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PAGE THEGENERAL

valon Hill Philosophy Part 64ENER

rne ame Players Na gaz ~neThe Avalon Hi ll GENERAL is dedicated to the presenta-

tion of auth orita tive articles on the strategy, tactics, andvariation of Avalon H il l games of strategy. Historical articles

are included oniv insomuch as they provide useful back-ground inforr rrent Avalon Hill titles. THEGENERAL is the Avalon Hi ll Company solelyfor the culturi f the serious game aficionado, nthe hopes of i lame owner's proficiency of playand providing .herwise available to the AvalonHill game buff.

Publication 1s bi-monthly with maili ngsmadeclosetothe end of February. April, June. August. October , andDecember. All edl torlal and general ma il should besen t tothe Avalon Hill Game Company. 4517 Harford Ad.,Baltimore. O 21214 One yearsubscriptlons are $7.50.Trlal subscrlptlons of 4 issues for $5.00 are available. Atwo year subscription is only 512.00. Send checks ormoney orders only. Not responsible o rcas h lost in transit.All subscr~ptlons ent via bulk permit. Airmail and 1stclass delivery must be prearranged wlth the subscriptiondepartment at additlori al cost. Address changes must besubmitted to the subscription department 6 weeks in

-advance o guar antee delivery. No paid advertlsina of anytype is accep , news of ~ m r ewargaming cc ~ rinted ree 1 s

solic~ted.Articles from nuomrtlsrs are considered for puwgcatton at

the discretion of our editorial staff. Articles should betypewritten, double-spaced, and embrace the tenets of goodEnglish usags. There is no lim it to w ord length. Accompany-ing examples and diagrams should be neatly done in black orred ink. Photographs should have caption and credit linewrit ten on back. Rejected articles wil l be returned wheneverpo%ibIe.

EDITOR: Donald J. GreanwoaGRAPHICS: Jim Hamilton, I

Moores, Steve Oliff. Charles

Nothing, i t seems, marches on at t he steady,unstoppable pace of inflation. The new year wi llbring yet another price increase for Avalon Hill

games making Christmas this year a doubleinducement for purchase of that Avalon Hillgame you've been putting off. Effective January1st all flat box games currently priced at $9. 00will sell for $10.00. In addition the followingbookcase games will rise to $12.00: ARABISRAELI WAR S, DIPLOMACY, THIRD REICH,PANZER LEADER, PANZERBLITZ, WORDPOWER, SHAKESPEARE, TUF, TUFABET, andOUTDOOR SURVIVAL.

NEW GAMES REPORT

ASSAULT ON CRETE, NAPOLEON, andSUBMARINE are all in various staaes of

A.R.E.A.

Action in the A.R.E.A. r ating pools has beenhot and heavy of late wi th more and more people

reaching th e verif ied stage. A:R.E.A. technicianRon LaPorte reminds everyone that in order tofile a complaint (or answer one) in regards to anA.R.E.A. matc h you must in clude a SSAE andstate the A.R.E.A. n umber of both yourself andyour opponent. If you don't know the latter youmust provide us wi th his last known address.Our records are kept by numerical order. Wecannot look up an individual alphabetically.Failure to follow these simple in structions bogsdown t he system and makes it impossible for usto act on your problem.

MAGNETIC GAMES

nstion on cutpublished by

11 edification omproving the gservices not 01

production and wil l probably be announced formail order sale i n the next issue, if not this one.All w ill sell for 81 2.00. Thosewhocan't wait canplace their orders now and the games will beshipped when they become available. For themore patient, full page adswill follow i n he nextissue.

Work cont inues apace on the 197 8 projects.THE RISING SU Nhas been turned over to newdeveloper Frank Davis for comp letion by nextJuly. Davis comes to Avalon Hill a veteran of sixyears of professional wargame design anddevelopment. SPI advocates wil l recall hi s workon WELLINGTON S VICTORYand FREDERICKTHE GREAT among others. Frank made theswitch to Avalon Hill to enjoy our less rigorouspublication schedule and looks forward toworking w ith the Avalon Hill playtesting system.His eye for detail and completeness of rulespresentation will be a definite asset in theproduction of the TRS monster.

Don Greenwood and John Hill have mappedout the SQUAD LEADERexpansion kit series.Plans call for an eventu al series of six gametteswhich will provide enough additional counters,maps, rulesandchar ts togamealmost anyW Wlltactical situation. Each gamette wil l be boxed inan 8" x 11" x 1" semi-bookcase box with fullcolor art. At least one ne w somorphic board andsix programmed instruction scenarios will beincluded in each gamette. The first twogameswill be entitled CROSS OF IRON andBLITZKRIEG-THE EARLY YEARS.COI dealssolely with the Eastern Front and will concen-trate on expanded and more realistic armorrules. Armor counters will be provided forvirtually all of the armor which saw action onboth sides. Also included will be cavalry,

snipers, and SS units. B-TEY will, as the titlesuggests, deal with Germany's early conquests.British, French, Polish and Norwegian infantrywil l be introduc ed as well as the early armor ofboth sides. Partisans, a ne w terra in feature, andadvanced infantry rules will offer even morevariety. Both kits should be available in early1978.

Work on GUNSLINGER, BISMARCK,TRIREME and NORMANDY continues onschedule with publication expected in time forORIGINS IV. In addition, J oh n Edwards-theAustralian designer of THE RUSSIAN CAM-PAIGN, is about to lay his western frontcounterpart on us. If up to John's usualstandards it could well be added to the 1978lineup.

Our n ewest service offering t o our customersis one whic h we fee l offers a great deal of both"charisma" and uti lity to wargamers. The

development of a new type of pliable, magneticmaterial has revolutionized many aspects of theoffice supplies indus try giving bi rth to a varietyof convenient inventory control and memodevices withou t ha ving to resort to the far lessversatile and clumsy metal magnet. We'vediscovered a way to apply this new ma terial towargames. The result is a product that anydevoted postal enthusiast wil l long cherish; theability to magnetize your favorite game@) Nolonger do you have to worry about your mother-in-law or child inadvertently knocking over thegameboard (as happened to this write r just lastmonth) and scattering your panzers across thesteppes of your living room. In act, we purposelydropped one of these magnetized games from aheight of four feet to test the results of just suchan eventuality. Only one counter was dislodgedfrom its original position. Don't you try itthough . . . continual shocks of this sort willeventually cause your pieces to lose theirmagnetism.

The usefulness of a magnetic gameboarddoesn't start and end with the postal player.Think of it . . . now you can display your gamesin progress vertically on the wall. Perhaps youplay by phone or during your lunch hour at work.Just make your move and leave it there to studyon the wa ll over your desk until tomorrow whenit's the re set up and ready to resume play. Andtalk about a conversation piece . . . what betterway to proclaim to any potential closetwargamer . . . "hey, I actually play those thingstoo."

Al l you have to do to magnetize your favoritegame is order the necessary magnetic tape andan unmounted mapboard. The magnetic tapecomes in %"wide, 1 16" thick, one foot lengthswi th self sticking adhesive already applied to thebackside. Using an exacto knife or ordinary razorblade cut the tape into % lengths. Each %"square bonds perma nently with the un it counteron contact. A pleasant side effect is that eachcounter is now Ye thick and easier to handle.NOTE: It is important to secure the countersuniformly to the magnetic strips so that thepolarity is not reversed. Therefore, we suggestyou use chalkor a crayon todrawa line along thetop of each magnetic strip before cutting

ted. However)mm uni ty 8s

Iortance to thf charge and

d

, Rodger Mac; Veit. Jean B;

:Gowan. Scotler. Stephanic

Czech, Margaret LehmanEDIT ORIAL STAFF: J. Angiolillo. R. Beyma. W. Buchan-an. D. Burdlck, S. Carus. R. Chiang. J. C onnolly. J. Davis.R. Easton. A. Gruen, R. Hamblen, R. Harm0n.T. Ha2lett.T.Hilton, J. Jarvinen. R. Livermore, R. Medrow. D. Mil ler, T.Oleson, G. Phillies, L. Pinsky, R. Plock, J. Pournel le, R.Reed. M. Saha. D. Turnbull. M. Uh l. C. Vasey. L. Zocchi.

PUZZLE EDIT

To facilitate sto Avalon Hill IS

follows:A.R.E.A. Technic ian: Ron L2Purchases of the GENERAL iept. - Gertrud.

OR: A. Richa~

correwondencbe marked in

rd Hamblen

e, we SugSast tlthe lower left

?at all envelope-hand corner a

me parts: Ordsr

Ouestions Concerning Play: Research & Design Owartmmt.Note: all questions should be throughly diagrammed. Noquestions will be answered that are not accompanied by astamped, self-addressed envelope. Only questions regardingrule clarifi cations (not hi stor ical or design subjects) can ba

answered.

Articles for Publication, Lena rBrochures, and Readers Respot I

Oept. Donald Greenwood.

EXCLUSIVE AGENTS: ENG ,-- iHill(U.K.)Ltd..650 High Rd., No. Finchl ey N. 12 ONL; AUSTRALIA:JEDKO Games. 11 1 Beatrlce St. Cheltenham 3192.Victoria: SCANDINAVIA: A.H. SCANDINAVIA. P.O. Box329,13103 Nacka 3, Sweden; GERMANY: HOBBYCOM-MERZ. FeldbergstraBe 35. 6051 Dudenhofen, W. Ger-

many; GREECE: American Book & News, 68 SyngrouAve.. Athen s 408; ITALY: Don. Alfredo Gentili. Tirrenia(Plsa). Via del Lecci 1; JAPAN: Taiyo Trading Co.. P.O. Box95, Asakusa, Tokyo 11 1

AREA O COORDINA TOR: ( multi-player games only)Steve Heinowski, 1630 W. 28th St.. Lorain. OH 44052

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THEGENERAL PAGE

NUTS BOLTS PHILOSOPHY A N D DESIGNBy Richard Hamblen

THE PHILOSOPHY

Consider, for a m oment, the war in the Pacificdurin g World Wa r 11. It was fought over40,000,000square miles-from Pearl Harbor to Ceylon, fromthe Aleutian Islands to the South Pacific-and thenature of thestruggle was such tha t there was alwaysa threat of a b attle everywhere along th e front line.This area is 30 times the entire area covered by th eRusso-German struggle-the "Eastern Frontw-during the entire course of the war Th e opposingforces included the greatest navies in the history ofthe world-the legendary B ritish fleet was only apoor thir amongst the combatants-enormous airfleets and millions of soldiers that could range farand wide across the combatant area. Land armieswould take mon ths to trud ge across distances thatships could traverse in days, and airplanes couldstrike over in hours.

Now consider the nature of the co mbat. With al lof these forces spread over all that area, the mostcrucial battles were often foug ht by small forcesfighting for the tiniest airfield. Yet these tacticallysmall battles could yield strategically enormousresults, with the victor's planes ra ngin g far,destroying enemy planes, ships and troops andcutting off supply lines so effectively that any

surviving enemy troops were isolated, helpless,effectively ou t of the war, s that the victor couldignore them an d carry his at tack to the next crucialt iny island. E normous armies and en ormous fleetscould be held at bay, useless, by planes operatingout of a single airfield that had been won in adesperate struggle by a few battalions.

How can you represent such a vast war-and,paradox ically. such a microcosmic war-in awargame?

Th e first thing to be recognized is that the gamemust recreate the strategic consequences of thenum erou s battles if it is going to resemble the overallwar in the Pacific. These strategic considerationsdid not merely determine the overall direction ofeach side's attacks; in the Pacific, strategic con-siderations had to be taken into account ateverystep, both because in a sea war every maneuver iscostly in effort and risky to boot, and because thesmallest tactical decision could have enormousstrategic effects. With the sudden increase inairpower 's deadliness, an island-hopping war a t seasuddenly had the capabil ity of winninga war almostby itself-and this was particularly true where bothsides were fighting across a vast ocean where the wareffort rested on the fragile shoulders of shipping.

Th e military maneuvering in the Pacific-the hof any Pacific war game-was permeated strategic considerations, so a game on the ovePacific war must reflect the strategic aspects ofstruggle if the players are to have the choicehistory.

Second ly, (and more obviously), the game mhave some way of recreating the land, sea andbattles that actually determined the course ofwar in the Pacific. This is no small task-in factalmost impossible to do while keeping the gplayable in a reasonable amount of time. problem lies in the different time scales thatinvolved in land, sea and air combat. Land utake weeks to cover distanc es that ships can crodays and planes can fly over in hours. Even woland un its in com bat can fight for months beforbattle is resolved, while battles at sea usually laday (it takes that long to brea k away if things stago wrong), and crucial air com bat and air str iketake place in minutes Unfortunately, all of ttypes of movement and combat should be goinat the sa me time, excep t in very different time scand worst of all, they cannot really be separbecause they are very interactive-victory in type of comba t would have a profound effect o

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P GE THE GENER L

continuation of the other types of combat. Theresult is a rat s nest of minute s and m onth s, milesand kilomiles, extending in time and spacethroughout the Pacific war.

Clearly, some of the comba t (and com batants)has to be lumped together an d severely abstracted inthe game system, to keep things manageable.Typically, individual air sorties are lumped intomissions that extend over months; only the majorredeployments of ships are portrayed, with the ships

lumped into groups. Thus has it ever been instrategic-level games , and really it s not all that bad,since in practice military units ar e grouped and incombat, s mall maneuvers an d small victories can beconsidered incidents that merely lead up to thevictory or defeat of the massed unit that is trying tocarry out i ts mission. The important thing toremember abou t these abstractions is that the gamesystem should include the incidents that make adifference in the outcome-for example, if thedamaging of a ship would affect an overall battle,either by lessening its combat ability or byencouraging a player to withdraw from the batt le,then that damaging should be represented.

So we are left with the parameters of a playablegame about the whole Pacific war: represent thestrategy, abstract the battles but represent theimpo rtant incidents. These were the parameters thatfollowed in designing V I C TO RY I N TH

PA CIFIC.

I L L U S IO N S O F R E A L I T Y

At the very heart of a ny game are the designer spreconceptions about his subject, so to explainVlTP s design, 1 11 start by explaining how I perceivethe strategy of the war in the Pacific.

Japan s first and essential objective was the oil ofIndonesia, which w ould be required if Japan smilitary machine was to be able to function at all.Thus, Japan s f irst priori ty in the war was tocontro land maintain the security of Indonesia and all theother Japanese possessions scattered across thePacific. It was fo r the sake of this security th at the

Japa nese were determined to ca pture all alien basesin these areas (both to gain the bases for Japaneseuse and to remove the threat of enem y action); it wasthese bases that lured the Japanese into war anddetermined the initial at tacks on Singa pore, Guam,Wake, Java and the Philippines.

Beyond these crucial areas, the Japan ese had n opressing military needs, only alluring opportu nities.The Japanese could at tack towards Brit ish India,towards Austral ia, towards the Austral ian andU.S.-mandated islands of the Sou th Pacific,towards Midway and Hawaii or towards theAleutians; and all of these areas was within theJapanese capability to take and hold (for a while,anyway), but none of them was essential so theJapanese could choose freely between them. All ofthem were within Japan s sphere of am bitions(which in fact extended beyond, into areas thatJapan had no hope of winning or holding in theimmediate future), and gaining any of them wouldhave the additional-and important-benefit ofcrippling the Allied war effort, thus enhancingJapan s chances of winning the war.

These were the Japane se objectives. Jap an wasnot trying to win a total war, destroying andoccupying their enemies, so their plans were to takethese objectives-and then hold them against theinevitable Allied counterattacks. Th e Japa nesestrategy for gaining these objectives was based onthe realization th at eventually Jap an would have tofight a defensive war against a superior UnitedStates Navy (due to superior Allied shipbuilding).The Japa nese strategy fo r facing this eventual Alliedsuperiority had a num ber of main elements: I) togain as much of an init ial advantage a s was possible,

gaining initial superiority an d using it to captu restrategic points that would reduce Allied warpotential, deprive the Allies of forward bases andmaximize the area that the Allies would have toreconquer; 2) to form a tough defensive perimeterfrom which Japanese land-based air could defeatAllied advanc es; 3) in the defensive phase, to use theJapa nese fleet as a spoiling force, raiding fromwithin the defensive perimeter as the opportunitiesto cripple the Allies arose; and 4) to avo id a war ofattrition-which would favo r the Allies eventualmaterial superiority-and instead to seek climacticbattles in which the massed, superbly trainedJapa nese fleet could destroy locally infer ior Alliedforces in detail. Unfortunately, these principlesconflict with each othe r so in practice a b alancealways had to be worked out between them, and s oalthough the Japanese Navy stayed with theseprinciples thro ugho ut the war, the balance betweenthe principles and the emphasis placed on particularprinciples changed with the Japanese fortunesduring the war. Their stunning early successes ledthe Japane se to overexpand. leading to the debacleat Midway; at Guadalcanal they accepted attritionwarfare to defend their perimeter line; and theJapanese desire for climactic battles grew morelimited a s the war progressed, until they would sallyforth o nly if the battle was to be fought in Japanes ewaters, under friendly air cover.

Th e Allies were fighting a tota l war aimed a t thetotal defeat and occupation of Japan , so theirultimate objectives were Japan s crucial areas-thesame areas Japan was after, but for the conversereason of hurt ing Japan s war effort rather thanhelping it. Thus Japan was the ultimate objective,Indonesia was a close second, and the Allies alsowanted to take or hold al l of their own advancedbases and resource areas that they would need forthe f inal drive on Japan .

But the ab ove ar e ult imate,offensive objectives;with the war start ing on a note of Japanesesuperiority and expan sions, the Allies had to startby protecting their efensive objectives. The Allieswanted to protect their own populations andinterests in the Pacific, while at the same timeprotecting the basic network of resources and basesthat they would need to prosecute the war. TheUnited States Navy wanted to protect Hawaii, theBritish Navy wanted t o protect lndia and the crucialBritish sup ply line arou nd Africa t o the fighting inthe Middle East, and both Allies wished to protectAustralia an d the supply lines leading to it frome astand west.

It is impo rtant to note here tha t Britain was ableto make only a l imited contribution to the war in thePacific because their resources were almost com-pletely tied up in the mor e threatening struggle withNazi Germany-and because the British Navy wasnot really equipped nor trained to face the deadlynew airstrike tactics that the Japanese were using.Th e British were able-and forced-to keep apowerful fleet in the western Indian O cean, but onlybecause the Middle Eastern supply routeabsolutelyhad to be protected fo r the sake of the war againstGermany and because a British Fleet there wasrelatively remote from the deadly Japanese centralareas and bases. The British navy might assist theUnited States if a crisis or a very safe opp ortun ityarose, but otherwise the British had to leave thePacific to the United States Navy.

Thus, th e impo rtant supp ly line to Australia wasthe one that the United States forces were usingandprotecting-the supply line from Hawaii, throu ghthe U.S. Mandated islands and the Coral Sea, toAustralia. Th is supply line was crucial both f or theprotection of A ustralia and f or the buildup of forcesthere fo r the ult imate assault o n Japanese territory.

Allied objectives were thus to protect HawaAustralia and lndia and the crucial Middle Esupply line; then, in preparation for the attack Japan, to take or to hold the required advancbases and posit ions; and finally to take Indoneand Japan .

Th e Allied strategy fo r taking and h olding thobjectives had a number of elements that stayed same throughout the war, and a number of elemethat changed as Japan ese losses and Allproduction changed the balance of forces in Pacific. Theoretically, the Allied had agreed concentrate on defeating Germany first and to fionly a holding action in the Pacific. In fahowever, the United States had a large navy thwas sent to the Pacific since it could not be usprofitably against Germany, and the United Stacomma nders, motivated by the United States lainterests in the Pacific and the outrage over PeHarbor and the fall of the Philippines, wdetermined to use this force rather tha n let it sit idAlso, the United S tates comm anders knew that thwould have to pay the price of recapturing territory given up so passively. As a result, UnitStates strategy in the Pacific was aggressive, with Russia not even fighting, and Britain passivabiding by th e Allied agreem ent to defend, aggressive United States strategy was de facto Allied strategy in the Pacific.

Th e cons tant e lements in this aggressive stratewere: 1) to ensure the safety of Hawaii, Austraand India, and their value as staging areas protecting th e Australian supply line and the cruoutpost a t Midway); 2) to keep up the pressurethe Japanese by defending pugnaciously whpossible and making pinprick-or even massivattacks whenever the opportunity presented its3) to fight a war of attrition t o whittle away Japacombat potential ; and 4) to use land-based airdominate and control areas, rather than t ie domobile surface fleets in circumstances where Japanese could bring on a potentially disastrfleet action-surface fleets were to be usedreaction forces to meet Japanese threats or toescamphibious assaults that would capture the batha t the land-based a ir could then use to gcontrol of a region.

The strategic elements that changed with tiand circumstance were: I) while the Allies wdesperately short of carriers early in the war, carriers werenot o be tied dow n to offensive actiothat would t ie them down where the Japanesecocome and attack them-instead, the carriers wobe a reserve, meeting critical Japa nese advan cemaking pinprick raids to whittle away at Japanese; 2) when the Japanese had been foronto the defensive, but before the Allied carrshor tage h ad been remedied, Allies would be limto peripheral advances and fighting a war attrition, particularly with land-based air;3) whthe Allies finally received all those carriers, tcould d eploy them offensively to escort ma

landings to capture bases deep in enemy territan d then to protect these bases-but only in mastha t were sure of su periority; and 4) the British Nin the Indian Ocean was available to help out icrisis early in the war or to grab at a safe opportulater in the war, but otherwise it was firmly tdow n to the task of securing the safety of the MidEast supply rou te and other Indian Ocea n activiuntil Germany was defeated.

The re was one special circumstance tha t helthe Allies throughout the war, and that reinfortheir decision to be reactive an d aggressive in tstrategy durin g the dar k early days: the Allies coread the Japanese Naval Code and so always kwhere the Japa nese were going and what they wplanning. In the.end, this meant that the Alalways had the abil i ty to react to each Japan

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THEGENER L

move with complete intelligence, giving the Alliesthe knowledge of what they were up against beforethey brought on a battle. Th e Allies could bes ure ofknowing about Japanese moves in t ime to parrythem, and could be sure that the Japanese were notin a position t o punish a n aggressive pinprick raid.

The at tacks that both sides made when they hadthe chance are worth a word o r two. The immediateJapanese plans were to at tack towards the SouthPacific and the islands of the U.S. mandate, with

subsidiary at tacks o n M idway and the Aleutians(t0shield Japan from Hawaii) and New Guinea (toisolate Australia and prevent the bu ildup of Alliedforces there). India was ignored a s being away fro mthe axis of the main naval threat-the UnitedStates-and the conquest of Australia and Hawaiiwould require major invasion forces that theJapanese army was not wil l ing to provide. TheDooli t t le raid on Tokyo made the Midway-Aleutians operation top priority, which brought theJapanese offensive phase to a marked halt at thebattle of Midway. Th e Allied counte rattac k startedby dealing with the threatening Japanese airbasethat was building at Guadalcanal , and developedinto a slow advance al l the way up the Solo mon schain. Generally, Allied strategy was to attac k allalong the perimeter to keep up th e pressure, so evenbefore Guadalcanal, Allied carriers were makingshort . sharp, casualty-producing raids into theMarshall Islands, and these raids grew in frequencyand power until islands like Taraw a (in theGilberts,just south of the Marshalls) and Kwajalein werebeing captured while the Solomons campaign wasgoing on. At the same time, Allied forces werestr iking on and over New Guinea, culminating ininvasions aro und th e Vogelkop Peninsula. With thecracking of the outer Jap anes e perimeter, the Alliescontinued to press all along the line, raiding Truk,clearing away the Japanese airbases in the SouthPacific and then striking into the Marianas-and oninto the Phil ippines and Indonesia, preparatory tocapturing Iwo Jima and Okinawa-the outworks ofJapan i tself . Depending on island-hopping anddeveloping the advance through land-based air, thefinal All ied at tack came up through the SouthPacific and Australia against Japan's southernpositions.

Those were the strategies that clashed in thePacific. There were other strategies involving theland forces that were fighting on the continent ofAsia, but in fact these land campaigns wereindecisive and were almo st guaranteed t o remain so.The Japanese an d Chinese armies simply lacked thetransport and resources to press home a decisivecampaign, and the U.S.S.R. a nd Britain would notspare at tacking forces from the war againstGermany-although they were willing to send inmore troops to hold the Japanese back should theneed arise. T he result was a stan doff th at was likelyto continue until all the Allies were freed from theGerman distraction.

Those ar e my illusions abo ut the Pacific war, theillusions that 1 tried to build into th e strategicinterp lay of VICTORY IN T HE PACIFIC. T henext question is: How were the strategies built intothe game?

THE DESIGN

Avalon Hill's WAR A TS EA ga me is a strategic-level, simple game of the naval wa r in the Atlanticduring WWII. The purpose of the game is tocontrol various chun ks of sea (with the board

divided into the important seaa reas in the theatre-North Sea, North Atlantic a nd Me diterra-

nean, for example) by having ships survive anddrive off any enemy ships that venture there. Shipgunnery and armor strengths are represented in a

simple fashion, and detailed, complex sea battles ar erecreated by the simple expedient of having shipsfire at each other repeatedly until only one side isleft. Man euvering in the battles is confined to a fewsubtle techniques of retreating.

WA R AT S E A S g a m e s y s t e m d o es a n i c e j o b ofshowing the strategic implications of assigningvarious ships to certain patrolling forces (assignedto various ocean areas); the combat system does notrecreate detailed naval battles, but it does recreatethe effects of the naval battles; ships are lost inbattle, and one side succeeds in driving away theother.

With strategic aspects recreated and anabstracted battle system that allows large navalbattles to be fough t over a long period of time, theWAR A T SEA system has al l the basic elementsrequired for a Pacific game. Consequently, wedecided to use the WAR AT SE A system as a basisfor the Pacific-with appr opria te modifications forthe Pacific theatre.

(Game-ographical note: Area-type sea strategicgames are by no means new-in fact, I have beenfiddling aroun d with a similar, different system forabou t four years. We decided to use the WAR A TSEA basic system fro m amo ng these simply becausewe had already published WAR A TS EA , so with asimilar Pacific game, players would be able tocompare the ships and campaigns between theAtlantic and the Pacific-thus giving interestedplayers a hand le on the overall naval struggle duringWorld Wa r 11. Also, the similar games would belinked in to one combined game about b oth theatres,and , by a strange coincidence, this article concludeswith a variant that al lows you to do just that .

The sequence of events that led up to ourpublishing the game is also worth a word or two. Asa WAS variant , the game started a s a variant I didfor my own enjoyment; this version had a bout33 seaareas, an d you could have fu n for a I-o-o-o-n-g timewhile you played it. Then we thou gh t we'd p ut it inTH E GENERAL-which we announced-and theboard was pared down to6 sea areas. This was toofew, and in add ition, it could not be don e right as amagazine game-there were just too many coun tersand too much board. So , at the last moment wedecided to publish it as a game and have it out byO R I G I N S '77. We ha d 10 weeks from the time wedecided to publish it as a gam e (most of which wasspent in a lot of hard playtesting), and we barelymad e it-everybody in Avalon Hill 's research an ddesign section had som e hand in getting it out-atthe last possible moment. In a way you could saytha t it was do ne in ten weeks-which isastonishing,since it is a very go od little game in my somew hatprejudiced opinion-but to be fair, I have to say tha tthe WAS version started development abou t a yearago, and I've been fiddling with area movement inthe Pacific for four years.

So: en te r VICTORY I N TH E PACIFIC, ou t o fWAR A T SEA . H ow is the Atlantic different fromthe Pacific?

T I M E A N D S PA C EThe Dimensions of VITP

SPACE Since the WAR AT SE A game system(which was to be used for VITP) is based on thenotion of controlling sea areas, the first decisionwas that the mapboard should include al l the areasthat the Japanese actually had a chance ofcontroll ing, and only those areas. This meant thatthe gam e would no t need any complicated, artificiallogistics rules to impose the logistics shortcomingsthat actually limited the possibilities of Japaneseexpansion during the war. I t was also desired tokeep the area portrayed a s small as possible, so thatthe areas could be portrayed in as large a scale as

possible-so tha t the crucial central area s whmost of the combat would take place would notshrunken and overcrowded.

The problems came around the edges. TAleutians had to be included, since importJapanese forces were diverted there during batt le of Midway (and contributed t o the Japandefeat there). The Bay of Bengal similarly sawmajor Japanese incursion which turned out to bwaste of time at a c rucial period of the war; alsowas clearly within the sphere of possible Japanexpansion. T he farther reaches of the Indian Ocsaw important Allied operations, but thoper ations were peculiarly restricted and passivand the area was really outside of the Japansphere-so it was just dropp ed off the map. In South Pacific, it was very tempting to put in NZealand an d similar south ern areas, especially sithe Japanes e actually had plans for taking them,in the interests of keeping the board small it wdecided to telescope their effect into the are asju sthe north-the result being tha t New Hebriactually represents both itself and New Zealan

TIME The time frame of the game was a liimor e of a problem. As a general rule, a game baon a n actual campaign should cover only that t iperiod w hen b oth sides actually have the capabiof fighting, stopping before one side or the othebroken-especially if the side was brok en whtaking a reasonable gamble. T he reason fo r this ithe gam e continues after that t ime period then player whose forces historically br oke can d o betha n history simply by being artificially passive akeeping his forces intact, thus preventing disastr ous exploitation that followed. Similathe other player must strain unnaturally to breakopponent on schedule (rather than pursue mreasonable goals in accord with history).

This meant that the game should end a t the titha t the Japane se were broken beyond the capabty of meaningfu l resistance. This time turns out toat the batt le of the Phil ippine Sea-theUM arianTurkey Shootv-where the remnants of Japanair power was destroyed. (Although the Japanstill had a fleet at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, theylonger had an effective air force with whichcontest the Allied fleets-and it was air power tdecided battles in the Pacific.)

Start ing the game presented anoth er probleShould the initial Japanese attacks be includedthe game or should the game start immediatafter, amidst the wreckage? The initial attacwould either use up a w hole turn o r require a lospecial rules. In the en d, the attacks were inclufor a n umb er of reasons: the allocation of resouto the at tacks was a n imp ortant strategic decisthat the J apanese player should be able to maimportant decisions were made while the attawere going on , the attac ks were risky and the resuncertain and this uncertainty should be recrearathe r than being replaced by certain outcomes . Tuncertain results greatly increase game variatand allow the players to react t o all sorts of posssi tuations, and the poor frustrated Japanplayer-who always has to wait and watch Allied player get the last move, avoiding the mJapa nese fleet and chipping away a t weak pointgets at least one chan ce to shoot at a target that caget away.

S o he t ime of the game runs from Pearl Harto the M arianas Turkey Shoot. The temptationinclude Leyte, with the last sailing of the Japanfleet and the kamikazes, was just too muhowever, so I stuck it in too, as an optional niturn.

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N U T S N D B O LTS

T H E M A P B O A R D :Sea Areas: The placement of sea are asa nd bases

had to be carefully coordinated so that ships comingfrom the bases would have a reasonable range ofaction. Each sea area should represent all of thefollowing: an are a within which the geography is sointertwined tactically that battles there wouldinterrelate into a campaign, an d battles taking placeelsewhere would be separa te from tha t campaign;the area over which a surface fleet could maintain aneffective operational patrol; the are a with which anair tinit could operate without a major deployment(all of these criteriadefine ana re a of pretty much thesame size, since all were depe nden t on the range ofscouting aircraft). F ortunately, a little perusal of thehistory books yielded a number of very localizedcampaigns in the Pacific; the prolonged struggle inthe S outh Pacific is the most famous example, thecampaigns in the Marshall /Gilbert Islands, theMarianas Islands, Indonesia and the JapaneseIslands, and the operations at Pearl Harbor,Midway, the Bay of Bengal, the Aleutians and in theCora l Sea were also isolated by distance from oth eroperations. Scaling the sea areas to this size, therewere obvious holes, regions remo te and indepen-dent of all the above: the U.S. mandate, the NorthPacific and the Indian O cean. The sea areas in thegame were laid out to correspond with all of theseareas.

Bases: It was immediately apparent that any ofthe bases within the area of the mapboard weresubject to being captured by the enemy, but somebases were more vulnerable than others. Manybases had only small garrisons that could be (andwere) overwhelmed by amp hibiou s invasions, whileother bases were garrisoned by armies tha t wouldhave to be defeated in long campaigns. Sinceamphibious invasions were going to be an impor-tant part of th e game, it was necessary todifferentiate these types of bases-so the invadablebases were made into green-island bases, while themajor installations were made into red major

ports.The specific bases in the game were chosenbecause they were important ports, because theywere crucial central island chains that dominatedtheir sea areas, o r because they were needed for playbalance p urposes, t o reflect the a ctual defensibilityof a sea area to invasions. Pe arl Harbo r, Singapore,Australia, Truk, Ceylon, Yokosuka Navy Yard(also representing the other m ajor bases in theJapanese islands), and Sam oa were soimportant-and famous-that they had to be included, alongwith the important lesser ports of Saigon, DutchHarbor, the Phil ippines and the New Hebrides(Ra bau l was originally included as well, but it wasdeleted for reasons explained below). Midway,Maleolap, Attu and S aipan all represent the centr alisland chains that dominated their sea areas-thecrucial air bases that were the objectives of thefighting. In the South Pacific there were severalisland chains that were important, however, andthey wereespecially imp ortan t because they ran intoadjacent sea areas: Lae and Guadalcanal . PortMoresby represents the air bases in southern NewGuinea, which als o served as air bases in twoseparate sea areas.

Each invada ble base in a sea area is a defensiveweak spot, an ex tra place that has to be defendedlest i t suddenly turn into an advanced base forenemy ships and a source of swarm s of air units. Inthe game, the number of invadable bases in a seaarea should correspond roughly to that area 'svulnerabil ity to invasion. T hus, Okina wa, Johns onIsland and the An dam an Islands had to be includedbecause they were actua l weak spots in sea areas thatotherwise contained only uninvadable red ports.

The Marshall Islands was a highly vulnerableperimeter of islands that could have been invadedanywhere, so Kwajalein was added t o the board t omake that sea area more vulnerable. O n the otherhand, Rabaul had to be deleted from the SouthPacific because there were already two island basesthere-and to add a third would have mad e italmost impossible to defend (the Japane se don'tneed Rabaul anyway, since they have Truk, an d theAllies couldn't get to R abau l without first captu ringone of the borderl ine bases, so Ra baul turns out tobe functionally trivial anyway).

The exa ct delineation of the borders between seaareas, and the placement of bases, was don e verycarefully with the objective of recreating thehistorical s i tuation, so that ships coming from thevarious bases would have a realistic range of actionand bases were in theseaar eas where their air powerwas an impor tant factor. Ships had to be based inAustral ia (or Ceylon) to operate regularly inIndonesia, had to come from Austral ia or Sam oa tooper ate in the So uth Pacific. Sh ips from Hawaiicould raid as far as the Aleutians, Japan, SouthPacific and the Coral Sea, the Central Pacific andthe Marshall Island s were effective blocking are as inthe center, as were the Marianas Islands ( includingGuam) farther west; and so on. Midway was theblocking position between Hawaii and Japan, theMarshalls Islands werea shield between Hawa iiandthe interior of the Japanese island empire, theMarianas Islands/Guam controlled the easternapproaches to Indonesia, and so on.

One of the biggest questions was which basesshould be placed on the borders between sea areas.A bordering base is unusually important because itis harder to take by encirclement and starving i t out ,and ships and air units there have added rangebecause they can move into either sea area. Clearly,bases should not be placed on b orders if their effectwas local o r if they wereeas ily taken ; however, if thebases were crucial central p ositions affecting a largearea, then they should be on the borderl ine. Thus,significant naval bases with central positions wereplaced on borders: Dutch Harbor, the NewHebrides, the Phil ippines, and above al l Truk; i tshould be noted that these bases include all of theoutlying associated islands, where the air unitswould actually be based to range across an entire seaarea. Austral ia was placed on a bord er to m ake i tharder to capture-it was also an important centralbase, of course, althou gh it was never used as a basefor operations out into the Indian Ocean proper.Important air bases that historically affected twosea areas were also placed o n borders: Guadalcanal ,Lae and Port Moresby.

As a final note, theOwen Stanley Ridge wasinserted in New Guinea to separate Lae from PortMoresby. Northern New Guinea was really treatedas a single objective tactically-when the Alliesfinally invaded there they inv aded all al on g it atonce-and Sou thern New Guinea was the same, dueto the interlocking nature of the bases there. Northand Sou th were separated by a mountain range onland, however, and at sea the tips of New Guineastuck ou t enough to separate naval operations to thenorth from operations to the south ( i t was a majoroperation to circuit either tip because the swingwould take the ships close to enemy air basesguarding the passes). Both sides spent two yearstrying to conduct a land invasion across themountains, but in fact the terrain was so hard totraverse that the defender could always reinforcefaster by sea than the attacking forces could bringup forces overland. Overland attacks across thisOwen Stanley Ridge were thus doome d to fai lureuntil the enemy's bases had been capturedamphibiously-so in the gam e the fruitless overlandattacks ar e simply ignored. M ovement across theOwen Stanley Ridge is prohibited.

The Problem of the British Navy: The BritNavy was opera ting under the restriction that aball it had to guard the Middle East's supply linethe Indian Ocean; in effect, it always had to sbetween this supply line and the Japanese threThus, the British ability to return to ports in game was limited so that their fleet would alwayson the line between Ceylon and Japan; this is wthe British can not leave this line to base at, sAustralia. S imilarly, United S tates ships prohibited from basing in Ceylon because twould have removed them from the United Statareas of interest in the eastern Pacific.

Game T urns: With the game running from PeHarbor to the Marianas Turkey shoot, the gabreaks dow n nicely into one short surprise at tturn and seven turns of about f ive months eaEach turn turns ou t to be roughly the equivalentWA S turn , and there a re as many turns as inWAthe turns in the two games even correspond rougwith turn 3 of WA S equal to turn of VI(actually the shortened turn 1 of VITPisequ al tolast part of turn 3 in WA S .Th e dates specified the turns were modified a little in order correspond with the start ing and ending datesthe actual campaigns during the war.

The S urprise Attack Turn: The Japanese sthe game in Jap an to prevent them from gett incontrol ship into the Hawaiian Islands or the UMandate. The unique long-range str ike at PeHarbor is recreated, with the fuel limitations tapplied. Units are posit ioned a s they were att ime of Pearl H arbor, except for thePrinceof Waand Repulse which are positioned as hey were wthey reacted to the Jap anese invasion. ThescatteUnited States cruisers were committed patrol/convoy duties, so they cannot move, butJapanese onslaught in Indonesia cancelled assignmen ts in that are a, leaving those units frebe reassigned to other tasks.

The Japanese ran at Pearl Harbor after thfirst wave because they had lost track of where of the United State s carriers were (actually onlywas near Pearl Har bor). The location uncertarules for the American carriers recreate this untainty.

Reinforcements: Ships appear o n the turn twere available to be deployed in the Pacific example, the Shoho did not get its aircrews uafter the start of the war, and theYamato, launchin December 1941, was not functional until it used at Midway). Air units and marine usimilarly appear when those units, with tcapabilities, were fun ctional in the Pacific (the Marines were in the Pacific at the outbreak ofwar, but they were not yet equipped for amphib

operations). Each side gets its submarine unit durin g the period when th at side's submarines wregularly getting shots at enemy capital ships.

Eliminated air and marine units automaticreap pear afte r a five-month rebuilding perwhich w orks ou t well in keeping strength levels aaccu rate level durin g the play of the game. This seem a little fast, particularly for the notorioupoor Japanese training program, but it shouldremembered that while the United Streplacements represent new men and machijoining the war effort, the Japane se were rebuildtheir losses primarily by pullingexistingunits outhe war in Asia an d reassigning them to the Paccampaigns . By the end of 1944, the Japanes e exhausted their supply of these existing units, could no longer replace losses at all.

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The British Navy Again: Since British ships inthe lnd ian Ocean were available for tacticalat tacks,they had to be included in the game; since Britishpolicy was to not make an y long-term move into thePacific unti l Germany was defeated, som e way hadto be devised to prevent the Brit ish from taking thestrategic offensive. (T he British policies were to beassumed in the game because they presumablyreflected the true interests of the British Empire-after al l , who am 1 to argue with Winston

Churchill?)Early in the game, through turn 5, the Brit ishareprevented from going on the offensive simplybecause the Japanese are too strong. Therefore,durin g this period sh ips arrive and leave dependin gon the times they were available to be used in theIndian Ocean-ships that leave were actually goingeither to the Atlantic o r ( in the case of the pair ofcarriers that leave) to Madagascar to defend theMiddle East supply line; other ships that went toMadagascar for sh ort periods of t ime or that werebasing there but were still available to operate in theIndian Ocean are left in the game. (Since leavingships were going to theatres with a higher priority,replacement ship s must be sent if the listedsh ipsarelost.) From turn 6 on. however. the Allies are

aircraft carriers with enough 5 guns get a nominalfacto r because of the sheer weight of metal they ca nput out .

GunneryFactor

65432

I

Main Armamentx 18.I guns

8 or 9 16 guns8 or more 14 or 15 guns

6 15 , 9 to 12 x 12 . or 9 x 1 1 guns6 x 1 l guns

8 guns, and special cases(lesser guns, torpedoes)

The attack bonus was given to ships to reflectunusual accuracy in their surface combat. Inpart icular, the Japanese cruisers get the bonusbecause of their excellent training in night tactics(when most surface actions were fought), andbecause of the efficacy of the long-lance torpedoesthey carried. U.S. batt leshipsget theatta ck bon us toreflect the accuracy resulting from the gunnery-control radar they carried; all U.S. battleships wereeventually fitted with this feature (and so should getthe bonus, as indicated in the op tional rules), but theonly ones that are indicated right on the counters arethe ones that were equipped with gunnery control

Speeds are assigned as in WAS, except thatfactors represent marginally greater speeds in Vbecause of the greater distances that had tocovered in the Pacific.

Speed Factor Actual Speed34.5 knots32.5 knots

6 3 0 k n o t s5 27.5 knots4 2 5 k n o t s

3 2 1 k n o t s

Each carrier airstrike factor represents roug20 planes carried by that carrier, or 10 plalaunched in a typical str ike (roughly the samWAR A TSEA) . Du e to the increased deadlinesair str ikes in the Pacific, due to superior equipmand pilot training in attack techniques, carrequipped with first-rate equipment and pilots wgiven the attack bonus. British strike planes training were inferior, however, so they don't geattack bonus; and th e Japanese system for traipilots was inadequate, so he later Japanese carrmanned by poorly trained pilots, also do not geattack bonus.

overkhelm ingly superior and ev;ry British ship radar when they were commissioned. Air Units: Land-based air units were a spebecomes an offenske threat-at exactly the t imethat the British were deciding to confine theircounterattacks to the Indian Ocean. T o simulatethis in the game, ship arrivals during this offensiveperiod are simply left out of the game-the shipsthat really arrived during this period a re presumablytied up in the Indian Ocean. Brit ish ships that ar ealready in the game are left in on th e theory that theBritish actually were willing to make a very minoroffensive, i f th ey had not suffered too many lossesand if the Japanese left themselves veryvulnerable-in reality the British did cont emp latesuch a move for a short while, unti l the Japanesebeefed up their Indonesia defenses.

The Unit Counters: Given that VITP was to usethe WASsystem, it was only sensible to use the samecriteria for assigning combat and speed facto rs inboth games, so assigning values was practicallyautomatic.

Ships: The first decision was to use only the sameclasses of ships that are represented in WAS:aircraft carriers and surface gunnery ships with afirepower equal to or greater tha n a heavy cruiser(i.e. battleships and battle cruisers). This is quitereasonable, since these were the ships that wereexpected to decide any major naval batt les thatmight happen-lighter ships, such as escort carriers,light cruisers and de stroyers w ere typically assignedas escorts and supports that were not expected tocarry the main weight of the action. As escorts, theopposing light ships fought their own fierce littlewar, but the net result was that they cancelled eachother out , so they are left out of the game. The onlyexceptions to this are the l ight cruisers that wereused as main fleet battle units-the De Ruyter, Oiand Kirakami-which are included in the game(the De Ruyter represents the small fleet of lightcruisers that the Du tch used as a main battle fleetsimply because they didn't have an y more powerfulships; the Oi and the Kirakami were speciallyequipped with 40( ) torpedo tu bes each for specialuse durin g fleet actions-although they never didget to use them.)

Gunnery factors indicate the size and quali ty ofthe ship's m ain arm ame nt, with factors assignedaccording to the samecri teriaa s in WAS, so that theships in the two games would be comparable. As ageneral rule, only guns of 8 or better confergunnery factors (since large-ship armor wasdesigned to keep out lighter shells), although

Armor factors are assigned using pretty muchthe same criteria in WA Sand VITP, except that inthe Pacific game, the factors are a l i tt le more biasedtowards representing defense against torpedoattacks, rather than protection against gunneryshellfire. This is particularly true of the armorfactors in th e U.S. f leet, because Japanese torp edoattacks played an unusually large role in Pacificsurface combat; generally, U.S. ships have a littleextra in their armor factors because of theirexcellent protection (torpedo bulges all over theplace).

Otherwise, armor factors are based on com-plicated comparisons of armor weight and place-ment, ship weight and design, damage controlpractices (in which theU.S. Navy became markedlysuperior, as the war wore on). Carriers, which had to

spread their arm or (when they had armo r) over alarger ship tha n battle units of the same weight, havehad their armor factors weakened accordingly,al though those few carriers that had a rmored fl ightdecks have been strengthened.

It is worth noting tha t those ships that were builtbetween the wars have comparatively higher armo rfactors, reflecting their improved design andtorpedo protection. No single criterion was used inassigning armo r factors, but the following chartshould give you a feel for h ow the strength s wereassigned:

ArmorFactor Maxim um Displacement

(Old BB) (New BB) (BC)9 over 50.0006 45,0005 40,000 35.0004 30,000 27.000 45,0003 24,000 35,000 35.0002 ***15,000 including heavy cruisers8**

Old battleships had generally been converted,adding weight and protection above the originaldesign-but this was not as effective as protectiondesigned in at the start. In addition , newer ships hadbetter underwater (i.e., torpedo) protection andcompartm entalization. BC (batt le cruisers) werelarge, fast ships with weak spots in their armor.Aircraft carriers are given strengths on a verydifferent basis, combining armo r, damage controland size with game interaction to arrive atreasonable numbers in the game.

problem. Each individual air str ike was comparin size with carrier air strikes, but the land-basedunits actually disposed of many more planes were constantly getting whittled away inday-to-attr i t ion. T he solution was t o give them the atstrength of a typical airstrike, with the Japaattack being stronger to reflect the supeattacking capabil i ty of Japanese aircraft-but give the Allies many more units with the sdefense factor, to represent the superior armoAllied aircraft, th e superior ca pacity of the Allireplace losses, and the greater number of air utha t the Allies could dispo se of in the Pacific. Sit would not mak e sense to have disabled resaffect air units , they would be roughly twice as to stay in action, so their defense factor need be half as large to represent the s ame ability to punishment-so, very roughly, an attac k farepresents a strike of 10 planes, and a defense farepresents 40 effective combat aircraft in that uSince land-based air was less vulnerable to destt ion than ships were ( islands being harder to sthe at tack bonus did not apply against land-baair; but land-based air pilots were not trainemake devastat ing pinpoint at tacks o n ships, soland-based air units d o not get the at tack bowhen they attack, either.

A lot of playtesting went into determinexactly how many air units each side should get ,exactly what their strengths should be. It finturned out that six was the r ight number forJapanese, al lowing them to cover their whperimeter but not al lowing them t o massoverwhelming fo rce without leaving somethingopen; th e Allies needed ten t o be able to deployway the Allies actually did during the war.

(Fo r those who are interested, the I th fougthe Aleutians, the 7th defended Hawaii, the and 14th fought in Indonesia and the rest wunder the comm and of the 5th Air Force, f ightithe South Pacific and bordering areas. For Japanese, the 21st, 22nd and 23rd started withattac k on the Philippines and then advanced toJapa nese perimeter, the 22nd sinking the PrincWalesand Repulsealo ng the way; the 24th defenthe Marshalls; the 25th an d 26th were formed funits that had been defending Japan, the 2staying there and the25 th going to the Sou th Pawhere it was joined durin g the disastrGuadalcanal campaign by the 22nd and 23rd. 21st was operatin g out of Timor, between Indonand Japan , a t tha t t ime. )

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I t is worth noting that the Japanese air units arenamed after naval air units, but they actuallyrepresent both naval and arm y land-based air unitsthat were taking part in the sam e campaigns. Thenaval air units were Air Flotillas ; the equivalentarmy unit was the Air Division. Much of the arm yair was tied up in the Asian land campaigns, but the2nd. 5th and 6th Air Divisions fought in thePhilippines, South Pacific and Indonesia-although they were often catastrophically un-derstrength.

Submarines: I t was decided early on thatsubmarines would be included only to the extentthat they attacked enem y capital ships; the strategicaspects of subma rines, includ ing convoys, would beleft out as being not relevant to the Pacific war andbeyond the players' control.

Submarines only got an occasional shot atenemy capital ships, so only one submarine wasincluded for each side; the submarines were giventhe at tack bo nus in o rder to generate a stat ist icallyrealistic number of casualties. Since the onesubmarine was symbolic, representing the oc-casional submarine that got a clear shot, thedefenses against it had already been factored in to itsexistence and it could not be defended against nordestroyed (after all, it is assumed to get a clear sh ot,

and it abstractly represents one of many prowlingsubmarines.) The Japanese get their submarineduring the period when Japanese submarines weregetting an occasiona l clear shot, and the Allies startto get theirs at the t ime when their submarinesstarted to sink Japanese naval units.

Land Units Marine divisions are a new addit ionto the game system, an innovation in VITPthat wasnot present in WA S . They were included becausethere had t o be some means of quickly taking smallbases, as often happene d in the Pacific.

Each Marine Division unit actually representsthe abil i ty to conduct a number of small , in-terrelated amphibious landings, in effect clearingout the whole area represented by a single base in thegame. Each unit represents the availability ofamphibious landing craft an d other logist ical andback-up support for an invason as much as i trepresents a particular body of troops. Consequent-ly, the number of Marine units available was madeto correspond to each side 's abil i ty to invade, ratherthan to the presence of a particular unit. The1stMarines thus represents the 1st Marine Divisionplus its backup elements, including the 25th andAmerican divisions; the 2nd Marines includes the43rd lnfantry and the forces that fought atBougainville and New Georgia, and s o on. There aremany gri t ty lnfantry divisions that ma de subsidiarylandings that are not nam ed in the game.

Fortunately , Allied amp hibi ous capabilitycorresponded nicely with the arrival of the MarineDivisions, so the Marine designations were used forthe Allied M arine units . The Japanese had a muchmore complicated arrangemen t, however. They hada number of infantry divisions trained inamphibious landings, but most of their invasionswere actually executed by hodge-podges ofbattalion-sized units operating together temporari-ly. The Navy's own infantry arm (like the U.S.Navy's Marine s) were a large numb er of small unitscalled Special Naval Landing Forces and namedafter Javanese Naval Bases. Thus. in naming thet h re e am p h i bi o u s u n it s th a t t he ~ a ~ a n e s e s h o u l det(based o n their am ohibious l if t caoabil itv) . I namedthem after th e threk m ost promin;nt b a s e s / ~ ~ ~ ~ s :Yokosuk a, Sasebo and Kure. Incidentally, theseunits do not become available because of newproduction by the J apanese d uring the war; instead,they become available as they were freed fromearlier assault duties that a re not represented in the

game, such as the conquest of Guam, W ake, andother outlying island bases. These landings werereally essential, so they are assumed in the game.

Actually executing an invasion had a tendencyto use up the invasion force. The actual invadingtroops nearly always took severe losses, and in anycase both the landing craft and logist ics buildupsupp ortin g the invasion were used up, so executingan invasion in the game uses up the invadingamphibiou s unit . T he basic unit was sti ll intact andcould st i l l be buil t back up to strength again, sothese units automatically reappear after arecuperative delay of five months.

The Garrison cou nters are worth a f inal word.For major ports these represent the armies, and forisland bases t he smaller forces, that garriso ned thesepositions. (At on e point1 was even going tog ive theunit designations for these garrisons, but wecouldn' t f i t them o n the counters.) The smallgarrisons represent ind ividual divisions or similiar-sized units, which could be overwhelmed by aninvading force and i ts supports . The garrison armieswere to o large to be simply overwhelmed, however,and would have to be defeated in lengthycampaigns-which is why major ports cann ot beinvaded.

N W TACTICAL SYSTEMS FOR VITP

In the first place, it was obvious that the airstrike system in WA S would have to be overhauledif it was going to represent the effect that air powerhad in th e Pacific. T he difference was that in thePacific air power was a n effective at tacking ar m,one th at cou ld win battles all by itself; and this wascrucially important because it meant that battlescould be won by aircraft striking at long range, sobattles could be resolved without either gettingwithin gunnery range of the other ( in fact , mostgunnery battles in the Pacific were fought by fleetscoll iding at night, when planes could not at tackeffectively). The devastating effectiveness of airpower in the Pacific was due to four elements: theJapanese and United States Navies had aircraftcapable of making the pinpoint at tacks required tohit elusive ship targets (unlike the British in theAtlantic, who had inferior aircraft); the Pacificpowers trained their aircrews to make such pinpointattacks; such at tacks were made en masse, with acarrier 's squadrons usually concentrat ing on onetarget-usually a critical carrier; and air attac kswere expected to d ominate th e batt les, so carriersand air units were expected to launch str ikesrepeatedly until the battle had been resolved. Asubsidiary effect of airpower's ab ility to win battlesby itself was that air units could suddenly controlsea areas all by themselves-they did not requirenaval patrols, and in fact land-based air couldeventually obli terate a n enemy surface f leet that didnot have air cover.

Three types of rules changes had to be made tointroduce thesechanges toV1TP:airstrikeattackingprocedure had to be changed to reflect the tacticsand deadliness of airstrikes in the Pacific; someprovision had to be made for f ighting purely airbattles, in which gunnery factors would n ot fire atall; and land based air units would have to beallowed to control sea areas by themselves.

The rules were changed so that eac h unit'sairstr ike factors at tacked as a group against on etarget. The expert aircrews, trained in pinpointbombing, were given the attack bonus to increasethe deadliness of their attacks-carrier airstrikeswere deadly, rather than disabling. Finally, air-strikes were given the ability to attack repeatedly,round a fter round, so they could f ight a batt leall bythemselves.

It was immediately obvious that battles in thePacific broke down into two very differentcategories: day actions o r carrier battles, and

night actions or surface actions without air covwhich mean t at night when a ir couldn't fly. Rarships would close to within gunnery range daylight, in which case air strikes and gunnwould com bine in a battle th at might best be titlmess. Anyway, it was clearly desirable to hav

least two different types of combat rounds in game, for day and night battles. A little mhitting of the old history bo oks and a lotplaytesting yielded the system employed in game; presumably the side that is seeking anbattle would have the advantage of aerial recnaissance in bringing on th e type of battle he waand the side that actually controlls an area wohave air and sea patrols out to sp ot the enemy foas they came so the current proprietor of an agets a similar bonus. With both bonuses, the oddfavor of some kind of an air batt le are 5-1, but od ds are even when sailing into enemy waters, whappears t o be abou t r ight judging from the histbooks.

The next change was that VITP, unlikeWAwould have to have bases and ports that chanhands as a result of the naval war. After all , the win the Pacific was essentially a naval wa r, unlikeEuropean war where land armies determined ownership of territory.

As expla ined in the TIM E AND SPAC

section, there were two types of bases in Pacific-those garrisonned by armies and thgarrisonned by m uch smaller forces. The ports bases in the game were correspondingly divided red ports and green bases. Now, the smalgarrisons could be overwhelmed by a relativsmall invasion, but the larger forces would havebe overwhelmed slowly over the course ofcampaign that could last many months. Conquently, the small invasion forces represented byMarine units could take a minor port-but tcould not take a major port . Since both kindsports should be capturable, this required thaspecial rule be formulated to allow capture of major ports-and so the rule allowing captu re atwo turn s of control was born. The rat ionale behthis rule is that during those two turns

controlling player is actually sending in large foto wage an extended campaign o n the port , but hable to win the campaign by breaking the enemsupply line- to p revent the enemy from se ndingforces to keep up the defense. Obviously, ttechnique would also work against lesser portsthe green ports were included in the rule.

This rule probably calls for a word o r t 'woabsom e special items of interest. Th e Japa nese Nadecided not to attack Australia because Japanese Army would not supply the10 divisiothat w ould be needed for the operation, yet in game A ustralia can be taken. T he rationale is, ifJapanese Navy had succeeded in breaking supply lines to Australia, the Army cou ld have btalked into supplying the troops that would needed; after all, f ir ccompli is an accepttechnique in politics, even military politics. Philippines and Saigon are special cases ofdifferent sort, min or ports with major garrisonsthere was a real question whethe r they should beor green. In the end the Phil ippines had to be grlest a major Alliedfleetmaterialize there on turn (see the next section of this discussion) and becaan invading army could actually capture outlying island or two, enough t o serve as a mibase (as the Allies did at Leyte). Since Philippines' imp ortan ce was in its usefulness toAllies (after all, the Japanese have plenty impregnable bases in the area), making it grlimited its usefulness early, but made it useful lawhich was convenient. Saigon, on the other hahas no m eaning at all after Singapo re falls, so it be a red base with no problem-and it is essentia

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a Japanese base for ships and planes early in thewar, to reflect their actual capabilities in the area.And those who think that Japan should not besubject to cap ture should remember tha t for most ofthe war th ere were only a few divisions garrisoningthe home islands.

Submarines are the very heart of WA R ATSEA but they were a major problem in designingVICTOR Y IN THE PACIFIC because the

Japanese and the United States were involved in adifferent type of submarine war than was beingfought in the Atlantic. T he United S tates was indeedusing i ts submarines to f ight a war to strangleJapanese shipping in Indonesia but it was nocontest-the Japan ese never came up with a mean sof countering Allied depredations. On the otherhand, Japan was not using i ts submarines againstAllied shipping a t all; Japanese d octrin e was to useits submarines as fleet elements, to bag Alliedcapital ships. Th e result was that there was no realcontest in either side's subma rine war. S o ratherthan jerry-rig som e kind of strategic subm arinestruggle tha t never happened-and never couldhave happened unless the Japanese had rethoughtsom e of their most basic notio ns of naval strategy-I just assumed th at the submarine wars o n shippingwere a constant, a nd built the historical results intothe game. Convoys and special submarine effectswere deleted from the game.

Movement on the VITP board presentedproblems concerning all of the units in the game.The f irst , and m ost important , problem arose out ofthe fact that in the war in the Pacific-being fough tagainst a roughly equa l enemy-fleets weredeployed differently tha n they w ere in the Atlantic,where a superior f leet was trying to contain aninferior fleet. In the Atlantic nearly all ships wereassigned to some sort of patrol l ing function in aneffort to intercept an enemy sort ie ( the only realexception to this is the employment of ForceH inGibralter). A lthough ships were assigned to patroll-ing duties in the Pacific, the main fleets were usuallyused quite differently, for prudence' sake. M ain fleetelements would be held back in reserve, spending

most of their time in port, and then when anoperation was decided upon-either a singlesmashing raid o r a parry of a n enemy move-themain fleet would sail to reinforce the forces alreadyon the spot where the trouble was occurring.

There were three important things to note aboutthese reserve forces: in the first place, the y were notcomm itted early to a course of action; second, whenthey f inally did go into ac t ion in a n area they werenot in that area long enough to maintain a constantpatro l there; and lastly, since they were not spe ndingtheir time to patrol back a nd forth in an area, theyhad more time to move-i.e., they could movefarther before striking (assuming they had therange).

In order to reflect this important aspect of thePacific war, it was necessary to differentiate

patrolling ship s fro m reserve o r raiding shipsin the game. Raiding ships get to move later, af terpatrol ling ships are committed, and they can movefarther-but they do not count towards controll ingan area. British ships, however, had a shor teroperating range-so raiding British ships d o ot

move any farthe r (this also reflects the fact that theBritish were really limited to opera ting in the veryeastern regions of the board , because Ceylon-theirusual base-is so remote from the other areas).

An interesting point arose here. Ships thatat tempt to move an extra sea area must make aspeed roll as in WA S . Now, failing a speed roll

presumably means that the ship fai led to o peratesuccessfully in the manner that had been plannedbecause of its limited speed. A pa trolling ship thatfailed would thus not be able to maintain its

patrol-but wouldn't it still be present part of thetime, like a raider? So patrolling ships th at fail theirspeed rolls move as planned an yway, but they areturned into raiders. Raiding ships that fail a speedroll fail in their mission to get to the battle(presumably they arr ive too late to take part), andsimply return to port .

The next movement problem was that theredeployment of forces between bases was simplytoo slow using the WA S rules on the vast VITPboard. Ships that were simply changing basescouldcross the whole VITP board in a small part of a five-mon th turn; however, these transfers would have tobe planned ahead of t ime and preparat ions made forthe new ships at their new base. The solution was toallow ships to return to an y major (red) port fromany sea area on the board, the redeploymentrepresenting the assignment of the ship to a newcommand when i ts current assignment was com-pleted. Minor ports were excluded on th e theorythat supplies for major incursions of ships wouldnot be stockpiled at such bases(many of which weremere anchorages); the delay involved in ac-cumulating such supplies is represented by the turnit takes to deploy the ships there using normalmovement. Enemy cont rol of sea areas can beignored by deploying ships, which might be aproblem if there were major Allied ports behind

Japanese l ines or major Japan ese ports behindAllied lines. Fortunately the geography does notwork out that way so major forces cannot safelyredeploy into enemy lines, only out (presumablysneaking o ut on th e run). Allied forces redeployingbetween the edge bases of Ceylon, Australia, Sam oaand Pearl Harb or are presumably travelling a longcircuit through the vast sea areas tha t ar e off theboard to the south and east , far beyondany possibleJapanese interference.

Amphibious units were treated like ships butgiven a range of one adjacent sea area to accuratelyreflect the range of an amphib ious strike-after all,the marine unit represents the logistical backup an dsupport ing elements that have to be transported in

from the staging area of the invasion, in addit ion tothe first wave of assault troops.

In WA S he legal placement f or each side's land-based air units is indicated right on the board . Withairbases changing hands du ring the game in VITP.this system clearly had t o be replaced by a generalrule. S ince air units could easily redeploy anyw hereon the board within the t ime frame of one turn, aslong as they had bases available, the final rule wassimply that air units could be placed o n any sea areatha t contained a friendly base or port, regardless ofrange (planes could fly for enormous distancesthrou gh enemy territory if they were just chang ingbases, and in pa rticular they could even be ferried towithin rang e by escort carriers).

(Digression o n air raids: since units com ing fromislands could bom b sea areas, clearly ships in the sea

areas should be able to conduct air raids againstthose islands. Only carriers can make these surprisestrikes, however, because in practice land-based airnever did successfully raid an enemy port;presumably the land-based air, operat ing fromdistant and well-known bases, would be spotteddurin g its appro ach, giving the ships in port enoughadvanced warning to put to sea and escape theattack.)

Submarines, of course, could turn up anywhereso the symbolic submarine counter can be placed inany sea area.

With all of the tactical systems worked out, thelast problem w as settling on a sequ ence of play. Th edesired effect was to have thedifferent typ esof unitsdeployed in the same order that a real commanderwould have to commit them, with units that

required more prepara tion or an earlier stamoving before units that could be shifted on shonotice.

Patrolling ships would have to spend all thet ime to keep up their patrol , with no t ime to wait asee what the enemy was doing first, so patrolliships are deployed first. Air units require cosiderable prep aratio n of bases and supplies, so thcannot be easily shifted; thus air units are placnext. The deployment of amphibious forces inaction takes a comparatively short amount time-just the sailing time for the transpor ts to gto the objective, followed by t he rapid follow-up support waves. This is still longer than the sailitime of fast combat ships sailing directly incombat, however, so am phibious units move thiand raiding ships move after.

The submarines are special cases because theare symbolic units. They represent the reguloccurrenceof surpriseat tacks, so their abil ity to gesurprise attac k each turn has already been assumin defining the unit. In order to ensure that thsubmarine always gets this at tack, and in order mak e it impossible to know where the attack willahead of time, the su bma rine unit is always placlast.

That's t he orde r in which units move. Since tAllies, having broken the Japanese code, alwa

knew what t he Japan ese were doing before they hto com mit their ow n forces, the Allies always getmove after the Japanese. T o compensate somewhfor this enormous advantage, and because for muof the war the Japanese had the ini t iat ive enoughdetermine exactly when operations would at tempted, the Jap anese player has thechoice of torder in which battles are resolved.

Air units are placed alternatingly one at a timbecause both sides could shift them m ore or lesimultaneously to meet enemy redeployments.

The batt le sequence was designed on the theothat aircraft w ould always get to at tack at lorange before gunnery could get in range, excewhen ships slipped to within close range at nighSubmarines usually had to spend a significaam oun t of time jockeying in to position before th

could get a clear shot at ships in the area, submarine at tacks occur after the f irst round com bat. With defending fleets intercepting invasiforces sailing rapidly for an objective, a m arine unobviously should have to survive the interceptibattle before it is allowed to land.

T H E G M E I N C T I O N

Th e last task was to assign PO C values so ththe players would place the proper importance each sea area . Fro m a particular side's point of viea sea area can have three statuses: under friendcontrol, in which friendly commerce can mosafely; under enemy control, in which friendcommerce is completely prevented; and uncotrolled, in which commerce is possible but can

attacked by light ships, PT boats and the likClearly, if commerce in an area was importa nt one side, then that player shou ld get a lot of POCthat area s o he will be motivated t o completecontr ol it. O n the other hand, if completely stoppienemy commerce in a n area was im portant , a playshould get many PO C for control there. Places thwere important primarily for tactical reasons dnot need m any P OC , since the game's blocking ruwould pay tactical rewards to the player wcontrolled it and thus blocked enemy movemeand gained the reconnaissance benefits of cotrol l ing the area during a daylnight role there.

The basic procedure for assigning POC wasevaluate all the sea areas in comparison with eaother, f ind out how many total POC each arshould be worth, assign tentative POC values on t

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basis of the value to each side of controlling thatarea (as explained in the paragrap h above), and thenshift P OC points between the Allied and Japa nese ineach sea area so the net gain turn by turn would totalout to a close game. The historical campaign wasexamined as if it were a game and PO C gained forcontroll ing sea areas each turn, and the PO C valueswere shifted s o that the final result was a close Alliedwin. Then the PO C values were examined with aneye for possibilities. Regardless of how well they d oearly the Japanese should lose if they have nothingleft at the end to defend against the final Alliedonslaught, so the maximum POC limit was set sothat the Allies could win th e game o n the last twot.urns no matter how badly they have done up to th att ime. T he Japanese planned perimeter was examin-ed; the Japanese fel t that holding this perimeterwould be an ad vantage for a s long as they held i t , soholding those areas should result in a smallJapanese edge in PO C each turn. Areas wereanalyzed as to whether commerce there had to beabsolutely protected-in which case enemy raiderscould win PO C just by breaking enemy controlthere, as in Japa nese Indonesia-or whethergradually m ore interference with shipping there wasworth gradually increasing amounts of POC-sora iderscan win-^^^, but patrollers stopping tradecan win even more, as in gradually strangling theAllied supply line through the Coral Sea.

There are a few things worth explaining in thePO C values th at f inally resulted. Indonesia, forwhose sake the war was started in the first place,seems undervalued-but this is because the Alliedsubmarine campaign there was devastat ing, reduc-ing its value far beyond Japanese expectations.Also, since the very vulnerable Japanese shippinghad to be protected from even minor raids fromadjacent sea areas, so me of Indonesia 's PO C wereassigned to bordering areas such as the Sout hPacific, Bay of Bengal and Mariana s. The IndianOcean contained a moderately important supplyroute, but the vastness and emptiness of the seasthere made i t necessary to patrol i t constantly toreally break the line, so the Japan ese get points onlyfor controll ing i t . The Central Pacific and theAleutians are important tactically, but otherwisethey are worth a net swing of only one POC, whichwas assigned according to their value in protectingshipping in nearby sea areas. T he result is a game inwhich very large P OC swings are possible, but thatshould average out t o a very close game.

In order t o win, the Japanese must use their earlysuperiori ty to garner POC and establish theirdefensive perimeter, and then hold off the Alliedcounterattack, which means that they must alsopreserve their forces. Generally, the Japanese needto be 20 POC ahead by turn5, because the Alliesaresure to gain a lot in the last three turns. In order togain 20 POC, the Japanese must come outside oftheir basic perimeter somewhere, sometime-theonly question is, where and when?

Attacking towards Bay of Bengal can gain aslow, steady POC profi t and has the addit ionalbenefit of knocking the British out and m akingIndonesia far easier to defend; unfortunately, itleaves the United States forces free to get into allsorts of mischief. Capt urin g Australia can knock th ebottom out from under the Allied war effort fortactical reasons, but it is not easy in any case and it isvirtually impossible without capturing PortMoresby first, which is no easy task. Gaining POCby attacking and raiding into the Coral Sea and theU.S. Man date is a m uch safer, if less profitable, wayof gaining PO C each turn-and this was indeedwhat the Japa nese were planning to do. Otherwise,the Japanes e can gain a few PO C in building theirperimeter in the Aleutians and Midway, but notenough to win-in the north the perimeter is more

important tha n the POC. Th e only other Japaneseoption is to shoot for the moon and try to takeHawaii. This r isks catastrophe, fo r if the Japanesetry it on turn 2 the Allies have a nice counterattackin Indonesia tha t can knock the middle r ight out ofthe Japanese war effort , and if the Japanese try i t ontur n 3 o r later the Allies have swarms of land-basedair to make l ife really rough f or the Japanese. Th ethreat against Hawaii must be guarded against, butassuming competent American play it is adangerous long shot.

The American strategy must be to defend thecritical areas, such as Hawaii and Australia, butotherwise to be very, very cautious; the Allies hav eaway of losing carriers a little at a time, until they ar efacing a crisis on turn 5. This is particularlyimportant because the Allies really need to make ahole on the Japanese perimeter on turn5 so tha t h i sturn 6 carrier swarm can get int o the heart of theJapanese Empire, where al l the POC live. At thesame time, th e Allied player has to be whittling theJapa nese fleet down-the Allies will have to divideup their f leet into many groups to gain PO C whenthey swarm ou t late in the game, but they won't beable to split up if the Japanese have a massed fleetavailable to pounce on the separate groups. Andabove all the Allied player must fight for bases-advanced bases where he can use his air units incombat, advanced bases so his ships can stay inadvanced posit ions instead of having to raid eachturn from the red ports around the edge of theboard.

For the Japanese , expans ion , per imeters andraiding. For the Allies, carrier preservation,cautious defense of critical positions, a war ofattr i t ion t o keep up the pressure on the Japanese,and finally the struggle to capture bases for Alliedair use. The illusion is complete.

DETAIL: THE OPTIONAL RULES

One problem with a game designed to representstrategies is that i t can easily be inadequate inrepresenting the tactical level of the conflict, andsuch is the case with VITP It is not crucial, since thegam e yields casualties in realistic proportion s, but itis irri tat ing; so I added the optional rules to azz upthe tactical level of the simulation.

The 9-turn game: This is a slightly different case.As I explained above, Leyte Gulf has a certainshowy attraction, even if i t did come after theJapanese were really throu gh. But who am I to turndown a showy attraction? Besides, it gives me achance to t ro t ou t theShinano and w hoca n resist a60,000 ton aircraft carrier with a 10-inch armoredflight deck?

Task Forces: This is the most important of theoptional rules, since it recreates two of the mostimp ortan t tactical phenomena in Pacific battles: thedesperate search to f ind th e enemy before he f indsyou, an d t he cataclysmic results if you d o not, andboth sides' tendency to have different groups ondifferent missions operating in the same area, withall the r isks inherent in having one group caughtalone. It is very hard to refight such crucial battles asSavo Island and Midway with any degree ofrationality unless this rule is being used.

Gunnery Radar: This just gives the UnitedStates ships the capabili t ies that they actually had. I tis not strictly accurate, since the ships were beingfitted out a few at a time from mid-1943 on, butgiving specific dates would be too difficult,particularly since which ships got fitted out wasreally a matter of chance, depending on whohappened to st op over at Pearl H arbor. Given thesereservations, it seemed an optional sort of rule.

Island Combat and Anti-aircraft: These arereally scaleddown holdovers from the enormous33-sea-area version of the gam e, in which every

division and every carrier a ir group in the Pacwas rep re~e nted y a separa te counter. I t was rekind of fun, and a lot of interesting tactisitua tion s cropped up, so 1 couldn't resist puttinin the game. The real problem with it, of coursetha t you're fighting that ma ny more little battwhich takes that much more t ime.

OUTTAKES

There ar e a number of rules that didn' t quiteinto the box because they would unbalance game. You might like to use them in the gamethey tickle your fancy; they certainly can add sfireworks to the play.

24 SURPR ISE YOURSELF TOJO

The Pearl H arbor com mander almost got wof the at tac k before it happened because somebin Washington had read a coded Japanese messand knew tha t something was up. So, just befexecuting the Pearl Harbor raid, the Japanplayer rolls a die.24 1 If he rolls a 1, the code-b reaker finds GeneMarshall in Washington right away, instead having to hunt for him. Marshall is a sma rt cooso he sends ou t a warning right away (as he didand the player rolls the die again.24 2 If he rolls a agai n, the messenger boy

Hawaii immediately picks up the telegram pedals u p to th e U.S. com mand todeliver i t , insof having the message delivered just a fter the attstarted. Roll again.24 3 Th e Army or Navy com man der is in his offso he immediately gets the message and routino r d er s a n a l er t. T H E J A PA N E S E L O S E OROU ND O F SUR PRIS E ATTACK But a l so, ragain24 4 The commander in Hawaii immediately sthe significance of the alert The Japanese bombcome sweeping up over the hills above PHarbor-and find Pearl Harbor EMPTY (Whd a w ed o no w ?? ) T H E J A PA N E S E G E T N O S UP R I S E AT TA C K S : T H E Y C A N N O T R UBEF ORE COMBAT-AN D (with their aircra l ready commit ted to th e Pear l Harbor s t r ike)T

J A PA N E S E C A R R I E R S C A N N O T AT TA CAT A L L O N T H E F I R S T R O U N D O F N O R M AC O M B AT, W H I C H I S A U TO M AT IC A L LY DAY ACTION. The U.S. player rolls normally his carrier groups before the first round of com24 5 Note that a roll of 2 through6 at any poibreaks the chain at that point .

I t is worth noting that the Japanes e commandwere worried about this possibility, and it couljust possibly-have happene d. The last Japa nrecon of Pearl Harb or was early that morning, if the wa rning telegram had arrived after that before the raid

25 OTHER PEARL HARBOR RULES25 1 The Japanese may assign no more thanships to their Pearl Harb or surprise at tack, dufuel limitations . This is the num ber of ships invoin the actu al raid.25 2 The first round of co mbat after the air raiautomatic ally a "day action"; if the Japan ese elestay and fight, they must select their targimmediately, before the Allied player rolls for "location uncertain" groups.

26 DAMAGE CONTROL26 1 Subtract 1 from eachdamage die roll maagainst a British 0-2-7 carrier o r against theTaihoShinano because of their armored flight decStart ing on turn 4, similarly subtract from edamage die roll made against any United Stcarrier with an airstrike of 4, to reflect improdamage-control procedures after that t ime.

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WA R AT S E A a n d VICTO RY IN THEPACIFIC use the same game system to recreate thenaval wars in the Atlantic and Pacificduring WorldWa r 11. The tem ptation to link them into one gameabou t the world-wide naval struggle is irresistable-and what can you call such a global scale gameexcept VICTORY A T SEA?

1. S E A A R E A S : To s imula te the war on aglobal level it will be necessary for the game toinclude all of the areas where large fleets weredeployed-which means that the Carib bean and thesupply l ine aroun d the Cape of Good Hope have tobe added to the combined gam e. These two new seaareas will be added to the WA R AT S EA game,WA S combat, movement, etc. applying.

1.1 CARIBBEAN: Borders NORTH ATLA N-TIC and SOU TH A TLANTIC, and the por tsUNITED STA TES and NEU TRAL . Although thesea area is part of the WAS game, i ts PO C count inthe VITP game: 1 POC t o the Allies in VITP, o r 3POC to the Jap anese. The Allied air str ike may beplaced in the CARIBBEAN. Only United States,British, French, and, starting turn3 German ships(and U-Boats) ar e allowed in the CAR IBB EAN -no Japanese n or I tal ians, and no German s on turns

o r 2.1.2 C A P E O F G O O D H O P E : Borders SOUTH

ATLANTIC in W A R AT S EA a n d BAY O FBENGAL in VIC TOR Y IN THE PACIFIC, a n dthe NEUTRAL port . I t is worth 3 POC to theGermans in W A R AT S EA , and nothing to theAllies in either g ame. N o land-based airstrikes canbe placed here; only British, Italian, French,German and Japanese ships ( including the I-Boat)are allowed in this sea area.

1.3 B AY O F B E N G A L : Remains unchanged,except it coun ts as PO C for the British inWA S .nor in VITP-Allied co ntr ol yields the BritishPOC in WA S , Axis control yields the Japanese 2POC in VITP. The Brit ish start gett ing this PO C onturn 1, even before the VITP game starts, if theycontrol the sea area.

2. NEW UNITS: Since the game is meant tosimulate the clash of the great navies, all of theworld's major combat ships should be included inthe game, including those ships that spent the warguarding the two new sea areas.

2.1 Some new ships have been added to thecombined game. Counters for these ships can befound in the insert in this magazine; the time andplace of appearance of each ship is given in theV I C TO RY AT S E A order of appearanc e chart inthis article. The new French ships ar e treated likeBrit ish ships and are controlled by the Britishplayer.

2.2 In addition, some new types of units havebeen added to the combined game, to reflectimportant aspects of the world-wide struggle.

2.21 Surface raiders were German merchantraiders disguised as peaceful merchant ships; theymad e life very unplesant fo r British shipping in theSouthern Hemisphere early in the war.

2.211 The three German surface raiders areavailable on tu rn 1; instead of moving normally thatturn, they may be placed in any sea area(s) inW A RAT S E A , or in the BAY O F BENGAL.

2.212 After that , the surface raiders return toport and move l ike other Germa n ships.

2.213 Surface raiders cannot at tack at al l , andthey cann ot be attacked by gunnery o r airstrikeattacks. Instead, they are at tacked by ASWattacks-in effect, they are lumped in with anyU-Boats in the same area(s) and are attacked by theASW attacks against the U-Boats. The surfaceraiders take the first casualties, however-the U-Boats take no hits un til all the surface raiders in thatarea have been sunk, and the U-Boats are notdisabled until all the surface raiders have beendisabled.

2.214 If a surface raider remains at sea in anarea after ASW attacks are f inished, i t cannot beattacked again that turn-and the Allies cannotcon trol that sea area thar turn (surface raiders breakcontr ol just like U-Boats). In additio n, if there ar e

no Allied surface ships in that sea area at the enthe turn, the surface raidercontrols thar sea ar(surface raiders co unt for co ntrol like surface shif they are unopposed).

2.22 T h e Italian Frogmen counter represethe Italian frogmen who crippled the BritMediterranean fleet late in 1941.

2.221 The Frogmen counter joins the I talforces on turn 3 but it can be used only once game-once used, it is removed fr om play. If used, the Frogmen counter rolls to change sideturn just like other Italian counters.

2.222 The Frogmen counter at tacks l ike addit ional airstr ike, at tacking three targets ( thatnot being attacked by anoth er airstrike).

2.223 The Frogmen can be used only in MEDIT ERRA NEAN , aga ins t MALTA, oraga iITALY.

2.3 Fo r the rest of the units, use all the countin VITP a n d WA S combined; if a ship appearsboth games, use the counter fromVITPand discathe WA S counter (so the Washington is a 5-6-WA S ships should have their values printed o nback of their counters, so they can be invertedraiders in VITP.

2.31 The time and place of appearance of soof these ships has been change d. The new times places of arrival are listed on the V I C TO RY ASEA order of appearance chart .

2.32 Ships and units that a re not l is ted on tchart are assumed to appear at the normal t imlisted in either WA S (for British and other WAnavies) or VITP (for United States and other VInavies). H owever, British ship s can be placedeither ENGLAND or CEYLON on the turn thappear, and United Statesshipscan appear in ei tU N I T E D S TAT E S o r P E A R L H A R B O R o n t hturns of arrival. Note that British ships appearthe turns indicated in WA S , except for the chanlisted on the chart.

2.33 Use the WA S time track to keep trackBritish, German, Italian, French and Russ

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reinforcements, and use the V ITP charts to keeptrack of United States, Dutch. Australian andJapanese reinforcements.

3. L I N KI N G T H E T W O G A M E S: WA R A TSEA and VICTORY IN T HE PAC IFIC wil l beplayed as two separate games, requiring fourplayers: one player controls the Japane se ships andunits . onecontrols the G erman and I talian ships andand units. one contro ls the United Sta tes ships andunits. and one controls all the other Allied ship san d

units. Notice that a player controls his nation's shipsregardless of which game those ships are in; ofcourse, the players can loan ships back and forthfrom game to game so that o ne player is controllingall of his side's ships in a game, but the player whoruns the nation still has final authority about howhis nation's ships move.

3.1 VICTORY CON DITIO NS: To win VIC-TOR Y A T SEA, the All ies must win or t ie bothgames. The Axis wins t he overall game if they wineither game.

3.2 SEQ UE NC E O F PLAY: Both games will beplayed sim ultaneously. The first two turn s of WARA T SEA will be played before the start ofVICTORY IN TH E PACIFIC; thereaf ter the twogames will be played sim ultaneously, with turn I ofVlTP being played at the same t ime as turn 3 of

WAS, turn 2 of VIT P at the same time as turn ofWAS, and so on. So that both games wil l end on thesame turn . two tu rns a re added to the end of WARA T SEA, s o WAR A T SEA becomes a 10-turngame. For simplicity's sake the WAR A TS EA tu rnnumbering system will be used t o identify turns inthe combined game-so VITP starts on turn 3.

3.21 AFI Japanese. United States, Australianand Dutch ships and units are set u p normally forthesta rt o fagarn eof VICTORY IN TH E PACIFICall other United State s ships listed o n the VIC-TORY A T SEA appearance char t fo r tu rn3 of thecombined game are placed in the CARIBB EAN . Allof these ships must remain where they are, inactive,until the VITP game starts on turn3. All sea areasremain controlled by the side that controls a t thestart of VITP-except BAY O F BEN GAL and (see3.231) INDONESIA.

3.2 The British player then sets up all Britishships available on turn in any available ports inWAS or VITP: ENGLAN D, MALTA, NEU TRALC O U N T RY. C E Y L O N o r S I N G A P O R E , a n dmakes his first move. The German player then setsup his surface raiders in any sea area in WAS, setsup his other ships in Germany, and the playersproceed to play the f irst two turns of WAR A TSEA. (Both sides ' ships can move into the CAP EO F G O O D H O P E a n d t o a n d fr o m th e V l T P b o a r das explained below, but Axis ships may not movein to the CARIBBEAN dur ing tu rnsI and 2.) Britishships cannot enter Japanese-controlled areas untilthe game of VITP begins.

3.23 On turn 3 t h e V I C TO RY I N T H EPA CI FI C game begins. T he followin g special rulesapply:

3.231 The British must have two patrol lingbattleships 3-3-6 or better) in Indonesia when theJapan ese ships on raid start to move, o r h e Alliedcontrol in Indonesia is immediatelv removed,allowing Japanese raiders to pass through In-dones ia and en ter INDIA N OCE AN and BAY O FBENGAL.

3.232 The British do not move for turn 3 inWAR A T SEA unti l a f te r the LOCATIONUNCER TAIN groups are rolled for (after thePearl Harb or strike) in VITP. All group s that do nota p p e a r i n C E N T R A L PA C I F I C o r H AWA I I A NISLAN DS are placed in the CARIBBE AN. Then:

3.233 The British player rolls once foreach shipin the CARIBBEAN. On a rol l of 6 hat ship isplaced in the NO RTH AT LA NT IC sea area (doingneutrality patrols when the war breaks out), and

otherwise that ship remains at sea in the CARIB-BEAN. Th en the players proceed to finish turn3 inthe two games normally.

3.24 Except as noted above, once VIT P startsthe two games should be played simultaneously,turn by turn, with WAS movement treated aspatrolling and with the Japan ese moving first, the

Allies next and the Germans and Italians last.Specifically; the turn sequence is:

3.241 Japanese move their patrolling ships.

then A llies. then Germ ans and Italians; this includesships moving to, from or between WAR A T SEAsea areas (including the two new sea areas). R epairsare done.

3.242 Air strikes are placed in the two games,according to the rules for those games.

3.243 I n V I C TO RY I N T H E PA C I F I C , t h eJapan ese player moves all his marine unitsan d thenthe United States player moves all his marine units.These may not enter the WAS game.

3.244 Th e Japanese player moves his raidingships, then the Alliesmo ve their raiding ships, andfinally the Germ ans move any raiding ships theyhave in the VI TP game. Raiding ships are notallowed in WAR A T SEA-they may not enter,leave nor move between WAR A T SEA sea areas.

3.245 The Japanese player places any sub-marines, then th e Allies, then the Ge rmans, subjectto the placement limitations explained in section3.4. below. This completes movement; combat isresolved in the gam es separately.

3.246 Ship s and units still at sea at the end of theturn may return to port, including returning to portsin the other game, subject to the limitationsexplained below, in section 3.3.

3.3 SH IP TRANSFE R: Ships may movebetween the games ei ther between turns o r duringmovement d uring the turns. Ships from one gameare limited as to where they can go in the othergame. however.

3.3 If the Japanes e are ahead in PO C in VITP,then Jap anese ships and t he I-Boat may be placed inN E U T R A L C O U N T RY a nd C A P E O F G O O DHOPE . but not in any other W ASports o r sea areas.If the Axis is ahead in PO C in WAS, then Germanships are allowed in C EYL ON (if friendly) or BAYO F BENGA L, but no more than one U-Boat maybe in BAY O F BENG AL in a turn. No other VITPsea areas or ports may be entered, and the I tal iansmay not enter the VITP board at all.

3.42 Russian ships must remain in the BALT IC,and Dutch and Australian ships may not leave theVITP board. British. French and United Statesships are allowed in both games, but ar e restricted asto the ports they are allowed to use.

3.421 The UNIT ED ST ATES i s the on ly por tthat United State s ships can use in WAR AT SE A;they can enter no o ther ports in that game. In VITP,United States ships may not base at C EYL ON.

3.422 Th e British and French can usean y Alliedor neutral port in WAR A TSEA;they aresubject to

the normal limitations in VITP, except that theremay be one British or French ship based at PearlHarb or (if friendly) each turn (this is in place of theVictorious in the regular game).

3.323 Marine units . VITP air units and the F-Boat m ay not be placed in any WAR A T SEA seaarea; WAS air strikes may not be placed in VITP,and only one U-Boat per turn can be in VITP, inBAY O F BENGAL.

3.33 Ships that are st i l l at sea in certain areas atthe end of the turn can transfer to the other game byreturning to certain ports in that other game. Onlyships that are at sea at theend of the turn can use thisrule. however: ships that return to port earlier,either because they failed their speed rolls. weredisabled in com bat or retreated from com bat.cannot change games.

3.331 Ships a t sea in the CAPE O F GO OHOPE can return to CEYLON. if it is friendly. addition. British or French ships at sea MED ITER RAN EAN can retu rn to CEYLON (vthe Suez Canal, of course).

3.332 Ships at sea in BAY O F BENGAL mareturn to NEUTRAL COUNTRY. In addit ionBritish or French ships at sea in BAY O FBENGAcan return to MALTA (again, the Suez).

3.333 United States and British ships at sea

t h e N O RT H PA C I F I C o r H AWA I I A N I S L A N Dcan return to the UNIT ED S TA TES (via thPanama Canal, of course).

3.334 United States and British ships in thNORTH ATLANTIC or CARIBBEAN sea a recan return to PEARL HARBOR, subject to thlimit of one British o r French ship basing there pturn: if Pearl Ha rbor is controlled by the JapanesUnited States ships can return to SAM OA bBritish and French ships cannot.

3.34 Ships can m ove from gam e to game if themove when patrolling ships are being moved.

3.341 Ships in NEUTRAL COUNTRY mam o ve t h r o u gh C A P E O F G O O D H O P E ( if nenemy-controlled) and enter BAY O F BENGAL patrolling ships. If they fail their speed rolls, th

ar e inverted, beco min g raiders. Similarly, Britior French ships in MALTA may move througMEDITERRANEAN (if not Axis-controlled) inBAY O F BENGA L, making speed rolls .

3.342 Japanese, German, French and Bri t isships in CEYL ON may move through BAY OBEN GAL (if uncontrolled by the enemy) and entCA PE O F GO OD HO PE; if they fai l their sperolls , they must return to NEUTRAL COUNTRimmediately. Similarly, British or French ships iC E Y L O N m a y m o v e t o M E D I T E R R A N E A Nreturning to MALTA if they fail their speed roll

3.343 No other m ovement of ships from gamto game is allowed. Notice that ships movinbetween games move while patrolling ships abeing moved in VITP, and that they must makspeed rolls since they are moving two sea areaships moving into WAS return to port if they fatheir speed rolls, while ships moving onto VITbecome raiders.

3.35 The I-Boat and the one U-Boat can bp laced in the BAY O F BENGAL or CA PE OGOOD HOPE when submarines are placed.

3.36 Important: Whenever the Japanes eare noahead in PO C in VITP, Japan ese ships and the Boat are not allowed in WAS sea areas; Japaneships already in WAS sea areas are automaticalplaced in BAY O F BEN GAL a s raiders at the staof the next t urn , regardless of who controls what sareas. Similarly, Germa n ships and U-Boats ar e nallowed in VITP if Germ any is not ahead in WAGer man sh ips in V ITP are automatically placed C A P E O F G O O D H O P E a t t h e st a rt of t h e neturn, without making speed rolls.

4. R U L E S C H A N G E S :4.1 The method of combat resolution depenon which game the ships and units are in, bships-and airstrikes- that have the attack bonin one game also have it in the other game.

4.11 In WA S air strikes attack once per turafter ASW combat but before normal combat. target can be attacked by no more than one airstrifactor per turn (a frogman at tack counts as airstrike for this purpose). United States carriehave full ASW 3 rolls). The I-Boat cannot battacked by ASW; the F-Boat is not allowed WA S.

4.12 In V lT Pai r strikes attack repeatedly, onper day action, and can be attacked. All of aairstrike's factors must atta ck en masse against tsame target each time the airstrike attacks: gunne

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THEGENER L P GE

factors attack only during night actions. U-Boatsin VITPare attacked by ASW in the same way theyare attacked in WAS, before the U-Boats attack(and the U-Boats do not get the attack bonus);surviving U-Boats d o break control in that sea area.

4 2 The Italian cruisers are allowed only inNORTH ATLANTIC, SOUTH ATLANTIC,CAPE O F G O O D HOPE, MEDITERRANEAN,ITALY, FRANCE or NEUTRAL COUNTRY.

4 3 United States ships in the UNITEDSTATES roll for placement on turn 3 only (roll a 6place the ship in N ORTH ATLANTIC, any otherroll place in CARIBBEAN);from turn 4 on all shipsin the United States are always free to move. UnitedStates ships in WAS must ALWAYS return to theUNITED STATES, however-they may not base inany other WAS ports. Within this restriction theymay move freely-they can enter NORTHATLANTIC or CARIBBEAN, and, with a speedroll, BARENTS SEA, NORTH SEA, and SOUTHATLANTIC.

4 4 Important: If the German player gets U-Boat reinforcements when his U-Boat fleet isalready at full strength, he may defer taking thereinforcements until he needs them-in otherwords, he may save up U-Boat reinforcements hegets when he is a t full strength.

5 AN D AS AN A D D E D B O N U S . .(OPTIONA L)

5 1 Sections 1-4 above define VICTORY A TSEA, based on the assumption that J ap an willattack on December 7, 1941. This is a goodassumption, but it is also interesting to examine thepossibilities inherent in an earlier-or later-Japanese attack. This section allows the players torecreate this possibility, if they wish

5 2 The Situation on Turn I . The Japaneseand United States players set up their startingforces(except the British ships, which are under thecontrol of the British player in WAS) normally,andthen remove the ships and units that are listed asarriving on turns 2 and 3 on the VICTORYATSEAchart; these units are not available on turn 1.

5 3 The reinforcements listed on the VICTORYA T SEA chart are placed a t the start of each turn,and are available to be used that turn. They must beplaced in the areas indicated, until the Japaneseplayer attacks.

5 4 Port, base and sea area controlcounters areset up normally for a game of VITP, except thatSAIGON is Allied-controlled a t the start of thegame.

5 5 From the start of turn 1, all Japanese,United States, Australianand Dutch shipsand unitscan move normally, except:

5 51 If the Japanesehave not yet attacked at theend of the turn, then each nation's shipsmust returnto certain ports:

5 511 Australianshipsmust return to Australia.5 512 The Dutch ship must return to Singapore.5 513 United States ships a t sea must return to

Samoa or Pearl Harbor.5 514 Japanese ships and units must return to

YOKOSUKA NAVY YARD, T R U K or (if friend-ly), SAIGON.

5 52 If the Japanese have not yet attacked, noJapanese units may enter sea areascontrolledby theAllies and no Allied (including British) units canenter sea areas controlled by the Japanese.

5 53 If the Japanese have not yet attacked,certain units cannot be moved a t all.

5 531 The United States ships and units listedasstarting in PEARL HARBOR cannot move.

5 532 The Houston, in the Philippines, cannotmove.

5 533 The Japanese I-Boat cannot move.

5 534 The LOCATION UNCERTAIN 5 6 The game proceeds normally, turn to tugroups remain off the board, unusable, until the before the fighting starts.fighting begins. 5 61 Sea areas are controlled normally, a

5 535 The United States air units must remain POC is awarded normally. T o make up for the POin the areas listed for them. that the Allies should gain (and to reflect t

5 54 United States ships that transfer to the deteriorating Japanese position once the AllPacific from the CARIBBEAN must join the froze all Japanese assets), the Japanese start tPEARL HARBOR group, and thus cannot move game POC ahead on turn 1.(and are subject to the surprise attack). VICTORY AT S E A . . Cont'd. o n p g 32 col

VICTORY T SEORDER OF PPE R NCE CH RT

British, German, Italian and Russian ships not listed below appear on the turns listed on the WAStime track.

United States, Dutch, Australian and Japanese ships and units not listed below appear on the turnslisted on the VITPcharts. The starting forces listed in VITPare assumed to beavailable and placed atthe start of turn 1 in WAS, turn 1 of the combined game-two turns before the normal start of VITP.

Ship names in italics indicate new units/ships.

TURN NO. BRITAINIFRAN CE UNITED STATE S(WAS) (VITP)

Argu ew York, as,Furious, ,,.....all, ..ew me xi^ .dahcShropsh~re ,Hermes Mississippi,( ~ n NGLAND, Arkansas,MALTA, NEUTRA Ranger, Wichita,CEYLON and Tuscaloosa, August

(all inAN)

CARIBBEAN)*7 A.F. (inPEA RL H.)**

ndon (in Hornet (in GROUF,.IGLANC . Z * WashingtonCEYLON) (in CARIBBEAN)*

5 A.F. (inINDONESIA)**

IndomitabltCEYLON c

AXIS

Shokaku (atYOKOSUKANAVYYARD) 24 AirFlot

CuikakuVOKOSL . _ .

D ) ZuihoI U A O S U K AYARD) 25 264irFlot l talia~

Frogmen

ENGLANC

in PEARL HARBOR

or UNITED

-..,j,,c;g;4 ;...,&.;,;.;:+; n ' a a ' a f '

,.:t:.:?.~ . .. ,.; ~. & PEARL. . ARBOR-TAT

6 Lorrarne (InNEUTRAL)

=.T-,;-J~~ i u c u ~ R A L j

g Indefatrgable.

PEARL HARBOR orI INlTED STATES)

Implacable (inENGLAND or

British starting forces not listed above can start in ENGLAND, MALTA, NEUTRAL, CEYLON oSINGAPORE. British reinforcements not listed above appear in ENGLAND o r CEYLON. UnitedStatesstartingforces (and other VITP Allied units)not listedabove start turn in the locationsspecifieon the ALLIED STARTING FORCES chart on the back of the VITP rulebook. United Statereinforcements not listed above appear in the UNITED STATES or PEARL HARBOR.

Japanese startingforces not listed above start on turn 1 n the locationsspecifiedon the JAPANESEORDE R O F APPEARANCE card in VITP.*If VITP war has already begun, may appear in PEARL HARBOR or UNITED STATES.**If VITP war has already begun, place like normal air unit.

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PAGE 4 THEGENERAL

BRP W RF RE inTHIRD REICH

By Jeff Nordlund

There comes a time for nearly every player of It seems time, several years after THIRD offensive-or it should be-and the side with fewTHIRD REICH when he sees a once-in-a-game REICHS release, to examine the one element tha t B R P s is usually waging a defensive battle. As oopportunity. Maybe it's someth ing a s simple as a makes it unique a m o n g other strategic warfare might expect, the Axis has theedge in BRPsear lyhole in the gefense's line tha t could be exploited. O r games-the BRP. Other articles have dealt with the game, and it gradually decreases until a parmaybe it's something more complex, as the chance other subtleties, but little has been said about the with the Allies is reached by 1942.At the end of tto wear down the opponent irreparably with a B R P. It's a main ingredient in every win and a n game, the pendulum has swung completely in favmassive offensive. But inviting a s the opportunity equally important reason for every loss. THIRD of the Allies, who possess a n enormous B Rmay be, the player can't make it work-not for a REICH isn't won through tactical brilliance, advantage.lack of tactical ability-but for a lack of basic though tha t is important , a s much a s it's won byresource points (BRPs). sound strategic concept. And a t the heart of a n y As can be seen, this is roughly the way t

It's a frustrating moment. T h e poor player can THIRD REICH strategy is a consideration of the initiative went in the war itself. Clearly, the B Ronly dream of things tha t might have been- BRP. gives impetus to the tides of war. T o imagine a siGermans goose-stepping along Downing Street o r F o r those unfamiliar with the perplexing, with fewer B R P s winning the game is difficult aAllies awakening Hitler f rom his sleep in the vexing, overwhelminga n d always stimulatinggame can only happen when the losing player has allowChancellery-and turn his mind t o endeavors of THIRD REICH a quick explanation of BRPs is the enemy todefeat him by not engagingall the unwithin his means. in order. A B R P is a unit of measurement which, and resources the loser had a t his disposal.

Then too, there is that moment when a player when totalled, roughly determines tha t country'ssees that everything has seemed to work perfectly. ability to wage war. More simply, and in terms of Char t # I , based o n several campaign gameHis strategic plans mesh with his B R P totals. T h e the game itself, a B R P is a unit of payment whichall played recently, indicates the average YearIStplayer seems to possess a keener insight into the powers use for nearly everything they do. If they B R P allocations for each of the major powers.THIRD REICH than the player who is B R P want to declare war, that takes BRPs. If they want included not only to support the statement that wbankrupt. to conduct a n offensive, that costs them too. Build initiative follows the B R P difference between ea

These are the opposite ends of the player new units, refit damaged ones-nearly everythingis side, but also because B R P strength f rom yearspectrum,and it's likely you've been a t both sidesat paid for with BRPs. And each country h a s a limited year is the major consideration for that yeadifferent times. T h e sorrowful thing is that you supply of them. strategy of a particular country. The total will reflprobably don't know how you got there, and how to There is no better indication of the direction of the ability the power has to mobilize troops, payd o it-or not to d o it again. That's what this article is the game than a quick look at each country's B R P offensives and withstand the BRP attritionall about. track. T h e side with more BRPs is certainly on the combat.

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THEGENER L P GE

C H A RT 1AV E R A G E B R P S T R E N G T H S IN C A M PA I G N G A M E

Germ an) Italy Britain France Russia ['nit11 1 1 1

>te n top chart, the figure In parenthes~s S the base.

The B R P strengths are estimates, of course, andthere is no promise that every game will yield totalsclose to the ones presented. But they are averages,a n d when determining the best strategy for a gamewhat else has a player to use but his knowledge ofwhat usually happens? T h e figure in parenthesis,incidentally, refers t o the usual B R P base figure ofthe power that year. T h e games on which this chartwas based tended t o follow the historical case fairlyaccurately.

Given these totals, a player should ask himselfprior t o the game how he can raise his side's totala n d / o r reduce his opponent's. It is, afterall, not howmany B R P s a side has that matters, bu t how manymor o r l ss t h a n his opponent tha t does. This is a nimpor tan t distinction t o remember.

For the player t o understand how t o increase hisedge in BRPs, he must grasp the fundamenta l sofhow BRPs are gained, how they are lost, a n d whatto d o with them dur ing the play of the game. F r o mthere strategies can be developed.

It is impor tan t t o emphasize here tha t the B R Pshouldn't be the main consideration for a player ofTHIRD REICH Winning the game should be theult imate goal. T h e game isn't won becausi a side hasachieved some sort of B R P edge over the other side.It is won by conquering capitalsa n d objectives. Butthe more a player grows experienced in play of thegame, the more he realizes very little can beaccomplishedwithout a solid B R P policy f rom startto finish. count ry there is one plan tha t yields the highest

return of BRPs by the war's end , it isn't always thebest one t o follow. There are other considerations.

GAINING BRPs F o r instance, one power may prefer t o get itsmaximum B R P return earlier in the game, so it must

S AV I N G S BRPs: players are opt for a shorter, if any, savings plan.think one of the best ways t o increase the number of T h e n too, is the considerationthat n o playercanBRPs they have is by saving as many as possible determine a t the start of the year, let a lone the starteach year in order to raise the B R P base figure. In of the game, how many B R P ~e plans to saveeachtheory, th i s is sound, but in practice it is as year, Events dur ing the game largely determinetha tpromising. It turns o u t it is best to a d o p t a savings for him, So to say he will save 20 or howeverpolicy early, if a t all, and even then theeffectswill be many B R P ~hat year is impossible. B~~at the startminimal. of the game, using this char t a n d his own experience

This does mean, go ut and of how certain strategies affect B R P totals, a playerneedlessly spend B R P s s o tha t there is noth ing o n should be able to adopt a realistic -posturew towardswhich t o achieve some base growth f rom year t o savings,year. But when faced with a choice of spending Study Char t #2 carefully. Notice tha t a savingsBRPs f o r someth ingworthwhile o r saving, the rule program tha t continues throughout the gameof t h u m b spend them. There a r e several reas0ns as effFctive a s one that starts early a n d then endsfor this, but put simply the re turno n a n y investment somewhere in the middle of the game. can beof BRPs is relativelyslow in coming,a n d the game is seen, saving a very effective method alone inshor t in the number of years played. Those BRPs gaining BRPs. It's marginally effectivea t best. Andwould probably be better spent in building new its employment must always be weighed against theunits o r conducting offensives which may achieve option of spending those B R P ~ n somethingimpor tan t strategic goals. worthwhilethe year in which they are first received.

Raising the B R P base of a count ry one yearresults in a net savings t o the count ry equal t o theraise times the number of years remaining in thegame, minus the initial investment. For instance, if CONQUEST O F MINOR NEUTRALS:Germany manages t o save 10 B R P s in 1940,her base Assume a minor neutral count ry could be con-is raised from 150 t o 155 B R P s in 1941, because of quered in one turn with a relatively insignificanther 50 per cent growth rate. Though this means number of losses to the attacker. Assume again tha tGermany has five mor B R P s to spend in 1941t h a n the minor count ry is wor th 10 BRPs. T h e cost of a nshewould have had she spent everythingin 1940,she offensive is 15 BRPs, a n d the cost of a minora lso spent 10 l ss than she could have had she used declaration of war is 10 BRPs. This expendi tureofall her B R P s in 1940.This is a net loss of five BRPs. 25 BRPs, plus losses, becomes one side of the

Following the example further, say Germany balance in determining whether it's smar t to invadesaves nothing in 1941. Her base is 155again in 1942. a minor neutral for a profi t in BRPs. T h e other sideThis is still five more BRPs t h a n it would have been of the balance is the BRP-worth of thecountry, 10 inhad she not saved anyth ing a t the end of 1940. But this example, times the number of years the capitalthe initial investmentmust be paid before any profi t can be held.shows. So , two years after tha t savings of 10 BRPs ,Germany has just broken even. It won't be until the If the invasion is successful.and for the sake ofthird year following the savings that a n y profit will simplicitythe attacker's losses are zero, he hasspentshow. 25 B R P s t o gain anaddi t iona l 10 BRPs each year he

The effectiveness of saving depends o n each controls the country. So , the first year followingcountry's growth rate. C h a r t #2 details what conquest the attacker is actually 15 BRPs in thehappens t o the powers' B R P totals when they follow hole. T h e followingyear he is still five B R P s d o w n .certain savings plans. Though in the case of each It's in the third year the invasion will show a profit.

This example paints a bleaker picture of minoneutral conquest thanis actuallythe case, howeveEspecially for the Axis powers w h o have the earinitiative in the game a n d thereforethe first crackall the minor countries, this is the best methodgaining BRPs. Consider Germany, for instancwhich for the cost of one western front offens ive(BRPs) and five declarations of war (50 BRPs) caconquer Norway, Denmark , Netherlands, Belgiua n d Luxemburg in just one turn a s early a s Winte1939. T h a t is a n investment of 65 BRPs plus lossfor a re turn of 50 B R P s every turn the capitalsaheld. Clearly, the German player can expect to hothe countries a t least two years and show a prof

This evaluation method outl ined here assumthere isn't any interventionby another major poweThere can be none, incidentally, if the conquetakes only one turn. But when there is interventiothe BRP-worth of the venture is seldom profitablThese conquests a re made with other strategconsiderations in mind.

The BRPs t o be gained by any conquest mayalways be sufficient reason to declare war ominor neutral . The amou nt of t ime, the numbetroops and whether the invasion actually ctr ibutes to the goal of winning the game need tconsidered, too.

To contin ue the example of German y attackthe five minor neutrals in western Europe earlythe game, the at tacks take a considerable sharher forces. It 's likely tha t all Germany will beab ldo that turn is invade the minors. But the BRworth, which has already been shown to profitable, and the location of several of countries make the at tacks necessary. FrBelgium and Luxemburg, the invasion of Fracan be launched. and from Norway the MumaConvo ys can be conte sted. These strategic pointaddit ion to the B RP profi t , t ip the scale to one quite heavily.

Other minor countries have B RP values emore invit ing tha n the western European ones,for various reasons aren't as go od risks. Don't bto think the only consideration should be BRTime is money the saying goes, and often was

time is as bad a s wasting BRPs. No country sho

8/12/2019 Vol14i4


P GE 6 THE GENER L

CHART 2PLANS FOR THE MAJOR POWERS

(In each year the count ry sa

Saves Saves Sa Savesin 40 40- 41 403 40- 44

owth)

BRPs t o anyone. Sti ll , l taly can lend to Germand Britain can lend to the United States.

The catch here is that once the direction of Bloan s between two countrie s has been set, it cabe reversed. If ltaly grows B RP b ankr upt late igame and she has already lent to Germany, thenothing short of sending troops Germany can help her ally. But th e practice does have a histoprecedent, s ince the Germans did demand receive Italian goods early in the war, and Germany did wind up defending Italian soil.

To use the example of I tal ian BRPs lenGerma ny, let's see how effective this practice cafor the Axis. Assume Italy has 10 BRPs remaiafte r builds in th e Winter, 1940 turn . If she kthose BRPs and factors them into her 1yearlstart BR P base growth, i t gives her an incof two BRPs. If I taly lends the BRPs to Germthe Germans' BR P base can grow by five. Thatincrease of three B RPs fo r every 10 lent. Tsavings can then be multiplied by the numbeyears left in the game. T herefore, such a loan iWinte r, 1940 tur n results in a net profit of I5 Bby 1945. That 's en ough f or an extra offensivseveral more rebuilt units.

Loaning BRPs, like saving them, isn't a effective means of raising a side's BRP total. Bcould result in a small profit and when added saving and conquest of minor neutrals gives aseveral al ternatives that al l contribute to helBR P s i tua t ion .

SPENDING BRPsFORCE POOL UNIT CONSTRUCTION:

country can lose BRPs for building new troopsrebuilding damage d ones from the force pool. Abeginning of th e game, every coun try has unitsto be built (mobilize). The cost of this mobilizanges from cheap, as in the case of Franc

expensive, as in the case of Germany. Scountries can mobil ize in one or two turns an d rebuilding lost units immediately, while othershave a difficult time doing so.

A look at Ch art 4 will show the relproblems each country faces in trying to builnew troops that a re availableto her a t the beginnof the game and a t various times afterward. Asbe seen, France, for instance, can mobilizeher smforces in the fall of 1939for a cost of 24 BRPs anda s ready a s she will ever be for the German invasiO n the other hand , Germany, England andUnited States h a v e a very difficult time buildingntroops, because they must weigh that expenditurB R P s with a n equallypressingone t o spend themoffensivesand declarationsof war. For those lacountries, the choice of which units t o bu

NOTE he first frgure in e ach yearly line represents the TOTA L base-figure BRPsspent up to and including thatyear. The figure m parenthesis the BRP base-f~g ure or that particular year. This chart oes not take into

becomes critical.cons~derat~onRP growth through any means other than by savings. It assumed every year a country saved, she This is most t rue for those powers tha t a r e o nsaved 10 BR R and spent the rest of the year s BRPs t ealsoassumedthat ~nallcascs eachcountryspent tsentire offensive when they enter the game. Their problsum in 1939 when there rs no permanent growth. is finding tha t proper balance between buil

offensives and declarationsof war.

be an invasion target , no matter what i ts BRP-wor th, if its conques t won't con tribu te to the over-all goal of winning.

Chart 3 detai ls the worth of many minorcountries, the number of turns in which they canusually be conquered, the total BRPs spent by theattacker and the number of BRPs he can derivefrom possession of the m inor as the gameprogresses. Some minors are better r isks thanothers. Two of the countries, Spain and T urkey,arethe worst risks of all. Though conquest may beaccomplished fairly quickly, hanging on to them issomething entirely different.

LOANING BRPs: Loaning and receivingBRPs, as on e might expect , do l it tle to increase that

side's BR P tota l in relation to the oth er side's tally.So, thou gh British and American help to Russia isessential in the game, for instance, the transfers ofBRPs do noth ing to increase the advantage ordeficit the Allies have with the Axis at the mom ent.

Loaning B RPs is actually more a device to makecertain all co untries o n a given side are at relativelyequal fighting abilities, so that each can maintaineven pressure on the enemy.

The only way in which loans can be used toincrease a side's tota l is by the transfer of BR Ps fromcountries of lower growth rates to those of higherones. Rules prevent a back-and-forth lendingarrangem ent between nations, probably because ofthis very strategy turning into a loophole andcausing unrealistic results. Russia cannot lend

Since offensive movement is usually achievethe concentratio n of overwhelming power in a sarea, the offensively-active power should pauthe start of the game and decide what i t needbuild t o achieve the battlefield results it desir

If Germany, for instance, plans masbreakthrou ghs into France in her f irst turns ogame, she has l i tt le option but to build a s marm or units an d air force factors as possible. Tha very expensive proposition. But since the Germoften start the gam e with one or two turns of mneutral conquests, they may not need breakthrou gh potential immediately.

Germany may still need concentrated pothough, in order to win batt les and conquerminor capitals . I t may come a s a surprise to splayers that the cheapest way to concentrate at

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THEGENERAL PAGE 1

power in THIRD REICH is not with armor-airforce attacks. It is, instead, by attacking withinfantry and air force.

A quick computation proves this. AssumeGermany needs eight attack factors to either comefrom one hex or from one hex and the rest added byair power. The cost of eight armor factors (two 4-6counters) is 16 BRPs. The cost of six infantry (two 3-3 counters) and two air force factors is only 12.That's a savings of four BRPs. This is an important

consideration for Germany most of all. She can usethis to her advantage more easily, especially if shefears an Attrition counterattack by the enemy thenext turn. Having advanced infantry, not armor,into the vacated defender's hex in her attack, shewon't be as reluctant to "pick up" her units forattrition losses and deny the enemy the hex. So,infantry-air force attacks are doubly worthwhile incertain instances.

Along this same line of battlefield economy, it isoften a popular practice to attack repeatedly at oddsof 1-1 and 2-1 along a front, thinking the attacks aredraining BRPs from the defender faster than theyare from the attacker. The truth is that this isn'tusually the case.

Though the odds of occupying the defender'shex (an important consideration) are almost alwaysbetter than 50 50 for the attacker even in 1-1 battles,the average BRPs lost is generally heavier for theattacker than the defender in low-odds attacks.Chart 5 details the way in which the average BRPlosses of a particular battle can be computed. Theequations draw heavily from the excellent article byRobert Beyma in THE GENERAL(Vol.13, No. 4 .Also given are several examples of the average lossesto attacker and defender in common battles.

Suffice it to say, the low odds attack is generallynot a profitable venture for improving a BRPsituation. But as any player of THIRD REICHknows, this isn't the only consideration to attack. Itmay go a ways in making the "offensive attrition"tactic less inviting, though.

DECLARATIONS O F WAR A N D OFFEN-SIVE OPTIONS: There isn't much a player can doto cut down spending BRPs in this phase of thegame. Declarations of war should be a considera-tion, of course, when determining whether a minorcountry is worthwhile to invade for BRPs. Offen-sives, however, can be saved from time to time if aplayer realizes the advantages an Attrition optioncan have over an Offensive.

An Attrition option is a valuable tool for acountry fighting a defensive battle. Here is why.Assume the enemy is on the attack alonga front. Hepossesses more troops and-most important-airsuperiority. There really isn't much the defender can

The attrition is a viable alternative for a that. Nothing should be spared, and every undefender, but it produces little offensive movement, should be used. It's a waste of BRPs to spend for twand therefore it isn't useful in those situations when offensives when one could have accomplished tha power needs to advance over large portions of same thing.enemy territory. In those cases, an Offensive option Finally, it's important for the playerwho was ois the only choice. And an Offensive should be just the offensive at one point earlier in the game

OTE Total BRPs spent by attacker includ~ laratic

-Germany is already at war with Poland at game s start and has fr

do in the way of an offensive option in this case. Butthings an Attrition option can accomplish are

. .

slgnltlcant.First, an Attrition completely ignores the other

side's strength on the entire front. Its successdepends only on the strength of the "attritioner."So, instead of worrying about whether or not theenemy is going to commit that powerful air force asdefensive air support in a given battle, the only Iconsideration necessary is how to get the mostattacking factors counted in the attrition, whileleaving sufficient numbers behind to prevent amassive and crippling counterattack.

In the case of a defender trying to cut off enemyexploiting armor, an Attrition can be devastating.

than an Offensive. Consider what surroundinghere are even times an Attrition works better here

several enemy armor pieces and then rolling anAttrition result of at least that many hexes can do.It's possible to destroy enemy armor, an expensivecommodity, despite a battlefield inferiority-and ata cost of zero BRPs spent

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PAGE 8 THEGENERAL

realize when it's no longer possible to carry the war BRP s ta neutralize i t with an interceptor, or theyto hisenem y. When victory isn't an y longer possible, will lose two BRPs during the strategic warfarebut a draw is, then it's best to tu rn attentio ns that resolution phase.way. There is nothing more fruitless thanconduct - This appears to give the Germans a 3:2ing an offensive against a defender with moreBRPs. advantage, because for every two BR Ps they spend

the Allies must spend three. This isn't entirelySTRATEGIC WARFARE BUILDS: It,s correct, thou gh it's close. Assume, for instance, the

curious how tricky strategic warfare results can be Allies have more ASW factors than the Germans

to understand. O n the surface. the system appears to : ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ k ~ ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~be rather simple. But looking closer, it really isn't.Despite the re listic changes by Avalon Hill in the factors are worthless, since they have no effect onresolution of strategic warfare af ter 1943 (1 ASW the enemy'sdestroys 2 U -~ oa ti ) , he system stil l favors theGerman player to a large degree.

Examining what each BRP spent for strategicwarfare builds can do shows why. F or every twoBRPs the Germans spend on U-Boats, the Alliesmust either spend three BRPs to neutralize theU-

Boat with an ASW factor, or they will lose threeBRPs during the Strategic Warfare resolutionphase. For every three B RPs the Allies spend o n aSAC factor, the Germans must ei ther spend two

Also, for every U-Boat o r S A C factor remainingafter the exchange dur ing the resolution phase, theside with the remaining factors can keep themtowards the next year's total. Tha t means the samefactor can harm the enemy two, three a n d fourtimes. This multiplier effect makes it imperativetha t each side try a n d prevent a n y of the enemy'soffensive factors f rom staying in the strategicwarfare box longer than one year after the one inwhich they were created.

. 667

a = losses o n a full exchange b = losses o n CA exchangec = losses o n a n A-elim d = losses o n a D-elim

Attacker's avg. loss equation: LA = A x a ) B x b) C c)

Defender's avg. loss equation: L D=

A x a ) B x b) ( D x d)T h e values for variables a, b, c a n d d hould cor respond to losses in BRPs taken by either thedefender o r the attacker, depending o n which side the solver is interested.

COMMON BATTLE EXAMPLES

Defender s strength Attacker s strength Avg. losses in BRPsin combat factors combat factors Defender Attacker

4 a r m o r(doublc

6 infantry(doubled)

8 infantry

This mea ns the Allies, seeing the Germans hfive U-Boats factors left after the resolution phone year, should build at least five ASW facduring the next strategic warfare construcphase. This prevents those sam e five U-Boat facfrom doing addit ional harm. This maintains Germans' 3:2 adva ntag e in BR P expenditures, bwill get worse if they allow German factors toused twice. The same works in reverse whenAllies have a surplus of S AC factors, of cours

Char t 6 shows how many strategic warffactors the Axis and Allies can expect to build inaverage gam e. It also shows that, since the Axisthe edge in B RP s at the sta rt of the game, it wiable to produce more factors and get the mbenefit from the multiplier effect.

HOW TO USEA BRP ADVANTAGE

AIR ATTRITION: As stated earlier, a side wa BRP advantage should be on the offenswherever it 's possible an d contribu tes to the oveobjectives of winning the game. Without a Badvantage, thoug h, offensives become limited min the way Germany's a t tempt to break through

Bulge late in 1944 was an offensive with a slimany, chance for success.

Once a side has a B RP advantage, i t mconduct Offensives an d Attr i t ions th at are capaof translating that edge into some sort of stratan d tactical success. Obviously, this isn't very with a n A ttr it ion op tion, though a side with a Badv antag e mustn't feel it has to be on the offeneverywhere every turn.

But it's in the offensive that the B RP superiois best exercised. In the Designer Notes JPrados, th e game's designer, quotes DGreenwood of Avalon Hill as saying that supremacy is the factor which generates offenmovem ent. It 's n o coincidence that a ir power ismost effective tool for translat ing BR P dominainto a battlefield advantage, too.

One of the most expensive factors to buildpower is indispensable in an offensive. Masattacks of ground troops, supported by lanumber s of air factors, is the game's most im porattack style.

To assert a BR P dominance quickly on battlefield, it 's necessary to begin counterairingenemy's air force immediately. The factor s shobe destroyed in equal exchanges. Of course, than expensive proposition-but the attack er shohave ihe capa bility to recoup his lossenew builds. Hopefully, this tactic will eventuaforce the defender to keep his air power eiunbuilt or so far behind the front line, he can ouse i t during his turn as offensive air supp ort beSR'ing i t back to safety at the end of the turn. tactic of aggressive counterairing may eventu

force a defender into B RP bankruptcy, the mvulnerable of po sitions in which a cou ntry canWithout DAS, the defender is forced to tak

real pounding durin g the attacker's offensives. the attacker should carefully reserve enoughpower to gua rd against the defender staging hiforce forward again during his turn and inflicheavy damage on a counterattack. Given the lcost of rebu ilding air factors and th e complete of any luck in the counterairing process, becomes the best way to convert a B RP dominainto a battlefield advantage.

BOLD A ND MULTIPLE ATTACKS: Posseing a BR P advantage isn 't always a guarantebattlefield success. In addition to the air attritalready m entioned, the a ttacke r should be willinattempt bold at tacks in many places. Though no

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THE GENER L P GE

may work he should be will ing to take a n equal, oreven slightly disadvanta geous, exc hange of BRP s incombat .

The at tacker shouldn' t s tand pat with his BR Psituation as i t is ei ther. He should lo ok to continu eto expand his base by grabbing new capitals orobjective hexes. He should look elsewhere on theboard to c arry the war to the BRP-weaker enemy.The BRP edge should be asserted in every possibleway so its effect can be felt soonest.

If a player has been follo wing a sensible BR Ppolicy throughout the game, he may have savedhimself enough BRPs to conduct that extraoffensive or build those ex tra units which may be thedifference between victory, a draw, or defeat.

BRP STRATEGIES FORINDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES

G E R M A N Y: As one might guess, Germany'srole is the most difficult a n d complex of all themajor powers. This includes her consideration ofBRPs. Assuming the Germans want to conquer a tleast two of the Allies, they should realize they willhave to d o nearly all the work themselves.Germany

can expect some Medi te r raneanSea area help f romthe Italians, but that's all.

Obviously, Germany's base of 150 B R P s isn'tenough to subdue two powers. S o she, more thanany other country, needs t o broaden her B R P basethrough the conquest of minor countries. Polanda n d all the minor countries of western Europeshould fall as soon a s possible (usually in the firsttwo turns of the game). Mobilization, keeping inmind the economy of buildinginfantrya n d air forceinstead of a r m o r, should also begin immediately.Usually, if the Germans are followingthe historicalcase closely, they can wait until 1940 to a t tackFrance. They may not need that overwhelminga r m o r superiority a s early as 1939.

Because of the large cost of conduct ing offen-sives and mobilizing her t roops a t the same time,

Germany should restrict her involvementsearly inthe game to one front each turn. F o r instance, sincePoland is already a t war a n d a n offensive in the eastis paid for in the fall of 1939,Germanyshoulduseit and g o after the Poles alone. Unless the goldenoppor tun i ty of a quick strike in to France presentsitself, it's best t o go slowly a n d economicallya t thestart . T h e Germans will be rewarded by gett ingmobilized just that much more quickly.

There's n o permanent growth in the 1940YearISta r t sequence, s o saving B R P s in 1939 isuseless. Whatever isn't spent on front opt ions a n ddeclarations of war should be used for mobilizingtroops.

In terms of savings, Germany may have a noppor tun i ty to keep 10 o r 20 BRPs a t the end of

1940, depending usually on how things went inFrance, a n d a similar a m o u n t a t the end of 1941,depending on how things went in Russia. If she has,these savings result in a modest profi t of B R P s laterin the game. If Germany is to save a t all, the years of1940-42 are the only ones in which she shouldconsider doing so. She should a lso try t o convinceItaly tha t loans t o her are more advantageousto theAxis than Italy's insistance on keeping the B R P s toherself. Afterall, without German aid later in thegame, Italy will fall tha t much more quickly, s o abargain should be struck.

Maximum strategic warfare builds should bemade every year of the game. The Germans shouldbuild all U-Boat factors in 1940, and all U-Boatfactors the rest of the game, save only enoughinterceptorsto counterac t those S A C units built theprevious year by the Allies. F o r instance. say in 1941

CHART 6AVERAGE STRATEGIC WARFARE BUILDS A N D LOSSES

Germany AlliesB R P s U-Boa' Inter. B R P s A S W S A C

Year spent fac ton r a e t o ~ pent factors__factors Outcome

12 Allies loseI R R P r .

Allies 10s

A l l ~ e s0sR R P s

94: All~ es ose

7 Axis lose

Total spent and lost in BR Ps for strategic warfare: Axis 160; Allies 261

-reflens the change in strategic warfare resolution beginning in the 1944 yearlsta rt sequence.

the Allies build two S A C factors, in addi t ion t o the

ASW factors. Germany has n o interceptor factors,s o she takes a loss of four BRPs. T h e Germansshould then cont inuet o build sub factors in the 1942builds, constructing only two interceptors in ordert o prevent those built by the Allies in 1941 from, ineffect, being used twice.

T h e Allies won't be able t o erase Germany's edgein U-Boat factors each year early in thegame. Whenthey finally do , the subs' toll will have been sizableanyway. T h e Germans should never underestimatethe impor tance of strategic warfare, especially o nthe British player in the years of 1941 and 1942.Even if Germany hasn't any intention of trying t oconquer England, the freezing of British BRPs instrategicwarfare keeps those same BRPs from beingsent t o Russia.

ITALY: Italy starts the game with a weak B R Pbase a n d a meager force pool. Her possibilities arelimited, a n d they should be carried out withGermany's consent. Italy can pick u p some neededB R P growth in Yugoslavia, if the Germans don'twant it for themselves.T h e Italians can dea l for thecountry, however. They can use the possible loan oftheir 10 air force factors t o Germany for the Frencho r Russian f ronts a t a later t ime as a condit ion.

T h e Italians should stride for immediatemobilization, especially in naval power, since whenFrance falls, they may find themselveso n a par withthe British in the Mediterranean. T h e possibilityofAxis opera t ions in the southern front suddenlybecomes more inviting with naval equality. Savingis useless for the Italians, and left over B R P S arebest sent to Germany every winter turn.

G R E AT BRITAIN: Great Britain has a s t rongB R P base a t the game's beginning, but a small landarmy. T h a t causesgreat problems for most players,because though the BRPs are often available t ocarry out several aggressive strategies early in thegame, the forces are not. Basically, the British canconcentrate o n any, but usually not all, of thefollowing areas: England (of course), Norway,France, o r Egypt. T o try a n d get Norway, forinstance, and hold the other three areas is a veryexpensive and taxing situation. A spreading ofEnglish forces like this is dangerous too. It d ra inspriceless BRPs needed for the dark year of 1941.

Strategic opt ions o n the board must be weighedagainst mobil ization and strategic warfare buildspossibilities. Saving is virtually impossible,given all

on-the-board demands England faces early, a

even mobilization is a slow process. Abovethough, the British should not let themselbecome so dispersed they become a n invastarget. BRPs must be kept for the possibility ofinvasion. All offensivesearly in the game shouldseverely scrutinized, and nearly half of Englanforces should remain in the country o r be imediately deployable there.

In regards to strategic warfare, the Britishobliged, because the Germans will usuallyfollowaggressive plan. to build a t the maximum strengT h e British want t o s top the German U-Boat thra s best they can f rom profiting f rom the multipeffect. England won't be ablet o build ASW facta s fast a s the Germans can build subs, but she mtry and eliminateas many as possible. Despitethefforts, the British should keep severaldozen BRready at the end of the early years in order to absstrategic warfare losses a n d preserve their bfigure.

Obviously, the British, once they see they wobe the second target of German aggressionagainmajor power (France is usually the first) msuspend most of their activitiesa n d help Russiathe fullest. Russia can only remain in the gamereceiving B R P loans if the Germans manageattack by early 1941. T h e loans must be maimmediately, even though it appears they maybe needed that year.

Later in the game, upon the ent rance ofUnited States, England can swing over tooffensiveand should d o s o a s soon a s possible. Tis because, now that the B R P edge is on the Allside, they should a t once begin to assert it. Thouattacking Germany directly as early as 1943 or 1is difficult, it's possible t o execute some operatiin the southern European theater in order topressure on Italy o r retake some of the Balkcountries.

Also, a judicious, though admittedly vdifficult, allotting of British a n d American t rocan often save BRPs. For instance, if the Alagree t o allow the British to work on the southfront and the Americans to fight o n the westfront, each count ry will have t o pay for only ooffensiveper turn, instead of two. That's a saving30 BRPs per turn for the Allies.

T h e mat te r of loaning BRPs from Englandthe United Sta tes is left up t o the players to dec

T H I R D RElCH . . . Conr d. on pg 32 col

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UNEXPECTEDPAGE 2

M A N E U V E R SPILOT S S U P P L E M E N T TO RICHTHOFEN S WAR

by Michael Turner

"A s long as I live I shall never forgetm y admiration of rhar German pilot, who,single handed, fought seven of us for tenminutes, and put bullets rhrougheach of our machines."

McCudden writ ing of thatfatal encounter with Voss.

RICHTHOFEN'S W A R has always lackedsomething in the eyes o f your editor. Even wheninvolved with the initialplaytest and design I oundlittle t o like about the game aside f rom rheCampaign Game which I helped develop. Thegamehas always lacked the "guesswork" which madeorher games exciting. Instead, play boiled down to

hex counting and geometric puzzles as playersplotted how best to get into position for a I hexshotwith their maneuverschedulewhen it was their turn.Excitement was non-existent except for the sur-prises afforded b y the two dice C RTa n d its built-incritical hits, or the rigors o f the 10 second reactionrule.

Michael Turner's variant for rhe game remediesthesefaults to a large degree andrestores an elementof suspense and maneuver to a game which hasdeteriorated into a hex counring contest and tradingof close shot dicerolls. W eare so impressed with hisvariant that we have printed u p the necessary cards

for mail order sale as an optional exrra. They areprofessionally printed with a beautiful coverillusrration b y historic aircraft artist Joe De Marcoo n the reverse and pertinent diagrams and rules o nthe front. f i e deck o f 27 cards is available f romAvalon Hill for 2.00 plus the usual postagecharges.

Yo u are flying your Sopwith Pup at 3000metersabove enemy territory, watching the blue skies forany movement. Yo u r senses are somewhat lulledinto a false sense o f security by the steady dull h u mo f the 100 horsepower Gnome Mono engine. T h efact is forgotten that any moment now your frailcraft could be riddled b y blazing twin Spandaus.Yo u sit straight, your head twisting and turningconstantly.

Tw o hundred meters above: an Albatross DIIfighter f r o m Jasta 2 has picked up your scent. T h epilot begins the hunt; watching, trailing, stayingabovelbehind the bouncing Pup. T h e time and

setting is not quite right.T h e Sopwith Pup climbs f i f t y meters and yousomehow sense that something is wrong.

T h e Albatross fighter closes the throttlesomewhat, quivers, and swoops down onto theSopwith.

T h e situation occurs o f t e n n R I C H T H O F E N ' SWA R , a game that realistically recreates the airactivity that took place in the skies o f France. T h egame offersconstant hours o f playing and harrow-ing escapes. It can bring a player instant glory in theway o f acehood, or it could give that same player avicarious slow spinning death f rom 4000 meters. InRICHTHOFEN'S one activity feels the exhilara-tion o fa "kill" and the remorse o f eeing a comrade'splummet t o the earth.

Ye t ,although R I CH T H O FE N 'S W A Rs one o fthe best games out o n W W I aerial warfare, it stilllacks a number o f hings that would drastically alterthe playing o f he game as well as the realism. In thisarticle, hope t o give the RICHTHOFEN'S W A Rdevotee some added optional rules that wouldgreatly increase the playability and in turn enhance

the entertainment derived from the game itself.T h emain problem with the game is play balance.Play balance is a major constituent t o any war gameand more so t o a game like R I C H T H O F E N ' SWA R . Here the Germans have free rule over theskies. It is only with a bag o f ricks and a lot o f uckthat the Allied player manages t o win an evenlymatched encounter. It is not until late in the war thatthe Allied player manages t o gain the advantage inflying equipment. W h a t expediency the Alliedplayer has at any time is entirely that o fmaneuverability o f his aircraft. T h e Allied playercan take some solace in that his aircraft is likelyt o bebetter equipped than the German aircraft inmaneuver schedules, climb and dive rates, andmaximums o f altitude. But, this is only a smalladvantage.

Now, back t o the Pup and Albatross DII: i f weplay out the encounter using the standard rules, theoutcome would probably be in favor o f theAlbatross. T h e fact is, the Albatross fires first. Thisisn't the worst o f it. T h e Albatross fires on the Atable o f he T D T. This would almost totally disablethe Pup (givingthe German player anaverage roll o fthe dice), enabling the German player t o finish thePup o f f before the Albatross could take sufficientdamage. T h e outcome seems cut and dry. Ye t , f heroles were reversed, the situation would mostprobably be the same. T h e fact is, the Pup hasn't thefirepower o f the most powerful Albatross. This isnot a fault o f the game; it is the fault o f history.

Suppose, though, that the pilot o f he Sopwithhad sensed that something was wrong; he feels thebullets cutting through his machine and heinstinctively hits the right rudder and peels o f f .T h eAlbatross zooms b y and the Sopwith Pup has theoption o f following the Albatross (? ) or getting theheck out o f here. T h e important thing is: the pilot o fthe Pup has the ability t o increase his chances forsurviving the dogfights he will encounter.

T h e maneuvers used during W W I were beingperformed before actual war took place in the air.T h e y were stunts and used at air shows anddaredevil matches. T h e y were dangerous t o ac-complish and took men's lives. Ye t , they were anintricate part o f W W I air history and should beemployed during the hectic dogfightsthat take placein the game.

Beating a competent German player is nevereasy t o accomplish. T h e A class weapons o f theGerman becomes dangerously murderous. But,

with maneuvers, the better turning schedules o fAllied player can more than save his skin. It canup reverse situations and a Germa n Ace may finspunky Allied plane on his tail

Maneuvers are done with a series o f maneuvcards, three o f each maneuver, twenty-sevencarin all. T h e nine maneuvers represent a cross sectio f the countless aerobatics pilots performed. Hmany cards each player receives depends o nnumber o f actors which will beexplained later. Ttwenty-sevencards(3 o feach 9 maneuvers)represthe chances that each pilot has in being capableeluding or trailing the enemy. T h e cards workfollows:

During combat only, the defender(plane undattack) has the option o f performing a maneuvertrying t o escape by diving or climbing. Maneuving might be a wisechoice i feither the plane is falliapart or the aircraft's guns are jammed or i f tenemy aircraft is being flown by anace. It might nbe a good decision t o perform a maneuver i f defender's aircraft is quite capable o f defeating tattacker. Once the choice has been made, eaplayer picks his allotted number o fmaneuver carT h e defender sorts through his cards and picks owhich he wishes t o perform. T h e attacker then laall his cards down o n the table. f any one o fcards matches the defender's cards then the attackhas successfully followed and both go through tmaneuver. f the cards do not match, then tdefender performs his maneuver and the attackmust flya penalty move o fsix MPsstraight and thmay move as he wishes (provided he still has aMPs lef t ) .He may not dive or climb during this tuphase. All cards are returned t o the deck ashuffled after each attack.

T H E M A N E U V E R S :

Diagram #1 Barrel Roll2 ) Falling Leaf3 ) Flat Spin4 ) Immelmann5 ) Loop6 ) Nose Dive7 ) Side-Slip8 ) Tight Circle9 )Vertical Spin

T h e diagrams o f each maneuver show trelationship o f the aircraft on the hex board. Taircraft illustrated -is the initial position. Tnumbered hex is where the aircraft will finishas was the number o f MPs expended. All aircraft fathe same direction as the initial position exceptthe lmmelmann where the facing is reverseddegrees.

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THE GENERAL PAGE 2

The Barrel RON is accomplished by placing theaircraft marker a s shown in t h e diagram. Thismaneuver takes five movement points with no losso r gain in altitude. T h e Falling Leaf is accomplishedby placing the aircraft marker as shown in thediagram. This maneuver takes two movementpoints and is a 100 meter d r o p in altitude. T h e FlatSpin is accomplishedby placing the counterone hexforward a n d count ing this as three movementpoints. The remaining movement points multipliedby 50 meters is the alt i tude loss. T h e lmmelmann isaccomplishedby placing the aircraft marker directlybehind the initial posit ion but facing the oppositedirection and adding 50 meters to the heightindicator. T h e Loop is accomplishedby placing theaircraft counter behind the initial posit ion a n dcount ing this a s four movement points, six for twohexes behind initial posit ion and eight for threehexes behind initialposition. There is n o loss o r gainin altitude. T h e Nose Dive is accomplished byplacing the aircraft counter one hex forward andcounting it a s two movement points. T h e remainingturn speed is multiplied by 100 meters a n d added t othe normal dive maximum for tha t particularaircraft. This is the loss in alt i tude d u e t o themaneuver. T h e Side Slip is performed by placingthe aircraft marker directly to the side of the initialposition a s shown in the diagram.This countsa s fivemovement points and a loss of 50 meters. T h e TightCircle is accomplishedby leaving the counterwhereit is with n o loss o r gain in alt i tudea n d expendingallmovement points. T h e Vertical Spin is ac-complished by placing the aircraft marker directlyin front of the initial posit ion and count ing this astwo movement points. T h e remaining turn speed ismultiplied by 50 meters a n d then added to thenormal dive maximum for the aircraft. This ismeters loss in altitude d u e to the maneuver.

All these maneuvers take place dur ing dogfightsonly. After a maneuver is performed the player maynotice that he has several movement points left;except in the case of the Tight Circle which uses upall the aircraft s movement points. H e may use these

t o either catch u p with a n enemy aircraft o r to putdistance between them. If head o n attacks occur,there a r e no maneuvers performed. T h e aircraftperforming Barrel Roll, Side-Slip and Falling Leafcan move their counterseither t o the left o r right ofthe initial position. If t o the left, it is a mir ror imageof the diagrams.

Whenever one aircraft is set upon by more t h a none enemy aircraft, each enemy player goes throughthe maneuver (provided the defender haselected t ouse the maneuver option). T h e defender receives hiscards and each a t tacker receives his cards. Playprogresses and follow standardmaneuver rules. T h eattacking plane tha t has first shot gets to trail firstfollowed by the second enemy aircraft, etc.

T h e number of maneuver cards each playerreceives depends o n his aircraft s performance a swella s his own status, combat posit ion(i.e. defendero r attacker) a n d range.

The defender receives four cards a n d theattacker gets two cards. This is the basenumber. Inaddit ion each pilot receives one bonus card perevery five kills t o his credit. T h e attacker receivesone addit ional card for every two hexes he is awayfrom the defender a t the moment of attack.Fractions are not considered.T h e aircraft s turningschedule a lso increases/decreasesthe base number:

Turning AbilityABC

E

Cards-2

0+ I+2

MANEUVER DIAGRAMS

BARREL ROLL

IMMELMANN(+50 meters)

SIDE SLIP(-50 meters)

FALLING LEAF- 100 meters)

LOOP

(All M P )

(remaining M P x -50 meters

NOSE DIVE(remainingM P x -50 meters +

normal dive maximum)

pVERTICAL SPIN(remainingM P x -100 meters

+ n o r m a ldive maximum)

If the aircraft has a n A turning schedule then two After all players involved in maneuvers cards ar e taken away. If the aircraft has anE turning their al lot ted cards, the maneuvers ar e matchedschedule then two c ards are added. If C then no results are followed.change.

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P GE 22 TH GENER L

The movement chart explains which aircraftmove during which phase of the maneuvers. It isvery important that this chart be understood andfollowed. Basically, if the defender gets away(successfully eluded his attack er) then the n ext movehe receives will be combat free, unless the playerdecides to engage in aerial melee again or becomesinvolved in combat with another enemy aircraft .Even though maneuvers are bonus movements theyin no way upset the player turn phase of the game.

It would seem that the succees of the maneuverwould depend on the type of aircraft involved aswell as the status of the pilot . This very muchmatches the situation th at pilots faced when orderedto go aloft in cloth and wood boxes pulled or pushedthrough the air by sputtering oil-soaked engines.

Returning to the example of the Sopwith Pupand A lbatross D11. the Albatro ss attack s theSopwith Pup and ro l l s for damage on the TDT.After this, the Sopwith Pup has the option ofperforming a maneuver which he elects to take. ThePup takes four cards with no bonus/penaltiesas thePup is a C turning schedule and the pilot is not anace. The Alba tross receives two cards but m ust giveup one because of the m inus one for B turningschedule. Let us say that the Albatross is one hexaway and thus receives no bonus for range (must beat least two away). He is not an ace and receives nobonus. Th us, the Pu p has four cards to theAlbatross' one. The Pu p player chooses a L oop andthe Albatross does not have this card. The Pupperforms the Loop and moves the remainingmovement points du e him. If the Pu p is lined up sohe may fire at the Albatross then the Pu p may nowfire. This is not defen sivefire. It is an added bon usfor the defender. The Albatros s now m oves six of hisallotted M P straight. He may not perform amaneuver during this turn even if he is beingattacked by the Pup . Now, it is the Pup's tu rn againand he has the option of attacking the Albatross orturning tail. He elects to dive away from theAlbatross and turn back home. N ote: if the Pup hadattacked the Albatross, the German player wouldnow have the option of performinga maneuver aftercombat results have been determined. If theAlbatross had matched thedefender 's card, then thePup would have performed the maneuver andwould not be al lowed rofire on the Albatross if thesituation warranted i t . The Albatross would thenperform a Loop and, after the allotted num ber ofMPs have been expended for that particularmaneuver, may fire on the Pup. The next movewould be the Pup's and he may now performanother maneuver if he feels relatively lucky thatday.

After using the man euvers a few times, it will beobvious that the aircraft's turning schedule, move-ment points, dive rate and t o some extent ac-cumulated damage all come together and performmore vividly. The aircraft specifications become

even more important in the overall picture ofRICHTHOFEN S W ARa nd with maneuvers this ismagnified a great deal. The key to this rule is that theuse of maneuv ers is optional. One need not performthe maneuvers if one believes the situation is notserious enough to warran t i t . Th e maneuversare notso much an advantage to any p i lo t as they are a toolfor survival.

MULTI PLAYER GAMES:In the case of more than one comba t si tuation

taking place on the board at the same time,determine results for each individual combatseparately. That is , after maneuver card s are usedfor the first group, return all cards to the pack beforegoing to the next group.

Additional points to remember:maneuvering aircraft move first. After allresults are determined. then other aircraftmay m ove.aircraft cannot go off the board edge whileperform ing man euver results. If an aircraft isforced off the board (usually this occursduring the penalty move inflicted on theattacker) stop one hex sh ort of the board edge.This ends the players turn regardless ofnumber of MPs left.the Loop is the best maneuver to perform ifthe defender wishes to get on the opponent'stail. It will enable the defender to inflict themost punishment on his aggressive opponentbut does not enable the defender to escapefrom his opp onen t if sufficient dam age is notinflicted.if the defender eludes his opponent, he mayfire at the enem y aircraft if the line of sight is inaccordance with the sighting rule. If thedefender does not elude his opponent, he maynot fire at the enemy aircraft following thecompletion of the maneuver.

***** Q

RUSSIANCAMPAIGN

PBM KITIn response to many requests for it, we've

ahead and done another PBM Kit after stnumerous times: "never again".R U S S IA N C A MPAIGN is a good medium for postal play thoand is perhaps our best game for pbm. combination of double impulse moves andrelatively small num ber of turn s makes it a deliplay by mail.

Each kit comes with full instructions for pbm in general and R U S S I A N C A M PA I G Nparticular. A kit includes 4 pads-two eachRussian and German moves, and incleverything necessary to record movement, comand retreats plus special functions like rail mment, sea movem ent, weather and replacemencomple te kit sells for $6.00 plus postage. A hawith only two pads costs $3.00 plus posMaryland residents please add 5% sales tax.

.

NEW KINGMAKER EVENT CARDSAre your K I N G M A K E R games getting a bit well as 23 blanks fo r use in your own variants.

dull? You can spice them up with the new Event entire deck is backed by the same Cards described in Vol. 14, No.3 Avalon Hill K I N G M A K E R design which m akes the game suis making available in a special expansion kit a newa joy to play and ca rds fromthe: two de cks will bdeck of 48 Events card s includ ing 25 printed indistinguish able from the rear. This speciaTreachery , Gales At Sea, Refuge, Vacillating deck is available for $2.00 plus postage. MaAllegiance, Catastrophe , and Ro yal Death cards asresidents please add 5%sales tax.

AN IMPO RTAN T NOTICE TOELITE CLUB TICKET H O LD ER S

Good news for Elite Club members. From now be sure to ask for your Elite Club membershon yo ur Elite Club D iscount coupons are good cardltickets to insure we don't forget.towards the Mail order purchase of any AvalonHill game direct from Avalon Hill-not just the You'll then be a lifetime mem ber of the AvalMail Order only variety. Hill Elite Club eligible for discounts on gam

Discounts are applicable only to those mem- purchased directly from Avalon Hill every year hers o the Elite Club w ho staple their 1977 the rest of your life-PROVIDING youd on't lcale ndar year Elite Club ticket to their order. Used the m embersh ip card. Absolutely no lost cards wor lost Elite Club tickets are not replaced under be replaced.any circumstances. This offer doe s no t inc lude a free subscripti

to the G E N E R A L , and is not to be confused witcan become a member of the the initial offering made in 1974. You rgam eord

Club. T o qual i fyYOU must place a mail order for must total at least to qual i fy you forany six Avalon Hill games. N o discounts apply tothis qualifying order. When placing such an order membershipand c n inc lude anygame

than once.

SPORTS G A M E R S A N O N Y M O U SPsst Hey, you. The one with the copy of

Football Strategy hidden inside yourPanzerblifzbox. There's a new magazine coming out forpeople just like you, who like to play and discussany of A valon Hill's line of sport s ganies (and wemean the Sports Il lustrated and 3M gam es, too).We haven't got a name yet, b ut we've got lots ofgood ideas. I'll bet you have, too . If you are a realsports game nut, and think you can write, drop usa line. We need contributors, and club news, too,for our first issue to appear this fall.

Ssh Not so loud. know you're interested, butput it down on paper, and mail it to me, B.C.Milligan, Sports Editor, The Avalon Hill GameC om p an y, 451 7 H ar fo rd R d., B altim ore , ~ d .21214. And hey, bu ddy. Tell all your pals, right?

ORDER BY PHONE~ t ~ t w

t n y r

e will now accept game orders by phofrom those individuals with currently vaM A S T E R C H A R G E , B A N K A M E R I C A(VISA), or AME RICAN EXPR ESS credi t caThe num ber to call is 301-254-5300. Ask for CNewton or ext.34 a nd state that you wish to pan order for aga me. You must give the order tathe number, expiration date, and name of ycredit card alon g with your orde r and shippaddress. Pho ne orders ar e available every Mday-Friday from 8:30 AM t o 5 PM. Absolutelnocollect phone calls can be accepted.

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THE GENERAL PAGE 3

STALINGRAD art 2RUSSIAN: Tom BaruthGERMAN: Joe AngiolilloCOMMENTARY: Paul Bakulski

We pick u p our Series Replay w ith the RussianFebruary 1942 mov e. A t this point in the gameyou ll recall from our October issue that thecommentator had given the G ermans the edge. Th econclusion of the Replay below demonstrates whyjudges have such a hard tim e adjudicating games in/ace to face tou rnam ents.

Russian February Move: I anticipated a possibleattack against Dnepro-Petrovsk but I also figuredthat the Germans might shed a little blood if theytried it. Not only was Russia n blood th e only liquidflowing, but my 64th ln fantry is in troub le next tur n.For weather next turn I think mud would be ideal

allowing me to get a 2-3-6 to t he front in t he sou thyet preventing a 3-1 against Smolensk.

German March Move: What luck Clear weathermeans the panzers roll again. The Russianssolidified considerably durin g the winter. Smo lenskis a good target since it flanks t he Divina. I m ust alsokeep up the pressure in the south. Prospects areincreasing; I'll still play conservatively.

Neutral Comment: Two units should have beenplaced at U28 to prevent the 3-1 on Smolensk. TheDivina is still sucking up too many units. There isnothing I would change about the German moveThis is a low point in Russ ian fortunes.

Russian March M ove: Well, so m uch fo r buildingup the Russian army-the Germ ans keep gettingstronger as the Russians keep getting weaker. Theyjust are not being made' to pay for the ground theyare gaining. M y troo ps seem t o collapse every timethey defend against a 3-1 attack from a doubledposit ion As much a s 1 hate to keep a valuable unitlike the 4th C avalry in th e back lines this turn, ifI getmud in April I would be unable to reach U31 withthat unit and t he Ugra River would fall. Concerningthe Divina, 1 can't make th e river 3-1 pro of, but 1hope any attack there will look uninvit ing andcostly.

German April Move: Last turn was the best Mar ch'42 I've had. Th ere are numer ous optio ns available:R24, S25, BB29, and FF28. If only had placed 2and 2R o FF26 with units on 227 and BB27,Icould assault I127 (or have increased the press ureat

least). 1 may be wrong in choosing to break theDivina now instead of plunging along with mysouthern strategy, but it will force the Russian tosacrifice one more unit next turn. A 2-1 againstKK27 with the PBM table allows me to flankStalino with little chance of loss.

Neutral Comment: This may be the turningpoint .In my opinion the German should have pressed hisadvantage in the south, where (thanks to Russianwithdrawals on diagrams 4a nd 9) he German is or3 turns ahead o f schedule. Since Stalino is3-1 proof,the choice is between FF28 and K ursk. True, Kurskis about to b e surrounded, but CC29 is valuable realestate. But m ore imp ortant, as the G erman in thisgame. I want all those Russians along the Divina,not all those Germans. Those Divina Russians willnow turn up on the Luga and in ront of Moscow.

GERM AN MARC H 42-Although the Russian receives three new the weather changes to Clear.units as reinforcements (3, 4 and IS A rmor) he is about to suffer his The Germ an scores AV s again st all three Russian 2-3-6 s and

worst turn in the game. The Russian 6th Armor is kept busy playinga eliminates the 28th and 64th lnfantry with 3-1 s. The Russian has lostlo rn of tag w ith FX4 near Lake Onega while the 16th Infantry must 26 factors to none for the German.garrison Leningrad against any foray of 5R from Helsinki. And now

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THEGENERAL PAGE 5

good headway this game but the Russian bayonetsare glistening everywhere since the Divina turnedred. I fear the worst is yet to come.

Russian J u n e Move: Russian citizensare cheeringinthe streets of Moscow at news of further Sovietvictories. for the next turn 1a m somewhat afraid ofa possible low-odds assault against my 3rd lnfantryand a possible breakthrough there. Even worse

would be a n early collapseof the Don. If I can holdon there until a t least Septemberthingswill begin t olook promising.

German July Move: The Soviet army is rebuildingat almos t twice the rate 1 can inflict casualties andmy German forces are dwindling. I must conserveunits and make one final thrust with less than 3-1attacks just before winter. Th e target is Moscow. 1must get one more turn of good luck and thenprepare for the inevitable, ultimate risk.

Neutral Comment: After last turn s results, a 1-1against S33 isan intelligent risk. Theatrack on FF28will expose GG29. Attacking U3I from U3O andV30 (and advancing after combat ) is often done orthis point.

Russian July Move: My good luck on the 3-1attacks resulted in a much-needed re building of theRussian army. It was very tempting t o knock off theRumanian Cavalry this turn, but it would have leftRostov defended by a single 5-74. At a risk of only14 factors Joe could try a 1-1 there with a 50%chance of success and a serious blow to theStalingrad defense.

German August Move: Woe is me The Russianbegins his end run. There are numerous at tackspossible but n othing to attack them with. I 'll attackas much as possible and hope to banzai Moscownext turn. Moscow may fal l with extremely go odluck, paving the way to assault o r isolate Leningradduring the winter. But even with this strategy,Stalingrad looks impregnable.

Neutral Comment: The Russian ronr is coagularingalter the last rwo turns. The German needs to makeand win a low-odds artack. Bur where? Q32outflanks Moscow and opens up 3-1 s in that area;or AA33 gives many, many 3-1 s or a long rime; orHH3l yields panic in Stalingrad. My o w n prefer-ence would be Q32 ar 2-1. Apparently we disagree.

Russian August Move: I a m really gett ing backedup against the wall bu t the winter is approaching ,thank goodness. With full mobility a n d possessionof the Kursk-Kharkov railroad, those Germanarmored units can strike just a b o u t anywhere on theboard, making it impossible to 3-1 proof all riverlines. 1 would like to fortify the D o n and Volgamore, but I can't afford t o give inexpensive shots a tMoscow and L30 (adjacent to Leningrad).

German SeptemberMove: I've prepared for this forthe last three turns. Moscow is finally ad jacent t omy army. By assault ing Moscow, I will, in effecteliminate six Russian factors in replacements, plusanything I can kill in the city. What's best? Three I

2's risk the least factors. One 1 1 gives the bestchance, and the worst chance t o win the game. Tw o1-2's and a 2-1 give the best chance of stayingadjacent t o the city, a n d causing To m a number ofproblems. That's the only solution I can th ink ofthat will keep the Russian a r m y from gett ingstronger and stronger a n d stronger.

Neutral Comment: Tom s defense this turn doesnorlend itself to any low oddsarracks worth taking. The

GERMAN AUGUST 42-The German is again unable to garner a to AV s. The Russian lost 22 f a c t o r s ~ x a c t l y hat he brought onDE on his 3-1 and loses the 4th 6th Infantry in exchange for the reinforcements while the German lost 8.TheGermanshowsa net lRussian 2nd in crossing the Oshol River. Elsewhere the Russian lows of 3 factors for August in his attrition ratio ..:- vis the Russiahis 10th infantry inas-I in front of Moscowaswellas thethree2-3-6 s

GERMAN SEPT 42-The usual automatics take place against the German has traded a turn for the outskirts of the city but the RussRussian delaying armor hut the real action is at Moscow. A pair of I- still holds Moscowitself, and as such, thecdge in any prolonged ba2 s retreats one attacking onedefendingunit allowing theGermana there.2-1 against the Russian 6th Cav resulting in a DBZ. Net Result: the

Don, just as important as the Dniepr, should beattacked at 3-1 at AA33.

Russian September Move: I'm glad I fortifiedMoscow in anticipationof a possibleassaultthere. Ididn't really expect to see such masses of Germana r m o r risked o n such a venture, however. J o e isdefinitely a bold player-the fall of Moscow thisturn would have really jolted my defense, but thenheavy losses of the German a r m o r in a n un-successful assault would have all but crushedGerman chances. T h e Don line is crumbling, but Iheld o n there a s long a s hoped for.

German October Move: The luck last turn was verygood. What would To m have done if the first die rollhad been a D Back 2? 1 accomplished my objectiveof weakening the Russian army since sixteendefense factors were eliminated a n d only twelveavailable through replacement.

T h e big question is what t o d o now? Moscolooks t o o strong. The weather may change andmust take account of all eventualities. Hencepanzer reserve is neededjust nor th of Smolensk.M

other two objectives of breaking the Don anreducing the Russian a r m y are fulfilled by a 3-1 an"sneaky" 1-2. If they both work 1 will have a chanto win the game by taking Stalingradand surrouning the remainder of the Russian army in the norafter taking Moscow dur ing the winter.

Neutral Comments: The 1-2 against Rosrovexcellent. Are things desperate enough to 1

Moscow? It is better to 3-1 Q32 rom Q31 and R3The Italian unit on V35 is weak.

Russian October Move: It is a definite relief t o nhave to worry about the possibilityof clear weathfor a while. J o e has his a r m o r pretty well located fmaximum threat , after which he will have to comm

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P GE 6 THE GENER L

GERMAN OCT 42-The Russianc, red the German 39th and withdraws his armor NW of Smolensk soas o beable to threaten Elsewhere the customary AVs vs the Russian armor fake placeArmor near Moscowat 3-1 and f o r d t back whilelosingthe29thin both Moscow Leningrad in November regardless of the weather. the 17th Infantry ia eliminated at 3-1. A bold 1-2 vs Rostov witha 1-6 aoakoff.Faced with 4 factorsin MoscowtheGerman backsoff However, his thinly held front can ill afford 29 factors in the rear. Hungarians is repulavl.

it. Then my winter offensive can start in earnest. Iexpect another assault on Moscow next turnbecause Joe s position will not improve by waiting. Iwas happy to see the Italian unit alone on V35because it was possible to simultaneously attack itand secure the southeastern flank of Moscowbehind a river line.German November Move The worst thing thatcould have happened did. I did not get the die rolls Ineeded in both the combat and weather portions ofthe turn. I must get a centralized position for mypanzers and eliminate as many Russians as possible.In other words, it s banzai time. Moscow must behit. The solrth is weak and the Luga can also be hitsince it is frozen over. I must get good luck andattack everything. But most of all, I must occupyMoscow, giving me more mobility in the winter thanTom; and weakening his army to boot.

Neutral Comments I usually like attacking theLuga less than the Divina since the best defensive

position of all, Leningrad, still remains). At thispoint in the game, losing 20 German factors atMoscow hurtsps much as losing40, so make the I-I .How about another 1-2 against Rostov with thesneaky DB2)?

Russian November Move Well, I think the combatresults this turn mark the final turning of the tide.Moscow and Leningrad are relatively safe for awhile. The German army is too dissipated to sustaina substantial drive against more than one or two ofthe three cities, and there is not enough time to takeone and then move on to the next.FINAL R E M A R K S

Russian Comments My basic philosophy as theRussian in this game is to give up ground as slowly

GERMAN OV 42-The Russian counterattacksto regain the Oka further casualties,settlingfor DB2 s ina4-1 vsthe4thArmor andRiver and destroys the Italian Cavalry with yet another inhis seriesof vs the 4th Infantry. In addition. a Hungarian unit is lost in auninterrupted DEs. The Novembersnowslimitmovementand lead to soakoff near Leningrad. The German has lost 23 factors tosome strangcattacks.Uppermost among them is the 1-2 Exchangeat Russians 2 and is no closer to taking a major city. The RusMoscowcosting the Germans 2 factorsand still not gainingthecity. counter offensive is about to begin.Aside from the customary delaying AVs the German causes no

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TH GENER L P GE

RUSSIAN NOV 42-The tide has turned. The Russians destroy 4Rin a 4-1s before Leningrad-losing the 6th Armor in a I 4 oakoff.

The Moscow chapter is closed with a 6-1 DE of the Italian Infantryleft to guard the Moskva.

as possible without undue sacrifice of units. It isoften tempting in the early part of the game to throwanother delaying unit out in the open rather thanfalling back to a better defensive position, and thefull effect of that is not felt until later in the gamewhen Russian units are scarce and the front line islong.

I think Joe's aggressive play with the Germans isthe most successful way to defeat a competentRussian. Not only is an occasional low-odds attacka good way to make an unanticipated breakthroughand disrupt the Russian player's careful plans, butthink that just the knowledge that the German

might at any time risk a low odds attack causes theRussian to give up certain concessions. I foundmyself overfortifying certain crucial sectors of myline to prevent even low odds attacks there, andconsequently giving better opportunities againstother sectors of my line.

German Comments: Tom is a competent, ex-perienced S TA L I N G R A D player. Against thiscombination the German player cannot win ontactics alone. All the dirty tricks in the world,correctly executed only give a slight edge to theattacker. Solid play can only be beaten by moresolid play.

And this is where I went wrong.When you first master STALINGRAD, you

understand defensive tactics, offensive tactics, and

The German now realizes that the game is forfeit and throwscaution to the winds, hoping to reverse the tide with a series of low

odds attacks. The December turn will be his last. He AVs the 2ndArmor at 5-lsand nailsthe 35th in Lake llmen witha I-I,losingonlythe I th Infantry in a 1-5 soakoff. The44th Armor alsoeliminates the

the end game. As you become a better tournamentplayer, you develop a good opening, but the middlegame can only be understood after hundreds ofhours of experience against as many competentRussian opponents as possible.

As the German player you want the Russian tooversolidify the Divina during the middle game, andyou shouldn't attack it with your main strength ifthe Russian is weaker elsewhere. As I have learnedfrom Paul (Bakulski) after hours of analysis of thisgame, the German usually wins the game bybreaking the Don and with it Russian mobility andcommunications during the middle game-he

doesn't try to do this, the Russian player naturallygives him this area because the Moscow-Leningradand Stalingrad-Rostov sectors are so much moreimportant.

Neutral Comment: The Series Replay pretty muchspeaks for itself: Early unnecessary German lossesat 8 8 1 4 the 1-1 on the Prut, the soak-off near

Lwow) were offset by unexpected Russianwithdrawals from the Nemunas and Dniepr. Ifeelthe German had the upper hand until the dis-asterous attack on the Divina. Ajier that point itbecame necessary to gamble on a wellplaced lowodds attack or two.

EPILOGUEThe game was won by Tom after three more

furious turns of attack and counterattack, and when

Russian l l th Infantry in a 1 1 as the German close in on Leningbut it is too little too late. Aside from a 6-1 DE vs the 7th Armor

German has enjoyed his last success--ending the gamein

a pooblood before Stalingrad with 3 low oddsexchanges vs the Russian36th lnfantry and 4th Armor.

the smoke cleared, Joe could not take LeningradMoscow by the end of the game. In the rematch Jbarely squeezed out a victory with the Russiansthat neither player gained or lost AREA points aresult of their PBM match, but they did gain a gredeal of experience and satisfaction that they playexcellent games.

THE GENERALBINDERSThese binders are ruggedly constructed

attractive red leather finish vinyl, with goembossed logos of the THE GENERAL andAvalon Hill Game Company located on the froand spine. Each binder measures 9 x 12 x 1% aholds twelve (12) copies of THE GENERASpring-steel retaining wires hold the issues firmlyplace, yet your magazines are not damaged in away, and can easily be removed from the binderyour desire. The binders are available from AvaloHill for $5 plus 75e postage. Maryland residenplease add 5 state sales tax.

8/12/2019 Vol14i4


PAGE 8 THEGENERAL

POSTAL JUTLANDJUTLAND-THE POSTAL TEAM GAME

by DON TURNBULL

Postalplay nowadays often involves the loss ofconsiderable "feel" or the game as the phases of the

newer games have to be drop ped in favor of moreplayable "m y turn-you r turn"po sta1 mecha nics. Itis rare rhen to think in terms of agame 's realism andexcitement level being increased bypostalplay. OurBritish author provides us with ust thar opportun i-ty with his outline of rules for Postal JUT LA ND ,and rhen tops rhat performance by offeringinterested readers a chance to participate in ap ost algame which he is moderating

Lest Don feel t oo cocky ho wever we reallyshould state thar the sorry picture he paints ofJUTLAND sales isn't really all rhat gloomy.Althoug hpoor sales performance w as the reason orthe game originally beingd ropp ed, it remains one ofour best mail order titles and has ledthat div ision insales since its revision in 1974.

The history of the J UTLAND gam e is a triflesad. It emerged fro m the stable for the first time inthe late 1960s-a prod uct of the early pen of JimDunnigan whose work has developed such strengthsince. Even when first published it did not feat ure atthe top of the sales rankings, and for most of i ts f irstedit ion existence i t was probably close to the bottomof the list. It was discontinued as part of the AHstreamlining policy, which retrenchment also sawthe last of other games like 1914 and Gua dalca nal.Later still, it was re-introduced, a s a mail ordergame, with so me rules revisions and the inclusion ofnew mini-games. Even a t the time of its reintroduc-tion, it was described (in The General volume I Inumber 3) as . excessively long . till operateson the honour system during the search procedure. still requires a large flat surface on which t o play

no PBM system'. An honest appraisal by AH,but hardly one calculated to inspire widespreadpurchases. Small wonder, in the face of suchhonesty, that it is still hardly a best-seller; had theminigames not been introduced it seems unlikelythat AH would have reintroduced it in the firstplace. Since the second edition was published, therehave been but three articles aboutJUTLAND inThe General, none rated highly in the reader polls.Volume 12 number 3 contained tw o of thesearticles(the third was in volume 11 number 4), a n d A Hruefully reported on the read er poll in the next issue:Volume 12 number 3 apparently suffered from too

much JUTLA ND material as we took i t on the chinwith our worst rating ever . Note that AH doesn'tblame the articles (correctly) but the subjectmatter-JUTLAND is still the A H Cinderella.

In light of all this, you ma y dou bt my sanity inwrit ing about JUT LAN D here. But, you see, Ibelieve in fairy stories, and thoug h I would no t go sofar as to cast two very unlikely and unprepo ssessingcandidates (Ken Norris and myself) in the roles ofJoint Fairy Godmo thers, I would say that a magicwand is available to solve at least some ofJUTLANDS problems, if only we can be botheredto find it. Tha t magic wand was originally forged byKen Norris as a set of rules for postal team play-rules which not only overcome normal PBMproblems but also, transform rather a dull , tedious,mechanically-imperfect Cinderella into an excitingpostal Princess. Indeed , there is no reason why som eof the improvemen ts in the postal rulescou ld not beincorporated into the ftf game. My role was as a sortof assistant blacksmith-to refine and test theoriginal forging into a workable piece of equ ipme nt.

S o believe me when I say 1 am not just beingstubborn-blow the dust off the forgottenJUTL AN D box: as with s o many things, there isanother way of looking at it. I hope this article,which describes the postal rules and procedur es, willresurrect interest in w hat is potentially a fine game.

Search.One of the principal faults with the ftf game is

the inordinate length and tedium of the searchprocedure, coupled with a n unsatisfactory offshootwhich gives the players 'partial intelligence'-approximate information, which they should nothave, about the location of the enemy fleet . Theconcepts of 'scouting' and 'patrolling' don't reallyenter in to the ftf gam e: each player can do little buthope that his guesses prove correct and that , whentwo opposing forces happen to stumble across eachother , his guns will be bigger than the one s the otherguy can bring to bear.

In the postal game the mechanics are simple anduse the standard A H search sheets, but they removeunwanted intelligence elements and speed upsearch, in terms of player time, that is. Both fleetsstart in port at 0100 hours on 30th May. For everyhou r of search procedure, each comma nder writesorders for the h our and sends them to the monitor-a third, neutral party wh o must not only be familiarwith the game but must also have patience andforbearance in plenty, for he must see the wholepicture yet take n o par t in it and it is his task to sendimmediate and individual reports to the opposingsides. The mon itor must be prepared to act quickly;nothing harms a postal game more than slowresponse from the monitor and in a game of thislength the maintenance of player-interest is vital.The mon itor plots the moves and then sends a reportto each comm ander, advising of any contact , resultof U-Boat a ttack etc. H e also tells the players whatprocedu re is to be followed fo r the next move-e.g.'continue search procedure', 'start b attle procedure'etc.

This system, though it solves the 'intelligence'problem and forces players to be more careful anduse more ingenuity in scouting out the enemy, canstill be tedious in the early phases of th e game. At thestart , therefore, the mo nitor asks for, not one, butten sets of search orders, one fo r each o fth e f irst tensearch hours. He plots these one by one and 'stopsthe clock' as necessary. If there is no sightingd uringthis time, he advises players accordingly and asks

for o rder s for the next period, which is probably hours rather tha n ten ( the forces being by then mcloser), and this procedure continues at five-hintervals, o r as amend ed by the monitor, usighting does occur. When it does, he 'stops clock' and starts ba ttle procedure which is describelow.

Difficulties can arise, during the period befcapital ships come into contact, from U-Bmovem ent an d airsh ip sightings. Clearly this sorinformation must be relayed back to the miralties and they should be allowed to reacta f tesho rt game-time de lay. The rules leave this area vmuch to the discretion of the monitor, but suggthat he plots movement up to and including the hof sighting, plots one additional search hmovement and then stops the clock and report

the players, the addit ional hour representing t ime taken fo r the new information to be fed bacAdmiralt ies and for them to react with new ord

E X A M P L E At the start of a game both sides send orders for 0101000 inclusive. No sightings occur during that timethe monitor then asks for orders for 1100-15inclusive. When these are plotted. the mo nitor sees tha German airship sights some British capital ships ithe 1200 turn: he therefore plots up to and includin1300. ignoring orders for the two remaining hours aninforms the players. He will then ask them to seorders for 1400-1800 inclusive.

Above all, the monitor must be flexible thoughtful. He must at once bear in mind necessity to keep the gam e flowing, but at the stime must not reveal mo re informa tion tha n reapermits, nor must he give hints, implicit or explTo ask for orders fo r only the next search hour wopposing fleets are close may seem sensible, bthat request com es after a series of requests forhours' orders, it can in fact convey too minformation, implicitly, to the players who coreact accordingly. Of course , if the players alreknow that the f leets are close (e.g. as a resultairship sightings) no secrets would be given awThe re is a case, in certain circumstances , for asthe British to provide orders for five hours (tmay know of an airship's proximity but haveinformation on th e positions of surface vessels)Germans (who have a lot more information)only one or two. Obviously the reports to eachare different. 1 have often re-typed a report becit seemed to me there was a danger of a plainferring more than I had intended. The FGodmother never had it this difficult.

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Players must send ord ers which are clear andunambiguo us. Fast search speed ships must begiventwo hexes through which to move in the appro priatehours, if required by the player, unless the coursemakes the intervening hex obvious. The postalversion allows full use of the German airships,which again must be given two hexes per hour ifnormal m ovement is required. Airships may be usedmore than once; after returning to base, they may beordered out again after a 3-hour refuelling period.Airships which sight British ships will always besighted by those ships and the event will be reportedto both players.

Again, the postal version allows full use of U-Boats, which may initially be placed in the searchhexes desired by their commander. Orders for U-Boat actions must clearly state what happens ifBritish ships enter the s ame hex; the monitor shouldaccept conditional orders here-the U-Boat com-mander may wish, for example, to attack un-escorted BBs but would turn awa y if there were DD spresent. Similarly the British ships must be givenorders by their commanders indicating the actionthey would take in the event of a U-Boat attack.

Although U-Boat movement conforms to thenormal rules, complications can arise if a U-Boatcontinually turns away from contact , thus ex-ceeding its normal movement limit. This sort of

complication is again handled by the monitor.Generally, the turn-away arising from one searchhour is counted a s the movement for the next searchhour, but turn-away could occur again and createthe situation in which the U-Boat is moving everyhour. In such a case the mon itor would inform theGerman commander that no movement of any sortis permitted tha t U-Boat for a specified number ofhours, in order to restore the average movementrate. This forces the G erman comm ander ei ther toattack when sighting British forces, whatever thecomposition of the forces, or to orde r his ship 'to th ebottom' so that it stays in the same search hex for agiven period and does not sight enemy ships durin gthat period (nor is it sighted by the British).

If a U-Boat sights and att acks a British force, thepresence of the U-Boat is always reported t o the

British comm ander even if the attack is indecisive. AU-Boat which turns away on sighting the enemy,however, is given a 50% ch ance of escaping w ithoutbeing spotted and the monitor will roll a die toresolve this. At night the U-Boat is never spotted.

This covers the search procedure. In myexperience, the system is smooth and reasonablyfast-flowing-it creates an interesting battle of witsnot so effectively generated in ftf play. Airships,UBoats and fast, light, scouting forces assume moresignificant roles than in the normal ftf game-indeed I gathe r they are often 'le in the box' in ftfplay, which is a great pity.

The Team Game.Taking t ime off from the rules for a momen t, one

of Ken Norris' im porta nt innova tions was the use ofteams in the game. The f irst JUTEX games hadthree or four players on each side-onecommander-in-chief who determine d overall strate-gy and policy, and subordinate comm anders whotried to execute that policy without driving theirships into each other. The CinC had the task ofallocating all the ships available to commanders inhis team and issuing general instructions to thecommanders. Orders were sent by each commanderdirect to the m onitor and a n obedient subordinatesent a copy to his CinC, despite the additionalpostage cost (actually I think that nicety could bedispensed with; if a com man der isn't going to do theright thing, he won't send in orde rs so early tha t hisCinC has t ime to amend them, and anyway there isnothing approaching realism in this). There was a

chance that a commander would. deliberately oraccidentally, depart from the letter or spirit of hisCinC's intentions and this might reduce theeffectiveness of coordi natio n, to say nothing of themorale, of that team. T herear e those who dislike the'team' concept because of the uncertainty it adds,just a s there are those who dislike the 'anonymity'rule in postal K I N G M K E R games. Fo r my part, Iwelcome it and leave others to make their choice.

Given a team situation, t houg h, it was even moreimportant for commanders to coordinate their

movement in battleotherw ise a collision betweenfriendly ships was a real and awful possibility. I

remem ber only one of these in theearly games whena commander failed to send in orders by thedeadline and his ships steamed full speed ahead asbefore, only to run smack into a BC squadronmoving across their bows; an interesting departurefor an y game, and o ne which is not witho ut its real-life parallel.

In the early games each commander retainedcontr ol of th e force of ships initially allocated to himthroughout the game; this led, when battle wasjoined, to some of the players whose ships wereelsewhere not taking part in the action and in thesecircumstances they could be pardoned for losinginterest. It 's not mu ch fun spectating a battle inwhich none of your own ships are involved,

particularly if the action is prolonged.I suspect thisfactor. mo re than an y other. was responsible for thefailure of some of the early games when playersdecided they had seen enough. Recently, I haveintroduced a new ruling which forces each CinC toreallocate all ships involved in an action at the startof that action and in such a w ay that every player ineach team is responsible for one of the shipsinvolved. I s uppose a case will arise in which thereare fewer ships than there ar e players, but if it doeshappen I suspect the action will be brief. Whenbattle is over, ships are reallocated back again an dsearch proc edure restarts; the CinC could make anentirely new allocation at that point, and willprobably wish to do so if a number of ships havevanished vertically. Obviously the team gam e is anoption-postal J U T L N D can be played just aseffectively between two players as between twoteams, so long as the monitor is in the middle, andindeed dispensing with teams dispenses withcomm unications problems. HoweverI like to thinkthat team play, and the attendant problems ofcomm unications and relat ionships, add a welcomeelement; if nothing else. a team game putswargam ers in contact with each othe r, and this in mybelief is the most important aspect of the hobby.

Battle.For the postal team game you need no large

surfaces or even the ship counters. The much-crawling-on-the-carpet nuisance of the ftfg am e(fo rhas anyone found the 3 'x4'area suggested by AH t obe adequate?) is a thing of the past. The only item ofadditional equipment needed is a large sheet of

graph paper. If the postal rules inspire players to d onothi ng else but replace thecarp et by a largesheet ofgraph paper (for playing J U T L N D on, that is)then they have in my view conquered the secondmajor difficulty of the ftf game.

Th e graph paper we used was 21" x 18". markedin tent hs of an inch. A smaller sheet would suffice,given proportionate reduction in the scales andmeasurem ents given below; however actions involv-ing large numbers of ships would be made moredifficult to plot, particularly since it is necessary tolabel each 'ship' on the battle ch art with its name, orat least a n abbreviat ion.

A large hexagon is drawn on the graph paper torepresent the hex in which the action is takin g place.T o dra w the hex, first locate the centre of the paperand th e east and west boundaries (l8" apa rt) by eye;

it is convenient to lo cate the east and west 'flats' othick, rather than thin. lines on the graph papeThen plot the vertices of the hexagon which are a10.4" from the centre-one due north and one dusouth of the centre point. two each o n the east anwest 'flats'. As a check , each hexagon side is al10.4" long. Sin ce the east-west dim ensio n is 18" 180 small squa res, and this represents 36.000 yardeach small square represents 200 yards square.

Each small s quare is given a pair of coordinatseparated by an oblique stroke first the west-eacoordinate, then the north-south. (It is a pity thKen didn't use normal convention here-west-eastsouth-north-but by now the tradition has beestablished and for the sake of continuity perhawe had better stick t o it). Th e west-east grid consiof the numbers 1 to 180 inclusive across the top othe hex; the north-south grid consists of thnumbers I to 208 inclusive do wn the west side. Tsquare I is, of course, well outsi de the hex itselfthe top left corner of the paper. Ascheck points, tsmall square whose south-west corner is also tsouth-west vertex of the hex is 11156; the smasquares ar oun d the centre of the hex, starting in tnorth-west and moving clockwise, ar e 901 1091 1104, 91 105 and 901 105 respectively.

Th egr aph paper is used for all battleactions. Oit, monitor and players plot the positions of ea

ship involved (use very soft pencil an d have a goeraser-the sheet gets a lot of use ) Sometimes tmonitor 'scopy wil l have more information than tplayers'-some ships which the mon itor will plmay be beyond visibility of their enem y antherefore their presence is not reported by tmonitor. When the postal Jut land games starteclear film coverings and inks for marking them w erelative novelties, but nowdays the pencil aneraser are rather out of fashion. If you use a clefilm covering on the battle sheet and spirit pens whatever to m ark it, mak e sure the markings can completely erased otherwise the sheet will not lamany actions. Of course, if action spills over intwo hexes, an additional sheet is needed and tsame is true if tw o simultaneous actions are takiplace in diffetent search hexes. Players usual

manage t o get by with a single sheet but the monitwill need two o r three in most games.Since each small square represents 200 yar

square, only one capital ship, CL squadron or Dflotilla is allowed to occupy a small square at aone time. Further, occupation of adjacent smasquares is prohibited-at least one squar e of clewater m ust be left between neigh bouring capiships. squa drons o r flotillas. This is not because tships were m ore than 300 yards long ( though a Dflotilla was) but to represent allowance for m anevering space. Some monitors may prefer not to uthis restriction, while othe rs with more informatitha n I have will determine what B ritish and Germnaval doctr ine had to say about the matter at ttime, and reflect it in their rules.

Th e range between ships is measured w ith a rulmarked in tenths of an inch and placed so as to jothe centre of the target square to the centre of thsquar e occupied by the attacki ng ship; the distanin inches is converted to game y ards by multiplyiby 2000. Thus ships 3.6"apart on the batt lechart a7.200 yards apart for ranging purposes.

Movement on the battle chart is straighforward. One basic movement factor of a shallows i t to move through 3 small squarorthogonally; diagonal movement counts 1/2 rathethan I , so one movement factor permits movemethrough two small squares diagonally. Fractiocan be carried over within the m ovement phase iship combines orthogonal and diagonal m ovemebut not from one M &F phase to the next . A shcannot change direction in fewer than 3 smasquares and cannot change course by more than

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degreeseach time. The minimumturning circle forcapital ships is therefore 9 small squares o r 1800yards. A turn through 45 degrees from the lastdirection of sailing is permitted a t the start of eachM & F phase.

EXAMP1 E: ixer starts a M F phase in 6196. She moves east to9 / 96 . south-east through 10 97. 11198. 12199.southto12 102. south-west through 11 103.101104.9/ 105andfinally west to 61 105. This reverses her courseand totalmovement used is 9 orthogonal@ I plus 6diagonal@I = 18. Since Ti pr has a movement factor of 12 shecould. for example. move 18 more small squares duewest.

Light ships (See 1974 AH rules page 8,Maneuverparagraph 4) have smallerturningcirclesthan capital ships; they need move only one smallsquarebetween45 degree changesof course.

It is the responsibility of the monitor todeterminethe initialpositionsof opposingforceso nthe battle chart a t the openingof in-hex hostilities;here again, flexibility(and perhapsa knowledgeofbasic geometry)is necessary.The normalprocedureis to enter the shipson the battlecharta t the point a twhich sighting first occurs, then move them oneM & F phase. For this reason-and as in the searchprocedurethereis a 'reaction time' motivehere-thefirst hour of any action has seven M & F phasesrather than the usual six, the first being in realityregarded a s the last portion of the previous searchhour-those few minutes during which initialsightingare confirmedand everyonewonderswhatto do. This means that ships will already be withinsighting distance of each other, but usually notwithin firing range, which is a s it should be givennormalvisibility. However,if opposingforcesenterthe same hex through adjacent hex sides, forinstance, the leading shipso r ships 'on the wings'might already be within firing range; this isunreasonable, so the monitor should adjust theinitial positionsof the ships in accordancewith thecircumstances, and this is where flexibility andcommon sense come in. Sometimeshe might evendecide that it would be more reasonable, in aparticularcase, to plot initial positionson adjacentbattle hexes and have sighting and even firingcrossing the hex side between;garners will want toavoid thiswhenpossible-it increasesthe amoun tofpaper and could confuseeveryone.

The initial placement of ships can be a trickybusinessand may demandgeometricalskill if it is tobe absolutelyaccurate. However, perhaps absoluteaccuracy is not required (it certainly doesn't takeplace on the carpet on the ftf game,and Cinderella'sslipper didn't fit all tha t well o r it wouldn't havecomeoff). Generallyspeaking,the guidingprinciplecan be summed up in the sequence:a ) determinewhich ships of opposingsides a re the

first to sight each otherb) place them in position so that the distance

between them is equal to the current visibility,rememberingthat the central axis of advanceofeach force is the linejoining the hex centerto themid-point of the appropriate 'flat' of the hex

c) place other ships in each force in their correctpositions relative t o the sighting ships; resolveone round of fire if ships a re within firingrange

d ) move all shipsone M&Fphasein the directionofadvance

e) if ships are in firing range execute one round offire

f) report t o players and ask for ordersfor the nextM & F phase.

It's much easier than it sounds-honestAs you will seefrom the above,eachcommander

is asked,early in the game and long before there isany possibilityof action, to lodge with the monitorprovisionalgunneryordersfor eachof his ships.Themonitor can then use these if it turnsout that shipsget an early chance t o fire on each other (perhaps

when the visibilityhas been reduced);this savestimeand perhapsreflectsinitialreactionsin the faceof a nunexpectedenemy. Theseorderscan be conditionalto reflect various possibilities-e.g. 'fire o n closestenemy capital ship, BB rather than BC if both a reavailabletargets a t approximatelythe same range'.

Other information which the monitor needsfrom all players, before there is any ship-to-shipaction,concernsthe compositionand dispositionoftask forces controlled by each commander.This

informationshouldincludethe numberof columns,the names of the ships and their positions in thecolumns, distances between columnsand betweenships of the same column, position of D D flotillasetc.

During battle, the respectivecommanderssendtheir movementand gunneryordersto the monitorin the same way a s search orders. For shipmovement,the orders must say not only where theship ends its movementbut alsothe small squaresthroughwhich it passeson the way(thefirst and lastsquares of each straight section a re sufficient).If acommanderfails to order his ships, it is assumedthat the guyso n board will continueto obey the lastorders they received and will duplicate the movemade in the previous M & F phase. Gunneryinstructionsshouldstate the name of the firingship,the previous position of the target ship (since thename of the opposingship will not be known, andmovement is simultaneous) and the number offactors firing. If several ships are to combine fireagainst a single target, this must be stated. Acommanderis allowedto write gunnerypriorities-for example'Agincourt fires 14 factors a t nearestBB; if no BB in range, fire o n nearest BC; if nocapital ships in range, fire a t nearest light ship'. Itmightbe arguedthat conditionalinstructionsof thissort should not be allowed in gunnery-that gunswill already have been aimed a t a particular targetand the fire will be less effective if the target ischangedin the middleof a 10-minute M&Fphase .This is really up to the monitor, but for my part Ithink little purposewould be servedin complicatingthe issue a t this stage. Tha t completesthe descrip-tion of the processfor the battlephases.Therepor tsto the players are, I think, fairly obvious and ofcourseeach team gets a n individualreport. 1havefound this process quite simple, and indeedfascinating, to operate; it is much better than the ftfgame procedure, and this counts for a lot inJUTLAND.

Optional Rules.Use o r otherwiseof the optionalrules is reallya t

the discretion of the monitor. We have found onlyone changedesirable-visibility is ascertainedeachsearchturn ratherthaneachbattle turn;this is reallyonly for convenience in play and admittedlyrepresents a departure from realism, so anothermonitor may decide to retain the original. F a s tSearch Speed, German Submarines,German Air

Reconnaissance, Reduced Visibility, Wind Direc-tion, ExtraordinaryDamageare all rules generallyincluded in the postalversion,whilethe practicehasbeen to leave ou tBritish Sweep(taken care of in therevised search procedure, effectively), AdditionalBritish Forcesand Redistributionof BritishForces.Ammuni t ion Supply Limitations are generallyignored, but Smokescreensare included.

Having said this, the only optional rule whichdoesn't really apply to the postal ganie is BritishSweep-all the others can be used without difficul-ty.

FinallyWe have here a set of postal J U T L A N Drules

which not only make PBM possible but also makeimprovementso n the mechanicsof the ftf game.The

resulting PBM game is no longer than a typipostal D I P L O M A C Ygame, for example, s o tsheer lengthof the originalftf game need not dethose interested in PBM. In my submission,froexperienceof half a dozen games, anyone withmodicum of interest in naval wargamingand wthe stamina to assume responsibility for a posgamewill find JUTLAND-by-maila realchallena realexcitement.Perhapswe will seein the nextfyears some other game taking AH'S Cinderetitle-certainly Jut land does not really deservethfate.

J U T L A N D77, a postal game I a m monitorihasjust started,but 1a m preparedt o monitorothpostal J U T L A N Dgames(myfeesare v ry modeand interested players should write to me atGreenlands,Red CrossLane,CambridgeCB22QU.K. US players, and otherslivingoutsidethe Uare welcometo join.

Q

D DAY 77

li l

James Stahler, a local gamer of considerabrepute, has authored the third edition D-DArules with co-developmentby Richard Hambland Don Greenwood.The D-DA Y revision woriginally intended a s just a clean up of a poordone,outdatedset of rules which had been passup by the state of the art . D-DA Yhas been oneour biggest sources of nut mail due to thincomplete and poorly done rules of the 19edition. The current revision not only does awwith the problem in presenting ambiguity-frrules, but also addresses play balanceproblemand incorporates design innovationswhich habeen developedin the past decade;withoutgoiin to complicatedphasesystemswhich would ruthe game's excellent postal characteristics.

Among the changesa re revised, more realistsupply rules which make Sou th France a viabinvasion site, strategic movement, tactical aipower, carpet bombing, river interdiction, anstrategic fortresses whose capture affects thAllied replacementrate. But aboveall, these rula r e ambiguity-free-a competitivepostal playerdream-and a 100% improvement to the o

classic.The revised D-DA Y rules sell for $2.00 plu

postagecosts, and are availableonlyby mail froAvalon Hill. Due to overstockand the slownewith which retail suppliesare moved, these rulwill not be found in D-DA Y games on the retashelves for several years. If you order a D-DAgame by mail, be sure to request the new ruleThey will be provided free to mail ordpurchasers of the game if you request them wit

your purchase. Marylandresidents add 5% stasales tax.

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THEGENERAL PAGE 3

PATIENCE IN 1776by Major Edward Caswell

It has been my observation, no adequate work o rarticle oriented toward British strategies in the 1776Campaign Simulation Game (CSG) has yetappeared. In fact, Crown conduct of the war has so

far been treated only as an aside to, or as part of,comment generally devoted to American technique.Further, most of these same writings also representBritish strategies as necessarily containing signifi-cant actions in 1776-the first year of the war-while at the same time reflectingan opinion only theContinentals must be patient to win; a misleadingtheme at best (at least in view of my experiences withthe game).

It is believed the cause of this shortcoming is asubconscious form of patriotism on the part ofplayer/contributors, coupled with a general feelingthe British have an easier go of it.

To implement a winning strategy, the Crownforces must also bide their time, with no majoractions initiated until the spring of '77-the second

year of the war. The British, in my opinion, have theuphill struggle-not the Americans-and conse-quently must be meticulous in preparation for theoffensive.

Before proceeding, two constraints which applyto this paper should be mentioned. The CSG Rules(Second Edition) less Continental Navy, andInverted and Decoy Counters apply. Also, it is wellrealized elements of this dissertation could easily beexpanded t o articles in their own right, however, thearticle will only address a need for British patienceduring the first year of the war, regardless of long-term strategies.

Arguments in support of the above may bedivided into three broad categories; strategiesinvolved, manpower to sustain these strategies, andsupporting logistics. Each is discussed, In turn,below.

The conflict is one wherein conventional forces,the English, operate against guerilla elements, theColonies, in a rugged, distant land favorable to thehighly mobile (extra Movement Factor (MF )) andresultingly elusive enemy. To alleviate-or at leasttemper-the problems inherent therein, the Britishmust, above all else, establish a strong front withone area being cleared before moving on to the next.To campaign effectively against the elusive Con-tinentals, the Crown forces must employ multiple,strong (secure 2:1 or better combat ratio odds aswell as balance an occasional bad die roll),mutually supporting (where possible) columns,operating on axis' with multiple objectives. The fleetalso represents a potential column where Class 2or 3 rivers are available. Obviously, the manpowerand logistics base required to support strategy islarge.

For all practical purposes, British strength hasan effective ceiling while American manpower ispotentially unlimited. The bulk of the British forcesarrive during the first year of the war. After that,their manpower allocations are small enough not tobe considered worthwhile in constituting a large(strong) force/column. Those elements arrivingafter the first year are sufficient only to fill outmajor columns which have suffered casualties-nothing more. The Crown must allocate carefullythose significant forces arrivingduring the first year.Three or four major formations should be built upin preparation for the offensive. And, to those whowould argue the American army is growing strongeralso, 1 would reply, Winter Reduction-at the end

of 1776-will provide sufficient counterbalance tothis occurrence. Winer reduction is the equalizerduring the first year British buildup.

It is imperative the logistic support to sustaincombat operations be adequate. Ports, wheremanpower and supply units enter the theater mustbe properly garrisonedldefended to insure acontinuous supply line to the campaigning columns.The construction of fortifications provides forfavorable die roll adjustments when defending,while the construction of magazines insures con-tinuing supply for any defending units within thefortification or in the immediate vicinity. Construc-tion of these facilities requires, however, threeSupply units; two for a Magazine and one for theFort. An artillery unit is also a requisite for Fortconstruction. And, it takes no great strategist torealize these resources-Artillery and SupplyUnits-take time to amass. As mentioned above,the British army has pretty much peaked by the

beginning of the second year. Only routine combatand supply unit replacement occurs thenceforward.

Again, it is emphasized the British strategyrecommended above is dictated by the nature ofthewar being conducted. Further, this type of Britishstrategy is dependent upon adequate and concen-trated manpower (prior to conducting operations)and abundant supply. The Redcoats must, repeat,must be patient and hold off' until such resourcesare available. This means delaying until 1777 anymajor maneuvers/combats.

As I move toward the end of this treatise, twoimportant points must be made. First, the mentalstate or mental concentration of the British player isparamount. Realizing I am again repeating myself, Istress patience and a methodical approach to thefirst year of the war. It iscertainly fun to move outimmediately against the scarce and scatteredContinentals, but it is also not a winning method.Early on, the British cannot afford manpower lossesresulting from battles at poor (less than 2:l) odds.They would never be able to field sufficiently strongcolumns to trap the enemy. The British playermust be careful not to be distracted from hismethods. He must not fall victim to deception by theAmerican contestant. Certainly the Americanopponent is wise enough to realize what the Britainsare doing and will attempt to entice them intomoves/combat which will lead them away fromtheir plans/goals. The weakness-and that isprobably an ill-chosen word-to this entire buildupoperation is it leaves only nine turns in which toconduct offensive operations in quest of MVC #I.However, this necessary evil may be overcome byprecise timing on the part of the British whenconducting their moveslcombat during these nineturns.

Finally, employment of forces in line with theabove guidance will not guarantee a win, but willenhance the chances. As stated early on, I believe theBritish have an uphill struggle. Additionally, thesemethods will leave the Crown player with a solidposition with which to begin the third year of thewar. At this point-in fact, during the second year-the strategyltactics change also. From the spring of1777, and on, the enemy must be pursued relentless-ly and without mercy to avail oneself of the bestposition prior to the entry of French forces.

@

T

AREA TOP 25TIMES PREVIO

RANK N A M E O N LIST RATING RA1. W. Dobson 3 NGM23632. R. Chiang 9 FGN21563. T. Oleson 10 MNU19284. P. Huffman 4 DCD19225. K. Combs GFJ1906

6. J. Zajicek 4 DEK18977. D. Cornell 3 KEI18438. J. Angiolillo 3 CEH18429. D. Barker 8 EFK1831

10. D. Burdick 1 CDG181911. S. Packwood 8 EFE180312. J. Sunde 2 FFF177113. S. Heinowski 8 DEJ174614. G. Kilbride 7 DEI174415. R. Leach 3 CFI173216. K. MacDonald 2 CDF171717. K. Blanch 3 CEE171118. B. Haden 2 DFG169619. D. Greenwood 2 CDD169220. F. Small 1 DDG166421. D. Stephens 1 CEH164822. R. Wood 7 FFN1643

23. D. Agosta 3 ECE1639 224. C. Todoroff 1 EHJ162925. J. Kenower 1 CEE1607

The above players represent the 20 higheverified 1 rated games) of the 3 000 membAREA pool.

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8/12/2019 Vol14i4


P GE 3 THEGENER L

A.H. Philosophy Continuecl.from Pg 2. Col.

e n a b l i ng you t o ma t c h t h e t op of e ac h co un t e rw i t h t h e s a m e s i d e of t h e m a g n e t . Th i s a l l o w sy ou t o s t a c k t h e c o u n t e r s u n if o rm l y s o h a t t h e ywi ll rem ain in p lace eve n in a ver t ica l mou nt ingw h e n s t a c k e d 6 o r 7 high A on e foo t l eng thm a g n e t i z e s 2 4 c o u n t e r s . T h u s , a g a m e l ik eSTALINGRAD could be magnet ized wi th s l ight lymore t ha n f o u r f e e t of t ape .

You' ll a l s o need a n u n m o u n t e d mapb oa rda n d a ny magn e t i c s u r f ace of su f f i c i e n t s i z e .Shou ld you lack a meta l sur f ace , an y loca lha r d ware s t o r e shou l d be ab l e t o p rov ide youwi th an a t t r a c t ive p i ece of sh ee t me t a l ( such a st h e o n e i n t h e p h o to ) of t h e a p p r o p r i a t ed imens ions fo r abou t $2 .00 . Na tu r a l l y t hes y s t e m is l e s s u se fu l f o r gam es w i th two- s idedc o un t e r s .

T h e m a g n e t i c t a p esells f o r 90C a fo o t i n on ef o o t i n t e rval s o r t h e d i s coun t p r i ce o f $7 .5 0 fo r1 0 f e e t. U n m o u n t e d m a p b o a r d s a r e a v a il a b leu p on r e ques t f o r $ 6 .00 ap i ece . Usua l pos t agec h a rg e s a p pl y, a sd o e s t h e5 t a t e s a l e s t a x f o rMar y l an d r e s i den t s .

Q

T H I R D R E I C H . Cont d. from pg 19, col.

upon the entrance of the Americans into the war. Ifthings have gone well for England up until then,loans can serve to mak e the Allies' B RP edge a littlebetter.

THE UNITED STATES: The Americans 'dilemma is having overwhelming BRP strength,excellent combat strength, but agonizingly slowdeployment capabili t ies. When she enters the game,

it is best th e United Sta tes builds only as manyforces as are needed and can be shipped to England.The rest of the BRPs should either go to keepingRussia in the game o r to savings.

Don't think t hat once the tide begins to turn inthe game, the Americans ar e a bottomless well ofBRPs. They can, and often do, run out of B RPs in1942, 1943 and even 1944. Th e Americ ans should bebold in their use of BRPs for offensives, but notreckless. This is most true in terms of invasionattempts. As at Dieppe, no hasti ly planned andunder-m anned invasion will succeed. It's best to goslowly and build huge forces, certain to land andbreak through o n the first turn.

Like England, the United States' chances forexpanding her BRP base are mainly confined tosaving or reconquering German-held territories.

This can be important, though. Taking France orItaly. or even some of the Baltic countries, by theend of 1943 will ma ke the Axis feel the B RP pinch alittle earlier, while giving the Allies a freer hand.

For strategic warfare, the Americans must jointhe British in eliminating the U-Boat threat. Oncethat is accomplished, usually at th e start of 1944, it 'sonly marginally helpful to construct S AC factors toturn on the offensive. The Germans' 3:2 advantagein BRPs spent in strategic warfare will continue.

FRAN CE: France's BRPsituation isclouded byher short stay in the game. France will likely beconquered despite having a bounty of BRPs left.That is her lot in the game. She loses because of alack of military strength rather than B RP strength,and is better off spending her time entreating Britishhelp than looking for places to expand her BRPbase.

RUSSIA: There is no better example of BRPwarfare and how it translates to the conducting ofcombat than in Russia. Germany's war with theSoviets is very dependent on economics. Even thevictory conditio ns fo r the Axis reflect this. A fterall,the Soviets don't fall when M oscow iscaptured, butwhen they don't have the BR Ps to build a7 factorforce any more.

BRPs a re the key to Russian existence. Space,cities and un its (to a lesser degree) are expend able.Some of the BRPs for Russia can come fromeconomic expansion into the Baltic States, or intoan Axis min or if the Ge rma ns have foolishly left oneungarrisoned early in the game. Turkey, thoughinviting, isn' t w orthwhile to attack. A wise Germanwill make sure the Russians don't hold Turkey longenough t o m ake it profitable. A Russian invasionthere may actually help the Germans, since theRussians can't afford too m any units to guard thecountry. A quick Germa n thrust will take the minorin little time, possibly giving the Axis a valuableflanking position.

Saving BRPs, of course, is impossible. TheRussian commander should use offensives early inthe game only extremely rarely. He should also tryand concentrate on building back his infantry oncethe invasion begins, rather than ar mo r and air force.

Th e latter two types of units are offensive weapons.Infantry is nearly as good as arm or and better thanair force on defense. For those reasons, the Russiansshould hoard arm or and a ir power. In fact, keepingthe air force off the front l ine, out of counterairrange, is a good practice.

Nearly half of Russia's spen dable BR Ps in theyears 1941-44 should com e from the Allies. Witho utthis aid, defeat is hard to avoid and victory isimpossible to achieve. That means for the sak e ofhaving a route to receive those BRPs, the Russianplayer must be careful to defend the northernfrontier for Murmansk Convoy shipments and thesouthern frontier for Lend Lease traffic.

Once the tide turns, the Russian player should berelentless in destroying German units and winningback territory. The Russian front, because of its

size, is where BRP advantage can show mostquickly. A steady loss of German troops there willpress her abili ty to rebuild and SR units back to thefront.

ON LUSION

As stated earlier, BRPs alone d o not determinethe winner of THIRD REICH. Without anadvantage at the time, though, victory is nearlyinconceivable. Therefore BR P policy, determinedbefore the gam e and refined as each year progresses,is mandator y. P art of the fascination for a game likeTHIRD REICH is that no tw o games are the same.That's true of how a side handles its BRPs also.

Many times it will be events which determineBRP strategy, rather than the BRP strategy which

determin es events. But it should still be possiba player, w ho has assimilated t he facts in this ato play an even larger part in the destiny ocountry. He m ay find himself cast in the role BRP-rich player more often than as the ppitiable bankrup t one.

V I C TO RY AT S E A . Cont d. from pg 13. col5 62 No combat takes place. "Raiding"

have no effect on a sea area-they d o not henemy "patrolling" ships from controlling sea

5 63 Ports and bases are not affected by bsurrounded by enemy sea areas; the twocapture rule does not begin until the turn figstarts.

5 64 Special: SAIGON becomes a Japaport at the end of turn 2.

5 7 S TA RT I N G T H E G A M E :5 71 At the time he is moving air units.

after all patroll ing ships have moved) the Japaplayer an nounces whether he is attacking thatA.fter he announc es that he is attacking, he mamove his units (that have not yet mo ved) into Allicontrolled sea areas.

5 72 The units making a surprise attackPEARL HARBOR must be "raiders"YOKO SUKA NAVY YARD; theseuni tsareplin the HAWA IIAN IS LA ND Sat thesame t imeJapanese ai r units are moving.

5 73 The surprise attacks are executedimediatelv (i.e., before normal "raiders" gemove).

5 731 The Japan ese d o N OT get a "surpriseraid against PEARL HARBOR if they hadships or units based in TRU K at the beginnithat turn.

5 732 The Japanese do NOT get a surpattack against IN DO NE SIA if they had any shunits based at SAIGON at the beginning ofturn.

5 7333 Only the surprise attacks themselwith no enem y return fire, are executed at thisSubsequent rounds of combat are left fornormal resolution of co mbat at the end of the

5 734 If the Japanese player loses a surpattack, then he just loses that surprise attack-units can remain in posit ion to make no rmalatduring normal combat.

5 735 As so on a s the surprise attacks haveexecuted, the Japanese player announces whhis Pearl Har bor special raiding force is stayinnormal combat. Then the Allied survivorPEA RL HAR BOR may put to sea, and the UStates player rolls for his "LOCATION UNCT A I N groups , p lacing them dow n as "patro l

5.736 Important: The Allies immediately cont rol of any sea are a in which they do not hship or unit when the Japanese have finishedsurprise attacks. Japan ese "raiders" can then through these sea areas. (Thisreplaces rule 3.2above.)

5 74 After the surprise attacks have resolved. the players finish moving their muni tsa nd "raidin gWship s till in port, and the I-

5 75 A n y r e m a i n i n g c o m b a t i n HAW AIIAN ISLA ND S must be resolved fir

5 751 The United States player annouwhether his forces in HAW AIIAN ISLA NDrunning o r fighting and the I-Boat attacknormal.

5 752 After two rounds of normal comba tJapanese special striking force must retreat, wmeans that if the special force is presentJapanese must retreat all their units, includinships that were normal "raiders."

5 76 Then the combats in the rest of the bare resolved normally. and the game proceedsthere. Q

8/12/2019 Vol14i4


THEGENER L

Gentlemen:

Although m a long time A H gamer aveonly ust bought a subscription o the GENERAL .Excellent What can ay? Clearly hould havestarted this yearsago. The first issue that eceivedwas Vol. I3 No. 6. Being a SF fan and fond ofHeinlein's books, STARSHIP TROOPERSespecially. am delighted to see bot h this gameintroduced and the extensive analysis in thisedition. I f all youreditionsare asgood as this illnever dream of allow ing my subscription to lapseThese analyses give one an excellent idea o f what agame is llke without having to see a copy of thegame, there by saving money for the games thatreally appeal to the individual.

On the negative side, wish you wouldconsider thedevotion of Canadian and other non-Americ an playe rs). When we buy a game we mustfirst contend with the unfavorable position of theCanadian dollar with respect to yours, then paytwice as much postage and 32% import duty andtax. For example: A U.S. subscriber gets"CAESAR-The Epic Batrle of Alesia" for $12U.S. The Cana dian buye r pays $12 2.50 = $14.50U.S. orat present, $15.08 Canadian, or ifyoulike.$18.16 U.S.

This is no fault of yours but ote that theGENERAL'S postage coupon says "Valid only i nthe United States". I f Canadian subscribers coulduse these coupons to pay even hal f of the postage twould be a help. Perhaps have misunderstoodthe meaning of the words on the coupon or youhave some good reason for denying us thisprivilege. I f some explanation or clarificationcould be printed we up here in Canada would begrateful.

Roger HarperVictoria, B.C.

Again, we commiserate with ou r foreigncustomers over the high prices of Avalon Hill

games, but fina ncial facrs can't be denied. Wecannor use the muc h moreefficienr ande cono micUPS into Canada. This forces us to relv o n rheU.S. Posr Awful, an d here's onlv one rhi ng worsethan the U.S. Posral Servire . the U.S. andCanadian Posral Service. Thus we pay double ortriple domestic UPS delivery charges ro rhe PosrO{fce wirhour the guaranteed delivery of UPS-which means we ger ripped o for a lot ofundeliverable or lost orders. The postage chargeyo u pa.v does nor cover what we must spe nd ro getthe game arross the border an d nfo pou r hands.&sides the inflored postage charges, Canadianorders must be accompanied by a separatederlararions sraremenr or rusroms which musf be

filled our bv hand. Ir rakes our shipping dept. sixrimes as long ro prepare a game or shipment roCanada as it does fo r domestic mail. Time ismoney and rhus we can'r aflord to pass on thebenefit of the postage coupon to you folks upnorth. We are in a sense already subsidizingCanadian customers bv keeping the postagecharges as low as thev are. Theseare. unfortunate-Iv, the economic acrs of Ir e.

Friends;

Though ave been around wargaming or along time, nly came lately to The General.Amo ng the first issues eceived was Vol. 14, No.1 was intrigued by the letter fro m Scott Duncanbut more for what he missed than for what he said.Id like to comment on his letter.

First, h is analogy between book and gamepublishing is not quite exact. The lack of errata

sheets for books is not fro m the perfection ofbooks bu t because the publishe rs have no reasonto issue them. ead quite a lot and m veryfamiliar wi th books which neederratacorrections.An example would be a science fiction novel,published not too many years ago in paperback,which omitted the last two pages of the manu-script. There are other examples which shouldillustrate the point ish tomake. That is that thepublication of errata, while indicative of a failureof the publisher, is an attempt to make acorrection. We are better off with it than without i tand oubt that the day will come whenallgamescan be free of all flaws. Certainly 500 years ofbooks have not resulte d n hat and wargaming,only 20 years old i n ts eresent orm. canexDect nobetier.

ave closer agreement with his statementson complexity and proliferation versus complete-ness. I t seems to me that t he qua lity an dcompleteness of games from most publishers aresuffering in the explosion of titles. on't agree

Let te rs to the d i to r . . .that this is a cause and effect relationsh ip. Rather.

elieve that these things are happen ing at thesame time and that the large number of new titlesreleased has made it easier for companies to letincomplete titles get past. I n games, as in allpublishing and ente rtainment. t is easier to makemoney by selling a few of a wide range of itemsthan it is to sell many from a smaller range. Asreaders, music listeners and film freaks havefound, it is more rewarding o pick and choose andlet your preferences n he things you like in yourchoices be known .

Wit h luck and response from the publishers,this wi ll result in more enjoyable and completegames. Such games will n ot come from restrictingthe efforts of any company or from limitin g thedegree of complexity which designers put intotheir work. Advancescome only fromexperiment-ation. Experimentation comes only when design-ers and consumers realize that the old days aregone. it's time to move on.

Gamers must make their voices heard. Withthe proliferation o f titles, it wil l be hard to do thisby contributing to the commercial success orfailure of any one tit le or group of titles. Instead,the best results will come fro m letters of praise orcomplaint to those publishers who wil l listen tothem (not all will) or from ballots, personalconversation or seminar attendance at conven-tions such as Origins. I f oneor bot h of hose routes

are closed to a gamer, fo r any reasons, he canalways ry to make hisopinions knowna tthel ocallevel. It may filte r through to the places where itreally counts.

Certainly. Mr. Duncan's voice has beenheard. ope that he and others like him do notstop af ter one success, however. I t is just asimport ant that they continue o speak out and alsothat they support other independent criticismwhen it appears.

Dave MinchAtlanta, Georgia

Dear Sirs;I've just finished reading J. Richard Jar-

vinen's interestine and wrce div e article about his"Viipuri ~efense'in the ~ene ral . 13.U6.1 foundMr . Jarvinen's remarks enllehtenine and heloful.

but I've got to disagree with the i nit ial set-up hesuggests for the Soviet forcesinthe Baltic Mili tar yDistrict.

Jarvinen places the Soviet 1st and 7thArmoured Corps in H-20.theSoviet th Army inG-18 and the Soviet 8th Army in 1-19, the ideabeing that the German will be reluctant to devoteall o f the thirty-five factors of Army Grou p Northand a Stuka to the overrunning of the five Sovietfront-line factors.

My point is that there's no need to overrunthem Al l the German would have to do is set upthe two Panzer Corps available to Army GroupNorth (the 41sl and 56th) in (3-20, along with the1st or 2nd Infantry Corp. Since these 19 factorsstart the first impulse n enemy ZOC, and since F-20, the adjacent hex, is not i n enemy ZOC. theymay move there and continue t o move. ending themovement phaseof the first lmpulseoneither F-I 8or F-19, on the northern flank of the Soviet t hArmy.

Here they'll have 19 factors to the l th

Army's 6 factors-a 3-1 attack (or a 6-1 attackwith a Stuka). The destruction, o r even the retreatof the th Army isdevastatingforthe Russians. tleaves the Germans three option s for their secondimpulse movement: I ) an attack on Riga (fool-hardy)2) a hrust across the Dvina 3) anenvelopingattack on the Soviet 8th Army and/or a moveagainst the rail line that enters the WesternMilitar y District from the east at L-21. (Irecommend U2; it scares the pants off theRussians ) The onl y problem an see with thisapproach is German supply: the 1st and 7thArmou red Co rps, bypassed. aren't dead. and mustbe eliminated. Nothing boosts Soviet morale likeseeing the 4th Panzer Army wiped o ff the map. Ifthe Germans can't take care of them wi th theremaining AG N units in the first impulse (3-1).they will easily in the second with the help of acouple of unengaged corps from AGC. In brief.instead of stalling the German. Jarvinen's BalticPlan gives him dangerous mobili ty and a corrid orpointed straight at Leningrad.

With their Stukas and massed armor, theGermans can smash their way through just ab outanything the Russian can set up i n 1941. What'simportant is making sure that the German doesn'tget any use out o f his tremendous second-lmpulsemovement-factor. TheSovlet th Army is the keyto this in the "Viipuri" Baltic sel-up: 11s the hingeof the no rthern fron t. At G-18, it's easily out-flanked. A t F-19, it assures that the the Germanwon't get out of the Baltic Military District untilhis second turn .Peter OlafsonLa Jolla. CA

Dear Mr. Greenwood:

As an avid gamer. the past three years havek e n very pleasing and encouraging o me in tworespects. First, the new releases by Ava lon H il l nthis period have been excellent in that sophistica-tion has not interfered with playability. Secondly.the revision of the Afrika Korps, Stalingrad.Waterloo, and most re cently DDay rules are, t ome, evidence of your continued interest in the"classics".

I n he General, mention was made to maintain-ing DDa y as a game easily played by mail. Tomany of us, p bm is the most enjoyable f not the

only way of gaming. Over this same three yearperiod lit tle attention has been given to a long imeclassic and pbm favorite. Battle of the Bulge.would imp lore you to devote whatever efforts youcan to rewrite the rules fo r Bulge, or devote spacein the General to many questions and answersconcerning its play.

Through the efforts of many pbm games ofBulge, i t seems there are still entirely t oo manyquestions or misinte rpretations of the rules of thegame. We realize the time spent answerin gquestions from garners, on an individual basis.only takes your time and energy from otherprojects. A t times, we have received confl ictinganswers to the identical question. We appreciatedrawing the diagrams to accompany our specificquestions. as (theo retica lly) the diagra m leaves noroom for doubt as to what the question is. Thentoo, we suggest that mo re is needed than a mereseries of qu estions/answers n the Genera las hasbeen done i n years past.

The ques tions/answers approach wou ld bemuch better than the current method of ndividualqueries. Questions/ answers with diagrams andsome discussion much, much be tter. The sameincorporated i nto a rules revision/battle manualbetter yet.

We "hardcore" who play ANZ IO cannotpraise Tom Oleson highly enough for his continu-ed addendum on the game. But most of us"hardcore" still immensely enjoy theclassics. WithBU LG E he sole classic not revised nor discussedover the past several years, we feel somewhatcheated.

Sincerely,Larry J. Kelly

ED. NOTE: As you'vepoinredout BUL GEi s helast of the ol d classics awaiting its facelif~(although AF RIK A KORPS couldprobably usemore than the Q&A Appendix which constitutedits second edition). However, because these r u krewrite projects on the old classics come no

where> near pay ing for themselves they are anextremely low priority proposition. BULGEhowever has nor been orgotten and has, indeed,been the subject of an intensive srudy bv BUL GEexpert Bruno Sinigaglio or the past 3 years. Wenow in d ourselves vacillaring between an entirelynew game and one which w ill be merely a cleanedup ser of rules. I t wi ll doubtless take a while burwork s being done on this subject.

Gentlemen:LU FTW AFF E is, in my opinion, one of

Avalo n-Hill 's finest games. Rel ative ly simple atthe basic level. but capab le of easy pla y in theAdvanced Game. it allows many divergingstrategies for both players. No game of L UF T-WA FFE need ever be the same. Althoug h the rehave been discussions on the validl ty of the CRT.and on game balance. on't believe ha t they have

any adverse effect on the play of the game. Afterseveral PRM games. however. became disill u-sioned wllh the endurance rules. They areextremely over-simpl~fied. and eel they placesevere restrictions on game strategy and play.Alter only a day's work. and the investment ofabout $1.40, 1 worked u p a solution wh ich allowsincreased realism. with next to no sacrifice iplayability. To implement the idea, you'll needseveral report covers like those used to protectterm papers, some unlined paper. a ruler. and agrease pencil. The aircraft types can be found onthe PR M sheet. or the Luf twa ffe Target sheet.along wlth the I.D. numbers. The method sedtoconstruct the'Fuel Record Sheet'isshown. i n partbelow, but any personali7ed arrangement will do.To lacilll ate easler organi7ation and location . usea bright or different colored ink for the aircrafttype and endurance factors. The sheet alsoincorporates a Replacement section to tally thosefactors.

After preparing sheets for the Allies andGermans. slip them in to the plasti c covers.Remember to include those bombers with timecounters. as well as both Bomber and Flj hte rReplacement columns. on the Allied sheet. Byusing the grease pencil. you now havean easy touse 'Fuel Record' which will last almost forever,and whlch is easily erased to update the fuelsituation. Depending on h ow much help you needin remembering game info rmatio n. you can easilynote the present turn, which quarter you'replay ing. et bases, aircraft wit hdra wals. etc., usi ngyour own personal format.

My endurance entries show the requiredinformation as follows. Fw-190,JG-I. for exam-ple. shows I2T9. Assuming hat thls is Turn 8. thetwelve shows the maximum endurance in Game-Turns. p rovlded ranks are not dropped early. TheT9 indicates hat tanks will drop automatically onTur n 9. This is arrived at by subtractingthe secondnumber on the aircraft time counter from themaximum endurance number. In summary, thisentry shows that JG-I took o ff on Turn 8. With 4turns offligh t time, it is duedown onTurn 12.andtanks drop automatically on Turn 9. I f anksdropautomatically. slmply erase the T(X ) portion ofthe entry. as was done with JG-2. Ifthetanksdropearly, just recompute the maximum endurancenumb er by addin g the second number on theaircraft time counter to the number of the turn onwhich the tanks drop, and enter that result. JG-2must land this turn.and SG-I dropstanks. Aspaceleft blan k indica tes a ready aircraft.

F U E L R E C O R D S H E E TG E R M A N Y

ACFT. TYPE FUEL STATUS

FW-190 41 3JG-l I2T9SG-I l T8JG-2 8

Hopefully. someone will read this. try it, a nd starttaklng L UFTW AFF E off the shelf again. It's tooexciting a game to lie idle.

David A. GoodwinPlattsburgh AFB. N.Y

Gentlemen:

We all come to a time when we would like tomake our life easier. When playing by mail, youstill have to divide your stock results by hand,using the tediou s and time c onsuming process oflong division. In his age of electronics. we shouldbe able to useelectroniccalculators ocompute theremainders for us. Im not talkin g about the large(and expensive) scientific calculators, but about asmall 4 or 5 function calculator which most of usalready own (or i f we don't may be purchased orabout $5.00 fro m the local departme nt store).

By using the chart below, yo u may divide thesales in hundreds by 6 and get the rema inder byusing the decimal equivalent.

1 ,166 4 .66

2 ,333 5 ,833

3 ,500 6 ,000

Example: Sales in 100's = 296

296 6= 49.333 Die roll =

Example: Sales in 100's = 304

304 = 50.666 Die roll =

Example: Sales in 100's= 162

162f 6~27.000 Die roll =

George ValaitisWatertown. CT

8/12/2019 Vol14i4


PAGE 3 4 THEGENERAL

READER BUYER'S GUIDETITLE VICTORY IN T H E PACIFIC PRICE 9SUBJECT Strategic Game of Naval Action During WWlI

VICTORYIN THEPACIFICisthe34thgame On the plus side VITP tied an existiAgto be rated in he RBG and rated slightly better record (FRANCE 40) or best components w i t hthan average wi th a 2.70 cumulative score. a set of beautiful and utilitarian two sidedDue to the many innovations and added counters and well designed and graphicallysophistication found in VlTP the game im- portrayed setup charts. I n addition, the Excite-proved greatly on the ratings performance of ment Level rating proved to be he third best toits sister game WAR ATSEA, but ared badly n date behind only the two top rated games:the same categories that hurt WAS; Mapboard RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN and WS&IM. The Playand Realism. Balance score probably reflects the indecision

or initial reactions of players who have onlyThe increased size of the mapboard gotten a few games under their belts. Our

(double that of WAS) probably had something initial reaction to the question was that theto do wi th the improvement exhibited over Allies had a cake walk but recently as we'veWAS'S mapboard rating of 3.96 but was still concentrated on the more challenging aspectsnot enough to render an average score in this of Japanese play, many of us havecometo lookcategory. And although the realism rating was upon the Japanese as the favored side.greatly improved over the 5.1 2 of WAS, it wasnot enough to hide the disfavor of those who 1 physical ~ ~ ~ l i ~ ~ .2-47can not reconcile themselves to the fact that astrategic area movement game canbe realistic 2. . . . 3.26and fun too. It appears that combat has to be 3. Components 1.85resolved on a tactical level to be judged 4 E~~~of understanding . 2.21universally realistic. For although the gameprobably gives the Japanese more credit than Of ules 2'79they're due i n order to make a game out of a 6. Play Balance. . . . . 3.38very lop-sided situation. VITP does illustrate 7 Realism . . . 3.91w i t h surprising clarity the basic principles of 8 ~~~i~~~~~~~~~~lthe war in the Pacific and does so in an

1.94enjoyable manner and a reasonable time 9. Overall Value . . 2-53period. 10 Game Length 3 hours

Q. Suppose I have carriers in a sea area. but I

cannot make any air raids because there are noenemy ships in he ports in hat base. Then, enemyships return to a port in hat sea area. Can I makean air raid attack against them?A. Not if the fighting in that sea area has alreadybeen resolved. The Japanese player chooses theorder in which battles are fought; i f hechooses oresolve the fighting in an area (even if he has noships or units there). then the units in hat seaareamust make any air raids there as soon as thelighting ( i f any) is over, or those units lose thechance to make air raids for the rest of that turn.Q. Can Australian and Dutch ships base at PearlHarbor or Ceylon?A. Yes. either. Only British and United Statesships are restricted.Q. Can ships and units retreat through enemy-controlled sea areas to get to a friendly port?A. Yes.Q. Can the 5th A. F. in Indonesia be attacked bythe surprise attack in lndonesia on turn I?A. YesQ. Suppose both Japanese and Allies have amarine unit in an area, and there is only one Alliedbase there-does the Japanese unit land first. thusdiaahling Allied air units in that area. or do themarlnes land at the same time, so the Allies keepthe base?A. The Japanese capture the basefirst. and allAllied air must leave-then the Allies canrecapture he base-but the air unitsarestillgone.Q. Can damaged air or marine units be repaired(ignoring the OPTIONAL RULES)?A. No

T H I R D RElCHQ. Must the Germans maintain a 25 factor forceon the East Front throughout the game?A. No-only until at war with Russia.Q. After Russia occupies East Europe, is EastEurope considered part of Russia for any of thefollowing purposes: unit construction, partisanconstruction or movement, first winter invasion?A. NoQ. I f a unit is isolated but still in supply due to

VICTORY I N T H E PACIFIC: enemy has had it surrounded for two turns, so the a lortress hex can it still

Q. Can the Japanese ships making the Pearl enemy immedioteh captures it back. A. Yes. because it was in supply at the beginningHarbor surprise attack control the Hawaiian Q. I n rule 7.73 isn't a shids zunnerv factor ofthe move.

Q. Are replacement un~ts ounted n determiningfactors in contact with the enemy durlng aAttrition Option? If so, can they advanceoccupy a hex gained by Attrition?A. NoQ. When does the West Wallacquire fortified hestatus?A. Spring, 1944Q. Since the fall ofMoscow does not result in hsurrender of Russia, can Moscow be used assupply source by the German?A. NoQ. I f Gilbraltar falls, do British units in Maltcount toward the 8 unit Suez Canal supply rusince fortresses are automatically supplied?A. Yes-Malta loses its supply sustenance abiliti f both Suez & Gilbraltar are lost.Q. Can units move directly from Batum o the heSW of it?A. NoQ. Do BRP losses such as losing a conquestMoscow count aaainst the maximum BRPscountry can spend in one turn?A. NoQ. Are ASW and U-Boats exchanged on a I orbasis in the Murmansk Convoy box?A. Yes-during every turn in which a convoy'spassage is contested.Q. Must the Allies wait until a Spring turnremove ASW from the Murmansk Convoy BoxA. Yes-note both ASW and U-Boats can btaken from the SW Box to the Murmansk Boduring any turn but the reverse can occur onlduring Spring turns.Q. Is the beach hex SE of Kiel invadablefromtheAtlantic?A. NoQ. If Lend Lease has been opened do the Axhave to declare war on Persia before invading iA. NoQ. Are units doubled on defense in cities oraren'tclties considered in olain terrain?A. Units are doubled in cities.Q. If Germany captures Leningrad and Moscowand later conquers Russia does Germany stlll g30 BRPs plus half the Russian BRP base?A. No-a conqueror never receives more thahalf the BRP base value of acountryat the starta scenario for its conquest.

Islands on turn I ?.. .

reduced to 1 when it takes damage equal to itsA. NO. They are like "raiding" ships, since they armor factor?must retreat before the end of the turn. A. Yes NOT its armor factor: this was a typo.

AVALON HILL RBG RATING CHART

Q. On turn I when the Allied survivorsmove into Q when an airstrike attacks, do all he factors The games are ranked by their cumulative scores which is an average of the 9 categories for ea

the Hawaiian Islands, and the Allied LOCATION attack the same target (like gunnery factors) or game. While it may be fairlyargued that each category should not weigh equally against theothers

U N C E R T ~ ~ ~roups are rolled for, can these does each factor attack a separate target in w e use it only as a generalization of overall rank. By breaking down a game's ratings nto ndividu

ships then move into other sea areas that same WAR ATSEA)? categories the gamer is able to discern for himself where he game is strong or weak in hequalitieturn? A All of the factors attack the same target, like a he values the most. Readersare eminded hat the Game Length category is measured n multipleso

A. NO They must remain where thev are. or eunnerv attack. ten minutes and that a rating of 18 would equal 3 hours.- , ~

retreat at the appropriate time. Q. What happens when a "disabled is rolledQ. Do these ships--the survivors and the LOCA- against a target during the initial surpriseattacks?TlON UNCERTAIN groups-count for control? A. Nothinx. The surprise attacks are "air raids"Are they "patrollers" on turn I? (even in Indonesia), and during air raids "dis-A. Yes. They are "patrollers". and control the abled" results are ignored. Notice that any shipsHawaiian lrlands andlor Central Pacific if they that survive the surprise attack in Indonesia must 1

remain at sea at the end of the turn. go through one round of normal combat before<m

Q. What happens when a marine unit lands on a they can get away.base that is surrounded by enemy controlled sea Q. Is it legal to choose a "day action" even whenareas at the end of the turnand wassurrounded by you have no airstrikes inthe~eaarea~just oavoid

nemy sea areas on the previous turn? enemy gunnery attacks? 3A. When the marine unit lands, it captures the A. Yes-you may always choose day or night 4

Island: thuseliminating t as a base forenemy land actions. regardless of what forces you have in thebased air: however. at the en o rhe turn the area.

3.21 2.93 2.60 3.31 3.08

IN FEBRUARY

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THEGENER L

Vol. 14, No. 3 proved to be our most popularissue i n the past year; polling a 3.1 7 cumulat iverating which was somewhat surprising in thatthe secondary and tertiary articles beat out thefeature in the individual voting on our 1 200point maximum scoring system based on 200random samples. The individual articlesf ared asfollows:

Third Re~ch-The Early Years 298arbarossa Repulsed 193

AIW: Armies in Conflict 89Arab Tank Tactics in AI W. . ............................ 148talingrad Series Replay.. 11 6

AIW Unit Composition Chart s.. 109War At Sea & The French Navy 78

941 Panzerblitz 41Avalon Hill Philosophy.. 28

A headline on page 1, -secti on C of theOctober 2 1 st TORONTO STARdrew attention tothe r ising general acceptance of wargames. Theheadline: Canadian c ivil war game seditious?prepped a report on the seizing by customsagents at Toronto International Airport of anAmerican game called THE CANADIAN CIVILWAR. The games were confiscated under asection of the customs l aws which prohibitsgoods found t o be treasonable or seditious. The

games were later released after a protest wasfiled with customs officials in Ottawa.

Visit the GAME EMPORIUM, Suite C-115 inthe Hilt on North Tower. So say the placards onall the restaurant tables in Baltimore'sfashionable Hilton Hotel. Window displays andsigns such as these direct the traveler to thehotel's very own Avalon Hill outlet astoreroom of Avalon Hill merchandise. Thegame outlet is aimed at the gi ft trade offered bythe traveling businessman looking for a gift totake back to the family.

ANZlO redesigner Tom Oleson i s once againoffering an updated Addendum for the game.

This time it's 9 pages long and includes quite afew new optional rules. It can be obtained bysending Tom a 9% x4 stamped, self addressedenvelope and 26C in uncancelled stamps.Overseas people will have to send 5 Inter-national Reply Coupons. Write: Tom Oleson,631 Foster City Blvd., Foster City, CA 94404.

TEXCON is a brand new effort set for theMarch 10-1 2 weekend at the Stephen F. AustinHotel in Austin, TX. Preregistration for the threeday event which promises the full gamut ofactivities costs $10. Among 'the AH eventsplanned are tournaments i n PANZER LEADER,DIPLOMACY, WS IM, KINGMAKERand RUS-SIAN CAMPAIGN.Additional information from:

TEXCON, P.O. Box 12385, Austin, TX 7871 1.

WINTERCON VI is scheduled for Ja nuary 13-15 at the MIT Student Center i n Cambridge, M A.Attendance for the entire weekend is $5.00Among many other activities planned aretournaments in VICTORY IN THE PACIFIC,THIRD REICH, RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN,andDIPLOMACY. Preregistration information fromPaul Bean, 13 Grove, Apt. 7, Boston, MA 0 21 14.

We have been i nformed of plans for WARGYVI-a gaming convention to be staged at SouthPlatte College i n Columbus, NE on January 7 thand 8th. For information contact Rick Plankin-ton, RR 6, Box 52, Columbus, NE 68601.

GENCON SOUTH is being held i n Jackson-ville, FL on February 9- 1 1 at the Robert MeyerHotel. Room rates are a very reasonable $17single and $22 double. Among the plannedevents are tournaments in WAR AT SEA andARAB-ISRAELI WARS.Pre-registration infor-mation is available from Carl Smith, 5333 SantaMonica Blvd., N., Jacksonville, FL 32207.

N e ~ l o pol nick^ right), judge of the RUSSI N C M P IGN

tournament, presents Larry L~ppert of Sarasota. FL with firstprize for the event held recently at GEN CON X

Avalon Hi ll gave out some awards of its ownat GEN CON to Larry Lippert of Sarasota, FL forwinning the 16 player RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNtourname nt and BiIITric omi of Madison, WI whotopped our disgruntled editor and four others inbesting a field of 32 i n the WAR AT SEAtournament. Both winners are wargamers of 17years standing in the hobby. Also winningAvalon Hill merchandise was John Wallor ofBellflower, CA for winning the impromptu RAILBARON tournament.

One of the more interesting books to crossour desk recently is The Comprehensive Guideto Board Wargaming by European authorNicholas Palmer. A noted game enthusi ast andcritic, Palmer got hi s chance to publish this finehard cover edition by befriending a fellowDIPLOMACYenthusiast who just happened tobe a book publisher. The book is 9% x 8 . 22 4pp, with introduction, preliminaries and chap-ters covering such diverse topics as strategy,tactics, winning, and an overall review list ofgames in print wh ich naturall y became obsoletethe day after t he book was published. The bookincludes 30 full page photographs of variousgames and is an ideal primer for the novicewargamer, yet makes for entertaining readingfor vets too. The American edition sells for$1 2.50 and is available from Hippocrene Books,Inc., 17 1 Madiso n Ave., New York, NY 100 1 6.

The P hoenix branch of OOPS has announcedtheir 1978 tournament schedule. The eventsinclude a Strategy Olympics in January,BASE BALL STRA TEGYin April, ORIGINS OFWWIIin May, FOOTBALL STRATEGYLeague inAugust, and KINGMAKERin October. Those inthe Phoenix area owe it to themselves to getinvolved in one of the best run, on-goingcompetitive clubs going. lnterested partiesshould call Dave Slick at 945 -6289.

P GE 3The 197 5-76 Avalon Hill PBM Team Cham-

pionships started so long ago are approachingthe end in a dead heat with the OOPS andITHACA groups i n a virtual tie wit h 1 4 of 16games finished. The National Gaming Club ofsponsor Nicky Palmer seems destined to take3rd.

POINT OF CONFLICT at 9 % N orth Mai n St.,Fairport, N.Y. is another retail establishmentwhic h reports that it has turned over a portion ofits space for wargaming and encourages at leastone live game being played on the premisesduring business hours. The store has nowbecome a focal point for the local enthusiasts.Those interested in joining the group shouldwri te Frank Schuttee care of the above address.

Yet another wargamin g group has sprung upusing a retail establishment as its meetingplace. The Dolphin Wargamers of.Groton, CT(sonamed fort he sub base here) meet at Pat Flory'shoppy shop The Citadel every Saturday. Flory,a Navy man himself, wi ll soon retire to full timeskippering of his store. Those in he area can callPat at 445-6224 or find The CITADEL at 171Bridge St, Groton, CT 06340.

Reports of yet another retail'establishmentthrowing open its doors to house a localwargaming club have arrived from Manitowoc.WI where the Manitowoc Area Miniatures andBoardgames club meets on the first twoSaturdays of each mont h n he basementof theOne Hour Martinizing store on 8th & QuaStreets. Area gamers should contact KevinLuebke, 58 06 S. Union Rd., Manitowoc, WI54220.

INTEREST GROUP SAN FRANCISCO is nowru n by Steve Spoulos out of his 1 18 EastridgeCircle, Pacifica, CA 94044 address. Meetingsare held regularl y every Friday evening. Amongthe members is our own Robert Harmon.lnterested parties are requested to call (355-1683) prior t o attending.

There was a heavy turnout for Contest No.78, and judging from the number of correctentries that arrived the lack of difficulty inobtaining the solution was a major factor. Twovery important statements were left out of theinstruc tions: 1 The Basic Game rules andset-upwere t o be used, & 2) Plague Event cards had noeffect if drawn. If either the Advanced Gamerules or the Plague cards are used in he contestthere is no guaranteed solution as a noblesummoned by raid and revolt i n an AdvancedGame has a chance of being kil led and there isno set-up that can guarantee the contest

objectives if a Plague Cardigan Event Card isdrawn. Our substitute puzzle editor ofCHANCELLORSVILLEfire through the woodsfame has again been drawn and quartered andexcused from future contest designs.

The winners listed below were drawnrandomly from those who gave the correctsoluti on and wh o also pointed out the problemsengendered by the omission of the twostatements above. Recipients of certificates forAH merchandise are: M. Hendrickson, LittleRock, AR; M . Wood, Sarnia, ONT; C. Drong,Spring Grove, IL; D. Farrow, New Castle, DE; K.Boody, Three Hills, AB; R. Kauffman,Dallastown, PA; R. Wagner, Milford, OH; W.MacMurdy, Woodbridge, VA; R. Pospisil,Bloomington, IN; and R. Mosher, Oakland, CA.

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