ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis

VAMIK D. VOLKAN

AbstractThis paper examines the psychology of ethnic, national, religious or political ideological groups composed of thousands ormillions of people. In such large groups most of the individuals will never meet during their lifetimes. But, they share apersistent sense of sameness, large-group identity. This paper examines how this abstract concept, large-group identity,can become the central force that influences international relationships. Psychoanalysts who are willing to become involvedin interdisciplinary initiatives can provide information to the diplomats about large-group psychology in its own right andsuggest peaceful strategies for international conflicts.

Key words: Large-group identity, transgenerational transmission, chosen trauma, entitlement ideology, the need to have

enemies and allies

The title of my presentation in the printed program,

Psychoanalysis and International Relations, is a

vast topic, and I will only be able to address one

limited aspect of it. In the next thirty minutes, I will

discuss a psychoanalytic look at large-group identity

and how issues related to it play a role in interna-

tional relations.

International relations primarily refer to interac-

tions between political leaders such as presidents,

ministers of foreign affairs or diplomats belonging to

different nation states as they negotiate and decide

upon, draft, and sign agreements between each other

involving diplomatic, legal, economic or even sports

matters. The negotiating parties will be perceived as

allies or enemies according to existing formal

agreements. Their relationships will also conform,

if controversies do not develop, to international

rules and regulations accepted by organisations

such as the United Nations or the European Union.

In todays changing world, however, the term

international relations includes much more.

Yesterday I was on a panel concerning the concept

globalisation. As we discussed, this concept al-

ready expands what people in the street think about

what international relations means. Furthermore,

when there are wars or war-like situations or

alliances between ethnic, religious or political ideo-

logical groups within one nation state or in different

nation states which are not accepted as legitimate

entities, often legal international bodies are involved

in their unofficial or even diplomatic negotiations. In

todays world, there are globalised terrorist groups.

Their activities, at least in the public mind, are

categorised as international relations. We can also

consider the so-called nongovernmental organisa-

tions and giant business corporations as players in

international relations.

However one defines the concept of international

relations and whatever one includes under this term,

it always involves interactions between national,

ethnic, religious or political ideological large groups

composed of tens or hundreds of thousands or

millions of persons. My focus today is on the

psychology of such large groups. They inevitably are

recognised by a name, such as German, Arab,

Catholic or Communist, and share sentiments, belief

systems, and often language and representations of

history; in short, all have a large-group identity.

Dissenters in a large group are only important in

changing the shared psychological processes within

their large groups if they successfully start a major

movement that attracts a substantial number of

followers or are recognised and supported by foreign

large groups.

Starting with Freud, psychoanalysts have written

about various aspects of international relations. To-

day I will emphasise that psychoanalytic conceptua-

lisations of large groups, as I define them in this

Correspondence: Vamik D. Volkan, Senior Erik Erikson Scholar, The Austen Riggs Center, 25 Main Street, Stockbridge, MA, USA. E-mail: vdv@virginia.edu

International Forum of Psychoanalysis. 2009; 18: 206213

(Received 10 November 2008; accepted 13 December 2008)

ISSN 0803-706X print/ISSN 1651-2324 online # 2009 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/08037060902727795

presentation, need to be expanded. For an indivi-

dual, a large group may stand for an idealised

Oedipal father or as a nurturing mother (Kernberg,

2003a,b; Rice, 1965; Turquet, 1975). Besides study-

ing what large groups unconsciously symbolise for

individuals, psychoanalysis needs to examine the

psychology of large groups in its own right. By doing

this we can better understand the existing shared

processes within each large group that consciously,

but more importantly unconsciously, influence and

direct its leaders negotiations and agreements. In

short, we need to look at what it is that motivates the

leaders of opposing large groups, above and beyond

their individualised psychologies, in their interna-

tional relations that leads to either peaceful or

destructive massive movements.

My second career and observations on large-

group identity

I was born on the island of Cyprus. By the time

ethnic conflicts became hot and deadly there in the

early 1960s, I was already in the USA studying to

become a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst. Never-

theless, it is most likely, because of my background,

that after I became a psychoanalyst I slowly deve-

loped a second career. I became involved in

international relations and tried to understand how

enemies relate to each other from a psychoanalytic

point of view. During the last 29 years, I have been

involved in bringing together influential enemy

representatives for unofficial diplomatic dialogues.

During this time, I was present when representatives

of Arabs and Israelis, Americans and Soviets, Rus-

sians and Estonians, Serbians and Croats, Georgians

and South Ossetians, Turks and Greeks, and Turks

and Armenians came together in years-long dialogue

series to understand each other and hopefully find

entry points for strategies and actions for peaceful

co-existence (Volkan, 1988, 1997, 1999a, 2004,

2006). I also visited many refugee camps and met

many world leaders such as Mikhail Gorbachev,

Jimmy Carter, and Yasser Arafat. At the present

time, Lord John Alderdice, the former head of the

Northern Ireland Parliament who is also a psychia-

trist and psychoanalyst, and I have just begun a new

project. We are bringing representatives of the

Western world, such as those from the USA and

Europe, together with representatives from the

Islamic countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Jordan,

and the Arab Emirates, as well as representatives

from Israel, Russia, and India to try to understand

the post-September 11, 2001 world, in particular the

IslamicWestern world split.In this, as in other projects I have facilitated,

I noticed that because of the tasks given to them

during the dialogue series, the enemy representa-

tives, as spokespersons for their large-group identi-

ties, became preoccupied with large-group identity

issues. At locations where refugees or internally

displaced persons are located, these victims also

constantly refer to their large-group identities.

Whenever I happen to be with a political leader at

the time of an international conflict, I notice that he

or she also becomes preoccupied with large-group

identity issues. By listening to dialogues involving

these people enemy representatives, dislocatedpersons, and leaders I have learned much aboutlarge-group psychology.

In peaceful times, people usually turn their atten-

tion toward themselves, their families, relatives,

clans, neighbors, professional and social organisa-

tions, schools, sports clubs, and local or national

politics. But when a large group is humiliated or

threatened by others who belong to another large-

group identity, the attacked population abandons its

routine preoccupations and become obsessed with

repairing, protecting, and maintaining their large-

group identity. It is like an individual who is not

constantly aware of his breathing, but if he finds

himself in a smoke-filled room or develops pneumo-

nia, he notices every breath he takes. Similarly, when

a large group is under stress and the large-group

identity is injured or threatened, the people who

belong to it become keenly aware of their we-ness

and quickly and definitively separate their large-

group identity from the identity of the other, the

enemy large group.

Influences and consequences of traumas that are

caused by others belonging to another large-group

identity do not remain regional (Volkan, 2000). If a

foreign large group deliberately shames, humiliates,

and destroys the lives of a number of individuals in

the name of their large-group identity in, lets say, the

northern part of a country, others belonging to the

same large-group identity in the south will also feel

their pain and rage. Large-group identity connects

people in emotional ways wherever they live. When a

large groups identity is humiliated or threatened,

people belonging to that identity psychologically find

it easy to humiliate, victimise, and kill individuals

belonging to the enemy group in the name of identity

without blinking an eye. They use aggression in order

to repair, protect, and maintain their large-group

identity. If people who belong to the victimised group

feel helpless, they will in this case tolerate forced or

voluntary masochism, again, in order to hold on to

their large-group identity. This abstract concept, the

large-group identity, becomes the central force

that influences international relations.

When I think of diplomacy, I remember W.

Nathaniel Howell, the US ambassador in Kuwait

Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis 207

when Saddam Husseins forces invaded that country,

a tall man who played basketball in his youth. He

compares good diplomatic negotiation to playing

basketball. The opposing teams rush from one side

of the basketball court to the other using rules and

regulations and try to score points. In the end, one

team wins, but the other team also scores and

achieves some degree of self-esteem for being a

good competitor. According to Ambassador Howell

(personal communication, 2000), being involved in

a well-managed and fair diplomatic activity is as

pleasurable as watching a well-played basketball

game.

If an international conflict becomes hot or

chronic, a large groups psychological identity issues

contaminate all the real-world problems such as the

economy or legal rights, as well as the diplomatic

efforts for resolving them. Expanding Ambassador

Howells metaphor, let us imagine that someone

spills a large amount of oil on the basketball court.

Now the game becomes chaotic. The first thing

required is to wipe off the oil spill and clean the floor.

In an international relationship, the oil spill that

makes a routine play impossible primarily centers

around large-group identity, its protection and

maintenance. When large-group identity issues be-

come inflamed and problematic, conducting inter-

national relations only through typical diplomatic

efforts becomes very difficult and sometimes im-

possible. I do not have a name for my second

career; perhaps it can be compared to cleaning

up oil spills on basketball courts. Obviously, mine

is a difficult career, reminiscent of Freuds

characterisation of psychoanalysis as an impossible

profession.

Shapiro and Carr (2006) state that attempting to

understand large groups is a daunting task and that it

may be a defense against the experience of despair

about the world, a grandiose effort to manage the

unmanageable (p. 256). I join them, however, in

their suggestion that to make efforts, nonetheless, is

essential for large groups psychological well-being.

I believe that such efforts include the development

of a large-group psychology in its own right, so that

the meaning and influence of the abstract concept of

large-group identity can be better understood, and

so that we have a theoretical foundation to suggest

psychoanalytically informed strategies for finding

peaceful answers for international conflicts. Many

obstacles have hindered collaboration between psy-

choanalysts and authorities dealing with interna-

tional relations. Elsewhere I have tried to examine

in some detail these obstacles that come from

both the diplomatic world and psychoanalysis itself

(Volkan, 1999b, 2005), but this brief presentation

does not allow time to review them.

Large-group identity

In the psychological literature, the term large

group sometimes refers to 30150 members whomeet in order to deal with a given psychological issue

(Kernberg, 2003a,b), but I am not referring to such

gatherings. In order to understand international

relations by revising Erik Eriksons (1956) descrip-

tion of individual identity, I define large-group

identity whether it refers to nationality, ethnicity,religion or political ideology as the subjectiveexperience of thousands or millions of people who

are linked by a persistent sense of sameness, even

while also sharing some characteristics with people

who belong to foreign large groups. In such large

groups, most of the individuals will never meet

during their lifetimes. They will not even know of

the existence of many others belonging to the same

entity. Yet they will share a sense of belongingness,

usually a language, sentiments, nursery rhythms,

songs, dances, and representations of history. They

share what John Mack (1979) called cultural

amplifiers, which are concrete or abstract symbols

and signs that are only associated with a particular

large group and which are accepted as superior

and as a source of pride. The sharing of the large

groups national, ethnic or religious elements begins

in childhood. This applies also to those who are

members of a political ideological group whose

parents and the people in the childhood environment

are believers in the ideology. To become a follower of

a political ideology as an adult includes other

psychological motivations.Belonging to a large group, after going through the

adolescence passage (Blos, 1979), becomes crystal-

lised and endures throughout a lifetime. Sometimes

belongingness can be a shadow identity, as we

sometimes see in persons after voluntary or forced

migrations. Nevertheless, such belongingness never

disappears (Volkan, 1988, 1997, 1999a, 2006). Only

through some longlasting drastic historical event

may a group evolve a new large-group identity. For

example, certain Slavs became Bosniaks while under

the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

Think of a man lets say he is German who isan amateur photographer. If he decides to stop

practicing photography and take up carpentry, he

may call himself a carpenter instead of a photo-

grapher, but he cannot stop being a German and

become French. His Germanness is part of his large-

group identity, which is interconnected with his core

individual identity, his subjective experience of his

self-representation.Through early identifications with the mother and

important persons in their environment, small chil-

dren begin to learn how they are members of a

specific large group and what cultural amplifiers are

208 V. D. Volkan

theirs. Some children have parents who belong to

two different ethnic or religious groups. If an

international conflict erupts between these two large

groups, these youngsters may, even as adults, have

severe psychological problems. I saw such examples

in South Ossetia, when people had one South

Ossetian and one Georgian parent. When South

Ossetians and Georgians began a deadly conflict

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, persons with

mixed lineage became confused and psychologi-

cally disturbed.

There is another childhood process that more

clearly creates the precursors of large-group enemies

and allies in the childs mind. This process also

illustrates how people, without being aware of it,

need to have large-group enemies and allies, to one

degree or other, throughout their lifetime. Belonging

to the same large-group identity allows thousands or

millions of people to share the same large-group

enemy and ally representations, and this in turn

plays a key role in large-group identity issues

contaminating and influencing international rela-

tions. This childhood experience can be understood

with a concept that I call suitable targets of externa-

lisation (Volkan, 1988). The object relations theory

of psychoanalysis, as well as observations of children,

tells us that when children become able to tolerate

ambivalence, they integrate their previously frag-

mented or split self- and object images (Kernberg,

1976; Volkan, 1976). However, such integrations are

not totally complete. Some self- and object images

remain unintegrated, and the child finds ways to deal

with them in order to avoid facing and feeling object

relations tension. One psychological method a child

uses to deal with this problem is to externalise his or

her unintegrated self- and object images into other

persons, or animate or inanimate objects.

The people in the childs environment also help

the child to find permanent reservoirs in which to

keep the externalised unintegrated self- and object

images. Such images, in the psychoanalytic litera-

ture, are known as bad aggressively loaded and

good libidinally loaded unintegrated images. Since

externalisations into such reservoirs are approved

by the individuals important to the child, what

is externalised will not boomerang, will not be

re-internalised by the child. Such reservoirs are the

suitable targets of externalisation that become the

precursors of large-group enemy and ally representa-

tions. A child is, to use Eriksons (1966) term, a

generalist as far as nationality, ethnicity, religion or

political ideology is concerned. Once the child

utilises suitable targets of externalisation, he or she

ceases to be a generalist. Here are two examples.

In Cyprus, Greeks and Turks lived side by side for

centuries until the island was de facto divided into

two political entities in 1974. Greeks often raise pigs.

Turkish children, like Greek children, invariably are

drawn to farm animals, but imagine a Turkish child

wanting to touch and love a piglet. His mother or

other important individuals in the Turkish childs

environment would strongly discourage him from

playing with the piglet. For Moslem Turks, the pig is

dirty. It, as a cultural amplifier for the Greeks,

does not belong to their large group. Now the

Turkish child finds a suitable target of externalisation

for his unwanted, aggressively contaminated and

unintegrated bad self- and object images. Since

Moslem Turks do not eat pork, in a concrete sense

what is externalised into the image of the pig will not

be re-internalised. When the child unconsciously

finds a suitable target for unintegrated bad self-

and object images, the precursor of the other

becomes established in the childs mind at an

experimental level.

The Turkish child at this point does not know

what Greekness means. Sophisticated thoughts,

perceptions, and emotions, and images of history

about the other evolve much later without the

individuals awareness that the first symbol of the

enemy was in the service of helping him avoid feeling

object relations tension. Since almost every Turkish

child in Cyprus will use the same target, they will

share the same precursor of the other who may

become an enemy if real-world problems become

complicated.

Children also are given suitable targets as reser-

voirs for their good unintegrated self- and object

relations. For example, a Finnish child most likely

uses the sauna as such a reservoir. Only when

Finnish children grow up will they have sophisticated

thoughts and feelings about Finishness. It is inter-

esting that when there is an international conflict or

a war-like situation, members of a large group who

feel victimised regress and become involved in the

creation of an adult version of suitable targets of

externalisation. For example, when Gaza fell under

the Israeli occupation, Palestinians began to carry in

their pockets small stones painted with the Palesti-

nian flags colors. When facing humiliating external

situations, they would reach in their pockets and

touch the stones. Having stones created a network of

we-ness and supported the large-group identity of

Palestinians living in Gaza at that time and separated

their large-group identity from the Israelis large-

group identity.

Two principles and the accordion

phenomenon

Large-group psychology primarily deals with a shared

need to repair, protect, and maintain large-group

Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis 209

identity. Thousands or millions of people, without

being aware it, are assigned these tasks and respond to

international relations accordingly. In their daily lives,

members of a large group mostly unconsciously

follow two unalterable and intertwined principles

(Volkan, 1988, 1997, 1999a). They may become

aware of these principles if the other humiliates

and threatens them in the name of large-group

identity.

I call the first principle the maintenance of

nonsameness. One large group must not be the

same as, or even closely similar to, a neighboring

large group that is perceived as an enemy. Although

antagonistic large groups usually have major differ-

ences in religion, language, and historical or mytho-

logical backgrounds, minor differences between

antagonists can become major problems that lead

to deadly consequences. Much earlier, Freud

(1921) noted minor differences among small and

large groups, but did not study their deadly con-

sequences in international relations. When large

groups regress, any signal of similarity is perceived,

often unconsciously, as unacceptable; minor differ-

ences therefore become elevated to great impor-

tance to protect nonsameness.

Another unalterable principle in large-group

relationships, intertwined with the first one, reflects

the need to maintain a psychological border, gap or

tangible space between large groups in conflict.

Although the demarcation and maintenance of

physical borders has always been vital to interna-

tional and large-group relationships, closer examina-

tion indicates that it is far more critical to have an

effective psychological border than a simple physical

one. In a regressed large group, political, legal or

traditional physical borders begin to symbolise the

large-group identity that provides a huge umbrella

protecting the people belonging to it, including the

political leaders.

In individual psychology, as Freud (1921) indi-

cated, what is important is to idealise the leader and

identify with the other followers and lose individual-

ity. In large-group psychology, what is important is

to repair, protect, and maintain the large-group

identity. Physical borders become highly psycholo-

gised, and people, leaders, and official organisations

become preoccupied with their protection. At the

present time, the border issue in Israel is very

prominent and deadly, but its psychological aspects

are not taken into account. The upcoming presiden-

tial elections in the USA will reinflame the border

issue between the USA and Mexico. Once again,

discussion will make reference to real-world issues

such as illegal Mexicans stealing Americans jobs.

Its psychological meaning will not be examined. In

Europe, immigrants from the Middle East, Africa,

and Eastern European countries inflame the affected

large groups border psychology. When clear physi-

cal demarcations are perceived as ambiguous or

indistinct, psychological borders are weakened as

well, and shared anxiety can develop.

These two principles maintaining nonsamenessand psychological borders influence internationalrelationships, especially at negotiation tables. I have

observed that one of the dangerous times during

which diplomatic negotiations quickly may collapse

is when the opposing parties, usually with the help of

a third neutral party, come close to making a

major agreement. This coming close, for both

parties, unconsciously threatens the two principles

mentioned above. Anxiety about injury to large-

group identity increases and this leads to the collapse

of negotiations, paradoxically after hard work and

after coming very close to making an agreement.

Knowing about these two principles will help the

neutral third party introduce a strategy that will

inform the opposing parties in the following way:

Making an agreement and signing a document does

not mean that you will lose the border separating

your large-group identity from the identity of your

enemys large group or that you will face the

possibility of becoming the same as your enemy.

When a mutual formal agreement on a difficult issue

is reached, both sides will still keep their own

identities.

Becoming like the enemy

While it is very threatening for a large group to lose

its psychological border and contaminate its own

large-group identity with the one belonging to the

enemy, in situations where conflict between two

large groups becomes hot and deadly or chronic,

paradoxically, enemies become alike. This process

on a conscious level is denied vehemently. At the

foundation of this paradox lies the fact that large-

group enemies are both real and fantasised. They are

real if they are shooting and killing people in the

other large group. They are also fantasised because

they are reservoirs of the first large groups externa-

lised unwanted parts, a result of the process that

began in childhood when suitable targets of externa-

lisation were established, or as a result of large-group

regression in which adult members do the same

thing children would do: create suitable targets of

externalisation.

In hot and deadly or chronic international con-

flicts, suitable targets of externalisation do not

remain permanent, safe, effective, and distant re-

servoirs out there. The first large groups externa-

lisations and projections put in these reservoirs

overflow and come back to contaminate itself.

210 V. D. Volkan

Thus, psychologically speaking, both large groups,

to a certain degree, become the same. Al Qaeda

divided the world into two categories. After Septem-

ber 11, the USA did the same. You are either on my

side or else, became a political doctrine. Ideas such

as the clash of civilisations, or in this case clash of

religions, directly or indirectly was supported within

both large groups. Again, I should repeat that in

examining large-group processes the voices of dis-

senters do not count much unless they are capable of

starting new large-group processes.

On a conscious level, there is a wish on the part of

a large group to do to the enemy what the enemy did

to them. When speaking of enemies becoming alike,

I refer to shared psychological movements, not to the

actual methods used by each group involved in wars

or war-like situations. One may kill through terror-

ism and the other may kill in legal and so-called

civilised ways. Many factors, such as historical

circumstances, reactivation of past victimisations,

the existing political system, military power, tech-

nology, economy, and, most importantly, the degree

of large-group regression can make a large group

dehumanise the other and exercise terrible cruelty

in both barbaric and civilised ways.

Elsewhere (Volkan, 2004) I describe how a poli-

tical leaders personality organisation plays a crucial

role in inflaming or taming the process of one large

group becoming like the enemy group. If the leader

is able to explain to the followers where the reality of

the enemy ends and where the fantasy about the

enemy begins, this tames the process of becoming

like the enemy. If the leader does not provide good

reality testing that includes an understanding of the

enemy large groups psychic reality and does not

make some attempt to respond to it in humane

nondestructive ways, dangers become magnified and

regression is maintained. Therefore, we should find

noncontroversial and psychoanalytically informed

methods to openly examine the concept of a large

group becoming like its enemy in order to concep-

tualise and realise opportunities for different

responses, above and beyond destructive ones.

Shared mental mechanisms and processes

Large groups are made of individuals; therefore,

large-group processes reflect individual psychology.

But a large group is not a living organism that has

one brain. Therefore, once members of a large group

start utilising the same mental mechanism, it estab-

lishes a life of its own and appears as a societal, and

often a political, process. In this presentation, I have

already referred a few times to the regression of large

groups. I borrow the word regression from in-

dividual psychology since I have not yet found a

good term that describes a large groups going

back to the earlier levels of its psychic development in

defense of the shared anxiety caused by threats to

large-group identity. First of all, it is difficult to

imagine that large groups have their own psychic

developments. The closest thing to the concept of a

large group having a psychic development is the large

groups usually mythologised history and the story of

how the large group was born. In fact, when large

groups regress, they reactivate certain, sometimes

centuries-old, shared historical mental representa-

tions, which I have named chosen glories and

chosen traumas (Volkan, 1988, 1999a, 2004,

2006).

Large groups celebrate independence days or have

ritualistic recollections of events and heroes whose

mental representations include a shared feeling of

success and triumph among large-group members.

Such events and heroic persons attached to them are

heavily mythologised over time. These mental re-

presentations become large-group amplifiers called

chosen glories. Chosen glories are passed on to

succeeding generations through transgenerational

transmissions made in parent/teacherchild interac-tions and through participation in ritualistic cere-

monies recalling past successful events. Chosen

glories link the children of a large group with each

other and with their large group, and the children

experience increased self-esteem by being associated

with such glories. It is not difficult to understand

why parents and other important adults pass the

mental representation of chosen glories to their

children; this is a pleasurable activity. Past victories

in battle and great accomplishments of a religious or

political ideological nature frequently appear as

chosen glories.

In stressful situations, political leaders reactivate

the mental representation of chosen glories and

heroes associated with them to bolster their large-

group identity. A leaders reference to chosen glories

excites his followers simply by stimulating an already

existing shared large-group amplifier. During the

first Gulf War ,Saddam Hussein made many refer-

ences to Sultan Saladins victories over the Crusa-

ders even though Saladin was not an Arab, but a

Kurd.

While no complicated psychological processes are

involved when chosen glories increase collective self-

esteem, the role of a related concept, chosen traumas,

in supporting large-group identity and its cohesive-

ness is more complex. It is for this reason that a

chosen trauma is a much stronger large-group

amplifier than a chosen glory. A chosen trauma is

the shared mental representation of an event in

a large groups history in which the group suffered

a catastrophic loss, humiliation, and helplessness at

Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis 211

the hands of its enemies. When members of a victim

group are unable to mourn such losses and reverse

their humiliation and helplessness, they pass on to

their offspring the images of their injured selves and

the psychological tasks that need to be completed,

such as reversing humiliation and helplessness, and

completing the work of mourning. This process is

known as the transgenerational transmission of trauma.

(For a review and examination of the concept of

transgenerational transmission and the ways it is

accomplished, see Volkan, Ast, & Greer, 2001).

All such images and tasks contain references to the

same historical event, and as decades pass, the

mental representation of such an event links all the

individuals in the large group. Thus, the mental

representation of the event emerges as a most

significant large-group identity marker, a large-

group amplifier. Such reactivation can be used by

the political leadership to promote new massive

large-group movements, some of them deadly and

malignant. In one prime example of this, I have

(1997) documented the story of how Slobodan

Milosevic allowed and supported the reappearance

of the Serbian chosen trauma the mental repre-sentation of the June 28, 1389 Battle of Kosovo.

The reactivation of chosen traumas fuels entitlement

ideologies. Entitlement ideologies are also connected

with the large groups difficulty mourning losses,

people, land or prestige at the hands of an enemy in

the name of large-group identity. Mourning is an

obligatory human psychobiological response to a

meaningful loss. When a loved one dies, the mourner

has to go through predictable and definable phases.

The individual mourning processes can be infected

due to various causes (Volkan, 1981; Volkan & Zintl,

1993), just as infected large-group mourning for

losses caused by the actions of another large group

will appear on societal/political levels. For example, a

political ideology of irredentism a shared sense ofentitlement to recover what has been lost may slowlyemerge that reflects a complication in large-group

mourning and an attempt both to deny losses and to

recover them.

What Greeks call the Megali Idea (Great Idea)

is such a political ideology. Such political ideologies

may last for centuries and may disappear and

reappear when historical circumstances change

(Volkan & Itzkowitz, 1994), thereby influencing

international relations. Diplomatic efforts become

very difficult to handle because the reactivation of a

chosen trauma with its accompanying entitlement

ideology causes time collapse. This is reactivation of

shared anxieties, expectations, fantasies, wishes, and

defenses associated with the chosen trauma and the

entitlement ideologys magnification of the image of

the current enemies and current conflicts.

Elsewhere (Volkan, 1997) I have listed the signs

and symptoms of large-group regression. Although

today there will be no time to examine them all, I

will mention one that clearly illustrates why we

need to evolve a large-group psychology in its own

right. I call it purification. What externalisation/

projection is for an individual, purification is for an

ethnic, religious, national or political large group

(Volkan, 1997, 2004). During stressful situations or

soon after a large group emerges from a crisis such

as war, the break-up of a political system or drastic

revolutionary change, a period of restabilisation

typically ensues. During this time of reassessment

and redefinition, when a large group in a sense

collectively asks Who are we now?, then attempts

at purification occur. Like a snake shedding its skin,

a large group will cast off certain elements that they

feel are contaminated with the image of the enemy

large group or those things that seem to impede

growth and the revitalisation of large-group identity.

Large-group purification rituals involve a spec-

trum of practices ranging from benign, such as

Greeks removing the Turkish words from their

then-spoken language after the Greek War of

Independence; to dangerous, such as the newly

independent Latvians planned (although not-car-

ried out) removal of some 20 Russian corpses buried

at the entrance of their national cemetery; to tragic

and malignant, such as Serbians murdering Bosniaks

in an attempt to have a greater Serbia after the

collapse of the former Yugoslavia.

Concluding remarks

This presentation focuses on large-group identity

and on some psychological processes that are related

to repairing, protecting, and maintaining it. Such

processes are reflected in various aspects of interna-

tional relations. There are warning signs for malig-

nant and destructive large-group processes. Besides

an obvious provocation from the enemy large group,

these signs include an inability to maintain principles

concerning nonsameness and psychological borders,

reactivating chosen traumas and evolving a time

collapse, inflaming entitlement ideologies, attempt-

ing extreme purification, and having political leaders

whose personality organisations will not allow them

to separate the realities about enemies from fantasies

about them. Perhaps psychoanalysts, because they

study human nature, are best equipped to notice

these signs to which official diplomacy may not pay

attention. This recognition gives psychoanalysts ifthey are willing to do some field work outside of their

offices and work with diplomats and scholars from

different professional backgrounds such as history

and political science an opportunity to suggest

212 V. D. Volkan

strategies for peaceful solutions for some selected

international conflicts. My colleagues and I have

been trying to do this.

Acknowledgements

This paper was originally presented at The Annual

Meeting of the German Psychoanalytic Society

(DPG), May 22-25, 2008, Munich, Germany.

References

Blos, P. (1979). Adolescent passage. New York: International

Universities Press.

Erikson, E.H. (1956). The problem of ego identity. Journal of the

American Psychoanalytic Association, 1, 56121.Erikson, E.H. (1966). Ontogeny of ritualisation. In R.M.

Lowenstein, L.M. Newman, M. Schur, & A.J. Solnit

(Eds.), Psychoanalysis: A general psychology (pp. 60121).New York: International Universities Press.

Freud, S. (1921). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego.

SE 18: 65143.Kernberg, O.F. (1976). Object relations theory and clinical psycho-

analysis. New York: Jason Aronson.

Kernberg, O.F. (2003a). Sanctioned social violence: A psycho-

analytic view. Part 1. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,

84, 68398.Kernberg, O.F. (2003b). Sanctioned social violence: A psycho-

analytic view. Part 2. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,

84, 95368.Mack, J.E. (1979). Foreword. In V.D. Volkan, Cyprus: War and

adaptation (pp. ixxxi). Charlottesville, VA: University ofVirginia.

Rice, A.K. (1965). Learning for leadership: Interpersonal and

intergroup relations. London: Tavistock.

Shapiro, E., & Carr, W. (2006). Those people were some kind of

solution: Can society in any sense be understood? Organi-

zational and Social Dynamics, 6, 24157.Turquet, P. (1975). Threats to identity in the large group. In

L. Kreeger (Ed.), The Large Group: Dynamics and Therapy

(pp. 87144). London: Constable.Volkan, V.D. (1976). Primitive internalized object relations: A clinical

study of schizophrenic, borderline and narcissistic patients. New

York: International Universities Press.

Volkan, V.D. (1981). Linking objects and linking phenomena: A study

of the forms, symptoms, metapsychology and therapy of compli-

cated mourning. New York: International Universities Press.

Volkan, V.D. (1988). The need to have enemies and allies: From

clinical practice to international relationships. Northvale, NJ:

Jason Aronson.

Volkan, V.D. (1997). Bloodlines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism.

New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Volkan, V.D. (1999a). Das Versagen der Diplomatie: Zur Psycho-

analyse nationaler, ethnischer und religioser Konflikte [The

failure of diplomacy: The psychoanalysis of national, ethnic

and religious conflicts]. Giessen: Psychosozial-Verlag.

Volkan, V.D. (1999b). Psychoanalysis and diplomacy. Part III.

Potentials for and obstacles against collaboration. Journal of

Applied Psychoanalytic Studies, 1, 30518.Volkan, V.D. (2000). Traumatized societies and psychological

care: Expanding the concept of preventive medicine. Mind

and Human Interaction, 11, 17794.Volkan, V.D. (2004). Blind trust: Large groups and their leaders in

times of crises and terror. Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone

Publishing.

Volkan, V.D. (2005). Politics and international relations. In E.S.

Person, AM. Cooper, & G.O. Gabbard (Eds.), Textbook of

Psychoanalysis (pp. 52533). Washington, DC: AmericanPsychiatric Publishing.

Volkan, V.D. (2006). Killing in the name of identity: A study of bloody

conflicts. Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone Publishing.

Volkan, V.D., Ast, G., & Greer, W. (2001). The Third Reich in the

unconscious: Transgenerational transmission and its consequences.

New York: Brunner-Routledge.

Volkan, V.D., & Itzkowitz, N. (1994). Turks and Greeks: Neighbours

in conflict. Huntingdon, UK: Eothen Press.

Volkan, V.D., & Zintl, E. (1993). Life after loss: The lessons of grief.

New York: Charles Scribners Sons.

Author

Vamik D. Volkan, MD, DLFAPA, FACPsa, is

Doctor of Medical Science Honoris Causa, Univer-

sity of Kuopio, Finland (2005) and Doctor of Medical

Science Honoris Causa, University of Ankara, Turkey

(2006). He is also Professor Emeritus of psychiatry,

University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA and Senior

Erik Erikson Scholar (www.austenriggs.org/Senior-

Erikson_Scholar), Erik Erikson Institute of Educa-

tion and Research of the Austen Riggs Center,

Stockbridge, MA, USA. In addition, he is Training

and Supervising Analyst Emeritus at the Washington

Psychoanalytic Institute, Washington, DC.

Large-group identity, international relations and psychoanalysis 213