vol2.pdf

n a t i o n a l p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s

volume 2

Learning Experiences Study on Civil-Society Peace Building in the Philippines

Nat ional PeaceCoal i t ions

Josephine C. Dionisio

2005

UP-CIDS

Learning experiences study on civiL-society peace BuiLding in the phiLippines Volume 2: NatioNal Peace coalitioNs

Published by the UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP CIDS) in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Copyright 2005 the United Nations Development Programme Manila Office.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means including information storage and retrieval systems without permission from the UNDP and UP CIDS. Inquiries should be addressed to:

UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Bahay ng Alumni, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City 1101 Tel/Fax: (632) 9293540 Email: [email protected]

United Nations Development Programme30/F Yuchengco Tower RCBC Plaza, 6819 Ayala Ave. cor. Sen Gil J. Puyat Ave.,Makati City 1226 PhilippinesTel: (632) 9010100 Fax (632) 9010200

The National Library of the Philippines CIP Data

Recommended entry:

Learning experiences study on civil-society peacebuilding in the Philippines.- - Diliman, Quezon City : UP-CIDS, c2005. 5v. ; cm.

CONTENTS: v.1. Framework and synthesis oflessons learned in civil-society peace building / Miriam Coronel Ferrer v.2. National peace coalitions / Josephine C. Dionisio v.3. Psychosocial trauma rehabilitation work / Marco Puzon, Elizabeth Protacio-De Castro v. 4. Peace education initiatives in Metro Manila / Loreta Castro, Jasmin Nario-Galace and Kristine Lesaca v.5. Peace building experiences of church-based organizations in the Philippines / Jovic Lobrigo and Sonia Imperial.

Published in partnership with the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP).

1. Peace-buildingPhilippines.2. Peace-buildingCase studies.3. Civil societyPhilippines. I. UP Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS).

JZ5538 303.69 2005 P061000334

ISBN 978-971-742-095-0 (vol. 1)ISBN 978-971-742-096-7 (vol. 2)ISBN 978-971-742-097-4 (vol. 3)ISBN 978-971-742-098-1 (vol. 4)ISBN 978-971-742-099-8 (vol. 5)

cover design Ernesto Enriquebook design and layout East Axis Creative

The opinions expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UNDP.

contents

vii acknowledgments

xi listofacronyms

1 introduction

5 peacecoalitions 7 Coalition as a Form of Organization

10 Coalition Dynamics in the Philippines: Contending Discourses on Peace

and Their Implications on Coalition Building

14 Emergence and Development of Peace Coalitions in the Philippines:

Socio-historical Context

24 Social Actors/Groups in Peace Coalitions

33 Peace-building Activities of Peace Coalitions

52 Assessing the Impact of Peace Coalitions Peace-Building Strategies

57 Facilitating and Hindering Factors to Peace Coalitions Peace Building

63 Lessons Learned from Peace Coalitions Peace Building

68 Conclusion

70 Endnotes

74 Bibliography

77 toolkit:peacecoalitionwork 79 Introduction

81 Part 1: Phases of Peace Coalition Building

88 Part 2: Areas of Work of Peace Coalitions

100 Part 3: Tools and Exercises for Effective Peace Coalition Building

vii

acknowledgments

This volume was completed through the generous assistance of several individuals. Miriam Coronel Ferrer, mentor and friend, encouraged me to accept this project and gave

me enough instructions, inspiration, and leeway that enabled me to gain my bearings in the

more difficult phases of this research. Her comments on the first and second drafts of the main

paper helped me focus on my research objectives and to strengthen my analysis.

Alma Evangelista, my first mentor on peace studies, patiently gave me a comprehensive

and passionate orientation about this project. She provided valuable suggestions on what to

include in the toolkit, which accompanies the main paper of this volume.

Dean Zosimo Lee (of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy or CSSP) did important

preliminary work for this project. Dean Lees preliminary work provided me with important leads

on which peace coalitions to include in this study and in identifying key informants. I also tried

to retain his vision on how the toolkit might be developed.

After reading the revised draft of the main paper, Professor Randolf David nudged me

along the direction of further archival research and referred several important sources of data

particularly on the topic of peace coalition dynamics in the Philippines.

This volume also documents the lifelong commitment to just and lasting peace of several

advocates who graciously shared their time and insights for this study. I understand that each

one of them was in the thick of their respective crusades when they agreed to make time for me

and this study. I will forever be in awe of their passion and commitment, and this documenta-

tion is my humble way of paying tribute to their selflessness and dedication.

1] Honorable Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel,

Partylist Representative, Akbayan Citizens Action Party

Former Secretary General, Coalition for Peace

September 29, 2005 9:30am 10:30am

At her office at the House of Representatives, Batasan Complex, Quezon City

2] Mr. Max De Mesa

Executive Director, Task Force Detainees of the Philippines

August 3, 2005 4pm 5pm

viii| a c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

l e a r n i n g e x p e r i e n c e s s t u d y o n c i v i l - s o c i e t y p e a c e b u i l d i n g

At the Waiting Area of the Cardio-Rehab Center of the Philippine Heart Center for Asia,

Quezon City

3] Sr. Arnold Noel

Executive Director, Balay Rehabilitation Center, Inc.

August 4, 2005 9am 10 am

At the Balay Office, Diliman, Quezon City

4] Dr. Carol Pagaduan-Araullo

Secretary General, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan

August 6, 2005 1:30 pm 2:30 pm

At the Bayan National Office, Diliman, Quezon City

Also answered the questionnaire sent to her via email.

5] Ms. Karen Taada

Executive Director, Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute

August 15, 2005 9am 10 am

At the GZOPI office, ADMU, Loyola Heights, Quezon City

6] Professor Miriam Coronel Ferrer

Program Director, Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights,

University Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines

August 17, 2005 10am 11am

At her office at the Faculty Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City

7] Ms. Teresita Quintos-Deles

Former Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

Lent her book and file copies of her previous speeches, in lieu of a personal interview

8] Mr. Fred Lubang

Regional Coordinator, NonViolence-International Southeast Asia

Answered the questionnaire sent to him via email

My task was made lighter by the valuable assistance provided by Sarah Domingo who

transcribed my interviews and helped tabulate my research data. Salvador Feranil worked with

me in developing the tools and exercises in the toolkit. Abraham Baladad Jr. helped me clarify

a c k n o w l e d g m e n t s |ix

v o l u m e 2 : n a t i o n a l p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s

crucial details that enabled me to strengthen the presentation of my findings and to revise some

of the tabular presentations in the main paper.

I also benefited from the research assistance of Joel Ariate, Jr. (coalitions), Maria Mendoza

(socio-historical context), and Nicole Curato (planning tools). Tess Lubang of the UP Main Library

assisted me in borrowing peace-related books from the Main Librarys Social Science Section.

I am sincerely grateful to Dr. Teresa Tadem, Director of the Third World Studies Center

(TWSC), who repeatedly reassured me of her support and allowed me to work on this volume

even if TWSC-related work was already piling up on my desk. I am equally indebted to each

one of my colleagues in the Department of Sociology at UP Diliman. Through many different

ways, they have helped me hone my skills in social research and have motivated me to further

enrich my teaching through the conduct of empirical research.

As I explained in my introduction to this volume, the UNDP Peace and Development Port-

folio shared the vision of this project and provided the necessary funding support to ensure

its completion.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge my whole family in whose loving embrace I find the

quest for peace necessary and meaningful.

Still, I remain solely responsible for all the shortcomings of this volume.

xi

acronyms

ADMU Ateneo de Manila University

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AKBAYAN AKBAYAN! (Citizens Action Party)

AMRSP Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines

AOPG All-Out Peace Group

AR Now Agrarian Reform Now

BAYAN Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (New Nationalist Alliance)

BISIG Bukluran para sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa

BRSACs Bicol Regional Social Action Centers

CARHRIHL Comprehensive Agreement for the Respect of Human Rights

and International Humanitarian Law

CBCP Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines

CBCP-NASSA Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines-National Secre-

tariat for Social Action

CEWS Conflict Early Warning System

CfP Coalition for Peace

CPAR Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines

DILG Department of Interior and Local Government

DLSU De La Salle University

FDC Freedom from Debt Coalition

GfP Gathering for Peace

GMA President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines

GZOPI Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute

HOPE Hearts of Peace

IPER Institute for Political and Electoral Reform

KARAPATAN Alliance for the Advancement of Peoples Rights

KKD Kilusan para sa Kapayapaan at Demokrasya (Movement for Peace

and Democracy)

KMU Kilusan Mayo Uno (May One Movement)

LES Learning Experiences Study

MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MLSA US-RP Mutual Logistics and Support Agreement

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MSPA Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates

NAPC National Anti-Poverty Commission

NCCP National Council of Churches in the Philippines

ND National Democrat

xii| a c r o n y m s


NDF National Democratic Front

ND-Independent National democratic groups not affiliated with RA or RJ ND blocs

ND-RAs National Democrat-Reaffirmists, the dominant CPP bloc after

the splits in the early 1990s

ND-RJs National Democrat-Rejectionists, ND bloc that split from the

CPP in the early 1990s

NFPC Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NIC Newly-Industrialized Country

NOWARGAMES National Outrage of Women Against Angelo Reyes and Gloria

Arroyos Militarism and Erosion of Sovereignty

NPA New Peoples Army, military arm of the CPP

NPC National Peace Conference

NSAs Non-State Actors

NUC National Unification Commission

OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process

PCBL Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines

PO Peoples Organization

PopDem Popular Democrat

PPC Philippine Peace Center

PPDHR Program on Peace, Democratization, and Human Rights

PPI Philippine Peasant Institute

PPSA Philippine Political Science Association

PRRM Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement

PSSC Philippine Social Sciences Center

RA Reaffirmists, the dominant CPP bloc after the splits in the early 1990s

RAM Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (Revolutionary Patriotic Alliance)

RJ National Democrat-Rejectionists, ND bloc that split from the CPP

in the early 1990s

SD Social Democrat

SEA Southeast Asia

SOMO Suspension of Military Operations

SPP Sosyalistang Partido Sa Paggawa

SRA Social Reform Agenda

TWSC Third World Studies Center

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNORKA Ugnayan ng mga Nagkakaisa at Nagsasariling Organisasyon sa

Kanayunan

UP University of the Philippines

UP CAL University of the Philippines College of Arts and Letters

UP CIDS University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Develop-

ment Studies

UP CSWCD University of the Philippines College of Social Work and

Community Development

US United States (of America)

VMG Vision-Mission-Goals

This synoptic paper presents an overview of peace-building initiatives of civil-society peace coalitions at the national level, which emerged from 1986-2005. It is one of four case studies

that are part of the UNDP-funded Learning Experiences Study (LES) on Civil-society Peace

Building in the Philippines.

Key concepts that are used in this study, such as civil society, peace, peace building and

peace-building impact areas have already been adequately defined and clearly operationalized

in the framework paper for this LES, and will only be briefly discussed here. In the said frame-

work paper, civil society is distinguished from the state and the market, and is identified as

the public sphere where groups and citizens interact on matters of collective concerns. Peace

as a collective concern of civil society is conceptualized not only as the absence of violence (or

negative peace) but also as the absence of structural violence, the protection of human rights,

and the presence of social justice. Peace building is considered as a general term used to refer

to the various initiatives or activities that are part of the peace process, which basically aims

to transform a conflict situation into a just and lasting peace. The framework for this study

assumes that peace building can also be implemented prior to conflict resolution or settle-

ment. Three categories of activities were identified as the impact areas of peace building that

need to be evaluated. These categories are: building the infrastructure for peace, engagement

of state and nonstate actors, and the protection/promotion of community/civilian interests in

the context of continuing conflict or in moments of relative peace.1

The general objective of this study on peace coalitions is to contribute to our understanding

of civil-society peace building by gauging the impact of peace-building strategies employed

by peace coalitions, and then analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of these initiatives. The

study also seeks to identify the factors that facilitate or hinder coalition efforts at peace building

of peace coalitions by contextualizing these within specific socio-historical contexts. Some of

the major themes discussed in this report touch on the nature of civil-society peace coalitions

peace-building initiatives, the dynamics within peace coalitions, their current capabilities, and

their contributions toward transforming the conflicts in the country.

For this particular study on peace coalitions, the narrower definition of the term national is

used. National-level peace coalitions therefore refer to peace coalitions with a national network

introduction

| i n t r o d u c t i o n


but are actually based in Metro Manila, and which are engaging centers of political power as

part of their peace-building efforts. Thus, peace coalitions in Metro Manila that emerged from

1986-2005, and which are actively taking part in national-level advocacy work have been chosen

as the subjects of study in this report. The case-study method was used as the main research

methodology because it would incorporate two levels of analysis. At one level, civil society-initi-

ated peace coalitions were viewed as a single case that provides the range of strategies used in

peace building by peace coalitions and the collective impact of these multiple tracks. This level

of analysis allows us to gauge the current level of capability of civil-society peace coalitions as

a network of effective actors. At another level, these coalitions were viewed as individual cases

that provide insight into specific dimensions of coalition work and peace building. This level

of analysis allows us to focus on the specificity of each peace coalition and on the dynamics

within and among peace coalitions, thus enabling us to identify facilitating and hindering fac-

tors to their peace-building efforts. It also allows us to appreciate the nuances of strategizing

as a dimension of peace building.

In this study, peace coalitions refer to networks, alliances, or other similar groupings of

individuals and organizations that have defined their organizational mission as the achieve-

ment of a focused peace agenda. They consider themselves as primarily a civil-society peace

organization whose campaigns, services, and other activities revolve around specific peace

concerns.2 Included in this study are the following coalitions: Coalition for Peace (CfP); Multi-

sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA); National Peace Conference (NPC); All-Out Peace Groups

(AOPG); Gathering for Peace, Pilgrims for Peace; and the Sulong CARHRIHL (Comprehensive

Agreement for the Respect of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law). Based on

an initial review of literature, these were the most prominent peace coalitions in engaging the

parties in conflict at specific junctures from 1986-2005.3 This study also looks at the cases of

the Peoples Caucus and the Peoples Congress as coalitions that were not primarily peace co-

alitions but have tried to put the peace agenda in a different framework. Thus, taken together,

these coalitions would represent the spectrum of ideological persuasions that may be found

in peace coalitions in Metro Manila for the period covered, the range of peace concerns and

organizational goals of Metro Manila-based peace coalitions, and the multiplicity of strategies

that have been employed by civil-society peace coalitions as part of peace building.

These peace coalitions are described in terms of their current capability as networks of ef-

fective actors. Peace-building efforts of peace coalitions are be assessed in terms of their impact

on building the infrastructure for peace activism, and in positioning themselves as a third party

to the conflict. More generally, this impact assessment will bring out the contributions of peace

coalitions in transforming the conflict at different levels, e.g., policy (creating a more favorable

environment for peace building), discourse (changing the things that we talk about in relation

i n t r o d u c t i o n |


to peace), and culture (facilitating the emergence of a culture of peace in Philippine society).

To increase the reliability and validity of data, and to ensure a multidimensional profile

of the case, this study used multiple data sources. An intensive reading of published and

unpublished literature was done to piece together a comprehensive overview of civil society-

initiated peace coalitions in Metro Manila (e.g., proceedings of conferences, documentation

of roundtable discussions, transcripts of interviews, compendium, institutional reports, and

think-pieces written by key informants). A thematic analysis of the content of internal and

external institutional documents (e.g., internal organizational assessments, reflection papers

on peace-building or coalition-building experiences, press releases, position papers) was done

to identify themes that allow better understanding of the case. Focused conversations with key

informants were conducted to facilitate the systematic reflection of prominent peace advo-

cates and coalition builders in relation to peace building, and to validate some of the studys

preliminary findings.

peace coalitions

peace

peace coalitions

Recent scholarship on coalitions takes into account a broad- ened definition of coalitions as any combination of two or more social actors formed for mutual advantage in contention with other actors in the same

social system.4 The definition asserts that coalitions are formed on the basis of a common agenda

for mutual benefit, a characteristic that it shares with many other forms of organizations, such

as cooperatives or political organizations. Thus, in the definition, focus must be placed on the

concept combination of social actors as an identifying characteristic of coalitions as a form

of organization. Coalition building necessarily begins from a situation of differences and works

toward achieving higher levels of unity or solidarity.

Coalitions are generally studied as a kind of social-movement organization that is an or-

ganization of organizations. They mobilize based on a set of ideas and demands that challenge

existing policies and practices without necessarily offering themselves as a political party.5 While

political parties through their hierarchy of leaders could demand obedience and allegiance

from its members, coalitions are compelled to observe shared decision-making processes,

and to maintain the autonomy of their member-organizations, thus making dynamic tensions

generally built into their systems. Coalitions may also be distinguished from other types of

organization by their loose and non-hierarchical structure, and it is this looseness that makes

coalitions generally temporary but not necessarily short term.6

In the Philippines, an oft-quoted definition of a coalition is that of a coming together of

groups carrying different political or developmental perspectives [that] unite around an issue

or a set of issues, an agenda, a project, or a process. From these they define a common analysis,

positions, and set of long-term or tactical responses.7 There are various reasons for the eventual

formation of coalitions among different organizations. Coalitions may be formed in the hope

of bringing about certain changes. Other organizations coalesce around a specific field of work

or a common approach to a field of work. Coalitions may also be formed around specific issues

that may cut across other groups or networks.8

Organizations in the Philippines have coalesced in recognition of coalitions as an effective

means to broaden their reach and to intensify their impact. Issue-and sector-based coalitions

in the Philippines have effectively engaged the government on policy issues by combining

coalition as a form of organization

| p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s


their strength toward mounting large-scale street demonstrations and their skills at incessant

lobbying in the corridors of power.9 More recently, coalition building has cut across national

boundaries and has made possible transnational acts of solidarity.10

Various types of coalitions have also helped their member-organizations transcend

their individual organizational weaknesses, such as insufficient funds or lack of personnel by

instituting mechanisms that would avoid the wasteful duplication of efforts and facilitate the

sharing of resources.11 Experience shows that coalitions in general also facilitate the emergence

of more basic organizations by tapping already consolidated groups or politically active

individuals whose subsequent efforts have led to the formation of organizations in previously

unorganized territories or sectors.12 Prominent personalities and leaders within the coalition

also add credibility to advocacies and facilitate access to a broader range of networks and

connections.

However, in spite of the many benefits that individual organizations stand to gain from

coalescing with other organizations, coalition building has always been a formidable task.

While the strength of any coalition generally lies in its ability to build the broadest (at this

point tentatively referring to the number of social actors that are involved) possible consensus

on a particular agenda, coalition building inevitably starts from the management of tensions

arising from differing analysis of the situation, stand-point on issues, and strategic agenda of

member-organizations. Often, coalitions are not only channels through which resources are

shared but are also arenas where the struggle of ideas and interests take place. As a result, most

coalitions are gatherings of like-minded organizations. They tend to remain loose networks or

temporary alliances for the pursuit of issue-specific campaigns, making them harder to sustain

or to consolidate for more strategic campaigns.

Coalitions also tend to be dependent on the designated representative to the coalition of

its member-organizations. The degree to which the coalition is able to mobilize its members

depends on the degree of commitment of the representative to the many activities within the

coalition and to his/her capacity to become a conduit through which the coalition could reach

out to the whole organization he/she represents.

Still, there are coalitions that have successfully built enduring consensus on an increasing

number of issues and a more strategic agenda. These coalitions tend to acquire a life of their

own. These coalitions are able to set up regular structures that help sustain the formation as

a regularly functioning organization. It is able to build an identity and a niche for itself that is

independent and may even be different from that of its member-organizations. As a result,

coalitions and coalition-leaders tend to personify the social movement in which they belong,

which makes it necessary to look at coalitions in understanding specific social movements.

Coalition as a form of organization is an important mechanism for peace building. Because

c o a l i t i o n a s f o r m o f o r g a n i z a t i o n |

v o l u m e 2 : national peace coalitions

coalitions embody the achievement of solidarity and consensus amidst a situation of differ-

ence and conflict, they could become the foundation upon which enduring structures of peace

may be built. A lot of insights for peace building could therefore be gained from an intensive

examination of coalition work, especially within the peace movement.

0

Progressive organizations in the Philippines have historically been divided on the basis of ideological persuasions13, and the biggest hurdle to coalition building has been these seemingly impermeable ideological cleav-

ages that tend to group organizations into divergent blocs, each with its own set of principles,

priorities, strategies, and brand of collective action14. It is important to understand these ideo-

logical differences because they have defined how national-level coalitions in the Philippines

have emerged, evolved, and have related with one another. In the case of peace coalitions, the

dynamics among them could become more comprehensible by taking stock of these historical

antagonisms, especially within the ranks of the Philippine left.

The dominant groups comprising the Philippine left before and during the Marcos years

could be identified with either the national democrat or the social democrat. National dem-

ocrats (NDs) are strongly critical of the historically entrenched interconnections between US

imperialism, local feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism. They view these three -isms as the

root causes of social inequality, injustice, and underdevelopment in the Philippines. They

believe that only a national democratic revolution, waged principally through armed struggle

and led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), can transform Philippine society

into a genuinely developed and democratic society, and bring about meaningful changes in

individual lives and in the social structure. Armed struggle is justified as consistent with the

genuine interests of the exploited and the oppressed. The state is viewed as the coercive and

incorrigible tool of the ruling classes, which cannot and will not promote meaningful reforms.

It is thus futile and foolish to fight for reforms within the existing system. Such attempts would

only serve to distract the masses from the necessity and the urgency of taking up arms against

the state, and should thus be consciously and viciously exposed and opposed.15

From this perspective, the pursuit of peace could be an agenda of the state and its cohorts.

Peace as an agenda can be a deceptive ploy that hides or justifies the coercive measures of the

state and can therefore be an important aspect of the states counter-insurgency strategy. The ND

movement before and during the Marcos years has always called attention to the fact that the state,

contending discourses on peace coalition dynamics in the philippines:

and their implications on coalition building

c o a l i t i o n d y n a m i c s i n t h e p h i l i p p i n e s |


peace coalitions

as exemplified by its pacification campaigns in Mindanao, pursues peace through consistent acts

of violence against the people.16 Peace as an agenda therefore cannot be pursued as a priority of

the ND movement unless it is couched in anti-imperialist or anti-fascist terms. In this context, the

peace issue is pursued to shield the revolutionary movement against the violence of the state. More

recently, the National Democratic Front (NDF) has been pursuing the issue of peace in the context

of peace negotiations toward achieving tactical gains for the revolutionary organization.

The social democrats (SDs), on the other hand, have generally been silent on the role of US

imperialism in the Philippines but have always been critical of the greediness of local elites and

of corruption in government. They believe that persistent poverty and inequality may be solved

through the gradual but consistent implementation of thoroughgoing reforms. These reforms

should destroy the structural bases of unequal power relations in Philippine society, and put

in place democratic institutions that would strengthen equality.17 The state is seen as basically

an arena in which struggles for the rights and welfare of the powerless and impoverished ma-

jority can be fought and won. Thus they have actively pursued collaboration with traditional

powerholders and absorption into the existing system in the hope of enacting changes from

within that would bring about changes in the social system. Although a radical wing of the SDs

recognizes armed struggle as a legitimate and necessary form of struggle, the SDs generally

spurn the use of violence toward achieving their political ends. For the SDs, the cessation of

hostilities between the warring parties is a fundamental concern.

The SDs have always presented themselves as an alternative to the ineptness of traditional

politicians and to what they perceive as the avoidable radicalism of the national democrats.

The SDs have always claimed to represent the silent majority who they say is not necessarily a

supportive base of either the state or the NDs. In the 1980s, some individuals within the ND bloc

formed into a group that was eventually referred to as the popular democrats (PopDems). Pop-

Dems were able to establish closer links with the SDs by converging in the same coalitions.

The differences in perspectives between the NDs and the SDs have necessarily led to dif-

ferences in preferred strategies and tactics between these two major blocs, which have generally

hindered many of their attempts at forging a coalition.18 Both of them have always been suspi-

cious of each other and have consistently questioned the others motives and methods. This

antagonism became more manifest in the events leading to and immediately after the peoples

uprising in 1986. The NDs who officially rejected all forms of electoral processes as farcical

called for a boycott of the snap elections, while the SDs who viewed elections as an important

component of their strategy to change the system from within supported the candidacy of

Corazon Aquino. It was, therefore, not surprising to find the SDs together with other political

and nonpolitical groups at the forefront of the four-day people power revolution, which was

triggered by protests against the rigged results of the snap elections and was supported by a coup



detat. The NDs decided to stay away from this four-day revolt and, as a result, the rainbow

coalition that eventually wrested political power from the Marcoses was generally an SD-influ-

enced coalition that consciously chose to isolate and exclude the NDs. The ND leadership felt

contempt for the newly installed rainbow coalition and was tormented by the fact that after

years of posing the greatest threat to the Marcos regime, it found itself disenfranchised after

the regimes eventual collapse.19

The sudden ouster of the Marcos regime and the reconfigured political arena that succeeded

it intensified the debates within the Communist Party in the Philippines (CPP) concerning arenas

and forms of struggle, which culminated in the partys eventual fragmentation in the early 1990s.

For example, a challenge was posed to the NDF to heed popular will and to accept Aquinos call

for reconciliation by shifting their strategy into more peaceful forms of struggle. But the NDF

countered that the genuine interest of the people is to continue defending themselves from the

elite-dominated state.20 In the 1980s, the CPP undertook internal cleansing operations, which

sought to expose and expunge deep penetration agents of the state within the partys ranks.

Unfortunately, even up to now, the guilt of many of those who were eventually executed could

not be established beyond reasonable doubt. Victims accounts of torture and of other human-

rights violations became a subplot to this grim episode in the CPPs history, which has left in

its trail a bloody mess and sad tales of executions and political assassinations, besides ruined

friendships and shattered lives.21 Worse, the threat of political executions still hangs in the air

for many former comrades as an offshoot of the still-unresolved bickering between the different

factions that have emerged from the splintered ranks of the CPP. It is within this context that

those who bolted the CPP, specifically those who have come to question the primacy of armed

struggle as a strategy for revolution, have emerged as a player in peace advocacy.

As a result of this realignment of political forces in the post-Marcos years, three major

groupings of leftist parties in the Philippines based on their strategic political framework or

tradition may be identified, namely, the Communist-National Democratic, mixed (ND/SD/In-

dependent), and Social Democratic.22 Based on their strategic framework we may deduce their

respective positions in handling the peace question. (see Table 1)

We can observe from Table 1 that all major grouping of leftist parties in the Philippines

recognize the value of achieving peace. What has hindered or limited the formation of endur-

ing coalitions among them on the basis of peacebuilding are their rigidly contending positions

regarding relations with the state, and their deep-seated suspicions about one anothers motives.

Thus, if coalition building is to proceed among these contending ideological/political blocs, it

has to proceed on the basis of mutual recognition of the irreconcilability and respect for each

others standpoint and viewpoint, and with the willingness to risk sharing with one another

leadership over the coalition.

c o a l i t i o n d y n a m i c s i n t h e p h i l i p p i n e s |


But even if it is important to pursue coalition building among ideological/political blocs, it

might be more fruitful to focus on building new peace coalitions that go beyond these blocs.23 It

might also be more productive to focus on forging collective action on the basis of less conten-

tious but mutually acceptable issues such as the resumption of peace talks, condemnation of

human rights violations, and delivery of basic social services especially to calamity-stricken

communities.24

Table 1: Handling of Peace Question based on Strategic Framework

Primary Form of Struggle Relating with the State Peace QuestionSocial Democratic (SD) Unarmed - Parliamentary

or ElectoralCollaboration Priority concern is the

cessation of hostilities and more long-term peaceful settlement of all internal armed conflicts in the country

Mixed National Demo-cratic-ReJect (ND-RJ)/ radical SD/ Independent

Combination of Armed and Unarmed

Combination of Critical Collaboration and Militant Actions

Revolution should not be limited to armed struggle; pursuit of just, lasting, and positive peace should be an important element of the agenda for change

National Democratic-ReAffirm (ND-RA)

Primacy of Armed Strug-gle over Parliamentary or Electoral Struggle

Consistent Rejection of the fascist and pro-impe-rialist state

Peace is a natural outcome of the resolution of the basic problems of society. Governments framework of pacification aggravates armed con-flict, thus one must guard against the states tactic of using peace negotia-tions as a counterinsur-gency measure

4

Peace coalitions in the Philippines can trace their lineage from human rights and other political organizations that persisted

even under Martial Law and to justice and peace organizations that were part of the broad anti-

dictatorship movement that flourished after the assassination of Ninoy Aquino in 1983. These

organizations campaigned against the Marcos regime and the brutality of the military, and called

for the dismantling of the dictatorship. The issue of peace was only one among the many issues

subsumed under the overarching goal of ending the Marcos dictatorship. But it was in the post-

Marcos era when liberal democratic practices were revived that peace coalitions in the Philippines

emerged as a distinct player in the political arena. This section is an analysis of the combination of

conditions that characterized each of the successive administrations in the post-Marcos era, and

which defined the socio-historical context wherein peace coalitions emerged and developed.

1986-1992: peace and democratizationuniting against the resurgence of fascist rule

The first wave (1990) of successive formations of peace coalitions in the Philippines in the

post-Marcos era was directly related to the collapse of the planned peace negotiations between

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP-New Peoples Army (NPA)-

NDF in 1987 and to the brewing tension between the parties involved that culminated in the

pullout of the US military bases in 1991.

The avowed mission of the Aquino administration was the reinstitution of liberal democ-

racy in the Philippines. After assuming the presidency in 1986, Corazon Aquino immediately

pursued the track of reconciliation and peace, particularly with the CPP-NPA-NDF. The CPP-

NPA-NDF, who were wary of the new ruling coalition and its offer of peace, remained steadfast

on its basic political and economic demands. ND-affiliated groups demanded the withdrawal

of the US military bases and the non-renegotiation of a new bases treaty with the US, which

carried with it a sizeable military aid package, as a precondition to peace negotiations26 . When

emergence and development of peace coalitions in the philippines: socio-historical context

e m e r g e n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s i n t h e p h i l i p p i n e s |5


peace coalitions

peasants who were demonstrating in Mendiola to demand the immediate implementation of

land reform were massacred in January 1987, the CPP-NPA-NDF took this as the worst in a se-

ries of undeniable signs that the Aquino administration was incapable of asserting its authority

over the military. They decided to pull out of the planned peace talks that were supposed to

accompany the historic sixty-day bilateral cease-fire in December 1986.26

The military was equally adamant in its position of not pursuing talks with the CPP-NPA-

NDF. A strong military-oriented bloc within the ruling political coalition led by then-Secretary

of National Defense Gen. Fidel V. Ramos and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of

Staff Gen. Renato de Villa, consistently impeded these attempts. Rebel groups in the military

and Marcos loyalists mounted a series of failed coups detat that eventually caused the Aquino

government to vacillate in its position concerning the peace process.27

It was in this context when the resurgence of fascist rule loomed as a possibility, that the

earliest peace coalitions were formed. Their activities were focused on placing the peace process

back on track by convincing the parties concerned to resume peace talks.

coalition for peace (CfP):

cease-fire, peace talks, peace zones

The Coalition for Peace (CfP) was formed in December 1986 by individuals and organiza-

tions that were mostly identified with the SD and PopDem blocs. The intention was to intervene

in the peace process by presenting themselves as a third-party formation representing the citi-

zenry. The conveners of CfP consciously excluded the NDs from their ranks to avoid what they

perceived would be the unnecessary delays in their work that could be brought about by their

irreconcilable differences with the NDs.28

The CfP formulated a framework for the peace talks and a comprehensive peace agenda

that could be offered as a possible starting point of negotiations for the parties in conflict. But

with the breakdown of the planned negotiations in January 1987, CfPs continued efforts to fa-

cilitate the negotiations were consistently rebuffed by both the military and the CPP-NPA, which

challenged the coalitions mandate and questioned its motives. The coalition had to redefine its

strategy; thus while it continued to engage the armed parties through advocacy, the coalition

also started to focus its attention toward building a solid constituency for its peace advocacy. A

series of peace consciousness-raising activities and mobilization campaigns were conducted

by CfP, such as the three-day Tent City for Peace in July 1987, which was organized to urge the

new Congress to adopt a legislative agenda for peace. Provincial networks were established, and

efforts were made toward effecting even a temporary cessation of hostilities, such as negotiating

for the declaration of cease-fires or a moratorium on military offensives by both parties dur-

6 | p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s


ing the Christmas break (Peoples Christmas Cease-fire) or to allow the delivery of basic social

services (Immunization for Peace) in specific communities.29 The CfP also adopted the peace

zone concept and promoted its establishment in different areas as part of its effort to build its

peace constituency. Eventually, from a loose network of individuals and Metro Manila-based

institutes, the CfP spun off into more formal organizations at the regional or provincial level.

Armed hostilities between the military and the different armed nonstate actors (which

included not only the CPP-NPA and the Muslim separatist movement but also factions of the

military) continued to escalate from 1987 to 1989. In response, efforts were made by both civil-

society players and the civilian bloc in government to put the peace process back on track. Two

more major peace coalitionsthe National Peace Conference (NPC), and the Multi-Sectoral

Peace Advocates (MSPA)emerged in 1990, coinciding with the declaration of Corazon Aquino

of the 1990s as the Decade of Peace.

national peace conference:

poverty alleviation as national peace agenda

In October 1990, the CfP helped convene the NPC, where organizations representing dif-

ferent SD-leaning sectoral and regional organizations gathered to define a comprehensive

national peace agenda. The objective was to blend peace concerns with the basic demands

for poverty alleviation and economic development of different social sectors. The result of this

conference was a document entitled Basic Peace Agenda that contained proposed executive

and legislative actions from four sectors, namely the urban poor, fisherfolk, labor, and peasant

sectors. After that first conference in Tagaytay, the NPC eventually functioned as a coalition,

which tried to further develop its national peace agenda and persistently lobbied the Aquino

administration for its adoption. Still, the NPCs Basic Peace Agenda would only be substantially

adopted by the succeeding Ramos administration.

The formation of the NPC and its subsequent pursuit of defining and lobbying for a com-

prehensive peace agenda through sectoral organizations and development NGOs is a conscious

effort on the part of the SD bloc to use the development track in pushing for continued peace

negotiations and peace building. The strategy called for putting in place policies and programs

that would be conducive to the implementation of development projects. The hope was that

by achieving some degree of poverty alleviation, some degree of positive peace would also be

achieved. Thus, while CfP remained as a coalition that implemented seasonal national cam-

paigns, the NPC became a coalition that focused on upgrading the technical skills of the basic

sectors especially in terms of translating their advocacies into doable development programs

that could be implemented in partnership with development NGOs.30

e m e r g e n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s i n t h e p h i l i p p i n e s |


multisectoral peace advocates:

inconspicuous channel for peace talks

The MSPA was formed in 1990 after a meeting that was originally intended to convene

the representatives to the peace talks of both the GRP and the NDF did not push through and

was transformed instead into a meeting of peace advocates. As such, the MSPA is technically

not a coalition but a loose grouping of individual peace advocates coming from a broad array

of ideological and political persuasions. Although originally convened by the CfP, members of

the MSPA come from different ideological leanings. Prominent personalities who are identified

to be sympathetic with the NDs and politicians who come from traditional liberal democratic

political parties became members of MSPA. Members included personalities from the Peoples

Caucus, NPC, Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), the Philip-

pine Peace Center, among others.

The MSPA sought to achieve what the CfP could not. As mentioned earlier, because the

CfP was perceived as partisan, it was unable to assert itself as a third party to the negotiations

between the GRP and the NDF.31 Given this setback and in the face of the perceived necessity

to bring the warring parties back to the negotiating table, peace advocates established them-

selves into the MSPA to reach out to the national leadership of the GRP and the NDF through

more inconspicuous channels. It was able to establish itself as nonpartisan and gained access

to both sides. They were able to meet with the Cabinet Cluster E for Political and Security Af-

fairs under the Aquino administration, but these meetings were short-lived, as the peace talks

were eventually foiled by the refusal of both parties to enter into compromises and the series of

destabilization plots against the Aquino government that made further talks untenable.

peoples caucus:

lasting and substantive peace based on justice and democracy

It is important to note that as early as November 1989, ND-leaning members of the Prot-

estant National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) resolved to work for the resump-

tion of the stalled peace talks and instituted a Special Programme Unit on Peace.31 Together with

other peace advocates within the ND bloc, they initiated the formation of the Peace Caucus,

the first ND-initiated peace coalition that could have served as a vehicle for the assertion of the

ND agenda into the peace process. However, when it was formally launched in March 1990, it

was renamed the Peoples Caucus because it was deemed necessary to highlight that the prin-

cipal stress of the coalition was to challenge the Aquino government into adopting the Peoples

Agenda. The Peoples Agenda, which focused on the call to dismantle the US military bases in



the Philippines and to redefine US-RP relations, drew attention to the imperative of addressing

the roots of the peace problem, and of preventing the government from ignoring the peoples

resolutions should the peace process falter.

The Peoples Caucus comprised political groups, peoples organizations, issue-based co-

alitions, sectoral and multisectoral alliances, and individuals from the church, academe, media,

business, local government councils, and Congress. It mounted a series of conferences, rallies,

and demonstrations that culminated in a welgang bayan (peoples strike) to demand from the

Aquino government a clear commitment to the pursuit of substantive peace by addressing the

basic issues confronting the people. With the eventual pullout of the US from and the disman-

tling of their military bases in Subic and Olongapo in 1991, the Peoples Caucus seemed to have

outlived its purpose as an issue-based coalition and eventually disbanded. It was also during

this time that the national democrats were breaking up into various formations, including the

RAs and RJs.

1992-1997: peace and development uniting against elite domination

By 1992, when Fidel Ramos assumed the presidency, the world had already witnessed

the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the splintering of what used to be the Soviet Union. A

new era in global politics opened as the Cold War came to an end. Ramos focused his energy

on directing a model of fast-track industrialization for the Philippines. His vision was for the

Philippines to achieve newly industrializing country (NIC) status by the year 2000. This may

partly explain his motivation in pursuing the peace process during his term. Peace has been

offered by peace coalitions as a necessary step toward the achievement of sustained economic

growth, and given that the CPP-NPA-NDF was also reeling from the effects of a bitter internal

struggle, it became apparent to the Ramos administration that the time was ripe for talking

peace with the rebels.

In his first State of the Nation Address, Ramos identified the pursuit of peace as a priority

for his administration. The pronouncement dumbfounded many peace advocates who knew the

newly elected president as the chief stumbling block in the peace process within the previous

Aquino administration. Among the first acts of Ramos as the new president was the repeal of

the antisubversion law (Republic Act 1700) that made it illegal to join the CPP and other similar

organizations, the pursuit of exploratory talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),

and the implementation of an amnesty program for all rebels.



peoples congress:

people-centered development toward just and lasting peace

The Peoples Caucus outlived its purpose as an issue-based coalition by this time, and gave

way to the formation of the Peoples Congress. The coalition presented The First 100 Days

Peoples Alternative Agenda as a challenge to the new president to take decisive measures in

the first 100 days of his administration and show proof of his commitment to the pursuit of a

people-centered development program and to a just and lasting peace. Together with many peace

advocates, the Peoples Congress also criticized Ramoss amnesty program as being tantamount

to a call for the rebels to surrender, and its peace strategy as a strategy toward cooptation.

the national unification commission and the social reform agenda:

opportunities or threats?

Ramos created in September 1992 the National Unification Commission (NUC), an ad-hoc

executive-legislative body with representatives from the private sector, and appointed Haydee

Yorac, a respected human-rights activist and academic, as chairperson. The NUC was mandated

to hold consultations with different sectors nationwide toward the formulation of national peace

agenda and a viable peace framework that could guide the governments dealings with the CPP-

NPA-NDF, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the rebel military groups.

From November 1992 to March 1993, the NUC consulted the different armed groups and

the different national peace coalitions including the NPC, the MSPA, and the Peoples Congress.

It also held public consultations in different provinces and with different sectoral organizations.

By the end of its term of office and as a result of these consultations, the NUC summarized its

recommendations to President Ramos in the document Six Paths to Peace. The document

identified the social, economic, and political reforms, which the NUC saw as necessary in order

to solve the root causes of insurgency. It also outlined a set of doable measures that could be

immediately implemented by government. Ramos eventually adopted these recommendations

as basis of his own peace strategy. While the SDs hailed the adoption by the Ramos government

of the Six Paths to Peace as a concrete indicator of the success of their peace advocacy, the NDs

rejected the output of the NUC as inadequate because it failed to address many of the more

contentious peace-related issues.

Despite these mixed reactions, by 1994, Ramos announced that the centerpiece program

of his administration would be the implementation of a Social Reform Agenda (SRA), which

would address the root causes of rebellion in the country. The National Anti-Poverty Com-

mission (NAPC) composed of representatives from non-government organizations (NGOs),



peoples organizations (POs), and government was created as the main vehicle through which

the SRA would be pursued. The NPC, through its conveners, actively participated in the process

of crafting the SRA and in the operations of the NAPC itself.

The consistent and persistent efforts of national peace coalitions and the presidents frame-

work of governance made possible the achievement of concrete gains for peace building under

the Ramos administration. By the end of his term, Ramos was able to reach a comprehensive

peace agreement with the military Rebolusyong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM) in 1995, and with

the MNLF in 1996. It secured a cease-fire agreement with the MILF (1997) and resumed peace

talks with the NDF. Together with the NDF, the GRP under the Ramos administration signed

the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian

Law, or CARHRIHL in March 1998 in The Hague, The Netherlands.

Toward the end of the Ramos administration, the MSPA, the Peoples Caucus, and the Peoples

Congress had become defunct. Members of the MSPA, while remaining actively involved in the

peace movement, concentrated on other equally pressing concerns, effectively disbanding the

MSPA. The organizations comprising the Peoples Congress were mired in the ND debates and

eventual splits, and as a result the Peoples Congress was never convened again.

1998-2005: peace and national securityuniting against an all-out war policy

Unfortunately, the short-lived Estrada administration (1998-2001) did not pursue the peace

process with the same conviction as his predecessor. Peace talks were conducted and initial

steps were taken toward the forging of peace-related agreements, but these never bore fruit.

At best, Estrada had a blurred peace plan. Worse, Joseph Estrada made the military renew and

intensify its offensive against secessionist Muslim groups in Mindanao. He ordered the siege

of the MILFs Camp Abubakar in December 2000.

By this time, only the CfP and the NPC, through their conveners and secretariat, had re-

mained relatively active and continued to protest against Estradas all-out war policy. Prominent

personalities in Metro Manila identified with these coalitions continued to use the name of

these national peace coalitions in calling for the ouster of Estrada in 2001.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was installed as president after Estrada was impeached and then

forced out of office by another people power in EDSA in January 2001. At the beginning of her

term as president, Arroyo tentatively pursued the track of peace by resuming negotiations with

the MILF and the NDF. But these were sidetracked by the 9/11 attacks, which precipitated the

US-led war against terror. Arroyo made it a policy of her administration to provide all-out sup-



port to the US campaign. This translated into intensified war efforts against the communist and

Muslim rebellion in the country, which was justified as part of the administrations campaign

against terrorism. By this time, the CfP and the NPC had become inactive as national peace

coalitions, but a number of national peace coalitionsthe Gathering for Peace, the All-Out

Peace Group, the Pilgrims for Peace, and the Sulong CARHRIHLemerged in 2002-2004 as civil

societys response to this escalation of hostilities.

The second wave (2002) of successive formations of national peace coalitions surged as an

aftermath of this US-led all-out war against terror and the Arroyo presidencys militarist turn

in policies, aided by her defense chief Angelo Reyes.

gathering for peace (GfP):

peace and national sovereignty

The Gathering for Peace was formed in February 2002 to serve as a broad-based vehicle

to oppose US military operations and interventions in the Philippines, and to assert that true

and lasting peace is a consequence of addressing poverty and injustice. It is a loose network of

individuals, political blocs, coalitions, NGOs, and POs, whose basis of unity is the protection of

national sovereignty and the pursuit of non-violent solutions to the countrys internal conflicts.

The coalitions membership includes personalities and organizations identified with different

ideological groups such as Sanlakas, Akbayan, Peace Camp, Bukluran para sa Ikauunlad ng

Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG), and the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC). Secretariat

support for Gathering for Peace was provided by the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC)

and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM).

all-out peace group (AOPG):

peace and civil society

The All-Out Peace Group was formed in April 2002 after a series of workshops on Third-

Party Peace Constituency Building organized by the University of the Philippines (UP) Center

for Integrative and Development Studies (UPCIDS) and the UP Third World Studies Center

(TWSC) to revitalize the Philippine peace movement, and partly in response to governments

all-out war policy. It seeks to publicly advocate a national peace policy that would bind all suc-

ceeding administrations to pursue the peace process, and to serve as a forum for third-party

mediators, who could privately engage the different state and nonstate actors or parties to the

conflict. The All-Out Peace Group included university-based programs and centers, church-

based peace programs, peace institutes, and various NGOs. Among these were the CfP, NPC,



GZOPI, Amnesty International-Philippines, Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL),

Gathering for Peace (GfP), Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), and the Agrarian

Reform Now (AR Now).

pilgrims for peace:

resisting the terrorist label

Pilgrims for Peace was formed in August 2002 by religious leaders, most of whom were from

Protestant churches. It is a loose network of individuals, NGOs, and POs that seeks to become a

vehicle for campaigning for the resumption of peace talks, and against the labeling of Jose Ma.

Sison as a terrorist and the CPP-NPA as terrorist organizations. Groups that are allied with the

Pilgrims for Peace include groups like the Kilusan Mayo Uno (KMU), Bayan, and Karapatan,

which are identified as ND-leaning organizations. Secretariat support for the Pilgrim for Peace

is provided by the Philippine Peace Center.

sulong CARHRIHL:

extracting accountability from the parties in conflict

Sulong CARHRIHL was initiated in mid-2004 and the national network was formally

launched in February 2005. Two months earlier, the Bicol Chapter of Sulong CARHRIHL was

launched by the Bicol Regional Social Action Centers (BRSACs) on December 10, 2004. Sulong

CARHRIHL brings together peace, human rights, religious and academic institutions in order

to promote the goals, support the implementation, and prevent violations of the CARHRIHL

signed by the GRP and NDF. The Program on Peace, Democratization and Human Rights of the

UP CIDS hosts the national secretariat of Sulong CARHRIHL.

Sulong CARHRIHL was formed after the government and the NDF agreed to operationalize

the 1998 human rights/international humanitarian law agreement in April 2004. The two parties

Joint Monitoring Committee was established, with support from the government of Norway.

The data in Table 2 suggest that the emergence of national peace coalitions coincide with

the threat of escalation of hostilities, such as when the peace talks between the GRP and the

NDF were stalled and when the state adopted an all-out war policy. We could therefore say that

the emergence of national peace coalitions has largely been reactive and is directed towards

conflict prevention. The challenge lies in how to initiate the formation of peace coalitions on

the basis of positive peace building.

We will now assess the impact of the strategies employed by national peace coalitions in

the Philippines since 1986 up to 2005 in the context of the broader socio-historical background



that was briefly described above, and in the context of internal organizational dynamics that

will be briefly described in the next section.

Table 2: Emergence of National Peace CoalitionsPeriod Peace/Conflict Scenario National Peace

Coalitions FormedYear

Formed1986-1989

People Power Revolution - End of Martial Law (Feb 1986)Historic 60-day bilateral ceasefire between GRP and NDF (Dec 1986)Mendiola Massacre (Jan 1987)Collapse of peace talks (Jan 1987)Coups de etat by factions of the military (1987, 1989)Re-negotiation of US BasesCollapse of Berlin Wall and USSR (1989)

Coalition for Peace Dec 1986

First Wave: 1990

End of Cold War eraAquino declares 1990 as Decade of PeacePeace talks still suspendedEscalation of hostilities between GRP and different NSAsDevastating Earthquake in Northern Luzon

National Peace ConferenceMultiSectoral Peace AdvocatesPeoples Caucus

19901990

1990

1991-1997

Eruption of Mt. PinatuboPull out of US Bases from Clark and SubicRamos repeals Republic Act 1700Exploratory talks with MILFGeneral Amnesty ProgramCreation of the National Unification Commission (1992)Adoption of Six Paths to Peace as peace framework (1993)Pursuit of Social Reform Agenda and creation of National Anti-Poverty Commission (1994)Peace Agreement with RAM (1995)Split within the CPPPeace Agreement with MNLF (1996)Ceasefire agreement with MILF (1997)

Peoples Congress 1992

1998-2001

Talks with NDF (1995, 1998)CARHRIHL (1998)Estrada orders siege of MILFs Camp Abubakr (2000)Sept 11 attacks (2001)

Second Wave:2002

Arroyo pursues all-out war policy against insurgents based on national security framework and her all-out support to US-led war against terrorism (2002)Anti-terrorism bill

Gathering for PeaceAll-Out Peace GroupsPilgrims for Peace

200220022002

2003-2005

Oslo Talks between the GRP and NDF; the parties agreed to form the Joint Monitoring Committee of the CARHRIHL in April 2004 but talks broke down in 2005.Oakwood MutinyAssassinations of leftist leaders at the local level

Sulong CARHRIHL 2004

4

A coalition as a form of organization is the coming together of different social actors to pursue mutually beneficial goals that become more or less achievable depending on the coalitions strength. The coalitions strength

is measured basically in terms of organizational spread and depth, or the broadness of the

coalitions social base. Thus, all coalitions strive hard to become and actually project themselves

to be broad-based. Broadness is an ideal that is at the core of coalition building.

In the case of the national peace coalitions covered in this study, the term broad may

refer to the range of political or ideological groupings that are represented in a coalition. It may

also refer to the range of sectors or to the scope of geographic areas that are represented in a

coalition. This section describes the social base of national peace coalitions.

ideological / political bloc

Although a coalition, as an organizational expression of unity, implies the coming together

of groups of peoples and individuals with diverse ideological or political persuasions, some

peace coalitions may be clearly identified as belonging to a specific ideological persuasion, e.g.

SD, PopDem, ND-RA, ND-RJ, independent, etc. For example, the oldest peace coalition in this

study, the Coalition for Peace, is basically identified as a coalition of SD-leaning and PopDem-

leaning organizations and individuals, while one of the younger peace coalitions in this study,

the Pilgrims for Peace, is identified with the reaffirmist (RA) bloc of the national democrats.

The SDs and the PopDems organized the first national peace coalition in the country, is

the Coalition for Peace. That they were the first ideological blocs to take up peace as a basis for

organizing is easy to understand. Peace as an agenda is at the core of the SDs strategy of criti-

cal collaboration with the state to be able to institute social reforms from within. From their

perspective, the pursuit of radical change through violence is irrational especially in light of the

opportunities that have become available after the fall of the Marcos regime. Meanwhile, the

PopDems support the view that changes through peaceful means is clearly a popular demand

among the masses of the people as illustrated by the EDSA people power experience in 1986.

social actors/groups in peace coalitions

s o c i a l a c t o r s / g r o u p s i n p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s |5


peace coalitions

They both assert that the people were tired of war and that the rebirth of democracy in the

country promised the possibility of achieving thoroughgoing and strategic changes through

incremental reforms.

The SDs and the PopDems initiated the formation of the CfP, the NPC, and the MSPA. Con-

sistent with their self-definition as an alternative to the state and to the CPP-NPA, these peace

coalitions present themselves as a third party to the conflict that enjoys the support of the broad

masses of the people, referring to what they consider as the silent and nonideological majority

of the people. Their earliest calls focused on peace talks and cease-fires.

A number of bourgeois reformists and liberal democrats belonging to traditional politi-

cal parties actively participate in various national peace coalitions. They believe that with the

ouster of the dictatorship, the biggest stumbling block to instituting pro-people reforms has

already been removed and that the re-institution of democracy in the country provides better

chances for reform to take root. Peace is thus a paramount concern because it is a prerequisite

to democratization and economic development. Conveners of peace coalitions coalesce with

sympathetic politicians because they value the credibility and clout that these politicians lend

to peace building.

The NDs may also be considered an important social base in relation to national peace co-

alitions. Before and during the Marcos years, in spite of internal debates regarding the handling

of the peace question, ND-leaning human rights and justice and peace organizations during

this period projected a unified stance in relation to peace issues. The focus of their efforts was

to consciously subsume peace issues under anti-imperialist and antifascist themes and to re-

direct collective action toward more militant actions against the repressive regime. They have

consistently presented themselves as the voice of the marginalized majority whose demand is

for substantive and radical changes.

The NDs assert that no substantive changes have taken place even after the ouster of

Marcos in 1986 and that democratization can only be genuine if it addresses issues pertaining

to economic democracy, such as land reform. Instead of opportunities, what they saw in the

post-Marcos era was the danger of capitulation through cooptation. Thus, the primary concern

was to show the bankruptcy of the existing order and to reiterate the legitimacy and urgency

of radical social transformation. Contrary to the position of the SDs and the PopDems, the

NDs believe that the masses of the people are ready to continue with militant forms of action

because it is in line with their class interests. Moreover, they argue that the people have persis-

tently challenged the dictatorship even under conditions of severe repression. Any discussion

about peace should necessarily start with the demands of the people and not with calls for the

surrender of the option to use force in defense of their rights. It is therefore easy to understand

why the Peace Caucus had to be renamed as the Peoples Caucus, and why the issue of the US



military bases in the Philippines or the issue of a thoroughgoing land reform program were seen

as necessary elements of a genuinely pro-people and sincere peace process.

In the aftermath of the bitter struggles within the movement, the ND bloc has been split

into several groups by the mid-1990s. The basic ND position regarding the peace question that

was briefly discussed above is retained by the ND-RAs. The ND-RAs consider it important to

educate the masses of the people on the difference between the ND position on peace and the

way it is being handled by other political blocs especially the non-ND-RAs because they also

consider it important for the masses of the people to be able to discern which is genuine and

which is not. Apparently, this is the context in which we would be able to understand why the

Pilgrims for Peace has consciously carved a separate niche for its own peace discourse. While

it participates in conferences or forums organized by non-ND-RA peace coalitions, it has re-

frained from joining their mass mobilizations and other forms of protest actions. Instead it has

launched its own parallel campaigns through parallel organizations and without enlisting the

cooperation of non-ND-RA peace coalitions.

As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the internal crisis that rocked the ND movement was

marked by personal, ideological, and even violent contentions, such as executions of leading

cadres who broke ranks. As a result, the ND-RJ and the ND-Independent blocs emerged as a

distinct social base for peace coalitions. The Independent bloc specifically has become a new

actor in the peace movement and has taken up the issue of peace and nonviolence as important

elements of its advocacy for social transformation. They abhor vanguardism or the principle

of trying to ensure dominance by the party in any organization, which they identify as among

the root causes of the excesses within the ND movement. They are seriously challenging the

strategy of armed struggle as the only means to achieve meaningful social change. Thus, they

are consciously inserting the issue of respect for life and human rights, and the value of plural-

ism into the discourse of social transformation.

Peace coalitions formed more recently such as the All-Out Peace Group, Gathering for Peace,

and Sulong CARHRIHL exhibit interlocking membership and leadership indicating that peace

coalitions in Metro Manila can now more readily transcend ideological or political divisions,

and achieve a consensus in specific peace concerns, thus allowing the implementation of joint

campaigns and activities. But this interlocking leadership and membership may also indicate

a relatively small community of core advocates for peace in Metro Manila. Thus it remains a

major challenge for peace coalitions to expand this community, to sustain their peace-build-

ing initiatives, and to strengthen their capability to actively take part in the peace process in

the Philippines. Peace coalitions need to consciously develop a crop of future peace-building

advocates and leaders.

s o c i a l a c t o r s / g r o u p s i n p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s |


middle forces

A cursory network analysis of the peace coalitions covered in this study reveals that prom-

inent personalities and leaders coming from what are considered to be the middle forces,

such as the religious sector and the academe, are the initiators of peace coalitions. The middle

forces are those social sectors that could influence policies and public opinion on the basis of

their status in society. In Philippine society, where religious beliefs and education are highly

valued, the religious sector and the academe have become acceptable mediators and effective

brokers of peace. Also, since peace is inherently valued within their respective institutions, it is

not surprising to find religious leaders and academics at the forefront of peace advocacy and

engagement.

Churches and schools, through the initiatives of peace advocates within their ranks, have

become sanctuaries for peace coalitions and their members. They have also become spaces for

the conduct of peace research and training. Thus, they have contributed a lot in refining the

concept and practice of peace building in the country.

religious sector

Church leaders and prominent personalities from religious institutions such as NCCP,

AMRSP, and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), etc. have been involved

in the formation of the peace coalitions, which were covered in this study.

Some of the more prominent peace advocates from the religious sector are as follows:

Macario Francisco, SJ

Feliciano Cario (NCCP)

Fr. Frank Vargas (AMRSP)

Bishop Francisco Claver (ICSI)

Fr. Eliseo Mercado Jr, OMI

Bishop Estanislao Abainza

Rafael Donato, FSC

Fr. Frank Vargas, CM

Bishop Nestor Cario

Most Rev. Deogracia Milguez, Jr. (Ecumenical Bishops Forum)

Sharon Rose Joy Ruiz-Durendes (Gen-Sec of NCCP)

Rev. Dr. Domingo Diel (Convention of Philippine Baptist Church)

Prime Bishop Ignacio Soliba (Episcopal Church of the Philippines)

Obispo Maximo Torres Millumena (Iglesia Filipina Independente)



Rev. Fr. Aristela Miranda, OSC (St. Camillius Seminary)

Sr. Rosalind Tanliueco, OSB (Social Pastoral Apostolate, St. Scholasticas College)

Sr. Elenita Belardo BSG (Inter-Faith Network for Justice and Peace)

Fr. Gilbert Sabado (Promotion of Church Peoples Response)

Sr. Alice Areglo, DC (Justice and Peace Coordinator)

Sr. Arnold Mary Noel of Balay Rehabilitation Center Inc.

academe

Academics from the University of the Philippines, Miriam College, the Ateneo de Manila

University, and the Philippine National University have always been involved in initiating and

maintaining peace coalitions. In most cases, they are acting on the basis of their own personal

convictions rather than on behalf of the academic institutions with which they are affiliated.

sectoral groups and individual peace advocates

Aside from the church and the academe, womens organizations, leaders from the NGO

community, and prominent political leaders also figure prominently in national peace coali-

tions. Most of these personalities come from organizations that were actively involved in the

human rights movement and the justice and peace movements during the Marcos years. These

sectoral organizations and public intellectuals have helped call attention to other important but

less visible expressions of conflict (e.g., domestic violence, development aggression, cultural

marginalization). They have also helped initiate new forms of organizing, and identify new areas

of work for peace coalitions (e.g., community development, promoting a culture of peace).

Based on a review of existing documents, some of the individuals who have consistently

been involved in peace coalition work are:

Table 3: Peace Advocates in Peace CoalitionsName Peace CoalitionTeresita Quintos-Deles CfP MSPA NPC (was Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process,

from 2001 to mid-2005) Ed Garcia CfP MSPA NPC (now with International Alert)Jose Luis Gascon CfP NPC Jean Llorin CfP NPC HOPEClark Soriano CfP NPC (now with UNDP)Karen Taada CfP NPC AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL Risa Hontiveros Baraquel CfP MSPA NPC AOPGFeliciano Cario (deceased) MSPA NPC

s o c i a l a c t o r s / g r o u p s i n p e a c e c o a l i t i o n s |29


support institutions

Once formed, a core staff that is provided by member organizations sustains the coalition

by providing secretariat support. It is important to note that the more enduring coalitions were

sustained through the efforts of a more regularly functioning organization, which is the core group

or the secretariat of the coalition. It is the core group, which attends to the day-to-day tasks of the

coalition, and facilitates the crafting of the coalitions comprehensive and strategic plans. Some of

the organizations that have consistently provided support work for national peace coalitions are:

In implementing the myriad tasks of peace building, peace coalitions in Metro Manila have

also benefited from the support of various agencies like the UNDP-Philippine office, Interna-

tional Alert, the UNICEF Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Inter-Agency Committee, the

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Council of Churches, the Southeast

Asian Conflict Studies Network-Philippine chapter, and the Asian Peace Alliance. 33 Since peace

coalitions are establishing themselves as third party facilitators, they should exercise prudence

in choosing their funding partners. They need to ensure that their choice of funding partners

will not jeopardize their reputation as a non-partisan organization.

Name Peace CoalitionFr. Frank Vargas MSPA NPCWigberto Taada MSPA Peoples Caucus NPC Gathering for PeaceBonifacio Gillego MSPA Peoples Caucus NPC Cecilia Muoz-Palma MSPA NPC Fr. Jun Mercado Peoples Caucus NPCFelicisimo Joson MSPA NPCCorazon Juliano Soliman MSPA NPC Ma. Serena Maris Diokno MSPA Peoples Caucus NPC Corazon Fabros GfP AOPG Soliman Santos, Jr. HOPE CfP AOPG Sulong CARHRIHLMiriam Coronel Ferrer AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL

Table 4: Support Institutions for Peace CoalitionsInstitute/Organization Peace CoalitionGZOPI (Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute) CfP MSPA NPC AOPGUniversity of the Philippines-Center for Integrative Development Studies Program on Peace Democratiza-tion and Human Rights

AOPG Sulong CARHRIHL

Philippine Peace Center Pilgrims for PeacePhilippine Rural Reconstruction Movement Gathering for Peace



Table 5: Organizational Profile of Peace Coalitions (Metro Manila, 1986-2005)34Coalition (name, facts of establish-ment, current status)

Date Estab-lished

Coalition Leadership/Ideological Persuasion

Coalition for Peace (CfP)

Formed shortly after the collapse of the negotiations between the GRP and the NDF

Starting 1991, secretariat support provided by Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute (GZOPI).

Active until 2000 but currently inactive

December 1986

Convened by prominent personalities from academe, church, and Manila-based NGOs

Conveners:Teresita Quintos-Deles (GZOPI, WAND); Randy David (BISIG); Macario Francisco, SJ; Ed Garcia (GZOPI); Jose Luis Gascon (Youth Committee for Peace); Rolando Librejo; Jean Llarin (HOPE); Nemesio Prudente; Clark Soriano (Movement for Popular Democracy); Karen Taada (GZOPI, KASAPI); Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel

Identified with Social Democrats (SDs) and Democratic Social-ists (DemSocs)

Multi-Sectoral Peace Advocates (MSPA)

Formed after a meeting that was originally intended for rep-resentatives of parties to peace talks did not push through, and was transformed into a small gathering of peace advocates.

Currently inactive

1990 Prominent personalities from academe, church, political parties, and existing peace coalitions

Conveners:Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel (CfP); Ed Garcia and Ging Deles (CfP and GZOPI); Feliciano Cario (NCCP); Fr. Frank Vargas (AMRSP); Bishop Francisco Claver (Institute of Church and Social Is-sues); Wigberto Taada; Bonifacio Gillego (deceased ); Cecilia Muoz-Palma (deceased ); Howard Dee and Florencio Abad (NPC); Fr. Jun Mercado (Peoples Caucus); Mercy Contreras (Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates); Felicisimo Joson (Federation of Free Workers-Labor Advisory Coordinating Council); Corazon Juliano-Soliman (Congress for Peoples Agrar-ian Reform); Maris Diokno

Mostly SD allies but with personalities who are identified to be sympathetic to NDs

Peoples Caucus

Formed through a series of meetings, and partly in response to attempts of rightist elements to gain control of government.

Name was changed from Peace Caucus to Peoples C

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