volume x, issue no. 38 april-june 2008

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSApril-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008

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SUPREME COURT

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PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWS2

PHILJAACADEMIC PROGRAMS

ORIENTATION SEMINAR-WORKSHOP

FOR NEWLY APPOINTED CLERKS OF COURT

The 10th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Clerks of Court was held on April 8 to 11,2008, at the Montebello Villa Hotel, Banilad, CebuCity. The 30 participants were as follows:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION VIAtty. Joan Marie B. Bargas-BetitaRTC Br. 14, Roxas City, IloiloAtty. Susanita F. OrleansRTC Br. 22, Iloilo City

REGION VIIAtty. Armi Sylvia F. LezamaRTC Br. 34, Dumaguete City, Negros OrientalAtty. Pamela Faye S. Pesidas-LubatonRTC Br. 15, Cebu City

REGION VIIIAtty. Hubert Y. LucbanRTC OCC, Laoang, Northern SamarAtty. Vernon H. OquiñoRTC Br. 27, Catbalogan, SamarAtty. Estefanie Ripalda PlazaRTC Br. 36, Carigara, LeyteAtty. Isagani S. EspadaRTC Br. 10, Abuyog, LeyteAtty. Aileen Falar SiayngcoRTC Br. 25, Maasin, Southern LeyteAtty. Dexter M. RicafortRTC Br. 73, Caibiran, Biliran

REGION IXAtty. Ahmad H. AripRTC Br. 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del NorteAtty. Ian O. CampiseñoRTC Br. 9, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del NorteAtty. Jeanecel G. Vercide-ClimacoRTC Br. 24, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay

REGION XAtty. Leah M. SajulgaRTC Br. 7, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur

REGION XIAtty. Emily G. MercedRTC Br. 23, General Santos City, South Cotabato

Atty. Nelia Q. Tancio-SedilloRTC OCC Digos, Davao del Sur

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION VIIIMs. Marlene T. BactolMTC Barugo, Leyte

REGION XIIMr. Norhani K. Mangelen-MagumparaMTC Shariff Agual, Maguindanao

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

REGION VIMs. Ellen M. CarnazoMTCC Br. 9, Iloilo CityMs. Ma. D’clyn A. DiceMTCC Br. 6, Iloilo CityMs. Eva G. GenialMTCC Br. 5, Iloilo CityMs. Divinegrace J. Agrazada-GuillenMTCC Br. 10, Iloilo CityMr. Jofel M. LadietMTCC Br. 2, Iloilo CityMs. Julie D. LiraMTCC Br. 3, Iloilo CityMs. Ma. Fe E. NievesMTCC Br. 8, Iloilo CityMr. Freddie S. PamulagMTCC Br. 4, Iloilo CityMr. Susan C. TarrazonaMTCC Br. 7, Iloilo City

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION VIIIMs. Laurencia Lesil M. ReyesMCTC Sta. Rita-Talalora, SamarMs. Elisea E. SabagkitMCTC Caibiran-Culaba, Biliran

SHARI’A COURT

REGION XIIMr. Amer P. MacalawiSCC, Pikit-Aleosan, North Cotabato

The 11th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Clerks of Court was held on June 17 to 20,2008, at the PHILJA Development Center, TagaytayCity. The 46 participants were as follows:

COURT OF TAX APPEALS

Atty. Margarette Y. GuzmanCourt of Tax Appeals

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSApril-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008April-June 2008 3

(Continued on NEXT page)

Atty. Jesus P. Inocando, Jr.Court of Tax Appeals


NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Atty. Felomina F. ApostolRTC Br. 107, Quezon CityAtty. Corazon Arafol-EleriaRTC Br. 254, Las Piñas CityAtty. Noreen T. BasilioRTC Br. 129, Caloocan CityAtty. Jane T. JavierRTC Br. 2, ManilaAtty. Maria Corazon B. MillaresRTC Br. 195, Parañaque CityAtty. Butch M. Ordanza-AbutalRTC Br. 95, Quezon CityAtty. Marlon N. RamosRTC Br. 41, Manila

REGION IAtty. Alta Grace N. BrionesRTC Br. 69, Lingayen, PangasinanAtty. Helengrace G. CabasalRTC OCC, Narvacan, Ilocos SurAtty. Xandrine B. LasamRTC OCC San Fernando City, La UnionAtty. Ludy A. PalarcaRTC Br. 28, San Fernando City, La UnionAtty. Avelina J. Villegas-RosarioRTC Br. 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan

REGION IIAtty. Genevieve D. AndeRTC Br. 36, Santiago City, IsabelaAtty. Gina Lyn R. RubioRTC Br. 30, Bambang, Nueva VizcayaAtty. Edna P. DupoRTC OCC, Appari, Cagayan

REGION IIIAtty. Mary Grace P. Carrasco-MustardRTC Br. 38, San Jose City, Nueva EcijaAtty. Fernando C. CunananRTC Br. 79, Malolos, BulacanAtty. Percyveranda A. Dela CruzRTC Br. 22, Malolos, BulacanAtty. Richard R. LausRTC Br. 63, Tarlac City, TarlacAtty. Maria Fe B. VelascoRTC OCC, Gapan, Nueva Ecija

REGION IVAtty. Elmer H. AleaRTC Br. 2, Batangas City

Atty. Ludybeth B. BatoyRTC Br. 49, Puerto Princesa City, PalawanAtty. Lovette Joi O. BelzaRTC Br. 34, Biñan, LagunaAtty. Jaarmy G. Bolus-RomeroRTC Br. 93, San Pedro, LagunaAtty. Seter M. Dela CruzRTC Br. 22, Imus, CaviteAtty. Jyl C. LaurosRTC OCC, Puerto Princesa City, PalawanAtty. Liza Manaog-Dela CruzRTC Br. 31, San Pedro, LagunaAtty. Roberto B. RiveraRTC Br. 32, San Pablo City, Laguna

REGION VAtty. Jonel C. Martinez-UrsuaRTC Br. 22 Naga City, Camarines del SurAtty. Dominador A. SalangaRTC Br. 49, Cataingan, Masbate

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS


Mr. Rodrigo V. Bulatao, Jr.MeTC Br. 14, ManilaMs. Dyna J. RoldanMeTC Br. 25, ManilaMr. Agnes M. VargasMeTC Br. 19, Manila


REGION IMr. Efren L. CamatMTC Naguilian, La Union

REGION IIIMs. Rosalie I. CruzMTC Norzagaray, Bulacan

REGION IVMs. Loida S. MesaMTC Morong, RizalMs. Lira R. SiazarMTC Claveria

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

REGION IMr. Alexander M. LlamasMTCC Br. 2, Dagupan City, Pangasinan

REGION IVMr. Percival C. BanagaMTCC Br. 1, Lipa City, Batangas


52ND ORIENTATION SEMINAR-WORKSHOP

FOR NEWLY APPOINTED JUDGES

The 52nd Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Judges was held on April 29 to May 8, 2008,at the PHILJA Development Center, Tagaytay City.In attendance were 20 judges, comprising 16 newlyappointed judges and four promoted judges.

A. NEW APPOINTMENTS



Hon. Carlos M. FloresRTC Br. 73, MalabonHon. Antonietta Pablo-MedinaRTC Br. 276, Muntinlupa City

REGION IHon. Mona Lisa T. TaboraRTC Br. 7, Baguio City

REGION IIIHon. Angelito I. BalderamaRTC Br. 1, Balanga, Bataan

REGION IVHon. Arnelo C. MesaRTC Br. 65, Infanta, Quezon

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS


Hon. Jean Marie A. Bacorro-VillenaMeTC Br. 6, Manila

Ms. Marian B. LatayanMTCC Br. 2, Lipa City, Batangas

REGION VMs. Annabella B. HermosaMTCC Masbate City, Masbate


REGION IIMr. Esteban D. DacsigMCTC Maddela-Nagtipunan, QuirinoMr. Gerard N. LindawanMCTC Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya

REGION IIIMs. Fe R. ArcegaMCTC Moncada-San Manuel-Anao, Tarlac

Hon. Marina B. Gaerlan-MejoradaMeTC Br. 70, Pasig CityHon. Alfonso C. Ruiz IIMeTC, Br. 4, Manila

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES

REGION IIIHon. Rose Mary E. BautistaMTCC Br. 3, Olongapo City


REGION IHon. Mauro R. Muñoz, Jr.MTC Infanta, PangasinanHon. Amalia G. RicablancaMTC Mangatarem, PangasinanHon. Plotinus T. SanchezMTC Umingan, Pangasinan

REGION IVHon. Emily R. Aliño-GeluzMTC Imus, CaviteHon. Francisco V.L. Collado, Jr.MTC Los Baños, Laguna


REGION IHon. Edna Lou C. Ibe-Pulmano1st MCTC, Burgos-Magini-Dasol, PangasinanHon. Arleen T. Rodelas-OrpillaMCTC Natividad-San Quintin, Pangasinan

2. PROMOTIONS



Hon. Germano Francisco D. LegaspiRTC Br. 31, ManilaHon. Cristina Javalera-SulitRTC Br. 140, Makati City

REGION IVHon. Manuel Gonzales SalumbidesRTC Br. 63, Caluag, Quezon

REGION XIHon. George E. OmeloRTC Br. 14, Davao City


SPECIAL FOCUS

PROGRAMS

RJCEP (LEVEL 5)

The Regional Judicial Career Enhancement Program(Level 5) for Regional Trial Court and First-Level TrialCourt Judges was conducted for Region III on April22 to 24, 2008, at the Century Park Hotel, Malate,Manila and for Region IX on May 27 to 29, 2008,at the Top Plaza Hotel, Dipolog City, with 140 and57 participants in attendance, respectively.

The topics discussed in the Level 5 of the RJCEPwere as follows: Management of the Courts and ofCourt Personnel; Media Management andRelations with Media; Bench and Bar Relations;Special Civil Actions and Provisional Remedies;State Accountability for Human Rights Promotionand Protection (Human Security Act, Rule on theWrit of Amparo and Rule on Habeas Data);Emerging Trends and Issues in Jurisprudence inthe Field of Civil Law; Criminal Law; RemedialLaw; and Modes of Discovery.

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION ON

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING FOR JUDGES

In collaboration with Anti-Money LaunderingCouncil (AMLC) and American Bar Association–Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI), PHILJAconducted the Roundtable Discussion on Anti-MoneyLaundering for Judges on April 3, 2008, at the TrainingRoom, Supreme Court, Manila. Twenty-twojudges participated in the discussion of the salientfeatures of the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001and were presented with recent relevantjurisprudence. Other topics discussed were: CivilForfeiture; Asset Preservation Order and FreezeOrder; Enforcement of Foreign Judgments andForeign Arbitral Awards; and Extradition andMutual Legal Assistance.

MULTI-SECTORAL AND SKILLS BUILDING

SEMINAR WORKSHOP ON HUMAN RIGHTS

ISSUES: EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS

AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES

PHILJA, in partnership with the Commissionon Human Rights (CHR) and United States Agencyfor International Development (USAID), AmericanBar Association-Rule of Law Initiative (ABA-ROLI),conducted the program Multi-Sectoral and SkillsBuilding Seminar-Workshop on Human Rights Issues:ExtraLegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances in fivebatches for the second, fourth, and fifth JudicialRegions.

Second Judicial RegionVenue: Hotel Elizabeth, Baguio City106 participants - April 3 to 4

Fourth Judicial RegionVenue: Traders Hotel, Pasay City57 participants - April 17 to 1860 participants - May 8 to 9

Fifth Judicial RegionVenue: Avenue Plaza Hotel, Naga City56 participants - May 22 to 2358 participants - June 19 to 20

Among the speakers were (from left to right): ProfessorSedfrey M. Candelaria, Associate Justice Adolfo S.Azcuna, Chancellor Ameurfina A. Melencio Herrera,Undersecretary Ricardo R. Blancaflor, and Police ChiefSuperintendent Leopoldo N. Bataoil.


CEDAW AND GENDER SENSITIVITY

The Seminar-Workshop on CEDAW, GenderSensitivity, and the Courts for Judges and Court Personnelof Davao del Sur was held on April 9 to 10, 2008, atthe Marco Polo Hotel, Davao City, with 43participants comprising judges, clerks of court, legalresearchers, and representatives of the Commissionon Human Rights.

On the other hand, the Seminar-Workshop onCEDAW and Gender Sensitivity for SandiganbayanEmployees, was conducted on June 19, 2008, at theMulti-Purpose Hall, Centennial Building,Sandiganbayan, Quezon City. A total of 46participants attended the program.

CAPACITY-BUILDING ON PUBLIC AND

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES

FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

In partnership with the Ateneo Law SchoolCenter for International Economic Law and incooperation with the British Embassy, the Academyconducted the 4th Seminar-Workshop on CapacityBuilding on Public and Private International Law Issuesfor the Philippine Judiciary: Focus on InternationalCommercial Arbitration for Cebu Court of Appeals Justicesand Commercial Court Judges of the Visayas andMindanao Judicial Regions on April 21 to 22, 2008, atthe Montebello Villa Hotel, Banilad, Cebu City.

SPECIAL FOCUS

PROGRAMS

COMPETENCY ENHANCEMENT TRAINING

FOR FAMILY COURT JUDGES AND PERSONNEL

IN HANDLING CHILD ABUSE CASES

This quarter, PHILJA and the Child ProtectionUnit Network (CPU-Net), in cooperation with theUnited Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF),conducted the Competency Enhancement Training forFamily Court Judges and Personnel in Handling ChildAbuse Cases for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanaojudicial regions .

Visayas Judicial RegionVenue: MetroCentre Hotel and ConventionCenter, Tagbilaran City, BoholNumber of participants: 28Date of Conduct: April 23 to 25

Luzon Judicial RegionVenue: Hotel Dominique, Tagaytay CityNumber of participants: 51Date of Conduct: May 28 to 30

Mindanao Judicial RegionVenue: Pryze Plaza Hotel, Cagayan De Oro CityNumber of participants: 43Date of Conduct: June 11 to 13

CODI SEMINAR-WORKSHOP

The Seminar-Workshop for the Members of theCommittee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) wasconducted for two batches this quarter.

In attendance on April 24 to 25, 2008, at theAsia Stars Hotel, Tacloban City, were 56 CODImembers of Tacloban, Samar, and Leyte,comprising executive judges, clerks of court, andrepresentatives of the different court employeeassociations.

On the other hand, there were 60 CODImembers of the NCJR, Bulacan, Rizal, includingofficials and lawyers of OCA who attended on May15 to 16, 2008, at the Bayview Park Hotel, Manila.

The program aimed to enhance the knowledgeof CODI members in writing reports andconducting investigations on sexual harassmentcases, while providing them with a solidbackgrounder on the multi-faceted nature of sexualharassment and the laws that address the same.

Prof. Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Dean Eduardo D. DelosAngeles, and Atty. Rena M. Rico with the participants ofthe 4th Seminar-Workshop on Capacity- Building on Publicand Private International Law Issues for the PhilippineJudiciary: Focus on International Commercial Arbitration


SEMINAR-WORKSHOP ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE

AND CODE OF CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL

The Academy, in partnership with theEuropean Commission (EC), Department of SocialWelfare and Development (DSWD), Department ofJustice (DOJ), Department of the Interior and LocalGovernment (DILG), and the Alternative LawGroups (ALG), conducted four batches of theSeminar-Workshop on Access to Justice and Code ofConduct for Court Personnel in the second quarter ofthe year.

Venue: Sarabia Manor Hotel, Iloilo CityBatch 1 - 175 participants - June 4Batch 2 - 209 participants - June 5

Venue: Hotel Veniz, Baguio CityBatch 3 - 145 participants - June 18Batch 4 - 139 participants - June 19

ECFM FOR LAPU-LAPU CITY JUDGES

AND COURT PERSONNEL

PHILJA, in partnership with the SupremeCourt Program Management Office, conducted theChange Management and Leadership Workshop on theEnhanced Caseflow Management (eCFM) System forLapu-Lapu City and Judges and Court Personnel on April28 to 29, 2008, at the Crown Regency Suites, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu. This workshop prepared the 129participants to be productive users of the eCFMsystem. Lectures on the principles of caseflowmanagement were complemented withteambuilding activities. On May 2, 2008, anorientation and hands-on training in the newly-constructed Lapu-lapu Hall of Justice wasconducted for a smaller group of key users tofamiliarize them with the features of the eCFMmanual and computerized system.

CAPACITY-BUILDING ON

ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND PROCEDURES

FOR LAWYERS OF THE DENR

The Seminar-Workshop on Capacity-Building onEnvironmental Laws and Procedures for Lawyers of theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) was conducted on May 19 to 23, 2008, atthe Sulo Hotel, Quezon City. A total of 61 DENRlawyers from all over the country attended the saidactivity.

The lectures focused on the different areas oflaw pertaining to the environment. There werediscussions on the Constitutional provisions onNatural Resources; Special Laws particularly onMining, Land and Forest; Procedural Laws suchas Modes of Discovery, Application of Search

Participants of the 6th Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshopon Agrarian Justice for the Province of Negros Occidental.

Warrants andHandling ofW i t n e s s e s ;P r o v i s i o n a lRemedies onE n v i r o n m e n t a lCases includingA p p e a l s ;International LawConventions andInstruments; andE n v i r o n m e n t a lLegal Ethics.

MULTI-SECTORAL SEMINAR-WORKSHOP

ON AGRARIAN JUSTICE

In partnership with the Agrarian JusticeFoundation, Inc. (AJFI), Department of AgrarianReform (DAR), Department of Justice (DOJ), andTask Force Mapalad (TFM), the Academy conductedthe 6th Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshop on AgrarianJustice for the Province of Negros Occidental on June3 to 5, 2008, at the Sugarland Hotel, BacolodCity. A total of 60 participants attended the saidseminar-workshop comprising judges,prosecutors, PAO lawyers, and representativesfrom DAR, PNP, CHR, non-governmentorganizations and people’s organizations.


THIRD DISTINGUISHED LECTURE OF 2008

PHILJA, in cooperation with the Far EasternUniversity, conducted the Third Distinguished Lectureof 2008 on “The Metes and Bounds of the PhilippineTerritory” on June 27, 2008, at the Far EasternUniversity, Manila. The Honoree and the GuestSpeaker was Honorable Lauro L. Baja, Jr., formerPhilippine Permanent Representative to the UnitedNations. Retired Supreme Court Senior JusticeFlorentino P. Feliciano, Former Minister of Justiceand Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, andSecretary General of the Department of ForeignAffairs’ Commission on Maritime and Ocean AffairsAtty. Henry S. Bensurto, Jr., served as Panel ofReactors. A total of 469 participants attended thelecture.

The lecture highlighted two issues, namely:1) the importance of drawing the baselines, and2) whether or not the drawing of baselines toinclude the Kalayaan Group of Islands violates theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas(UNCLOS).

SPECIAL FOCUS

PROGRAMS

ON MEDIATION

COURT-ANNEXED MEDIATION AND

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE ON JDR

In partnership with the JURIS Project, CIDA,and NJI, PHILJA through the PMC, conductedthe Court-Annexed Mediation and Judicial SettlementConference on Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) (SkillsBased Course) on April 2 to 4, 2008, at the BaguioCountry Club, Quezon City. A total of 57participants attended the conference.

The three-day activity empowered theparticipating judges in developing new skills inconnection with their functions under Rule 18 ofthe Rules of Court, and more specifically in JDR,as conciliators, neutral evaluators, and mediators.There was also a general discussion of issuesrelating to ethics, gender, and social context whichmay arise in JDR.

JDR MEETING FOR CAGAYAN DE ORO

AND MISAMIS ORIENTAL JUDGES

AND COURT PERSONNEL

The Philippine Judicial Academy through thePhilippine Mediation Center (PMC), and incoordination with the Justice Reforms InitiativesSupport (JURIS) Project, Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA), and the NationalJudicial Institute–Canada (NJI), conducted theJudicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) Meeting for Cagayande Oro and Misamis Oriental Judges and Court Personnelon April 8, 2008, at the Mulberry Suites, Cagayande Oro City. A total of 143 participants attendedthe meeting.

The meeting aimed to provide the participantswith information regarding Judicial DisputeResolution particularly the Amended Rules of JDRand JDR Statistics. After the activity, theparticipants were able to document their JDRexperience through appropriate statistics andperiodic reporting to PHILJA.

ADVANCED COURSE FOR MEDIATORS

This quarter, the program Advance Course forMediators was conducted in five batches, as follows:

Manila Mediation ProgramVenue: College of Saint Benilde Hotel, ManilaBatch 1 - 41 participants - May 15Batch 2 - 36 participants - May 16

Batangas Mediation ProgramVenue: Hotel Pontefino, Batangas CityBatch 3 - 27 participants - June 5Batch 4 - 118 participants - June 6

Zamboanga Mediation ProgramVenue: Grand Astoria Hotel, Zamboanga CityBatch 5 - 18 participants - June 19

Culminating the Zamboanga MediationProgram was the Inauguration of PMC UnitZamboanga City, Oath-taking of Zamboanga Mediatorsand Program Assessment on Court-Annexed Mediationwith Judges, Clerks of Court, Branch Clerks of Court,and Selected Stakeholders for the Zamboanga MediationProgram, all held on June 20, 2009.


JACOPHIL

The Sixth Convention and Seminar of the JudiciaryAssociation of Clerks of the Philippines (JACOPHIL) washeld on April 16 to 18, 2008, at the Bacolod Pavilion,Bacolod City, with the theme, The JACOPHIL:Vanguards on Strengthening and Maintaining JudicialIntegrity. A total of 901 participants attended theconvention-seminar.

Topics discussed included Updates on IssuancesAffecting Clerks in the Judiciary; Job Satisfaction;Stress Management; and Records Management.

CLERAP

The Convention and Seminar of the Court LegalResearchers Association of the Philippines(CLERAP) wasconducted on April 23 to 25, 2008, at the PalawanConvention Center, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan,with the theme, Career and Moral Enrichment of LegalResearchers as Indispensable Partners in theAdministration of Justice. A total of 282 legalresearchers from all over the Philippines attendedthe convention and seminar.

The lectures comprised Environmental LawIssues and Jurisprudence; Rule on ChildrenCharged under R.A. No. 9165; Rule on theAdmissibility of DNA Evidence, Innovation inLegal Research with the Use of New Technology;Training Needs Analysis for ComprehensiveComputer Training; and State Accountability forHuman Rights Promotion and Protection.

COSTRAPHIL

The Fifth National Convention and Seminar of theCourt Stenographers Association of the Philippines(COSTRAPHIL) was held on May 5 to 7, 2008, atthe Quezon Convention Center, Lucena City, withthe theme, COSTRAPHIL’S PRIDE: A Useful Tool inthe Delivery of Efficient, Professional, and DedicatedService in the Judiciary. A total of 2034 participantsattended the said program.

CONVENTIONSPHILACI

The Fifth National Convention and Seminar of thePhilippine Association of Court Interpreters wasconducted on May 7 to 9, 2008, at the Bohol TropicsHotel, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, with the theme,COURT INTERPRETERS: Responding to theChallenges of the Philippine Judicial System.

A total of 451 participants attended theconvention. The seminar portion highlighted onthe lecture The Ways and Means of Proper Translationof Languages.

PACSWI

The Sixth Convention Seminar of the PhilippineAssociation of Court Social Workers, Inc. (PACSWI) washeld on May 14 to 16, 2008, at The Baluarte, Vigan,Ilocos Sur, with the theme, Family Court SocialWorkers: Movants for Change. A total of 117participants were apprised on the salient provisionsof Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known asJuvenile Justice Law; Social Implications ofAdoption, Nullity of Marriage and Guardianship;Preparation and Problems encountered in MakingCase Studies; and Stress Management.

FLECCAP

The Convention and Seminar of First Level Clerksof Court Association of the Philippines (FLECCAP) wasconducted on May 28 to 30, 2008, at the BaguioConvention Center, Baguio City, with the theme,Making Excellence in Public Service a Way of Life. Atotal of 452 participants attended the said program.

There were a number of lectures on variousareas of Remedial Law relevant to the works of firstlevel clerks of court.


JUDICIAL MOVES

Court of AppealsAssociate Justice Ruben C. Ayson

appointed on May 15, 2008

Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santosappointed on May 15, 2008

SandiganbayanAssociate Justice Napoleon E. Inoturan

appointed on April 4, 2008

Philja

Justice Marina L. BuzonExecutive Secretary

appointed on June 2, 2008

Justice Delilah V. MagtolisHead, Academic Affairs Office

appointed on June 2, 2008

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss ormistake with respect to an exhibit is greatestwhen the exhibit is small and is one that hasphysical characteristics fungible in nature andsimilar in form to substances familiar to peoplein their daily lives. Graham v. State positivelyacknowledged this danger. In that case where asubstance later analyzed as heroin—was handledby two police officers prior to examination whohowever did not testify in court on the conditionand whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it wasin their possession—was excluded from theprosecution evidence, the court pointing out thatthe white powder seized could have been indeedheroin or it could have been sugar or bakingpowder. It ruled that unless the state can showby records or testimony, the continuouswhereabouts of the exhibit at least between thetime it came into the possession of police officersuntil it was tested in the laboratory to determineits composition, testimony of the state as to thelaboratory’s findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substancesis that they are not readily identifiable as in factthey are subject to scientific analysis to determinetheir composition and nature. The Court cannotreluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or atleast the possibility, that at any of the links inthe chain of custody over the same there couldhave been tampering, alteration or substitutionof substances from other cases—by accident orotherwise—in which similar evidence was seizedor in which similar evidence was submitted forlaboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating thesame, a standard more stringent than thatapplied to cases involving objects which arereadily identifiable must be applied, a moreexacting standard that entails a chain of custodyof the item with sufficient completeness if onlyto render it improbable that the original item haseither been exchanged with another or beencontaminated or tampered with.

(Tinga, J. Junie Mallillin Y. Lopez v. People ofthe Philippines, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008.)

REMEDIAL LAW(Continued from page 12)


With legal borders diminishing between nations and regions due to advances in communicationtechnology and to emerging issues involving international law, we kept our judges abreast of suchdevelopments through capacity-building programs on Public and Private International Law with focuson International Commercial Arbitration. Extent of Jurisdiction of Forfeiture Court as Compared with InsolvencyCourt was among the issues resolved during the Roundtable Discussion for Judges on Anti-MoneyLaundering.

Three Regional Judicial Career Enhancement Programs (RJCEPs), now conducted regularly withavailable funding, enriched the judges’ knowledge on procedural and substantive law. All were ratedan average of 100 percent in Profitability.

Pursuant to Chief Justice Puno’s recommendation at a PHILJA Board of Trustees meeting, weincluded the topic on Solemnization of Marriage and Reforms in Property Registration and Related Proceedingsin the 52nd Seminar-Workshop for Newly Appointed Judges, which was also rated 100 percent inProfitability.

We incorporated lectures on the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law and Proper Work Decorum in theprograms for court personnel associations such as FLECCAP, PHILACI and COSTRAPHIL pursuantto the goals of the Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) of the Supreme Court, Court ofAppeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals, and in cooperation with the Committee on GenderResponsiveness in the Judiciary. This topic was also included in four seminar-workshops on Access toJustice and Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.

CEDAW and Gender Sensitivity programs, seminar-workshops for newly appointed Clerks of Court,Change Management and Leadership Workshop on Enhanced Caseflow Management (eCFM) Systemround up our special programs for court personnel.

The pictograph shows a total of 6,153 participants benefiting from 23 Regular Programs and 10 Special Programs heldduring the period. On the average, there were 49 participants for each of the Special Programs comprising an almost equalnumber of men and women participants. The 6 convention-seminars for the various court employees’ associations increasedthe average number of participants to 246 and also accounted for the distinctly higher percentage of female participants inthe PHILJA Regular Programs.

PHILJA continues to intensify its efforts to maintain the quality of its programs. With the sameardor, it is in constant watch for innovations and recent developments that it avails of to continue tomake a difference in the delivery of quality judicial education.

Once again, many thanks to all who steadfastly support our cause and share our vision.

Ameurfina A. Melencio Herrera Chancellor

FFFFFrom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’rom the Chance l l o r’s Desks Desks Desks Desks Desk (Continued from page 1)

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CIVIL LAWImplied Trust

Petitioner contends that the EDSA property,while registered in the name of his son AlexanderTy, is covered by an implied trust in his favor underArticle 1448 of the Civil Code. This, petitionerargues, is because he paid the price when theproperty was purchased and did so for the purposeof having the beneficial interest of the property.

Article 1448 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 1448. There is an implied trust whenproperty is sold, and the legal estate isgranted to one party but the price is paid byanother for the purpose of having thebeneficial interest of the property. The formeris the trustee, while the latter is thebeneficiary. However, if the person to whomthe title is conveyed is a child, legitimate orillegitimate, of one paying the price of thesale, no trust is implied by law, it beingdisputably presumed that there is a gift infavor of the child.

The CA conceded that at least part of thepurchase price of the EDSA property came frompetitioner. However, it ruled out the existence ofan implied trust because of the last sentence ofArticle 1448: x x x However, if the person to whomthe title is conveyed is a child, legitimate orillegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale,no trust is implied by law, it being disputablypresumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.

Petitioner now claims that in so ruling, theCA departed from jurisprudence in that such wasnot the theory of the parties.

Petitioner, however, forgets that it was he whoinvoked Article 1448 of the Civil Code to claim theexistence of an implied trust. But Article 1448 itself,in providing for the so-called purchase moneyresulting in trust, also provides the parameters ofsuch trust and adds, in the same breath, theproviso: “However, if the person to whom the titleis conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, ofthe one paying the price of the sale, NO TRUST ISIMPLIED BY LAW, it being disputably presumedthat there is a gift in favor of the child.

Stated otherwise, the outcome is the necessaryconsequence of petitioner’s theory and argumentand is inextricably linked to it by the law itself.

The CA, therefore, did not err in simplyapplying the law.

Article 1448 of the Civil Code is clear. If theperson to whom the title is conveyed is the child ofthe one paying the price of the sale, and in this casethis is undisputed, NO TRUST IS IMPLIED BYLAW. The law, instead, disputably presumes adonation in favor of the child.

(Azcuna, J. Alejandro B. Ty v. Sylvia S. Ty, in hercapacity as Administratix of the Intestate Estate ofAlexander Ty, G.R. No. 165696, April 30, 2008.)

REMEDIAL LAWChain of Custody Rule

As a method of authenticating evidence, thechain of custody rule requires that the admissionof an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient tosupport a finding that the matter in question iswhat the proponent claims it to be. It would includetestimony about every link in the chain, from themoment the item was picked up to the time it isoffered into evidence, in such a way that everyperson who touched the exhibit would describehow and from whom it was received, where it wasand what happened to it while in the witness’possession, the condition in which it was receivedand the condition in which it was delivered to thenext link in the chain. These witnesses would thendescribe the precautions taken to ensure that therehad been no change in the condition of the itemand no opportunity for someone not in the chainto have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is notalways the standard because it is almost alwaysimpossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custodybecomes indispensable and essential when the itemof real evidence is not distinctive and is not readilyidentifiable, or when its condition at the time oftesting or trial is critical, or when a witness hasfailed to observe its uniqueness. The same standardlikewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptibleto alteration, tampering, contamination and evensubstitution and exchange. In other words, theexhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility,alteration or tampering—without regard towhether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application ofthe chain of custody rule. (Continued on page 10)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAWValid Transfer of Appropriation; its requisites

Clearly, there are two essential requisites inorder that a transfer of appropriation with thecorresponding funds may legally be effected. First,there must be savings in the programmedappropriation of the transferring agency. Second,there must be an existing item, project or activitywith an appropriation in the receiving agency towhich the savings will be transferred.

Actual savings is a sine qua non to a validtransfer of funds from one government agency toanother. The word “actual” denotes thatsomething is real or substantial, or existspresently in fact as opposed to something whichis merely theoretical, possible, potential orhypothetical.

As a case in point, the Chief Justice himself

transfers funds only when there are actualsavings, e.g., from unfilled positions in theJudiciary.

The thesis that savings may and should bepresumed from the mere transfer of funds is plainlyanathema to the doctrine laid down in Demetria v.Alba as it makes the prohibition against transferof appropriations the general rule rather than thestringent exception the constitutional framersclearly intended it to be. It makes a mockery ofDemetria v. Alba as it would have the Court allowthe mere expectancy of savings to be transferred.

Contrary to another submission in this case,

the President, Chief Justice, Senate President, andthe heads of constitutional commissions need notfirst prove and declare the existence of savingsbefore transferring funds, the Court in Philconsa v.Enriquez, supra, categorically declared that theSenate President and the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, as the case may be, shall approvethe realignment (of savings). However, “[B]eforegiving their stamp of approval, these two officialswill have to see to it that: (1) The funds to berealigned or transferred are actually savings inthe items of expenditures from which the sameare to be taken; and (2) The transfer orrealignment is for the purpose of augmenting theitems of expenditure to which said transfer orrealignment is to be made.”

As it is, the fact that the permissible transferscontemplated by Section 25(5), Article VI of the1987 Constitution would occur entirely within theframework of the executive, legislative, judiciary,or the constitutional commissions, already makeswanton and unmitigated malversation of publicfunds all too easy, without the Court abetting itby ruling that transfer of funds ipso facto denotesthe existence of savings.

Precisely, the restriction on the transfer offunds, and similar constitutional limitations suchas the specification of purpose for specialappropriations bill, the restriction ondisbursement of discretionary funds, theconditions on the release of money from theTreasury, among others, “were all safeguardsdesigned to forestall abuses in the expenditure ofpublic funds.”

(Tinga, J., Andres Sanchez, Leonardo D. Regala,Rafael D. Barata, Norma Agbayani, and Cesar N.Sarino v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 127545,April 23, 2008.)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAWGrave Misconduct; Elements of

In grave misconduct, the elements ofcorruption, clear intent to violate the law, orflagrant disregard of established rule must bemanifest. The act of petitioner of fondling one ofhis students is against a law, R.A. No. 7877, andis doubtless inexcusable. The particular act ofpetitioner cannot in any way be construed as acase of simple misconduct. Sexually molesting achild is, by any norm, a revolting act that it cannotbut be categorized as a grave offense. Parentsentrust the care and molding of their children toteachers, and expect them to be their guardianswhile in school. Petitioner has violated that trust.The charge of grave misconduct proven againstpetitioner demonstrates his unfitness to remain asa teacher and continue to discharge the functionsof his office.

(Velasco, Jr., J. Dioscoro F. Bacsin v. Eduardo O.Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008.)

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CRIMINAL LAWElement to prove violation of B.P. Blg. 22,Bouncing Checks Law

Unless the following elements are shown tohave been proven by the prosecution, an accusedwill not be convicted for violation of B.P. Blg. 22:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues anycheck to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of theissuance that he or she does not havesufficient funds in, or credit with, thedrawee bank for the payment of thecheck in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored bythe drawee bank for insufficiency of fundsor credit, or it would have beendishonored for the same reason had notthe drawer, without any valid reason,ordered the bank to stop payment.(Emphasis supplied)

While issuing of a bouncing check is malumprohibitum, the prosecution is not excused from itsresponsibility of proving beyond reasonable doubtall the elements of the offense.

Respecting the second element of the crime, theprosecution must prove that the accused knew, atthe time of issuance, that he does not have sufficientfunds or credit for the full payment of the checkupon its presentment.

The element of “knowledge” involves a stateof mind that obviously would be difficult toestablish, hence, the statute creates a prima faciepresumption of knowledge on the insufficiency offunds or credit coincidental with the attendance ofthe two other elements.

CIVIL LAWWhat constitutes psychological incapacity

Although petitioner was able to establish hisimmaturity, as evidenced by the psychologicalreport and as testified to by him and Dr. Dayan,the same hardly constituted sufficient cause fordeclaring the marriage null and void on the groundof psychological incapacity. It had to becharacterized by gravity, juridical antecedence andincurability.

In Republic v. CA and Molina, the Supreme Courtruled that the psychological incapacity must bemore than just a “difficulty,” a “refusal” or a“neglect” in the performance of some maritalobligations. A mere showing of irreconcilabledifferences and conflicting personalities does notequate to psychological incapacity. Proof of a natalor supervening disabling factor, an adverse integralelement in petitioner’s personality structure thateffectively incapacitated him from complying withhis essential marital obligations, had to be shown.In this, petitioner failed.

The evidence adduced by petitioner merelyshowed that he and respondent had difficultygetting along with each other as they constantlyfought over petty things. However, there was noshowing of the gravity and incurability of thepsychological disorder supposedly inherent inpetitioner, except for the mere statement orconclusion to that effect in the psychological report.The report, and even the testimonies given bypetitioner and his expert witness at the trial,dismally failed to prove that petitioner’s allegeddisorder was grave enough and incurable to bringabout his disability to assume the essentialobligations of marriage.

Petitioner also made much of the fact that heand respondent never lived together as husbandand wife. This, however, fails to move usconsidering that there may be instances when, foreconomic and practical reasons, a married couplemight have to live separately though the maritalbond between them remains. In fact, both partieswere college students when they got married andwere obviously without the financial means to liveon their own. Thus, their not having lived togetherunder one roof did not necessarily give rise to theconclusion that one of them was psychologicallyincapacitated to comply with the essential maritalobligations. It is worth noting that petitioner

himself admitted that he and respondent continuedthe relationship after the marriage ceremony. It wasonly when they started fighting constantly a yearlater that he decided to file a petition to have themarriage annulled. It appears that petitioner justchose to give up on the marriage too soon and tooeasily.

(Corona, J. Lester Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M.Santos-Halili and the Republic of the Philippines,G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008)


Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.– Themaking, drawing and issuance of a checkpayment of which is refused by the draweebecause of insufficient funds in or creditwith such bank, when presented within 90days from the date of the check, shall beprima facie evidence of knowledge of suchinsufficiency of funds or credit unless suchmaker or drawer pays the holder thereofthe amount due thereon, or makesarrangements for payment in full by thedrawee of such check within five (5)banking days after receiving notice thatsuch check has not been paid by thedrawee. (Emphasis supplied)

In order to create such presumption, it mustbe shown that the drawer or maker received anotice of dishonor and, within five banking daysthereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the checkor arrange for its payment. The above-quotedprovision creates a presumption juris tantum thatthe second element prima facie exists when the firstand third elements of the offense are present.

The presumption is not conclusive, however,as it may be rebutted by full payment. If the makeror drawer pays, or makes arrangement with thedrawee bank for the payment of the amount duewithin the five-day period from notice of thedishonor, he or she may no longer be indicted forsuch violation. It is a complete defense that wouldlie regardless of the strength of the evidencepresented by the prosecution. In essence, the lawaffords the drawer or maker the opportunity toavert prosecution by performing some acts thatwould operate to preempt the criminal action,which opportunity serves to mitigate the harshnessof the law in its application.

It is a general rule that only a full payment atthe time of its presentment or during the five-day grace period could exonerate one from criminalliability under B.P. Blg. 22 and that subsequentpayments can only affect the civil, but not thecriminal, liability.

(Carpio Morales, J., Marciano Tan v. PhilippineCommercial International Bank, G.R. No. 152666,April 23, 2008.)

REMEDIAL LAWDifferences between certiorari and appeal

The CA was, therefore, correct when itdismissed outright the petition for certiorari. ThisCourt has invariably upheld dismissals of certioraripetitions erroneously filed, appeal being the correctremedy. It is a very basic rule in our jurisprudencethat certiorari cannot be availed of when the partyhas adequate remedy such as an appeal.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rule of CivilProcedure explicitly states when a petition forcertiorari may be availed of, to wit:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. – When anytribunal, board or officer exercising judicialor quasi-judicial functions has actedwithout or in excess of jurisdiction, or withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction, and there is noappeal, or any plain, speedy and adequateremedy in the ordinary course of law, aperson aggrieved thereby may file a verifiedpetition in the proper court, alleging the factswith certainty and praying that judgmentbe rendered annulling or modifying theproceedings of such tribunal, board orofficer, and granting such incidental reliefsas law and justice may require. (Emphasissupplied)

The Court has exhaustively enumerated andpainstakingly discussed the differences betweenthese two remedies in Madrigal Transport, Inc. v.Lapanday Holdings Corporation, viz.:

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari,there are substantial distinctions which shallbe explained below.

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedydesigned for the correction of errors ofjurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In PureFoods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained thesimple reason for the rule in this light:

“When a court exercises its jurisdiction, anerror committed while so engaged does notdeprive it of the jurisdiction being exercisedwhen the error is committed. If it did, everyerror committed by a court would deprive itof its jurisdiction and every erroneous

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As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appealsshould be filed within 15 days from the noticeof judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, theappellant must file a notice of appeal and arecord on appeal within 30 days from the saidnotice of judgment or final order. A petitionfor review should be filed and served within15 days from the notice of denial of thedecision, or of the petitioner’s timely filedmotion for new trial or motion forreconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, thepetition should be filed also within 15 daysfrom the notice of judgment or final order, orof the denial of the petitioner’s motion for newtrial or motion for reconsideration.

On the other hand, a petition for certiorarishould be filed not later than 60 days fromthe notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration was timely filed, the periodshall be counted from the denial of themotion.

As to the Need for a Motion forReconsideration. A motion forreconsideration is generally required prior tothe filing of a petition for certiorari, in order toafford the tribunal an opportunity to correctthe alleged errors. Note also that this motionis a plain and adequate remedy expresslyavailable under the law. Such motion is notrequired before appealing a judgment or finalorder.

With these distinctions, it is plainly discerniblewhy a party is precluded from filing a petition forcertiorari when appeal is available, or why the tworemedies of appeal and certiorari are mutuallyexclusive and not alternative or successive. Whereappeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even ifthe ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion.

(Reyes, R.T., J. Tible & Tible Company, Inc., Heirsof Emilio G. Tible, Jr., namely: Almabella Menla Vda.De Tible, Emilio M. Tible IV, Ma. Myleen Tible, VictorM. Tible, Eric M. Tible, Allan M. Tible, Norman M.Tible and Johann Emil M. Tible v. Royal Savingsand Loan Association (now assigned to ComsavingsBank) and Godofredo E. Quiling, Deputy ProvincialSheriff of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 155806, April8, 2008.)

judgment would be a void judgment. Thiscannot be allowed. The administration ofjustice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment thatthe court may commit in the exercise ofits jurisdiction is not correctable throughthe original civil action of certiorari.”

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court overthe issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot beexercised for the purpose of reviewing theintrinsic correctness of a judgment of thelower court-on the basis either of the lawor the facts of the case, or of the wisdom orlegal soundness of the decision. Even if thefindings of the court are incorrect, as longas it has jurisdiction over the case, suchcorrection is normally beyond the provinceof certiorari. Where the error is not one ofjurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact– a mistake of judgment-appeal is theremedy.

As to the Manner of Filing. Over anappeal, the CA exercises its appellatejurisdiction and power of review. Over acertiorari, the higher court uses its originaljurisdiction in accordance with its powerof control and supervision over theproceedings of lower courts. An appeal isthus a continuation of the original suit,while a petition for certiorari is an originaland independent action that was not partof the trial that had resulted in therendition of the judgment or ordercomplained of. The parties to an appeal arethe original parties to the action. Incontrast, the parties to a petition for certiorariare the aggrieved party (who therebybecomes the petitioner) against the lowercourt or quasi-judicial agency, and theprevailing parties (the public and the privaterespondents, respectively).

As to the Subject Matter. Only judgmentsor final orders and those that the Rules ofCourt so declare are appealable. Since theissue is jurisdiction, an original action forcertiorari may be directed against aninterlocutory order of the lower court priorto an appeal from the judgment; or wherethere is no appeal or any plain, speedy oradequate remedy.

REMEDIAL LAW (Continued)



Conditions for the validity of MemorandumDecision

However, also in Permskul, this Court laid downthe conditions for the validity of memorandumdecisions, to wit:

The memorandum decision, to be valid,cannot incorporate the findings of fact andthe conclusions of law of the lower courtonly by remote reference, which is to saythat the challenged decision is not easilyand immediately available to the personreading the memorandum decision. Forthe incorporation by reference to be allowed,it must provide for direct access to the factsand the law being adopted, which must becontained in a statement attached to the saiddecision. In other words, the memorandumdecision authorized under Section 40 of B.P.Blg. 129 should actually embody thefindings of fact and conclusions of law ofthe lower court in an annex attached to andmade an indispensable part of the decision.

It is expected that this requirement willallay the suspicion that no study was madeof the decision of the lower court and thatits decision was merely affirmed without aproper examination of the facts and the lawon which it is based. The proximity at leastof the annexed statement should suggestthat such an examination has beenundertaken. It is, of course, alsounderstood that the decision being adoptedshould, to begin with, comply with ArticleVIII, Section 14 as no amount ofincorporation or adoption will rectify itsviolation.

The Court finds necessary to emphasizethat the memorandum decision should besparingly used lest it become an addictiveexcuse for judicial sloth. It is an additionalcondition for the validity that this kind ofdecision may be resorted to only in caseswhere the facts are in the main accepted byboth parties and easily determinable by thejudge and there are no doctrinalcomplications involved that will require anextended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employedin simple litigations only, such as ordinary

collection cases, where the appeal isobviously groundless and deserves no morethan the time needed to dismiss it. x x x

Henceforth, all memorandum decisionsshall comply with the requirements hereinset forth both as to the form prescribed andthe occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strictenforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 ofthe Constitution and strike down theflawed judgment as a lawless disobedience.

(Chico-Nazario, J. Solid Homes, Inc. v. EvelinaLaserna and Gloria Cajipe, represented by ProcesoF. Cruz, G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008)

Right to Counsel

The CA failed to consider the fact that thepetition before it was filed by petitioner, a detainedprisoner, without the benefit of counsel. A litigantwho is not a lawyer is not expected to know therules of procedure. In fact, even the mostexperienced lawyers get tangled in the web ofprocedure. We have held in a civil case that todemand as much from ordinary citizens whose onlycompelle intrare is their sense of right would turnthe legal system into an intimidating monstrositywhere an individual may be stripped of his propertyrights not because he has no right to the propertybut because he does not know how to establishsuch right. This finds application specially if theliberty of a person is at stake. As we held in Telanv. Court of Appeals:

The right to counsel in civil cases exists justas forcefully as in criminal cases, specially sowhen as a consequence, life, liberty, orproperty is subjected to restraint or in dangerof loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accusedperson to be assisted by a member of thebar is immutable. Otherwise, there wouldbe a grave denial of due process. Thus,even if the judgment had become final andexecutory, it may still be recalled, and theaccused afforded the opportunity to beheard by himself and counsel.

x x x x



Issuance of a writ of possession in favor ofpurchaser in a foreclosure case is ministerial

The RTC, Branch 158, which issued the writ ofpossession cannot be adjudged to have committedgrave abuse of discretion, nor can its order directingthe issuance of said writ be considered patentlyillegal for, a fortiori, there is no discretion involvedin its issuance of such an order, it being theministerial duty of the trial court under thecircumstances.

In Mamerto Maniquiz Foundation, Inc. v. Pizarro,we emphasized the principle that the issuance of awrit of possession in favor of the purchaser in aforeclosure sale is a ministerial act and does notentail the exercise of discretion:

This Court has consistently held that theduty of the trial court to grant a writ ofpossession is ministerial. Such writ issuesas a matter of course upon the filing of theproper motion and the approval of thecorresponding bond. No discretion is leftto the trial court. Any question regardingregularity and validity of the sale, as well asthe consequent cancellation of the writ, isto be determined in a subsequent proceedingas outlined in Section 8 of Act 3135. Suchquestion cannot be raised to oppose theissuance of the writ, since the proceeding isex parte. The recourse is available even beforethe expiration of the redemption periodprovided by law and the Rules of Court.

The purchaser, who has a right to possessionthat extends after the expiration of theredemption period, becomes the absoluteowner of the property when no redemptionis made. Hence, at any time following theconsolidation of ownership and the issuanceof a new transfer certificate of title in thename of the purchaser, he or she is evenmore entitled to possession of the property. In such a case, the bond required underSection 7 of Act 3135 is no longer necessary,since possession becomes an absolute rightof the purchaser as the confirmed owner.(Emphasis supplied.)

The order for a writ of possession issues as amatter of course upon the filing of the propermotion and the approval of the correspondingbond, if applied for by the purchaser during the

Even the most experienced lawyers gettangled in the web of procedure. Thedemand as much from ordinary citizenswhose only compelle intrare is their sense ofright would turn the legal system into anintimidating monstrosity where anindividual may be stripped of his propertyrights not because he has no right to theproperty but because he does not know howto establish such right.

The right to counsel is absolute and may beinvoked at all times. More so, in the case ofan on-going litigation, it is a right that mustbe exercised at every step of the way, withthe lawyer faithfully keeping his clientcompany.

No arrangement or interpretation of lawcould be as absurd as the position that theright to counsel exists only in the trialcourts and that thereafter, the right ceasesin the pursuit of the appeal. (Emphasissupplied)

The filing of the petition for certiorari bypetitioner without counsel should have alerted theCA and should have required petitioner to causethe entry of appearance of his counsel. Althoughthe petition filed before the CA was a petition forcertiorari assailing the RTC Order dismissing thepetition for relief, the ultimate relief being soughtby petitioner was to be given the chance to file anappeal from his conviction, thus the need for acounsel is more pronounced. To repeat the rulingin Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of lawcould be as absurd as the position that the rightto counsel exists only in the trial courts and thatthereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of theappeal. It is even more important to note thatpetitioner was not assisted by counsel when hefiled his petition for relief from judgment with theRTC.

It cannot be overstressed therefore, that incriminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of anaccused person to be assisted by a member of thebar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a gravedenial of due process.

(Austria-Martinez, J., John Hilario y Sibal v. Peopleof the Philippines, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008.)



at present as the solitary guideline throughwhich the State may expropriate privateproperty. For example, Section 19 of the LocalGovernment Code governs as to the exerciseby local government units of the power ofeminent domain through an enablingordinance. And then there is R.A. No. 8974,which covers expropriation proceedingsintended for national governmentinfrastructure projects.

R.A. No. 8974, which provides for aprocedure eminently more favorable to theproperty owner than Rule 67, inescapablyapplies in instances when the nationalgovernment expropriates property “fornational government infrastructureprojects.” Thus, if expropriation is engagedin by the national government for purposesother than national infrastructure projects,the assessed value standard and the depositmode prescribed in Rule 67 continues toapply.

There is no question that the proceedings inthis case deal with the expropriation of propertiesintended for a national government infrastructureproject. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied theprocedure laid out in R.A. No. 8974, by requiringthe deposit of the amount equivalent to 100 percentof the zonal value of the properties sought to beexpropriated before the issuance of a writ ofpossession in favor of the Republic.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Republic of the Philippines,Represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) v.Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., G.R. No.172410, April 14, 2008.)

Distinction between a Petition for review onCertiorari and a Petition for Certiorari

As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedydesigned for the correction of errors ofjurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In PureFoods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained thesimple reason for the rule in this light:

‘When a court exercises itsjurisdiction, an error committedwhile so engaged does not deprive itof the jurisdiction being exercised


redemption period; and upon the filing of theproper motion, with no more need for a bond, ifapplied for by the purchaser after the lapse of theredemption period. The judge issuing the order,following the express provisions of law and settledjurisprudence, cannot be charged with havingacted with grave abuse of discretion.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Hon. Jose Fernandez, RTC of PasigCity, Br. 158 and United Overseas Bank, Phils. v. Sps.Gregoria Espinoza and Joji Gador-Espinoza, G.R. No.156421, April 14, 2008.)

Expropriation procedures under R.A. No. 8974 andRule 67 of the Rules of Court distinguished

At the outset, we call attention to a significantoversight in the TRB’s line of reasoning. It failedto distinguish between the expropriationprocedures under R.A. No. 8974 and Rule 67 of theRules of Court. R.A. No. 8974 and Rule 67 of theRules of Court speak of different procedures, withthe former specifically governing expropriationproceedings for national government infrastructureprojects. Thus, in Republic v. Gingoyon, we held:

There are at least two crucial differencesbetween the respective procedures underR. A. No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under thestatute, the Government is required tomake immediate payment to the propertyowner upon the filing of the complaint tobe entitled to a writ of possession,whereas in Rule 67, the Government isrequired only to make an initialdeposit with an authorized governmentdepositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes thatthe initial deposit be equivalent to theassessed value of the property for purposesof taxation, unlike R.A. No. 8974 whichprovides, as the relevant standard for initialcompensation, the market value of theproperty as stated in the tax declaration orthe current relevant zonal valuation of theBureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whicheveris higher, and the value of the improvementsand/or structures using the replacement costmethod.

x x x x

Rule 67 outlines the procedure under whicheminent domain may be exercised by theGovernment. Yet by no means does it serve



when the error is committed. If it did,every error committed by a courtwould deprive it of its jurisdictionand every erroneous judgmentwould be a void judgment. Thiscannot be allowed. Theadministration of justice would notsurvive such a rule. Consequently,an error of judgment that the courtmay commit in the exercise of itsjurisdiction is not correct[a]blethrough the original civil action ofcertiorari.’

The supervisory jurisdiction of a court overthe issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot beexercised for the purpose of reviewing theintrinsic correctness of a judgment of thelower court—on the basis either of the lawor the facts of the case, or of the wisdom orlegal soundness of the decision. Even if thefindings of the court are incorrect, as longas it has jurisdiction over the case, suchcorrection is normally beyond the provinceof certiorari. Where the error is not one ofjurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact—a mistake of judgment—appeal is theremedy.

As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal,the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction andpower of review. Over a certiorari, the highercourt uses its original jurisdiction inaccordance with its power of control andsupervision over the proceedings of lowercourts. An appeal is thus a continuation ofthe original suit, while a petition for certiorariis an original and independent action thatwas not part of the trial that had resultedin the rendition of the judgment or ordercomplained of. The parties to an appeal arethe original parties to the action. In contrast,the parties to a petition for certiorari are theaggrieved party (who thereby becomes thepetitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties(the public and the private respondents,respectively).

As to the Subject Matter. Only judgmentsor final orders and those that the Rules ofCourt so declared are appealable. Since the

issue is jurisdiction, an original action forcertiorari may be directed against aninterlocutory order of the lower court priorto an appeal from the judgment; or wherethere is no appeal or any plain, speedy oradequate remedy.

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appealsshould be filed within 15 days from thenotice of judgment or final order appealedfrom. Where a record on appeal is required,the appellant must file a notice of appeal anda record on appeal within 30 days from thesaid notice of judgment or final order. Apetition for review should be filed and servedwithin 15 days from the notice of denial ofthe decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filedmotion for new trial or motion forreconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, thepetition should be filed also within 15 daysfrom the notice of judgment or final order,or of the denial of the petitioner’s motionfor new trial or motion for reconsideration.

On the other hand, a petition for certiorarishould be filed not later than 60 days fromthe notice of judgment, order, or resolution.If a motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration was timely filed, the periodshall be counted from the denial of themotion.

As to the Need for a Motion forReconsideration. A motion forreconsideration is generally required priorto the filing of a petition for certiorari, in orderto afford the tribunal an opportunity tocorrect the alleged errors. Note also that thismotion is a plain and adequate remedyexpressly available under the law. Suchmotion is not required before appealing ajudgment or final order.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Alfredo Tagle v. Equitable PCIBank (Formerly Philippine CommercialInternational Bank) and the Honorable HerminiaV. Pasamba, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional TrialCourt, Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan, G.R.No. 172299, April 22, 2008.)



Offer of Evidence

Under Section 8 of R.A. No. 1125, the CTA iscategorically described as a court of record. As casesfiled before it are litigated de novo, party-litigantsshall prove every minute aspect of their cases.Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given thepieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as the ruleson documentary evidence require that thesedocuments must be formally offered before theCTA. Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the RevisedRules on Evidence which reads:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. — The court shallconsider no evidence which has not beenformally offered. The purpose for which theevidence is offered must be specified.

The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case ofVda. de Oñate, which reiterated this Court’s previousrulings in People v. Napat-a and People v. Mate onthe admission and consideration of exhibits whichwere not formally offered during the trial. Although in a long line of cases many of whichwere decided after Vda. de Oñate, we held that courtscannot consider evidence which has not beenformally offered, nevertheless, petitioner cannotvalidly assume that the doctrine laid down in Vda.de Oñate has already been abandoned. Recently, inRamos v. Dizon, this Court, applying the saiddoctrine, ruled that the trial court judge thereincommitted no error when he admitted andconsidered the respondents’ exhibits in theresolution of the case, notwithstanding the factthat the same were not formally offered. Likewise,in Far East Bank & Trust Company v. Commissioner ofInternal Revenue, the Court made reference to saiddoctrine in resolving the issues therein.Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. DeOñate still subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. deOñate, we held that:

From the foregoing provision, it is clearthat for evidence to be considered, the samemust be formally offered. Corollarily, themere fact that a particular document isidentified and marked as an exhibit does notmean that it has already been offered as partof the evidence of a party. In InterpacificTransit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we hadthe occasion to make a distinction betweenidentification of documentary evidence andits formal offer as an exhibit. We said that

the first is done in the course of the trial andis accompanied by the marking of theevidence as an exhibit while the second isdone only when the party rests its case andnot before. A party, therefore, may opt toformally offer his evidence if he believes thatit will advance his cause or not to do so atall. In the event he chooses to do the latter,the trial court is not authorized by the Rulesto consider the same.

However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 484],we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowedevidence not formally offered to beadmitted and considered by the trial courtprovided the following requirements arepresent, viz.: first, the same must havebeen duly identified by testimony dulyrecorded and, second, the same must havebeen incorporated in the records of the case.

From the foregoing declaration, however, it isclear that Vda. de Oñate is merely an exception tothe general rule. Being an exception, it may beapplied only when there is strict compliance withthe requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, thegeneral rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rulesof Court should prevail.

(Nachura, J., Rafael Arsenio S. Dizon, in hiscapacity as the Judicial Administrator of the Estateof the deceased Jose P. Fernandez v. Court of TaxAppeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue,G.R. No. 140944, April 30, 2008.)

Modes of Discovery; fishing for evidence;requisites in order that a party may compel theother party to produce or allow inspection ofdocuments or things

Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection;order.—Upon motion of any party showinggood cause therefor, the court in which anaction is pending may (a) order any partyto produce and permit the inspection andcopying or photographing, by or on behalfof the moving party, of any designateddocuments, papers, books, accounts, letters,photographs, objects or tangible things, not




privileged, which constitute or containevidence material to any matter involved inthe action and which are in his possession,custody or control; or (b) order any partyor permit entry upon designated land orother property in his possession or controlfor the purpose of inspecting, measuring,surveying, or photographing the propertyor any designated relevant object oroperation thereon. The order shall specifythe time, place and manner of making theinspection and taking copies andphotographs, and may prescribe such termsand conditions as are just.

The aforecited rule provides the mechanics forthe production of documents and the inspection ofthings during the pendency of a case. It also dealswith the inspection of sources of evidence otherthan documents, such as land or other property inthe possession or control of the other party. Thisremedial measure is intended to assist in theadministration of justice by facilitating andexpediting the preparation of cases for trial andguarding against undesirable surprise and delay;and it is designed to simplify procedure and obtainadmissions of facts and evidence, thereby shorteningcostly and time-consuming trials. It is based onancient principles of equity. More specifically, thepurpose of the statute is to enable a party-litigantto discover material information which, by reasonof an opponent’s control, would otherwise beunavailable for judicial scrutiny, and to provide aconvenient and summary method of obtainingmaterial and competent documentary evidence inthe custody or under the control of an adversary.It is a further extension of the concept of pretrial.

The modes of discovery are accorded a broadand liberal treatment. Rule 27 of the Revised Rulesof Court permits “fishing” for evidence, the onlylimitation being that the documents, papers, etc.,sought to be produced are not privileged, that theyare in the possession of the party ordered to producethem and that they are material to any matterinvolved in the action. The lament against a fishingexpedition no longer precludes a party from pryinginto the facts underlying his opponent’s case.Mutual knowledge of all relevant facts gathered byboth parties is essential to proper litigation. To thatend, either party may compel the other to disgorgewhatever facts he has in his possession. However,fishing for evidence that is allowed under the rules

is not without limitations. In Security BankCorporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumeratedthe requisites in order that a party may compel theother party to produce or allow the inspection ofdocuments or things, viz.:

(a) The party must file a motion for theproduction or inspection of documentsor things, showing good cause therefor;

(b) Notice of the motion must be served toall other parties of the case;

(c) The motion must designate thedocuments, papers, books, accounts,letters, photographs, objects or tangiblethings which the party wishes to beproduced and inspected;

(d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;

(e) Such documents, etc., constitute orcontain evidence material to any matterinvolved in the action; and

(f) Such documents, etc., are in thepossession, custody or control of theother party.

(Nachura, J., Solidbank Corporation, Now Knownas Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.Gateway Electronics Corporation, Jaime M.Hidalgo and Israel Maducdoc, G.R. No. 164805,April 30, 2008.)

Doctrine of Res Judicata; two main rules andconcepts of the doctrine

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down twomain rules which may be stated as follows: (1) Thejudgment or decree of a court of competentjurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties andtheir privies to the litigation and constitutes a barto a new action or suit involving the same cause ofaction either before the same or any other tribunal;and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directlyadjudicated or necessarily involved in thedetermination of an action before a competent courtin which a judgment or decree is rendered on themerits is conclusively settled by the judgmenttherein and cannot again be litigated between theparties and their privies whether or not the claimsor demands, purposes, or subject matters of the twosuits are the same. These two main rules mark thedistinction between the principles governing the



two typical cases in which a judgment may operateas evidence. In speaking of these cases, the firstgeneral rule above stated, and which correspondsto the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47,Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as “barby former judgment”; while the second generalrule, which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the samesection and rule, is known as “conclusiveness ofjudgment.”

The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v.Register of Deeds provides the following enlighteningdiscourse on conclusiveness of judgment:

The doctrine res judicata actually embracestwo different concepts: (1) bar by formerjudgment and (b) conclusiveness ofjudgment.

The second concept—conclusiveness ofjudgment—states that a fact or questionwhich was in issue in a former suit and wasthere judicially passed upon and determinedby a court of competent jurisdiction, isconclusively settled by the judgment thereinas far as the parties to that action and personsin privity with them are concerned andcannot be again litigated in any future actionbetween such parties or their privies, in thesame court or any other court of concurrentjurisdiction on either the same or differentcause of action, while the judgment remainsunreversed by proper authority. It has beenheld that in order that a judgment in oneaction can be conclusive as to a particularmatter in another action between the sameparties or their privies, it is essential that theissue be identical. If a particular point orquestion is in issue in the second action, andthe judgment will depend on thedetermination of that particular point orquestion, a former judgment between thesame parties or their privies will be final andconclusive in the second if that same pointor question was in issue and adjudicated inthe first suit (Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of actionis not required but merely identity of issues.

Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company(Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201,210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez v. Reyes (76 SCRA179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction

between bar by former judgment which barsthe prosecution of a second action upon thesame claim, demand, or cause of action, andconclusiveness of judgment which bars therelitigation of particular facts or issues inanother litigation between the same partieson a different claim or cause of action.

The general rule precluding therelitigation of material facts orquestions which were in issue andadjudicated in former action arecommonly applied to all mattersessentially connected with the subjectmatter of the litigation. Thus, itextends to questions necessarilyimplied in the final judgment,although no specific finding may havebeen made in reference thereto andalthough such matters were directlyreferred to in the pleadings and werenot actually or formally presented.Under this rule, if the record of theformer trial shows that the judgmentcould not have been rendered withoutdeciding the particular matter, it willbe considered as having settled thatmatter as to all future actions betweenthe parties and if a judgmentnecessarily presupposes certainpremises, they are as conclusive as thejudgment itself.

Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v.Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiatedbetween the two rules of res judicata, as follows:

There is “bar by prior judgment” when,as between the first case where the judgmentwas rendered and the second case that issought to be barred, there is identity ofparties, subject matter, and causes of action.In this instance, the judgment in the firstcase constitutes an absolute bar to the secondaction. Otherwise put, the judgment ordecree of the court of competent jurisdictionon the merits concludes the litigationbetween the parties, as well as their privies,and constitutes a bar to a new action or suitinvolving the same cause of action before thesame or other tribunal.




But where there is identity of parties inthe first and second cases, but no identity ofcauses of action, the first judgment isconclusive only as to those matters actuallyand directly controverted and determinedand not as to matters merely involvedtherein. This is the concept of res judicataknown as “conclusiveness of judgment.”Stated differently, any right, fact, or matterin issue directly adjudicated or necessarilyinvolved in the determination of an actionbefore a competent court in which judgmentis rendered on the merits is conclusivelysettled by the judgment therein and cannotagain be litigated between the parties andtheir privies whether or not the claim,demand, purpose, or subject matter of thetwo actions is the same.

In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars there-litigation in a second case of a fact or questionalready settled in a previous case. The second case,however, may still proceed provided that it will nolonger touch on the same fact or question adjudgedin the first case. Conclusiveness of judgmentrequires only the identity of issues and parties, butnot of causes of action.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Lolita R. Alamayri v. Rommel,Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamedPabale, G.R. No. 151243, April 30, 2008.)

Motion to dismiss under Section 1, Rule 17 of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure provides:

SECTION 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. –A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiffby filing a notice of dismissal at any timebefore service of the answer or of a motionfor summary judgment. Upon such noticebeing filed, the court shall issue an orderconfirming the dismissal. Unless otherwisestated in the notice, the dismissal is withoutprejudice, except that a notice operates asan adjudication upon the merits when filedby a plaintiff who has once dismissed in acompetent court an action based on orincluding the same claim.

Under this provision, it is mandatory that thetrial court issue an order confirming such dismissal

and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, thedismissal is without prejudice and could beaccomplished by the plaintiff through mere noticeof dismissal, and not through motion subject toapproval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto uponnotice, and without prejudice unless otherwisestated in the notice. The trial court has no choicebut to consider the complaint as dismissed, sincethe plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matterof right, regardless of the ground.

Respondents argue that the Motion to Dismissthey filed precedes the Notice of Dismissal filed bypetitioner and hence, the trial court correctly gaveit precedence and ruled based on the motion.

This argument is erroneous. Section 1 of Rule17 does not encompass a Motion to Dismiss. Theprovision specifically provides that a plaintiff mayfile a notice of dismissal before service of the answeror a motion for summary judgment. Thus, uponthe filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff,the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents becamemoot and academic and the trial court should havedismissed the case without prejudice based on theNotice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.

Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed withprejudice would erroneously result in res judicataand imply that petitioner can no longer file a caseagainst respondents without giving him a chanceto present evidence to prove otherwise.

(Quisumbing, J., Frederick Dael v. SpousesBenedicto and Vilma Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April30, 2008.)

Forfeiture of bond

Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules onCriminal Procedure states:

SEC. 21. — Forfeiture of bail. When the presenceof the accused is required by the court orthese Rules, his bondsmen shall be notifiedto produce him before the court on a givendate and time. If the accused fails to appearin person as required, his bail shall bedeclared forfeited and the bondsmen given30 days within which to produce theirprincipal and to show cause why nojudgment should be rendered against themfor the amount of their bail. Within the saidperiod, the bondsmen must:



(a) produce the body of their principal orgive the reason for his non-production;and

(b) explain why the accused did not appearbefore the court when first required todo so.

Failing in these two requisites, ajudgment shall be rendered against thebondsmen, jointly and severally, for theamount of the bail. The court shall not reduceor otherwise mitigate the liability of thebondsmen, unless the accused has beensurrendered or is acquitted.

The provision clearly provides for the procedureto be followed before a bail bond may be forfeitedand a judgment on the bond rendered against thesurety. In Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v.Amante, Jr., we outlined the two occasions uponwhich the trial court judge may rule adverselyagainst the bondsmen in cases when the accusedfails to appear in court. First, the non-appearanceby the accused is cause for the judge to summarilydeclare the bond as forfeited. Second, the bondsmen,after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given30 days within which to produce the principal andto show cause why a judgment should not berendered against them for the amount of the bond.It is only after this 30-day period, during whichthe bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to beheard by the trial court, that the trial court mayrender a judgment on the bond against thebondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannotbe entered unless such judgment is preceded by theorder of forfeiture and an opportunity given to thebondsmen to produce the accused or to adducesatisfactory reason for their inability to do so.

In the present case, it is undisputed that theaccused failed to appear in person before the courtand that the trial court declared his bail forfeited.The trial court gave the bondsmen, respondents inthis case, a 30-day period to produce the accusedor a reasonable explanation for their non-production. However, two years had passed fromthe time the court ordered the forfeiture and stillno judgment had been rendered against thebondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, anorder of execution was issued and the property wasput up for sale and awarded to petitioners, thehighest bidders.

This turn of events distinctly show that therewas a failure of due process of law. The executionwas issued, not on a judgment, because there wasnone, but simply and solely on the declaration offorfeiture.

An order of forfeiture of the bail bond isconditional and interlocutory, there beingsomething more to be done such as the productionof the accused within 30 days. This process is alsocalled confiscation of bond. In People v. Dizon, weheld that an order of forfeiture is interlocutory andmerely requires appellant “to show cause whyjudgment should not be rendered against it for theamount of the bond.” Such order is different froma judgment on the bond which is issued if theaccused was not produced within the 30-dayperiod. The judgment on the bond is the one thatultimately determines the liability of the surety, andwhen it becomes final, execution may issue at once.However, in this case, no such judgment was everissued and neither has an amount been fixed forwhich the bondsmen may be held liable. The lawwas not strictly observed and this violatedrespondents’ right to procedural due process.

(Carpio, J., Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat v.Fernando Alarma and Fausta Alarma, G.R. No.151970, May 7, 2008.)


SEC. 7. Motion day—Except for motionsrequiring immediate action, all motionsshall be scheduled for hearing on Fridayafternoons, or if Friday is a non-workingday, in the afternoon of the next workingday. (underlining supplied)

The aforequoted Rule provides for its ownexception and any grounds invoke by the trial courton scheduling of hearing of motions other than whatis prescribed by the Rules should only be based onmeritorious considerations and should properly beinformed to the parties in advance.

Strict compliance herewith is enjoined.

April 18, 2008.

(Sgd.) ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO Court Administrator

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 45-2008 (Continued from page 31)


RESOLUTION of the COURT En Banc dated June 3,2008 on Bar Matter No. 1922

“Bar Matter No. 1922—Re: Recommendation of theMandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Boardto Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts theCounsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance orCertificate of Exemption. The Court Resolved to NOTEthe Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate JusticeAntonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committeeon Legal Education and Bar Matters, informing theCourt of the diminishing interest of the members ofthe Bar in the MCLE requirement program.

The Court further Resolved, upon therecommendation of the Committee on Legal Educationand Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members ofthe bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before thecourts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date ofissue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance orCertificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for theimmediately preceding compliance period. Failure todisclose the required information would cause thedismissal of the case and the expunction of thepleadings from the records.

The New Rule shall take effect 60 days after itspublication in a newspaper of general circulation.”Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on officialleave.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd. ) FELIPA B. ANAMA Assistant Clerk of Court

For: MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA Clerk of Court

RESOLUTION of the COURT En Banc dated June 3,2008, on A.M. No. 08-3-09-SC

“A.M. No. 08-3-09-SC.—Re: Amendment ofAdministrative Circular No. 84-2007 on Amendmentsin the Rules on Inhibition of Division Members and onLeaves and Vacancies in a Division.—The CourtResolved to APPROVE the amendment to paragraph3 of Administrative Circular No. 84-2007 onAmendments in the Rules on Inhibition of DivisionMembers and on Leaves and Vacancies in a Division,to wit:

“3. When a Member of the Division, not theponente, was counsel or a partner or member ofa law firm that is or was counsel in the case

SUPREME COURTbefore the Division, such Member shall recuseherself or himself, unless the Member was nolonger a partner or member of the law firmwhen the firm was engaged as counsel in thecase and the Member votes against the client ofsuch firm. In any event, the mandatoryinhibition shall cease after the lapse of 10 yearsfrom the resignation or withdrawal of theMember from the law firm, unless the Memberpersonally handled the case when the Memberwas a partner or member of the law firm.”

With respect to the instances covered byparagraphs 1-c to 1-f and 2, it is discretionary on theMember of a Division, who is not the ponente, to inhibitherself or himself from the case.

When a Member who is not the ponente has torecuse herself or himself, the case shall be decided bythe four remaining members and one additionalmember from the other two Divisions chosen by raffle.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the circular covers theinstances where the Member of the Division is theponente, while paragraph 3 applies when the Memberof the Division is not the ponente.

This amendment shall take effect upon itspublication.” Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ.,on official leave. (adv178a)

Very truly yours,



RESOLUTION of the COURT En Banc dated June 3,2008, on A.M. No. 08-4-1-SC

“A.M. No. 08-4-1-SC.—Re: Inhibition and/orDisqualification of Clerks of Court in all levels, underSection 1, Canon III of the Code of Conduct of CourtPersonnel and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court)

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court is herebyamended to include the disqualification of clerks ofcourt, viz:

SEC. 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge orjudicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, orhis wife or child, is pecuniarily interested asheir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which


RESOLUTION of the COURT En Banc dated June 17,2008 on Bar Matter No. 1755

B.M. No. 1755 (Re: Rules of Procedure of the Commission onBar Discipline)

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court governs theinvestigation of administrative complaints againstlawyers by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).Section 12 of said rule prescribes the procedure beforethe IBP, thus:

a) Every case heard by an investigator shallbe reviewed by the IBP Board of Governorsupon the record and evidence transmittedto it by the Investigator with his report. Thedecision of the Board upon such review shallbe in writing and shall clearly and distinctlystate the facts and the reasons on which it is (Continued on the NEXT page)

he is related to either party within the sixthdegree of consanguinity or affinity, or tocounsel within the fourth degree, computedaccording to the rules of the civil law, or inwhich he has been executor, administrator,guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which hehas presided in any inferior court when hisruling or decision is the subject of review,without the written consent of all parties ininterest, signed by them and entered upon therecord.

The above disqualification shall likewiseapply to all clerks of court, assistant clerks ofcourt, deputy clerks of court and branch clerksof court in all court levels insofar as relevant tothem in the performance of their respectivefunctions and duties.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sounddiscretion, disqualify himself from sitting in acase, for just or valid reasons other than thosementioned above.

This amendment shall take effect immediately afterits publication in a newspaper of general circulation.”

Very truly yours,



based. It shall be promulgated within aperiod not exceeding 30 days from the nextmeeting of the Board following the submittalof the Investigator’s report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of itstotal membership, determines that therespondent should be suspended from thepractice of law or disbarred, it shall issue aresolution setting forth its findings andrecommendations which, together with thewhole record of the case, shall forthwith betransmitted to the Supreme Court for finalaction.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Boardor the disciplinary sanction imposed by it isless than suspension or disbarment (suchas admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shallissue a decision exonerating respondent orimposing such sanction. The case shall bedeemed terminated unless upon petition ofthe complainant or other interested partyfiled with the Supreme Court within 15 daysfrom notice of the Board’s resolution, theSupreme Court orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of theBoard shall be given to all parties throughtheir counsel. A copy of the same shall betransmitted to the Supreme Court.

To implement Rule 139-B, the Court, in Bar MatterNo. 1755, approved the Rules of Procedure of theCommission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP onSeptember 25, 2007. The rules pertinent to pleadings,notices, and appearances are provided in Secs. 1 and 2of Rule III which read:

RULE IIIPLEADINGS, NOTICES AND APPEARANCES

SECTION 1. Pleadings. The only pleadingsallowed are verified complaint, verified answerand verified position papers and motion forreconsideration of a resolution.

SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The followingpleadings shall not be allowed, to wit:

a. Motion to dismiss the complaint or petitionb. Motion for a bill of particularsc. Motion for new triald. Petition for relief from judgmente. Motion for reconsiderationf. Supplemental pleadings


1 497 SCRA 130, 137-198

Upon query of IBP National President FelicianoM. Bautista, the Court issued on February 12, 2008 aResolution amending Sec. 1, Rule III of the same rulesby deleting the phrase “motion for reconsideration ofa resolution,” to resolve the conflicting provisions ofSecs. 1 and 2 of said Rule III, thus:

SEC. 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowedare verified complaint, verified answer andverified position papers.

Pursuant to the February 12, 2008 Resolution, aparty cannot file a motion for reconsideration of anyorder or resolution with the InvestigatingCommissioner of the CBD hearing the case.

In the Resolution dated July 31, 2006 in A.C. No.7055 entitled Ramientas v. Reyala, the Court held that:

IN CONCURRENCE WITH THE ABOVE,NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it ishereby resolved, that in accordance with ourruling in Halimao v. Villanueva, pertinentprovisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedureof the Commission on Bar Discipline, ascontained in the By-Laws of the IBP,particularly Subsection 1 and Subsection 2, arehereby deemed amended. Accordingly,Subsection 1 of said rules now reads as follows:

SECTION 1. Pleadings. – The only pleadingsallowed are verified complaint, verified answerand verified position papers and motion forreconsideration of a resolution. x x x

And in Subsection 2, a motion forreconsideration is, thus, removed from thepurview of the class of prohibited pleadings.

Further, the following guidelines shall beobserved by the IBP in respect of disciplinarycases against lawyers:

1. The IBP must first afford a chance to eitherparty to file a motion for reconsideration ofthe IBP resolution containing its findingsand recommendations within 15 days fromnotice of receipt by the parties thereon;

2. If a motion for reconsideration has beentimely filed by an aggrieved party, the IBPmust first resolve the same prior toelevating to this Court the subjectresolution together with the whole recordof the case;

3. If no motion for reconsideration has beenfiled within the period provided for, the IBP

is directed to forthwith transmit to thisCourt, for final action, the subject resolutiontogether with the whole record of the case;

4. A party desiring to appeal from theresolution of the IBP may file a petition forreview before this Court within 15 daysfrom notice of said resolution sought to bereviewed; and

5. For records of cases already transmitted tothis Court where there exist pendingmotions for reconsideration filed in duetime before the IBP, the latter is directed towithdraw from this Court the subjectresolutions together with the whole recordsof the cases, within 30 days from notice, and,thereafter, to act on said motions withreasonable dispatch.1

In view of the February 12, 2008 Resolution, thefallo of Ramientas amending Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule III ofthe Rules of Procedure of the CBD is consequentlyrepealed. At present, a motion for reconsideration is aprohibited pleading in CBD proceedings before theInvestigating Commissioner. It has to be clarifiedfurther that said CBD rules of procedure applyexclusively to proceedings before said CBDCommissioner and not to proceedings before the IBPBoard of Governors (BOG) which are governed by Sec.12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. As such, the otherdispositions in Ramientas relative to the filing of amotion for reconsideration before the IBP BOG are stillvalid and subsisting. In fact, Ramientas has amplifiedthe rules laid down in Rule 139-B by supplying theprocedure for the filing of motions for reconsiderationsbefore the BOG.

Thus, in answer to the query of Deputy Clerk ofCourt and Bar Confidant Ma. Cristina B. Layusa datedMarch 17, 2008 on whether the February 12, 2008Resolution in Bar Matter No. 1755 has effectivelysuperseded Ramientas, the Court resolved as follows:

1. On the amendment to Secs.1 and 2 of RuleIII of the CBD Rules of Procedure, the fallo inRamientas is repealed and superseded by theFebruary 12, 2008 Resolution. A party canno longer file a motion for reconsiderationof any order or resolution of theInvestigating Commissioner, such motionbeing a prohibited pleading.

2. Regarding the issue of whether a motionfor reconsideration of a decision or

RESOLUTION on Bar Matter No. 1755 (Continued)


ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 58-2008

SUBJECT: Implementation of Section 1, Rule 137 ofthe Rules of Court, as amended by the EnBanc Resolution dated June 3, 2008, inA.M. No. 08-4-1-SC, re: disqualificationof all clerks of court, assistant clerks ofcourt, deputy clerks of court and branchclerks of court, in all levels in theperformance of their respective functionsand duties.

Effective immediately:

1. Clerks of court, assistant clerks of court,

resolution of the BOG can be entertained,an aggrieved party can file said motionwith the BOG within 15 days from noticeof receipt thereof by said party.

In case a decision is rendered by the BOG thatexonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction lessthan suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved partycan file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is denied, saidparty can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 ofthe Rules of Court with this Court within 15 daysfrom notice of the resolution resolving the motion. Ifno motion for reconsideration is filed, the decisionshall become final and executory and a copy of saiddecision shall be furnished this Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from thepractice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue aresolution setting forth its findings andrecommendations. The aggrieved party can file amotion for reconsideration of said resolution with theBOG within 15 days from notice. The BOG shall firstresolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate theassailed resolution with the entire case records to thisCourt for final action. If the 15-day period lapseswithout any motion for reconsideration having beenfiled, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to thisCourt the resolution with the entire case records forappropriate action.

Let this Resolution be published once in anewspaper of general circulation.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd. ) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA Clerk of Court

deputy clerks of court and branch clerks ofcourt in all levels shall conduct a screening ofcases now pending before their respectivecourts or divisions to verify and report inwriting to their respective presiding judges,Chairpersons of Divisions, or in en banc cases,to the Presiding Justice and Chief Justice, asthe case may be, if there are grounds for theirdisqualification in regard to the performanceof their functions and duties, under the firstparagraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rulesof Court.

2. The Court Administrator shall cause theimmediate dissemination of thisAdministrative Circular to all clerks of court,assistant clerks of court, deputy clerks ofcourt, branch clerks of court, trial courts andjudges of the first and second level; and submitwithin 30 days from notice of herein Circular,for approval by the Court, an appropriateprocedure for the temporary replacements ofclerks of court in the handling of the particularcases from which they are disqualified underSection 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, asamended.

3. The Presiding Justices of the Court of Appeals,Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals aredirected to submit within 30 days from noticeof herein Circular, for approval by the Court,their respective internal rules on thetemporary replacements of their respectiveclerks of court in the handling of the particularcases from which they are disqualified inregard to the performance of their respectivefunctions and duties under Section 1, Rule 137of the Rules of Court, as amended.

4. The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court isdirected to submit, within 30 days from noticeof herein Circular, for approval of the Court,the procedure for temporary replacement ofthe SC Clerks of Court and Assistant Clerks ofCourt covering particular cases from whichthey are disqualified under Section 1, Rule 137of the Rules of Court, as amended.

Issued this 3rd day of June, 2008.

(Sgd.) REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

RESOLUTION on Bar Matter No. 1755 (Continued)


OCA CIRCULAR NO. 40-2008

TO : ALL TRIAL JUDGES

SUBJECT: PROPOSED GUIDELINES ON THEHANDGUN ACQUISITIONPROGRAM FOR JUDGES

The Supreme Court En Banc in its Resolution dated1 April 2008 in A. M. No. 08-3-13-SC, Re: ProposedGuidelines on the Handgun Acquisition Program forJudges, Resolved to APPROVE the Proposed Guidelineson the Handgun Acquisition Program for Judges, towit:

PROPOSED GUIDELINES ON THE HANDGUNACQUISITION PROGRAM FOR JUDGES

OBJECTIVE

To provide judges of the lower courts theopportunity to acquire handguns for their personalprotection, safety and security.

CONCEPT

An interest free handgun loan will be madeavailable to judge: repayment scheme of not morethan 36 monthly installment. An initial revolving fundof P10M shall be made available for this purpose.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

A. Qualified judges refers to those appointed toMunicipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit TrialCourts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,Metropolitan Trial Courts, and Regional TrialCourts, who:

I. are not more than 67 years of age as of thedate application;

2. are not under preventive suspension fromoffice;

3. have a minimum 30 days leave credits;4. have met the minimum of P3,000.00 net take

home pay as required by the GeneralAppropriations Act; and

5. have at least three qualified co-makers.

B. Qualified co-makers are judges of the court withthe same qualification as qualified judges.

C. Committee refers to the Supreme Court-Motorcycle and Computer Acquisition ProgramCommittee who shall be tasked to handle theadministration and operation of the program.

D. Distributor or supplier refers to a privatecompany engaged by the Committee on anexclusive basis to sell, deliver and service gunsjudge-borrowers.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

STATEMENT OF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A. The Committee shall:

I. negotiate and enter into contract or agreementwith gun companies to sell, distribute andservice guns under the program at the lowestpossible cost;

2. give out individual loans without interest inan amount not exceeding Fifty Thousand Pesos(P50,000.00) payable in36 equal monthlyinstallment; Provided, that loans not exceedingTwenty-Four Thousand Pesos (P24,000.00)shall be payable in 24 equal monthlyinstallments;

3. see to it that all necessary document relatingto the loan as required by its rules andregulations are satisfied; and

4. render necessary reports to the Court throughthe Committee on Security.

B. The Distributor or Supplier shall:

I. administer the non-policy aspects or theprogram as agreed upon in a finalmemorandum or agreement; and

2. process the application or the license andpermit to carry in favor of the judge-borrower.

C. The judge-borrower shall:

I. pay his obligation within the stipulatedperiod;

2. use the gun exclusively for their personalprotection, safety and security;

3. exercise thorough care in choosing the brand,model and caliber of the handgun. No changeof brand, model or caliber will be allowed afterthe approval or the application andcorresponding Delivery Order is issued to thedistributor or supplier;

4. not transfer, assign or encumber the gunwithout the approval of Committee or untilfull payment of the loan has been made;immediately report to the Committee on theSecurity in case of transfer, resignation,separation, retirement, discharge or dismissalfrom service.

5. secure a clearance from the Committee in caseof resign, transfer, separation, retirement ordischarge or dismissal from service.

FILING AND PROCESSING OF

APPLICATION DELIVERY AND PAYMENT

A. Filing and Processing of Applications

Application forms together with the


The loan shall be amortized over a period notexceeding three years. For this purpose, the judge-borrower must render service obligation for thesame period immediately after receipt of the gunduring which period the installments shall bededucted monthly from his/her salary.

Should the judge-borrower fail to render therequired service obligation through his own fault,negligence, unsatisfactory or poor performanceor other causes within his control resulting in thenon-payment of the full cost of the handgun; orshould the judge-borrower resign, transfer to anagency or office, voluntarily retire, or be separatedor removed from the service, the entire unpaidbalance shall become due and demandable. Thejudge-borrower shall pay the unpaid balancewithin 30 days from such retirement, separationor removal from service.

The Committee on security may change orsuspend any provision of the program if itbecomes necessary and desirable considering theavailability of fund.

For your information and guidance.

April 10, 2008.

(Sgd.) ZENAIDA N. ELEPAÑO Court Administrator

necessary documents (application, promissorynote, request for automatic salary deduction andservice obligation undertaking) will be madeavailable at the Office of the Court Administrator-Property Division.

Qualified judges desiring to acquire ahandgun under the program shall fill out theapplication form specifying the Make, Model andKind of the handgun applied for. They shall bemade to choose among the different loan schemesbased on the handgun’s predetermined price andthe distributor or supplier. All duly accomplishedapplication forms and its enclosures shall besubmitted to the Committee.

If the loan application is approved, theCommittee shall immediately forward copy of theapproval to the concerned distributor or supplier.The concerned distributor or supplier shallprocess the license and permit of the judge-borrower. It is the duty of the concerned borrowerto coordinate with and to supply the distributoror supplier all documents required by law for theissuance of a license and permit to carry. All feesand expenses in the processing of the license andpermit to carry shall be on account of the judge-borrower.

Upon the issuance of the license and permit tocarry in the name of the judge-borrowerconcerned, the Committee shall issue a DeliveryOrder to the concerned distributor or supplier forthe issuance or handgun. The distributor orsupplier shall personally deliver the gun to thejudge-borrower concerned.

The judge-borrower shall be responsible forthe costs of maintenance and repair of the gun, ifthe same is not covered or beyond the periodwarranty.

It is understood that the gun shall remain theproperty of the Supreme Court until the judge-borrower satisfies in full his/her obligation to theCourt.

B. Payment

The judge-borrower shall pay in cash theequity or difference between the cost/price of thegun and amount of loan.

The distributor or supplier will forward theInvoice of the gun together with the Delivery Orderto the Committee for payment of the gun issued tothe judge-borrower.

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 45-2008

TO : ALL TRIAL COURT JUDGES ANDBRANCH CLERKS OF COURT

SUBJECT : STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THERULE ON MOTION DAY

It has been brought to the attention of this Courtof the prevalent practice of hearing of motions on aday or time other than what was prescribed by theRules of Court, thereby creating confusion amongparty litigants and their counsel. Moreover, a numberof administrative complaints have also been filedassailing the orders allegedly given on a particular“non-motion day.”

For this purpose and for the guidance of allconcerned, Section 7 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules ofCourt is reproduced hereunder:

(Continued on page 25)

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