f 53rb.

have

followed

ender's

numberingf

Nicholas'srticles.

53 bid.О (Oxford,rielCollege, 5)f.214va.

54

bid. art.

;

O

219rb.

55

bid.

O

219ra

orrected

y

W

50ra.

51

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Tertia

opinio

est,

uam

volo

enere,

uod

mne

uod

non st

Deusest on-

tingens

d

utrumlibet,

t

quod

omnis

ropositio

st

propositio

e

contingente

[contingenti*]

d

utrumlibet,

xcepta

sta,

Deus

est,"

vel

convertibilis

um

eadem.Quod sta ositioit ationalisrguoic.Primaausa, ecundumenten-

tiam

heologorum,

umme

ibere t

contingenter

onservâtmnem em d

extra.

Igitur

ndifferenter

otest

onservare

t non

onservare.

gitur uicquid

st d

extra

otest

ndifferenter

sse t

non

sse.56

One

can

hardly

magine

a doctrine

more

calculated

to

destroy

man's

trust

n

his

knowledge

of

the created

universe.

Any

'

truth'

concern-

ing

the universe

based

on

the

past

or

the

present

could

become

falsehood

at

any

moment,

unless

man

were assured that

God

would

never use

his

annihilatingpower,

or

that,

if He

were

going

to

do

so,

He would let man know. But Nicholas Aston mentioned no such

divine assurances.

And so man's

knowledge

of

both substances and

causes

is

put

in

eopardy.

Nicholas had

a

further eason

for

distrusting

man's

knowledge

of

substances.

An

objection

was

made

against

Nicholas

that,

f

the

past

can be

undone,

an adult

cannot be certain

he

existed as a

young per-

son,

any

more

than

he

can be

sure

he

will

exist

n

the

future s

an old

person;

the

past

will

be as

uncertain

as the future.

Nicholas's answer

was

that one

cannot be sure

of

the

past

in

any

case,

or of the

present

either.The reason is that ense knowledgecan be illusory, nd a defect

in

sense

knowledge

produces

a

defect

in

intellectual

knowledge,

as

Aristotle

aid.

Ad

septimum,uando

rguituruod,

i

preteritum

uodlibetontingenter

it

preteritum,

uilibet

aberetubitaree

seipso

umquidpse

uit

sic

'

sit

ms]

n

tali

nstanti

el

n

tali,

icut

abet ubitare

umquid

rit

n

tali

nstanti

el

n

tali

(quia

ex

quo

non

plus

nnotescitlicui reature

uod

Deus vult

psam

uisse

n

tali nstanti

el tali

uamquod

Deus vult um

foren

tali nstanti

el n

tali):

Similiteruisse

el fore olum nnotescitobis

er

ensibiliael

a

cognicione

generata

x

sensibus.

ed

n

nulla

ognicione

ensitiva

st

ertitudo,

uia

cum

omni ali otestsse llusio. rgo ulla ogniciontellectivast ertauiadefectus

cognicionis

ensitiveacit efectum

ognicionis

cogniscionis s]

ntellective

(secundo

e

Anima,

apitulo

e

olfactu).57

And

Nicholas

gave

three

rguments

for ense

knowledgebeing

sub-

ject

to illusion.

First,

ense

knowledge

takes

place

by

means of

species,

and

it

is

possible

forGod to

preserve species

in

any

of

our senses

and

replace

the

object

it

represents

with

another

object:

56

lbid.'

W

5

ra.

57Ibid., rt.5; W 53va.The referenceoAristotlestohisDeAnima,II, 9; 421a

20-26.

52

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Notum st enim

uod

Deus

potest

onservare

conversare

s]

n omni ensu

speciem

upponendo

ibi

ontrarium,

t

sic

potest

sse

llusio.58

Second, we do not have a species representingany material

substance

anyway.

As

a resultwe cannot

know

whether

substance

is

present

r not.

We

can

have

only

opinion

(piafides)

n

this

matter.This

is

true,

for

xample,

of the substance

of

bread;

we

do

not

notice

that

t

is

not

present

n the Sacrament

of the

Altar.

Similiter

otum st

quod presencia

elabsencia licuius ubstancie

aterialis,

manentibuselnon

manentibus

ccidentibus,

on

st

ognoscibilis

nobis

um

nos non

habemus

peciem

per

se

representantem

liquam

substantiam

materialem.deo

emper

sitandumst

numquid

sta ubstantia

it alis

el

alis,

velpiafide redendum.stud atet e substantiasubstantiams] anis uiusabsencia onpercipiturnSacramentoltāris, anentibusccidentibus.59

Third,

since dreams are as

realistic as

waking

experience,

a

person

cannot

be certain

whetherhe is awake

or

sleeping:

Similiter

robabiliter

otest

ici

uod

nulli onstat

ertitudinaliter

umquid

ste

vigilat

utdormitum onsimiliter

pparerei

mnino

ormientiicut

igilanti.60

Nicholas

accepted

some of the

consequences

of

this

teaching.

Since

a

contingent eing

doesn't

have to

exist

when

and where

t

does,

it

can

be elsewhere at

the same

time.

Indeed,

it can

be

everywhere

t

one

and

the

same time.

Ad

secundum.oncedo

uod

omne

ontingensuod

est

n hoc nstanti

otest

non sse

pro

hoc nstanti.

tcum nfertur

Igitur

multo ortiori

osset

mutari

ad omnem ifferentiam

osicionis,"

onceditur,

t

quod

potest

sse

ubique

imul

et semel.61

And

a

person

would

not

know

his

body

or

his

own

soul.

A

man

in

two

places

at

the same

time could

meet

himself,

nd one

of

his selves

could

cut

off he head of the other

without

realizing

it was

doing

so.

SimiliterxquoDeuspotestacereuod dem omo it n diversisocis, omo

posset

bviare ibi

psi

t nescire

uod

esset

llud,

t

pse

ic

posset

mputare

capud ropriumgnoranter.

..62

And,

since

the senses

are so

subject

to

illusion,

Nicholas told

his

hearers

that

they

probably

were not certain that Nicholas

was

really

a

human

being.

58

Sentences

art.

5;

W

53 a.

59

bid.60 bid.:O 215va.

61

Ibid.,

rt.

;

W

50vb.

62

Ibid.,

rt.

5;

W

53 a.

53

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Ideo

potest

ici

probabiliteruod pro

tatu ievel

nature

apse

non st ertum

quod

ste

egens

n cathedrait

homo.63

God can even arrange appearances, Nicholas continued,so that,even

if

no man

existed

n

the

University

f

Oxford,

t

would seem thatthere

were a number of men

sitting,

nd

listening

o a

person

ecturing,

nd

these

umen" would

really

be wood and

stones;

and

God

can cause

even more

amazing

appearances.

As a

result,

no

one can be sure

that

his fellow

lecturer s

really

a

human

being;

he

can

only

believe it.

Ideo dico

quod

omnem

pparenciam

xistentemn scholis

stis,

uta

uod

n

scholisstis unt

hominesedentest

audientes num

egentem,

t

quod

haec

sunt

igna

t

apides

t

huiusmodi,

t multo

maiorem

otest

eus

facere,

ullo

hominexistentenscholisstis. tperconsequensullus stcertusn id est

homo,

emonstrandoocium uum.Credendum

st arnen

uod

est

homo.64

In

addition to

raising

doubts about our

knowledge

of

substances,

Nicholas raised a doubt about

our

knowledge

of efficient

auses. He

taught

that

we

cannot demonstrate

that a

particular

effect

will

follow

from a

particular

set of causal circumstances because

there is no

reason

why

any particular

effect

hould

follow,or,

indeed,

any

effect

at all.

And this s true not

only

of

secondary

causes but

also of

God.

Nicholas

was

sure

that

God

is the

primary

efficient ause

of ¿illthat

happens,

but he

thought

thatGod cannot be the

explanation

of

why

any contingent ausality

takes

place.

Et

dico

uod

Deus est ausa

omnium,

.. Deus est ausa fficiens.

amen

ico

quod

Deus

non

st ausa

quare

st.65

If

a

secondary

cause existed

with

everything

aturallyrequired

for n

effect,

here s no reason

why

one effect

ather

han another would be

produced.

So

there s

no strictdemonstration hat a

particular

effect

would be

produced.

63

bid.

O 215va.

64

Ibid.;

W

53va.These

rguments

or he llusorinessf ense

nowledge,

nd

the

consequencesollowing

rom

hem,

re

found

lso

n

Sentences

art.

2;

O

222rb.

here

is a

problem,

owever,

ince

his

assage

n

article

2,

onsisting

f lmost

wo un-

dred

words,

s

used,

lmost

ord

or

word,

n

question

8 f

he

Questiones

ttributed

o

Osbert

f

ickenham.

sbert,

Carmelite,

ead

he

entences

t

Oxford

bout he ame

time s

Nicholas,

ndbecame

Master f

Theology

t Oxford.

See

В. M.

Xiberta,

e

Scriptoribus

cholasticisaeculi

IV xOrdinearmelitarum

Louvain

938,

41-284;

ndD.

Trapp, p.

it.,

27-228.)

wentyuestions

avebeen ttributedo

Osbert.

iberta

concludedhat hefirstine recertainlyenuine,nd that he leventhnd four-teenthre

purious.

have xamined

uestion

8 n

Mantua,

iblioteca

ommunale,

F IV

2,

f. 98vb.

65

Sentences,

ddition

o

Prologue;

nj.

L.

Bender,

p.

it.,

.

263.

54

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Nullius

ffectus

reatureive

racionalis

ive

rracionalis

ositi

n

esse

ecundo

esset are

ausam

ua

posita

um

omnibus aturaliter

reviis

d

effectum

e-

quitur

ffectum

oni.

Tune

nonforet

acio

uaremagis

lle

ffectus

oret

fröret

ms]uam uiscumqueonsimilis.ttuncequituruodnulla sset emonstracio

propteruid

potissima.66

No

particular

ffect

would followfor

ertain

because,

if

t had

to,

God

could

not

prevent

t. But

Nicholas was sure

that no

secondary

cause

acts

except

n

virtue

of the

First

Cause,

and

that

God is

free

s

regards

all

contingent

vents.

So

God

can

prevent

any

effect

rom

ensuing.

Thus

the

effects

uncertain;

there s

no

necessity

for t to

be

produced.

Thus,

if t

is

produced,

there s no

reason

why

it is

produced.

Probaturuia tunc, tante ausailiacumomnibusllisdisposicionibus,on

posset

eus

mpedire

liumfïectum

e

esset. ..

Ergo,

osita

ausa

prima

um

omnibus

tc.,

oncurrente

ausa

ecunda

um

ausa

prima,

qualiter

tat

ffec-

tum

sse icut

on

sse.67

Nicholas

did

not

see

how

a

free

cause

can

produce

an

effect

which

can be

known

in

advance. Where

the

cause is

free,

no effect

s

necessary

and

hence

there

s no

demonstration hat

a

particular

ffect

will

follow.

Et

ex necessario

on

equitur

ontingens.

rgo, osita

ausa

prima

um

isposi-

none tc. t oncurrenteausa ecundaum ausaprima,tat ffectumsse icutnon sse .. et

npossibile

st

quod

necessario

equatur

ffectus.68

The

problem

s the

same

as that

nvolved

in

deciding

whether

God

can

undo

the

past

or

the

present.

For

Nicholas,

the

contingent

s

always

contingent;

no

necessity

ver

attaches

to

it.

We

are

now

in

position

to

point

out

the

similarities

nd

differences

in

the

positions

of

Nicholas

Aston and

Nicholas

of

Autrecourt.As con-

cerns

substances,

Nicholas

Aston

taught

thatwe

cannot

know

them

for

the

reasons

(d)

that,

if

they

were

known

by

us,

they

would be

representedby speciesbutGod can preservea speciesn our mind and

yet

replace

the

object

it

represents

with

another

object;

(e)

that

there

are

no

species

of

substances

anyway,

so that

we

cannot

be

sure

substances

exist;

(f)

that

we

cannot be

sure

we

know

substances

because

we can

never

be sure

we're

not

dreaming;

and

(g)

that all

4

'knowledge'

of

past

and

of

present

ubstances

can

at

any

moment

be

rendered

false.

Nicholas

also

taught

that we

cannot be

sure

of

efficient

causality

because

(e)

all

'

'knowledge"

of

past

and

present

causes

can

66Sentencesart.9; W 23ra.

67

bid.

O

213rb-va.

68

bid.

O 213va.

55

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


at

any

momentbe rendered

false,

and

(f)

no

demonstration hatan ef-

fect will

be

produced

under certain

conditions

can

be

given

because

there s no reason whya particulareffect s produced, or whyany ef-

fect

s

produced.

Conclusion

We

have seen

that,

for number

of

reasons,

some the same as

those

of

Nicholas

of

Autrecourt,

some

different,

ive

English university

ec-

turers

n

the

second

quarter

of the fourteenth

entury

denied

that

we

can have

certainty

bout substances

or

efficient auses. That

such

teachingwas censured at Paris at thattime,but not in England, is no

proof

hatthe

English

doctrinewas

less

destructive f confidence

n

the

power

of human

reason

to arrive at

truth.

There is

a

tendency

n

some

historiansof this

period

to

downplay

the seriousnessof this tate

of affairs

or

philosophy.

G.

Leff,

for

xam-

ple,

has stated:

This

hift as

ommonly

een

egarded

s

the

oming

f

n

attitude

f

riticism

and

skepticism

hich

estroyed

he cholastic

chievement.ritical

ndeed

t

was;

but

keptical

nly

nthe ontextf

previous

ertainties.

oward

nowledge

itselfoone, ncludingicholasfAutrecourt,oubteditherhe xistencer

knowledge

fwhat ould e known:twastheir

ertainty

hatwas

denied,

nd

with

t

their

emonstrability,

ecause f he

ontingency

f reation.69

There

was

ittler

nothing,

hen,

f he

keptic

n

Autrecourt,

ertainly

ot

n

he

negative ejorative

ense

n

which

t

s

usually

pplied

o

the hinkers

f

this

period.70

True,

a

philosopher

s

usually "skeptical"

by

someone

else's stan-

dard,

not

by

his

own;

the word

can

have

many

definitions.

But,

ifwe

define

t

to mean

"doubting

the

ability

of the

human mind

to

arrive

at

certainty,"

Nicholas

of

Autrecourt s

certainlyskeptical concerningman's natural

knowledge

of substance and efficient

ausality.

How

does

admitting

the "existence of

knowledge"

save

one

from

being

skeptical

if

he denies the

certainty

and

demonstrability

of

this

knowledge,

and

makes no case for

the

value of

probable

knowledge?

And,

if Nicholas of

Autrecourt s

skeptical

on

the

points

we have

con-

sidered,

so

are the

English

writerswho

agreed

with

him.

W.

J.

Courtenay

has claimed that

these

philosophers

should be

absolved

from

ny

real

charge

of

skepticism:

69

The

issolution

f

he edievalutlook

NewYork

976,

4.

70

bid.

84.

56

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


No

medieval

riters

ith

hom

amfamiliar

oubtedhat

verythingexcluding

God)

must

ave ne

rmore

auses,

lthough

his hesis as

not

lways

tated

n

causal

anguage.71

What was

at

issue,

in his

opinion,

was

4

that events

have definable

causes

or

that

causal

sequences

are

predictable."72

But

we

have seen

that

Nicholas

of

Autrecourt

aid

that

there

may

not

be

any

causes at

all;

and

that

Monachus

Niger

said

that

we cannot be sure

there are

causes

because

we

cannot

be

sure

there

are

substances,

and

because

the

regular

succession

of

4

'cause"

and

4

'effect"

is

no

guarantee

that

there

are

causes.

Concerning

God

being

able

to make

the

past

never

to

have

been,

as

Nicholas Aston said He could, ProfessorCourtenay also has no wor-

ries:

No

one have xamined

n the

uestion

f

God's

power

o make

past

hing

never o

have

een

nvisaged

od's

wishing

o

hange

he

ast.

hat s

excluded

from

he ealm

f

eal

ossibility

ecause

f he rdainedrder

nd he onsisten-

cy

ofdivine

ction.73

But

Nicholas

Aston

did

not

mention

"the ordained

order

and

the con-

sistency

f divine

action;"

he offered

o

safeguards

gainst

destruction

of

the

past.

Of the fiveEnglishmenwe have considered,theteachingofonlyone

might

be

exempted

from

being

taken

seriously:

that

of

Monachus

Niger.

I

have shown

elsewhere

that

he

claimed

that

all his

Commentary

on

the entences

as

written

imply

to

make

his

students

hink,

not

to

be

an

indication

of his

own

thinking.

But

I have

also claimed

that

only

a

philosophic

sceptic

would

treat

theology

in such

a

derogatory

manner.74

The

philosophical

scepticism

we

have

been

considering

was

as

real

and

as

serious

in

England

as

it

was

in

Paris.

Houston,

Texas

Center

or

Thomistic

tudies

University

f

St.

Thomas

71

The

Critique

nNatural

ausality

n

theMutakallimum

nd

Nominalism

in: Harvard

Theoloeical

eview,

6

1973),

9.

72

bid.

73

John

f

Mirecourt

nd

Gregoryf

Rimini

nWhetherod

an

Undo

he ast

n:Recherches

deThéologienciennetmédiévale,0 1973),166.

74

Theology

he

andmaiden

f ogic

in:

Augustiniana,

n

an

issue

o

be

printed

oon.

57

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

1

1983)

Valla s Dialectic in theNorth

A

Commentary

n Peter

fSpain

by

Gerardus

istrius

PETER

MACK

Lorenzo

Valla's Dialecticae

isputationes

as

now

attracted he

attention

and

even

the

acclaim of

several

modern

scholars.

It

has been seen

as a

subordinationof dialectic to rhetoric,1 he startingpoint of Renais-

sance

Dialectic,2

a

key

work

in

the

transmission

of

scepticism3

nd

even

an

anticipation

of

ordinary

language

philosophy.4

While the

meaning

of

this

original

work

is

now debated

from

various

points

of

view,

the

problem

of its influence

s

less

explored.

G.

Zippel,

in

1957,

at the same

time

as

he

promised

a critical di-

tion,

listed

eight

manuscripts,

which he

divided

into three different

recensions.5

The second recension

was

printed

on its

own

perhaps

twice

before 1500

and four

imes

between 1509 and

1541,

and was

in-

cluded in the twiceprintedOperaOmnia1540, 1543).6Some of tspro-

positions

are

mentioned

by

Valla as

charges

n

his

trial

by

the

Inquisi-

tion

in

Naples

in

1444,

but

the

details

of

accusation

and defence are

1

S.

I.

Camporeale,

orenzoalla: manesimo

Teologia

Florence

972,

9-80.

Much f

the irst

alf f his aluable ook s

devoted

otheDialecticae

isputationes.

2

C.

Vasoli,

a dialetticala retorica

ell

Umanesimo,

ilan

1968,

7.

See

also

28-77.

3

L.

Jardine,

orenzo

alla nd

he

ntellectual

riginsj

Humanist

ialecticn:

Journal

f

the

History

f

Philosophy,

5

1977),

143-164.

4

R.

Waswo,

The

Ordinaryanguagehilosophy

f

Lorenzo

alla n:

Bibliothèque

d'humanismetRenaissance,1 1979), 55-271.Waswocknowledgesn mportant

debt

o H.

Gerì,

Rhetorik

b

Philosophie

Munich

974,

who ses he ialecticae

isputa-

tiones

n

her iscussion

fValla's

re-orientationf

philosophy

owards

hetoricnd he

mastery

f

anguage.

Waswo

as

recently

rgued

hat

alla's

philosophical

ethods

are used

by

Vives.

R.

Waswo,

TheReaction

f

ean

uis Viveso

Valla's

hilosophyf

Language

n: BHR 42

1980)

595-610.

5

G.

Zippel,

oteulle edazioni

ella ialécticai

Lorenzo

alla

n:Archiviotorico

er

e

provinciearmensi,

e

erie,

1957),

01-315.

n taliaMedioevale

Umanistica,

3

(1970),

9

the dition as

n

proof.

rofessor

iuseppe

illanovichas

nformede

(March 980)

hat

twill

ppear

oon nd

will ontainll three ecensions.

6

I have seen

editions f the Dialecticae

isputationes

rom

scensius

aris

1509,

Colinaeus aris

530,

Gymnicus

ologne

530

nd 1541.

Risse,

ibliographiaogica

,

Hildesheim965 dds Venice ditionf1499Hain15828).He foundo ocations

for

Hain

15829.

. R.

Goff,

ncunabula

n

American

ibrariesNew

York

964,

ecords

three

opies

f Milan

ncunable 49

Guillermus

e

Signerre

496-1500).

58

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


unknown.7

Poggio

attacked

the work n

general

terms,8

rasmus'

cor-

respondence

ndicates

that

he

had

read it.9

Vives condemns

it

at

the

end ofhisAgainsthe seudo-Dialecticians.

0

The most mportant hannel

of nfluence s

through

Rudolf

Agricola's

often

reprinted

De

Inventione

Dialéctica

n

However,

thiswork

never mentions

Valla

and,

while often

taking

similar

views,

also

frequently

refers

deas Valla has

rejected.

The

relationship

ertainly

alls formore

investigation,

articularly

s

Agricola's

rather clectic

approach

would

seem to be

in

opposition

to

the

kind of

radical

unity

modern

commentatorsfind

n

Valla's doc-

trines.

As

might

have been

expected

the

commentaries n

logical

textbooks

are proving obe much richer ndetailed referencend in argument.12

They

promise

to

provide

a far

more

accurate

idea of how

Valla

was

being

read

in the

early

sixteenth

entury.

The

commentary

n Peter of

Spain

Tractatus

y

Gerard

Listrius refersto

Valla's

work

at

many

points.13

t

is

possible

to tell

clearly

and

in

some

detail,

how he

receivedvarious of

Valla's ideas and innovations.

Listrius,

who is

best

known

today

for

a

commentary

on Erasmus'

Praise

of Folly

was a

humanist,

a

correspondent

f

Erasmus,

who had studied medicine

at

7

G.

Zippel, Autodifesa

i

Lorenzoalla

er

l

processo

ell'

nquisizione

apoletana

1444)

in:

taliaMedioevaJe

t

Umanistica

1970)

88-89.

ippel rints

hewhole

ocument,

59-94. ee

lso

his

Defensio

uaestionum

n

hilosophia

iLorenzo

alla

e

un oto

rocesso

ell

Inquisizioneapoletana

in: Bulletinoell'Istituto

torico

taliano

er

l Medio

Evo e

Archivio

uratoriano,

9

1957),

19-347.

8

Poggio, pera

mnia

,

Turin

964,

01.

See

Lorenzo

alla,

Antidotumrimum

ed.

A.

Wesseling,

ssen

978,

ntroduction.

9

Erasmi

pistolou,

d. P.

S.

Allen,

ol.

I,

Oxford

906,

95.

10

/.

L.

Vives

gainst

he

seudo-ialecticians,

d.

R.

Guerlac,

ordrecht

979,

52-3.

11

On

Agricola,

ee

Vasoli147-183.W.

Ong gives preliminary

ensus

f

ditions

RamusndTalonnventoryCambridge, ass. 1958, 34-558. manuscriptsf this

work

renow

knownnd

the extualituationeems

o

be more

omplex

han

ng's

useful rief

urvey

evealed. am at

present

orking

n

Agricola's

nfluencendhis

debt

o

Valla.

12

For

xample,

herere small umberf

nteresting

eferences

nj.

Noviomagus'

commentary

n

George

f

Trebizond

ialéctica.

Cologne 539)

Alardus'

ommentary

on

Agricola's

e nventione

ialécticaontains

larger

umber.

13

G.

Listrius ommentatolin

Dialecticen

Zwolle

520).

his

eems

obe the

nly

di-

tion. he

entry

n

Nijhoff-ronenberg,

ederlandsche

ibliographie

an

500

ot

540

's-Gravenhage

940,

159

ogether

ith he act hat

isse,

ogik

er euzeit

,

Stutt-

gart

964,

5

hadnot

een

t,

uggest

hat t

s

a

very

are

ook.

M. E.

Kronenberg

describesistriusonnections

ith

he

rinter

imon orverius

n

ets veren nbekend

Novumestamentůmn ept. 522 eAmsterdamitgegeven,n veredrukkerijan owern:

Het

Boek,

5

1926),

41-256. or

omparison

have

sedPeter

f

pain,

Tractatus

ed. L. M. de

Rijk,

Assen 972.

59

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Pavia and Basel.14

To

judge

fromthe

correspondence,

he

also

knew

More and

Caesarius,15

and

was

helpful

o Erasmus

in

obtaining

Greek

manuscripts.In 1516, he was appointed rector f the Latin School at

Zwolle.

He told Erasmus

thathe had

begun

to teach Greek

there,

hat

he was

reforming

heir

grammar

texts,

but

that

he

had not

yet

been

able

to do

away

with

the barbarous

logic

books.16

The outlook

of

the

preface

to his

commentary

s also that

of the

humanist

Pedagogue.17

He had

originally

refused to undertake

the

project,

thinking

hat the works

of

Trapezuntius,18

Agricola

and

Valla

had rendered Peter

of

Spain completely

redundant

Alv).

However,

the demand

for Peter was

so

great

that he had

finally agreed

to

brighten

up

the

parts

takenfrom

Porphyry

nd Aristotlewith a com-

mentary.19

e

commentson the first

our ractates

xplaining

that

the

topics

are

best studied

in

Giorgio

Valla,20

book

five of

Quintilian,

14

Biographical

nformation

romrasmi

pistolae

I 407.See

also

H.

C.

Rogge,

Ger

r-

dus

Listrius

in:

Archief

oorNederlandsche

erkgeschiedenis,(1899),

207-220.

There s also

a

biography

n

J.

Austin

avin,

The

Commentaryf

Gerardus

istriusn

Erasmus

Praise

f

olly

A

critical

ditionnd

ommentary

St. Louis

University

974,

xvi-

xlvi.

15

Erasmi

pistolae

I

198,

15.

16Graecasitterasie ic eminavitpueruliampassimhematiolaua Graece cri-

bant.Unum

me

torquet,

arbaram

stam

ialecticam

xtrudere

dhucnon

possim;

nam

barbaricam

rammaticam

lim ieci.

Erasmi

pistolae

I

415. His

other

ublica-

tions

re

mostly

ducational

a

work

n

the

ight

igures

f

onstruction,

ditionsf

Terence

unuchusnd Cicero

Tusculan

isputations

ook

).

He

helped

orverius

publish

ther

works,

ncluding

corrected

dition

f

Erasmus

e

Copia.

ee M. E.

Kronenberg's

rticle

ited bove.

Around ovember

517

.

rasmi

pistolae

II,

122)

he was

unjustly

ccused

f

poisoning

is

nemy

Murmellius.

17

Fortherest

fthis

rticle,

o save

pace

page

number eferences

o Listrius

nd

Valla are

given

n

the ext.

olio

numbers

AlrQ4v)

re to

Listrius,

age

numbers

(645-761)

re

oL. Valla

Opera

mnia

Basel

1540).

have sed

his dition

ecause

he

reprintTurin 962)

has

made

t

widely

vailable.

18GeorgefTrebizond'sialécticaIsagoge ialéctica) asofteneprinted5 times

before

520).

ee

J.

Monfasani,

eorge

f

Trebizond,

eiden

976,

00-317.

19

Quare

ptime

istri

osses

u

optime

e

pueris

uis

mereri,

tque

deoque

e

Ger-

mania

nostra,

i,

quando

Petrus

ispanus

radicari

on

potest,

ptima uaque

ius

quae

aut

x

Porphyrio

ut

x Aristoteleutuo

umpta

unt,

ommentariis

ut

choliis

tuis llustravesis.

Alv.)

20

One

of he

ections

n

G.

Valla's

ong

work e

expetendis

t

ugiendis

ebus

enice 501

is

on

dialectic

A8vff.here

s

also

shorter ork

e

xpedita

adone

rgumentandi

ibellus

which s

printed

nder

arious

ames

Libellus

e

argumentis,

ompendaria

t

acilis

disserendi

atio)

rom 498 nwards.

isse

gives

ive ditions

etween498

nd

1527,

Bibliographia

ogica

Hildesheim

965.

This shorter ork, romwhich istriusuotes,

s

in

fact

argely

tissue

f

(unacknowledged)

uotationsndreferencesromtheruthors,nd speciallyrom

his

own ranslation

ftheDialectic

f

Nicephorus.

osellanus

ecognises

his

n

the

preface

o his

commentary,

hich

s

printed

t

the nd

of

Trapezuntius

ialéctica

60

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Rudolph

Agricola

and

the

Topics

of

Cicero

(Alv).

In

particular

he has

avoided

every

kind of

sophism

and

time-wasting

cavillation.21

Listrius' principalmodelshave been Ammonius,22Boethius,Lorenzo

Valla and Rudolf

Agricola.

In

his

letter

to the studious

boys,

which

follows,

Listrius

outlines

another,

similar,

programme

of

study.

Atfirst

othing

smore seful

o

untrained

oys,

n

my pinion

han

he ialec-

tic f

George

f

Trebizond,

ollowed

y

hat f

Giorgio

allafor oth

re

qually

compendious,

nd

cover hewhole

fdialectic

riefly,

nd

boys

an

tastewhat

dialectics

nthem.

fterhese

he risian

udolf

gricola,

.

Valla,

Quintilian

and

the

opics

f

Cicero,

with ristotle

nd

Boethius

re tobe read. 23

Lorenzo Valla occupies a place of honour in each ofthelists Valla

uses three

ong chapters

from

Quintilian

as his

section

on

the

topics)

but

the

company

is

not

altogether

congenial.

Valla had

denounced

Boethius and

Aristotle t

vituperative

ength.

This

pattern

of

promi-

nent reference

and

unlikely

combination

is

repeated

in the

text.

Although

we shall

mainly

be concerned with

explicit

reference,

the

questions

of the

unity

nd

purposefulness

f

the

doctrine,

nd

of

silent

disagreement

sk

that we

first

ttempt

o establish

the version

of Valla

which

s

being

used.

Listrius'

report

f

Valla's definition nd

explana-

tionof oratio howsfairly learlythathe was notusingthe first ersion.

Orationem

alla

ibro

ecundo

ialecticaeuae icdescribit.

ratio

st

ocum

ex

nstitutione

rtificis

ignificantium,

ongruaomplexio

t

Socrates

tPlato

..

Valla

dicit sse

triplicem

rationem,

nam

implicissimam,uae

duabus

ic-

tionibus

st

ontenta,

ubiecto

t

praedicato,

anquam

iro t uxore:

Alteram

pleniorem,

uae pluribus

ropositionibus

onstat,

ualis

st

yllogismus,

an-

quam

pagus

ut

vicus. ertiam

lenissimamquae

constat

x

plurimis,ualis

st

oratoria,

eluti

uaedam

rbs.

B4V

(Lyons

559)

75.

The translation

ndthe ialectic

ext re

printed

n

a collection

f

G. Valla's worksnd translations.. VallaInterprete,icephoriogicatc Venice

1498).

The section

n

the

Topics

o which istrius

ften efers

s

mostly

rawn

rom

Cicero's

opica

nd

De Oratore.

asoli

hinkshat

iorgio

alla

was

nfluenced

y

his

unrelated

amesake

orenzo,

ut

he doesnot

xplain hy.

ee Vasoli132-144.

21

Porro exúltimos

ractatus/ex

ullo

hilosophorum

mitatos,

ed

plenos ophisticis

cavillandis,

enitus

misi,

ndignos

os

ratus,

ui

a

pueris

egerentur.

lv-2r.

22

Ammonius'

ommentary

n theDe

nter

retatione

ad

nly

een

ublished

n

Greek

(Venice,

503)

efore

520.

Listriuseems

o

have

known

reek

well.Ammoniuss

also

ited

n

the

ommentary

n

the raise

f olly.

23

Primum

meo

iudicio,

nihil

pueris

rudibus

tilius

uerit,

ialéctica

Georgii

Trapezontii,

einde,

eorgii

allae,

Nam

utraque

uxta

ompendiosa

st,

otamque

dialecticamreviterbsolvit,neisquequiddialécticait,gustareueri oterunt.

Secundum

os

egendi

unt

Rodolphus gricola

risius,

aurentius

alla,

Quin-

tilianus,

t Ciceronis

opica

um

Aristotele

t Boetio.

2V.

61

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Valla's first

ecension:

Oratio

upliciter

ccipitur:

nomodo

um

st

omplexio

ocum x

nstitutione

artificisignificantiumuaesuntnomen tverbum: lteroum st omplexio

plurium

uiusmodi

rationum

ualis

st

yllogismus;

uae

ex

tribus

rationibus

constatt

orátorůmictio

uae

constat

x

plurimis

Biblioteca

postolica

aticana

Ms.

Urbināt. at.

1207 3v

Second

recension:

Oratio

ut

superiori

robavimus

ibro)

est

vocum

x

institutione

rtificis

significantium

ongrua

omplexio:

na

quidem

implicíssima

uasi

et

mater

aliarum

uae

vel

duabus

ictionibus

otest

sse

ontenta

ominet

verbo an-

quam

viro

t

uxore:

uae

dicitur

nunciatio

raece

pophansis

eluti

na

domus.

Altera

ero

lenior:

uae

ex

pluribus

uiuscemodi

rationibus

onstat:

ualis

st

syllogismusuasipagus uidamutvicus. ertiautem ienissimauaeconstat

ex

plurimis

ualis

ratoria eluti

uaedam

rbs.

L.

Valla

Dialecticae

isputationes

Paris

509)

0r ol

2

In

other

nstances,

doctrines

not

enunciated

before

the second ver-

sion

are

reported.24

have not

been

able

to find

n

Listrius

variants of

quotation

or

doctrine

which

would

discriminate

between second

and

third

versions.

The

balance of

probability

must

be that

he used the

printed

text

second

version),

and

in

any

case

in

the

areas

with

which

the

commentary

s

concerned,

the

differences

etween

second

and

thirdrecensionare not substantive.

Between the

Prefaces and

the

first

ortion

of

Peter's

text,

Listrius

defines

dialectic

ars

est

quae

de

qualibet

re,

quantum

ipsius

natura

patitur

dissereredocēt

A3r),

divides

it

into

topical

and

judicial,

and

explains

the

topics

'certain general

heads of

things').

He

criticises

e-

cent

dialecticians for

failing

to

distinguish

these

parts

properly.

All

these

points

come from

he

first

wo

chapters

of

Book

2 of

Agricola's

De

Inventione

ialéctica

25

except

that

Agricola's

definition

of dialectic

originally

read,

ars

probabiliter

de

qualibet

re

proposita

disserendi,

proutcuiusque natura capax esse fideipoterit . Listriushas removed

the

emphasis

on

the

probable

and

on

the

securing

of

belief.

A few

paragraphs

later

when

Listrius

s

relating

with

a

reference,

his

time)

Agricola's

account

of the

duty,

matter,

nstrument

nd aim of

dialec-

tic,26

the

references

to

the

probable

are

retained.

Among

the

paragraphs

based on

Agricola

are

interspersed

attacks on

the un-

necessary length

and

difficulty

f

scholastic

manuals. This

is con-

24

For

example,

he

discussion

f

the

problem

f

xtç,

he

objection

o

genusgeneralissimus.

25

R.

Agricola

e

nventioneialéctica

Cologne 539), 93,

179.

26

Agricola

90-1.

62

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


trasted

with

Valla's view

that

no

subject

seems

to be shorter r

simpler

than dialectic.

(A4V,

694).

The use ofAgricolais in accordwith theprefaces.He also seems to

stand behind

the

step-by-step

ccount

of how

appropriate arguments

are

found,

using

the

topics,

and

constructed

nto

syllogisms.

This

is

followed

by

observations

on the

inappropriate

order of Peter's trac-

tates,

dealing

with sentences

before

single

words. Thus there

is a

strong

mphasis

on

invention,

t the

outset.

When

the

first

ection of text

provides

Peter's definition

f

dialectic,

Listrius' first

omment

is that he

prefers

the

Agricolan

definition

which

he had discussed

earlier.

Throughoutthediscussion of the basics of language, Valla's ideas

seem to

predominate.

Listrius

follows

him in

noting

Quintilian's

cor-

rectionof Aristotle's

nd

Priscian's

views

on

how

sound is

produced.

Valla's

own

classification

of all

sense

impressions

as

qualitas

is

repeated.27

His remarks

n

the definition f

anguage,

and of

oratio

re

recorded,

apparently

with

approval,

as

are his

objections

to the

bar-

barism

of

the

4

'indefinite

use

(' 'non-homo ),

and

to

the resolution

f

the

verb into

the form

copula

plus participle'.

In his

discussion of

quantity

universal,

particular

or

singular)

and

quality

(affirmative

r

negative) of propositions,Valla's long analysis of the use of various

signa

e.g.

omnis,

nullus,

quidam,

aliquis,

non

etc)

and

combinations

of

signa

s

summarised

at

some

length

n a list of

signaprovided

in the

commentary

nd

a

selection

of

rules and

problems.

Valla's

work

in

this

area is

originad

nd

important,

based,

like

his

Elegantiae

n sen-

sitive

analysis

of actual Latin

usage.

To

incorporate

them reflects

Listrius' earlier

pronouncement

that the

logical

definitionof noun

should be

the

same

as the

grammatical

definition.28

e

uses them

to

improve

the level of Latin

implied

without

demanding

alterations

n

the

philosophical

framework.

Valla's

views

on the

square

of contraries re

not

so

easy

to

accom-

modate

(710-16).

First,

he

objects

to the dea

thatboth of a

pair

of

con-

trariescan

be

false,

arguing

that the

false

cannot

be

contrary

o the

false and

positing

a three-valued solution

at the

level

of

universality

(either

4

'all

elephants

are

white

is

true,

or it

is

false,

or it

is

partly

true

and

partly

false,

when some

elephants

are

white

but

not

others).

27

This

s Aristotle'shird

ype

f

uality. ategories

a28f.

28Verum t ibereoquar uodsentio onvideo uidconférâtaectam pinosae

tradi,

um everanter

omen

n

Grammatica

tnomen

n

ogica,

ihil

it iscriminis

nisi

uod

nomen

ic

tiam

ronomen

t

participium

omplectatur.

3V.

63

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Secondly

he

objects

to Boethius'

argument

for

the

simultaneous

truthof both

subcontraries,

which

runs a man

is

a

grammarian;

if

someone says this about Donatus, it is true. A man is not a gram-

marian;

if

omeone

says

this about

Cato,

this

s true as

well ,

arguing

that

such

an

argument

could

be

used

to show that both

subcontraries

could

be

false

by

reversing

he

order of

the

examples)

and

that

t

s

an

error to allow the reference f

the

subject

to

change.

It is also un-

natural

in

language.

He wishes

a

subcontrary

to state

only

that

of

Plato is alive and Plato is

dead ,

one must

be

true and the other

false;

that

they

are

incompatible.

In

part

this

section

of

the

argument

depends

on

the

fact that

quidam

s

singular,

though

t

is used

by

the

logiciansas a particular.Valla is preparedtouse thismisapprehension

as

part

of

his

attack,

and does

not seem

to be

troubledthat

some

of

his

objections

would

be met

by

employing

nonnullus

s

the

particular ign.

He

employs

the same

tactic

(substituting

Catalina

for

quidam

in

Boethius'

rule)

to

attack

arguments

from

ingular

to

universal

through

the

contradictory.

He

argues

that

the

singulars give

indications

only.

Furtherhe

shows

that

n

cases

of non-essential

ualities,

there

may

be

only

one

contradictory

atherthan

the

two

required by

the

symmetry

of the

square.

In

case

that

Bucephalus

is

white,

Every

horse

is

white and

Bucephalus

is not white are both

false,

and therefore

not

contradictory.

n

order

to make

this

argument,

of

course,

he is

employing

the older two-valued

treatment f the universal.

This

may

suggest

that

Valla is

more

concerned

to

exploit

nconsistencies

nd er-

rors

in the

old

system

than to create

a

new one. This

does

not

mean

that his remarks are without

ogical

interest.

Commenting

on Peter's

account,

Listrius insists on consistent

reference

or

he terms29 nd recalls Valla's

point

about

the connection

of

contrary nd subcontraryusing his example.

After

xplaining

the

system,

he

says

that Valla

wrote

at

great length

on

this

subject,

anyone

who wishes to know

his

most acute

reasoning

may

read

it in

the

second book of his

dialectic,

however

it

is

longer

than

can

be set

down here .30 This is not

condemnation,

ndeed 'most acute'

implies

approval,

but Valla's

position

would

hardly

admit tolerance of

the

29

D3V.Like

Valla

713)

Listrius

ecalls

xamples

oethiusadused

n

his ntroductio

ad

Syllogismosategóricos

L

64 778C-D.

30De iis egibus ppositarumongelia LaurentiuscripsituamBoetiusthunem-

itatus

.H. cuius

ententiam

cutissimam,

i

quis

cire

upit,

x

secundoibro ialec-

ticae iusdiscat

icebit,

am

prolixior

st,

uam uam

ubiicere

ic ibeat.

lv.

64

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


received

account,

if

Listrius

had

understood

t

fully.

To

agree

with

t

would

have had

to

involve

reproducing

t least

its

conclusions.

AfterPeter's text on themodal propositions,Listriusquotes from

Valla's

chapter

the

section

in which

he asserts

that

there

are

many

other

adjectives

which could

as

easily

be

considered

modal as

'possi-

ble'

or

'necessary',

but he concludes

immediately

hat

although

this s

so he

does

not

consider

it

worth

discussing

n

detail.31 n

Valla's

text

this

uggestion

had

formed

art

of a

sequence

in

which he

moved

away

from

talking

about the

square

of

modal

propositions

possible,

im-

possible,

necessary,

contingent),

which

he

held to be

unnecessarily

elaborate,

to

discuss

the

two

kinds

of

argument,

the

necessary

and the

likely.This leads to the discussion of the probable arguments,from

Quintilian.

It is

a transition f

some

importance

n

directing

he rest

of

the work

towards

nvention,

nd

those

who

see Valla

reducing

dialec-

tic to

rhetoric r

supporting

cepticism

place

particular emphasis

on

it.32Listrius

picks

out one

of

the

arguments against

the

modais and

uses

it

to

cut shortPeter's

discussion

of the

square

of

modais,33

omit-

ting

the new

modais and the

remarks

on the

probable.

Listrius

begins

his second tractate

by

explaining

that the role

of

the

predicables

is to

analyse

five words which are

necessary

to the

understanding

f the

categories.

It is of littleuse to be told that the

categories

are

the ten

principal

genera

nless

we

know

what a

genus

s.

The

point

s

taken

up

when,

in

his second

section

of

commentary,

fter

he

has

explained

nominalist and realist

positions

on

the

universais,34

he

explains,

with

reference o

Ammonius,

that most of

them err

in

thinking

hat

Aristotle

s

speaking

about

things

ather han

words.

The

predicables

classify

the

words

Aristotle

uses

in

the

categories.

Valla

had not had a

chapter

on the

predicables,

treating

he

terms s

consti-

tuents

of a

definition, istrius' positionthoughdifferenteems to have

the

same effect f

removing

the

metaphysical implication.

In the

course

of

his

exposition,

Listrius

notices and

agrees

with

severed

of

Valla's criticisms:on

Porphyry's

ystem

of

answering

with

the

genus

alone

instead

of

the

whole

definition,

when

asked a

question

in

quid

31

Quae

cum ta

int,

on

perae

recium

rbitror

nhiis

pinetis

iuel

ctari,

uare

quam

brevissime

eliqua

radamus

.. flr.

32

See

for

xample, amporeale

7-42.

33

The

square

fmodal

ropositions

hich esultss

reproduced

n

Tractatus

ed. De

Riik, . 16,

Listriusmits

eter's

ext ere.

34ListriusspromptedyPeter'sextUndepredicabileroprieumptumt univer-

sale' dem

unt)

ut e

ustifies

t

with iswish hat is tudentshould

ot

e amazed

whenmasters

hatter

bout

his.

65

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


the

barbarity

of

expressions

like

'hinnibile

curriť.

However,

he

disagrees

with

Valla's

complaint

about

the

barbarity

of

'genus

generalissimům', noting that the comparison of 'generale' which

Valla

objects

to is

acceptable

in

the

equivalent

Greek

words. This

is

quite

a

significant

point,

since Valla

seems

to

regard

the

Latin

language

as the

natural

repository

of

logic

and

rejects

with scorn

similar

grecisms.

Listrius

permits

himself

second

long

excursus

on

the

meaning

of first

nd second

intentions,

so

that his

pupils may

understand

the

sophistries

f his

predecessors.

In

the accounts

of

dif-

ferentia nd

proprium,

Valla's

opinions

receive

due

prominence

and

agree

with the

author's

own.

In commenting n and filling ut the treeofPorphyry, istriusdoes

not mention Valla's

alternative

version,

but

he

does note

it n

the sec-

tion

on

substance

in the next

tractate.

At

this

point

he is

pursuing

an

even-handed

policy, relating

Valla's

opinions

after Aristotle's.

However,

Valla's

first

bjection,

that

Porphyry

id

not

say

what

in-

corporeal

substance

was or how

it

was

to

be related

to

immortal ra-

tional animals is answered

by

Listrius'

earlier

expansion

of

Porphyry's

diagram.

What

Listrius

has done is to add

a

division

of

spiritus which

is

one of Valla's

classifications)

s

an

explanation

of

Porphyry's

ncor-

porea.This does not meetValla's objectionsto soul appearing at dif-

ferent

oints

n

the

tree;

as a

genus

at

the

top

evel,

and

as a

differentia

further own.35

Nor

does

it

endorse

Valla's own

explanation

of

soul,

which he

allows,

though

in

a

different

egree,

to men and animals.

This

argument

Listrius

explicitlyrejects.

Truly,

,

as

I

may reelyay

what

think,

hink

hat

heres

no other

oul

n

animalshan he

orporeal.

e

have

triple

oul,

nimal

n

he

rain,

ital

n

he

heart ndnaturati

n

the iver.36

Thus thesubsequent reference o Valla's denial ofsouls toplantsis

disapproving.

Listrius ends

this section

by

referring

back to

the

diagram

in

the

tractate

n

predicables,

which confirms is

rejection

of

Valla's

view.37

Valla had reduced

the

categories

to

three:

substance,

quality

and

action.

He had also limited he

role of

substance,

at first

rguing

that t

35

Stulte

tiam

eparantesanquam

iversa,

nimatum

orpus

tanima.

57.

36

Verum

go

ut ibere

uod

sentio

īcam,

uto

n brutis

on

sse

alium

piritum

quam

orporeum.

ualem

t nos

habemus

riplicem,

nimalem

n

crebro,

italem

n

corde ndnaturalemnepate.K4r.

37

..

animai ationale

omo,

rrationale

rutumocari

otest

..

Haec series

tordo

praedicamentiepicta

st

n

praedicabilibus.

4r.

66

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


was

the

focusof

unity

behind the more variable

perceptiblequalities,38

later

that it

included

the

possession

of

the

qualities

(but

not

the

exact

aspector extentofthem). He wishedtoclassify verything erceptible

as

quality.

This

place

eems o

require

hat

when

wediscuss hatAristotle

hought

bout

the

redicaments,

e should dd

what

Valla,

who

ebuked

im,

hought

bout

the

ame.39

The first haracteristic

f

Listrius' discussion

of

the

categories

s its

evenhandedness.

After

isting

Aristotle's

ten

predicaments,

he

ex-

plains

how Valla

reduced them

to

three,

adding

that

he also

reduced

the transcendentais

o

res.*0

Although

Listrius attends to Aristotle's

versions,

often

noting

the

views of his

commentators,

many

of

Valla's

points

are

recorded,

for

example,

he

apparently

agrees

with

Valla

in

rejecting

Aristotle's

ac-

count of

mathematical

points,41

n

admitting

that

geometrical

solids

can

be

grouped

under

figura

a

part

of

quality)42

and

in

adding

arguments

of his

own

against

the

predicament

of relatives.

In

his

Aristotelian ection

he

follows

Ammonius'

explanation

of

the last six

categories

as combinations

of the

first

our,

and therefore

ependent

on them.43He uses theauthority fAmmoniusto rejectValla's argu-

38

Vatican,

rbināt,

at.

1207,

.42v:

ubstantia

substandost

ppellata:

uae

vel

per

e stat ullis

dminiculis

ulcta;

el

uae

accidentieu

qualitati

ubstat

tque

ub-

sistit: on

uia

lli

ubiaceat:

ed

uia

llam

ontineat

He

finds imself

nable

o

give

an

example,

ejectinghomo')

non sthaec ubstantia:edres

onstans

x

substantia

qualitate

t actione.

39

Postulareidetur

ic

ocus,

t

uando

arramus

uid

Aristotelese

praedicamentis

senserit,

ddiciamus

uid

Vallensis,

ui

hunc

ncrepat,

e iisdem

enserit. 3r.

40

K3V. istrius'

ntroduction

o

hese

matters

I

neither

ollow

or

eject

.)

enhances

the

oubt

s tohis

own

position.

e

iis

onge

ateque

pse

Valla

disputât

t

quidem

acutissime

oncluditque,

on nisi

tria sse

praedicamenta

t

transcendensnum

nempeem.Quemhoc ocoutnon mitortaпесrefello.41

Haec

pluraque

allensis

ontra

eripatéticos

cute

disputât,

ensens

ontra os

punctum,

t sit

minimum,

artem

amen sse

ineae,

uoque

puncta lus

ccupare

quam

unum. 3V.

42

Figura

utem st

uantitatis,

t

ineae,

ut

uperficiei,uaedam ompositio

t

pro-

tractio.. Ponunt

n

hac

pecie

mneš

iguras,

ive

n

ineis

olis

int,..,

sive

n

uper-

ficiebus. lr.

43

Porro

Ammonius,

t eum mitans

eorgius

alla,

utores

unt,

aec ex ultima

fierix

commixione

uatuor

liorum

raedicamentorum.

d

quod

x hac

distributione

capiunt.

orum

uae

sint,

uaedam

er

e

sunt,

t

Essentia,

uaedam

n

aliis

unt,

ut

omniaAccidentia.

orro,

orum

uaedam er

e

sunt,

uaedam

on

per

e,

qui

non

er

e

sunt,

unt

d

liquid.

uae

per

e

sunt,

utdivisibiliaunt tfaciunt

uan-

titatem,ut ndivisibilia,t onstituuntualitatem.aetera iuntx eoquod ubstan-

tia vel

Essentia,

eliquis

ribus

misceatur,

t

quantitati,

ualitati,

t

Ad

aliquid.

Substantia

nim

uanto

dmixta acit

uo

praedicamenta,uando

t ubi.

Tempori

67

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


ment that

the

property

not

receiving

more

and

less

belongs

to

the

grammatical

class

of

nouns,

ratherthan to the

category

of

substance,

byarguingthatonlywhatcan be a contrary an receive moreand less,

and

only

a

quality

can

be a

contrary.44

Valla did

not see

his account as

at

all

compatible

with

Aristotle's

and

even

if

Listrius

agrees

in

finding

ubstance and

quality

the

prin-

cipal categories,

his

view of them

s

more like

Aristotle's

han Valla's.

In

addition,

he

gives

fairly trong

ssent to

Ammonius' formulation f

the

relationship

of the

first our

categories;

which

pleases

me

suffi-

ciently

but

does

not

completely

gree

with

the

words of Aristotle .45

Listrius

treatment

of

perception

is

interesting.

While

discussing

Valla's predicament actio Listrius discusses Aristotle's theoryof

perception.

To

it he

opposes

the

view

of

Macrobius,

Lactantius and

many

others,

following

lato,

that

the forceof

sensing goes

out to the

object.

This is

explained by

the

fact

that some

people

see

better

han

others. Senses are said

not to

suffer

heir

objects

but

to receive them.

Many

of the

sentences

n this

area

are

closely

based

on

Valla's but the

phrasing

and

the

way

they

are

introduced

imply

that

they

are the

author's own views.46

enimdmixtaacit uando, t oco dmixtaacitbi .. IamEssentiaualitati ixta

facit

ctionem

t

passionem

.. Porro

ssentia

d

aliquid

mixta acit itum

sse

..

Habere

nim

ssentiae,

ircum

ssentiam

ignificatircumpositionem.

N2V).

Some

cholastic

ogicians

ad lso ended

o

reduce

he

raedicaments.

ckham or

example

adreferred

o

ubstances

nd

ualities

s

res

bsolutas.umma

ogica

q

49.

44

Ammoniusicit a

demum

uscipere

agis

t minus

uae possint

sse ontraria.

Diximus utem

os. contrarietatem

ere

on

sse,

nisi nter

ualitates

t albedo t

nigredo.

2r.Prior

o

this istrius

ave uite

full ccount fValla'sviews.

45

Quae

mihi

atis

rrident,

ed cumAristoteliserbis

on

per

omnia

onveniunt.

M4r.

46

ContraMacrobio

actantio,

liisque

ermultis.

latonem

ecutis,

ideturis

psa

sentiendi,

endered obiectum.

ec

dsine

ausa,

nam

lias

non

erneret

elius,

ui

acuto isu sset, uamquihebeti. dhaec,utdemus oloremliaque bjectaen-

suum endere

d

suos

ensus,

arnen

on unt icendi

ensus

ati,

b

objectis

ed

recipere

biecta,

t

Vallensis

it.Nam unc b

iis

patiuntur,

um b iisoffenduntur.

Veluti

umnimius

plendor

isum,

ut

nimiusonus

uditum,

ut

nimiusalor

ac-

tum,

fTicit.unc sensibus

lla

recipiuntur,

anquam

manibus

oma

de arbore

cadentia,

uae

nisi,

manibus

xciperentur,

rustra

n

manus,

eciderent.

gunt

igitur

ensus,

um

uis

funguntur

fficiison

patiuntur

isi umdolent.

ic

Valla.

N3r v.

The

quotations

rom

alla

text

elow)

re

reorganised

nd new entence

s

sup-

plied.

he

tag

ut Vallensis

it would ot

e

appropriate

f

hewhole ere

ntended

as

an

exposition

f

Valla's

view

atherhan

hat

f he uthor.

Esto

nim t olor d visum

endat,

t onus d

auditum. on unt icendi

ati

en-

sus bobiectis,edreciperebiecta. am unc b hispatiuntur,um b his stendun-

tur,

eluti umnimius

plendor

isum,

ut

nimiusonus

uditum,

ut

nimius

alor,

vel

percussioncisioque

actum

fficit. unc sensibus

lia

recipiuntur,anquam

68

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Listrius

begins

his

commentary

n

Peter's fourth

ractate,

by

refer-

ring

the

reader to the

accounts

of

the

topics

by

Cicero,

Quintilian,

Giorgio Valla and Agricola. He also remarks on the obscurityof

Aristotle'sversion. After he first

ortion

f

text,

he

explains

Boethius'

views

on

the four

kinds

of

argumentation,

of

which

two

are

perfect

(syllogism, nduction)

while

the

other two

(enthymeme,

xample)

are

incomplete

forms

correspondingly.47

lthough

this

seems

to

be his

preferred

ccount,

he

discusses

a

version

of

nduction

by

Cicero

(based

on

question

and

answer).48

He also

refers he reader to

Valla's ac-

count.

He notices

Aristotle's views

on

example

and

refers

o the

opi-

nions

of

Quintilian,

Valla

and Erasmus.

Valla's own account is verydifferent.

He

had

proposed

that

enthymemes

re

incomplete

forms,

above

all

the

incomplete

syllogism),

while

epicheiremes

are

forms

with

only

probable

premisses.

Syllogism,

example

and

induction

may

each have

dependent

enthymemes

nd

epicheiremes.

Example

is an

independent

formwith

ts own kind

of

validity.

Valla's

induction

s

a

technique

of

question

and

answer,

like

that of

Cicero,

or

the method of

Plato's

dialogues.

Listrius

certainly

went

further

han

his

text

n

adding

Boethius' ac-

count, thoughPeterdoes refer o this n his tractateon the

Topics.49

To include

Cicero's version of

nduction

s

a

significant

ddition.

This

still eaves

him

well short of

Valla's

position,

and

suggests

that the

references

mply

no

strong pproval.

In

his brief

ommentary

n the

types

of

syllogism,

he

notes and

perhaps

approves

Valla's

rejection

of

third and fourth

figure

syllogisms

and

of

conversions

among

the

figures.

He

also refers

o

remarks

f

Valla and

Agricola50

n

the varie-

ty

of

forms

of

argument

which are

underpinned

or

guaranteed

by

syllogisms,

ven where no

syllogism ppears explicitly.Listrius

ignores

the

many

variant

formsof

syllogism

which

Valla

proposes

(syllogisms

on

whole

and

parts,

all

negative

syllogisms,

manibus

oma

e arboreadentia:

uae

nisi manibus

xciperentur,

rustran

manus

deciderent.

gunt

gitur

ensus,

um

uis

funguntur

fficiison

patiuntur,

isi um

dolent

.. Macrobioum

multis

hilosophis,

ecnon

actantio

idetur

is

psa

ernen-

di

tendered obiectum.

ec ine

ausa

videtur,

liter

on

erneret

elius,

ui

acuto

visu

st

minus

uam ui

hebeti.

86-7.

47

Boethius,

e

Ďifferentiisopicis

PL

64,

1183A-1184D.

4804vCicero,e nventionexxxi1-56.

49

Peter f

Spain

Tractatus

6-58.

50

04r R.

Agricola

e

nventione

ialéctica40-3.

69

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


syllogisms

with

ingular

propositions

tc.)

as

well

as the otherforms e

had discussed

(including

hypothetical yllogism,

orites

dilemma).

For

Listrius, the syllogismas definedin the PriorAnalytics s thedomi-

nant form.

For

Valla

it

is one form

mong

many

and

it

is

not

totally

distinct

rom he

others,

but

has

variant forms

which

shade

into them.

Only

a

sample

of the

points

of contact

between

Valla

and

Listrius

have

been discussed.51

They probably over-representproblematic

issues

at

the

expense

of

more

straightforward

greements,52

ut

it

should

still

be

possible

to

draw

some conclusions.

Although

Listrius

only

four imes

disagrees

with

position

he

has attributed

o

Valla,53

t

is clear

that there are

many important

omissions. In

particular

his

more philosophical interests the soul, the abstractadjective, habitus

ethics,

the

Trinity,

motion),

the

forms

f

argumentation,

nd the

deas

on

the

probable

are

left

ut.

The form f the

commentary

elps

to

sup-

press

important

onnections.

Valla's

tendency

o

avoid

purely

mental

concepts

(mathematical

points,

the abstract

adjective, secondary

substance),

his

emphasis

on

the

definition,

is

refusal

of

abstract

con-

cepts

behind

anguage

and

his

emphasis

on

persuasive reasoning

fail

to

communicate.

On

matters

of

logical

technique,

Valla's

dissenting

views are

sometimes

merely

referred

o,

or

presented

merely

s alter-

natives, often

among

doctrinewithwhichtheyare incompatible.

It

seems

that

Listrius does

not share

Valla's

vehement

opposition

to

Aristotle

nd Boethius.

He assertsfor

xample

thatPeter has culled

in-

formation

rom he

best

authors.54

t

is often ufficient

or

his

purposes

to

get

behind

Peter

of

Spain

to their

opinions.

George

of

Trebizond

and

Giorgio

Valla,

who

also

appear

in

Listrius'

lists of authorities

have a

similar

view,

retaining

most of Peter's

points,

rejecting nly

his

interest

n

supposition,

and

adding

some orientation

owards the

pro-

51

Furthernstances

nclude:

he ndefinite

roposition

aken

s universal

Dlv,

696)

the

comparison

f noun

to

husband,

erb

o

wife

B3r,

694),

thedefinition

f

homonymI4r, 95),

hat

he

hree

efinitions

synonym,

omonym,nivocal)

elong

to

grammar

ather

han ialectic

Klv,

696)

hat ctios

not n accident

N3V,

78),

he

reduction

f

the

ast

five

ategories

N3V-02V,80-1),

hat nunciatio

s the

generic

term,

or

which

ropositio

s

wrongly

ubstituted

Plv, 733).

52

Between 2V

nd

D2r,

for

xample

here

re two o three

riendly

eferences

n

virtuallyvery age.

53

Thefour

re:

rejection

f

genus

eneralissimůmG3V

46);

Valla's

views n

the

oul,

(K4r, 60-3), ejection

f

ccepting

ore nd

ess s a

property

f

ualityL2r,

87),

the cholasticefinitionf inesL4V, 83).

54

At

haecut

it

ilissimus,

erte a

quae collegit,

on x vilibus

ed xclassicis

tque

adeo

Corypheis

utoribus

empe

orphyrio

t Aristotele

ollegit.

2r.

70

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


duction

of discourse.

(So

does

Caesarius,

though

he is

probably ust

later

than

Listrius.)

Thus there are

four authorities

(and

often

Agricolaas well) againstValla in all hismajor logical innovations e.g.

the

contraries,

he

modais,

forms

f

argumentation).

This

is

also

true,

of

course,

of

points

on

which Listrius

followsValla

or

approaches

his

position e.g.

the

predicables,

the facts of

language,

the

categories).

Valla's

views

are

much more often

repeated

where

they

touch on the

appropriateness

r

elegance

of the

anguage

used,

when

they

re more

easily

absorbed

into the

existing

system.

Similarly

t

is

usually

details

which are

carried

over,

larger

units

are more

often referred

o,

or at

best

presented

s

alternatives.Much

of the humanist'

polemic against

recent logicians (as in Caesarius)55 and several definitions are

repeated. Perhaps,

as

the

opening

definitions

nd the

sequence

of

publication

may

suggest

it is above ¿illValla seen

through

Agricola.

The

importance

of

the

topics

(in

a form

near

to that

of

Quintilian)

is

taken for

granted;

linguistic

improvements

and

metaphysical

simplifications

ontributed

to

a

logic

directed

more towards

the

pro-

duction

of

discourse,

but radical

changes

in

the

logical apparatus

are

avoided.

To the

very

small

degree

to

which

a concern

with

the

prob-

able

enters,

t

s

throughAgricola; though

the

suppressions

of

possible

scepticism

probably

outweigh

the inclusions. Nor does the reorienta-

tion of

philosophy

owards

anguage

which recentcommentators

have

insisted

on in

Valla,

seem to have

impressed

this

northern

humanist

reader. The evidence

of this

commentary uggests

that Valla's

Dialec-

tic

is understood

and

reproduced

much

more

on

matters

of

argumen-

tative

technique,

and

especially

on

points

of

style,

than

on

philosophical

questions.

The

possibility

that Valla is

read

through

Agricola by

1520,

that

is

even before

Agricola

becomes

a dominant

feature fhumanistsyllabusesmay lead us

to

reconsiderthe

usual

pic-

ture

of

the

intellectual

elation

of

the

two,

in

which

Agricola

is

seen as

a

populariser

and

a

pedagogue,

Veilla as an innovator. f these conclu-

sions

were

supported by

more than the so far

meagre

evidence

of

Valla's direct

nfluence nd

if nvention

nd

simplification

were

to be

seen as the

key

points

of

the

humanist

reform

f

dialectic,

we

should

probably

wish

to

study

ts

nfluence

more

in

its

applications,

in the use

55

J.

Caesarius

ialéctica

PCologne,525) Britishibraryopy 20d6(2)) a2,BS1V,Aa3V.For shortccount fCaesarius'ndebtednessotraditionalextbookseemy

M. Phil.

Thesis,

ermeations

f

Renaissanceialectic

nto

nglish

iscourse

Warburg

Institute

978,

1-2.

71

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


of

argument

n

letters,

documents,

iterary

exts nd

in

the

practice

of

rhetoric

han

in

more

strictly hilosophical

developments.36

Coventry

University

f

Warwick

56

have o thank

rofessor

.

T. Grafton

Princeton

niversity)

or

rawing

his

commentary

o

my

ttention.am

grateful

or

elp

o

my

riendsnd

teacherst the

Warburg

nstitute

LondonUniversity)

specially

ill

Kraye,

harles chmittnd

VickiBehm.

Work

enerously

upported

y

Leverhulme

uropean

ellowship

n

1978-9

iesbehind

his

aper.

72

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

1

1983)

Collège une institutionvant la lettre

OLGA

WEIJERS

Un

des

aspects

de la vie

universitaire

u

moyen

âge

était

le

loge-

ment des

étudiants,

un

problème

d ordre

pratique

auquel

les diri-

geantsde l université e sont ntéressésde bonne heure etqui suscitait

la

générosité

des riches.

Le

«collège»

médiéval nous a

légué

son

nom,

qui jusqu à

ce

jour

a

gardé

sa

signification

ncienne,

notamment

en

anglais.2

Ce n était

d ailleurs

pas

la forme

a

plus

ancienne

de

cohabitation des étudiants.

Le

collège

était

précédé

par Yhospitium

u

aula

En

somme,

les étudiants

avaient

plusieurs possibilités

pour

se

loger.

Ils

pouvaient

entrer

en

pension

chez leurs

professeurs

ou louer

une

chambre chez

des

particuliers.

Les

étudiants riches

pouvaient

louer

une maison pour s y installer vec leur suite. Souvent, et dès le début,

les

étudiants

vivaient

en

groupe

sous

la

présidence

d un

responsable,

normalement

un

maître

ès

arts,

dans

des

maisons

appelées

hospitia

u

aulae

A

cause du nombre croissantdes

étudiants ces

maisons devenaient

trop

rares et

trop

chères.

C est

pour

secourir

es étudiants

pauvres

que

de

richesbienfaiteurs ondèrent es

collèges,

qui,

à

l origine,

n étaient

rien

d autre

que

des

hospitia

otés

de

bâtiments

t de revenus

réguliers.

Mais cet

aspect

de

dotation

apportera

une différence

ondamentale,

car il crée les conditionsd une

présence permanente

et stable au sein

du monde

universitaire.

Je

ne

m étendrai

pas

ici sur histoire

du

mouvement

de la fondation

des

collèges

ni

sur leur

organisation

nterneou

leur

signification

ans

le monde

intellectuel.

Le but

de cet article est de montrer

u il

n est

pas

correct

de

parler

de

la fondation

de

collegia

ès

le début du

XlIIe

siècle,

pour

la

simple

raison

que

le mot

collegium

e se

vit

appliquer

à

1

Cet rticle

st ssu

unerecherche

enée ans

e

cadre une

tude

ueje prépare

sur aTerminologieesUniversitésu XlIIe siècle.

2

En

français,

e sens établissement

enseignement

e

orrespondlus

ntièrement

au

concept

édiéval.

73

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


ces

institutions

u au

cours de la

seconde

moitié

de ce

siècle. De

plus,

on

verra

que

ce ne

sont

pas

les fameux

«collèges»

des

Cisterciens ou

des autres ordresreligieuxqui furent l origine de cettedénomina-

tion,

mais les

maisons

séculières,

et

notamment le

collège

de la

Sorbonne.

Les

ordres

religieux

fondèrent

es

maisons à

Paris

pour

permettre

leurs

membres

de

participer

l enseignement

universitaire.En

prin-

cipe,

ces

maisons étaient

des

monastères,

comme les

autres

maisons

des

ordres

qui

se

trouvaient n

dehors des

villes

universitaires,

mais

elles

avaient

un

caractère

particulier

u

fait

u elles

étaient

destinées

recevoir

ceux

qui

étaient

ugés

les

plus

aptes

aux

études et à

qui

on

donnait l occasion de suivreles cours à l université,et

parce

qu elles

fonctionnaient

galement

comme

écoles. Les

différencesvec les

collè-

ges

séculiers sont

évidentes: les

maisons

d études

des

réguliers

n étaient

pas

fondées

dans le

but

de

secourir les

étudiants

pauvres;

elles

étaient

exclusivement

destinées aux

membres de

l ordre

auquel

elles

appartenaient.

On

y

donnait en

plus

un

enseignement

dès le

début,

tandis

que

les

collèges

séculiers

ne

commencèrent

u^au

cours

du

XlIIe

siècle

à

organiser

des

répétitions

t des

disputes.

Cela

dit,

il

faut

souligner

un

point

commun

fondamental: un

groupe

d étudiants vivait ensemble dans une maison fondéedans ce

but,

en se

soumettant

certaines

règles

qui

servaient

l organisation

de la

petite

communauté,

et

sous

la

direction

d un

maître

qui

s appe-

lait

souvent

provisor

aussi bien

dans

les

maisons

séculières

que

dans les

fondations

régulières.

On a

dit

que

le

collège

séculier ne

serait

peut-être

amais

devenu

l institution

mportante

ue

nous

connaissons,

s il

n y

avait eu l exem-

ple

des

collèges

des

Mendiants,

et

que

les

maisons des

réguliers

ont

sans doutesuggéré a formation es grandscollègesséculiersqui ontvu

le

our

vers

e

milieu du

XlIIe

siècle,

en

particulier

es

collèges

de

théo-

logiens,

destinés à

ceux

qui possédaient

déjà

leur

grade

de

maître

ès

arts et

qui

voulaient

obtenirun

doctorat n

théologie.3

C est

plausible.

De

toute

façon,

les deux

institutions,

l origine

si

différentes,

inirent

par

se

ressembler

fortement.

Ce

qui

m intéresse dans

cette

affaire,

c est

l aspect

sémantique.

Comment

les

«collèges»

s appelaient-ils,

à

quel

moment

le

mot

colle-

3

H.

Rashdall,

he

Universities

f uropentheMiddlegesédition eviséearF. M.Powicket A. B. Emden, xford936, . I, 506-7. es

premiers

ollèges

éculiers

étaient

es

nstitutions

haritables

on

réservées

une ertaine

atégorie

étudiants

pauvres.

74

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


gium

a-t-il

fait son

apparition

dans ce

contexte?

Comment

se fait-il

qu on

ait

pu

utiliser

ce

terme

pour

décrire

cette

nouvelle

institution?

Mon pointde départdans cetterechercheest le «collège» séculier,

plus

directement

ié à

l histoire

des

universités

t

plus

nouveau comme

institution

ue

la

maison des

réguliers.

Les

collèges

séculiers,

fonda-

tions

charitables,

comme

on

l a vu

plus

haut,

s appellent

à

l origine

et

pendant

une

bonne

partie

du

XlIIe

siècle,

domus

auperum

colarium.

Ainsi,

une

des

plus

anciennes

maisons

de

ce

genre

est

décriteen

1210

dans

les

termes

uivants:

domus

auperum

colarium

ancii

Thomae

martyris

Parisiensis

4

Pendant la

seconde

moitié du

XlIIe

siècle,

le

terme

collegium

ait on

apparition,mais le motdomusontinue à êtreemployé.On peut suivre

l entrée en

fonction

du

terme

collegium

ans

le

Cartulaire de la

Sor-

bonne.5 Ce

collège

de

théologiens,qui

accueillait

non

pas

des

pauperi

scolares

mais

des

pauperi

maģistri

maîtres

ès

arts)

désireux

de suivre

l enseignement

de la

faculté de

théologie,

fut fondé

par

Robert

de

Sorbon en

1257.

En

1259,

le

pape

Alexandre

IV,

dans une

lettre u

roi

Louis

IX,

utilise

e

mot

collegium our

indiquer

le

groupe

des

maîtres

ainsi

réunis:

quod

tu

..

in eadem

ivitate

erpetuum

ollegium

magistrorum

artium

qui

a

liber

litate

egia

ite

ecessaria

ercepturi

bidem

tudio

acent,

ie

instituereecrevistiad hoc amcertis omibuseputatisi n 1261 Robertde

Sorbon

reçut

une donation

de

Hugues,

évèque

d Apros

vice

t

nomine

collegii

auperum

magistrorum

arisius

studenciumn

theologica

acúltate.1

Dans cette

sorte de

contexte,

e

mot

collegium

eut

être

remplacé

par

consortium

un

bref

du

pape

Urbain

IV

de

1262:

magistřiauperes

arisius

commorantes

n

unum

congregati

onsortium

)

ou

congregatio

un

bref

du

même

pape

de

1263:

congregatiouedam

auperum

magistrorum

).

Il

est

clair

que

dans

ces

premiers

xemples,

le mot

collegium

ndique

la

communauté

des

maîtres

plutôt

que

la maison

qui

les

abrite.

C est

probablementdans ce sens

que

Robert de Sorbon lui-mêmeutilise e

terme

pour

décrire

sa

création en

1264:

collegio

auperum

magistrorum

Parisius tudentiumn

theologicaacúltate.10

4

Chartularium

niversitatis

arisiensiséd.

H. Deniflet

A.

Chatelain,

.

,

Paris

889,

10

appelé

ans

a

suite .

U.P.).

5

Edité

ar

P.

Glorieux,

ux

ripin.es

e a

Sorbonne,.

II,

Paris1965.

6

Glorieux,p.

it. 79

p.

207.

7

Ibid. 97

p.

224.

8 Ibid. 03p. 230.

9

Ibid.

18

d.

246.

10

bid.

35

p.

265.

75

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Cette communauté des

maîtres

e

distingue

nettement e la

maison

dans une

lettrede

Thibaud,

évêque

de

Beau

vais,

de

1292:

extititomus

quedicitur eSorbona.. inqua moraturenerabileollegiumauperummagis-

trorum

ui

inibi n

theologica

acúltate

tudeant. Mais la suite de

cette

ettre

contient

ncore

deux

fois

e

terme

collegium

dont une

fois

uxtaposé

à

domus. Les deux mots

sont

apparemment

interchangeables,

c est-à-

dire

qu ils

signifient

ous les

deux

l ensemble

de l institution:

d

cuius

collegii

mpliationem

t

conservationem

t ut de bonis

ibi

a

Deo

collatis icte

domui

eu

dicto

ollegio

ias

elemosinas

argiantur.12

Bien

que

cet

article

soit

primairement

asé sur les

sources

de l uni-

versitéde

Paris,

il

n est

pas

inutilede

comparer

un

instant a

situation

en Angleterre,où les collèges ont connu une évolutionsemblable et

d ailleurs

plus

durable.

Là

aussi,

le

mot

collegium

ommence

à

apparaître

au cours de

la seconde

moitié du

XlIIe

siècle,

également

précédé par

domus t

utilisé

ensuite

à

ses

côtés. Les

Status

de Merton

College,

de

1274,

parlent

constammentde

domus

cholarium

u

domus

tout

court,

mais

collegium

est

également

attesté:

veniat

pse

ustos..et

decern

el

cto

colares

e

maturioribusomus

psius

ausa

visitacionis

ustodist

fratrum

eu

yconomorum

ecnon t

aliorum

icti

ollegii

..

impendende.

Ayant

constaté

que

le

mot

collegium

ommence à

être

employé pourdécrire es institutions ontil

s agit,

tant à Paris

qu à

Oxford,

pendant

la seconde

moitié du XIII

siècle,

e

me

suis

posé

la

question

de

savoir

d où

venait

cette

dénomination.

Comme

dans la

littérature ur

ensei-

gnement

dans les

ordres

religieux,

j avais

souvent

rencontré

des

expressions

comme «les

collèges

bénédictins»,

«le

collège

Saint-

Bernard»

etc.,

je

me

suis

tournée

naturellement vers

ces

maisons

d études mentionnées

plus

haut,

considérées

par

Rashdall

comme

les

exemples

de

l évolution

des

maisons

séculières.14 l

semblait

logique

de

penserque

si

ces

institutions

eligieuses

vaient

été à

l origine

d un

développement

vers une

forme

de

«collège»

dont celui

de

la

Sorbonne

est un

exemple,

il

fallait

galement

chercher

origine

de cette

dénomi-

nation

dans

les

sources

concernant eur

histoire

primitive.

Et

l emploi

du mot

«collège»

dans la littérature

econdaire me

donnait tout

espoir

d être

sur la

bonne

piste.

Mais cet

espoir

fut

entement

déçu.

Je

découvris

que

si

pour

es

mai-

sons

d études

de

l ordre

des frères

rêcheurs

on

utilise

généralement

e

n

Ibid.

88

p.

478.

12 bid.

13

Merton

unimentséd.P.

S.

Allen

t

H.

W.

Garrod,

xford

928, . 24; f.bid., .

26.

14

Cf.

i-dessus

.

2.

76

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


terme studia

l emploi

du

mot

collegia our

les

maisons

respectives

de

l ordre cistercien

ne voulait

pas

dire

pour

autant

que

ce

mot

se

trouvât

dans les sources du XlIIe siècle.15

Les

observations

uivantes

sur la

terminologie

es maisons

d étude

des ordres

religieux

n ont

pas

la

prétention

d être d une

vérité abso-

lue.

Les

«collèges»

des

réguliers

à

Paris au

XlIIe

siècle étaient

nombreux16 t

e

n ai

certainement

pas

vu toutes

les

sources

qui

les

concernent.

Mes

recherches

taient

axées sur

a

question

de

savoir si le

mot

collegium

appliqué

à la

Sorbonne à

partir

de

1259

par

le

pape

et

par

d autres autorités

cclésiastiques,

était

emprunté

un

emploi

déjà

entré en

usage

pour

les

institutions

arallèles

des

réguliers.

J ai dirigé

meseffortsrincipalement urtrois rdres: es Franciscains, es Domi-

nicains

et les

Cisterciens.

Pour commencer

par

les frères

prêcheurs,

la

situation

n a

rien

d ambigu.

Quand

il

s agit

dans

les

sources de

leur

histoire17

de

l enseignement

dispensé

par

l ordre,

on

trouve

régulièrement

e

mot

studium.

u

cours du

XlIIe

siècle,

ils

ont

mis en

place

une

hiérarchie

d écoles au niveau

de

l ordre

entier,

dans

laquelle

les

simples

studia

avaient une fonction

ocale;

les

studia

sollemnia

deux

par

province,

recevaient

es

plus

doués,

et

les

studia

ener

lia,

écoles

centrales

pour

la

totalitéde l ordre, accueillaientson élite intellectuelle.18 e

plus

célè-

bre

parmi

ces

studia

ener

lia était e

couvent de

Saint-Jacques

à

Paris.

Denifle,

en

parlant

de

cette

école,

se

sert

des

appellations

«Studium» et

«Studienconvent».19

e

dernier

mot,

bien

qu allemand,

décrit

assez

bien

le

caractère de

l institution:

c est un

couvent

qui

sert

essentielle-

ment à

accueillir

es

étudiants

es

plus

intelligents

e

l ordre et à

leur

donner

un

enseignement

de haut

niveau,

en

théologie

bien

entendu.

L organisation

de

l enseignement

dans l ordre

des

frères

mineursne

semble

pas

différer

eaucoup

de celle

des

prêcheurs.Cependant,

on

15

L index

e

Martène-Durand

tome

V)

renvoieous

Collegia

rdinis

redicatorumà

«

tudium

,

mais e n est

as

e

cas

pour

es

«

Collegia

rdinis

isterciensis».

16

A

part

es

Dominicains,

ui

avaient

eur ouvent

e

St-Jacques

ès

1218,

t

es

Franciscainsvec

eur

ollège

es

Cordeliersès

1219,

l

y

vait

es

Cisterciensvec e

Collège t-Bernard,

es

Trinitaires,

es

Mathurins,

es

Clunisiens,

tc.

17

urtout

cta

apitulorum

eneralium

rdinis

raedicatoruméd.

B. M.

Reichert,

ome

(1221-1303),

ome

1898.

18

ur

enseignement

es

Mendiants,

f. ar

xemple

e scuole

egli

rdini

endicanti

(Todi 1978)

vec

notamment

.

Barone,

Gli

Studia

ella

egislazioneegli

rdini

Mendicanti. 205-247.

19

H.

Denifle,

ie

Constitutionenes

rediger-

rdensom

ahre

228

dans:Archivür

it.

und

Kirchengeschichte

es

Mittelalters,

(1885),

165-227.

77

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


parle

du

«Collège

des Cordeliers»

à

Paris.20Dans

les sources

atines,

e

n ai

trouvé

que

les

termes

studium

t

studium

enerale

comme

pour

les

Dominicains.21

Le mot

«collège»

est

régulièrement

tilisédans

le contexte

de Tordre

cistercien.

Tous

les

historiens

de cet ordre

parlent

du

«Collège

Saint-

Bernard»

à Paris et de

celui du même

nom

à

Toulouse.22

Dans les

textes

latins cités

par

ces auteurs23

pour

les

premiers

siècles

de

leur

existence,

on rencontreou bien

studium

u

bien les termes domus

t

locus,

mais

pas, queje

sache,

collegium.

ar

exemple:

provisori

t

monachis

loci

qui

dicitur eati

Bernardi

n

Cardineto

arisiensi

4

et

domusmonachorum

ordinis Cisterciensis

arisius

studentium.25

édition

par

Canivez

des

statutsdes ChapitresGénéraux de cet ordre a l avantage incommen-

surable

de contenir

un

index.26

Celui-ci

énumère sous

le

titre

romet-

teur

«

Collegia

seu Studia

Generalia rdinis

une

longue

liste de

passages

se

rapportant

l organisation

de

l enseignement.

Pour

tout

le XlIIe

siècle,

il

n y

a

pas

un

seul

de ces

passages qui

comprend

effectivement

le terme

collegium.

ci

aussi,

ce sont

les

mots

studiumdomus

t

locus

ui

décrivent

es maisons

d études,

par

exemple:

in

domo colarium rdinis

in

Montepes

ulano

t in

domo

colarium arisiensium

27

oco

.

Bernardi

tu-

dentibus.

8

20

J.

Moorman,

History

f

he

ranciscanrder

rom

ts

Origins

o

he

ear

517

Oxford

1968,

tilise lternativement

school»t

«collège».

f.

ussi

P.

Gratien,

istoiree a

fondation

t

de

évolutione

ordre

es

rères

ineursux XlIIe

s.,

Paris

928,

ui

dans

e

chapitre

Organisation

es

études»

p.

125

qq.) parle

par exemple

u

«Collège

u

Grand

ouvent

e Paris».

21

I

est

évident

ue

le mot

ollegium

tilisé

ar

Wadding

Annales

inorum

éd. Les

Eaux Claires

931-4)

e ditrien ur

emploi

u terme ans

e

atin u XlIIe siècle.

22

Cf.

G.

Müller,

ründung

es

t-Bernhardkollegiums

u

Paris,

ans: stercienser

hronik,

XX

1908),

1-14

t

38-50;

E.

Kwanten,

e

collège

aint-BernardParis. a fondation

[1244] t esdébuts,ans:Rev.Hist.Ecclés., 3 1948), 43-72; . Gérard,es rigi-

nes

u

Collège

aint-Bernarde

Toulouse

vers

1150-1335),

ans:Annales u

Midi,

69

(1957),

189-205;

.

J.

Lekai,

ntroductionl étude

es

ollèges

isterciensn rancevanta

Révolution

dans:

Analecta

isterc.,

n. 25

1969),

145-79,

.

ex.

p.

145

fondationu

Collège

aint-Bernard

Paris».

23

De

nombreux

assages

ans

étude

e

Kwanten

cité

i-dessusote

2).Egalement

dansMüller

id.).

24

Bulle Innocent

V chezKwanten

op. it.)

.

457.

25

Matthieu

aris,

Chron.

ajus

V

p.

528-9.

26

J.-M.

Canivez,

tatuta

apitulorum

eneralium

rdinisisterciencis

Louvain 935

(index

ans

ome

III).

27

Canivez II an. 1262:6.

Cf.

unenote e l éditeur

our

année

237:9:

Haec

unt

initiaollegiiancii ernardiarisienss

28

bid.

1248:3.

La même hosevaut

pour

es bulles

ditées

n

faveur u

Collège

Saint-Bernard,

f.

M. H.

d Arbois e

Jubainville,

tudeur état

ntérieur

es

bbayes

is-

78

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Le mot

collegium

dans

les statuts

des

Cisterciens,

ne

commence

à

être

utilisé

que

tout

au début

du XVe

siècle,29

abord

pour

le

Collège

Saint-Bernardà Paris: de etsuper uodam ensu nnuo exdecimolidorum

odo

denariorum

ollegio

ancii Bernardi

arisiensis

debitorum.. de

quo

censu

ieti

ollegii

colares

ihil

penitus

eceperunt

30

nsuite

aussi

pour

les

autres

maisons

d études.31

Il

ne

s agit pas

du

remplacement abrupt

des vieux

termes

par

le

mot

collegium.

e

dernier ne

l emportera

qu après plusieurs

décades,

pendant

lesquels

on trouve

tantôt colle-

gium

tantôt

tudium u domus

et

parfoix

deux de

ces termes à la

fois,

par exemple:

ad

constructionemeu

provisionem

omus eu

collegii ro

studio

personarum

rdinis

2

et

Alioquin

osomni

ure

ollegii

eu

tudii

rivat

33Ceci

ne vaut que pour les Cisterciens,mais il est peu vraisemblablequ ils

aient

eu

beaucoup

de retard ur

les

autres

ordres

dans leur terminolo-

gie.

Notons encore

que

pour

les Bénédictins a

situation est

identique34

et

que

dans les

statutsdu

«Collège

des

Clunisiens» à

Paris

le

titre ffi-

ciel

de la

maison

est

donné

explicitement

ous

cette

forme:extra ietam

domum

nostram

que

domus

scolarium

luniacensiumommuniterarisius

appellatur

35

terriennest rincipalementeClairvauxuxXlle tXlIIe .y aris 858, 60-7.Cf. ussiB.

Lucet. es

Codifications

isterciennese

1237

t

de

1257

Sources

histoire

édiévale,

CNRS

1977):

indexmentionnee terme

ollegium

parisiense,

mais e

passage

ont

l

s agit

ontiente mot tudium.

29

I

y

a en

fait n

passage

ans es mêmes tatuts

ui

est ntérieur

u

XVe

siècle,

mais

ui

me emble ssezobscur: ommittitur

bbati e

Valle ostrae

ominae,

uatinus

cum

iligentia

e

nformet

n

permutatio

iusdemineaeitaen

ardino

ar[dineti]

ntercolares

Sanctiernardit

ollegium

ar[dineti]}

e

ua

nno

uolibet

ontroversia

onsuevit

riri,

ictotu-

dio it

utilis,

t

referatur

equenti

apitulo

enerali

Canivez 389:29).

e

Collège

aint-

Bernard

e trouvait

epuis

250

nvironu

Chardonnet

t

e

ne vois

pas qui

sont es

scolaresanctiernardi

utres

ue

es tudiants

u

collège.

otons

ailleurs

ue

c est e

seul ndroitù

l

est

uestion

u

Chardonnet,

e

collège

tant

oujours

ommétudium

ou collegiumancti ernardiarisiensis.Ajoutonsncore ue P. Gérard, ans on

étude ur e

collège

e

Toulouse,

vait

éjà

fait

emarquerue

«lenom e

collegium

e

fut

éfinitivementtabli

ue

dans

e

courantu

XVe siècle»Les

rigines

cf.

ote

2)p.

197).

30

Canivez

.

IV an.

1401:19.

31

Cf.

Canivez

. V an.

1411:

3

in

oppido

uo

Lypzik);

426:

6

Cracovie);

431:

8

(Toulouse).

32

Canivez

426:56.

33

Canivez 430:67.

ans

e

statut

411: 3

tudiumt

ollegium

emblent

ésigner

eux

choses

ifférentes:um

quoddamenerale

tudiumn

ppido

uo

ypzik

undaverunt

t

dem

studium

dominoostro

apa onfirmari

t

rivilegian,

btinuerunt,

n

uo

ieti omini

pecialiter

desiderant

num

ollegium

rdinisostrinducere

t

nire

t ut

bbates

ro

onstruction

ollegii

n

dictotudioontribuant.

34

H.

Denifle,

as erste

tudienhaus

er enedictiner

nder

niversitätarisdans:

Archiv

für it.

und

Kirchengeschichte

erM

As,

(1885),

70-83;

erlière,

es

olleges

énédic-

tinsux niversités

u

moyen

ge

dans:Revue

Bénédictine,

(1893)

145-158.

35

C.U.P.

II,

687-91

1309-19]

titre

e

Denifle: tatuta

ollegi

luniacensium).

79

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


On

peut

en conclure

que

les ordres des

réguliers

n avaient

pas,

au

XlIIe

siècle,

l habitude

d appeler

leurs maisons

d études

collegia.

l

faut se tourner vers les sources séculières pour trouver ce terme

appliqué

aux maisons des

religieux.

Dans le Cartulaire de

l université

de

Paris,

il

y

a

quelques

passages

où des

responsables

universitaires

utilisent e mot

collegiumour indiquer

ces maisons. En

1252,

les

doc-

teurs

en

théologie

émettent

un statutdestiné

à

réduire

e nombre

des

religieux

enseignant

dans

la ville:

ut de

cetero

eligiosus

liquis

non

habens

collegium

t

cui est

ure

publico

ocere

rohibitum

ad eorumocietatem

ullate-

nus

admittatur

6

et

plus

loin ut

ingula eligiosorum

ollegia ingulismagistris

actu

regentibus

tunica colade ceteroint ontenta.31eux

années

plus

tard,

on trouve une énumération ces «collèges»dans une lettrede l univer-

sité: Porro

empore

rocedente

onsiderantes

ajores

ostri

iverarum

eligionům

vi

collegia

videlicet

ratres

larevallensesPremonstratensesde Valle-Scolarium

de

Ordine

rinitatis,

ratres

inores

preter

lios

regularespud

nos

ollegia

on

habenes

causa discendi acras

itteras arisius onvenisse.. .

38

Cette

lettre

est

instructive.

Elle

montre

que

le

mot

collegium

ans ce contexte est

remplaçable

par

conventusut

nullus

regularium

onventus

n

collegio

ostro

duas

simul

ollempnes

athedras abere

aleat39

t

que

le mot

collegiumeut

avoir

en

effet a

même valeur

que

conventus

également

en dehors du

contexted une villeuniversitaire:

fratresredicatores)

nnumerodeo unt

dilatati

uod

am

ubique

errarum

er

multa

ollegia

unt

dispersi.*0

Faisons d abord la

distinction

ntre

es

différentes

ignifications

u

terme

collegium

ans les sources

universitaires.D une

part,

il

est

utilisé

comme

synonyme

de

corpus

consortiumu

societas,

est-à-dire

a

corpo-

ration de

l université

elle-même.

Dans

ce

sens,

il

est souvent

employé

en

combinaison

avec

universitasu

l un des termes cités. Ainsi

on le

rencontredans la même lettrede

1254:

corpus

ollegii

ive

universitatis

L expression

in

collegio

ostro

u

deuxième

passage

cité ci-dessus de

cette

ettre

e

rapporte

à cet

emploi.

Deuxièmement,

le

mot

collegium

ert nommer es

«collèges

des

doc-

teurs»

d une

faculté,

nés

probablement

à

l universitéde

Bologne

et se

manifestant

Paris à

partir

de la seconde moitié du XlIIe

siècle.41

36

CUP.

I,

200

12521.

37

bid.

38

C.U.P.

I,

230

1254].

39

bid.

40

bid.

41Cf. ar xemple . Cencetti,ull rigineellotudioiBolognadans:Rivistatorica

Italiana,

er.

VI,

t. 5

1940),

55-7;

A.

Sorbelli,

l Liberecretus

urisesareiell Uni-

versitài

Bologna

t.

I,

Bologna

938,

X-CXXIV.

80

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Enfin,

dans

la

signification ui

nous

préoccupe,

le terme

décrit es

maisons

pour

étudiants

pauvres.

Mais en dehors de ces trois acceptions «universitaires», e terme

peut

évidemment

garder,

aussi dans

les textes

officiels e

l université,

ses sens courants.

Et

l un

de ces

sens,

parmi

les

plus

fréquents

d ail-

leurs,

est «communauté

religieuse»,

monastique

ou

canoniale. Les

exemples

de

collegium

monachorum

collegium

anctimonialium

collegium

canonicorum

sont

innombrables. Cet

emploi

commun

du

terme

a sans

doute

influencé es

uristes

dans leur

définition:

pour

eux,

un

collegium

est

spécifiquement

ne collectivité ont les

membres habitent ensem-

ble. Cela

s applique

aussi

bien aux

maisons

d étudiants

qu aux

com-

munautés religieuses.

A mon

avis,

le

mot

collegium

ans les

passages

cités du

Cartulaire

de

l Université

de

Paris,

a

simplement

e sens

courant

de communauté

religieuse

ou

maison de

réguliers.

Cette

interprétation

emble

être

confirmée

ar

le

fait

ue

dans

l un d eux

le mot

est

remplacé par

(

regu

larium

conventus

et

que

dans un autre le mot

collegium

st

utilisé

pour

indiquer

toutes les

maisons des frères

prêcheurs

à

travers

e

monde,

donc

pas

nécessairement des

«collèges»

abritant

des étudiants.42

Je

pense que

l expression

regulare

ollegiumemployée par

le

pape

Alexan-

dre IV dans une lettre l université en

1256,

signifie galement

une

communauté de

réguliers:quorum

rojecto

ulti

uerunt

x

vobis

tde vestro

consortio

ui

ad

regulareollegium

ransierunt.

3

En

résumant,

l

faut

constater

qu il

y

a à Paris

vers

1250-60

d une

part

des

«collèges»

séculiers

qui

s appellent

normalement

domus

aupe-

rum

colariumdestinés à

héberger

des étudiants

mpécunieux.

D autre

part,

il

y

a

des maisons

religieuses

fondées

par

les ordres des

réguliers

pour

accueillir

leurs membres les

plus intelligents.

Ces

maisons sont

en

même

temps

monastère

et école de

théologie

et

s appellent

studium

domus

u

locus.Elles sont

parfois

décrites

par

l université

avec

le terme

collegium

l un des

mots

courants

pour

indiquer

une communauté

religieuse.

42

Cf.

galement

.U.P.

I,

221

1253]

ù le

Collège

aint-Bernard

stdécrit

omme

monasterium

eati

ernardi

ussibien

ue

comme acrumtudium

heologie.

43

С.U P.

I,

296

1256].

ans une utre

ettreu même

ape С.

U

P.

309

1257],

e

mot

ollegium

st

tilisé

omme

ynonyme

e

consortium

t ocietas:

el

maģistros

ut

colares

predictorum

ratrum

d

magistrorum

onsortium

el

jusdem

niversitatis

ollegium,

e

uo

am

sse

desierant,

dmitiereullatenus

enebantur,

reter

d,

uod

d ocietatememost

ogendus

nvitus,

t

ipsijratresuobusonebentniversitatis,idelicetcolariumt onventusredicatorum,ollegiis

contineri.

e couvent

esfrères

rêcheurs

st oncmis

ur e même

lan,

omme

orps

constitué,

vec

Y

universitascolarium.

81

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Dans cette

situation,

l

arrive

que

de

hauts

fonctionnaires cclésias-

tiques

commencent à

appeler

la

nouvelle

communauté des

pauvres

maîtres alias étudiantsen théologiede Robert de Sorbon du nom de

collegiumparfois

remplacé

par

consortium

u

congregatio.

l

me semble

que

le choix du mot

collegiumeut

avoir

été

inspiré

par

la

ressemblance

entre a maison

de

Robert de

Sorbon

et les

maisons des

réguliers.

La

Sorbonne était

la

première

nstitution

éculière de

ce

genre

destinée

aux

étudiantsen

théologie

xclusivement.Ceux-ci

y

vivaient

ensemble

sous la direction d un

proviseur

et

selon certaines

règles.

Un tel

groupe

de

gens pouvait

être

décrit

omme

une

«communauté»

pas trop

dissemblable des communautés

religieuses.

En

plus,

le

mot

collegium

avait des connotationscorporativeset figuraitdans ce sens dans le

vocabulaire universitaire. La combinaison de

ces deux

acceptions,

communauté dont

les membres

vivent

ensemble et

corporation,

fai-

saient

de ce

terme un

nom

particulièrement

eureux

pour

cette nou-

velle institution

ommunautaire

et

incorporée

dans

la vie

universi-

taire.

En

conclusion,

e

voudrais retenir es

points

suivants:

1.

Il

est inexact de

parler

de la

fondation

de

«collèges»

avant

1250,

le

mot

collegium

étant

appliqué

à ce

genre

d institutions

u à

partir

de

la seconde moitié du XlIIe siècle.

2.

Il

est aussi inexact de

parler

des

«collèges»

des

réguliers ui

s instal-

lèrent à Paris au cours

de

la

première

moitié du

XlIIe

siècle,

puisque

ces maisons

étaient

nommées

généralement

tudia et

souvent dans des

cas

particuliers

domus

ou

locus ou encore

d un nom

général

«monastère»

conventusu

monasterium)

3. Il

est

possible

que

l idée

du

collège

séculier

pour

étudiants

en théolo-

gie

ait

été

inspirée par

l exemple

des maisons des

réguliers.

4.

Il

est vraisemblable

que

le nom

de

collegium

ans

le

sens de

l anglais

«college»

ne fait

pas partie

de cette

mitation,

mais a été

imposé pour

la

première

fois

à

l institution

éculière

de

Robert

de

Sorbon

comme un

nom

qui

réunissait

heureusement

son

aspect

communautaire et son

aspect

corporatif.

Voorburg

(N.L.)

Nicolaas

Beetslaan

1

82

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Review

Abbon e

Fleury,

uestions

rammaticales

Texte

tabli,

raduittcommenté

ar

Anita

Guerreau-Jalabert,

aris

Les

Belles

ettres)

982,

39

pp.

-

ISBN 2 25133630

The

Quaestiones

rammaticales

r

Epistola

as this

pusculum

sedto be

called

y

ts

author,

bbo f

Fleury

*

40/950-

1004)

nd s

it

was

referredo

during

he

reater

part

f

he

Middle

Ages,

as

ertainly

ot een

ne

of

he

eading

extbooksf

gram-

mar n he

Middle

ges.

ndeed,

ts

mportance

s

mainly

ueto

he ircumstancehat

it

allows

s

an

interestinglance

t

the

grammatical

eeds elt

y

a

monastic

om-

munity

t the ndof he enth

entury.

The

Letter

aswritten

y

Abbo or he

enefitf

his

English upils

uring

is

tay

atthe

Abbey

f

Ramsey

n

the

ears

85-987.

he

emphasis

asbeen aid

n

problems

of

ccentuation,

ronunciation

nd

orthography,

ut

t

also

contains iscussionsn

inflexion,

n

well-known

igurative

onstructions,

uch s

"sermonem

uem

udistis,

non stmeus" loh.14,24)and "horummaior st aritas"/Cor. 3,13),on some

aspects

f

he

Holy rinityerminology

f

he

Quicumquet

c.

n

short,

t

ontains

at-

ters that

raditionally

rew the

attentionf the

inhabitantsf

the mediaeval

monasteries.s

to

the

greater art

fthe

Epistola

i.e.

the

ectionsn accentuation

etc.,

his

will

e

obvious:

hey elong

o

he ield f

he

ectorthe criband

the orrector

oremendator

odicum.here

s,

however,

lso

videnceromhe

rtesectoriaeo

uggest

that

Abbo's

bservations

n

inflexional,

etricalnd

syntactic

atters

avebeen

made rom

he ame

point

f

view.

or

Aimericus

nd

Siguinus,

oth fwhom om-

posed omprehensive

extbooks

n the

rt f

eading

loud,

iscussedhese nd

qual

constructionsndcalled he ttentionf he

ectores

ndof he

orrectoresodicum

o

the

correct

eadings.

o

doubt,

bbo's se

of

he echnical

ermsbraderend

orrectores

n

the ectionn

the

Quicumqueoints

n

the

ame irection.Hitherto,his ext as

only

een ccessiblenthe efectiveditionhatwas

printed

in

thefifth

olume fCardinalMai's Classici

uctoresVaticanisodicibusditi

Roma

1833),

which or he

most

art

wasre-used

y

MignePatrol,

at.

139,

21-534).

ar-

dinalMai's work

n Abbo's

pistola

s

now

upersededy

Mrs.

Guerreau's

dition,

whichs

based

pon

ll the

xtant

anuscripts:

at.

Reg.

at.

596,

f.

-22v

the

MS

used

by

Cardinal

Mai)

and

London,

L

Add.

10972,

f.

9v-48

usedby

Mabillon,

who

ook

ome mall

ragments

rom

t),

both f

whichontainhe

omplete

ext,

nd

Erfurt,

mpl.

53,

ff.

2-734which

as

preserved

nly

omeminor

ragments.

In a

comprehensive

ntroduction

rs.

Guerreau

ealswith

leury,

ts ntellectual

life

n

the

High

Middle

ges

nd

Abbo's ife ndworks

9-30),

Abbo's atin

31-82),

his

grammatical

octrines

83-120),

he

haracteristics

f he

atin

ulture

n

the

High

MiddleAges 121-146),he chool nd ibraryfFleury147-175),nd theFleury

manuscripts

entioned

n

the ntroduction

177-193).

A

chapter

n thetechnical

aspects, inally,

recedes

he dition

f

he ext.

VivariumX

,

1

1983)

83

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Unfortunately,

n hisatter

hapter

rs.Guerreau

s

not o

copious

s she s

n

the

previous

hapters.

ndeed,

would ave iked

o ee detailed

iscussion

nd

nalysis

of ll the

MSS that

ontain

he ext f

he

pistola

r

fragments

f

t n

xchange,

or

instance,orhe ectionf he bservationstatistiquesnAbbo's atin.Now newill ot

find,

or

nstance,

hich

ragments

f

Abbo's etter

ctually

ave

een

reserved

n he

14th

entury

rfurt

S,

the

more

o,

since

his odexhas been

xcluded

romhe

apparatus

riticus,

oo.Neither

ill nefind

serious

ote n the urtheriffusion

f

the

Epistola

n

theMiddle

Ages,

tsoccurrence

n

mediaeval

ibrary

atalogues

tc.

Moreover,

he tudent

f he

history

f

mediaeval

rammar

ould

lso

have

highly

appreciated

an

edition f

nd)

a discussion

f

he hort

rammaticali

otes

hat re

appended

othe

orpus

f

Abbo's

writings

n

theMSS

of

he

pistola,

t east

more

extensive

reatment

han he

ryptic

eference

n

p.

29.

The

editiontselfs

beyond

ny

oubt

n

mportant

mprovement;

tremoves

any

inaccuracies

nd

obscurities

hatmar

the

Migne

ext,

nd

may

be

considered

valuable ontribution

oour

knowledge

f he urrent

opics

f

grammar

nthe

High

MiddleAges.Thedetailedoteshatccompanyhe ranslation,rovidesefulom-

mentsnd

wealth

f

references

o

cognate

exts.

hey reatly

acilitate

stablishing

the

place

f

Abbo's

octrines

n

the

grammatical

radition.

A

few

oints

f

etail.

he

explanation

fAbbo's

iew nthe

meaning

f he uture

participle

n

p.

114 conflicts

ith he

ext

par. 42).

For

t

s

thefinite

erb hat

represents

he

ction

ecessary

or he ealisation

f he

ction

xpressedy

he

uture

participle,

ot

theother

way

about.

n

par.

27

(p. 243)

in

the

discussion

n the

pronunciation

f theGreek

X,

the ext

equires

he

reading

HPHAC

instead

f

KHPHAC.

In

par.

42

p.

262)

the

eproaching

oun

imperitorum'

s

eft ut

n

the

translation.

The

very

etailedndices

n the ext

f

he

pistola

ill

acilitate

urther

esearch,

but ndices

n the

ntroduction

ould

lsohave

been

welcome

Nijmegen

C.

H.

Kneepkens

84

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

2

(1983)

Statementsbout

Events

Modal

and Tense

Analysis

in

Medieval

Logic

*

KLAUS

JACOBI

In

modern research

into

modal

logic,

modal terms are

usually

semantically nterpreted

n

terms of

the

model of

possible

worlds:

necessary

(N)

= dftruein all

possible

worlds

impossible

(

-

M)

=

df

false

in all

possible

worlds

possible

(M)

=

df

true in

at least one

possible

world

contingent

(K)

=

df

true

in

at least one

possible

world and

false in

at least one

possible

world.

Now

philosophers

have

thought

about modal

terms,

modal

proposi-

tions and

modal

syllogisms

ong

before

the notion

of

possible

worlds

was

entertained.

The

question

what

interpretative

model

they

used

is

a relevantone today.Jaako Hintikkaand thecircleofpupils and col-

leagues

connected

with

him,

in

particular

Simo

Knuuttila,

have

tried

to

answer

this

question.

They

advance

the

following

hesis1: under-

lying

the

modal

analysis

proposed

by

Aristotle

and

the

scholastic

*

The

followingaper

wasfirstead tthe

ymposium

n the

History

f

Logic

which

took

place

in

May

1981

under he

directionf

Professor

gnatio

Angelelli

n

Pamplona.

should

ike o hank

hose

ho ook

art

n

discussing

he

aper, special-

ly

Professorario

Mignucci,

or

aluable

omments

hich

have

wherever

ossible

includedn his ersion.am lsomost ratefuloProfessorimoKnuuttila,ho ery

kindly

ent

me

ome omments

n the

aper

t

a

later

ate;

hese

ave

helped

me

to

clarify y

iews t various

oints.

should lso

ike

othank r. RiccaEdmondson-

Wörneror

er

ranslationf he

aper

nto

nglish.

1

This

thesis as firstdvanced

yJaako

Hintikka

n

1957,

nd

then

n

a series f

further

apers

hich

ere

ollected

n 1973

n

the olume

imend

Necessity

Studies

n

Aristotle's

heoryf

Modality

Oxford).

In

what ollows

shall efer

o this

olume s

'Hintikka').

he same

ine

f

nterpretation

as followed

n

Aristotlen

Modality

nd

Determinism

n:

Acta

Philosophica

ennica,

9,

1

(Amsterdam

977)

by Jaako

Hintikka,

nto

Remes and Simo

Knuuttila.

This

I

shall refer o

as 'Hin-

tikka Remes

Knuuttila').

intikka's

upil

nd

olleague,

nuuttila,

as n

work

edited

n

1981

Re/orging

heGreat hain

f

Being

Dordrecht)

ried o

show

hat he

scholasticsntil he ndofthe13th enturylmostll took his iew ftime nd

modality;

id.

Time nd

Modality

n

Scholasticism,

p.

cit.163-257

referred

o n the

following

s

'Knuuttila').

85

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


writers

here

appears,

at

least

in

central

sources2,

model

of

modality

in

which the

modal

terms are

semantically nterpreted

ike

this:

N = df

always

the case

(or:

always

true)

~

M

=

df

never

the

case

(or:

always

false)

M

=

df sometimes the

case

(or:

sometimes

true)

K

=

df sometimes

the case and

sometimes not the case

(or:

sometimes true

and

sometimes

false).

According

to

this,

the modal terms

are

interpreted y

reference o

periods

of time

in

the

history

f this one real world. In contrast o

the

semantics

of

possible

worlds,

this

nterpretation

ould be

reductionist.

In the reference o alternativeworlds the modal term possible' reap-

pears;

it

counts as

an irreducible

basic

term,

and the

definitions

nly

set out the relationsof

the

othermodal

terms

o the notionof

possibili-

ty. Against

this,

when reference s made to

time

periods

in

this

one

actual

world the modal

terms

are

removed from he

definiens

Thus

in

this

theory

modal notions are

in

the last

analysis

reducible to

exten-

sional

terms"3.

A

reductionist

theory

of

quantification

over time

periods

is

not,

strictly speaking,

a

modal

theory

at

all.

Anyone systematically

interestednmodal logicand analysiscould therefore,fHintikkaand

Knuuttila

were

right,

leave Aristotle and

the scholastics

unread;

according

to

them

these writersoffer

nly attempts

to

abandon

the

problem

of modalities

altogether.

I

dispute

the correctness f the

thesis

which

Hintikka and Knuuttila

advance.

In

my opinion

we can

learn

a

great

deal

about

the

problems

of

modality

from

Aristotle,

Boethius

and in

particular

Peter

Abelard,

William

of

Shyreswood

and Thomas

Aquinas.

The

scholastics

analyses pertain

to the

question

what is

meant

when,

in

both

everydayand scientific

anguage,

we describe

something

as in the real sense

possible,

impossible,

necessary

or

contingent4.

One of their

main

themes

is

precise

reflection n the

difference etween intensional

nd

2

At

various

oints

he uthorsemark

hat his

was

not he

nly

model

ropounded

by

Aristotlend he

cholastics;

f.

Hintikka

Remes

Knuuttila

4;

Knuuttila

65,

199,

203.

These

remarks

re

however f a

marginal

ature,

nd

the central

significance

f he tatistical

aradigm

s

repeatedly

mphasised.

3

Knuuttila

35;

cf.

VII-IX

and

passim;

Hintikka 13 and

passim;

Hintikka

Remes Knuuttila3andpassim.

4

Vid.

my

rticle,

öglichkeit

in:

Handbuch

hilosophischer

rundbegriffe

ed. Hermann

Krings,

ans-Michael

aumgartner

nd

Christoph

ild

Munich

973),

30-947.

86

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


extensional

anguage

and on the

relationship

between

these

manners

of

speaking5.

In the firstpart of the following nvestigation shall presentthe

thesis

put

forward

by

Hintikka and

Knuuttila,

and

my

objections

to

it6.

In

the

second

part

I

shall

expand my

criticisms

by

offering

counterinterpretation.

shall

take

up

the

topic

on

which

the authors

mentioned

above have

worked the

relationship

between tense and

modal

qualifiers

n

statements bout events

and

shall

put

forward

my

own

interpretation

f

the

scholastic

analyses.

This

I

shall

do

in

the

form

f a

systematising

econstruction

n

which

my

concern will

be to

indicate

basic

features,

not to differentiatehe

contributions

nd

posi-

tionsof ndividualphilosophers n a manner which shistoricallyxact

at

every

point.

I. The

"Statistical"

nterpretationf

Modal Terms

an

Account

f

he

Thesis

and

Objections

o t

1.

The

Point of

Departure:

the

''Principle

of

Plenitude"

Arthur

Oncken

Lovejoy'

s The

GreatChain

of Being1 appeared

in

1936

and was

reprinted

n

1950.

According

to

Lovejoy,

there

s

one

basic assumption at the root of the thinkingof many of the

philosophers

n

the

Western tradition.

This can

be termedthe

princi-

ple

of

plenitude',

according

to

which

nothing

which s

possible

in

this

world can remain unrealised8. In

that

part

of

his

investigation

which

concerns

the

early

history

f this

thought,

Lovejoy puts

forward

he

view

that the

principle

of

plenitude

was

accepted

by

Plato,

but

not

by

Aristotle.

At

this

point

Hintikka

emphatically

contradicts him.

5

Vid.

my

monograph,

ie

Modalbegriffe

n den

ogischenchriften

es

Wilhelmon

Shyreswoodndn nderenompendienes 2. und3.JahrhundertsFunktionsbestimmungndGebrauchnder

ogischennalyseStudien

nd

exte

ur

Geistesgeschichte

es

Mittelalters

ed.

Albert

immerman;

ol.

XIII,

Leiden-Coloene

980), sp.

section

,

337-355.

6

On

Hintikka's

nterpretation

f

Aristotle's odal

heory

f. M. M.

Mulhern,

Aristotle

n

Universality

nd

Necessity

,

in:

Logique

t

Analyse,

2

1969)

88-299;

Mar-

tha

Kneale'sreview

f

Time

nd

Necessity

in:

Philosophical

uarterly,

4

(1974)

367-370;

onathan

arnes's

eview f

Time nd

Necessity

in:

Journal

f

Hellenic

Studies,

7

1977)

183-186;

ichard

orabji,

ecessity

Cause nd

lame,

erspectives

n

Aristotle's

heoryIthaca,

ew

York

980),

id.

ndex

n

Hintikka;

. T.

McClelland,

Time nd

Modality

n

Aristotle,

etaphysics

X

3-4,

in:

Archiv

ür

Geschichteer

Philosophie,

3,

2

(1981)

130-149.

7

A.

O.

Lovejoy,

heGreat

hain

f eing; Studyf

he

istoryf

n dea

The

William

James ectureseliveredt Harvard niversity933, 936, nd dn.1950).8

Cf.

Lovejoy

op.

cit.)

52;

vid. index

n

Plenitude,

rinciplef

Hintikka

4-96;

Knuuttila63.

87

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Hintikka's

and Knuuttila's

research

nto

Aristotle's

modal

theory

nd

the scholastic

work

connected with

it

starts from the claim

that

Aristotlehimself onsciously presupposes thisprinciple9.

It

is

indisputable

that

Aristotledoes not define the

modal terms

by

reference o

a

totality

f

possible

worlds;

for

him,

what

is

possible

is

possible

in

this

real world.

Given

this,

t

is the

second set

of

definitions

of the

modal terms at the

beginning

of this

paper,

to

which

Hintikka

and Knuuttila

refer

as

the 'statistical model

of

modality'10,

which

explicate

the

4

'principle

of

plenitude".

More

exactly,

as

Hintikka

remarks11,

he theses

'What

is never the

case

is

impossible''What is

always

the case is

necessary'

as well

as

'What

is

possible

is sometimes the case'

'What is

not

necessary

s

sometimes not

the

case'

are

based on

the

"principle

of

plenitude";

whereas

the

opposite

implications

'What is impossibleis neverthe case'

'What

is

necessary

s

always

the

case'

'What

is sometimes the

case

is

possible'

'What

is sometimes

not

the case

is

not

necessary'

are valid

independently

f

this

principle.

Can

Hintikka and Knuuttila

prove

thatAristotle

nd

the scholastics

until the

end

of the

13th

century ccept

the

"principle

of

plenitude"?

Hintikka

can

show that

Lovejoy

brings

no

conclusive

proof

o

the con-

trary.The sources citedby Lovejoy12allow notonlyoftheinterpreta-

tions

'Some

possibilities'

or

'Every possibility

can remain

for

ever

unrealised',

but

also

-

and

more

plausibly

'Some

possibilities'

or

9

Hintikka

5;

Knuuttila

. Cf.

too

he ndices

n

Principlef

lenitude.

10

Hintikka

03.Cf. n

the

ndex:

Necessity

statistical

onceptf;

and

mnitemporality;

-

and he

rinciple

f lenitudePossibility,lways

ealizedn

he

ong

un;

realization

f;

realizedn

ime;

statistical

oncept

f

Ř

and he

rinciple

f lenitudeContingency,

nd

he

principle

f lenitude.

nuuttila

oes

not

peak

nly

f statistical

odel

r

paradigm,

but lsoof he tatistical

heory

f

modality:

.g.

X,

235.

11Hintikka6f.; f.HintikkaRemes Knuuttila1.

12

Aristotle,

etaph.

eta

,

1003a

;

Lambda

,

1071

13-14;

f.

Lovejoy

op.

cit.)

55.

88

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


'Every

possibility

can

sometimes

emain

unrealised'13.

Thus

inter

preted,

the sources are

compatible

with

the

principle

of

plenitude.

However, Hintikka's attempt o press thesesentencesfurther,o that

they

onfirm

he

validity

f the

principle, Every

sheer

possibility

con-

tingency)

will n

act

be realised at

some

time'14,

s at least

as

forcible s

Lovejoy's

attempt

o claim

them for the

contrary

hesis.

According

to

Hintikka15

nd

Knuuttila16,

t is

possible

to

claim with

regard

to

a

passage

in

Metaph.

Theta

that

"This

passage

learly

hows

ow he

ssumption

hat

ach

genuine

ossibility

s

realized t

somemomentf

ime

was

one of

the

presuppositions

fAristotle's

thinking"17.

The

passage

runs:

"oukendechetai

lēthēs

inai

o

eipein

oti unatonmen

odi,

ouk

stai

e.

hoste a adunata

inai

autē

iapheugein"

"It

isnot

ossible

hatt

anbe

true

o

ay,

This s

possible,

ut

will

ever ethe

case;'

thiswould

e

to

rule ut

mpossibility"18.

13

Hintikka7.

14

bid.15Hintikka 7 cf. he ther eferencesnthe ndex.

16

Knuuttila66.

17

bid.

18

Aristotle,

etaph.

heta

,

1047

4-6.

The

English

ranslation,

n which

intikka

and

Knuuttila

ase heir

emarks,

uns: It cannot e

true o

ay

hatthis

s

possible

but

will

not

e',

which

ould

mply

he

isappearance

f

mpossiblehings".

.

T.

McClelland

see

n.

6)

has

recently

xamined

his

assage, elating

t to

Aristotle's

discussionsn

Metaph.

heta -4. He reaches he

onclusion

hat

Aristotle

oesnot

accept

he

principle

f

plenitude'

146, 147).

He

translateshe

passage

n

question,

likeG.E.L.

Owen nd

Martha neale

efore

im,

s

follows:It cannot e

true

o

say

hat his s

possible

utwill

ot

happen

nd to

say

his o

such

ffecthat he x-

istence f the mpossible illescapeus in thisway" (132, 146).McClelland

paraphrases

his

n

order

o

make

Aristotle's

rgumentative

ntention

learer:If

the

possible'

s as we

have

described

t

or,

s derivablerom hatwe have

aid

,

it s

clearly

he ase

hatt annot e true

o

ay

f

nygiven

hing

this s now

apable

f

happening

ut

tnever

ill

appen',

ntending

y

uchmeans o

make f the

mpossi-

ble' an

empty

ocutionfwhich

here

re

no

nstances"

146).

Cf.

Sorabji

see

n.

6)

136: Kneale

ndOwen

uggest

hat

ristotle

s

not

bjecting

o

denial f he

rinci-

ple

f

plenitude,

ut

nly

o certain oral

misguidedly

rawn

rom

he

enial.

he

mistaken

orals

thatwhat ever

appens

s in

very

ase

ossible.

..As S.

Mansion

points

ut

Le

Jugement

'Existencehez

ristote2e

éd.,

Louvain

976,

n.

13),

f

he

passage

s

nterpreted

n

this

way,

t

ctually

oes gainst

he

scription

oAristotlef

the

rinciple

f

plenitude.

or

n

resisting

he

dea

hat

ll

things

hich

ail

o

happen

arepossible,ristotleill eallowinghatomehings hich ever appenrenone

the ess

possible".

he

interpretation

f the

passage

oncerned

iven

y

Thomas

Aquinas,

n

Metaph.

.IX,

1

ll,

n.

1807,

ery

argelygrees

with his.

89

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Hintikka

nd Knuuttila

clearly

read

this entence

as a

statement

bout

the

inconsistency

f

a

particular

combination of truth-values:

The

proposition,

"

Something s possible and willneverbe thecase", can-

not be

true';

this can be

formalised

s

4

M(Mp&

-

3t(p

-

1))'

Read

in

this

way,

the

sentence

really

does

presuppose

the

principle

of

plenitude;

it

allows of

the

equivalent

reformulation,

The

proposition,

"If

something

s

possible,

it is sometimes the

case",

is

necessarily

true'

formalised

s

'N(Mp

-

3t(p

-

1))'

However,

I

suggest

nother

interpretation.

ccording

to

my

reading,

the sentence

quoted

here has

nothing

to do

with the contentious

principle.

Aristotle

s not

in

the

least

concerned with

the

question

whether he truth alues of

proposi-

tions representable by variables are compatible with each other.

Rather,

he

is

disputing

he

reliability

f

the

following rognostication:

'This

is

possible,

but will

never be

the

case'.

Anyone

who

advances

claims

about

particular

vents

must be

prepared

to

ustify

hese

claims

in

argument.

The

prediction,

This

will never

be

the

case',

which

covers

the whole

of

future

time,

could be

justified

by,

'This

is

not

possible'.

And

if

anyone says

about

a

particular

event,

This is

possi-

ble',

he

ought

to be

in

a

position

to

advance

reasons for

which

t

might

occur19.

I

agree

with

Hintikka

when he

writes of

this

passage20,

"Aristotle .. warnsus againstassumingthatsomethings possiblebut

will

never

be".

But

I

dispute

the contention hat

this

means the

same

as,

'Aristotletells

us

that whatever

s

possible

will

be

the

case'.

In

other

cases too the

apparent

corroborativeforce of the sources

cited

by

Hintikka

and

Knuuttila

in

support

of

their

thesis

disappears

as

soon

as one

investigates

which

question

is

actually

being

discussed

in

the

text

oncerned.

In

answer to

the

question,

'

What

o

we understand

by

It

is

possible"?'

the

reply,

It

is sometimes

he

case',

is false.

And

none of

the authors

examined

by

Hintikka

and

Knuuttila does

give

this reply21.However, in answer to the quite differentuestion 'On

what

s the

laimbased hat

this

s

possible'?

the

reply

Something

of the

sort

s the

case

or

has been

the

case,

and it

cannot be

ruled

out that t

will

occur

again',

is

perfectly

ppropriate.

We do not

refer

o

what

is

19

For more

xact

ccountf

his

eflection,

nwhich

t

s

also

hown

hat hat

hich

only xceptionally

ccurs s not

a

possible

bject

f

prediction,

id.

my

article,

Kontingente

atur

eschehnis

e,

n:

Studia

Mediewistycne,

8,

2

(1977)

-70;

sp.

21,

32.

20

Hintikka

08.

21Hintikkaimselfllows hat ristotleever efineshemodal erms itheference

to the

principle

f

plenitude

102f.),

utwithout

rawing

he

onsequences

fthis

admission.

90

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


or

has

been

the

case

in

order to

define

possibility',

but

in

order to

justify

ubstantive

laims about

particularpossibilities.

Corresponding

observationsapply to the other modal terms.

The

connection between modal

and

tense

qualifiers

s not a matter

of

definition

ut one of

argumentation.

f

someone

says,

'This is

possi-

ble',

he

has

sufficiently

upported

his

claim

if

he can show that states

of

affairs

f

the same

type

as thatto

which

he

is

referring

ometimesdo

occur.

If he

says,

This is

not

necessary

=

possibly not)'

he has suffi-

ciently upported

his claim

if

he

can show

that states of affairs

f the

same

type

as

that to

which he

is

referring

ometimes

do not

occur.

Neither case

presupposes

implications

such

as 'If

possible,

then

sometimes he case' ('Only when sometimesthecase, thenpossible'),

or

'If

possible

that not

the

case,

then sometimesnot

the case'

('Only

if

sometimes

not

the

case,

then

possible

that not

the

case').

The

argu-

ment

takes

place,

rather,

according,

to

the

schema,

'Because

sometimes he

case,

therefore

ossible',

or 'Because

sometimesnot

the

case,

therefore

ossible

that

not

the case'.

Claims

about

the

necessity

or the

impossibility

f

some

state

of

affairs

annot

be

supported by

reference to

experiences

nor to

interpolations

and

extrapolations

generalising

about them.

The

argumentative relationship

between

statements ontainingmodal and time qualifiersis reversedhere. If

someone

says,

'This is

always

the

case',

he

is

claiming

that

his

state-

ment s

valid

forfuture ime as

well.

He

has

adequately

supported

his

claim

if

he can

show that

the state of

affairs

oncerned

belongs

to

a

type

to which

necessity ertains.

f

he

says,

This is never

the

case',

he

has

adequately supported

his

claim

if

he can show

that the state of

affairs concerned

belongs

to

a

type

which is

impossible

in

itself.

Arguing

n

these

ways,

one does not

presuppose implications

uch

as,

'If

always

the

case,

then

necessary' ('Only

if

necessary,

then

alwaysthe

case'),

or 'If neverthe

case,

then

mpossible'

('Only

if

mpossible,

then

never

the

case').

The

argument

runs,

rather,

according

to the

schema 'Because

necessary,

therefore

lways

the

case',

or

'Because

impossible,

therefore

ever

the

case'.

The

theses

which

follow from he

"principle

of

plenitude"

do

not

occur

in

the

schemata

I

have

given.

Both

references

o what

is

actually

the

case

and

time references re

completely

ut

of

place

when

we wish

to

explicate

what

is meant

by 'possible',

'contingent',

'impossible'

and 'necessary'. Thomas Aquinas expresslyrefusesto defineas well

as

to

differentiate,

he

modal terms

by

reference

o

what

will

be

the

case.

Attempted

definitions f

this

sort,

he

says,

are

"incompetent".

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Modal

terms

should

not

be defined

"

a

posteriori

and

'

'externally",

but

intensionally,

y

reference

o that to

which

a

thing

4

'is

determined

by its nature"22. In order to explain why he attaches the term "a

posteriori

to the

suggested

definitions,

That is

impossible

which will

never be the

case',

'That is

possible (in

the

sense of

"contingent")

which

will

sometimes

be the case

and sometimes

not',

Thomas

adds,

"For

something

s not

nccessary

ccause t

will

lways

e the

ase;

t

will

lways

be

the

ase

because t s

necessary;

nd

clearly

he ame

pplies

o the ther

(attemptedefinitions)"23.

Knuuttila has

discussed

this

passage24.

According

to

him,

if

Thomas

had

followed

his

thought through

to

the

end he would

have

had to

say correspondinglyto what he has said about the concept of

necessity

that

something

s

not

contingent

ecause it

will

sometimes

be

the

case and

sometimes

not;

it

will

sometimes

be the

case

and

sometimes

not

because it

is

contingent.

And this

would

be to

give

possibility

s a sufficient

eason

for

something's

being

the

case on

occasion

-

that

is,

it would

be

to

advance

what

the

"principle

of

plenitude"

advances.

But

it seems to

me

that Knuuttila

s

looking

here

in vain for

orroboration

or

his own

interpretation.

homas

argues

as

follows

gainst

the

attempted

efinitions

have

summarised:

even

if

n

all these definitions oth sides were

quivalent;

if,that s, itwerevalid

not

only

to

say,

'If

impossible,

then

never the

case',

but also

'If never

the

case,

then

impossible';

not

only,

'If

necessary,

then

always

the

case',

but

also

'If

always

the

case,

then

necessary';

not

only

to

make

the

conjunction

of

the

transpositions

orthe

first

air

of

implications,

'If

not

never

(

=

sometimes)

and

not

always

the

case,

then

contingent',

but also

'If

contingent,

then sometimes

the

case

and

sometimes

not';

even this

would

be irrelevant

o

the definition f

the

modal

terms.

This

passage

will

not do

for

testing

which

implications

Thomas

recognises

between

modal

and tense statements.

Thomas's

argumentative

intention

s

precisely

to

expel

references

o what

is

actually

the

case

-

whether

always

or

never

or sometimes

and

sometimes not

from definitions

f modal

terms. As

he

often does

elsewhere,

here

too

Thomas

makes

all

possible

admissions

to

his

opponents

in

order to

bring

the

controversy

o its

decisive

point:

22

Thomas

Aquinas:

n

Perih.

.I,

l.XIV,

n.

183;

f.

my

rticlementioned

n n.

19

above,

5f.

23ThomasAquinas,oc.cit.

24

Simo

Knuuttila,

he

tatistical

nterpretationf

Modality

n

Averroes

ndThomas

quinas

in:

Ajatus,

7

1978)

79-98;

ere: 4.

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definitions f

modal terms

may

not be

extensional and

must

be

inten-

sional.

The

statistical

model of

modality

is,

as

a

definitional

model,

useless.

The

"better"

definitions,

which

Boethius attributes o

Philo25

nd

which

Thomas

believes to

coincide with Aristotle's

view26,

run

as

follows:

That

is

necessary

which,

by

its

nature,

can

only

be';

'That

is

impossible

which,

by

its

nature,

can

only

not

be';

'That is

contingent

which,

by

its

nature,

is neither

ompletely

determined

o

be

nor com-

pletely

determinednot

to

be'.

Knuuttila cites similar definitions rom

the

logical

writings

f

Peter

Abelard27,

and

wonders whetherdefini-

tions

such

as

'Whatever Nature admits

of s

possible'

do not

contradict

his own view accordingto which Abelard too interprets he modal

terms

statistically.

Knuuttila tries to avoid this

objection

by pointing

out

that

we can

only

know what Nature

allows

by

abstracting

rom ur

knowledge

of facts. But

against

this it

can

be said

that

the

question

what

we

mean

by 'possible'

must not

be

confused

with

another,

a

question

concerning

ome state of affairs

namely,

How do

we

know

that this

s

possible'?

The medieval

authors

correctly ay

the

greatest

weight

on

keeping

these

distinct.

n

order to answer

the

second

ques-

tion,

we do

admittedly

have

to

rely

on abstract

generalisations

bout

experience.However, thesemantic nterpretationsf themodal terms

given

by

Abelard

like

Thomas's

later

emphatically

avoid

a

reduc-

tionist,

extensional

account of their

meaningful

ontent28.

Hintikka

and Knuuttila

refer o

a

large

number

of texts

n which

the

philosophers

they

interpret purportedly

assume the

principle

of

plenitude.

It is

not

possible

here

for

me

to

provide

individual

examinations

of

all these references

nd the

observations

made

upon

them;

I shall confine

myself

to

formulating

methodical

objections.

25A. M. S. Boetii n Librumristotelise Interpretation,d. sec.,L.III, PL 64,510

D-511B.

26

Thomas

Aquinas:

n

Perih.

.I,

l.XIV,

n. 183.

27

Knuuttila

1

.

The

ast ine fn.

41,

which

elongs

o

this,

hould

e corrected:

Lop.

npred.98,

33-35.

28

The

followingrgument

s a

further

xample

f

he

onfounding

f

emanticnd

epistemologica

tandpoints.

nuuttila

ightly

oints

ut

(215)

that

ccording

o

Thomas

Aquinas

we can ndeed

now hathere

re

unrealised

ossibilities,

ecause

God

andomore hanwill

ver e the ase

cf.

Knuuttila

98-207),

ut hat

n

tatu

iae

we can never

nowwhichhese

ossibilities

re.

Knuuttila

nfersromhis hat or

Thomas,

n

the

ontext

f

philosophy,nly

hat

whichs

at

some

ime ctual s

possi-

ble;

his alk fGod's

possibilities

s an dea seldom sed nhis

Thomas')

iscussions

ofphilosophicalroblems"215).Again,hisgnoreshe istinctionetween hatwe

mean

y possible'

ndhowwecantell

what

s

possible.

or he

irst,

hich

ertainly

is

a

philosophical

uestion,

ecourseo

God's

possibilities

s of

decisive

ignificance.

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Hintikka

and Knuuttila

quote,

paraphrase

or

name

parts

of

texts,

but

only

in

exceptional

cases29 do

they analyse

whole

patterns

of

argu-

ment.More usually theyomit toconsider thesubjectof debate ineach

of

the contexts

romwhich their

xcerpts

re

taken.

There

are,

though,

relevant differences

etween

them. One

of

the

formulations

n which

Hintikka

perceives

the

principle

of

plenitude

runs as follows:

Nothing

eternal

is

contingent'30.

This sentence

is,

in

fact,

Aristotle's31.

But

Hintikka

appears

to overlook

the fact hat

Aristotle

nly

uses

the

word

4

a'tdios

-

'eternal'

for

events in the

heavenly sphere;

the sentence

quoted

here

has no

application

to the

sublunary

world. It

cannot

be

understood

as a

principle

of tense

or

modal

logic,

but

as a

substantive

principleofa specific cience,that ofcelestialphysics.The conversion

of

this

sentence,

'Nothing contingent

s

eternal',

can be

taken

as

a

valid

rule

in

earthly

physics

nsofar

s its

principles

an

basically

only

claim to

apply

to that

which occurs as

a

rule32.

To summarise: there

is no

single

text

named

by

Hintikka

or

Knuuttila

in which Aristotle

or

Abelard or Thomas

directly upport

the

principle

of

plenitude

or

expressly ccept

the

"statistical"

inter-

pretation

f modal

terms.

Where

the

semantic

nterpretation

f

modal

terms

s

in

question,

it

is,

rather,

continually

emphasised

that

these

terms are not reducible. In most of the texts quoted by Hintikka

and

Knuuttila

it

is

claimed

only

that

in our substantive

speech

about

particular

possibilities

we remain

bound

to

what

can

be ex-

perienced

that

s,

to what

is at

some

time

the case.

This has

nothing

to do

either

with the

principle

of

plenitude

or with

a

statistical

nter-

pretation

of

modal terms.

In

the

remaining

references

t

might

be

investigated

what

is

being

discussed

in

the

surrounding

ontexts,

o

as

to

discover

under which conditions

a

reductionist

nterpretation

f

modal terms

might

be admissible.

2.

The

Problem:

Logical

Determinism

Hintikka33 nd Knuuttila34

lso

advance as one

place

in

which the

principle

f

plenitude

s

applied

the famous

sentence

from

e

Int.

c.935:

29

There re wo

f hese

xceptions.

ne

s Hintikka's

nterpretation

f

Aristotle's

e

Int.

.

9;

the

ther

s Knuuttila's

araphrase

f

Duns cotus's

e

Primo

rincipio

V, 4,

3.

Proof.

30

Hintikka

6.

31

Cf. Hintikka

04.

32

Cf.

Sorabjisee

n.

6)

60,

128-132;

lso

my

rticlementioned

n.

19.

33Hintikka5f.;Hintikka Remes Knuuttila4.34

Knuuttila

66, 35;

cf.

170f., 81,

183.

35

Aristotle,

e

nt.

,

19a23-24.

nj.

L. Ackrill'sranslation

Aristotle's

ategories

nd

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"

to

men

oun einai to on

hotan e kai to me on me einai

hotan

mē

ē,

anagkē

-

"Necessarily,

what

is, is,

when

it

is;

and

what

is

not,

is

not,

when it is not". This sentencecan be regardedas following rom he

principle

n

question

only

on

condition

that it

is

postulated

that it is

valid not

only

for

types

of

event,

but also for ndividual

ones.36 con-

sider

it

quite improbable

that Aristotle

accepts

the

principle

in

this

extreme

form37. e

would,

if he

did

so,

have

to admit that t

applied

also to events

distinguished

not

by

dating

but

by

qualifiers

of

quality,

place

or

position.

I

shall

make clear

later

how

I

understand

the

contentious

entence;

first shall

continue to examine

the

steps

taken

by

Hintikka

and

Knuuttila. The sentence,as theyunderstand t, s a deterministic ne:

"

Hence ll tatements

bout vents

hat re ndividualnthe

ense f

being

ied

to

a

particular

omentf

time,

will

be

either

ecessarily

rue r

necessarily

false"38.

According

to

these

authors,

Aristotle

believed,

though,

that

he

could

render

this

determinism

harmless

by

emphasising

the

difference

between

necessary

that

p

at

time

to'

and

'necessary

that

p'

De

Interpretation

Oxford

963),

he entence

s

rendered,

What

s,

necessarily

s,

when

t

s;

and

what s

not,

necessarily

s

not,

when

t

s not'.Hintikka

uotes

his

translation,utwithlightlylteredunctuation:What snecessarilys,whent s;andwhat s not

necessarily

s

not,

when t s not"

156).

nHintikka Remes

Knuuttilahe

unctuation

s as follows:What

s,

necessarily

swhent

s;

andwhat

s

not,

ecessarily

s not

when t

s

not"

44).

36

A

formal

roof,

hich

intikkandKnuuttilao not

provide

ut nstead

eplace

with

ormulations

uch s

seems ofollow'

Knuuttila66),

ould e

given

s follows:

Given:

M

p

-

3

t

p

t).

This

assumption

an,

according

o the

aws of modal

nd

predicate

ogic,

be

transformednto he

quivalent

V

t

p- t)

-

N

p.

Application:

M

(p 1¡)

(p

tļ).

By

ounterposition

nd

ransformation,

alid

n

modal

ogic,

his

ields:

- (p-t¡) - N ~ (p- 1¡).

From

his,

y

ubstituting

1¡

/

-

(p 1¡):

(P- ti)

-

N

(p- t;).

37

Hintikkalaims

160)

that

Aristotle

xpressly

resupposes

he

xiom

possibility

equals

ometime

ruth'

n

De Int.

9,

and

as

proof

f thishe

quotes

he

entence,

"horõmen

ar...hoti

olõs stin n toismē ei

energousi

o

dunatoninaikaimē"

-

"We see

hat...

n

hings

hat renot

lways

ctual

here

s the

ossibility

f

eing

nd

not

eing"

19

a 9-1

).

This

rgument

s

faulty.

n What

s not

lways

ctual

s

con-

tingent'

he

principle

f

plenitude

s,

as

Hintikka

imselfemarkslsewhere

96f.),

not

mplied.

-

V t

p t)

-

-

N

p'

can be

transformed,

ccording

o the aws f

propositional

ndmodal

ogic

nd

by ubstituting

t

/

-

(p

t),

nto

he

quivalent

'3

t

p t)

^

Mp';

but

nly

3

t

p t)

-

M

p'

is

dependent

n

Hintikka's

ostulated

principle.

38

Hintikka

5

f.;

cf.

161,174;

Hintikka

Remes

Knuuttila1-58 nd

passim;

Knuuttila66 nd

passim.

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8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


"Aristotle

ries

oavoid eterministic

onclusions

y

hifting

he

ocus fhis t-

tentionromtatements

f

type3) (

=

p

at

time

o)

o

temporallynqualified

statements39"

-

namely

those of the

type

p

simpliciter

r

'p

now'. The individual

event

is

not

regarded

as

individual,

but seen in

relationship

with

similaroccurrences.

But it is not

postulated

of

this

class

of occurrences

that

they

are either

necessarily

true

or

necessarily

false40.

Knuuttila

claims to discover the

same

attempt

o solve this

problem

in

the work

of

Boethius41,

Abelard42,

Lambert of

Auxerre43 nd

Thomas

Aquinas44.

He

emphasises

that it is

merely

an

apparent

solution:

' 'Thegeneralizationithespecto imeeaves ullyntouchedhe eterministic

implications

fAristotle's

ssumptions

oncerning

emporally

etermined

vents

and

sentences"45.

Knuuttila

presents

Duns

Scotus's

new

modal

theory

as "Duns

Scotus' Criticism f the Statistical

nterpretation

f

Modality"46.

Here

I

agree

with Knuuttila's

account

at

importantpoints.

Duns Scotus

develops

the basic

traits f

a

theory

f

possible

worlds,

and

indeed does

so

in

the

course

of

critical omments

on

the claims of

his

predecessors.

But I do

not

believe that this

argument

proceeds exactly

as

Knuuttila

describes. It seems to me that it is not his presentationof Duns

Scotus's

position

which is

mistaken,

but

rather

his view

of that from

which

Scotus distances himself. cannot set out

here

the

points

which

I

do believe

Duns Scotus

to attack

I

shall make some

remarks n this

at the

end of this

paper.

At

present

shall

content

myself

with

drawing

attention

to the

following.

Duns

Scotus

quotes

the

Aristotelian

sentencefromDe

Interpretatione

This

sentence,

4

Omne

uod

st

uando

st,

est necessarium

is

susceptible

of

two

interpretations.

aken

secundum

divisionem

it

appears

as a

conditional

sentence,

whose sense Knuuttila

correctly

onstrues as "Whenever

something

is, it then

necessarily

is".

Taken

thus,

the sentence

is false.

Interpreted

ecundum

omposi-

tionem

it is a

categorical

sentence,

construed

correctly y

Knuuttila,

39

Hintikka

61 n

connectionith

51;

cf.

160;

Hintikka

Remes

Knuuttila

44f.

Knuuttila

67,

35.

40

Hintikka70f.

41

Knuuttila

71.

42

Knuuttila

81,

184.

43

Knuuttila92.

44Knuuttila1Of.

45

Knuuttila

67;

f.

221,

235f.

Hintikka

Remes

Knuuttila

5,

46.

46

Knuuttila

17-234;

f.

236f.

96

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when

he

puts

it,

"Necessarily

everything

s

when

it

is".

Interpreted

thus,

the

sentence

is

true47.There

is, therefore,

n

interpretation

f

thisdisputed, purportedly eterministicentence,accordingtowhich

the

sentence

has no deterministic

mplications

and is

perfectly

rue.

And

nor is

this

interpretation

onnected

with

the

theory

of

possible

worlds. How

should it

be?

If

the

generalisation

o

what

can

take

place

at other

times

n

thisworld

supplies

no

real

avoidance

of

ogical

deter-

minism,

then neither

does the

generalisation

to

what

can

happen

at

the

same

time

n

different orlds. Now Duns

Scotus

does

not succeed

in

giving

his sentence

a

true

sense,

free f

determinism,

y

virtue

f

a

new semantic

theory;

he

does so

by

means

of

a

simple syntactic

distinction.This, the distinctionbetween readings secundumomposi-

tionem

nd secundum

ivisionemstems

from

Aristotle48,

nd is an

instru-

ment familiar o Boethius

and

the scholastics49.

Might

it

not be

plausi-

ble to

claim

that

Aristotle

himself

and

his

interpreters

efore

Duns

Scotus

also intended this

sentence to bear the construction

ccording

to

which

it

is

true?

And

equally

plausible

to

claim

that it

never

was

deduced from

ny

such

postulated presupposition

s

the

"principle

of

plenitude"?

II. On the ogic ofTense nd Modal QualifiersnScholasticWritings:

A

Systematising

econstruction

1 The

theses advanced

by

Hintikka

and

Knuuttila

refer

o

'

occasion

sentences'

0. In

what

follows,

I

shall

explain

how

I

understand

the

scholastic

nalyses

relevant

to this

type

of

sentence.

I

shall recur

only

occasionally

to other

ypes

f

sentence

nd

scholastic

ccounts of

them;

when

I

do

mention

these,

it will be

with the intention f

marking

he

distinction

between

them and the

type

of sentence

central

to the

discussion. In scholasticworks,the standard example for statements

about

particular

events

is the

sentence,

4

Socrates

edeť

'Socrates is

sitting'.

Here 'Socrates'

does not

refer o

the historical

ocrates,

but to

any

arbitrarily

elected

ndividual,

thought

f

as

existing

t

the

present

time.

For the

sake

of

simplicity

shall use

the same standard

example.

2.

Sentences about

particular

events

are

analysed

in

terms

of

propositional

nd of assertorie

lements.

The

thought xpressed

n

the

47

Knuuttila

29.

48Cf.Hintikka Remes Knuuttila8-50;Knuuttila68.

49

Cf.

Knuuttila

64f., 76,

1

9f

188f., 91-195,14,

221.

50

Cf.Hintikka

4,

150n. 6.

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sentence

'Socrates

is

sitting',

its

propositional

ontent

dictum

propositions

,

is

'that

Socrates

is

sitting'

'

Socratem

edere

),

or,

substan-

tively, the sitting fSocrates'. Its comprehensible ontent s thesame

forthe

statement

propositio)

Socrates is

sitting'

as for

the

incomplete

expression

sitting

ocrates',

for

he

question

'Is

Socrates

sitting?'

nd

for

corresponding

rders

or

requests.

The

question

what a statement

is,

in contrast o

incomplete xpressions,

questions,

orders

and so

on,

can

be answered

by

becoming

clear

about what is added to

the

com-

prehensible

content,

n

itself

nly

a

description

f

a

possible

proposi-

tion

(

enuntiabile

.

This added element

does not

comprise

a

new,

categorematic

ontent

but

is

the

proposition's

statemental

r

assertorie

content. n thepropositio truth-value s assigned to thepropositional

content.

'Socrates

is

sitting'

is

explicated

as,

'It

is

the case that

Socrates

is

sitting',

or 'It

is

true that Socrates

is

sitting'.

Socrates

is

not

sitting'

s

explicated

as

'It

is

not the

case

(is false)

that

Socrates

is

sitting'51.

The

distinction

stressed here could also

suitably

be

for-

mulated

as

that between

possible

and

actual

states of

affairs.

3. When

statements

such as 'Socrates

is

sitting'

are made in a

speech

situation,

they

count

as

statements bout

what is the case

at the

time

of

utterance.

his reference

to the time of utterance

is

usually

implicit; it can be explicated by expanding the "token reflexive"

'now'52:

'Socrates

is

sitting

ow',

or,

even

more

plainly,

It

is

now,

as

I am

saying

this,

the case

(true)

that

Socrates

is

sitting'.

When

such statements

are discussed as

they

are

by

logi-

cians

particular

ttention

s

paid

to

something

which

s

presupposed,

automatically

and therefore

acitly,

n

a

speech

situation: that the

reference

o the

situation

n

which a

statement

s made is

part

of

the

statement.

Socrates

is

sitting',

aid at different

imes,

may

sometimes

be

true

and sometimes

false. The

truth-value

f

statements

ike

this s

dependenton theirtime ofutterance;it is, so to speak, unstable.

It

is

our

habit to

make

statementsmore

precise

by dating

them.

Instead of

indicating

the situation

of

utterance,

we choose

fixed imes

of the

clock and calendar

as

reference

points53.

The

truth-values

f

statements

dated

in

this

way

are,

of

course,

stable.

But the fact

that

51

For his

art

f

my resentation

shall

rovide

nly

few electedeferencesnd

make

general

eferenceo

my nvestigation

entioned

n n. 5.

Exemplary

or he

distinction

etweenictum

ropositionis

nd

propositio'.

eter

belard:

ogica

Ingredien

tibus', lossaeupereriermenias,d. B. GeyerBGPhThMA1),326,37-327,1.52

Cf.

Hintikka

4-66, 5,

150.

53

Cf. Hintikka

7,

151.

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Aristotle nd

the

scholastics

proceed

differently

oes not detract from

the

worth f their

nalyses,

which deal

with

the

more

complex

type

of

case. Since

the

transitionfrom

the

more

complex

to the

simpler

is

always

easier thanthe other

way

round,

their

nalyses

are also

instruc-

tive

for

those

who

are

interested

n a

logic

of dated

statements.

The

4

'token

reflexive",

now,

at

the time

I

am

saying

this',

is

not

implicit

nly

n

statements n

the

present

tense,

but also

in

statements

whose

predicates

are

in

the

past

or the

future.

The

past

is

what

happened

before

now;

the future

s

what

will

happen

afternow.

4. How

should

we

analyse

statements bout the

past

or

about the

future?

hould the tense

qualifier

be

counted

as

(1)

part

of the asser-

torieaspect or (2) partof thepropositionalcontentofa statement?n

the

first

ase,

'is the case

(true)'

can be

made more

precise

by

a

tense

operator:

'It was earlierhan

ow the

ase

true)

hat

ocratess

sitting'

'It

is

now the ase

true)

hat

ocrates

s

sitting'.

'It will e

later han ow

the

ase

true)

hat ocrates

s

sitting'.

In

the second case

one would

assign

a "time

signification"54

o the

verb

in

the

dictum

ropositions:

Socratem

edere would have

another

meaning

than Socratemedisse

or

'

Socratemedentem

ore'

The

model

of

analysiswould be:

'It is the ase

true)

hat

ocrates

as

itting

earlier

han ow'

'It is

the

ase

true)

hat ocratess

sitting

now

'It is

the

ase

true)

hat

ocrates

ill

e

sitting

later

han

ow'.

Closer examination

hows

that

the

question

which

model

of

analysis

to

follow

has

not

yet

been

quite

correctly ut.

It

is in

fact

to

be

recom-

mended

that one

should follow

both.

For a

statement of

type

(1)

-

'There was a

point

n

time

at which

t was

true to

say,

"S is

P"

',

does indeed have thesame truth-value s thetype 2) statement,It is

now

true to

say,

"S

was

P"

';

but these two

statements re

not

saying

exactly

the same

thing.

To

put

it

even

more

carefully

and

more

precisely:

they

are

accentuating

the

same

thing

n

different

ays.

In

the

first ase

the

speaker

situates

himself,

so

to

speak,

in

another

period

in

time,

fromwhich he

makes a

statement n

the

present

ense;

in

doing

so he

draws

attention

to the

instability

f such

statements

about

particular

vents. In

the second

case,

however,

the

truth-value

seems

relatively

table: if t

s

now the case

that S' was

'P',

then

t will

54

Aristotle:

e

nt.

.3,

16 b 6.

99

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be

the

case

at

every

futuremoment that

S' was 'P'

I

want

to

try

o

clarify

his distinction

y showing

withwhat

instruments he medieval

logicians analysed

tensed

statements.

(1)

In statements about the

past,

we should bear in mind the

distinction etween

talking

bout someone

who existed

n

the

past

and

one

of

his

actions

or

states,

and

talking

bout

an

earlieraction or state

of

someone

who

still

exists now.

In

the former

ase

the

subject

term

stands

(as

well,

at

any

rate)

for

something

in

the

past;

the tense

qualifierbrings

bout an

extended

range

of

reference

ampliado

upposi

tionis).

The tense

operator

determines he

statement

s a

whole

{sensu

composito

;

adjusting

the

grammar

to

emphasise

the

sense,

this

gives,

'This was the case: Socratesexists and he is sitting'. n the atter ase,

the

subject

term stands

for

something

in

the

present;

the

tense

operator

determines,

ensu

iviso

only

the

verb of action or state: It is

now the case

that Socrates

exists and was earlier the case

that

he

is

sitting'55.

This

distinction s demanded

by

the

analysis

of

tensed

statements I

gave

first,

according

to

which

the time

reference

s

extracted

from the

dictum

ropositionis

nd counted

as

part

of the

statemental

spect.

The

dictums

split up

into

various

parts;

for

each

part

of the

statement's ontent t has

to

be

decided whether o

assign

it

a truth-value orthepresentmoment of time or for ome earlierone.

(2)

Statements

n

the

present

ense

express

what is or is

not the case

at the

momentof

uttering

hem. Statements

n

the

past

tense,

though,

do not

apply

only

at the moments

of

time

at which

they

are made.

Both

the

statement,

'Socrates was

sitting',

and the

statement,

'Socrates

was

standing,

so

he was

not

sitting',

can indeed

be

true

"now",

if

the

person

making

them is

referring

o states of

affairs

which

have

occurred at

different

imes

in

the

past.

But

if

the

state-

ment,

Socrates is

sitting',

has

ever at

any

time been

true,

the state-

ment, Socrates was sitting' = 'It is the case that at somemomentof

time

earlier

than this one

Socrates

was

sitting')

s valid for ll subse-

quent

moments of time.

Statements

n

the

past

tense

are, then,

valid

forthe

whole

period

of time

following

he moment

n

which the

cor-

responding

present

statement

is

true. The difference

etween the

"short-lived"56

quality

of statements n

the

present

tense and

the

55

Cf.

William

f

Shyreswood,

ntroductionesn

Logicam

ed.

Martin

rabman,

n:

SB

Bayerische

kademieer

Wissenschaften,

hilosophisch-Historische

bteilung,

g.

1937,

H. 10

Munich

937),

4, 12-30; 5,

16-31.

56Thismetaphorscoined yG. NuchelmansnTheoriesfPropositionAncientnd

Medieval

onceptions

f

he earers

f

Truthnd

alsity

Amsterdam

973, 62;

f.Knuut-

tila180.

100

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4

'long-lived"

quality

of

those

in

the

past

tense

is easier

to

perceive

in

that

analysis

of

tensed statements

which

distinguishespropositional

contents

n

termsof their enses

than

in

the

account I

presented

first.

The

scholastics

ecognise

he distinction

when

they ay

that statements

about

the

past

are,

if

they

are

true,

necessaryper

accidens.

n

order to

make clear

the exact

sense of this

expression

it

is

necessary

at least

briefly

o

look at the

function

f modal

qualifiers

n

general.

Before

do

so,

I

should

like

to

make one more

remark. t is

logically

quite

un-

problematic

to

transferthe accounts

we

have now

achieved for

statements

bout the

past

to

statements

bout

the future

nd

to

say

something

ike,

Once

the

statement,

Socrates is

sitting",

is at

some

moment of time true, the statement,"Socrates will be sitting", is

valid for

all

preceding

moments of time'57.

But

it

is

questionable

whether

uch a

transference

ould

be sensible.

The medieval thinkers

hold that

ong-term

rognoses

bout

particular

vents

are

possible

if t

all

only

in

astronomy58,

o

in

this

type

of

analysis,

where

speaking

about

the future

s

concerned,

the

hiddenness of the

future

s

usually

emphasised.

The

transference

have mentioned becomes

a

serious

subject

of

discussion, however,

with

regard

to

the

question

of God's

preknowledge.

5. For medieval logicians,modal logic is not a special area of the

discipline.

For

them,

rather,

t is

an

essential

part

of

determining

he

sense

of

any

sentence at

all

to

give

its

modality

whether r not modal

terms

overtly

ccur

in

it.

Modal

terms

serve to determine

he

way

in

which

subject

and

predicate

are linked

in

a statement.

n

giving

the

modality

one

makes

clear

in what

way

the

statement

should be

counted

as true or false.

Whenever

ogical

operators

re

part

of a

statement,

t

s

necessary

o

determine their

range

of

application,

by syntactic

analysis

of their

logical structure.The distinctionbetween sensucompositond sensu

diviso

s

an aid to

doing

this.

When several

syncategoremata

occur

together,

t

must

also be determined

which

of them s

the

"inclusive"

and

which

the

"included",

that

s,

the one

which falls nside

the

range

of

application

of

the inclusive one.

6. The basic distinction

in

medieval

logic

is that

between

statements

which are either

necessarily

rue

or

necessarily

false,

on

the

57

Cf.

Aristotle,

e nt.

.9,

18b

9-11;

18 b 33-19

1.

58Exceptionsre tatementsboutheAntichrist,hoseutureppearancestakeno

havebeen

guaranteedy

the

uthority

f

Jesus;

f.

Logica

UtDiciť ed.

L. M.

de

Rijk,

n:

Logica

dernorum

I-2,

Assen

967, 90,18-31.

101

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


one

hand,

and

contingent

tatements

n

the other.

Here

I

shall

explain

the

theory

of

necessarily

true and

necessarily

false

(

=

impossible)

statementsony as far as is essential for purposes of distinction.

Statements

are

necessarily

true

if

their

predicate

termsare contained

in

their

ubject

terms;

they

re

necessarily

false

f

heir

predicate

terms

are

incompatible

with their

subject

terms.

The

theory

of

necessity

statements

nd

thatof

mpossibility

tatements

re

systematically

ink-

ed

with

each other

by

the

following quivalences:

if

P'

is

part

of

the

concept

of

S',

then

not-P'

is

incompatible

with

S',

and vice versa.

If

'not-P'

is

part

of the

concept

of

S',

then

P'

is

incompatible

with

S',

and vice versa.

Necessity

and

impossibility

tatements

an

be

sum-

marised as statementswhose truth-values re fixedbythe ntensions f

the

concepts

used

in

them,

n

short s

semantically

eterminedtatements.

Semantically

determined statements

re

universally

valid.

For inten-

sionally

true

statements t

can be

said that

all

possible

instantiations

of their

ubject

terms

re also

instantiations

f their

predicate

terms.

t

can be said of

ntensionally

alse

statements hat

no

possible

instantia-

tions

of

their

subject

terms

will

be

instantiations f their

predicate

terms.

Note

that

here

it is

required only

that the terms hould be able

to

be

instantiated,

not that

they

should

have actual denotations

n

the

present.The statementHomo est nimaV or 4Omnishomost nimal' is

interpreted

s

'

Si est

homo,

st

nimaV

Contingent

statements

are

semantically

ndetermined

their

truth-

values

are

not

determined

by

intensional

considerations.

ntensional

examination of the terms used

in

them allows

us

to

say

only

that

in

contingent

statements

predicate

terms

are

compatible

with

subject

terms,

n

the exact

sense that

the

negation

of

the

predicate

term

s also

compatible

with

the

subject

term.

Accordingly,

the

notion

of con-

tingency

s defined

by

a

conjunction

of

determinants,

s

follows:

'K

p

iff

-

N

p

&

-

M

p';

or,

equivalently,

'K

p

iff

M

p

& M

-

p'

From this

definition t follows hat

f

p'

is

a

contingent

tatement,

hen

'

-

p'

is

a

contingent

tatement

oo

and

vice

versa. If

a

contingent

statement

s asserted

to

be

true,

the manner

of

its

being

so

will

be

given by

the

conjunction

'true,

but

not

necessarily

true',

or,

equivalently,

p

& M

-

p'

If

a

contingent

tatement

s asserted to be

false,themodal qualificationwill be, correspondingly,false,but not

necessarily

false',

or

'

~

p

&M

p'

102

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


7. The statements

bout

particular

events with which I

am con-

cerned

here are all

semantically

ndetermined,

whether

hey

deal

with

events n thepast, presentor future.

It

is

necessary

to

distinguish

etween

the

concept

of

semantic deter-

mination

and

that of

determinacy

f truth-value.

There are

seman-

tically

undetermined tatements

which have

determinate

ruth-values.

One

ype

of such

statements as been

mentioned

already.

As

soon as

a

statement bout

a

particular

vent

has once

become

true,

t

is

true

for

all

subsequent

points

in

time that the

statementhas once

been true.

When such

statements re termed

per

ccidens

ecessary

t is not

being

disputed

on the

contrary,

t

s

being

affirmed

that

they

re

not

necessary,butcontingent.The definition f per ccidens ecessary'is a

specification

f the

conjunction

true and

possible

that not true'.

Both

parts

of this

conjunction

re

specified

s to

time,

and

qualified

modally

in

opposite

ways:

something

s

per

ccidens

ecessary

f

t

cannot

be

false

in

the

present

and

future,

but could

have

been

false

in

the

past.

Take

the

statement,

Tt

is the case

that

Socrates

was

sitting

t

some

point

n

time earlier than

this';

the further

tatement,

Tt is the case

that

Socrates

was,

at some

point

in

time

earlier

than

this,

not

sitting'

s

relatedto

the first

s

its

subcontrary,

ot

ts

contradictory.

f

one

bears

this n mind it is easy to see thatone can without ontradiction ssert

per

ccidens

ecessity

both of Socrates was

sitting',

and

'Socrates

was

not

sitting'.

The

problem

of

logical

determinism

does not

arise. The

theory

f the

per

accidens

ecessary

reflects he aw of

the

factual at the

root of all

particular

facts: what is

done

cannot be undone59.

8.

Statements

n

the

present

ense

about

particular

events

also

have

determinate

ruth-values;

he

propositional

contents

orresponding

o

such

statements,

though,

do

not. That

Socrates is

sitting

can

at

various

differentimesbe

true,

false,

and

true

again;

but Tt is

now the

case thatSocrates is sitting' s, at everyrandomlychosen momentat

which

the

statement s

made,

either

"in a

determinate sense

(<

eter-

minate)

true"

or

"in

a

determinate ense

false"60.

The

scholastics

use

the notion

of

necessity

n

order

to

recognise

determinacy

f

truth-values n

the case

of

statements

n

the

present

tense

too. Here

they

take all

possible

care

to

avoid

any

confusion

between the

"temporal

necessity"

meant in

this

context with

59

n

scholasticorkst s

disputed

hetherhisaw

hould

ount s

a

logical

rinciple

oras a principlefnature. hequestionsusually iscussednconcreteorm:sit

possible

or

God

to restoreost

irginity?

60

Cf. Thomas

quinas,

n Perih.

.I 1

XIII,

n.

169.

103

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


"necessity

as such".

The

tool

they

use to

make the

distinction s not

the transference

rom entences

"determinate

as to time"

to sentences

"indeterminate s to time"61,which s onlyapparently pplicable; in-

stead

they

use exact

syntactic nalysis.

A sentence

such

as,

'

N

ecesse st

Socratem

edere

um edeť

is

capable

of various

constructions,

ccording

to

whether he

range

of

application

of the time

conjunction

4

as

long

as'

and

of the

modal

operator

are

fixed;

the

consistency

f these

construc-

tions has then

to be tested.

The sentence

can

be

understood

1)

in

such

a

way

that

the

necessity perator,

uninfluenced

y

the time

reference,

determines

he

whole sentence:

It is

necessary

that

what

the

following

states

is

the

case:

"Socrates

is

sitting,

while

he

is

sitting"

.

Understood in thisway, the sentence isfalse] it is not necessarythat

there should

be

a

time

at

which

the

possibility

of

Socrates' s

sitting

should

be instantiated.

(Formalised,

this

runs

as

follows:

'

-

N3t

(p

-

t)'.)

The

sentence

can

also

be understood

2)

as a

temporal

con-

nection

in which

the latter

part

of the sentence

is

distinguished

rom

the

former

nly by

an

added modal

operator:

As

long

as

it

is

the case

that Socrates

is

sitting,

t is the

case

that it

is

necessary

that Socrates

should sit'.

In

this

nterpretation

oo,

the sentence

must

be

rejected

s

false.

Its latter

part

is false for

ny randomly

elected

moment

of

time;

even supposing Socrates to be sittingnow, the possibilitythat he

should not be

doing

so is

a

present

ne.

The

conjunction

p

& M

-

p',

which

characterises

rue

contingent

tatements,

s also

valid when

the

proposition

variable is

qualified

by

'ti',

which indicates some

par-

ticular

point

in

time;

'

p-tļ

&

M

-

(p

-

ti)'

is defended

s

consistent

y

the scholastics.

The sentence

can

also

(3)

be

interpreted

n

such

a

way

that the

modal

operator

itself

s

temporally

qualified:

'Socrates

is

sitting,

nd

during

the time n

which he remains

seated it is not

possi-

ble that

he

should

not be

sitting'.

Understood

thus,

the

sentence

s

true.

The difference etween thisand therejected nterpretation2) can be

clarified

by

formalisation:

(2)

'V

tļ

p

-

ti

-

N

(p

-

t))'

is false:

(3)

'N

V

ti

p

-

ti

-

p

-

ti)'

is true62.

61

Knuuttila

ays

his

17

f.)

with

egard

o

Boethius;

81 nd

183f.with

egard

o

Abelard;

11-213

ith

egard

oThomas

Aquinas.

62Cf. PeterAbelard,upereriermeniased. L. Minio-Paluello,n: Twelfthentury

Logic:

exts

nd

tudies,

I: AbaelardiananeditaRome

1958,

n.

61-63,

p.

36,22-38,5;

nn.

76-77,

p.

41,23-42,20;

ialéctica

ed. L. M.

de

Rijk,

Assen

956, 06,7-210,19.

104

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


The

principle

to

which

the

Aristotelian

dictum,

'

Omne

quod

est

quando

st,

necessest

sse can be

traced

back is

not

ust

some semantic

principleor other,but the principleof non-contradiction.The time

during

which

Socrates

is

sitting

ow cannot be

the same

time

as

that

n

which he is

not

sitting

now;

the

conjunction

Socrates

is

sitting

now

and Socrates

s

not

sitting

ow'

cannot

possibly

be

true

for ne

and the

same

point

n

time.

But

'

-

M

(p

-

1¡

&

-

(p

-

tļ))'

is

equivalent

to

'N

(p-

t¡

-

p-

1¡)'.

9.

We are

only

able

to

make

predictions

bout future

vents

nsofar

as we can

conclude from

what is the case

to what

will

be

the

case. We

extrapolate

series of

ike events

beyond

the

present

time,

or

we

infer

from ome constellation fcauses existingnow to theirfuture ffects.

In

such statements he futureevent

is

not described

as

an

isolated

occurrence,

but instead as an instantiation

of some

rule or law.

Because

something

usually happens

(

contingens

t

n

pluribus,

ontingens

natum),

t

can

be

expected

to

happen

in

future

oo.

The

following

istinctions bout

prognoses

an be made

with

regard

to the

possible

relationships

between

given

causes and their

expected

effects63.

1)

A

future

ffect

s so situated

in

its

cause that

the cause

inevitably,

hat

s,

necessarily,brings

with

t

its

effect.Given

that t

s

certainthatthe causal eventoccurs,theprognosisof tseffectlso has

the status

of

certainty.

The

Aristotelian

and

scholastic

view is that

prognoses

f

this

kind

are

possible

only

n

celestial

physics. 2)

A

cause

or

a constellation

of

causes does indeed

normally

bring

with it

some

future

vent,

but

it

cannot

be ruled out that

in

exceptional

cases the

effect

will

not follow as

a

result

of

disturbing

factors

or because

causal

components

ssumed

to

be

given

do not

in

fact ake

place.

The

prognosis

f

the

occurrence

of

the

effects

well

grounded,

but

has here

only

probable

status.

According

to

Aristotle

nd the

scholastics,

all

prognoses n thenaturalsciences whichconcernearthly ventsare of

this

kind.

(3)

When some

future event

is

being

discussed,

those

discussing

it

may

consider

themselves

in a

position

to

permit

the

event's

occurrence or

non-occurrence

contingens

d

utrumlibet).

he

relevant lternative

an

be formulated

n

advance;

however,

no truth-

value can

ustifiedly

e

assigned

to

any part

of

t.

(4)

The

opposite

con-

cept

to

the

contingens

t n

pluribus

s

the

contingens

t

n

paucioribus.

What

seldom

happens

is,

though,

not

a

state of affairs

imply

formulable

n

63

Cf.

Thomas

Aquinas,

n

Perih.

L.I

1

XIII,

nn.

172,

174;

on

this,

id.

my

nter-

pretation

entioned

n

n.

19.

105

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


advance. One

can

only

talk about

anomalies and

exceptions

to

what

normally

and

naturally

occurs

by

distinguishing

what

normally

happens fromwhat necessarilyhappens. As soon as the contentsof

possible

anomalies

are

described,

they

are

already being

treated

as

instances

of some

rule

or law64.

10.

Anyone

who talks

about

particular

vents must

refer

o natural

causes

and

specific xplanations;

recourse

to God's

creation

or

to

his

ability

to work miracles

is not admissible in

the

science

of nature65.

Thomas

Aquinas emphasises

that

possibility

nd

impossibility,

on-

tingency

nd

necessity

must

be

spoken

about

in

such

a

way

that

the

standards

of

mputing

hem

are their

relationships

o their

proximate

and "proper causes. Itmaywellbe thecase, though,that omeconcur-

sus

causarum

s

not

explicable

in

terms

of

particular

proximate

causes

and

so

has

an

accidental

relationship

o

them,

but

that

an

explanation

can after

ll be found for t

if

t

is traced back to some more

general

cause.

Lastly,

it

is

not

possible

to

impute

any

obstacle

to

the universal

Godly

ause

of

ll

that

s.

Nonetheless,

neitherfrom

God's

omnipotence

nor from

his

prescience,

to

which

everything

hat

ever

happens

is

given

in a timeless

present,

can it

be

inferred hat our

estimation

of

events

as

contingent

s

simply

an

expression

of our

finite

tandpoint,

seen fromwhichdeterministicelationships annotbe properly raced.

The

concept

of

contingency

s

not

merely pistemic,

t

s an

ontological

one.

Thomas solves

the

theological

problem

of determinism

n

the

following

way:

"The

will fGod must

e

understood

s

outside he

rder

f

being,

s

a

cause

underlying

he

whole

f

what s and

all itsdiversities.

utdistinctions

n

what

there

s

are

possible'

nd

necessary'.

nd

herefore

ecessity

nd

contingency

in

things,

nd

the istinctions

etween

hem,

made

n

termsf he

unctions

f

their

roximate

auses,

ave

heir ource

n

the

will

fGod tself. or

o

those

effects

hich e

wished o be

necessary

e

gave

necessary

auses;

nd

to

those

effectshich e wished obe contingente gavecauseswhichperateon-

tingently,

hat

s,

auses

which

ay

e

deficient.

ccording

o he

ways

n

which

such auses

re determined

heir ffects

re termedither

necessary'

r

con-

tingent',

lthough

ll

depend

n

the

will fGod

as

their

rincipal

ause,

which

transcends

he rder f

necessity

nd

contingency"66.

Duns

Scotus's

new

modal

theory

does

not

arise

from

ny

discovery

of internal

difficulties

n

the

views of

earlier scholastics

nd

especially

64

Cf.

Aristotle,

etaph.

psilon

,

1027

21-26;

n

this,

id. the

ommentary

y

Thomas

Aquinas,

.VI l.II.

65

Cf.

Georg

Wieland,

lbert

er

rosse

nd

ie

ntwicklung

er

mittelalterlichen

hilosophie

in: Zeitschriftürphilosophischeorschung,4 (1980),590-607; ere592 with

referenceso

Abelard

nd

Albert,

f.

594

n.

21.

66

Thomas

Aquinas,

n

Perih.L.I

l.XIV,

n. 197.

106

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


of

Thomas. For

theological

reasons

Scotus attacks

the

principle

that

we can

judge

of

the

necessity

r

contingency

f

the

things

or events

n

this worldbylookingat theirpropercauses. For him,thefunctioning

of the first ause alone can

determine

whether there should

be

only

necessary

events

or

whether

there

should

also

be

events which

may

happen

and

may

not:

'

'Every secondary

cause causes

insofar

s

it is

moved

by

the

first

ause''.

If

it were

assumed

that

there were a

first

cause

which caused

everything

lse

necessarily,

ts

necessity

would be

transferred o

every

secondary

cause

and

thus

to

every

caused event.

That there

are

contingently

aused

events those

which,

when

they

happen,

could also

not

have

happened

-

can

only

be

explained

if

the

firstause causes contingently. ut sinceobstaclesto orotherdeficien-

cies

in

the

working

of

the first ause are

unthinkable

here,

a

con-

tingently ausing

first

ause can

only

be

imagined

as

a will

so

that

the

cause

itself

determineswhether

or

not

it

should

take

effect67.

Avicenna had

thought

f

God as

that

being

which includes

its

own

being

in

its essence.

He

had

opposed

to this

being,

necessary

n

itself,

the

totality

f

all

the

restof

being,

which

can

without

nconsistency

e

thought

f both

as

existing

and as

not

existing.

What

is in

itself

nly

possible

exists,

when

it does

exist,

through

ome

other

cause,

indeed

through hatbeingwhich s necessary n itself,God. As an effectfthe

first ause

it

is,

according

to

Avicenna,

necessary68.

Duns Scotus

adopts

the

whole

metaphysics

f

essences

from

Avicenna,

but without

accepting

his view

that

everything rought

about

by

God

necessarily

happens

as

it

does

happen.

What

takes

place

because

of God is not

brought

bout

necessarilyby

him;

it

is

freely

willed

by

him.

It would be

an

interesting

ask to

investigate

how

far,

n

Leibniz

and

in

modern

authors,

the

semantics

of

possible

worlds is

expressly

or

implicitly

ound

up

with a

metaphysics

f essences.

D-5000

Köln

41

Thomas nstitut

67

Cf. Duns

cotus,

ractatuse

Primo

rincipio

Abhandlung

berasErste

rinzip

ed.,

transi, nd

with

commentaryy

Wolfgang

luxen,

Darmstadt

974,

h.

IV,

sentence

,

n.

56;

cf.

Knuuttila

18-221nd for

detailed

nterpretation

n

he on-

text f

Duns

cotus's

metaphysics

Etienne

ilson,

ohannes

uns

cotus.

inführung

n

die

Grundgedanken

einer

ehre

transi,

y

Werner

ettloff,

üsseldorf

959,

h.

4, II,

esp.

326-328;

II,

33

.

335-342;V,

347f.

68

Cf.

Guy

J

lbert,

Nécessitét

Contingence

hez

aintThomas

'Aquin

t

chez

es

Prédécesseurs

Ottawa

961,

h.

II;

Etienne ilson

see

n.

62),

338f.

cf.

also

the

passageso be foundnthe ndex n 'Existenz',LogikdesNichtnotwendigen',

'Mögliches',

Nezessitarismus',

Nichtnotwendig(es)',

Nichtnotwendigkeiť,

Not-

wendiges)',Notwendigkeit'.

107

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Vivarium

XI,

2

(1983)

Rationalism

at

the

School

of

Chartres

JOHN

NEWELL

As

a

belief

in

the

subservience of faith

to

reason,

rationalism

s

perhaps

unique

to

the modern

world and

is

certainly

alien

to

that

period of timewe refer o as the Middle Ages. But as a belief n the

compatibility

f faith

nd reason

and as a confidence

n

man's

ability

to understand

himself nd the world

rationally,

ationalism

has

played

a

much

larger

role

in

the

development

of Western

Civilization.

A

number

of

significant

works

attacking

the

portrayal

of the

Middle

Ages

as a monolithic

Age

of

Faith"

have foundthat

this

atter

ype

of

rationalism

played

an

important

role

in medieval

thought.

Most

of"

these studies

have

concentrated

on

the

importance

of

reason

in

the

Aristotelian-based

philosophy

of

the

thirteenth-century

cholastics.1

The mostimportant omments bout medieval rationalismbefore he

"rediscovery

of Aristotle"

have

focused

on Peter

Abelard,

who is

sometimes

praised

and sometimes

criticized

for his

reliance on

reason.2

The

writings

of the scholars

associated

with the

School

of

1

The iterature

n

the

ubject

s

fairly

xtensive

f omewhat

neven,

ut

or

ome

f

themore

nteresting

reatments

ee Etienne

ilson,

he

piritf

Mediaeval

hilosophy

trans.

A.

H. C.

Downes,

New

York

1940,

sp.

1-41

nd

403-26;

tienne

ilson,

Reasonnd

Revelation

n

the

Middle

ges

NewYork

1938;

R.

W.

Southern,

edieval

Humanismin: MedievalumanismndOthertudiesNewYork1970, 9-60;WalterUllmann,MedievaloundationsfRenaissanceumanism,thaca1977, sp. 1-13 nd

89-148;

nd

Alexander

urray,

easonnd

ociety

n he iddle

ges

Oxford

978,

sp.

1

10-37

nd258-314.

or

hemost bsolute

enial

y

moderncholar

f he

ossibili-

ty

fmedieval

ationalismee

Robert

ultot,

a

doctrine

u

mépris

u

monde

enOccident

de

. AmbroiseInnocent

II

,

tome

,

vols.

1 and

2:

Le Xle

iecle

Louvain 963-64.

2

For a

glorification

fthe

modernity

fAbelard's

ationalism

ee

A. V.

Murray,

Abelardnd

t.Bernard

Manchester

967,

nd

for denial

fhis

ationalismee

Paul

L.

Williams,

he

Moral

hilosophyf

eter

belard,

anham,

Md.

1980,

sp.

45-62.

ora

more

alanced

reatment

ee

J.

G.

Sikes,

eter

belard,

ambridge

932,

1-60;

nd

Leif

Grane,

eterbelard:

hilosophy

nd

Christianity

n he iddle

ges,

rans. rederick

andChristine

rowley,

ondon

970,

4-46

nd82-105.

or discussion

f nother

earlymedieval riter hose iewsn the elationetweenaithndreason ave een

examined

eejaspar

Hopkins,

Companion

o he

tudy

f

t.

Anselm,

inneapolis

972,

38-66.

108

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Chartres, however,

also

offer

nvaluable material for

consideration

of medieval attitudes oward

reason. From

the

firstmodern

accounts

of

the

School of

Chartres,

historianshave

pointed

out the

importance

given

to reason

by

theChartrians.3More recentstudiesof the role of

the

Chartrians

in

the

development

of

natural

science and

literary

theory

have

given

further

nsight

nto

the

key

role

assigned

to

reason

by

the

Chartrians,

but there

have

been

no detailed studies

of

their t-

titudetoward and

use of reason.4

This

presentstudyhopes

to

fill

hat

gap

and

thereby

hed further

ight

on

the

significance

f

the School

of

Chartres

for

the

history

f

medieval

thought.

The

clearest and most detailed

expression

of

the Chartrians' at-

titudetoward reason appears in thewritings f William ofConches,

who

taught

t Chartres from bout

1

120 to

1

145 and

was

renownedas

a

grammarian

and

natural

philosopher.

In

addition to

glosses

on

Plato's

Timaeus

Boethius'

Consolatio

hilosophiae

and

Macrobius'

com-

mentary

on

the

Somnium

cipionis

William

composed

the

Philosophia

mundi

nd

the

Dragmaticon

encyclopedic

compendia

of

all

the scientific

knowledge

of

his

day.5

Also at Chartres

during

this

time were

Thierry

3

For

the raditional

iew f Chartresee

Reginald

ane

Poole,

llustrations

f

he

Historyf

Medieval

hought

Oxford

884,109-35;

nd

Jules

Alexandre

lerval,

es

écoleseChartresumoyengeduVe iecleu XVIe iecleMémoirese la Société r-

chéologique

'Eure-et-Loir,

ol.

11,

Chartres

895,

sp.

144-272;

ndj.

M.

Parent,

La

doctrinee a

créationans

'école e Chartres

Publicationse l'Institut 'études

médiévales

'Ottawa,

ol.

8,

Paris

938,

sp.

11-25.

. W.

Southern

as

recently

t-

tackedhis tandardiew

y

rguing

hat

here

s

no

vidence

hat he cholars

eferred

to s Chartriansver

ctuallyaught

t ChartresnHumanism

nd he

chool

f

hartres

in:

Medievalumanism

pp.

61-85.

outhern'sriticismavebeen

bly

nswered

y

Peter

Dronke,

New

Approaches

o the chool

f

Chartres

in: Anuario e estudios

medievales,

1969),

17-40;

ndNikolaus .

Häring,

hartresnd aris

evisitedin:

Essays

n Honor

f

Anton harles

egis

ed.

J.

Reginald

'Donnell,

Toronto

974,

268-329.

ee

alsoRoberto

iacone,

asters,

ooksand

ibrary

tChartres

ccording

o he

CartulariesfNotre-Damend aint-Perein:Vivarium,2 1974), 0-51.4 Seefor

xample

ullio

Gregory

nimamundi:a

filosofia

i

Guglielmo

iConchesa

scuola i ChartresFlorence

955;

Edouard

eauneau,

ote

ur 'Ecole e

Chartresin:

Studi

medievali,

rd.

er.,

(1964),

21-65;

Marie-Dominique

henu,

Nature, an,

and

ociety

n he

welfthentury

ed. and

trans.

erome aylor

nd

Lester .

Little,

Chicago

968,

-48;

rian

tock,

Myth

nd ciencen he

welfthentury:Studyf

er-

nard

ilvesterPrinceton

972;

Winthrop

etherbee,

latonism

nd

oetry

n he

welfth

Century:

he

iterary

nfluencef

he chool

f

ChartresPrinceton

972;

ndPeter

ronke,

Fabula:

xplorations

nto

he

ses

fMyth

nMedievallatonismMittellateinische

tudien

und

Texte,

and

,

Leyden

974,

3-78.

5

On

William's

ife nd worksee

especially eginald

ane

Poole,

llustrations

f

he

Historyf

Medieval

hought

nd

Learning

2nd

rev.

ed.,

London

920,

106-112 nd

294-314; arent,8-54 nd99-106;Gregory,-4; ndHäring, 94-95. tatements

concerning

illiam's ttitude

oward eason re

scattered

hroughout

is various

works.

eferences

o

his

Philosophia

undi illbe to the newedition

y Gregor

109

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


of Chartres

and Gilbert

Porreta,

colleagues

who,

like

William,

had

studied

under

Bernard of Chartres

and shared

many

of the

same

views

and concerns.6William's students ncludedJohn of Salisbury, Ber-

nard

Silvestris,

and the future

King

Henry

II of

England,

and his

writings

were

among

the medieval works held

in

the

libraries

of

the

humanists of the

Italian Renaissance.7

Maurach,

hilosophia

Pretoria980.For

he enefitf he eader will lso

give

he

citations

o he lder ditionsnPL

172,

9-102

nd

PL

90,

1

127-80. eferenceso

he

Dragmaticon

re o

Dialogus

e

ubstantiis

hysicis

ed.

Guilielmus

ratarolus,

trasburg

1567

rpt.

rankfort/M.

967);

nd

references

o

theGlosae

uper

latonem

re to the

edition

y

Edouard

eauneau

Paris 1965).

Referenceso William's losae

uper

Macrobium

ill

e

tothe

partial

dition

y

HelenRodnite

Lemay],7"Āč

octrine

f

he

Trinityn GuillaumeeConches'lossesnMacrobius:extsnd tudiesDiss.Columbia

Univ.,

1973.For theconstructionf a tentative

dition f William's losae

uper

Boetium

I

haveutilized

our f

he even

manuscripts

hichcholars ave

generally

judged

obe most eliable:

royes,

ibl.

mun.

1101,

f.

r-19v;

royes,

ibl.mun.

1381,

fT.

4v-95v;

eipzig,

Univ. Bibl. cod.

lat.

1253,

f.

0v-82v;

nd

Munich,

Bayer.

taatsbibl. lm

4603,

ff. 156r-176r.

follow

he

practice

stablished

y

William's

arlierditors

n

referring

ohis

workss Glosae

but

n the

assages

rom

thoseworks retain he

medieval

rthography.

6

On

Thierry

f

Chartres

ndthe

uestion

f

which,

f

ny,

f he ommentaries

n

Boethius'

e trinitatere

actually

is,

ee

Parent,

octrine

82-90;

Jeauneau,

ote

827-39;

dem,

Un

représentant

u

platonisme

u

Xlle

siecle:

aître

hierry

e

Chartres

in:

Mémoirese

a

Société

rchéologique'Eure-et-Loir,

0

1954),1-10;

Nikolaus

.

Häring, wo ommentariesnBoethiusDe Trinitatend e Hebdomadibusy hierryf

Chartres

n:

AHDLMA,

27

1960),

14-23;

ndAnneliese

tollenwerk,

erGenesiskom-

mentar

hierry

vonChartres

nd ie

Thierry

onChartres

ugeschriebenen

ommentare

u

Boethius(De Trinitate

ologne

971,

-37.The works fthe chool

f

Thierry

f

Chartres,

hich

ave been

variously

ssigned

o

Thierry

imself

r one of his

students,

re ll

printed

n

Commentaries

nBoethius

y hierryf

Chartres

nd

His

School

ed. Nikolaus .

Häring,

ontificalnstitute

fMediaeval

tudies,

ol.

20,

Toronto

1971.

On the ife

ndwork f

Gilbert

orreta,

eeAimé

orest,

ilberte

a

Porrée

t es coles

du

Xlle

siècle

in:

Revue es ours

t

onférences

ser.

2,

35

(1934),

10-20

nd

640-51;

Michael

.

Williams,

he

eachingf

Gilbertorreta

n he

rinity

Analecta

regoriana,

vol.56,Rome 951; ndH. C. vanElswijk, ilbertorreta:avie,on euvresapensée

Spicilegium

acrum

ovaniense,

tudes tdocuments,ol.33,Louvain 966, -124.

Allreferences

o

Gilbert's

ritings

ill e

to TheCommentariesnBoethius

y

Gilbert

f

Poitiersed. Nikolaus

M.

Häring,

ontifical

nstitutefMediaeval

tudies,

tudies

and

Texts,

ol.

13,

Toronto

966.

7

Our

major

ource f

nformationor

ohn's

ife ndhis tudiesnder

Williams his

own

Metalogicon,

d. Clement

.J.

Webb,

Oxford 929. or

modernxaminations

f

his ife nd

works ee

Clement .

J.

Webb,

ohn

f alisbury

London

932;

Hans

Liebschütz,

edieval

umanism

n he

ife

nd

Writings

f

ohn

f alisbury

London

950;

and

Christopher

rooke,

he

Twelfth-Century

enaissance

Norwich

969,

3-74.

Bernard

ilvestris

evermentions

aving

tudied

nder

William,

uthis

works

clearly

earevidence

fWilliam's

nfluenceither rom

ernard's

aving

tudied

underWilliam r fromishaving loselytilizedWilliam's orks.his sespecially

true fhis

Cosmographia,

d. Peter

ronke,

eiden

978;

nd

The

ommentary

n

he irst

Six

Books

f

he eneid

ommonly

ttributed

o

Bernardus

ilvestrised.

Julian

Ward

ones

110

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


In

his

theory

of

knowledge,

William

of

Conches

insists

that the

senses

serve

as the

basis

for man's

knowledge

not

only

of the

world

and

man,

but also

of

universais

and

even

God.

But

while

all man's

knowledge

must be based on what he learns

through

his senses, man

must

go

beyond

the senses

in

order to

gain

a

true

perception

f

reality.

And

one

can

surpass

the

senses

only

by

the

use

of reason.8

William

and his fellow

Chartrians

argue

that

while the senses

serve,

reason

must dominate.

William

repeats

Plato's

injunction

o bridle

the

senses

and

argues

that

anyone

who

udges

by

the senses

alone acts

bestially.

Just

as man excels other

creatures

by

means of his rational

ability,

so

he

should

base his

udgment

on

reason

rather

than

the senses alone.9

JohnofSalisburycloselyfollowsWilliam's account ofhow man forms

judgments

or

opinions

based on

what

he learns

through

his senses.

Since

such

opinions

may

be eithertrue or

false,

reason

must

examine

them

prudently

o determine

heir

validity.10 ohn,

Bernard

Silvestris,

and other

Chartrians

rarely

miss

an

opportunity

o

say

that reason

must

rule and

guide

the

senses.11

William

frequently

escribes

the conditionof

a

person

in

whom the

senses,

rather than

reason,

rule.

In

a child the

domination

of

the

senses

is,

of

course,

the

natural

state,

but

in an adult

it

represents

complete nversion fthenatural and properorder.The senses,which

should

be like the feet

serving

the

body,

are

elevated;

and

reason,

and Elizabeth

rances

ones,

incoln

977.

Recent tudies

nclude

tock,

Myth

nd

Scienceand

Wetherbee,

latonismnd

oetry

esp.

152-86.

On

the

possible

nowledge

fWilliam's

ritings

mong

Renaissance

ritersee

Raymond

libansky,

he

ontinuityf

he latonic

radition

uring

he

iddle

ges

Lon-

don

1939,

5-36;

ullio

Gregory,

latonismoedievale:tudiricherche

Rome

958, 7;

andjeauneau,

d.,

Glosae

uper

latonem,

9-31.

fl

On William'sheoryfknowledgeee Heinrichlatten,iePhilosophieesWilhelmvon onches,oblenz 929, 5-83;

Gregory,

nima undi167-75; ierreMichaud-

Quantin,

a

classification

es

uissances

e

'âme u Xlle iècle

in:

Revue

u

moyenge

latin,

1949),

5-34;

nd

myTwelfth-

entury

heories

f

nowledge:

ew irectionst

he

School

f

Chartres

forthcoming

n

PMR

Proceedings,

ol.6.

9

Dragmaticon

p.

38.

Cf.

G osae

uper

latonem,

17-18

nd

236.

n

this nd he ollow-

ing

araphrases

rom

eadily

vailable,

ublished

ources shall

ive

he eference

o

the

rinted

ditionsndomit

he

atin ext

rom

henote.

10

Glosae

uper

latonem

174-75.Cf.

Dragmaticon,

07-8;

nd

John

f

Salisbury,

Metalopicon

.11,p.

177.

11

For

xample,

hen ernardomes

oAeneid

.613,

he

centersn

oneword

or is

Commentary

n

Vergil,

12:

Dominorumicuti

orporis

embra

ervos

icimus,

ic

con-

tra nimi otentiast udicia.. dominosocamus." or therxamplesee bid., 2

and

80;

and

John

f

alisbury,

olicraticus

.1,

ed. Clement .

J.

Webb, vols,

Ox-

ford

929, ,

235-37.

Ill

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


which

should

be the

head

of the

soul,

is cast

down.

In such

a condition

man cannot

know

himself

and so seeks

only

bodily goods

with

no

thought

to

his soul or

mind.12

When

this

happens,

man in

effect

deserts

his divine

heritage

and,

yielding

up

his

superiority

ver the

animals,

becomes

no better

than a beast.

William

argues

throughout

his works

that

the

opinions

which we

form

from

sense

perceptions

are often

false

because

they

are based

solely

on

the

appearance

of

things

appearances

which

can

be

true

or

false.

He enumerates

many

instances

in

which

our

senses,

especially

sight,

lead us to

false

opinions

about

things.

A

straight

tick

n

the

water

appears

bent;

two

towers

seen

from

he distance

appear joined

together lthoughtheyare widely separated; and thesun, although t

is

eight

times

bigger

than

the

earth,

seems about

two

feet

in cir-

cumference.13

n

order

to

ascertain

the

real nature of

things,

the

in-

vestigator

f

nature

must

go

beyond appearances.

He uses reason

to

check

the

validity

of his

sense

perceptions.

By

careful

consideration

and

long

rational

deliberation

hereon,

he

can eliminate he

false

opin-

ions

and,

in

effect,

go

beyond

the

knowledge

which

the

senses

provide.14

William

thus

explains

the attainment f

knowledge

through

a

somewhat

vague

theory

of deliberation

which

emphasizes

man's

natural power ofunderstanding.

William

explains

that

whenever there

is

any

doubt

about

ap-

pearances,

the

issue

must

be resolved

by

rational

deliberation.

'

'Neither the

obviously

true

nor the

obviously

false

need to

be

proved,

but

only

those

things

about

which

there

is

some doubt."15

In

our

deliberations

about the

natural

world,

we

frequently

must

be content

with

probable

arguments

{argumenta

robabilia,

since

necessary

12

Glosaeuperlatonem,30.Cf. bid., 18-19,26,

nd

280;Dragmaticon249-50;

nd

DosMoraliumogmahilosophorumed.JohnHolmberg,ppsala 929, 1-46. imilar

statements

re found

n

other

hartrians

uch s Bernard

ilvestris,

ommentary

n

Vergil

.96,

p.

20.

13

Dragmaticon

69.

Cf.

bid.,

142-43;

nd Glosae

uper

latonem,

75.

14

Glosae

uper

oetium. m.

11.3,

Leipzig,

253,

.

64vb;

Munich,

LM

4603,

f.

167rb-va;

royes,

101,

.

12r;

ndTroyes,

381,

. 7v:

44

Revolvat

ntimeucem

isus

d

estrationem

t

ntellectum

uod

qualiter

iat ideamus. um

vult

liquis

udicare

e

aliquo

irigit

ationem

sque

d

ipsam

em

t

onsiderei

ius

proprietates.

ed

i sibi

aliquid

nde

videatur

on debet

tatimudicare

ic esse

sed

in

se

reverti

t diu

deliberare

n

ita it

uia

sepe

videtur

omini

sse

uod

non st

vel

non sse

uod

st

de

aliquo.

ed

stud liminatur

eliberatione

uia

non st udicandum

uod

non rit

longa eliberationerobatum."f.John f alisbury,etalogicon.17,p. 183.15

Philosophia,

7: "...

neque

nim

perte

era

neque

perte

alsa

robanda

unt,ed

de

quibus liqua

dubitatio

st."

Cf.

PL

172,

9B,

nd PL

90,

1132D.

112

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


arguments

argumenta

ecessaria

,

are often

not

possible.16

William

uses

such

probable

arguments

o attack false

opinions

based

solely

on

sense

perception.

For

example,

those who

rely nly

on their enses

think hat

the earth is flat because it seems so when theywalk. But rational

deliberation eads

us

to see

that the

earth

is

round.

For

if

the

earth

were

flat,

he

waters of the

earth would

not be

spread

out

as

they

are

but would

be

pooled

up

like a

lake.

Furthermore,

there would be

neither

he uniform

daily

change

from unrise

to

noon

to sunset nor

the

appearance

of different

tars

n

different

arts

of the

world.17

Our

senses

would also lead

us

to

think

hat t is warmer

on the

mountains

which

are

nearer

the

sun,

but

reason shows

us

that t is

in

fact colder

there

because

of the thinness

of the

air in

regions

farther rom the

earth.18

William

gives

some ofhis

most detailed considerations f

the

need

to

go

beyond appearances

in

his

discussion of

heavenly phenomena.

He

cites

three

types

of authorities

who

discuss

the heavens. Fables

tell

stories

explaining

the

configuration

f the

constellations.

Astrology

treats hose

things

which

appear

to

be,

whether

r

not

theyreally

are.

Astronomy

reats

the

true

structure

f

the

heavens,

whether r

not it

so

appears.19

n

treating

he

heavens,

William

clearly

concerns

himself

with

an

astronomical rather than astrologicalor fabulous study. He

explains

that the

"

fixed

tars" are so

called,

not

because

they

do

not

move,

but

because

they

do not seem

to move.

All

motion s

perceived

by

viewing

a

moving object

in

relationto

an

immobile or

slower

mov-

ing object.

When such

an

immobile

object

is

lacking,

as

with a

ship

16

Dragmaticon

40.

Cf.

bid.,

3;

Philosophic

6,

PL

172, 8C-D,

ndPL

90, 1132B;

and

Glosae

uper

latonem

1

15 nd

281-84.

William raws

is

oncept

f

probable

nd

necessaryrguments

rom

lato,

imaeus

9c-d,

d.

J.

H.

Waszink,

imaeus

Calàdio

translatus

ommentarioque

nstruētus

Corpus

latonicum

edii

evi,

Plato

atinus,

ol.

4,

London 962, 2; Boethius,n sagogenorphyriiommenta.12, d. SamuelBrandt.

Corpus

criptorum

cclesiasticorum

atinorum,

ol.

48,

Leipzig

906,167-69;

nd

Cicero,

e

nventionehetorica

.29.44,

oeb Classical

ibrary,

ondon

949,

3-85.

On

the

oncept

f

probable

nd

necessary

easonsndthe

eneral evelopment

f

dialectical

easoninghrough

he welfth

entury

ee

specially

. M.

Jacquin,

es ra-

dones ecessarie

de aint nselme

in:

Mélanges

andonnet:tudes

'histoireittérairet

doc-

trinale

u

moyen

ge

2

vols.,

ibliothèque

homiste,

ol.

14,

Paris

930, , 67-78;

ierre

Michaud-Quantin,

tudes

ur e

vocabulaire

hilosophique

u

moyenge

Rome

1970,

sp.

59-72

nd

216-19;

nd

L.

M.

de

Rijk, ogica

modernorum:

contribution

o he

istory

of

arly

erminist

ogic,

vols.Assen

962-67,, 1,

pp.

95-125 nd

177-234.

17

Dragmaticon

213-16.

18

Philosophia,83,

PL

172, 7B-C,

nd PL

90,

1169A-B.

19Dragmation70-71. f.Philosophia44,PL 172, 9A-B,nd PL 90,1140D-1141A;

Glosae

uper

latonem,

38;

nd

John

f

Salisbury,

olicraticus

.18,

vol.

1,

106-107.

113

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


moving

through

he

sea,

motion

s not

perceived.

Since

nothing

s

visi-

ble

over

the "fixed"

stars,

we are

unable

to observe

their

motion.20

Similarly,

n

rejecting

he

view

that

a

watery

firmament

xists above

the

sky,

William

argues

that the

watery-looking

matterwe thinkwe

see

in

the

heavens

is

simply

due to

a

failure of our

senses.21

n

these

and other observations about the

heavenly phenomena,

William in-

sists

that

the senses

lead man to incorrect

conclusions

which

only

reason

can

correct.

William

further escribes reason's

ability

o

go beyond

the

senses

in

terms

f Boethius'

statement hat

man's

soul has the

power

to

separate

the

oined

and to

oin

together

he

separated.22

He utilizes this dea to

explainhistheory felementůmelementatum.he trueelements elemen-

ta

-

pure

earth, water,

air,

and

fire

are

the

simple

and minimal

par-

ticles

of

which

all

bodies

are

formed.

The elementa

annot

exist

by

themselves,

but

in combination

with

one

another

they

compose

all

material

things.

Visible

earth, water, air,

and fire

elementata

are each

composed

of

a

combination of these four

simple

elements

and

are

named after the element which

dominates

in

their

make-up.23

The

elementa

re

themselves nvisible

and

are

known

only by

the use

of

reason.

In

the

same

way

we

speak

of

the

divisions

of

the

human

body.

Some of these divisions, such as the body into members and the

20

Dragmaticon,

7-88.Cf. Glosae

uper

latonem

194;

and

Philosophia,

5,

PL

172,

59C-D,

nd

PL

90,

1141A.William ere

ollows

acrobius,

ommentarii

n

omnium

Scipionis

1

14.

2,

d.

James

Willis,

ibliotheca

criptorum

raecorum

t

romanorum,

Leipzig

970,

9.

21

Dragmaticon

70.

Cf.

Thierry

f

Chartres,

rac

atus

e ex

ierum

peribus,

n:

Commen-

taries

nBoethius

y

Thierry

560.

22

Philosophia

27,

PL

172,

9C

andPL

90

1132D.

Cf. Glosae

uper

latonem,

29,

59,

and

280.

The

source f

he

uotation

s

Boethius,

n

sagogen

.11,

p.

165.

23

Glosae

uperlatonem,

29-30

nd

278-80.

f.

Philosophia26-30,

L

172,

9D-50D

andPL 90,1133A-D;ndDragmaticon22-28. ordiscussionf he ignificancend

origin

f

the erm

lementatum

ee

Theodore

ilverstein,

lementatum:ts

Appearance

Among

he

welfth-

enturyosmogonists

in:

Mediaeval

tudies,

6(1954),

56-62;

dem,

GuillaumeeConchesnd

Nemesius

f

messa: n

he

ources

f

he

New cience

of

he

welfth

Century

in:

Harryustryn

olf

on

ubilee

olume3

vols.,

erusalem

965,

, 719-34;

.

Lemay,

Doctrine

f

the

Trinity

31-35;

Richard

Lemay.

AbuMa'shar nd Latin

Aristotelianism

n

the

welfth

entury

Beirut

962,

70-79;

ichard

McKeon,

Medicine

and

Philosophy

n the

leventhnd

Twelfth

enturies

TheProblem

f

Elements

in:

The

Thomist,

4

(1961),

236-43;

nd

Flatten,

Wilhelm

105-21.

n

Plato's

heory

f

elements

eeFriedrich

olmsen,

ristotle's

ystem

f

he

hysical

orld:

Comparison

ith

His PredecessorsCornell tudies

n

Classical

hilology,

ol.

33,

thaca

960,

0-66;

Francis acdonaldornford,lato's osmology:he <Timaeus)}f lato ranslateditha

Running

ommentary

London

937,

sp.

33-57;

nd

Gregory

lastos,

lato's niverse

Seattle

975,

6-97.

114

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


members nto

organs,

we can

actually

see. But the

division

of

organs

into humors and

humors

nto elements

we can never

see but

can

only

comprehend hrough

eason.24

ohn

of

Salisbury

uses

this favorite

dea

ofhis master's to

explain

Aristotle's

opinion concerning genera

and

species.

The

mind

conceives of

genera

and

species

by contemplating

the form

without

the

matter,

although

the former

annot

exist

apart

from

he

latter:

This s

not

pposed

othe ature

f

hings

hich

as

conferred

n the

ntellect,

for he

purpose

f

the

nvestigation

f

nature

tself,

he

power

o

separate

he

joined

ndto

oin

together

he

eparated.25

Reason,

then,

enables

man

to

know

about

things mperceptible

o the

senses.

William

and

John

also describe

reason

as

transcending

he senses

by

moving

from

comprehension

f the

visible universe

to a

comprehen-

sion of the

invisible and immaterial.

John

describes

reason

as

the

judge

of

spiritual

nd

material

things

which can

rise to

the

contempla-

tion of

heavenly

things.26

n

his

Glosae

uper

oetiumWilliam

explains

briefly

hat:

through

eason

man

knows

he ature

nd

properties

f

hings

nd

he

knowshat

some

aturallyeavy

odies,

uch s the uman

ody,

move,

ndhe

knowshat

theressomethingther han hebodytself hicho moves he ody ecause

since he

ody

s

naturally

eavy

tcannotmove

tself.

t

s

therefore

oved

y

something

lse. And

o with eason

eading,

man

ttains

nowledge

f ncor-

poreals

nd

imilarly

nowledge

f he

reator.27

After similar

discussion

n his

Dragmaticon

William

gives

a

somewhat

fuller

description

f

how reason leads us

to

knowledge

of

the

invisible

and immaterial:

Understanding,

hichs true nd

ertain

udgmentrising

rom aterial

hings,

ascends roms to

he reator.

orwhen he irst

hilosophers

aw

ctions hich

could

e ascribed

either

o

man,

nor

o

angels,

or o

nature,hey

new

hat

24

Glosae

uper

latonem,

29.

25

Metalogicon

.20,

pp.

98-99:

Hoc autem

ature

erum

on

dversatur,

ue

ad

sui

investigationem

anc

otestatem

ontulit

ntellectui,

t

possit

oniuncta

isiungere

t

disiunctaoniuneere."

26

Metalogicon

.16,

p.

182.

27

Glosae

uper

oetium.

pr.

4.82,

Leipzig,

252,

.

80vb;Munich,

LM

4603,

f.

175ra;

royes,

101,

.

18rb;

nd

Troyes,

381,

. 91

:

"...

per

rationem

ognoscit

homo

aturamerumt

proprietates.

t

cognoscituedam

orpora

ravia

aturaliter

moverit

humanum

orpus

t

cognoscituod

liud st

uam

orpus uod

ta

movet

corpusuiacum orpus aturaliteritgravex senonhabet uodmovetur.rgo x

alio.

Et

ta

atione

ucente

ervenit

omo d

cognitionem

ncorporeorum.

imiliter

d

cognitionem

reatoris."

115

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


there

as

some

nvisible

ubstance

o

which hese

ctions

hould

e

ascribed.

Then

y

ong

meditation

nd

disputation

bout hese

matters,

heyomprehend-

ed

some,

hough

ot

ll,

ofhis

God's]

properties.28

It is

clear that

William and

John

believe that man's senses

by

themselves

could

provide

knowledge only

about the

physical

world,

but

through

the

use of

reason

man can

come to

knowledge

of

im-

materials,

ike the soul

and God. Neither

John

nor

William

explains

exactly

how

man

attains this

knowledge,

but it seems

to

be

by

means

of

the

same sort

of deliberation

by

which man

surpasses

sense

knowledge

n

other

areas.

For

William and

his

fellow

Chartrians,

reason is the

human

power

bywhich man overcomes the limits ense knowledgealone would set,

but

they

acknowledge

that

human reason

also

has

limits.

While fre-

quently making

this

observation,

however,

they nvariably ry

o tie

it

to the

belief that

reason,

though

imited,

s

still

a viable

power.

Near

the

beginning

of

his

Philosophia

William admits that

although

we

know God

to

be,

we

do not

know

any

of the

ten Aristotelian

ategories

as

applied

to God.

He

concludes,

"therefore

neither

re

we

ignorant

of

everything

bout

him

whom

we

know to

be,

nor do

we

know

perfectly

im about whom

we do not know

the aforesaid

things."29

William, Thierry, ndJohnall describe man's reasonas a mere mita-

tion

of the

only

real

reason,

which is God's.30

The

description

of

human reason

as an

image

of

divine

reason

recognizes

the

weakness of

human

reason

in relation to

divine,

but at the

same time

it

praises

man's

reason as the human

power

which most

closely

relates

man

to

28

Dragmaiicon

309:

4

'Est nim

ntelligentia

erumt

ertume

corporeis

udicium.n-

telligentia

sta nobis d

creatoremscendit.

um

nim iderunt

rimi hilosophi

c-

tiones

uae

nee

homini,

ec

ngelo,

ec

naturae

scribi

ossent,

ognoverunt

sse n-

visibilemubstantiam,uius essent llae actiones.Deindediu meditantest

disputantes

e

ipso,

eius

proprietates,

tsi non omnestarnen

uasdam

om-

prehenderunt."

29

Philosophia

19:

"Nec

ergo

lium mnino

gnoramus,uem

sse

eimus,

ec

perfecte

cognoscimus,

e

quo

praedictagnoramus."

f. PL

172,44A,

nd

PL

90, 1128C;

Dragmaticon

31;

Glosae

uper

latonem,

06, 09,

nd

113;

chool

f

hierry

f

Chartres,

Lectiones

121, 131,

nd

223;

and

dem,

Commentum60 and

116.William

robably

drew

is

knowledge

f

he

Aristotelian

ategories

rom

oethius,

n

Categories

ristotelis

PL

64, 159-61;

nd

dem,

e

trinitate

,

LoebClassical

ibrary,

ewYork

918,

6.

On

the

pplication

f heAristotelian

ategories

o

God

n

heMiddle

ges

ee

Gilson,

Spirit

f

Mediaeval

hilosophy

248-68;

nd

Flatten,

Wilhelm

87-88

nd

170.

30

Glosae

uper

latonem114: ... et imulacrum

ationisd

est

mperfecta

atio

uia

ola

divina atio ere stratio, umana ero st ius imulacrum."f. bid., 06; chool

of

Thierry

f

Chartres,

ommentum

58;

and

John

f

Salisbury,

etalogicon

.20,

p.

104.

116

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


God.

The

Chartrians

follow

the

traditional Christian

theme of at-

tributing

he

deficiency

f man's

reason to the

debilitating

ffects

f

the

body

and

of

original

sin. But the references o

original

sin are

few,and the

consequences

seem serious ratherthan

catastrophic.

William

explains

that

f

he soul were not

weighed

down

by

the

corrupted

body,

it

would be

able

from

nfancy

o

have

perfect

nowledge

ike

the

first

parents.

But

after his

corruption,

man

cannot exercise

the

power

of

understanding

nd

reasoning

without

experience

and

without

being

aroused

by

some

teaching.31

Drawing

on Plato's Timaeus and

Boethius'

Consolatio

hilosophiae

William advances

a

basically

Platonic

view of the

body's

effect

n

human

knowledge.

The

first

arents

had

all knowledge,but sin clouded theirmind, and since thenman has

been

incapable

of the immediate

comprehension

of truth.

Only

by

a

constant

striving

fter

knowledge

can

man

overcome

the

debilitating

effects f sin and the

body

and

attain

understanding.

The

overall

impression

derived

from he Chartrians'

discussion of

the limitations

of

man's

rational

capacities

is

not

the

weakness

of

man's reason but its

strength.Weighed

down

by

the

body, original

sin,

and

its own

sin,

man's soul

cannot

know

God

perfectly

nd

can-

not

discern

without

learning

and

experience.

But

although

human

reason is limited, it remains a valid power. William explains that

"

'The

wisdom

of

this world

s

folly

o God'

(1

Cor.

1:20)

not

because

God

regards

the wisdom

of this world

as

folly,

ut because

it

is

folly

n

comparison

to

the

wisdom of

God;

nevertheless,

t does

not

therefore

follow that it is

folly."32

William

gives

a similar

interpretation

o

Vulcan's

attemptedrape

of

Pallas Athena:

Vulcan

esiring

o

iewith allas

s ike

omeone,

rom

he

ervorfhismental

powers,spiring

o

perfect

isdom. ut

allas esists

ecause oone

n hisifes

able

o

have

erfect

isdom. ut

lthough

ulcan

oes

not old

ast o

Pallas,

e

producesemen ecause,venf omeone ay ot ave erfectisdom,emaynevertheless

cquire

ome

degree

f

wisdom].33

31

Dragmaticon,

10-11.

f.

Glosae

uper

latonem

210;

School f

Thierry

f

Chartres,

Glosa

300;

and

John

f

Salisbury,

etalogicon

.33,p.

201.

32

Philosophia

25:

"

'Sapientia

uiusmundi

tultitiast

pud

eum':

non

uia

deus a-

pientiam

uiusmundi tultitiam

eputet,

ed

quia

ad

comparationem

ivinae

apien-

tiae tultitia

st.

Nec

amendeo

equitur

uod

it tultitia."

f.PL

172, 8B,

nd

PL

90,

1131C-D.

33

Glosae

uper

latonem93: "Hic

Palladi

e

commiscere

esiderat

uando

x fervore

ingeniiliquis erfecteapientiespirai. ed Pallas eluctaturuianullusnhacvita

perfectam

otest

abere

apientiam.

ed,

uamvis

allada on

etineat,

emen amen

elicit

uia,

etsi

erfectam

on

habeat

apientiam,

liquam

amen

dquirit.

.."

117

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


William

accepts

man's

rational

capacities

as

limited but

far

from

useless.

And his

praises

of

reason far

surpass

his criticisms

n

quantity

and intensity.

The Chartrian

paeans

to reason

are

numerous

and diverse.

A

good

example

appears

in

William's

gloss

on

Boethius'

reference o

the

mind

wandering

n

outer

darkness,

deprived

of

its

proper ight.

William

ex-

plains

that

reason

and

understanding

are called

light

because

they

light

man's

way

to

knowledge

of the

creator

nd

the

creation.

They

are

called

proper

light

to

differentiate

hem

from

the

bodily

light

of

the

eyes

which

is

not

man's

proper light,

since it

is

common

to

many

others.34

By

the

use of

this

proper

light,

which

the

Chartrians

also

commonlyrefer o as the mage ofGod inman, man can examine and

come to

an

understanding

f

himself,

he

world,

and God.

In

glossing

Plato's

description

f the

soul,

William

explains

that

t

s

called

"greatest"

because

through

t man

is similar to

the

creator,

"best"

because of

reason

and

understanding,

nd

"first"

because it

rules the

body.35

The Chartrians

commonly

refer to

the

ap-

propriateness

f

wisdom's

having

its seat

in the head since

thereby

he

most

worthy

powers

of

man,

his reason

and

understanding,

are

located

in

the most

worthy part

of

his

body,

his head.36

John

of

Salisbury says that while man is physically nferior o many other

creatures,

he excels

all

other

errestrial

eings

by

his reason.37

William

perhaps

most

clearly

reveals the

high

value

he

ascribes to

reason

in

describing

the

relationship

which should

exist

between

teachers

and

pupils.

He

explains

that

a

student

hould love

his teacher

ike a

father,

or even more than

he

loves

his

father,

because

we

ought

to

love

him

more

fromwhom

we receive

greater

and more

worthy hings.

From

our

fathers

we

receive

merely

o

be

unrefined ut from ur

teachers

o

be

wise,

which is

clearly greater

and more

worthy.38

34Glosae

uper

oetium. m.

2.2,

Leipzig,

253,

.46rb;Munich,LM4603, .158vb;

Troyes,

101,

.

4ra;

nd

Troyes,

381,

.

42r:

Relicta

ropria

uceid

est

atione

t n-

tellect

que

dicuntur

ux

quia

illuminant

ominem

d

cognitionem

reatoris

t

creature.

ropria

ux dicitur

d

differentiam

orporalis

ucis

culorum

ue

non

st

propria

ux

hominis

uia

nmultis

liis

st

ommunis.

ed

sta

ropria

ux st

hominis

quia

solihomini

n

terrenis

onvenit."

35

Glosae

uper

latonem248.

36

Glosae

uper

latonem

74. Cf.

ibid.,

207

and

233;

Dragmaticon

269-70;

ohn

í

Salisbury,

etalogicon

.17,

p.

183;

idem,

Policraticus

4.1,

vol.

1,

235;

Bernard

Silvestris,

ommentary

n

Vergil

.1,

pp.

245-46.

37

John

f

Salisbury,

etalogicon

.1,

p.

5. Cf.

bid.,

1.7

and

4.16,

pp.23

nd

182.

38Philosophia114: "A patře utem sserude rudes severalÒÒJccipimus,

magistro

ero

sse

apientes,

uod

maius

st

t

dignius".

f.

PL

172,

00A-B,

nd

PL

90,

1178A-B.

118

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Reason

represents

or

William

the natural

power

of

man.

That the

soul

should

naturally

have

knowledge

of

all

things

s

shown

by

the

ease

with

which a

youth,

when he

first

egins

to

understand,commits to

memory

everything

which he

perceives,

as if

rejoicing

in

his true

nature.39William

provides

engthyglosses

of the

celestial

imagery

of

Boethius' Consolatio o

show

that

the

rational

life is

the

only

one

ap-

propriate

forman.

Reason and

understanding

re like

the

sun

which

lights

he

world,

ust

as

they ight

he

way

forman. And

ust

as

the sun

hides when

Corus

(the

northwest

wind)

brings

n

clouds,

so

reason

and

understanding

hide

when

adversity

brings

sorrow.

And

just

as

when

the sun is

in

eclipse

an

unnatural

night preads

over the

earth,

so when

reason and understanding re absent by some chance, an ignorance

that

is not

natural but

blameworthy ppears

in

man.40

William ex-

plains

in

the

same

termsthe

ine,

''Stars

hidden

by

black

clouds

send

down

no

light."

Just

as

the stars

illuminate

what is

under

them and

shine

naturally

unless

clouds

get

in

the

way,

so reason

and

under-

standing

illuminate

man and

shine

naturally

unless some

emotions

about

temporal

affairs

get

in

the

way.41

William

views

reason

as a

natural

power

through

whose

use

man

attains

his

greatest

potential.

Reason,

man's

highest

power,

relates

him

to

God

and

raises

him

above the other creatures.

William's

advocacy

of the

use of

reason

in

conjunction

with areas

traditionally

llotted to

the

domain

of

faith

most

clearly

reveals

his

view

of reason. In

his

confession

of

faith

n

the

Dragmaticon

William

does

indeed

say,

"We

believe

these

things,

ome

confirmed

y

human

reason,

some even if

they

are

against

human

reason."42

But

the

im-

39

Glosae

uper

latonem

96-97.

40

Glosaeuperoetium. m.3.3-5, eipzig, 253, .49r;Munich LM 4603, .160rb;

Troyes,

101,

.

5rb;

Troyes,

381,

.45v:"Notandumst onvenientem

sse

om-

parationem

olis t

rationist

ntellectus;

uia

sicut

ol lluminât

undum,

ta

t

lla

hominem.t

quemadmodum

ol atet

horo

CoroBoetii

odices]

nducente

ubem,

ta

ratio

t

ntellectusatent

dversitate

nducente

olorem. t

quemadmodum

ole

defi-

ciente alimodo

oxnon

naturalis

uper

erram

unditur,

ta

deficiente

ationet n-

tellectu

liquo

asu

ernorantia

on

naturalis

ed

viciosa it

n

homine."

41

Glosae

uper

oetium

.

m.

7.1,

Leipzig,

253,

.

53rb;

Munich,

LM

4603,

.

162rb;

Troyes,

101,

f.

7rb;

and

Troyes,

381,

f.

51v: "Et

est

conveniens

omparatio

siderum

d

rationemt

ntellectum,

ubium

d

turbationem

oloris,

uia

icut

idera

illuminant

ubditat

ucent

aturaliter

isi ubes

nterponantur,

ta atio

t

ntellectus

illuminant

ominemt

lucent

x

natura

nisi

aliquis

ffectus

emporalium

nter-

ponatur."42

Dragmaticon

12: "īsta

credimus,

uaedam

ratione

humana

comprobantes,

quaedam

tsi int

ontra

ationem

umanam.

.."

Cf. Glosae

uper

latonem76.

119

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


port

and

emphasis

of the

Chartrian

writings,

s of Peter

Abelard's,

is

to

expand

the

realm

appropriate

forreason.

Seeking

to

delineate the

supremacyof reason in the fieldof natural science,William says that

modern

divines attack

his

examinations

of

nature

because

they

do

not

find

what he

says

written

n

the books of the

Church

Fathers.

They

do

not understand

that the

authors of divine

things

are

generally

ilent

about

the

nature

of

things,

not because such

explanations

are

against

the faith but because

they

do not

pertain

to the edification f

faith,

which

is

their

subject.43

William

affirms

hat

it

is

not

permissible

to

contradict

he

holy

Fathers

n

those

things

which

pertain

o

the faith r

the

teaching

of

morals.

But

in

the fieldof

philosophy,

t

is

permissible

to contradict hem,forwhile theywere greater, heywere stillmen.44

Gilbert

similarly

explains

that

reason

follows faith

in

the

field of

theology,

but faith follows

reason

in

natural science.45

Even

while

subscribing

to

the

priority

f faith

n

theological

matters,

the Char-

trians

apply

reason

to areas which

their

contemporaries

and

predecessors

view as the domain of

faith.

William,

Thierry,

and

Gilbert all

attempt

rational

explanations

of

the

Trinity,

and

the

first

two

combine

the

Biblical and Platonic

accounts

of creation

with

a

heavily

rational

emphasis.

The Trinitarianspeculationof William and Thierry,thoughnot of

Gilbert,

is

very

closely

connected with their

study

of

nature and the

creation

and

provides

a

good

example

of

theirrational

nquiry

nto

an

area

usually

reserved forfaith.

Drawing

on

Boethius and

perhaps

on

Augustine

and

the

Pseudo-Dionysius,

William

emphasizes

the

unity

f

God

and

identifies

ach

person

of the

Trinity

with

unity.

He

explains

that whatever

s in

God

is

God

and that while there s a

trinity

f

per-

sons,

there

s a

unity

of

being.46

But from

his

basically

traditional

c-

43Glosaeuperoetium. m.9.5,Leipzig, 253, f. 0vb-61ra,unich, LM 4603

lacks his

assage,

royes,

101,

.

Ovb,

nd

Troyes,

381,

.61v: 'Sed

cum

moder-

ni

divini oc

udiunt,

uia

n

ibris

uis

ta

criptum

on

nveniunt,

bstrepunt

tatim,

hoc

gnorantes

uod

uctoresivinitatis

hilosophiam

erum

acuerent,

on

uia

on-

tra idemsset ed

quia

ad edificationemidei e

qua

laborant

on

pertinet."

44

Dragmaticon

65-66.

45

Gilbert

orreta,

he

Commentaries

n

Boethius164.ror n

examination

í

Gilbert

views

n

the

domain

f

reason ee

Elswijk,

sp.

226-29.

46

Glosae

uper

latonem,

78.Cf.

Philosophia

20-21,

L

172,

5D,

and

PL

90,

1130A;

and Glosae

uper

acrobium,

d. H.

Lemay,

72-76. or imilar

escriptions

f

God's

unity y

ther

hartrians

ee

for

xample

ilbert

orreta,

he

ommentaries

n

oethius

86, 89,

and

199-201;

hierry

f

Chartres e sex

ierum

peribus

568-70;

chool

f

ThierryfChartres,losa271; dem, ectiones,74; dem, ommentum,5.Thedoc-

trine

fthe

unity

f

God

was

of ourse ommono

theChurch athers

nd

writers

throughout

he

Middle

Ages.

Possible

ources or

he

Chartrians'

octrinere

120

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


count

of the

unity

of

God,

William and

Thierry,

believing

in man's

ability

o

comprehend

t

least

partially

he

nature of

God,

proceed

to

a

rational

explanation

of

the

Trinity

drawn fromGod's

creative

ctivity.

Bringing

together

Christian

and Platonic

thought,

William identifies

the

Demiurge

of

the

Timaeuswiththe

Creator

of

Genesis,

and

the

four

causes of the

world

efficient,

ormal,final,

and

material)

with divine

power

(

essentia

,

divine wisdom

(

sapientia,

divine

goodness

or

will

{bonitas

r

voluntas

,

and

the four

elements

respectively.

Each of these

causes is essential

for

the

creation,

and the first hree

are

identifiable

with

the

three

persons

of

the

Trinity.

In

God there

is,

therefore,

power,

wisdom,

and

goodness,

which are

metaphorically

alled the

threepersons:theFatherdesignatingpower,the Son wisdom,and the

Holy

Spirit

goodness.47

These

identifications,

hile

foreign

o

Church

tradition

and

contemporary

monastic

writers,

were

very

common

among

those

with Chartrian

connections

and

have

been the

object

of

considerable

discussion

about

their

originator.48

These

speculations

about the

Trinity

re

brief,

but

they

re

signifi-

cant

forwhat

they

reveal

of Chartrian

thought.

First of

all,

William's

identification

f the

Demiurge

of the

Timaeus

with the

Creator

of

Genesis

and

his

effortso

reconcilethe

Platonic

and Christian

descrip-

tions ofthe Creator indicate the importancehe attachedtoPlato as an

almost

sacred

authority.

While

contemporaries

ejected

Plato

because

he contradicted

the

Bible,

William

and

Thierry

viewed the

two

authorities

s

completely ompatible.49

econd,

explaining

the

Trinity

Boethius,

e trinitate

,

p.

12;

Augustine,

e

trinitate

.6,

Corpus

hristianorum,

eries

latina,

ol.

50,

Turnhout

968, 7-44;

nd sidore

f

Seville,

tymologiae

.1.26,

PL

82,

262C.

On

William's rinitarian

iews,

ee

especially

.

Lemay,

octrine

f

he

Trinity

38-72.

47

Glosae

uper

latonem,

8;

and

Philosophia

20,

PL

172,

4D-45A,

ndPL

90,

1129C.

48

SeeforxamplehierryfChartres,e sex ierumperibus-3,pp.555-56; eter

Abelard,

heologia

Summi

oni',

d. H.

Ostlender,

n:Peterbelars

Theologia

Summt

boni

zum rstenale

vollständig

erausgegeben

BGPTM,

Band

35,

Münster

939,

-4;

John

f

alisbury,

olicraticus

.5,

vol.

,

108.

Most ritics

ave

ollowed

illiam

f

t.

Thierry,

e erroribusuillelmi

e

Conchis

L

180,

333A,

n

crediting

belard

with

originating

his dentification.

ee for

xample

oole,

Thought

nd

Learning

107;

Parent,

0-81;

Gregory,

nima

106-21;

nd

Brian

tock,

ugh f

t.

VictorBernard

Silvesternd

MS

Trinityollege,ambridge

0.7.

7,

n:Mediaeval

tudies,

4

1972),

55.

But

tollenwerk,

-8,

rgues

hat

hierry

s

a

more

ikely

ource.

49

For

ejection

f

he dentification

fPlato's

emiurge

ith

he

reator

f

Genesis,

see

for

xample

ugh

f

t.

Victor,

dnotationeslucidatoriae

n

Pentateuchon,

L

175, 3;

andPeter

ombard,

ententiae

1A

Spicilegium

onaventurianum,

ol.

4,

1

tome o

dateGrottaferrata971), .2:330. or discussioneeJoseph oreau,Opifex,d st

Creator':

emarques

ur

e

platonisme

e

Chartres,

n: Archiv

ürGeschichte

er

Philosophie,

6

1974),

3-49.

121

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


in

termsof its creative

activity

ather

than its

internalnature reveals

the focusof Chartrian

thought.

William

and

Thierry

directed

heir t-

tention toward

an

investigation

of the

natural

world rather than

toward

nward

contemplation

because

the

world

which came

from nd

reflects

God,

is the

only

source of

information

bout God.

Finally, by

attempting

a

rational

explanation

of

the

Trinity,

the Chartrians

declared their onfidence n

reason

and

aroused the

opposition

of their

monastic

contemporaries.

William,

in a

slap

at

possible

critics

f

such

an

explanation,

said that Isaiah

53:8,

"Who will

explain

his

birth?,"

does

not

mean it cannot be

explained

but that t is

difficult.50

hierry

and

Gilbert

likewise

defended

the

possibility

f

rationally

xplaining

theTrinity.51 he Chartriansclearlybelieve, "It is not absurd to offer

philosophical

reason

to confirm nd

maintain

the faith."52

They

are

convinced that true reason

and true faithmust be in

accord;

conse-

quently,

all

matters

of

faith as well as

natural

science,

to the extent

that

they

are

accessible

to

human

reason,

ought

to

be

proved.

Their

monastic

contemporaries,

with

their

much narrowerview

of

the

areas

appropriate

forrational

examination,

saw much

of the

Char-

trian

writing

s

little hort

of

heresy.

Bernard of

Clairvaux described

philosophers

as

"the slaves of

curiosity

nd

pride"53

and

William

of

St. Thierrycondemned the "new things" derived fromphilosophy

and

physics.54

tto

of

Freising

attacked Peter

Abelard

for

triving

to

make

vain

the

meritof

Christian

faith,

ince he

believes he can com-

prehend by

reason

all

that s God."55 And

even so

learned a man

as

Hugh

of

St.

Victor

condemned

natural

philosophy

s

"the

disputes

of

men

who out of vain

curiositypry

into the

hidden

things

of

God's

works."56

The monks

strongly

riticized

the

Chartrians'

Trinitarian

50

Philosophia

20,

PL

172,

45A-B,

nd PL

90,

1129C-D.

Cf.

Glosae

uper

latonem

113-14;ndDragmaticon6-7. n the atterWilliam fConches, nderttackromWilliam fSt.Thierry,etractsis arliernterpretationftheBiblical

assage.

51

Gilbert

orreta,

ommentaries

n

Boethius

61-62;

nd

Thierry

f

Chartres,

e

sex

dierumberibus

,

555-56.

52

School of

Thierry

f

Chartres, ectiones,

41: "Non enim

absurdum

st

philosophicas

dducere

ationes

d confirmandum

t

ad tenendum

idem."

n the

Chartrians'

elief

n

the

oncordanceffaith

nd

reason

ee

Parent,

octrine

18-25;

Chenu,

Nature. an and

ociety1-48;

nd

Teauneau,

ote

821-65.

53

Sermo

in In

diePentecostesin:

Sancti ernardi

pera

ed.

JeanLeclercq,

. H.

Talbot,

nd H.

M.

Rocháis,

vols, o

date

Rome

1957-

),

vol.

5,

173.

54

De erroribus

uillelmieConchisPL

180,

33.

55

Gesta

riderici

mperatoris

.50,

d.

G.

Waitz,

Monumenta ermaniae

istórica,

Scriptoreserum ermanicarum,ol.46,Hannover912, 0.56

Hugh

f

St.

Victor,

n

ecclesiastenomiliaePL

175,

239D.

For

discussion

f

he

anti-rational

lement

n

patristic

nd

monastic

ritings

ee

especially

ilson,

eason

122

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


speculation

and their

writings

n

other

theological

doctrines

n

which

the monks

felt

vested interest.

Bernard

of Clairvaux

described the

Trinity

as

a

great mystery

which

should

not

be

scrutinized,57

and

William ofSt.

Thierry

viewed

any

such

explanation

of the

Trinity

s

insane and

blasphemous.58

Such

writers launched a

barrage

of

criticism

gainst

William

of

Conches,

Gilbert

Porreta,

and

Thierry

of

Chartres,

and

they

also succeeded

in

obtaining

the

condemnation of

Peter Abeland's

writings.

The

Chartrians

were in turn

ust

as

vituperative

n

their

riticism

f

their

pponents'

lack

of

earning.

William

criticizes hose

who

without

adequate study

or

a

proper

understanding

f

their

subject

'usurp

the

name ofmaster."59He aims most of his criticism t those who attack

philosophic

views without

having

studied the iberal arts. He

strongly

condemns those

who,

in

order

to cover

up

their

gnorance

of

the use of

myth,

dismiss

parts

of

Boethius

as

unworthy

of

explication.60

He

lashes out

at

his critics:

But ince

hey

hemselveso not

know

he

powers

f

nature,

hey

o not

want

anyone

o

nquire

nto uch

hings

o that

hey

might

ave llmen

s

companions

of

their

gnorance.

hey

want

s

to

believe

ike

peasants

nd

not

o seek

ut

reasons,

o that he

rophecy

ight

ow

e

fulfilled:

the

priest

ill e

ike

he

people."

Isa.

24:2)

We, however,

ay

that

reason

ught

o

be

sought

n

everything,f tcanbefound.61

and

Revelation

5-33;

Ermengildo

ertola,

agione

fede

elXII

secolo

in:

Sophia,

0

(1952):

5-71;

rich

leineidam,

issen,

issenschaft,

heologie

ei ernhardon

lair-

vaux n:

Bernhardon

lairvaux:

önchnd

Mystiker,

d.

Joseph

ortz,

Wiesbaden

955,

128-67;

nd

Roger

aron,

cience

t

agesse

hez

ugues

e

aint-VictorParis

957,

-31

and91-96.

57

De consideratone.18.

8,

n

Opera

vol.

3,

482.

58

De erroribus

uilliemie

Conchis

PL

180,

34D-335A.

59

Philosophia17,PL 172, 3A, nd PL 90,1127A. f.Dragmaticon62-64, 0,and210-21;ndSchool fThierryfChartres,ommentariusictorinus.94-501.

60

Glosae

uper

oetium. m.

12.5,

eipzig,

253,

.

66r;

Munich,

LM

4603,

.

167vb;

Troyes,

101,

.

12va;

nd

Troyes,

381,

.69r:

Neque

enim

redendumst tam

perfecto

hilosopho,

cilicet

oetio,

liquid

uperfluum

el

pro

nichilo

osuisse

n am

perfectopere.

Sed nostri

artiones,

arrulitati

ntenti

t

nichil

philosophie

cognoscentes

t deo

ignificationes

gnorantesntegumentorum

rubescentes

icere,

"néscio,"

uerentes

olacium

ue

imperitie,

iunt

hoc

exponere

rutannicum

sse.

Tamen

ne eis

consentiendo

imiles

imus,

uod

nobis

idebitur,

nde

xponemus

n-

tegumentum.

61

Philosophia

39,

PL

172, 6B-D,

nd PL

90,

1138B-D:

Sed

quoniam

psi

nesciunt

vires

naturae,

t

ignorantiae

uae

omnes ocios

habeant,

olunt

liquem

as

in-

quirere,edutrústicosos redereec ationemuaerere,t am mpleaturllud ro-

pheticum:

Erit

acerdos

icut

opulus.'

os utem

icimus

n

omnibusationem

sse

quaerendam,

i

potest

nveniri."

123

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


It is

for

such

opponents

of the use

of

human

reason

that

William

reserves his

greatest

ire.

Throughout

his

writings

he

maintains his

strong upport

forthe

validity

of rational

investigation

n all

areas

of

inquiry

and his

strong

denunciation of those who would sell their

birthright

their reason.

In

his

Dragmaticon

written

after the

condemnation of Abelard

s

writings

and

after

strong

criticism

had

forced

him

to

retract

some

earlier

statements

uch

as his identification

f

the

Son with

sapientia

and his

explanation

of Eve's

birth,

William

laments

the current

tate

of the

Church where the care

of

souls is

committed

to children

and

fools

ignorant

of

what

a

soul is.62

In

these

passages

William

clearly

attacks those monastic writerswho condemned his writingswithout

having

adequately

studied natural

philosophy.

n

much the

same

way,

Gilbert

rebuffed

Bernard of Clairvaux's

request

for a

meeting

to

discuss

theology

by

telling

him first

o

seek

further

nstructions

n

the

liberal

arts and

other

preliminary

tudies.63And

in a

passage

which

strongly

ecalls some

of William's criticism

f

his

opponents,

John

of

Salisbury

attacks

the

Cornificians,

who

insanely prefer

to

remain

foolish

han

to learn

from he

humble,

who do

enjoy

the

gift

f God's

grace.

He

concludes,

"If

you

do

not

believe

me,

enter the cloister nd

examine the conduct of thebrothers."64

William

of Conches

gives by

far

the

most

detailed

statement

f the

Chartrian

view of

the

proper

areas

for rational examination.

He

defends

himself

gainst

charges

of

heresyby arguing

that

something

s

hereticalnot because it has

not

been

written

efore,

but

if

t

is

against

the

faith.65

William

directly

ttacks

the

view

of

his

monastic contem-

poraries

that it suffices o

explain something

to

say

God

could

have

done

it:

But know hat

hey

ill

ay,

We

do

not

now

ow his

might

e,

but

weknow

God sable odo it."Miserablereatures hatsmoremiserablehan o ay

something

xists

imply

ecause od sable

o

make t nd

not o

ee hat

t xists

so,

nor o

have

reason

hy

t

xists

o,

nor

o how

ny

usefor

whicht xists.

For

God does

not

make

verything

e is able

to

make.As

the

peasant

s ac-

6ã*

Dragmaticon

158.

63

John

f

Salisbury,

istoria

ontijicalis

ed. and trans.

Marjorie

hibnall,

elson

Medieval

exts,

ondon

956,

6.

64

Metalogicon

.4,

pp.

12-13:

Plerique,nquam,

o

quod uidam,

n

ua

perdurantes

insania,

umidi

etusta

erversitate,

alebant

esipere

uam

b

humilibus,

uibus

Deus

dat

gratiam,

ideliter

rudiri;

rubescebantnim formam

iscipuli,

ui

magisteriiresumpserant

astum.

i

michi on

credis,

laustra

ngredere;

crutare

mores ratrum;t nveniesbi uperbiamoab. .."65

Philosophia

22,

PL

172,

46C,

and PL

90,

1130C.

Cf.

John

f

Salisbury,

istoria

Pontijicalis

17

and

21-22.

124

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


customed

o

ay,

God

can

make

calf rom tree runk.

as he ver one t?"

Let hem

ither

how reason r

usefor

whicht

xists,

r et hem

ease eclar-

ing

t

exists

n such

fashion.66

As Chenu has noted nhis commentson this

passage

inhis

magisterial

essay

on the Renaissance

of the Twelfth

Century,

"To

appeal

to the

omnipotence

f God is

nothing

but

vain

rhetoric;

naked

truth

equires

a

little

more sweat."67

William

shows his

complete rejection

of

the

shackles

fideists

would

place

on

human reason.

He

asserts that blind

acceptance

of

the

natural

world

is

not

enough;

one

must

use

one's

God-given

reason

to

seek out the

true nature

of

things.

William

offers

erhaps

his

most

eloquent

defense

forthe

expanded

use of reason in one ofhisrarebiblical interpretations an explication

of the

directionsfor

conducting

Passover in

Exodus

12.

He

explains

that

ust

as

the Israelites were

supposed

to call

in

their

neighbors

to

assist themwith

eating

the

Passover

lamb,

so

should

man

ask

the

help

of

all

his

neighbors

n

seeking

a

rational

explanation

of

things.

And

just

as

only

the

parts

of

the amb

which

no

one

could consume

should

be

burnt

s an

offering

o

only

those

things

for

which

no

one can find

rational

explanation

should be

consigned

to

the

realm

of

faith. Then

he

moves into

a

strong

denunciation

of his critics:

Butthosemen, lthoughhey avemany eighborsext oor, naccount f

their

ride hey

re

unwilling

o

call

n

nyone,

nd

hey

refer

ot o

know han

to

learn rom

nother.

ndwhile

riding

hemselves ore

n theirmonkish

cowls

han

having

onfidence

n

their

wisdom,

hey

all

anyone

hey

ind

o

inquiring

heretic.68

William

defends

rational

nvestigations

nto all

areas where

the

use of

human

reason

might

be

productive

of

positive

results. At

the same

time

he

clearly

criticizes

his

opponents,

ike

Bernard of

Clairvaux

and

William

of

St.

Thierry,

who

were

so

quick

to

bring

charges

of

heresy

againstthose with a morepositiveviewof man's rationalcapabilities.

66

Philosophia

43,

PL

172,

58C,

and

PL

90,

1130C: "Sed

scio

quid

dicent:

Nos

nescimus,

ualiter

oc

it,

ed

eimus ominum

osse

acere.'Miseri

uid

miserius

quam

icere:istud

st,

uia

deus llud

acere

otest,'

ec

videre

ic

ssenec

ationem

habere,

uare

ic

it,

nec

utilitatem

stendere,

d

quam

hoc

it?Non

nim

uidquid

deus

otest

acere

acit. t

autem

erbis ustici

tar:

otens

st eus e

trunco

acere

vitulum':

ecitne

mquam?

el

igitur

stendant

ationem

uare,

vel

utilitatem

d

quam

hoc

it;

vel ic

esse

udicare

esinant."

f.

Dragmaticon,

8-69.

67

Nature,

an

and

ociety

12.

68

Philosophia

39,

PL

172,

6C-D,

nd

PL

90,

1138C-D:

Sed isti

muitos

abentes

vicinos omui

uae

coniunctosx

superbia

olunt

liquem

onvocare

aluntque

nescire uam ab alio quaerere. t si inquirentemliquem ciant, lium sse

haereticum

lamant

lus

de

suo

capucio

raesumentes

uam

sapientiae

uae

con-

fidentes."

125

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


William

sees

them

as

ignorant

men,

frightened

of those more

knowledgeable

than

themselves and

seeking

protection

behind

the

walls

of

fideism.

As

long

as

we

define rationalism

s a

confidence n man's

ability

o

understand

himself

nd

his

world

rationally

ather han

as

the

subser-

vience

of faith o

reason,

then rationalism

learly

did exist at Chartres

in

the

twelfth

entury.

William

of Conches

and

his fellowChartrians

saw reason

as

complementing

heirfaith

ather han as

conflicting

ith

it. The

Chartrians

obviously

viewed

reason

as

man's most

important

natural

power.

It

was a

gift

f

God which set

man

apart

from he other

creatures

and which

most

closely

inked man

to

God.

Only by

the

use

of reason could man fulfill is true potential. Unlike many of their

monastic

contemporaries

and

predecessors, they

did not

emphasize

the

debilitating

ffects

f the

Fall

on

man's

rational

capabilities,

but

rather stressed

that

reason

remained a

viable

power

by

which man

could correct

errors

n

and even transcend

the

knowledge

which

the

senses

provided.

Rational

investigation

nd deliberation about

data

obtained

through

sense

perception

ed man

to

an

understanding

of

himself,

f the

world,

and

even to

some extent of

God. Attacked

by

many

of the

monastic

writers or

their

undue

reliance on

reason

and

theirmeddling n thehidden secretsofGod, the Chartriansaffirmed

their

confidence in their rational

powers

and

criticized

the

monks'

neglect

of

this

gift

f

God to

man. William

especially

insisted

that

it

was man's

duty

to seek rational

explanations

whenever

possible;

only

in

those areas

in which

no

such

explanation

could

be found

should

man

rely

on

faith lone.

The

Chartrians'

use of

reason

shows

us

that Peter

Abelard

was not

alone

in

his

rationalism and that the

high

regard

for

what human

reason could

accomplish

was

present

t

least at

Paris and

Chartres

nd

perhaps at othercathedral schools. This rationalism t Chartres also

shows that the

Middle

Ages

did

not

have

to

wait

for

he

rediscovery

f

Aristotle o have

confidence n man's rational

capabilities.

The

Char-

trians

drew from

their

primarily

Neoplatonic

sources

a

very

strong

sense

of

the

power

of

human

reason.69

Charleston,

South Carolina

The

College

f

Charleston

69

A

shorter,

reliminary

ersion

f his rticle as

read tthe

ewaneeMedieval

ol-

loquiumnApril 980. received uch dvice ndassistancenwritinghisrticle,

but

wish

o hank

specially

dward

ahoney

nd

RonaldWitt

or heir aluable

ug-

gestions

nd

support.

126

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

2

(1983)

Textkritisches

u den

sog. Obligationes

arisienses

F. HEINZER

Im zweitenTeil seines

Aufsatzes

4

Some

thirteen

entury

Tracts

on

the

Game

of

Obligation"

in

dieser

Zeitschrift

dierte L.

M.

de

Rijk

einen Logik-Text aus der Hs. OxfordCanon misc. 281, dem er den

Titel

Obligationes

arisienses

ab1.

Dazu

im

folgenden

einige

Anmer-

kungen

textkritischer

rt.

Diese stützen

ich

auf einen

neu

entdeckten

-

leider

nur

fragmentarischen

Textzeugen

dieses

formallogischen

Traktates:

ein

Makulaturfragment

us

der in

der Badischen

Landes-

bibliothek

n

Karlsruhe

ufbewahrten

Hs. St.

Peter

erg.

1

Vor

einigen

Jahren

bei der

Restaurierung

der Hs.

abgelöst,

wurde

das

Fragment

im

Zuge

der

von der

Deutschen

Forschungsgemeinschaft

eförderten

Katalogisierung

des

Hss. -Bestandes

aus dem 1806/7

säkularisierten

Schwarzwaldkloster2 enauer untersucht,wobei die Identifizierung

des Textes

glückte.

Zunächst

Einiges

zur

Hs.,

aus

der

das

Bruchstück

herausgelöst

wurde.

Bei St.

Peter

perg.

51

handelt

es sich

um ein

zisterziensiches

Prozessionale,

des

offenbar

für ein Frauenkloster

des Ordens

be-

stimmt

war3. Der

Grundstock

der

Hs.

stammt

us der

zweiten

Hälfte

des

13.

Jahrhunderts4

in

nachträglich eingelegter

Faszikel

enthält

Antiphonen

und

Responsorien

für

die

Fronleichnamsprozession;

eine

Entstehung

fällt

n die erste Hälfte

des

14.

Jahrhunderts.

Zusammen

mit weiterenvier Codices

gleichen

Inhaltes5hat die Hs. in

jüngerer

*

Fürfreundliche

ewährung

ines

ruckkostenzuschusses

anke

chder

Badischen

Landesbibliothek

n

Karlsruhe.

1

Vivarium,

3

1975),

2-54;

dition esTextes: 6-54. oweit

ch

ehe,

ind ür

en

Traktat

ußer er

Oxforders.

bisher eine

eiteren

extzeugen

ekannt

eworden.

2

ZurGeschichtees

Bestandes

gl.

ie

Einleitung

es

Kataloges

onK.

Niebier,

ie

Handschriften

on

t.

Peter

m

chwarzwald,

.

Teil,

ie

apierhandschriflen

Die

Handschrif-

ten erBadischen

andesbibliothek

n

Karlsruhe,

d.

X/l),

Wiesbaden

969.

3

Vgl.

den chluß er

Antiphon

lementissime

omineusdem

Officium

epulturae

ol.

9r:Domine,iserereupereccatrice.

4

Datierung

ufgrundaläographischer

ndizien.

5

Karlsruhe,

adische

andesbibliothek,

ss. St.

Peter

erg.

5

und

52-54.

127

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Zeit

mehrfach as Interesse der

Einbandforscher

eweckt,

da sich

bei

ihr

und den

mit hr

verwandten

Hss. die

ursprünglichen

omanischen

Einbände, die offenbar lle aus der gleichenWerkstätte tammen,er-

halten haben6. Die

Frage

nach der

Herkunft

er

Gruppe

ist nicht

ganz

geklärt.

H. Knaus

spricht

ich dafür

aus,

daß

die

Hss.

in

der

schwäbi-

schen

Zisterzienserabtei

alem

geschrieben

und

gebunden

worden

sei-

en,

um dann

in

einem

der dem

Salemer Abt

unterstellten

rauenklö-

ster

Verwendung

zu

finden7,

während

E.

Kyriss

vermutet

hatte,

es

handle

sich bei

den

Einbänden

um die

Arbeit einer

Pariser

Werkstätte8.

Dieser "mit sicherem

Blick

für

das

Stilistische der

Einbandstempel

aufgestellten

These möchte

Knaus insoweit

bei-

stimmen,als er einräumt,das Vorbild der Stempel sei wohl in Paris

zu

suchen;

auch sei es

aufgrund

der

verschiedentlich

ezeugten

Ver-

bindungen

zwischen

Salem und

Paris9

durchaus

denkbar,

daß

man

"am

Bodensee Pariser

Stempeleinbände

gekannt,

besessen und nach-

geahmt",

ja

vielleicht

sogar

in

Paris

hergestellte

Stempel

benutzt

habe. Als

Entstehungsort

er Bände

sei aber doch

Salem und nicht

Paris

anzunehmen10.

Wie

immer

diese

Frage

zu

beantworten

st,

eines

steht

fest:

m

Zu-

sammenhang

mit

der

fraglichen

Hss.

-Gruppe,

insbesondere

m

Hin-

blick auf die Einbände, weisen Linien nach Paris. Für das Fragment,

das uns hier

n

ersterLinie interessiert

übrigens

der

ehemalige

Vor-

derspiegel

von

St.

Peter

perg.

51

-

,

ist damit

schon

Wesentliches us-

gesagt,

zumal

auch die

Schrift,

n

der

das Blatt

beschrieben

st,

typisch

6

Vgl.

E.

Kyriss,

Vorgotische

erzierteinbände

erLandesbibliothek

arlsruhe

in:

Gutenberg-Jahrbuch

961, 77-285,

es.

S.

280-284 nd

Tafeln

u.

4;

H.

Knaus,

Deutsche

tempelbände

es 3.

Jahrhunderts

in:

Gutenberg-Jahrbuch

963, 45-253,

es.

S.

247-252.

7

Knaus

s.

Anm.

),

S.

250f.

8

Kyrisss. Anm. ),S. 284.9

Knaus,

S.

251,

mit

Verweis uf P.

Lehmann,

Mittelalterliche

ibliothekskataloge

Deutschlandsnd er chweiz

Bd.

1,

München

918,

84. Lehmannitiertn dieser

Stelle as VorworterEdition

es

og.

Codex

alernitani

s

durch

.

J.

Mone,

Quellen-

sammlung

er

badischen

andesgeschichte,

d.

3,

Karlsruhe

863,

9. Der

dortige

Hinweis eziehtich uf

. 30f.

esTextes

elber,

ovon inem ariser

tudienau-

fenthalt

er mdas

Jahr

273

n

Salem

ingetretenen

rüder

lrich ndAdelbod on

Selvingen

ie

Rede

st.

Vgl.

uch bd.S. 37dieNachricht

nuper

e

studio

arisiensi

vocatus"

m

Zusammenhang

it

er

1311

rfolgten

btswahl

esKonrad on

nslin-

gen.

10

Knaus,

.

252. Nachdem

ch

ufdem

Einband er us Salem

tammendens.

Karlsruhe063 en uf en

Einbänden

on

t.

Peter

erg.

3und

Cambridge

ass.,

Notenhs.mBesitz onPh. Hoferausdergleichen erkstätte,. Kyriss,. 284)

erscheinenden

tempel

0

(Kyriss,

afel

3)

entdeckt

abe,

neige

chebenfalls

u

dieser

nsicht.

128

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


französischeMerkmale

aufweist11.

Ob

nun das

Fragment

bei einem

Pariser Buchbinder

als Makulatur

Verwendung gefunden

hat,

oder

ob

die Hs., zu der es einmal gehörte, uf irgendeinemWeg

-

vielleicht

im

Gepäck

eines der

ehemaligen

Pariser

Studenten

aus

dem

Salemer

Konvent12

-

in

das

schwäbische

Kloster

gelangt

ist und

erst

dort

zerschnitten nd

in

der Buchbinderei verwendet

wurde,

bleibe dahin-

gestellt.Jedenfalls

st

das

Blatt bzw. die

Hs.,

von

der

es

stammt,

n

Frankreich

geschrieben

worden,

und zwar

höchstwahrscheinlich

m

Milieu der

Pariser

Artistenfakultät.

Damit

nun zum

Fragment

selber. Es

handelt

sich

um ein

doppel-

seitig

beschriebenes Blatt

aus

einer

Pergament-Hs.

mit

eweils

zwei

Spalten zu 46 Zeilen pro Seite. Bei seinerVerwendungals Einband-

spiegel

wurde es

vom Buchbinder leicht

beschnitten

und

mißt

heute

noch

ca.

17

x

10 cm. Es fehlen

der

obere

Rand des

Blattes

-

und

zwar,

wie

sich bei einer Kontrolle

des

Ubergangs

von der

linken

zur

rechten

Spalte

feststellen

äßt,

ohne daß dabei Zeilen

weggeschnitten

worden

wären

-

sowie dessen

Innenrand,

wobei

hier

eider

auch der

Text

in

Mitleidenschaft

ezogen

wurde:

die innere

Spalte

ist um ein

knappes

Fünftel

ihrer Breite beschnitten.

Die

Schrift,

eine

kleine,

abkürzungsreiche

Notula weist in

die

zweite Hälfte des 13.

Jahrhun-

dertsund ist,wie bereitserwähnt,französischer rägung.

Die Vorderseite des

Blattes

enthält

aus

den

Obligationes

arisienses

den Schluß

von

De

Positione owie das

ganze

Kapitel

De

Dubitatur:

...Ificit

Veritas

nius

partis

..

-

... Antichristumsse coloratum

de Rijk

4221-475).

Auf

der

Rückseite

folgt

nicht,

wie man erwarten

möchte,

das

in

der Oxforder-Hs. sich anschließende

Kapitel

De

Depositione

sondern

ein

anderer,

offenbar

elbständiger

Text

mit

folgendem

ni-

tium

<

>

quedam

bligationesifjerunt

nter e

secundum

iversitatem

<

>

principaliter

Sic

quedam

obligationes

nter e

difjerunt

ecundum

diversitatesnnuntiabilium.13. Dieser Sachverhalt

bestätigt

de

Rijks

Vermutung,

es könnte

sich

bei

den in der

Oxforder

Hs.

überlieferten

Obligationes

m

ein

Konglomerat ursprünglich

elbständiger

Traktate

handeln14.

11

Gleiches

ilta

übrigens

uch

für ie

Oxforder

s.,

vgl.

de

Rijk,

.

23.

12

Vgl.

Anm. .

13

Beiden

wegen

eschädigung

es

Pergamentes

ehlenden

nfangsworten

st u den-

ken n eine

Formulierung

ie

Nota

uod,

ciendum

uod

derAhnliches.ie zweite

LückeBeschädigungesTextes urcheimspuren)st ermutlichuszufüllenurch

responsionum.

14

De

Rijk,

.

24.

129

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Im

folgendengebe

ich

zunächst

eine

Aufstellung

er

abweichenden

Lesarten15

m

Karlsruher

Fragment

=

K) gegenüber

der

Oxforder-

Hs.

(

=

O).

Ich beschränke

mich

dabei auf den Text

der

Obligationes

d.h. auf

die

Recto-Seite

des

Blattes16.

Bei

den durch die

Beschneidung

am seitlichen Rand der linken

Spalte

entstandenen

Lücken

habe

ich

den Text

von

O

in

eckigen

Klammern

eingesetzt,

ofern

kein Anlaß

zur

Vermutung

bestand,

K

weiche an der betreffenden

telle

von

O

ab.

OXFORD,

Canonmisc. 81

KARLSRUHE,

Fragment

(ed.

de

Rijk)

aus St. Peter

erg.

1,

recto

DE

POSITIONE

Schluß)

4221

unius

unius

artis

4223

unius

artisuam

ult

espondens

unius

[partis

< et

]

recipitur

petitio ratia

nius

partis uam

vult

espondens

< et

]

coni.

4224-25

concedere ut

cuius

osito

dmi-

concedere

t cuius

positionem

sit

et

negatum

egare

ecundum

admisit >

que

respondere

suiqualitatem secundumuiqualitatem

<

>

]

lacunam

abet

4228-29

nesciens nescit

4230

Ciceronis

Socratis

el

< Piatonis

Socratis]

ocrates

< Piatonis

]

coni.

cf.

de

Rijk

283)

4232

positione

ndeterminate indeterminate

ositione

15

Nicht

m

Einzelnen

ngeführt

ind

ie

Stellen,

n

denen

statt

praeterea

n

Aufzäh-

lungen

on

Argumenten

der

Regeln

temat

de Rijk

321,

51

12 3

und

6n)

und

ebensowenig

ie

Lesarten

d. e nstelle

on

se

de

Rijk

3

8

9

und

444613)

Und

d

suam

artem

nstelle

on

sua

arte

4324).

iese

merkwürdigeerwendung

on d

mit

Akkusativ

tattb

mitt

blativeilt

übrigens

it .

16

Auf ine unächst

orgesehene

iedergabe

esTextes uf erVerso-Seite

n

die-

sem

Beitrag

ußte erzichtet

erden,

a diese

eim

esen

ochmehr

chwierigkeiten

bietetls

diebereits

echt

iffizile

ecto-Seite,

o mmerhiner dierteext

er

Obli-

gationes

ewissermassen

um

Gegenlesen

enutzt

erden

onnte. hne olche

olla-

tionierung

äremanche

telle

aum u entziffern

ewesen.

a nun iese

Möglichkeit

für ieVerso-Seitentfallt,as uch as bereitsrwähnteroblemesTextverlustes

durch

eschneidung

esBlattes och tärker

ns

Gewichtallen

äßt,

liebe

zu)

häufig

nur er

Ausweg

er

Konjektur.

130

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


DE

DUBITA UR

437

sit debeat sse

438 communiter

icitur diciturommuniterb

omnibus

43n

probatio

on

st

apientis

responsio

st

sapientis

alia>

quedam gnorantis

< alia

]

coni.

43

2

probatio

responsio

43

4

ratio

responsio

4315

ratio

responsio

4316

per

ationem

secundum

ispositionem

4316-17

veļ

per

dubitationem

el

per

sed

secundum ubitationem

el

ignorantiam ignorantiam

4317 artificiosa om.

4318

ratio

responsio

43

9

ratio

responsio

43

9-20

habere

rtem

artem

abere

4320

Nulla

ergo

ars

debet sse <de

[Nulla

rgo

ebet]

sse rs

rectifi-

dubitatione>

cans

respondentemesponsione

dubitationis

<

de dubitatione

j

lacunam

abet

O

43 2 unus

apiens,

liter utem

gno-

unus

[sapiens]

pariter eliquus

rans

ignorans

4324

scilicet om.

4326

opponendi opponentis

4329

in

concedendo

t

negando

et n concedendot n

negando

4330

in

respondendo

ad

respondendum

4331

habentis

habet

4333

in

Octavo

Topicorum

raditam

in

Octavo traditam

opicorum

44'

Demonstrativa

vero

scientia

[Demonstrativa]

cientia

ero

443

recipiens

accipiens

447

in

tertia

esponsione

in

tertio

odo

espondendi

4410

quedam

om.

4412

sustinendum

sustinendumit

4413 artem se non

habeat nonhabet se

artem

4416

in

om.

441

-18

pr0

er0

ej

dubio,

dest

ro

falso

pro

non

vero,

dest

ro

falso

el

dubio

4424 sive it

falsum

sive alsum

ille iste

4425

aliquam

rtem

espondendi

eter-

determinate

liquam responsio-

minate

nem

ed

ndeterminate

?)

131

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


secundo

ideo

455

vel

opposito egati

vel

opposito

el

oppositis

egato-

rum.

omne

ergo

verum

ntece-

densper e velcum oncessoel

concessis

el

opposito

45n

dubitatum

dubitandum

45

3

ad

dubitatum

dubitatorum

est

om.

4514 est

om.

4516

ad

om.

45' est

om.

4522

est

om.

461

Preterea

om.

462 omne

repugnans

ubitato

er

se omne

per

se

repugnans

ubitato

465

et

pro

dubio,

i

dubitetur

pro

dubio,

t

i

dubitetur

46'

propterea

propter

oc

4614

est

habita

st

46' ad

aliquid

ubie

dubie

d

aliquid

4618

ipsum

it

dubitandum

ad

dubitandumllud

4621

illud

oncedendum

concedendum

llud

4622 est

oncedendum

concedendum

4623 Si concédât om.

4624 Tu

om.

4626

ad

aliquid

om.

4627

directe

bligātus

obligātus

irecte

4628 cum

sset

cum nim

sset

463' Ex

oppositis egulis

upradictis suppositis

egulis

prius

dictis

4632

non

stringitur

irecte

directe on

stringitur

4634

est

esset

4634

dubie

dubie

d Antichristum

sse olora-

tum

471-2

sumptis

suppositis

473

'proba '

vel

dubie

dubie

474

regulas

.

regulas

llas

Die zahlreichen

Abweichungen

von K

gegenüber

O sind

von

recht

verschiedener

Qualität.

Häufig

handelt es sich

nur um

kleine

Auslas-

sungen

-

est,

sit und

Ahnliches

-

oder

Umstellungen.

In

einigen

Fällen

aber bietet

K

Lesarten,

die

vom

Text von

O nicht

unerheblich

abweichen

und

diesem

m.

E.

vorzuziehen

sind.

Dies betrifftnsbesondere das ersteArgument m Sedcontra-eil zu

Beginn

des

Kapitels

(de

Rijk

4311"20)

owie

den

Passus,

in

welchem

die

Regulae

der

Ars Dubitandi formuliert

erden

(4417-18

nd

451"11).

132

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


1/2

ro

non...

...dubioJK,

ro

vero el

dubio,

dest

ro

falso

Die erläuternde

Wendung

idest

ro also

steht

n

K

bei

non

vero,

und

zwar ergänztdurch vel dubio "für nichtrichtig,das heißt fürfalsch

oder zweifelhaft"

heißt

es

hier

korrekterweise,

während die Zuord-

nung

von idest

ro

also

zu

pro

vero eldubio

n

O nicht

innvoll,

a gera-

dezu falsch

erscheint.

Durch die Lesart von K

ist auch die

Entspre-

chung

in der Struktur er

beiden

"Regulae

generales"

wiederherge-

stellt:

-

Omne antecedens

ad dubitatum

habendum

est

pro non vero, idestpro falsovel dubio (Heinzer II1'2)

-

Omne

sequens

ad

dubitatum

habendum

est

pro

non

falso,

idest

pro

vero vel dubio

(de Rijk

4420"21).

III.

(de

Rijk

451"11)

Preterea: Enuntiabilium

quoddam

est antecedens

per

se

ad

dubi-

tatum,

quoddam

cum

concesso

vel

concessis

vel

opposito

negati

vel oppositisnegatorum.

Omne

ergo

verum antecedens

per

se

vel

cum concesso

vel

5

concessis vel

opposito

vel

oppositis negati

vel

negatorum

ad

dubitatum

et omne convertibile

um dubitato et omne

oppositum

dubitati

st

dubitandum.

Preterea:

Omne

falsum ntecedens ad dubitatumcuius

oppositum

10 non est verum

dubitatum est

negandum.

1 Preterea], ItemK 2negati] , ora. 3negatorum],negatielnega-

torum

4/5Omne...

-

...negatorum]

,

om.

O 9

Preterea]

,

ItemK

10

dubitatum]

,

dubitandum

Es

handelt sich

hier um die

erste

"Regula

specialis",

die anteceden-

tia ad dubitatum

betreffend. iese

beginnt folgendermaßen:

ciendum

ergo uod

ntecedensd dubitatum

uoddam

st

verum)

uoddam

st

alsum

de

Rijk

4429"30).

Während nun

in

O das

verum

ntecedens

ar

nicht

richtig

zur

Geltung

kommt,

ondern

nur das

falsum

ntecedens

de Rijk

459"11),

läßt der Zusatz Omne

rgo

erum..

in K

(Heinzer

III4'5)

die

ursprüng-

licheGestaltdes Textes klarer rkennen Omnergo erum. - ...estdu-

bitandum

Heinzer

III4"8,

vgl.

dagegen

de

Rijk

456"8)

st

Entfaltung

on

134

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


antecedensd

dubitatum

uoddam

st

verum

de

Rijk

4429),

Omne

alsum.

-

...est

negandum

Heinzer

III9'10

bzw.

de

Rijk

4510"11)

ntfaltung

on

qu-

oddam st alsum de Rijk 4430).

In

dieser

Struktur

ntspricht

die erste

Regula specialis

übrigens

genau

der

zweiten,

welche die

sequentia

ad dubitatum

behandelt

de

Rijk

4513"16).

ies

wird nun dank

des

Textes

von

K

nicht

nur

für

die

Einleitung

der beiden

Regeln

deutlich

-

de

Rijk

4429"30

(s.

oben)

als

Gegenstück

u

4513~14

sequentium.

-

...falsum)

,

sondern

auch

für

das

Folgende:

es

entsprechen

ich

die

Gegensatzpaare

omne

rgo

erum

antecedens omne

alsum

ntecedens

Heinzer

III4

9)

und omne

utem erum

sequens

omne

alsum

equens

de

Rijk

4514

6).

Die

besprochenen

Varianten

deuten

daraufhin,

daß

K

einen

Text

bietet,

der die

ursprüngliche

Gestalt

der

Obligationes

Parisienses an

manchen

Stellen

besser

bewahrt hat

als

O18. Umso mehr

ist zu

be-

dauern,

daß

der

Karlsruher

Textzeuge

fragmentarischen

harakter

hat

und sich somit

nur für inen

Teil

des Traktates

auswerten

äßt. Es

bleibt mmerhin

ie

Hoffnung

uf

weitere

Funde dieser

Art.

D-7500

Karlsruhe

Jahnstraße

18

Für

die

Crux

m

Endedes

Kapitels

e

Positione

de Rijk

223"25)

ingegen

ringt

auchK keine

echte

bhilfe,

adie

Beschneidung

es

Blattes

en

Text

eider

enau

n

der

kritischen

telle

n

Mitleidenschaft

ezogen

at.

135

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

2

(1983)

Collatio

philosophiae

ommendatoria

Aus dem

ntroitus

u einer

Physikvorlesung

es

14.

Jahrhunderts

JOACHIM

VENNEBUSCH

Wer

in

dem

lateinischen

Text,

der

hier

vorgestellt

werden

soll,

eine

ernste

philosophischeAbhandlung

vermutet,

wird

enttäuscht

werden.

Gegenstand dieses Aufsatzes ist die lockere Festrede eines jungen

Lehrers

der

Philosophie

-

eine

Rede,

die

nicht

neue

Einsichten

ver-

mitteln,

sondern mit

sprachlichen

und

gedanklichen

Kunststücken

beeindrucken und den Zuhörern

ein

akademisches

Vergnügen

berei-

ten wollte.

Der

Text

steht auf

den letzten Blättern

einer

Handschrift,

die um

1350 entstanden

st

und

in der

zeitgenössische

entenzenkommentare

überliefert

ind1. Die

anonymen

Kommentare

stammen teilweise

von

dem Franziskaner

Jacobus

de

Spinalo

und dem

Kölner Dominikaner

Henricus de Cervo. Uber den Entstehungsort er Handschrift st

nichts

icheres

bekannt.

n einem

mittelalterlichen

esitzvermerk,

er

sich

nicht

genauer

datieren

äßt,

eignet

sich

ein

frater

Wolterus

e

Valle

die Handschrift u. Der

paläographische

Befund läßt

vermuten,

daß

unser

Text

erst

gegen

Ende

des

14.

Jahrhunderts

n

die

Handschrift

eingetragen

worden st. Verfasserkorrekturen

eweisen,

daß

ein Auto-

graph vorliegt.

Es ist

flüchtiggeschrieben

und mit

Schreibfehlern

durchsetzt.

Der

erste Satz

und der letzte iefern

ie

Schlüssel

zu

einer

vorläufigenEinordnung

des Textes.

Eingangs

teilt

uns

der Verfasser

seine Absicht mit: die lobende Empfehlung einerHerrin,der Philo-

sophie

(

nostre

omine

hilosophie

ommendacio).

m

Schluß

verrät

er

den

Zusammenhang,

in

dem seine

Empfehlungsrede

teht: s ist

die Eröff-

nung (

ntroitus

einer

Vorlesungsreihe

über die

Physik

des Aristoteles.

1

Hist.Archiv

er tadt

Köln,

GB

f°

175,

148v-149r.ie

Handschriftes 14.

Jahr-

hundertsst

m

18.

Jahrhundert

n

der

Bibliothek

er

KölnerMinoriten it

üngeren

Bestandteilen

u einem

ammelband

ereinigt

orden.

usführliche

eschreibungen:

Joannis

uns

coti

pera

mniaBd.

1,

Vatikan

950,

.

126*

.,

Anm.

;

S. Ciasen

wie

Anm. ),Arch. ranc.Hist., 4 1951), 60-265mit ielen esefehlernnd nderen

Irrtümern);

.

Vennebusch,

ie

theologischen

andschriften

es tadtarchivs

öln

Teil

1,

Köln/Wien

976,

51-158.

136

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Feierliche

Vorlesungseröffnungen

aren

im

Mittelalterbeliebt

und

weitverbreitet,

or allem

in

den

Theologischen

Fakultäten. Wenn

ein

junger Theologe

nach

einigen Studienjahren

zum

Bakkalar

promo-

viert worden

war,

mußte

er zunächst

Vorlesungen

über biblische

Bücher,

später

Vorlesungen

über

die vier

Sentenzenbücherdes Petrus

Lombardus

halten.

Jede

der

Vorlesungsreihen

wurde feierlich

röff-

net. Man

nannte

die

Eröffnungsveranstaltungen

rincipium,

seltener

Introitus. Die

Principia

zu den

Sentenzenvorlesungen

hatten in

der

Regel

drei

Hauptteile:

eine

Empfehlungsansprache

collatio

ommenda-

toria

,

in

der die

Sentenzenbücher

oder die

Theologie

vorgestellt

nd

gelobt

wurden;

einen

wissenschaftlichen

ortrag

quaestio),

n

dem

ein

dem Textbuch entnommenes Problem erörtertwurde; eine kurze

Dankadresse

(gratiarum

ctio),

n

der der Bakkalar zunächst

Gott

und

den

Heiligen,

besonders aber seinen

akademischen

Lehrern und sei-

nen

Kollegen

dankbare Reverenz

erwies.

Wenn

ein

Bakkalar

nach

mehrjährigem

Aufbaustudium

zum Lizentiaten und schließlich zum

Doktor der

Theologie aufgerückt

war,

hielt

er zum

Abschluß der

Promotionsfeiern

och einmal eine Art

Antrittsvorlesung,

ie ähnlich

aufgebaut

war wie

die

Principia

der

Bakkalare.

Uber

die

Eröffnungsvorlesungen

er

Theologischen

Fakultäten

ind

wir gut unterrichtet2. ie werden in den Fakultätsstatuten oft

erwähnt3.

Viele

theologischePrincipia

sind

in

Handschriften berlie-

fert,

mehrere

ind

vollständig

oder teilweise

gedruckt4.

Uber feierliche

Eröffnungenphilosophischer

Vorlesungen

wissen

wir

nur

wenig.

Unser Text

bezeugt,

daß es

sie

gab.

Offenbar

haben wir

den ersten

Teil eines

philosophischen

ntroitus

vor

uns: eine

'

'Collatio

philoso-

phiae

commendatoria,,)

die den Auftakt u

einer

Vorlesung

über die

Aristotelische

hysik

bildete.

Die

Erklärung

der

Aristotelischen chriften

n

akademischen

Vor-

2

Vgl.

S.

Ciasen,

Walram

on

iegburg

.F.M.und

eine

oktorpromotion

nder

ölnerni-

versität,

in: Archivům

ranciscanum

istoricum,

4

1951)

257-317;

5

1952),

72-

126, 23-396;

esonders

.

278-280,

89-298.

3

Vgl.

F.

Gescher,

ie

Statutener

heologischen

akultät

nder lten

niversität

öln

in:

Festschrift

ur

rinnerung

n die

Gründung

er lten

niversität

öln m

ahre

388

Köln

1938,

3-108,

es.

61-64, 8,

82.

4

Beispielsweise

ie

Collationes

us den

Principia,

ieThomas

on

Aquin

ls

Bibel-

bakkalar

nd

ls

Magister

er

Theologie

ehalten

at:

Thomae

quinatis

puscula

mnia

ed.

P.

Mandonnet,

d.

4,

Paris

1927,

81-496.

pätmittelalterliche

rincipia:

.

Buchwald. Th.Herrle, edeakteei nverbungerkademischenradender niversität

Leipzig

m 5.

Jahrhundert,

eipzig

921, 4-62;

.

Ciasen

wie

Anm.

),

Arch. ranc.

Hist.,

5

1952),

51-367.

137

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


lesungen

war

hauptsächlich

Aufgabe

der

Artistenfakultäten5.

eshalb

liegt

die

Vermutung

nahe,

daß der

Verfasser

der Collatio

Mitglied

der

Artistenfakultätiner Universitätwar und daß er die Rede bei einer

festlichen

Veranstaltung

einer

Fakultät

vorgetragen

at.

Bekanntlich

vermittelten

ie Artistenfakultätenas

grundlegende

prachliche,

phi-

losophische

und

mathematischeWissen. Sie wurden

vorwiegend

von

jungen

Leuten

besucht;

die

meisten

Studenten waren

noch

nicht

20

Jahre

alt. Sehr

viele

der

älteren

Studenten,

die an den

drei

4

'höheren'

Fakultäten

Theologie

oder Rechtswissenschaft der Medizin

studier-

ten,

hatten

vorher

den

Studiengang

der

Artistenfakultät

bgeschlossen

oder doch

wenigstens

eilweisedurchlaufen.Auch

die Artistenfakultä-

ten verliehen,wenn bestimmteVoraussetzungen erfülltwaren, den

Grad

eines Bakkalars. Während

die Bakkalare

ihre

Studien

fortsetz-

ten,

beteiligten

ie sich

als

Hilfslehrer m

Unterricht

n

Grammatik

und

elementarer

Logik.

Wer schließlich

das

ganze

Pensum

des artisti-

schen

Stoffes

bewältigt

hatte,

konnte zum

Magister

(

magister

rtium)

promoviert

werden. Damit

hatte er

das Recht

erworben,

n Artisten-

fakultäten

Vorlesungen

zu halten. Wenn unsere

Collatio

an einer

Artistenfakultät

orgetragen

wurde,

war sie dann vielleicht

die

An-

trittsrede

ines frisch

promovierten

Magisters?

Ein

Bakkalar

kommt

als Redner nicht n Frage,weil die Erklärungder Aristotelischen hy-

sik

im

allgemeinen

den

Magistern

vorbehaltenwar.

Wir wissen

nicht

einmal,

ob Bakkalare der Artistenfakultät

berhaupt e

feierliche

or-

lesungseröffnungen

ielten6.

Allerdings

sind

wir

auch über

Antritts-

vorlesungen

der

jungen

Magister

nur lückenhaft

unterrichtet7.

aß

auch bewährte

Magister

am

Anfang

eines

neuen

Studienjahres

ihre

5

Vgl.

R.

Helssig,

ie

wissenschaftlichen

orbedingungenür

Baccalauréatn artibusnd

Magisterium,

n:

Beiträge

urGeschichteerUniversität

eipzig

m

5.

Jahrhundert,eipzig

1909, . Pag.,1-93. S. Ciasen, er tudiengangnder ölnerrtistenfakultät,n:Artes

liberales

hrsg.

.Josef

och,

.

Aufl.,

eiden/Köln

976,

24-136.

6

Die

gegenteilige

ehauptung

on

. Ciasen

wie

Anm.

,

S.

134)

st

öllig

nbewie-

sen.

Die beiden

hilosophischen

rincipia,

ie

r

us

ekundärer

uelle Arch.

ranc.

Hist.,

4

1951),

195,

197)

nführt,

ind

nichtn einer

Artistenfakultät,

ondern

n

einem rdensstudium

er ranziskanerntstandener Redner endetich ämlich

in seiner

ankadresse

ichttwa n einen

Magister

er

Artistenfakultät,

ondernn

denOrdenslektor

Patri

meo

ectori).

1

Georg

Kaufmann,

ie Geschichte

er

eutschen

niversitätenBd.

2,

Stuttgart

896,

314;

H.

Rashdall,

.

M.

Powicke,

. B.

Emden,

he

Universities

f urope

n he iddle

Ages,

ew

dition,

d.

1,

Oxford

936,

61

f.;

Buchwald,

errle

wie

Anm.

)

S.

5

u.

43

{prima

ectio

agistralis).

iasen

wie

Anm.

,

S.

275)behauptet,

aß auch

bei

der

Magisterpromotionn derArtistenfakultätine ogenannteAula" (zu ihr ehörte

auf

eden

Falleine

Collatio)

ehalten

urde.n denKölner

tatuten,

uf

dieCiasen

sich

ezieht,

teht avon

einWort.

138

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vorlesungen

mit einer

Collatio

eröffneten,

eigt

das

Principium

einer

Lectura ordinaria über

die

Logica

Vetus,

das Gabriel

Biel,

Magister

seit

1438,

im

Jahre

1441

in

Heidelberg

vorgetragen

hat8.

Aristoteleswurde auch außerhalb der Artistenfakultätentudiert.

Beispielsweise

rwarben

die

Studenten der Bettelorden hr

philosophi-

sches

Rüstzeug

in

der

Regel

nicht

an den

Universitäten,

ondern in

den

Studienhäusern hrer

Orden. Auch

dort hielten

unge

Lehrer der

Philosophie

zu

Beginn

ihrer

Vorlesungen

feierliche

rincipia9.

Es ist

deshalb

gut

möglich,

daß

unsere Collatio

in

einem

Ordensstudium

entstanden st. Diese

Vermutung

st zwar

durch

nichts

bewiesen,

aber

doch auch

nicht

ganz

abwegig.

Es

ist zu

bedenken,

daß die Hand-

schrift us einem

Kloster

der

franziskanischen

Ordensfamilie,

dem

Kölner

Minoritenkloster,

tammt

und daß

sie

im

14.

oder 15.

Jahr-

hundert m

Besitz

eines

Mannes

war,

der

sich

rater

ennt

und der

viel-

leicht

Minorit

war10.

Die

Frage,

ob die

Collatio aus der

Feder

eines

Magisters

der

Artistenfakultät

der

eines Lehrers der

Philosophie

an

einem

Ordensstudium

stammt,

muß offen

bleiben. Für die

Deutung

und

Wertung

des Textes

ist

das

nicht von

großem

Belang.

Im

Folgenden

stehtder

lateinische

Text

ungekürzt

und ohne

Um-

stellungen,

so daß

man,

wenn

man

die

Ausführungen

des Heraus-

gebers übergeht, die Rede in ungestörtemZusammenhang lesen

kann11.Die

Deutungen

des

Herausgebers

wollen

den

Leser

nicht

fest-

legen.

Der Text

ist

an

vielen

Stellen

mehrdeutig,

umal

wenn Reim

und

Rhythmus

die

Wortwahl

bestimmen.

Das

Thema

Der

Verfasser setzt

ein

Thema

an

den

Anfang

seiner

Collatio

und

verrät

damit,

wo

das

formale

Vorbild für

eine Rede

zu

suchen

ist. Er

folgt

dem

Brauch der

theologischen

Bakkalare,

die den

Collationes

8

UB

Giessen,

s

617,

22 -228v.

gl.

Handschriftenkataloge

er

Universitätsbibliothek

Glessen

Bd.

4

(Bearb.:

W.

G.

Bayerer),

iesbaden

980,

1.

9

Vgl.

Anm.

.

Die beiden

on

Ciasen

rwähnten

rincipia

ind

icht

rhalten,

ie

r

behauptet,

ondern

945

verbrannt.

ine

Collatio

hilosophiae

ommendatoria

es

Franziskaners

ndreas e

Wolff

us dem

Jahre

403 st

überliefertn

SB

München,

Clm

8950,

53v-256v

erwähnt

n

Arch.

ranc.

Hist.,

4

1951),

08).

10

Vgl.

Vennebusch

wie

Anm.

)

S.

156.

11

Interpunktion,

roß-

nd

Kleinschreibung,

owie

ie

Unterscheidung

on

und

sind

ormalisiert.

usätze es

Herausgebers

tehen

n

runden

lammern

), Ergän-

zungen

n

winkligen

> .

Die Ergänzungenaren eilweiseeshalb otwendig,weilbei der

Beschneidung

esBlattrandes

inige

Wörter ndWortteileerloren-

gegangen

ind.

139

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


ihrer

Eröffnungsvorlesungen

n

der

Regel

ein Bibelwort

als

Thema

voransetzten.

Vorbild fürdie

Bakkalare war die scholastische

Predigt;

sie knüpfte ast mmer an ein biblisches Thema an. Indes holtunser

Redner

sein

Thema

nicht

aus

der

Bibel,

sondern

aus einem

philo-

sophischen

Buch:

1

Sciencia

nobis

de natura

est;

3°

phisicorum12.

Das

Thema,

in

der

Physik

des Aristotelesnur

ein

Nebensätzchen,

ist

aus dem

ursprünglichen

Zusammenhang gelöst.

Es

bedeutet hier:

4

'Wir haben

naturphilosophisches

Wissen". Diese

These

will

der

Redner

in

seiner

Collatio

begründen

und entfalten.

r

tut

das

in zwei

Schritten. m erstenTeil der Rede legterdar, daß Aristoteles ehörige

philosophische

Kompetenz

besitzt,

um

die

als

Thema

vorgelegte

These

glaubwürdig

aufstellen

u

können.

Im

zweiten Teil beschreibt

er

die

Vorzüge

der

Naturphilosophie.

Teil

I

Die

Weisheit esAristoteles

Um

nachzuweisen,

daß

Aristoteles

erechtigt

st,

Aussagen

über

die

Naturphilosophie

u

machen,

bedient

sich

der Redner eines

Werkzeu-

ges,

das

Aristoteles elbst

bereitgestellt

at: des

Syllogismus.

Die

drei

Gliederdes

Syllogismus

zwei Prämissenund die

Folgerung

proposi

tio

maior,

ropositio

inor

conclusió)

sind

deutlich

unterschieden.

Der

Gedankengang

läßt

sich

in

groben

Zügen

so

darstellen:

Wer

vier be-

stimmte

Eigenschaften

hat,

der ist

zu

der

Behauptung

befugt,

daß

es

Naturphilosophie

gibt

1.

Prämisse);

Aristoteles

hat diese

vier

Eigen-

schaften

2.

Prämisse);

also ist

er zu

der

genannten

Behauptung

befugt

(Folgerung).

Die

Folgerung

ist ein

indirekter

Beweis

der

im Thema

vorgelegten

These.

Der Redner

kleidetdie

beiden Prämissen

des

Syl-

logismus

in

die

Form

gereimter

Gedichte.

Das

gibt

der

Darstellung

etwas

Spielerisches

und

mildert die

Ernsthaftigkeit

es

logischen

Anspruchs,

den

die

syllogistische

orm

zu erheben

scheint.

Die

1. Prämisse

maior)

Ad istius

verbi ntroductionem d

nostredomine

philosophie

com-

mendacionem

promitto

alem

proposicionem, quoniam

ex variis

scripturarum

iversarum

passibus

luculenter

apparet,

quod

12

Aristoteles,

hys.

II,

1:

200bl3.

Der

Verfasser

atte unächst

in nderes

hema

gewählt.s ist nder rsteneiledesTextes ogründlichusradiert,aßkein uch-

stabe

mehr

esbar

st.

Das neue hema

teht

uf er adierten

telle

nd

st

ußerdem

noch inmal

ber ie

erste eile

geschrieben.

140

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


5

(1)

dotatus

affluencia

sub numinis

presencia

quod

decet

operari,

(2)

prelatus

excellencia

pro

gregis ndigencia

10

qui

debet

iudicari,

(3)

probatus

in

sciencia

pro

magna

différencia

que

non

vult

adequari,

(4)

lunatus

eloquencia

15

pro

fame

evidencia

que novitadmirari,

(5)

hie

ex

condecencia,

quod

de

natura sit

sapiencia13,

poterit

ffari.

In

vier

Strophen

stellt

der Verfasser

vier

hervorragende

mensch-

liche

Eigenschaften

vor.

Schlüsselwörter

ind

(1)

operari

(2)

iudicare

(3)

sciencia

(4)

eloquencia.

benan stehtdas

"Werken";

gemeint

sind

handwerkliche,

auch

künstlerische

Fähigkeiten.

Daß sie

göttlicher

Eingebung zu verdankensind, wird nachdrücklichbetont. Die Vor-

stellung,

daß Gott

der

geschickteste

andwerker und

der

beste

Künst-

ler

sei,

war

dem Mittelalter

vertraut14.An

zweiter

Stelle

steht

das

'

'Recht-schaffen'

[iudicare).

relatusst

der

Träger

politischer

Kompe-

tenz,

der,

weil

das

Volk

(grex)

s

braucht,

für

Recht

und

Ordnung

sorgt,

sei es

als

Gesetzgeber,

sei

es

als

Richter. Die dritte

Stelle

im

Reigen

der

Eigenschaften

besetzt

das theoretische

Wissen:

eine wis-

senschaftliche

Bildung,

die das Maß des

Üblichen

übersteigt.

Am

Schluß

steht

die

Fähigkeit,

das

Wissen

in

der rechten

Form

auszuspre-

chen: die Beredsamkeit. Sie verschafft ewunderung und Ansehen.

Die fünfte

trophe

fügt

em

viergliedrigen ubjekt

des Satzes

das Prä-

dikat

an

und

schließt die

Aussage

ab:

Wer

praktische

Fähigkeiten,

politische

Kompetenz,

wissenschaftliche

Bildung

und

sprachliches

Geschick

besitzt,

der kann

mit

Fug

und Recht

behaupten,

daß es

Naturphilosophiegibt.

Ursprünglich

autete die letzte

Strophe

anders,

nämlich so: ...

der kann mit

Fug

und Recht

sagen,

was Weisheit

ist

13UrsprünglicherortlauterZeile: uid it apiencia.14

Vgl.

E. R.

Curtius,

uropäische

iteraturnd

ateinisches

ittelalter3.

Aufl.,

Bern/München

961,

27-529.

141

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


{quid

sit

sapiencia).

Der

Verfasser

wollte also

ursprünglich

m ersten

Teil

seiner

Rede

ganz allgemein

darlegen,

welche

geistigen

Vorausset-

zungen

ein Weisheitslehrer raucht und daß

Aristoteles iese Voraus-

setzungen

tatsächlich

hat.

Während

er

den

zweiten Teil der

Rede

niederschrieb,

hat

er

seinen

Gedankengang geändert,

vermutlich

es-

halb,

weil

ihm

ein neues Thema

eingefallen

st15.

n

dem

ursprüng-

lichen Thema

war wohl

nur

allgemein

von der

Weisheit

die

Rede

(s.

Zeile

127);

im

neuen

Thema

wird eine

Aussage

über

die

Naturphilo-

sophie

gemacht.

Der

Wechsel des

Themas

gab

Anlaß fürden

Eingriff

in

den

Text

der 1.

Prämisse

(die Folgerung

st

entsprechend

eändert,

s. Zeile

1

18)

und

ebnete den

Weg

für

die

Einführung

er

Naturphilo-

sophie in den erstenTeil der Rede.

Die

Aufzählung

der

vier

Eigenschaften

eines

guten

Philosophen

zeigt,

daß

der

Verfasser

der Collatio

im

Uberlieferungsstrom

Aristotelischer

enkweisen

steht.

n den

ersten

drei

Strophen piegelt

sich die

Gliederung

des menschlichen

Wissens

in

herstellendes

(Technik,

Kunst),

handelndes

(Ethik, Politik)

und

theoretisches

(Physik,

Metaphysik,

Mathematik);

der

Aristotelische

ernar

7t(H7)atç-

7cpãÇi<;-0£G)pta

lingt

auf16.

Die

vierte

Strophe

zielt auf

enen

Bereich

der

Philosophie,

in

dem

die

"Werkzeuge"

des Wissens

behandelt

werden (Logik, Rhetorik). In den bescheidenenVersen eines ungen

spätmittelalterlichen

ehrers

ist der

weite

Kosmos

der

griechischen

Philosophie

wahrnehmbar:

Logik, Physik,

Ethik,

Kunst.

Der

poetisch

formulierten

rämisse

folgt

er

4

'Beweis'

'

in

schlichter

Prosa.

Der

Verfasser

verknüpft

ie

vier

Glieder

der

Prämisse

mit vier

Bibelstellen.

Damit

führt

er

theologische

Elemente

in seine

philo-

sophische

Ansprache

ein. Die

Verwunderung

über dieses

Vorgehen

schwindet,

wenn man

bedenkt,

daß das

Vorbild unserer

Collatio

die

theologische

Predigt

st,

n der Beweise

aus der Hl. Schrift

icht

fehlen

durften.Es wäre überhaupt falsch,dem Redner eine argumentative

Beweisabsicht

zu unterstellen.

Er

hat offenbar

andere Absichten.

Indem

er

zeigt,

daß

seine

philosophische

Aussage

sich

in einen

theologischen

Horizont stellen

läßt,

bringt

er die

Harmonie

von

philosophischem

und

theologischem

Wissen zum

Ausdruck.

Er

bekennt

sich

damit

zu einer

Uberzeugung,

die

für die

meisten

Philosophen

und

Theologen

des

Mittelalters

Grundlage

des Denkens

war. Zudem

will

er

-

das

dürfen

wir ohne

Zögern

unterstellen

mit

15

Vffl. nm.

12.

16

Vgl.

Aristoteles,

etaph.

I,

1: 1025b25.

142

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


seinem

merkwürdigen

'Beweis" sein

Geschick

in der

Verknüpfung

von

entlegenenAussagen

vorführen.

Und so lautet sein Beweis:

20 (1) Dixi primo, quod dotatus affluenciaetc, hic ex condecencia

etc. Unde

Exodi 31°

capitulo

scribitur:

Ecce vocavi ex nomine

Beseleel

fìlium

Huri filii

Hur de tribu

uda,

et

impievi

eum

spiritu

dei,

sapiencia

et

intelligencia

et sciencia in omni

opere

ad

excogitandum

uidquid

fabrefieri

oterit

x

auro et

argento,

re et

25

ferro t

gemmis

et

diversitate

ignorum17.

(2)

Dixi

secundo,

quod prelatus

excellencia

etc,

hic ex condecen-

cia etc. Unde 3°

Regum,

3o

capitulo

scribitur: Audivit

itaque

omnis Israel

iudicium

quod

iudicasset

rex,

et

timuerunt

regem

videntesdei sapienciam esse in ilio ad faciendum udicium18.

30

(3)

Dixi

tercio,

quod probatus

in

sciencia

etc,

hic

etc. Unde 3o

Regum,

4o

capitulo

scribitur: Dedit dominus

sapienciam

Salomoni et

prudenciam

multam

nimis et atitudinem ordis

quasi

arenam

que

est

in

litore

maris;

et

precedebat sapiencia

Salomonis

sapienciam

omnium

Orientalium

et

Egiptiorum,

t erat

sapientior

35 cunctis hominibus19.

(4)

Dixi

quarto

et

ultimo n

maiore,

quod

lunatus

eloquencia

etc,

hie

ex

condecencia etc.

Unde

3°

Regum,

10

capitulo

scribitur:

Dixit

regina

Saba ad Salomonem: Verus est sermo

quem

audivi in

terra

mea,

super

sermonibus et

sapiencia

tua,

et non credebam

40

narrantibus

michi,

donee

ipsa

venirem

et

viderem

oculis

meis,

et

probavi

quod

media

pars

michi nunciata non

fuerit;

maior est sa-

piencia

tua et

opera

tua

quam

rumor

quem

audivi20.

Patet

igitur,

karissimi,

ssumpta proposicio.

In

jedem

der

vier Zitate aus dem Alten Testament

kommt

das

Wort

sapienciavor. Und das ist entscheidend für die Wahl gerade dieser

Texte.

Sie

sollen die vier

Erscheinungsformen

er

Weisheit

bezeugen.

Daß

Kunstfertigkeit

ottgeschenkte

Weisheit

ist,

sagt

ein Text aus

dem

Buch

Exodus:

Gott

beruft nd

befähigt

en Werkmeister

eseleel

(Besalel)

zur

Herstellung iturgischen

Gerätes für das

Heiligtum

(Ex

31,

2-5).

Für die drei

übrigen Grundzüge

im

Bild des Weisen wird

König

Salomo

als

Zeuge aufgerufen.

m

Schlußsatz

des biblischen

17

Ex.

31,2-5.

183 Reg. ,28.19

3

Reg.

,29-31.

20

3

Reg.

0,6-7.

143

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Berichtes

über

das Salomonische

Urteil lesen

wir,

daß

das Volk

Salomos

richterliche

Klugheit

als eine Form

göttlicher

Weisheit

anerkennt

1

Kön

3,28).

Der

folgende

Text

rühmt ie

Weite und Tiefe

der Einsichten

Salomos;

er weiß mehr

als

die

Gelehrten

des

Ostens

und mehr als

die

Ägypter

1

Kön

5,9-11

=

4,29-31

nach

der

Vulgata).

Schließlich

wird

die

Königin

von Saba zitiert. Der

Ruf

der

Salomonischen

Weisheit

hat sie nach

Jerusalem

gelockt,

und sie

zeigt

sich

beeindruckt

on Salomos weisen Reden

(1

Kön

10,6-7).

-

Damit

sind

die

vier

Eigenschaften

des

Weisen biblisch

belegt:

Kunst-

fertigkeit,

olitisches

Geschick,

Wissen und

Sprachkraft.

Die 2. Prämisseminor)

Aristoteles

besitzt

die vier

angeführten

igenschaften

der Weisen.

Dies

sagt

die

2.

Prämisse

in

gekünstelten

Reimen,

denen

zur

Bekräftigung

inige

Verse

aus

dem

Entheticus

des

Johannes

von

Salisbury

angefügt

ind.

Minorem talem

sic

infero,

quod

magister

eximius

Aristotilis,

t

45

patere poterit

veritate

oncordanciarum,

est

(1)

operator

mire

latus

et ad multa ampliatus

per

numen

spirativum,

(2)

legislator

admiratus

50

nec

a iusto

obliquatus

per

lumen

directivum,

(3)

disputator

nominatus

et

precunctis

ponderatus

per

flumen

llapsivum,

55

(4)

enominator

impidatus

et in ligua21venustatus

per

omen

rigativum.

Unde

Salisberiensis

n

suo

Enthetico

sic ait

metrice22:

Si

quis

Aristotilem

non sentit

mentis

habundum,

60 non

reddit

meritis

premia

digna

suis.

Quod

potuit

quemquam

ratio mundana

docere,

huic

dédit,

ut fierent

ogmata plena

fide.

21

Der

Verfasser

chreibt

mmer

igua

tatt

ingua.

22Johannesaresberiensis,ntheticus53-854,57-860;d. R. E. Pepin,n:Traditio,

31

(1975),

163. Statt on

entit

entis

abundum

=

abundum)

eißt s

im

Original:

primum

on enset

abendum.

144

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Quidquid

enim

docuit,

docuisse

putatur Apollo,

a

quo

progenitum

fabula

Greca dočet.

65

Hec

ille.

Aristoteles

st also

(1)

ein

vielseitiger

Hersteller"

(

operator

aufgrund

göttlicher

Eingebung;

(2)

er

ist ein

Gesetzgeber

( egislator

mit

unbeugsamer

Gerechtigkeit;

3)

er

ist

ein

namhafter

Wissenschaftler,

der sein

Wissen

in

überzeugender

Form

verteidigen

kann

( disputator)'

(4)

er

ist

schließlich ein

verständlicher

und

feinsinniger

Redner

(enominator)

Das

seltsame

Wort

enominator

auch

Zeile

102)

stört

den

Versrhythmus.

Ein

viersilbiges

Wort

wie

evulgator

würde besser

passen.

Auch

die

letzte Zeile

der 4.

Strophe

klingt

befremdlich.

ie

hätte einen verständlichenSinn, wenn man, Zeile 117 zur Text-

verbesserung

nutzend,

rigativum

urch

prospectivum

rsetzte23.

Der

Redner

will

auch

die

2.

Prämisse

"beweisen",

und zwar

aus

denselben

Bibelstellen,

die er

zur

Begründung

der

1.

Prämisse

herangezogen

hatte.

Jetzt

tritt

noch

offenkundiger

utage,

daß

hier

kein

logisch

überzeugender

Beweis

beabsichtigt

ist;

denn

"Aristoteles",

das

Subjekt

der

2.

Prämisse,

kommt

n

den

Bibeltexten

gar

nicht

vor.

Der

Redner nennt

die

Bibelstellen

concordancie

eritatis

d.h.

Stellen,

an

denen

übereinstimmende

Wahrheiten

aufklingen.

Er

will

zeigen,

daß man von seiner

philosophischen

Aussage

aus sinnvolle

Verbindungslinien

zu

den

Bibelstellen

ziehen

kann und

daß

eine

Analyse

der

biblischen

Textelemente

zu einem

tieferen

Verständnis

der

philosophischen

Aussage anregen

kann. In

dieser

Absicht for-

muliert

r

die

Begründung

und

Erläuterung

der

2. Prämisse.

Revera

tarnen,

ut

huius

minoris illacio

plenius

illucescat

et

nubilata

Veritas

planius

innotescat,

psam

resumamus et

concor-

dancias

veritatis

d

eius

probacionem

adducamus.

(1) Quapropter dixi primo, quod magister sacre philosophie

70

eximius

est

operator

etc.

Huic

consonai

concordancia

primo

oco

ad

maiorem

posita,

dicens:

Ecce vocavi

ex

nomine

Beseleel

etc. In

qua

videte,

karissimi,

magistrům

ximium

videlicet

(a)

elective

adoptari

in

superno

muñere,

(b)

spirative

llustrari

pro

interno

federe,

23

Diese

und

ndere

tellen

eben

nlaß

u der

Vermutung,

aßder

Verfasser

eile

der

Collatio

us einer

chriftlichen

orlage

bernommen

nd

nicht

mmer

anz

richtigerstandenat.Es istfreilich anchmalchweru entscheiden,b ein

Mißverständnisder

in

bloßer

chreibfehler

orliegt;

eispielsweise,

enn r

unten

prospectivi

ominis

chreibt,

o

der

innzusammenhang

rospectivi

minis

erlangt.

145

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


75

(c)

dimensive

dilatari

pro

externo

opere.

Propter primům

dicitur:

a)

Vocavi Beseleel

filium

Huri

filiiHur

de tribu luda. Proptersecundum additur: (b) et adimplevi eum

spiritu

dei

et

sapiencia

et

intelligencia. Propter

tercium

con-

cluditur:

c)

in

omni

opere

ad

excogitandum

etc.

80

(2)

Dixi

secundo,

quod magister

ste est

legislator

dmiratus

etc.

Pro

quo

facit

secunda concordancia secundo loco ad maiorem

posita,

dicens: Audivit

omnis

Israel etc. Ubi

videte, karissimi,

Aristotilem idelicet

(a)

precessive

diffamatum n cetu

generali,

85

(b)

amative formidatum

ub

metu

filiali,

(c) precautive preservatum motu illegali.

Propter

primům

dicitur:

a)

Audivit

omnis Israel iudicium

quod

iudicasset

rex.

Propter

secundum additur:

(b)

et timuerunt

regem.

Propter

tercium concluditur:

c)

videntes

sapienciam

dei

90 esse

in

ilio.

(3)

Dixi

tercio,

quod magister

ste est

disputator

nominatus etc.

Pro

quo

facit concordancia tercio loco

in

maiore

posita,

dicens:

Dedit

quoque

dominus

sapienciam

Salomoni

etc.

Ubi

videte,

karissimi,

psum magistrům

ximium

95 (a) conplacenterpreveniriper largumlargitorem,

(b)

condecenter

nsigniri

mundanum

ad

cultorem,

(c)

prevalenter

diffiniri

umanum ultra

morem.

Propter primům

dicitur:

(a)

Dedit

quoque

dominus

sapienciam

Salomoni,

usque:

mari<s>.

Propter

secundum

additur:

(b)

et

100

precedebat

sapiencia

Salomonis

etc,

usque:

Egipptiorum. Propter

tercium

concluditur:

c)

et

erat

sapientior

cunctis hominibus.

(4)

Dixi

quarto

et

ultimo,

quod predictusmagister

st enominator

limpidatus

etc.

Pro

quo

facit concordancia

quarto

loco

adducta,

dicens: Dixitque regina etc. Ubi videtemagistrům

105

(a)

illustratum

ei

dono,

quod

gratis

erogatur,

(b)

occultatum

fame

tono,

quo

mundus

gloriatur,

(c)

predotatum

magno

bono,

quod

unquam

bene fatur.

Propter primum

dicitur:

a)

Verus

est sermo

etc.

Propter

secun-

dum additur:

(b)

et non credebam narrantibus michi.

Propter

110 tercium concluditur:

c)

maior est

sapiencia

tua etc.

Der Verfasser

zerlegt

die

vier Bibeltexte

n

e

drei

Teile.

Ausgehend

von

jedem

Textstück,

ordnet er den in der 2. Prämisse

behaupteten

vier

Eigenschaften

es

Aristoteles

e

drei

Erklärungen

u.

Demnach

ist

146

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Aristoteles

1)

als Homo

faber

a)

von

Gott

erwählt,

b)

von

Gottes

Geist

erleuchtet

und

(c)

zu

vielfältigem

Werk

beauftragt.

2)

Als

Homo

politicus

st er

(a) allgemeinbekannt, b)

vom Volk

ehrfürchtig

angenommen

und

(c)

frei

von

Ungerechtigkeit.

3)

Als Mann

der

Wissenschaft

st

er

(a)

reich

begabt, (b) ausgewiesen

als

Erforscher

er

ganzen

Welt

und

(c)

eingestuft

ls

überragender

Gelehrter.

(4)

Als

Redner

ist

er

(a)

von

Gott

begnadet,

(b)

im

landläufigen

Ruhm nur

unzureichend

gewürdigt

nd

(c)

mit reicher

Mitgift usgestattet.

Der

Versuch,

die zwölfStücke der Bibeltexte

den zwölf

Aussagen

zuzuord-

nen,

ist

nicht mmer

überzeugend gelungen

und wirkt ehr

gekünstelt.

Aber offenbar ertrauteder

Redner

darauf,

daß

sein

Jonglieren

mit

Worten und Bibelstellen einen Zuhörern so sehrgefallenwerde,daß

sie

keine allzu

strengen xegetischen

Maßstäbe

anlegen

wurden.

Und

mit

dieser

Erwartung

hat er die

tatsächliche

Einstellung

seiner

Zuhörer vermutlich

enau getroffen.

Die

Folgerung

conclusio

Aus den

beiden

wortreich

ntwickelten

nd

begründeten

Prämissen

zieht der Verfassernun

die

Folgerung:

Aristoteles

kann

mit

Fug

und

Recht

behaupten,

daß

es

Naturphilosophiegibt.

Nunc

ergo,

ut

thema nostrum

concludamus,

silogisticum

hema

sic

vertamus:

Quia,

ut

patet

ex

premissis,

magister

sacre

philosophie

eximius

(1)

dotatur

affluencia

pirativi

numinis,

115

(2)

prefertur

xcellencia

directivi

uminis,

(3)

probatur

n

sciencia

rigativi

fluminis,

(4)

lunatur

eloquencia prospectivi

hominis24,

idcirco

ex

decencia

dicere

poterit, quod

de natura sit

sapiencia.

Que fuerunt erba vestre reverencieproposita.

Die vier

Reimzeilen

sind,

vom

Standpunkt

des

Logikers

aus

betrachtet,

ine erneute

und

eigentlich

überflüssige

Umschreibung

der

2. Prämisse.

In

der

kunstvollen

Komposition

der Rede

haben

sie

hingegen

eine

sinnvolle

Aufgabe.

Sie sollen

zeigen,

daß

beide

Prämissen

n

die

Schlußfolgerung

ingehen.

Die

Wortwahl

macht das

deutlich.

Die erstenWörter

einer

eden

Zeile sind aus der

1.

Prämisse

24

Das Wort

oministört

en

Zusammenhang

it

eile

57;

an

seiner tellemüßte

oministehen.

gl.

Anm.

3.

147

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


übernommen,

die

letzten

beiden

Wörter aus der

2.

Prämisse.

So

wird

der

ganze

syllogistisch ufgebaute

Gedankengang

in

den

Worten des

letztenAbschnitts och einmalrhetorischingefangen. m letztenSatz

verknüpft

der Redner

seine

Schlußfolgerung

mit dem

Thema der

Collatio,

wobei er den

Vorsitzenden der

akademischen

Versammlung

ehrerbietig

anredet: "Und dies sind die

Worte,

die ich

Eurer

Reverenz

(als Thema)

vorgelegt

habe".

Teil

II: Die

Vorzüge

er

Naturphilosophie

Im ersten

Teil

der Rede

stand

Aristoteles,

der Vater

der

Natur-

philosophie,

m

Mittelpunkt

es Blickfeldes.

m

zweitenTeil

lenktder

Redner sein

Augenmerk

auf den

eigentlichen

Gegenstand

seiner

Vorlesung,

die

Naturphilosophie.

120

In

quo

quidem

verbo

brevi introducto

tilo

evi

videte, karissimi,

docet

et

describit

quo

ad libros

philosophie

n

themate

promisso

(a)

naturam in se

stabilem,

alte

fastigiatam,

culturam

non

mutabilem,

sed firme

adicatam,

[ibi:

quid

sit

125

(b)

figuramperoptabilem,

grate

commendatam,

in multisgerminabilem t vere adamatam.

[quia:

sapiencia

Offenbar

will

der

Verfasser

n

den schwer

verständlichen

rosareim-

Zeilen

zunächst den

Gegenstandsbereich

a),

dann den

Wert

(b)

der

Naturphilosophie

umschreiben. Dabei beruft er

sich

auf

einzelne

Wörter des

Themas,

nämlich

quid

sit

und

sapiencia.

Dies sind

Wörter

aus dem

ursprünglichen

hema,

das der Verfasser

später

verworfen

hat.

An

dieser Stelle

hat er

versehentlich ie

Anpassung

des

Textes an

das neue Thema versäumt25.

25

n derHandschrift

olgt

ier in

durchgestrichener

bschnitt.

r

soll

nicht er-

schwiegen

erden,

eil r zur

Deutung

es

Folgenden

nd zur

Ausmerzung

on

Schreibfehlern

eiträgt.

udem

eigt

er

Text,

wie

der

Verfasser

rsprünglichvor

der

Änderung

es

Themas nddes rsten eils

der

Rede)

Teil undTeil I

verknüp-

fenwollte. er

stam

amqueapienciam,

aturalem

ntelligo

cienciam,

ue uidem

nverbis

premissisuadrupliciter

ereddit

ommendabilem.rimoescribitur

uius

ci<encie> ublimitas

sub

xcellencia

larioris

entencie,

ecundoub

nherenciaaiorisvidencietercioub

ubsistencia

validions

ermanencie,

t

uarto

ub

ufficiencia

mplioris

ontinencie.

1)

Dico

rgorimo,

uod

hec cienciaaturalis

eu

hilosophical)

onsidérâtur> sub

xcellencia

larioris

entencie,

o

quod psa remittitrincipia,ausas t lementa.t ideo ciret ntelligereontingitcirca>

omnesciencias

uarum

unt

rincipia,

auset

lementa;

ecundum

hilosophumrimo

hisicorum.

(2)

Secundo

ico,

uod

renuncupata

cienciaonsidertur

ub

del.:

nherencia

aioris

videncie)

148

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Tradition und

Satzung

wiesen

den akademischen Festrednerndie

Aufgabe

zu,

das

Fachgebiet,

das

Gegenstand

ihrer

künftigen

Vorlesungen

sein

sollte,

zu

"empfehlen".

Der Redner

muß

also

über

sein

Gebiet,

die

Naturphilosophie,

allerlei

Empfehlendes

sagen.

Zunächst

beschreibt

r vier

Vorzüge

der

Naturphilosophie.

Sed revera describitur huius

sciencie <

naturalis sublimitas

quadrupliciter:

130

(1)

sub

excellencia

clarioris

sentencie,

(2)

sub inherencia

maioris

evidencie,

(3)

sub subsistencia

validions

permanencie,

(4)

sub sufficiencia

mplioris

continencie.

Das

sind

dunkle Worte. Der

Reim vernebelt

den Sinn. Der

Verfasser

fühlt ich

zur

Erläuterung verpflichtet

nd holt

dazu

Texte

aus

der

Physik

des

Aristoteles

heran.

Gleichzeitig

zieht er

Verbindungslinien

zum

Thema

der

Collatio,

indem

er

die

vier

Vorzüge

einzelnen

Wörtern

des Themas zuordnet:

1)

Sciencia

(2)

nobis

(4)

de

natura

3)

est. Die

Aufzählung

der

vier

Vorzüge

erscheint o als die

Entfaltung

eines

im

Thema

verborgenen

hintergründigen

inns.

(1) Dico primo, quod describitur huius sciencie naturalis

135

< sublimitas sub

exceCllencia

etc>,

eo

quod

ipsa

premittit

principia,

causas

et

elementa. Et ideo scire

contingit

t

intelligere

circa omnes sciencias

quarum

sunt

principia,

cause

et

elementa;

secundum

philosophum

primo

phisicorum26.

(2)

Dico

secundo,

quod

consideratur

huius

sciencie

naturalis

140

sublimita<s> seu

fastigium

ub inhe<

renda etc>

,

eo

quod

ad

nostra attribuitur

ubiecta,

cum

dicitur

4

'nobis".

Nobis enim

sub< iciantur>

ea

que

sunt

natura;

prout

dicit

philosophus

Io

phisicorum, capitulo 2°27. (3) Dico tercio, quod declaratur hec

sciencia sub

subsistencia

etc

quo

ad

pre<senciam>

certiorem,

145

cum dicitur

4

'est".

(4)

Et

allegatur

huius sciencie

fastigium

ub

sufficiencia

amplioris

continencie

quo

ad

imp<

?>r< ... >28

evidenciaaioris

nherencie,

o

uod

d nostra

ttribuiturubiecta.

uia

nobis

ubiciantur

a

que

sunt atura

prout

icit

hilosophusrimohisicorum,

apitulo

°

(3)

Dico

ercio

quod

ec

ecla-

ratur ciencia

n

verbis

remi

ssis> sub

subsistencia

alidions

ermanencie

uo

ad

presencia

m>

certiorem.

uia

ciencia

obis enaturast

3°

phisicorum

n

<rincipio>

26

Aristoteles,

hys.

,

1:

1

4al - 1

27Aristoteles,hys., 2: 1 5al -28

Der

Prosareimäßt

ermuten,

aß

das verstümmelteortmit

..iam

ndete.

iel-

leichtautete

er

Reim

resenciam

ertiorem

mportanciamleniorem.

149

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


pleniorem,

um

subiungitur

natura".

Est,

inquam,

natura

prin-

cipium

et causa

movendi eius

in

quo

est

primo

et

per

se,

non

secundum <accidens>; 2° phisicorum, primo capitulo29.

-

150

Claret

igitur,

karissimi,

quod

vere

planum

est:

quoniam

sciencia

nobis

de natura est.

(1)

Der

erste

Vorzug

der

Naturphilosophie,

den der Verfasser in

eigenwilliger

Deutung

aus

dem

ersten

Satz

der

Aristotelischen

hysik

herausliest,

besteht

darin,

daß sie

fundamentale Einsichten

gewinnt

und

so

Grundlagenwissen

für

ndere Wissensbereiche iefert. nsofern

kann

man ihr besonders erhellende

Aussagen

(

clarior sentencia

zuerkennen.

(2)

Einen

weiteren

Vorzug

erblickt

der Verfasser

darin,

daß der

Gegenstand

der

Naturphilosophie

im Bereich der von uns

Menschen

erkennbaren

Gegenstände

(

nostra

ubiecta)

iegt.

Natur-

philosophischen

Aussagen

kommt

sogar

ein hoher

Grad

von Ein-

sichtigkeit

maior videnciazu. Dem

Aristoteleszitat,

as

den

zweiten

Vorzug bekräftigen

oll,

ist

ein

Sinn

unterschoben,

den

die Worte

im

ursprünglichen

Zusammenhang

nicht

haben.

(3)

Mit

den

Wörtern,

die den

dritten

Vorzug

umschreiben,

soll wohl

gesagt

sein,

daß

die

Aussagen

der

Naturphilosophie

dauerhaft

gelten

und

daß diese

Wissenschaft

von

den

Tagen

des Aristoteles

bis

in

die

Gegenwart

festenBestand

hat

(

validior

ermanencia

.

Der

getilgte

Entwurf

Anm.

25) zeigt,

daß

zur

Bestätigung

des dritten

Vorzuges

zunächst das

Aristoteleswort

dienen

sollte,

das dann

zum Thema der

ganzen

Collatio erhoben

worden ist:

"Wir

haben

naturphilosophisches

Wissen".

(4)

Die

Deutung

des

vierten

Vorzuges

ist

schwierig

und

das,

obwohl

die

geläufige,

kaum mißverstehbare

efinition

der Natur

als

Beleg

angeführt

wird. Vermutlich sind es

Bedeutung

und Weite

des

Gegenstandsbereiches

amplior

ontinencia

,

die

der Verfasser

der

Naturphilosophieals Vorzug anrechnet.

-

Der Abschnittüber die

vier

Vorzüge

der

Naturphilosophie

ist

der

"philosophischste"

der

ganzen

Collatio.

Es werden

wichtige philosophische

Probleme

berührt:

die

Aufgabe

der

Naturphilosophie,

hrVerhältnis

um

erken-

nenden

Subjekt,

die

Geltung

ihrer

Sätze,

ihr

Gegenstandsbereich.

Zudem

holt der

Redner diesmal die Stützen für eine

Aussagen

nicht

aus

biblischer,

sondern

aus

philosophischer

Vorratskammer.

Und

doch

präsentiert

r

sich

auch in diesem Abschnittnicht

eigentlich

ls

guter

Philosoph

oder

zuverlässiger

Aristoteleserklärer.

uch hier

will

er vor allem seine Sprachkunstzeigen.

29

Aristoteles,

hys.

I,

1:

192b20-23.

150

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Lernbereitschaft nd

Bescheidenheit ieren

den

Gebildeten. Diesen

Gedanken hat

Hugo

von

St. Viktor

ausgesprochen.

Unser

Redner

macht

sich

Hugos Ratschläge

zu

eigen. Das,

was er

anschließend

über

die

Naturphilosophie sagt,

stellt n der Tat an

die

Lernbereitschaft

und

die

Phantasie der

Zuhörer

große

Anforderungen.

Vieles ist

dunkel,

manches bleibt

unverständlich.

Rarissimi,

prout

dicit

Hugo

in

suo

Didascalikon

libro

3o,

capitulo

13°,

principium

discipline

humilitas

est,

cuius

cum

mult a

sint>

documenta,

hec

tria

precipue

ad lectorem

pertinent:primo

155 ut

nullam scienciam

vilem

teneat;

secundo ut

a ne < mine

>

discere

erubescat;

tercio

ut,

cum

scienciam

adeptus

fuerit,

eteros

non contempnat. Quoniam nemo est cui omnia scire d< atum

sit .

Ab omnibus

libenter

disce,

quoniam sapientior

eris30.

Insuper

et

istorum

philosophorum

tudiis

alutaribus

mmoremur

160

attencius et in

hiis

solicitemur et

maxime

in

sciencia naturali

Aristotilis,

cuius

ymaginem

Ermogennes

et

Achilles necnon

primitivi

p<...>

pulcerrimam

habebant

<...>

depictam.

Cuius

capud

erat de

auro,

pedes

de

luto,

corpus

de

ferro,

manus

de

arg<

ento

>

,

oculi de

cristallo,

igua

de

aere,

vestes de cérico31

165

crines de

sábulo. Hec

ymago

multis fuit

onerib<us

vel>

honoribus32 rnata. Dicebant

namque

ipsi, quod

in

capite

aureo

celum

gerebat,

in

corpore

ferreo

stellas

quasi

habebat,

cum

pedibus

luteis terram

primebat,

cum

manibus

argenteis

nubes

tenebat,

pro

suis

eloquiis

demones

timebant,

in

eius

crinibus

170

montes

pendebant,

et

de

eius

vestibus

angeli

cadebant.

Unde

ad

honorem

huius sciencie

naturalis circa

hanc

ymaginem

n

circuitu

sie

scriptum

rat:

(a)

Hic est

rex et

imperator,

cuius deus

est cognatus;

175

(b)

hec est

lex et

gubernator,

quam

celi

colit

ornatus;

(c)

hic

<est>

flumen

miserorum,

que( )

purgat

et

tollit

reatus;

(d)

hec est lumen

magistrorum,

180

que

mundi

regitprineipatus.

30

Hugo

de

S.

Victore,

idascalicon

II, 14;

PL

176,

73

f.

31

ericum

sericum.

32

Hier iegt ahrscheinlichine chreibervarianteor. ie entstehtadurch,aßein

Abschreiber

ber ie

Deutung

einer

orlage

m

unklaren

st nd

wei

hnliche

ör-

ter ur

Wahl

nbietet,

.B.

oneribus

el

onoribuswenn n

der

Vorlage

oneribus

teht.

151

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Der Redner beschreibt

das Bild

(

mago

depicta)

iner

menschlichen

Gestalt,

offenbar

ine

Allegorie

der

Naturphilosophie.

Der

Kopf

ist

aus

Gold,

die Füße

aus

Ton,

der

Körper

aus

Eisen,

die

Augen

aus

Kristall,

die

Zunge

aus

Kupfer,

die Kleider aus

Seide,

die Haare

aus

Sand. Die Teile der

Gestalt und die

Stoffe,

us denen sie

gebildet

ind,

werden

n

Beziehung gebracht

u bestimmten

Gegenständen:

Himmel

(goldener Kopf),

Sterne

(eiserner Körper),

Erde

(tönerne

Füße),

Wolken

(silberne Hände),

Dämonen

(Zunge), Berge

(Haare), Engel

(Kleider).

Was soll diese

Aufzählung

bedeuten?

Sind die

vielfältigen

Gegenstände

der

Naturphilosophie gemeint?

Offenbar hat der Ver-

fasserder

Collatio

das Bild und

seine

Deutung

nicht

elbst

erfunden,

sondern aus einer schriftlichen uelle übernommen33.War seine

Quelle

ein antikes oder ein

mittelalterlichesWerk? Wer

verbirgt

ich

unterden Namen

Hermógenes

und Achilles

Zeile 161)?

Wer sind die

Alten

{primitivi,

von

denen

in

der an

dieser Stelle verstümmelten

Handschriftnur der

Buchstabe

p

(Zeile 162)

zeugt?

Sind sie

es,

die

in

Zeile

166

zitiert

werden

(.

Dicebant

psi

?

Ein

Herausgeber,

der

sich

in

der

Philosophiegeschichte

ur

wenig,

n

der ateinischen

Philologie gar

nicht

auskennt,

muß die

Beantwortung

der

offenen

Fragen

notgedrungen

Kundigeren

überlassen und

beschämt bei

Hugo

von

St.

ViktorTrost suchen: Nemo est cui omnia sciredatum sit Zeile 157).

Zu dem

geschilderten

Bild der

Naturphilosophie

gehört

eine

viergliedrigegereimte

Umschrift,

ie

jedenfalls

aus einer

spätmittel-

alterlichen

Feder

geflossen

st.

Wenn

der

Verfasser diese Umschrift

seiner

Quelle

entnommen hat

-

und

er erweckt den

Eindruck

-

dann war

seine

Vorlage

sicher ein

spätmittelalterlicher

ext.

Die

gereimten

Zeilen

sprechen

a)

von einem

Herrscher,

der mit

Gott ver-

wandt

ist,

(b)

von

einem

gesetzeskundigen

Führer,

den die

Gestirne

schmücken34,

c)

von einem

Fluß,

der

Schuld

abwäscht,

d)

von einem

Licht der Lehrer, das die Machthaber der Welt lenkt35.Wer ist

gemeint?

Wenn

der Wechsel von hic und

hec

am

Beginn

der Zeilen

33

Ein

Anzeichen

afürstdas Wort ere. s

muß m

gegebenen

usammenhang

ls

Ablativ on

es

Kupfer)

erstandenerden. er

Verfasser

ißversteht

s alsAblativ

von er

Luft)Zeile

164u.

192).

Bei

richtigem

erständnisätter

nämlich

ach

en

orthographischen

egeln

einer eit re

so

Zeile

24)

schreiben üssen. r

muß lso

eine

Quelle

benutzt

aben,

ie

er

entweder

ißverstandenat

oder

die selbst as

Mißverständnischon nthielt.

34

Vgl.

Gen.

,1:

caeli t errat mnisrnatus

orum. Andere

eutung:

..

dendie

Engel erehren.35Andere

eutung:

.. das diebösenGeistereherrscht.

gl.

den

Begriff

rincipālus

in

den

Paulinischen

riefen,

.B. 1 Kor.

5,24

. Kol.

2,15.

152

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


kein

Schreibfehler

st,

dann muß

man

annehmen,

daß

teils Aristoteles

(a, c),

teils

die

Naturphilosophie

(b, d)

gemeint

ist. Indes

ist

ein

Schreibfehlerwahrscheinlicher; enn die

Wörter hic und

hec sind

in

der

Handschrift

bgekürzt

und unterscheiden

ich kaum

voneinander.

Es

spricht

viel

dafür,

daß

der

Verfasser,

der sich bei seiner

eiligen

Niederschriftehr oft

verschrieben

at,

hier viermal

hec chreiben

und

alle

Aussagen

auf die

Naturphilosophie

beziehen

wollte.

Nachdem

der Redner seinen Zuhörern ein

augenfälliges

Bild der

Naturphilosophie

orgestellt

at,

deutet

er einzelne

Züge

dieses

Bildes,

und

gewinnt

o

eine neue

Reihe

von

Vorzügen

der

Naturphilosophie.

Vorweg

beruft r

sich

auf

Boethius,

der

in

seinem Buch

über

den

"Trost der Philosophie" eine allegorische Frauengestaltbeschworen

hat,

in

der unser

Redner in

unbekümmert

igennütziger

Deutung

die

Naturphilosophie

oder

sogar

den Aristoteles elbst

erblickt.

Per hanc

igiturymaginem

excellentissimam

deducendo nostrum

propositum

intelligo

illam

de

qua

loquitur

Boetius

de

conso< lacione>

in

principio36,

bi describens

hanc scienciam

naturalem sive

eius

condi < torem

egregium

Aristotilem,

am

185

ymagini comparai

tam

exc<ellenti

quod>

excellencia

usque

ad

celi

pervenit

summitatem. Hec autem sciencia

ad modum

ymaginis

precunctis

st formata. < Habet >

capud

de

auro,

quia

celestivirtuti

oniungitur;

habet

corpus

de

ferro,

uia

cum labore

magno acquiritur;

habet

p

< e > des < de >

luto,

quia

in

terra

an-

190

tum(?)

cognoscitur;

habet manus

de

argento, quia

de

ipsa

honestas

nascitur;

habet oculos

de

saphiro, quia

spernit

vitiorum

immundiciam;

habet

liguam

de aere

propter

excellenciam

argumentorum;

habet

v<ero> crines de sábulo

propter

ffluen-

ciam

meritorum;

sed habet vestes de

cérico

propter

virtutum

195 habundanc< iam> et morum.

In

der Reihe der

acht

Vorzüge

fallen

diejenigen

auf,

die die

moralische Kraft der

Naturphilosophie

herausstellen.

Sie ist Wurzel

der

Ehrbarkeit,

verachtet

schmutzige

Laster,

ist reich

an sittlichen

Verdiensten

und

Tugenden.

Man wird sich

fragen,

warum der

Verfasser mit so

großem

Nachdruck ethische

Vorzüge

der Natur-

philosophie

vorbringt.

Vermutlich

wirkt sich

hier

der

Zweck der

Festrede

aus,

die als Collatio commendatoria

das Lob

der

Natur-

36

Boethius,

e

consolatione

hilosophiae

lib.

,

prosa

,

§ 2;

ed.

A.

Fortescue,

ondon

1925,

.

2

f.

153

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


philosophie vorzutragen

hat.

Ein

Lob,

das

nicht auch

sittliche

Vorzüge

erfaßte,

wäre

unvollständig.

An den

Schluß

seiner

Collatio

setzt

der

Redner einen

philo-

sophischen

Gedankengang,

in seinen

Augen

gewiß

die

Krönung

des

Ganzen:

Die

Naturphilosophie

hat

Züge

des

'

'vollkommenen

Seienden".

Quapropter

sciencia

naturalis

precunctis

audabilis bene

perfec-

tum

ens

dici

potest.

Nam

sicud ens

est

primari

um

>

universale,

sicud ens est

omnium

rerum

principale,

sicud ens

supponit

fun-

damentům,

sicud ens

disponit

complement

um > etiam

200 omnium

rerum

que

sunt vel

esse

possunt

in

natura,

sic

hec

naturalis seu phisicalis sciencia perfectum(?) pud hominescon-

cipi potest.

Nam

ipsa

est

quedam

res

universalis,

que regem

cupit

et

amplectit

pauperem;

ipsa

est omnium rerum

principalis,

nam

ipsa

nutrii

esuriem;

ipsa

est morum

fundamentum,

que

tocius

205

mali

tollit

ymaginem;

et

est meritorum

omplementum, ue

post

laborem adducit

requiem.

Quam

nobis

concédât

qui

sine

fine

regnat.

Amen.

Bevor kritische Leser einzelne Wörter auf die Goldwaage legen,

sollten

sie

bedenken,

daß der Redner die

Wortwahlden

Gesetzen

der

Reimprosa

unterwirft. s sind

gereimt: rimarium

niversale

rerum

rin-

cipale

supponitundamentum

disponit

omplementum;

upit egem amplectit

pauperem

nutrii suriem tollit

maginem

adducit

equiem

Der Verfasser

macht

zunächst vier

Aussagen

über

das

Seiende,

wobei

er

es

in

sorgloser

rhetorischer

reiheit

unterläßt,

zwischen dem

Seinsbegriff,

dem

Seienden und dem

Sein

des

Seienden

zu

unterscheiden.

Das

"Seiende"

ist

(1)

das erste

Allgemeine,

der

umfassendste

Begriff;

s

ist (2) das Wichtigste,die Hauptsache; es ist (3) Grundlage und (4)

Vollendung

aller

Dinge.

Den vier

Aussagen

über das "Seiende" ent-

sprechen

vier

Aussagen

über

die

Naturphilosophie.

Sie

hat eine

vier-

fache

Bedeutung

fürdie

Menschen:

(1)

Sie ist

allgemein,

weil sie alle

betrifft,

om

König

bis

zum

Bettler;

2)

sie ist

wichtig,

weil sie den

Hunger

stillt;

3)

sie

ist

Grundlage

der

Sittlichkeit;

4)

sie

ist

Voll-

endung,

insofern

ie

zur

ewigen

Seligkeit

führt.

Und

damit

hat

unser

Festredner eine Zuhörer an

den Punkt

geführt,

n dem die meisten

zünftigen

cholastischen

Predigten

enden:

die

ewige Seligkeit.

Die Collatio ist vollendet. Der Redner hat die munterenSprünge

seiner Phantasie und seine Wortkunst

vorgeführt.

m

folgenden

Teil

154

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


seiner

Antrittsvorlesung,

em

wissenschaftlichen

Vortrag,

muß er

eine

ganz

andere

Rolle

übernehmen,

die des

scharfsinnigen

Philosophen. Wie ihm das gelungen ist, wissen wir nicht. Er verrät

uns

nur das Thema

seines

Vortrags:

Pro

Introitu

n

libros

phisicorum

sit

hec

questio:

Utrum

materia

prima

sit

principium

n naturali

prod

<

uctione

.

210

Arguitur

uod

non.

Es

geht

um

die

Frage,

ob die erste

Materie eines

der

Prinzipien

n

den

natürlichen

ntstehungsprozessen

ei

-

eine

Frage,

die Aristoteles

n

der Physikausführlich ehandelt37.Unser junger Philosoph hat sie,

seinem Meister Aristoteles

olgend,gewiß

mit

Ja

beantwortet.

Die Collatio

ist

nicht

das

Werk

eines

begabten

Geistes,

hat

aber

doch ihre

Reize,

und zwar

darin,

daß sehr

verschiedene Gestalt-

elementeauf

eine-

manchmal verblüffende

Weise

miteinanderverbun-

den sind.

Philosophischer

nhalt

ist in die

Form einer

theologischen

Predigt gegossen.

Aus der

Bibel,

aus

philosophischen

Schriften,

us

der

Dichtung

und

sogar

aus

der

bildenden

Kunst

werden

Beiträge

her-

angeholt.

Die

Sprache

wechselt das

Kleid:

Prosa,

Reimprosa,

rhyth-

mische Poesie lösen einander ab. Ernste Aussagen sind überlagert

vom

Spiel

der Worte und Gedanken.

Ein

mäßig begabter

Schul-

meister

chwingt

ich auf zum

Minnesänger,

der

seine

"Herrin",

die

Philosophie,

überschwenglich

obt. Und

immer wieder

schlüpft

der

Redner ins Gewand

des

Gauklers,

der

mit akrobatischen

Kunst-

stücken

Beifall

heischt. Das

alles ist

bemerkenswert,

ber

gewiß

nicht

einmalig.

Die

Verwendung

von

Poesie und

Prosareim,

abwegige

Wortwahl und

gekünstelter

atzbau

waren im 14.

und 15.

Jahr-

hundert weitverbreitete

hetorische

Mode

-

bei

vielen

beliebt,

von

einigenauch getadelt38.

Es

mag

sein,

daß manche

Leser der Collatio

den Reiz

des Merk-

würdigen

absprechen.

Den

Reiz des Seltenen

wird

man ihr

zuerken-

nen müssen.

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einer

der

wenigen Zeugen

für inen

philosophischen

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Text

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derer,

die die

spätmittelalterliche

ultur

in

allen ihren

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uch

den

unbedeutenden,

kennenlernen

wollen.

37

Vgl.

Aristoteles,

hys.

,

7-9.

38

Die StatutenerTheol.Fakultät

er

Universität

rfurtchärfenen

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ein, ie solltenhreGedankenineuperßuishytmistverbisnutilibus,ictisel eregrinis

vortragenzitiert

ach:

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Kleineidam,

niversitas

tudii

rffordensis

Teil

I,

Leipzig

1964,

57).

155

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


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156

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Vivarium

XI,

2

(1983)

Books

Received

TheWorks

f

Richard

f

Campsall

Volume

,

edited

y

Edward

.

Synan,

ontifical

Institute

f

Mediaeval

Studies,

oronto

982,

50

pp.

S

29.00 SBN

0

88844

0588

(v. 2) (Studies

nd

Texts,

8)

Alessandra arabochia añavero, segi iblicacosmologia.ote ull'interpretazione

patristica

medioevalei Genesi

,2,

Vita

e

Pensiero,

Milano

981,

19

pp.

Lire

12.000

Francesco

ottin,

a

scienza

egli

ccamisti.

a

scienza

ardo-medievalealle

rigini

del

paradigma

ominalista

lla rivoluzione

cientifica,

aggioli

Editore,

Rimini

982,

62

pp.

Lire15.000

Studi

i filosofia

di storia ella

ilosofia,

)

Ann

Moss,

Ovid nRenaissancerance.

Survey

ftheLatin

Editions fOvid and

Commentaries

rinted

n

France efore

600,

he Warburg

nstitute,

ondon

1982,

2

pp.

£

5.00

SBN

0

85481 59

5

(Warburg

nstitute

urveys,

III)

Jozef Jsewijn,

heatrum

elgico-

atinum.et

Neolatijns

oneel

n de

Nederlanden,

in:

Academiae

nalecta,

ededeling

etteren,

rg.

43,

1981

nr

,

600. B.F.

(Brepols, urnhout)DescriptivenventoriesfManuscripticrofilmedor he illMonasticanuscriptibrary.

Austrian

ibraries,

ol. :

Geras,

Güssing,

aus,

nnsbruck

ilten,

alzburg

E.b.

Konsistorialarchiv,

alzburg

.b.

Priesterseminar,

alzburg

Museum

Carolino-

ugusteum,

chlierbach,

chwaz,

y

D.

Yates,

Collegeville,

inne-

sota

1981,

17

pp.

$

30.00

St.John's niversity)

Mystics

Philosophers

and

Politicians.

ssays

n

Jewish

ntellectual

istory

n

Honor

of

Alexander ltmann.

dited

y

Jehuda

einharz nd

Daniel

Swetschinski,

with he ollaborationf

Kaiman .

Bland,

uke

University

ress,

Durham

N.

C.

1982,

vi+

372

pp.

$

32.75

SBN

0

8223

04465

(Duke Monographs

n

Medieval nd Renaissance

tudies,

o

5)

Medievalia

Universidad

utónoma

e

Barcelon Instituto

niversitario

e

estudios

medievales) (1981),Contents:ictoria irlot,Unejemploconográficoe a ideadel

oder

n ornolano

mil;

MariáMercedes

osta,

os

reyes

e

ortugal

n a

rontera

castellano-aragonesa1304);

Felipe

Mateu

Llopis,

Un omentario

l textooneixenes

de

les

monedes

e

osMemoriales

e

Pere

Miquel

arbonell

José

Enrique

Ruiz

Domenec,

l sonido

e a

batallanBertran

eBornAlavaro

antamariá,

n torno

de a institucionalizaron

el

Reino e Mallorcan el

siglo

XIII'

Federico dina

Martorell,

n

nforme

obre

atalunya

levado Carlos

en

1520'

Boletín iblio-

gráfico;

rónica;

nforme

Mittellateinisches

ahrbuch

Band 16

(1981),

unter

Mitwirkung

on Peter

Dronke,

Cola

Minis,

eter on

Moos,

Jürgen

tohlmann,

osef

zôvérffy

erausgegeben

vonKarl

Langosch

ndFritz

Wagner

Anton

Hiersemann

ERLAG-Stuttgart)

ISBN 3 7772 1476

ErasmusfRotterdamocietyYearbookne 1981), dited yRichard . DeMolen,

Erasmus f Rotterdam

ociety,

37Wilson

ridge

rive

C-l),

Oxon

Hill,

Md

20745,

35.00 SSN

0276-2854,

ontents

Virginia

W.

Callahan,

edicatory

157

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Essay

n

Honor

fMargaret

ann

hillips',

larenceH.

Miller,

The

pigramsf

Erasmusnd

More:

Literary

iptychJacques

homarat,

rammarnd

Rhetoric

in he

araphrasesf

he

ospels

y

rasmus.

oseph

.

Klucas,

rasmusnd rasmians

onEducationnSixteenth-enturyortugal',. DouglasMcCullough,heConcept

of

aw n he

houghtf

rasmus

Margaret

ann

Phillips,

rasmusn he

ongue

Cecil

H.

Clough,

rasmus

nd

he ursuit

fEnglish oyal

atronage

n

1517

nd

1518'

Germain

arc'hadour,

mnium

orarum

omo:

A

ManFor ll easons

Nicolaas an der

Blom,

On Verse

f

Erasmus

id.,

OnAnothererse

f

rasmus

Reviews

Dieter

Wuttke,

Aby

M.

Warburgs

ähodels

Anregung

nd

ufgabe

,

Gratia-

erlag,

Göttingen

979,

3

pp.

10.00

DM

ISBN 3

921834 2

X

1

Anne-Kathrin

randt,

Die

'tugentreich

raw

rmut3.

esitz nd rmutn der

ugend-

lehre

esHans

achs

Gratia-Verlag,

Göttingen

979,

5

pp.

12.00

DM

ISBN

3 921834

4

X

Joachim

Knape,

De oboedientia

t fide

uxoris.Petrarcas

umanistisch-moralisches

ExempelGriseldis'nd einerüheeutscheezeptionGratiaVerlag,Göttingen

1978,

1

pp.

12.00

DM ISBN 3

921834 5 8

Gerhard

treckenbach,

tiltheoriend

hetorik

er ömerm

piegel

er umanistischen

Schüler

espräche,

ratia

Verlag,

Göttingen

979,

iii

252

pp.

22.00DM ISBN

3

921834

6 6

Ingeborg

admehr,

ypik

er

Gefühlsdarstellung

n

der

rühneuhochdeutschenrzählprosa

Gratia

Verlag,

Göttingen

980,

iii

270

pp.

28.00

DM

ISBN

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8

2

Paul Oskar

Kristeller,

tudien

ur

Geschichteer hetoriknd um

egriff

es

Menschen

inder enaissance

Gratia

Verlag,

Göttingen

981,

149

pp.

18.00

DM

ISBN

3 921834

9 0

Elfriede Regina

Knauer,

Die CartaMarina esOlaus

Magnus

on 539 Gratia

Verlag,

Göttingen

981,

51

pp.

18.00

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ISBN 3 921834 0

4

Paul Oskar Kristeller,Hans Maier, Thomas orusls HumanistH. Kaiser

Verlag,

Bamberg

982,

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ISBN 3 921834

1

2

Albert

Rabil,

LauraCereta.

uattrocento

umanist

State

University

ew

York,

Binghamton,

.Y.

1981,

79

pp.

$

18.00 SBN

0

86698 02

4

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Le Balet

omique

y

althazare

Beaujoyeulx,

581.

A Facsimile ith n

ntroduction

y

Margaret

.

McGowan,

enter or

Medieval& Early

Renaissance

tudies,

Binghamton,

.Y.

1982,

%

19.00 SBN 0

86698 12

1

MRST, 6)

The

ntry

f

Henri

I

into aris

6

June

549. With

n

Introductionnd Notes

y

I.

D.

McFarlane,

enter

for

Medieval & Early Renaissance

tudies,

Binghamton,

.Y.

1982,

19.00 SBN

0

86698

13X

(MRST, 7)

Wayne

Shumaker,

enaissance

uriosa.

ohn

Dee's Conversation ith

Angels,

Girolamo

ardano's

Horoscope

f

Christ,

ohannes

rithemiusnd

Crypto-

graphy, eorgeDalgarno'sUniversal anguage, enterfor Medieval &

Early

Renaissance

tudies,

Binghamton

.Y.

1982,

07

pp.

$

18.00 SBN

0

86698

14

8

(MRST, 8)

William

f

Malmesbury,

olyhistor.

Critical dition

y

Helen

Testroet

uellette,

Center for Medieval & Early Renaissance

tudies,

Binghamton,

.Y.

1982,

76

pp.

S

19.00 SBN

0

86698

17

2

(MRST,

10)

Italian

ulture

/,

dited

y

D.

RadclifT-Umstead,

enterfor Medieval

& Early

Renaissance

tudies,

inghamton

.Y.

1982

ContentsK.

Falvey,

heTwo

Judgment

cenesn the Great

t.

Andrewdvent

lay'J.

T.

S.

Wheelock,

he

Varying

emantics

f

Analogy

n he

ommedia;

.

Russell,

All' ombra

el

erlaro

narrazionedescrizione

el

madrigale

nella acciarsnovisticaD.

RadclifT-Umstead,

An talian

(

Comedyf

rrors'

G.

P.

Pierce,

owards

Popular

heatern

Seven-

teenth-Century

ilanA. Hallock, antasticheria:

erga'

Declaration

f

Transition

Books eviews

158

8/9/2019 VIVARIUM - VOL. 21, NOS. 1-2, 1983


Cahierse

'Institutu

Moyen-ge

rec

t

atin

Université

e

Copenhague),

ol.

41

(1982)

Contents

Jan

inborg

n

memoriam

III-VII;

Bibliographyf

he

ublications

f

Jan inborg

VIII-XII;

Jan

Pinborg,

nonymi

uaestiones

nTractatus

etri

ispani

-

III Traditaen odiceracoviensi42 nnoere350), -170; anPinborg,he 4th

Century

chools

f rfurt.

epertoriumrfordiense

171-192.

SSN

0591-0358

Cahiers

e 'Institut

u

Moyen-

ge

rec

t atin

Université

e

Copenhague),

ol.

42

(1982).

Three

ogical

reatises

scribed

oThomasradwardine:.

O.

Nielsen,

ho-

mas

radwardine'Treatise

n

incipit

and

desinit'.

ditionnd ntroduction

1-83;

N.

J.

Green-Pedersen,

radwardine

?)

onOckham'

Doctrine

f

Consequences.

n dition

85-150;

.

Pinborg,

pus

rtis

ogicae,

51-164.SSN 0591-0358

Cahiers

e

'Institutu

Moyen-

ge rec

t

atin

Université

e

Copenhague),

ol. 43

(1982)

Contents

K. E.

Dalgaard,

eter

f

reland's

ommentary

nAristotle's

eri

Hermeneias,

-44;

A.

Bülow-Jacobson

St.

Ebbesen,

aticanus

rbinas

raecus5.

AnEdition

f

he cholia

nAristotle's

ophistici

lenchi45-120. SSN

0591-0358

Comitatus

A

Journal

f

Medieval

nd Renaissance

tudies,

2

1981):

Center or

MedievalndRenaissancetudies,CLA.- ContentsP. Kidney,nterviewith

C.

Warrenollister

5-12;

C.

Rudolph,

eterodoxy

nd

he welve reateasts

f

he

Eastern

hurch

13-30;

M. A.

Beckwith,

he

lliterativeeter

f

iers

lowman,

1-

39;

D. S.

Spear,

Researchacilities

n

Normandy

nd

aris

A

Guide

or

tudents

f

Me-

dieval orman

istory

40-53;

.

Martin,

At he

alace

f tesiphon

QASEEDA

of

KHAAQAANI,

ranslated

rom

he ersian

54-69;

.

C.

Wilman,

Medievalr-

ban rontiersman

Pere eBarcelo

70-96

Wilfried

ühn,

Das

Prinzipienproblem

nder

hilosophie

es

Thomas

on

quin

Verlag

B.

G.

Grüner,

msterdam

982,

XXXVIII

+

555

pp.

Hfl. 5.- ISBN

90 6032

227

4

(Bound)

Manuel

Breva-Claramonte,

anctius'

heory

f anguage.

Contribution

o

he

istory

of

Renaissance

inguistics,ohn

Benjamins,

msterdam-Philadelphia

983,

VIII 4- 94pp.Hfl.90.- ($33.00) SBN90272 45053

vivarium - vol. 21, nos. 1-2, 1983

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