volatility paradigm and paradox
TRANSCRIPT
Christopher Cole, CFA Artemis Capital Management LLC Artemis Vega Fund LP 520 Broadway, Suite 350
Santa Monica, CA 90401
(310) 496-4526 phone
(310) 496-4527 fax
VOLATILITY PARADIGM AND PARADOX C B O E R I S K M A N A G E M E N T C O N F E R E N C E - M A R C H 3 , 2 0 1 3
For Investment Professional Use. Not for Distribution
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Volatility at World’s End Deflation Imagine the world economy as an armada of ships passing through a narrow and
dangerous strait between the waterfall of deflation and hellfire of inflation
Our resolution to avoid one fate may damn us to the other
Like Odysseus in the epic poem the global economy is trapped between the monsters of Scylla (fire of inflation) and Charybdis (the waterfall of deflation)
Our resolution to avoid one fate may damn us to the other
Illustration by Brendan Wuiff based on concept by Christopher Cole
Volatility at World’s End Deflation Imagine the world economy as an armada of ships passing through a
narrow and dangerous strait leading to the sea of prosperity. Navigating the channel is treacherous for to err too far to one side and your ship plunges off the waterfall of deflation but too close to the other and it
burns in the hellfire of inflation
Our resolution to avoid one fate may damn us to the other
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DJI
A (l
oga
rith
mic
sca
le)
Rea
lize
d V
ola
tilit
y (%
)
Volatility at World's End DeflationDow Jones Industrial Index (RHS) vs. 1-month Realized Volatility of DJIA (LHS)
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Volatility shocks are rightfully associated with deflationary crashes
Financial media pundits called the 2008 crash an “unprecedented” period of volatility
VIX index reached 20+ year high of 80.86 on November 20th, 2008
2008 was only “unprecedented” if you assume data from the inception of the VIX index in 1990
Historical DJIA realized volatility data going back to 1929 shows volatility climbed to similar levels or higher a total of 6 times in the past 80 years! VXO, precursor to VIX, hit 150.19 on Oct 19, 1987 / 2008 was rare but not unprecedented!
Weimar Germany would have experienced over 2000% monthly realized volatility
$1mm variance swap struck in 1919 at 17.5% (average vol for period) would payoff $417 billion by 1923 (hypothetical)
Germany in 1920-21 had no surface inflation, a booming stock market, and briefly the strongest currency in the world
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4 Source: “Economics of Inflation; A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany" by Constantino Bresciani-Turroni Out of Print / 1968 (1) Based upon monthly realized variance from available stock price data.
Vol is a statistic indifferent to price direction increasing when assets decline only because prices fall faster than they rise
How would volatility markets respond to an inflationary shock? (e.g. 20%+ inflation a year for 3 years)
Extreme inflation could turn variance markets backwards… literally… as volatility could rise in conjunction with stocks
Impacts in how risk is spread between right and left tails of probability distributions
Extreme volatility can also occur in hyperinflation
Volatility historically spikes when markets decline and vice versa… but this is a rule and not a law… extreme volatility can also occur in hyperinflation
0000001101001,00010,000100,0001,000,00010,000,000100,000,000
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g-19
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v-19
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v-20
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g-21
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-22
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-22
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v-22
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-23
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v-23
Pe
rfo
rman
ce in
pap
er
mar
ks (
mil
)
Pe
rfo
rman
ce a
dj.
fo
r fi
xed
exc
han
ge Performance of German Stock Market during Weimar Republic Hyperinflaton
Adj. according to USD exchange rate
Adj. according to wholesale index numbers
In paper marks, Weimar
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500
1,000
1,500
2,000
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-18
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Vo
lati
lity
(%)
Weimar VIX?(1)
Realized Volatility of German Stock Market during Weimar Republic Hyperinflation(monthly volatility data annualized)
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Impossible Object Illustration highlighting the limits of human perception challenging whether our awareness of naïve reality is
relevant to our understanding of truth… vast importance to mathematics, art, philosophy, and modern risk
Modern financial markets are an impossible object
Illustration by Brendan Wiuff based on concept by Christopher Cole
When global central banks manipulate the cost of risk the mechanics of price discovery break down resulting in paradoxical expressions of value that should not exist according to efficient
market theory
Fear and safety are now interchangeable in a speculative and high-stakes game of perception. The efficient frontier is now contorted to such a degree that traditional empirical views are no longer relevant.”
Modern financial markets are an impossible object Volatility of an impossible object is our changing perception of risk
Volatility of an Impossible Object
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Flash Crash
(Black Monday 1987, Flash Crash)
Slowly building crash with slow recovery
End of leveraging cycle
High volatility, but relatively muted VOV
Great Depression
Global Recession
Flash Crash
Hyper-speed crash with fast recovery
Market Fragmentation & Self-Reflexity
Extreme Volatility of Volatility
Predictable (in retrospect) Unpredictable (even In retrospect)
Hyper-speed crash with fast recovery
Market fragmentation and self-reflexity
High volatility of volatility
Common sense says do not trust your common sense
Volatility itself is now a paradox (both in time and space)
Temporal Paradox
Low Spot-VIX but steep VIX Futures term structure
Power law distortions in daily volatility moves
Steep Volatility-of-Volatility term structure & Skew but low-spot VOV
Spatial Paradox
Low volatility-of-volatility (realized) but higher potential for volatility-of-volatility (implied)
Historically expensive gamma on tails of probability distribution
Steeper volatility-of-volatility skew
Volatility is Global Macro
Bull Market in Fear is Defined by
1. Volatility Kindling / Higher Potential Vol of VIX 2. VIX Futures are less effective hedging tools 3. Unbalanced VIX Option Shadow Gamma
4. Shadow VIX Theta 5. Skew shift 6. Volatility of VIX futures increasingly driven by
short squeeze rather than VIX itself
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Unknown Unknowns Known Unknowns
Volatility of Volatility Volatility
Everything you need to know about trading volatility
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Debt Ceiling Crisis
China hard landing
War with Iran
European Crisis
Global Recession
Fiscal Austerity
“There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say there are things that, we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know, we don't know.”
Donald Rumsfeld, United States Secretary of Defense
?
Modern volatility markets can put a price on “unknown unknowns” via the volatility-of-volatility
Episodes of elevated implied vol-of-vol are associated with lower equity returns
SPX periods of high realized volatility-of-VIX underperform low by 13% annually
Individual stocks with high implied vol-of-vol underperform low VOV stocks by 10% annually(1)
Today everyone is afraid of the next 2008 but I am afraid of the next 1987…. in stocks… but more likely bonds
Regimes of Volatility-of-Volatility (2007 to 2012)
Period Average
Volatility Regime Vol of VIX VIX indexSPX Return
(annual)
Total
(2007 to Sep 2012)87.5 24.8 +1%
Bull Market
(2006 to July 2007)81.7 13.8 +5%
Credit Crisis Onset
(Aug 2007 to Aug
2008)
82.7 23.0 -11%
Market Crash
(Sep 2008 to Feb
2009)
95.7 49.6 -71%
Recovery to Flash
Crash
(Mar 2009 to May
80.8 26.7 +35%
Post-Flash Crash
Steepening
(May 2010 to Oct
90.5 23.2 +10%
LTRO Steepening
(Nov 2011 to Sep
2012)
97.7 20.3 +16% Vanilla Options
VIX Index
Implied Volatility
Vol Term Structure
Forward Volatility
Convexity
Tail Risk Hedging
Vol Curve Trades
Many investors who trade volatility (VIX ETNs, VIX futures) don’t realize they are actually
trading a market expectation of future uncertainty (volatility-of-volatility)… not volatility itself… there is a big difference
Episodes of elevated uncertainty (volatility-of-volatility) are associated with lower equity returns
but they are hard to predict
Many people who trade volatility do not realize they are only trading a market expectation of future
uncertainty… not volatility itself
Risks that you know and can
quantity
Risks that you know but can’t
quantify
Risks that you don’t know but could quantify
Risks that you don’t know and can’t quantify
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Bull Market in Fear is Defined by
1. Abnormally Steep Volatility Term-Structure
2. Distortions in Volatility from Monetary Policy
3. Expensive Portfolio Insurance
4. Violent Volatility Spikes and Hyper-Correlation
The new volatility regime is a reflection of investor neurosis generated by forced participation in risk assets by the financial oppression of global central banks
What is the “Bull Market in Fear”? New paradigm for pricing risk that emerged after the 2008 financial crisis as
related to our collective fear of the next deflationary crash
Bull Market in Fear is not about where volatility is today as so much as it is about where markets think volatility will be tomorrow
I. Emotional Post-traumatic Deflation Disorder
Desire for safety and security at any cost
II. Monetary Forced participation in risk assets drives desire for hedging
Unspoken feeling that gains in financial assets are “artificial”
III. Macro-Risks Debtor-developed economies face structural headwinds
Unrest in Middle East, Iran, Japan & China Tensions
IV. Regulatory Government regulation (Dodd-Frank, Volcker rule) has
constrained risk appetite for banks to supply volatility
Lower demand for structured products by investors
Structural imbalances in supply-demand dynamics of volatility markets
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The new volatility regime is a reflection of investor neurosis generated by forced participation in risk assets by the financial oppression of global central banks
Greater Demand for
Volatility
Less Supply of Volatility
I. Emotional Post-traumatic Deflation Disorder Memories of deflationary collapse create visceral and
primitive desire to avoid that pain again Desire for safety and security at any cost
II. Monetary Forced participation in risk assets by the financial
oppression of global central banks results in greater demand for hedging
Unspoken feeling that broad based gains in financial assets are “artificial”
III. Geopolitical Risk Factors Debtor-developed economies face demographic and
structural headwinds Unrest in Middle East
IV. Structural and Regulatory Greater government regulation (Dodd-Frank, Volcker rule)
has constrained risk appetite for banks to supply volatility to the market
Lower demand for structured products by investors (which sell vol)
TEMPORAL PARADOX - Abnormally Steep VIX Futures Term Structure
10
BULL MARKET IN FEAR
"There is no terror in the bang, only in the anticipation of it." Alfred Hitchcock
The most extreme term-structure for forward volatility in two decades reflects continued anticipation of a deflationary collapse and structural imbalance in risk
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VIX
M3
M6
0.50x
0.70x
0.90x
1.10x
1.30x
1.50x
1.70x
1.90x
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-04
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-04
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No
v-04
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-05
Ap
r-05
Jul-
05Se
p-0
5D
ec-
05M
ar-0
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ay-0
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ug-
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ct-0
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ar-0
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ug-
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-09
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-10
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-10
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-10
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-10
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-11
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Mar
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Jul-
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De
c-12
Expiry
Vix
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ture
s/Sp
ot V
ix
Bull Market in Fear / VIX Futures Curve 2004 to Present
10
15
20
25
30
35
Spot Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6 Month 7 Month 8
Forw
ard
VIX
ind
ex (%
)
Low Volatility? Really?VIX Futures Curve Comparison
August 2012 vs. September 2008
August 17, 2012 / Lowest VIX in 5 years at time
September 15, 2008 / Day after Lehman Bros. Bankruptcy
February 19, 2013
TEMPORAL PARADOX - Abnormally Steep VIX Futures Term Structure
11
Low VIX index does not mean cheap volatility
On August 17th 2012 spot VIX touched a 5 year low at 13.45 however…
It was more expensive to buy forward volatility at 6-12 months with the VIX at 13.45 in 2012 than it was one day after Lehman went bankrupt in 2008 when the VIX was at 31
Volatility hedge executed at the August 2012 low in spot-VIX would have already lost -12% of its value even while VIX increased by +15%
Successful hedging requires going beyond simplistic heuristics based on the absolute price of the VIX
!
Volatility is more than the VIX index
Overt focus on VIX is analytical equivalent using the 1yr UST to explain the entire bond market!
Volatility is more than the VIX index
Overt focus on VIX is analytical equivalent using the 1yr UST to explain the entire bond market!
Low VIX index does not mean cheap volatility Forward volatility more expensive in August 2012 at the 5 year low in the VIX than it was the day after Lehman went bankrupt
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16
21
26
31
36
41
46
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
Mar-0
9
May-0
9
Jul-0
9
Sep-0
9
No
v-09
Jan-1
0
Mar-1
0
May-1
0
Jul-1
0
Sep-1
0
No
v-10
Jan-1
1
Mar-1
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May-1
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Jul-1
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Sep-1
1
No
v-11
Jan-1
2
Mar-1
2
May-1
2
Jul-1
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Sep-1
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No
v-12
Jan-1
3
VIX
Ind
ex
(%)
Fed
BS
% C
han
ge s
ince
Se
pte
mb
er
20
08
No Fed ActionQEIQEIIOp. Twist+LTRO(ECB)QEIIIVIX
TEMPORAL PARADOX - VIX Regimes Defined by Central Banking
12
Since 2008 global central banks have expanded their balance sheets by $9 trillion - enough fiat money to buy every person on earth a 55'' wide-screen 3D television
VIX spikes consistently occur after the end of central bank balance sheet expansion
Orwellian financial repression as central banks define the risk premium in markets
16 central banks have eased since the fourth quarter of last year
Fed and ECB pledged unlimited purchases of bonds to support the system
If Fed follows through on promise to buy $40bn MBS it will own the entire market in a decade
Risk and Vol Returns in Fed BS Regimes
Crisis and Recovery (September 2008 to September 2012)
Period Average Weekly Change
SPX VIX 21d SV Fed BS
Fed Balance Sheet ↑ 0.6% -1.7% 0.0% 1.5%
Fed Balance Sheet > +1σ ↑ 3.2% -7.4% 0.0% 8.1%
Fed Balance Sheet ↓ 0.0% 1.3% -2.0% -0.9%
Fed Balance Sheet < -1σ ↓ 1.2% 2.7% -1.9% -4.7%
Post-Crisis Recovery Period (Mar 2009 to Sep 2012)
Period Average Weekly Change
SPX VIX 21d SV Fed BS
QEI con't (March09-Jun 09) 1.4% -2.6% -2.5% 0.6%
Post QEI (Jun09-Oct10) 0.2% -0.2% -0.8% 0.2%
QEII (Sep10-June11)(1) 0.5% -1.0% 0.0% 0.5%
Post-QEII (July11-Nov11) -0.2% 2.2% 2.3% -0.1%
LTRO (Dec11 to Sep 0.3% -1.5% -2.7% 0.0%
(1) period following announcement of QEII at Jackson Hole August 2010.
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank, ECB, Bloomberg
Flash Crash
Aug 2011 Crash
QEII
LTRO (ECB)
Fed Balance Sheet Expansion and VIX index
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-50
.0%
-35
.0%
-20
.0%
-5.0
%
10
.0%
25
.0%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
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10
Cu
mu
lati
ve
Pro
ba
bil
ity
Implied 12m %G/Lin S&P 500 index
S&P 500 Index 12-month % Contribution to Model-Free Variance by Expected Returns
(1995 to March 2012)
40%-50%
30%-40%
20%-30%
10%-20%
0%-10%
SPATIAL PARADOX - High Cost of Tail Risk Insurance
13
Fat Left Tails have Dominated the Distribution of S&P 500 index Variance
You are not smart for hedging what everyone else already knows! Since the 2008-crash strips of OTM SPX options show 21% contribution to a -50% or more crash(1)
Realized probability of a 50% log drop in markets is only 2.93% (using DJIA data to 1928)
1995 to 2012
Fear of deflation is not MISPLACED but it is MISPRICED
You are not smart for hedging what everyone else already knows! Tail risk insurance is now priced at multiple times the eight decade probability of those declines being realized
representing irrational exuberance for fear
What happens when everyone sells their portfolio insurance at the same time!?
Note: Artemis calculates the implied probability distribution using interpolated weights from variance swap pricing. This methodology may occasionally give higher weightings to tails in down markets than other methods like taking the second derivative of call prices, fitting mixture of normal PDFs to recover prices, or fitting vol models (SVI,SABR).
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0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
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90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
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20
13
Yie
ld(%
)
Volatility Yield (%) vs UST Bond Yields (%)1990 - 2013
-25% from SPX Strike Rate Breached
Volatility Yield (sell 1yr SPX put / -25% discount)
10yr UST Yield
30yr UST Yield
SPATIAL PARADOX – VOLATILITY and BONDS
14
For the first time in history the annualized short volatility yield (OTM SPX Put) is competitive with the yield on long dated UST Bonds!
WOW!
I find it funny when academics claim the US government will never default because it can just print money… that is like saying my house will never be burglarized because if someone tried I could just light it on fire
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1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
4.0%
-65%-55%-45%-35%-25%-15%-5%
SPATIAL PARADOX – VOLATILITY and BONDS
15
When the “Bull Market in Fear” meets a “Bubble in Safety” a short equity option position and “risk-free’ UST bond have similar risk-to-reward payoffs!
0.00x
0.20x
0.40x
0.60x
0.80x
May-03 May-04 May-05 May-06 May-07 May-08 May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12
TLT 20+ US Treasury Bond ETF - 5% OTM Vol Skew
Yield to Risk / UST Bond vs. "Volatility Bond" (Collateralized Short Put on S&P 500 index)Investment Stress Test #1 Stress Test #2 Stress Test #3 Stress Test #4
Volatility Bond / Short SPX Put + Collateral SPX ↓ -9% SPX ↓ -14% SPX ↓ -25% SPX ↓ -50%
Yield MaturityEst. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
Est. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
Est. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
Est. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
SPX Put (Strike @-25%) 2.69% 1 year -2% 68% 1.373x -4% 39% 0.616x -11% 13% 0.242x -33% 2% 0.081x
SPX Put (Strike @2009 lows) 0.51% 1 year -0.4% 68% 1.319x -0.9% 39% 0.588x -3% 13% 0.176x -15% 2% 0.034x
US Treasury Bond UST Rates ↑ 100bps UST Rate ↑ 200bps UST Rate ↑ 325bps UST Rate ↑ 600bps
Yield MaturityEst. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
Est. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
Est. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
Est. MTM
Loss
Historic Prob.
%
Risk to
Reward
US Treasury Bond / 10-year 1.87% 10 years -9% 68% 0.214x -17% 39% 0.113x -25% 13% 0.074x -41% 2% 0.045x
US Treasury Bond /30-year 3.09% 30 years -18% 68% 0.176x -31% 39% 0.099x -44% 13% 0.070x -62% 2% 0.050x
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
3.0%
3.5%
-65%-55%-45%-35%-25%-15%-5%
1yr Volatility Bond (short OTM SPX Put Option Collateralized)
Lond Dated UST Bonds
Risk (Loss in Stress Test)
Efficient Frontier / Long Dated UST Bond vs. 1yr OTM Short Puts (collateralized)
10yr UST Bond
30yr UST Bond SPX Put (Strike @ 2009 lows)
SPX Put (Strike @-25% OTM)
Risk / Unrealized Loss in Stress Test Scenario
SPX ↓ -9% to -14% 68% to 33% probability
SPX ↓ -50% 2% probability
10yr UST Bond
30yr UST Bond
SPX Short Put (Strike @-25% OTM)
Rates ↑ 320bps to 600bps 13% to 2% probability
Rates ↑ 100bps to 200bps 68% to 33% probability
Note: All data as of February 17, 2013. Estimated unrealized loss on position given stress test scenario. Historic probability data based on period of 1960 - 2012 for the UST bonds and 1950 to 2012 for the S&P 500 index. Option pricing based on estimated local volatility shifts, however actual shifts may differ from estimates during a real crash depending. All stress tests are assumed to occur close to the purchase period of the instrument. Unrealized losses may differ closer to maturity.
Higher rate volatility can be realized in deflation and inflation
When risk-free is risky it is time to buy volatility on safety itself
Look to buy long-dated forward rate volatility (10yr straddles fwd starting) to exploit this mispricing in risk
SPX ↓ -25% 13% chance
SPX Put Stress Test
UST Bond Stress Test
Risk / Unrealized Loss in Stress Test Scenario
Efficient Frontier / Risk to Reward Comparison Long Dated UST Bond vs. 1yr OTM Short Puts (collateralized)
Ret
urn
/ Y
ield
Risk Free Assets are Risky
We all know shorting volatility is very dangerous…
So… which is riskier right now? 1. Short collateralized far OTM S&P 500 index put (-25% or -50% OTM for 1yr)
2. Long a “risk-free” US treasury bond (10-30 yrs)
For the first time in history the volatility yield is competitive with the yield long dated UST Bonds
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0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
-50% -43% -35% -28% -20% -13% -5% +3% +10% +18% +25% +33% +40% +48%
Cu
mu
lati
ve P
rob
abili
ty W
eig
hti
ng
One Year Gain/Loss % in S&P 500 index
Mirror Reflection: Deflation vs. HyperinflationS&P 500 Probability Distributions in different Regimes of Risk
1-year Gain-Loss%
Implied from March 2012 SPX options
Simulated from in 2013-2022 Hyperinflationary Model (1 scenario of 10k)
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X The more people fear the LEFT TAIL the more you should buy the RIGHT…
16
Maybe it is correct to buy tail risk insurance ... but is everyone just hedging the wrong tail?
Volatility in the Mirror:
Right tails dominate left tails
Volatility driven by increases in stock prices
SPX calls at premium to puts
Volatility term structure would invert with higher asset prices
Note: Artemis created a model to simulate the behavior of the S&P 500 index and volatility during an inflationary shock. The model is not intended to be a prediction of the future but is merely a rudimentary stochastic-based method to understand what modern markets may look like in rampant inflation. The simulation runs 10,000 price scenarios for the S&P 500 index over 10 years modeling daily stock price behavior using a generalized Wiener process (Wiener.. not Weimar) and a drift rate that assumes linkages between annual CPI and equity performance. We assume inflation rises sharply from current levels of 2.87% in 2012 to 26% by 2015 and stays elevated at that level until 2017 (20% a year overall). The average volatility shifts are based upon assumptions regarding equity return to variance parameters observed in prior inflationary episodes (1970s US & 1920s Germany). The simulation shows annualized SPX returns for the decade at +9.94% but adjusted for inflation this drops to -9.8%.
No precedent for how modern derivatives market would perform in the hell of destructive inflation
…but it is a valuable exercise to theorize! … Volatility markets turn backwards… literally
Double Convexity
Far-OTM long-dated equity call options cheap form of inflation protection
Double convexity as prices influenced by rising volatility and interest rates
Volatility and rates are self-reinforcing in inflation crisis
0%
5%
10%
20.0%30.0%40.0%
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
15%20%
25%30%
35%40%
45%
50%
5yr UST Yield
Val
ue
of C
all O
pti
on
5yr implied vol
Double Convexity in Inflation Boom SPX 10yr OTM Call - 10K Strike
5 yrs to expiry/ SPX @ 3,000 (16% annual gain)
Future?
PARADOX IS FUNDAMETNAL
17
Bull Market in Fear is Defined by
VIX index Fire Danger is High – greater potential for Vol-of-VIX VIX Derivatives
1. Unbalanced Shadow Delta 2. Unbalanced Shadow Gamma 3. Shadow Theta
VIX Structured Product Inconsistent hedging ratios Vol-of-VIX derivatives driven by structured product flow rather than VIX
The new volatility regime is a reflection of investor neurosis generated by forced participation in risk assets by the financial oppression of global central banks
Effects of Volatility Paradox
I. VIX index
Fire danger (VOV) is higher despite low spot-Vol Higher potential for Volatility-of-Volatility (kindling) Skew Realization
II. VIX Futures & Options
Inconsistent hedging ratios
Loss of hedging effectiveness Roll-Yield Deception
III. VIX Structured Products & ETNs
To many players shorting the front of the curve
Shadow Risk in “dynamic” VIX structured products
Roll Yield Short Squeeze?
Inconsistent Deltas Shadow Gamma Shadow Theta
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Co
rre
lati
on
(0-1
)
HIGHER CORRELATIONS lead to...S&P 500 Sector Correlation (60 day)
2000 to 20120
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Co
rre
lati
on
(0-1
)
HIGHER CORRELATIONS lead to...S&P 500 Sector Correlation (60 day)
2000 to 2012
45
65
85
105
125
145
165
185
205
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
Vo
lati
lity
(%)
More VIOLENT VOLATILITY SPIKESVolatility of VIX index (60 day)
2000 to 2012
(0.80)(0.60)(0.40)(0.20)
-0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00
Au
g-0
3
Feb
-04
Au
g-0
4
Feb
-05
Au
g-0
5
Feb
-06
Au
g-0
6
Feb
-07
Au
g-0
7
Feb
-08
Au
g-0
8
Feb
-09
Au
g-0
9
Feb
-10
Au
g-1
0
Feb
-11
Au
g-1
1
Feb
-12
Au
g-1
2
Hedge Fund Strategies 12m Correlation to ATM Short Straddle on SPX
(HFRX Absolute Return, Equity Nuetral, Hedge Index, Merger Arb, RV Arb, Convertible Arb / Monthly)
18
Hyper-Correlation Drift
“Bull Market in Fear” has registered the highest cross-asset correlation readings between stocks, sectors, countries, and different asset classes in history
Massive headache for diversification
Fire Risk can be high when the forest is calm Higher correlations are kindling for violent VIX fires (spike)
Volatility-of-VIX has reached new highs every year since 2008 in concurrence with higher correlation drift
Implied volatility of an index is more sensitive when average correlations are higher
Hence volatility-of-volatility as a second derivative is sensitive to changes in both correlations and average volatility of index components (see left chart)
Higher correlations (e.g. >0.75) imply higher Vol-of-VIX (100+ vs. 90 historic average)
Relationship between Correlation and Volatility
Volatility of an index is more sensitive when average correlations are higher (higher volatility of volatility)
Hence Volatility-of-VIX has reached new highs every year since 2008 in concurrence with correlation drift
Volatility of Volatility WILDFIRE - Correlations
We are all volatility traders now!
In correlated markets asset selection is negated and alpha becomes increasingly driven by rising and falling volatility
Many hedge fund strategies converge to simple synthetic short (or long) volatility trades
Modern volatility markets can put a price on “unknown unknowns” via the volatility-of-volatility
Episodes of elevated implied vol-of-vol are associated with lower equity returns
SPX periods of high realized volatility-of-VIX underperform low by 13% annually
Individual stocks with high implied vol-of-vol underperform low VOV stocks by 10% annually(1)
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
Volatility of Volatility WILDFIRE - Correlations
Today the difference between high implied and falling realized correlations makes hedging single stock names cheaper than buying index vol Volatility-of-volatility microstructure is calmer than at any point
over the past six years of data (below)
The VIX index registered the lowest intra-day movement in history on January 11th (1.14%)
S&P 500 index had biggest yearly reduction in daily moves in eight decades (since FDR 1934 USD devalue)
Source: Barlcays GlobalVol
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
Volatility-of-VIX microstructure is calmer in 2012 however the last 30 minutes of the trading day have become increasingly more violent than previous periods
19
S&P 500 Implied Correlation (12m)
S&P 500 Realized Correlation (12m)
BSM Put-Call Parity Relationship is consistent when VIX options are priced using VIX futures as the underlying
When the VIX futures curve is in contango deep in-the-money VIX puts will trade at a discount to intrinsic value when evaluated against spot VIX
Likewise deep in-the-money calls will trade at a discount during backwardization
Most commercial options programs do not make this adjustment, erroneously pricing implied vol from the spot VI
5. M
OD
EL FR
EE VO
LATILITY E
XP
OSU
RE
VIX options widely misunderstood VIX options are priced off VIX Futures, NOT the VIX Index
20
Violation of BSM put-call parity when vol calculated on spot VIX index
BSM Put-Call parity holds when vol is calculated based on the VIX futures (accurate method)
Expiration
Type Strike Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11
Put 16 60% 43% 35% 26% 23%
Put 17 65% 43% 35% 24% 22%
Put 18 72% 45% 36% 22% 20%
Call 18 103% 119% 127% 130% 65%
Call 19 103% 115% 123% 126% 67%
Call 20 110% 116% 118% 124% 66%
Vix Index 17.88 17.88 17.88 17.88 17.88
Expiration
Type Strike Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11
Put 16 69% 63% 58% 51% 44%
Put 17 75% 66% 62% 53% 47%
Put 18 84% 73% 67% 56% 58%
Call 18 87% 72% 66% 51% 65%
Call 19 90% 73% 68% 56% 67%
Call 20 98% 79% 69% 61% 66%
VIX Future 18.40 20.00 21.05 22.40 22.30
Understanding VIX Options
Understanding VIX options
21
Dimensions of VIX optionality
VOV Term Structure (z-axis) & VIX Skew (x-axis)
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
Mar-13
Ap
r-13
May-1
3
Jun
-13
Jul-13
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
140%
160%
-1.0σ
0.5σ
2.0σ
3.5σ
5.0σ
Maturity
Vo
l of
Vo
l
Moneyness (Sigma)
VIX Volatility Surface
65
75
85
95
105
115
125
135
8 18 28 38 48 58 68 78
Vo
lati
lity
of
the
VIX
(1
m O
pti
on
s)
VIX index
New Regimes of FearVIX index vs. Vol of VIX / SKew of the VIX (Smoothed)
Bull Market (Jan 2006 to Jul 2007)
Credit Crisis Onset (Aug 2007 to Aug 2008)
Market Crash (Sep 2008 to Feb 2009)
Recovery to Flash Crash (Mar 2009 to May 2010)
Post-Flash Crash Steepening (May 10 to Sep 11)
LTRO Steepening Regime (Nov 11 to Mar 12)
QEIII Regime (Sep 12 to Feb 13)
SPATIAL PARADOX – Volatility of Volatility Skew
22
Vol of VIX skew has built in a higher probability of volatility spikes to account for this “wildfire” effect
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
45
55
65
75
85
95
0.08 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.50
Vo
lati
lity
of
VIX
Fu
ture
s (%
)
Expiration / Terms
New Regimes of FearVolatility of VIX Futures Term Structure / 2006 to 2013
Bull Market Jan 2007 to July 2007)Credit Crisis Onset (Aug 2007 to Aug 2008)Market Crash (Sep 2008 to Feb 2009)Recovery to Flash Crash (Mar 2009 to May 2010)Post-Flash Crash Steepening (May 2010 to Oct 2011)LTRO Steepening (Nov 2011 to Aug 2012)QEIII (Sep2012-Feb2013)
Temporal PARADOX – Volatility of Volatility Term Structure
23
Steepening VIX VOL Term Structure
Volatility of VIX Term Structure has steepened in the “bull market for fear” implying greater futures delta sensitivity to spot-VIX movement
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
Jan-07
Mar-0
7
May-0
7
Jul-07
Sep-0
7
No
v-07
Jan-08
Mar-0
8
May-0
8
Jul-08
Sep-0
8
No
v-08
Jan-09
Mar-0
9
May-0
9
Jul-09
Sep-0
9
No
v-09
Jan-10
Mar-1
0
May-1
0
Jul-10
Sep
-10
No
v-10
Jan-11
Mar-1
1
May-1
1
Jul-11
Sep
-11
No
v-11
Jan-12
Mar-1
2
May-1
2
Jul-12
Sep
-12
No
v-12
Jan-13
Vo
l of
VIX
(%)
Volatility of Volatility Drift
TEMPORAL PARADOX – VOV is falling from highs
24
Nonetheless VVIX has continued to drift lower tempered by the bull market in equities and QEIII – volatility can’t fight the Fed VIX Future Log-Contract Prediction Success/Failure %
Volatility Regime
Within
Prediction
Bound
Greater than
Upper Bound
Less than
Lower Bound
Total
(2006 to Mar 2012)72% 10% 19%
Bull Market
(2006 to July 2007)89% 6% 5%
Credit Crisis Onset (Aug 2007
to Aug 2008)72% 14% 14%
Market Crash
(Sep 2008 to Feb 2009)66% 23% 10%
Recovery to Flash Crash
(Mar 2009 to May 2010)71% 8% 21%
Post-Flash Crash Steepening
(May 2010 to Oct 2011)70% 10% 20%
LTRO Steepening
(Nov 2011 to Mar 2012)41% 0% 59%
8
18
28
38
48
58
68
78
Au
g-06
No
v-06
Feb
-07
May
-07
Au
g-07
No
v-07
Feb
-08
May
-08
Au
g-08
No
v-08
Feb
-09
May
-09
Au
g-09
No
v-09
Feb
-10
May
-10
Au
g-10
No
v-10
Feb
-11
May
-11
Au
g-11
No
v-11
Feb
-12
Futu
re V
IX in
de
x vs
. VO
V R
ange
VIX 1-month Range Implied by VIX Log Contract vs Actual Future VIX2006 to March 2012
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
Au
g-0
6
Oct
-06
Dec
-06
Feb
-07
Apr
-07
Jun-
07
Au
g-0
7
Oct
-07
Dec
-07
Feb
-08
Apr
-08
Jun-
08
Au
g-0
8
Oct
-08
Dec
-08
Feb
-09
Apr
-09
Jun-
09
Au
g-0
9
Oct
-09
Dec
-09
Feb-
10
Apr
-10
Jun-
10
Au
g-1
0
Oct
-10
Dec
-10
Feb-
11
Apr
-11
Jun-
11
Au
g-1
1
Oct
-11
Dec
-11
Feb-
12
VO
V R
ange
as
% o
f Sp
ot V
IX
High-Low Range of 1m VIX Implied by VIX Log Contract/ Spot VIX2006 to March 2012
45
95
145
195
245
295
Jan
-00
Ap
r-00
Jul-0
0
Oct-0
0
Jan
-01
Ap
r-01
Jul-0
1
Oct-0
1
Jan
-02
Ap
r-02
Jul-0
2
Oct-0
2
Jan
-03
Ap
r-03
Jul-0
3
Oct-0
3
Jan
-04
Ap
r-04
Jul-0
4
Oct-0
4
Jan
-05
Ap
r-05
Jul-0
5
Oct-0
5
Jan
-06
Ap
r-06
Jul-0
6
Oct-0
6
Jan
-07
Ap
r-07
Jul-0
7
Oct-0
7
Jan
-08
Ap
r-08
Jul-0
8
Oct-0
8
Jan
-09
Ap
r-09
Jul-0
9
Oct-0
9
Jan
-10
Ap
r-10
Jul-1
0
Oct-1
0
Jan
-11
Ap
r-11
Jul-1
1
Oct-1
1
Jan
-12
Ap
r-12
Jul-1
2
Vo
l of
Vo
l (%
)
Volatility of Volatility Drift
Realized Vol-of-SPX Realized Vol
Realized Volatility of VIX
Implied Vol-of-VIX (VVIX)
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
65
75
85
95
105
115
125
135
8 18 28 38 48 58 68 78
Vo
lati
lity
of
the
VIX
(1
m O
pti
on
s)
VIX index
New Regimes of FearVIX index vs. Vol of VIX / SKew of the VIX (Smoothed)
Bull Market (Jan 2006 to Jul 2007)
Credit Crisis Onset (Aug 2007 to Aug 2008)
Market Crash (Sep 2008 to Feb 2009)
Recovery to Flash Crash (Mar 2009 to May 2010)
Post-Flash Crash Steepening (May 10 to Sep 11)
LTRO Steepening Regime (Nov 11 to Mar 12)
QEIII Regime (Sep 12 to Feb 13)
VIX Exchange Traded Products vs. Traditional Volatility Strategies
25
VIX ETPs gain in popularity despite muddled performance in comparison to classic volatility strategies
VIX options are priced from VIX futures (not the VIX) hence their volatility increases exponentially as a function of time to expiration and SPX forward skew
Systematic VIX ETN strategies that rely on constant hedging relationships will not track back-tests during changing SPX forward skew regimes due to “shadow” delta drift
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X 0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.9
2.1
De
c-10
Jan
-11
Feb
-11
Ma
r-11
Ap
r-11
Ma
y-11
Jun
-11
Jul-1
1
Au
g-1
1
Sep
-11
Oct-1
1
No
v-11
De
c-11
Jan
-12
Feb
-12
Ma
r-12
Ap
r-12
Ma
y-12
Jun
-12
Jul-1
2
Gro
wth
of
$1
VIX ETPs vs. Traditional SPX Volatility Trades
Dec 2010 to July 2012
Traditional Volatility Trading Volatility ETNs
ATM Long
Straddle
ATM Short
Straddle10% OTM Put VXX VXZ XIV XVIX
Vol Bias Long Vol Short Vol Long Vol Long Vol Long Vol Short Vol Short Vol
Annualized Return -28.62% 31.31% -15.36% -52.35% -26.98% 12.13% -3.61%
Sortino Ratio -1.77x 0.79x -0.61x -1.94x -1.53x 0.18x -0.45x
Sharpe Ratio -1.20x 0.85x -0.45x -1.05x -0.87x 0.16x -0.30x
Return to Drawdown -0.57x 1.10x -0.36x -0.65x -0.58x 0.15x -0.20x
Max Drawdown -50.16% -28.39% -42.87% -80.38% -46.50% -79.53% -18.06%
Note: Prior to 1990 there was not VIX index. We have substituted the CBOE VXO index, the precursor to the VIX, which was available starting in 1986.
26
When the ‘shoeshine boy’ is shorting VIX ETNs maybe it is time to be cautious Front-month VIX futures are increasingly influenced by short squeezes due to rising popularity
of short selling strategies
Shorting the front of the Vol Curve Central Banks are fighting a World War € for the right to unseat the
Japanese Yen as next carry trade king
QE lowers currency volatility (see EUR,GBP,JPY) and increases the correlation between currency strength and risk asset volatility (see USD vs. VIX)
May 2012 VIX spike to 25
Ratio of 1m VIX Future Volatility vs. VIX Volatility (2007 to 2012)
Late 2011 VIX rebound to 30
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
20
12
(VIX
Fut)
20
12
(Vix)
20
11
(Vix)
20
10
(Vix)
20
09
(Vix)
20
08
(Vix)
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
9:31
AM
9:47
AM
10:0
3 A
M
10
:19
AM
10
:35
AM
10:5
1 A
M
11:0
7 A
M
11
:23
AM
11
:39
AM
11:5
5 A
M
12
:11
PM
12:2
7 PM
12:4
3 PM
12:5
9 PM
1:1
5 P
M
1:3
1 P
M
1:4
7 P
M
2:0
3 P
M
2:1
9 P
M
2:3
5 P
M
2:51
PM
3:07
PM
3:2
3 P
M
3:3
9 P
M
3:5
5 P
M
4:1
1 P
M
Vo
lati
lity
of
VIX
by
Min
ute
(%
an
nu
aliz
ed
)
Volatility of VIX Index vs 1m Vix Future (2012) by Trading Minute
Averages by Year (annualized)
2012 (VIX Fut) 2012 (Vix) 2011 (Vix) 2010 (Vix) 2009 (Vix) 2008 (Vix)
Shorting the front of the Vol Curve
Volatility-of-VIX futures in the last 15 minutes is substantially higher than that of the VIX index itself demonstrating the power of structural flows Volatility-of-volatility microstructure is calmer than at any point
over the past six years of data (below)
The VIX index registered the lowest intra-day movement in history on January 11th (1.14%)
S&P 500 index had biggest yearly reduction in daily moves in eight decades (since FDR 1934 USD devalue)
Source: Calculations executed by Artemis Capital Management LLC with data from CQG data factory. Average executed trades by minute.
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
Volatility-of-VIX microstructure is calmer in 2012 however the last 30 minutes of the trading day have become increasingly more violent than previous periods
27
VORTEX WISHING WELL Great Vega Short could work if these conditions are always met 1. Asset prices do not crash too far again and; 2. Other debtor-developed nations do not copy the strategy; 3. Taxpayer funded margin or government borrowing is unlimited
Volatility of an Impossible Object
28
Short Roll Yield Vol-of-Vol Timing
Leverage
If these conditions are not met before self-sustaining growth is revived the asymmetrical return distribution of the strategy will result in ruin Traders call this a Martingale process, similar to constantly doubling down your bet while gambling… It works only if your bankroll is unlimited …. so the real question is whether the debtor-developed world has unlimited borrowing capability? Despite higher asset prices little evidence experimental monetary policy is helping the middle and lower class who do not own stocks and do not have access to credit
Flash Crash
(Black Monday 1987, Flash Crash)
Mega-Cycle Crash
(2008 Crash, Great Depression)
Slowly building crash with slow recovery
End of leveraging cycle
High volatility, but relatively muted VOV
Great Depression
Global Recession
Flash Crash
Hyper-speed crash with fast recovery
Market Fragmentation & Self-Reflexity
Extreme Volatility of Volatility
Predictable (in retrospect) Unpredictable (even In retrospect)
Hyper-speed crash with fast recovery
Market fragmentation and self-reflexity
High volatility of volatility
Evolution of a Volatility Flash Crash (aka Killer Rabbit)
Artificially Low Vol from Monetary Expansion +
Higher potential for Volatility-of-Volatility +
Dangerous Global Macro catalysts +
VIX Derivatives Short Squeeze =
? ?
Short Vol Squeeze Hyper Vol-of-Vol
Self-Reflexivity
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
VIX Month 1 Month 2 Month 3 Month 4 Month 5 Month 6
VIX Futures Curve following Largest VIX % Spikes (VIX < 20 to start)
2004-2013
February 27, 2007 / 50% Vix Log Move
February 25, 2013 / 29% Vix Log Move
March 30, 2006 / 27% Vix Log Move
March 13, 2007 / 26% Vix Log Move13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
9:3
1 A
M
9:4
9 A
M
10
:07
AM
10
:25
AM
10
:43
AM
11
:01
AM
11
:19
AM
11
:37
AM
11
:55
AM
12
:13
PM
12
:31
PM
12
:49
PM
1:0
7 P
M
1:2
5 P
M
1:4
3 P
M
2:0
1 P
M
2:1
9 P
M
2:3
7 P
M
2:5
5 P
M
3:1
3 P
M
3:3
1 P
M
3:4
9 P
M
4:0
7 P
M
Minute by Minute Performance of VIX and Front Month Future
VIX Jumps 29% (log) on February 25th, 2013
VIX Index
March VIX Future
Shorting the front of the Vol Curve
February 25th 2013 - Volatility Killer Rabbit Volatility-of-volatility microstructure is calmer than at any point
over the past six years of data (below)
The VIX index registered the lowest intra-day movement in history on January 11th (1.14%)
S&P 500 index had biggest yearly reduction in daily moves in eight decades (since FDR 1934 USD devalue)
Source: Calculations executed by Artemis Capital Management LLC with data from CQG data factory. Average executed trades by minute.
VO
LATILITY P
AR
AD
IGM
AN
D PA
RA
DO
X
Volatility-of-VIX microstructure is calmer in 2012 however the last 30 minutes of the trading day have become increasingly more violent than previous periods
29
10% of future volume in last
minute of trading!
The Next Volatility Regime
30
Bull Market in Fear is Defined by
VIX index Fire Danger is High – greater potential for Vol-of-VIX VIX Derivatives
1. Unbalanced Shadow Delta 2. Unbalanced Shadow Gamma 3. Shadow Theta
VIX Structured Product Inconsistent hedging ratios Vol-of-VIX derivatives driven by structured product flow rather than VIX
The new volatility regime is a reflection of investor neurosis generated by forced participation in risk assets by the financial oppression of global central banks
Three Possible Macro-VIX regimes for the next decade
I. Bull Market in Fear = New Normal
Post-2008 vol environment of steep term-structure is here to stay
Traders short the front and buy the back but with violent corrections High Implied Correlations, Volatility of Volatility, but low spot-vol
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II. Bear Market in Fear = Japanization of US Volatility
Positive real rates lead to volatility as fixed income alternative Long-term volatility and skew collapse as investors short rich vol Rise of volatility short sellers builds systemic risk
III. Inflationary Volatility Spiral (Japan moving to this regime)
Runaway inflation actually drives higher volatility
Options skew “flips” to compensate (OTM Calls ↑ Vol) OTM calls re-priced as we all have been hedging the wrong tail
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Nominal Expected Return on Stocks
Optimal Portfolio with Positive Real Rates(Stocks, Bonds, Cash & Vol) / Portfolio Target = 3% real return
Inflation = 3%
Long Volatility (-3% nominal return, -6% real return)Cash (3.5% nominal return, 0.5% real return)Stocks (SPX, 3-15% nominal return, 0-9% real return)Bonds (10yr UST / 6% nominal return, 3% real return)
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Optimal Portfolio in Financial Repression(Stocks, Bonds, Cash & Vol) / Portfolio Target = 3% real return
Inflation = 3%
Long Volatility (-3% nominal return, -6% real)Cash (0% nominal return, -3% real)Stocks (SPX, 3-10% nominal return, 0-7% real)Bonds (10yr UST / 2% nominal return, -1% real)
Bull Market in Fear and Modern Portfolio Theory
Bull Market in Fear is Explained by Markowitz Portfolio Theory
Long volatility exposure extremely valuable to portfolio optimization in financial repression despite substantial negative carry because it hedges forced over-allocation to equity
5-12% is optimal volatility portfolio exposure in negative real interest rate environment!
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Volatility-of-VIX microstructure is calmer in 2012 however the last 30 minutes of the trading day have become increasingly more violent than previous periods
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Post-Modern Volatility can be more than just FEAR
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Volatility is the ultimate post-modern asset for our existential economic future because it protects you from the fracture of the abstraction
Forward Variance
Volatility of Volatility
Volatility
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Visualizing Volatility
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Volatility at World’s End: Two Decades of Movement in Markets is a depiction of real stock market variance using trading data from 1990 to 2011. The visuals are designed from S&P 500 index option data replicating the implied volatility wave (or variance swap curve) extending to an expiration of one year. The front of the volatility wave contains the same data used to calculate the CBOE VIX index. The movement of this wave demonstrates changing trader expectations of future stock market volatility. As the wave moves through time the expected (or implied) volatility surface transforms into a realized volatility surface derived from historical S&P 500 index movement. The transition represents what professional traders call ‘volatility arbitrage’. The color variation in the volatility waves show the volatility-of-volatility or internal movement of the wave. The track underneath the volatility wave represents underlying S&P 500 index prices.
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Christopher Cole, CFA – General Partner and Founder Contact Information Reference Material & Acknowledgements
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Artemis Research:
Volatility of an Impossible Object: Risk, Fear, and Safety in Games of Perception
Volatility at World’s End: Deflation, Hyperinflation and the Alchemy of Risk, March 30, 2012
Fighting Greek Fire with Fire: Volatility Correlation, and Truth, September 30, 2011
Is Volatility Broken? Normalcy Bias and Abnormal Variance, March 30, 2011
The Great Vega Short- volatility, tail risk, and sleeping elephants, January 4, 2011
Unified Risk Theory - Correlation, Vol, M3 and Pineapples, September 30, 2010
Artwork:
"Volatility of an Impossible Object" by Brendan Wiuff / Concept by Christopher Cole 2012 / copyright owned by Artemis Capital Management LLC
“Jack-o-Lantern” Istock photo / used based on purchase of rights
“Ocean Waves” Istock photo / used based on purchase of rights
"Odysseus facing the choice between Scylla and Chrybdis" by Henry Fuseli 1794 / public domain
"Penrose Triangle, Devil’s Turning Fork & Necker’s Cube” Derrick Coetzee / Public Domain
Reference Material:
Kritzman, M. and Y. Li. “Skulls, Financial Turbulence, and Risk Management.” The Financial Analysts Journal, May/June 2010
“Simulacra and Simulation” by Jean Baudrillard / University of Michigan / 1994
"A Tale of Two Indices" by Peter Carr & Liuren Wu December 22, 2005
“VIX Derivatives: A Poor Practitioner’s Model” Maneesh Deshpande / May 19 2011
“Understanding VIX Futures and Options” Dennis Dzekounoff; Futures Magazine/ August 2010
“The Volatility Surface: A Practitioner’s Guide.” Jim Gatheral / John Wiley and Sons, Hoboken, NJ, 2006
"Think Fast and Slow" by Daniel Kahneman / Farrar, Staus and Giroux 2012
“Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives” John C. Hull, Fifth Edition; Prentice Hall 2003
"Lifetime Odds of Death for Selected Causes, United States, 2007" / National Safety Council 2011 Edition
“Volatility Trading” Evan Sinclair, Wiley Trading 2008
"Dying of Money: Lessons of the Great German and American Inflations" by Jens O. Parsson / Wellspring Press 1974
"Economics of Inflation; A Study of Currency Depreciation in Post-War Germany" by Constantino Bresciani-Turroni Out of Print / 1968
“Variance Swaps” Peter Allen, Stephen Einchcomb, Nicolas Granger; JP Morgan Securities / November 2006
"Laughter in the Dark - The Problem of the Volatility Smile" by Emanuel Derman May 26, 2003
“Robust Hedging of Volatility Derivatives” Roger Lee & Peter Carr; Columbia Financial Engineering Seminar / September 2004
“More than you Ever Wanted to Know About Volatility Swaps” Kresimir Demeterfi, Emanual Derman, Michael Kamal & Joseph Zou; Goldman Sachs / March 1999
“The Performance of VIX Option Pricing Models: Empirical Evidence Beyond Simulation” Zhiguang Wang; Florida International University / April 2009
“Recent Developments in VIX Exchange Traded Products” Maneesh Deshpande/ April 3, 2012
"Deflation: making sure 'it' doesn't happen here" by Ben S. Bernanke (speech) / US Federal Reserve November 2002
"US Options Strategy TVIX Explosion Drives Vol-of-Vol Higher" Deutsche Bank February 23, 2012
"Unknown Unknowns: Vol-of-Vol and the Cross Section of Stock Returns" Guido Baltussen, Sjoerd Van Bekkum and Bart Van Der Grient / Erasmus School of Economics & Robeco Quantitative Strategies/ July 30, 2012
Definition of "Impossible Object" / Wikipedia / http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_object
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Christopher Cole, CFA – General Partner and Founder
Artemis Vega Fund L.P. Artemis Capital Management, L.L.C.
520 Broadway, Suite 350 Santa Monica, CA 90401
[email protected] www.artemiscm.com
Christopher Cole, CFA
Managing Partner & Portfolio Manager (310) 496-4526 phone
(310) 496-4527 fax [email protected]
Contact Information Artemis Capital Management – Contact Information
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Christopher Cole, CFA
Managing Partner & Portfolio Manager / Artemis Capital Management LLC
Christopher R. Cole, CFA is the founder of Artemis Capital Management LLC and the portfolio manager of the Artemis Vega Fund LP. Mr. Cole’s core focus is systematic, quantitative, and behavioral based trading of exchange-traded volatility futures and options. His decision to form a fund came after achieving significant proprietary returns during the 2008 financial crash trading volatility futures. His research letters and volatility commentaries have been widely quoted including by publications such as the Financial Times, Bloomberg, International Financing Review, CFA Magazine, and Forbes. He previously worked in capital markets and investment banking at Merrill Lynch. During his career in investment banking and pension consulting he structured over $10 billion in derivatives and debt transactions for many high profile issuers. Mr. Cole holds the Chartered Financial Analyst designation, is an associate member of the NFA, and graduated Magna Cum Laude from the University of Southern California.
Key Information/ Biography
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