Making and remaking the ultimate in early Tibetan readings of Santideva

Kevin Vose

Santideva's Bodhicaryavatara has long been celebrated, alongside Candraklrti's Madhyamakavatara, for its explication of empti­ness from the PrasaIigika-Madhyamaka viewpoint, set within a broader presentation of the Mahayana path structure. While the features that these two texts share - and, indeed, the features of PrasaIigika itself - have been oft-debated in the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka, we have good textual and doctrinal evidence for associating them. One compelling reason is Santideva's declara­tion that "the ultimate is not a referent of awareness,"l a claim that echoes CandrakIrti's statement that the ultimate "is ineffable and just not a referent of consciousness."2 Further, in explication of Santideva's assertion, Prajfiakaramati's (c. 950-1030) commen­tary on the Bodhicaryavatara quotes the Madhyamakavatara four times, linking these two texts' views on this central Madhyamaka doctrine. 3

The kind of ultimate suggested in these passages, an ultimate that transcends thought and language, would prove to be a stum­bling block for those early Tibetan Madhyamikas with strong com-

1 Stanza IX.2c; La Vallee Poussin, Prajfziikaramati's Commentary (1905), 352: buddher agocaras tattvaf!!.

2 La Vallee Poussin, Madhyamakiivatiira, 109,2-3: don dam pa'i bden pa bstan par 'dod pas de ni brjod du med pa'i phyir dan ses pa'i yul ma yin pa fzid kyi phyir dnos su bstan par mi nus pas.

3 Prajfiakaramati cites Madhyamakiivatiira V1.23, 25, 28, and 29 in his comments to Bodhicaryiivatiira IX.2; La Vallee Poussin, Prajfziika­ramati's Commentary (1905), 353, 361, and 366.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 32 • Number 1-2 • 2009 (2010) pp. 285-318

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mitments to the Buddhist epistemological tradition. Logic-minded Madhyamikas, particularly those connected with gSan phu Ne'u thog Monastery, tended to reject Candraklrti's philosophy follow­ing its spread in Central Tibet around the year 1100, in large part because of its perceived difficulties in explaining how one real­izes an ultimate that transcends human intellect. 4 In contrast, the Bodhicaryiivatiira, having long since been translated, retranslat­ed, and commented upon, was universally acclaimed, making an accounting of its views incumbent upon any author. Rather than accept or reject Santideva's seemingly transcendent ultimate and the host of problems attendant on this view, early bKa' gdams pa scholars found a variety of ways to interpret it. How one interpret­ed Santideva's ultimate, whether aligning with Candraklrti's tran­scendent portrayal or with gSan phu's logic-based model, in turn became a dividing line for a series of categories of Madhyamaka, including the well-known Svatantrika-Prasangika divide.

The authority of the Bodhicaryiivatiira was forged at gSan phu by the monastery's intellectual founder, rNog BIo ldan ses rab (1059-1109), who is credited with establishing the final version of the Tibetan translation of the text. The colophon of the Tibetan translation states that the text was first translated from a Kashmiri exemplar by Ka ba dpal brtsegs (prior to 840), then was revised in accordance with a central Indian exemplar and its (unnamed) commentary by Rin chen bzan po (958-1055) and Shiikya blo gros (eleventh century). Finally, rNog - apparently on the basis of no new manuscripts or commentaries, but under the guidance of his Kashmiri teacher Sumatiklrti - corrected and finalized the text. 5

Despite the credit given to rNog, early Tibetan commentaries re­veal a variety of readings of the root text, suggesting that it cir­culated in many forms during this period and not just in rNog's "finalized" version.6

4 Candraldrti's twelfth-century ascension and the debates it touched off in Tibet are treated in Vose, Resurrecting Candrakfrti.

5 This information is drawn from the colophon to the Tibetan transla­tion found in the bsTan 'gyur; sDe dge edition, vol. ya, 40a5-7.

6 Just what constitutes rNog's finalized translation of the Bodhicarya-

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rNog is known to have written both a commentary and a topical outline on the Bodhicaryavatara? The text likewise figured promi­nently at gSan phu in the generations following rNog, as a series of scholars in teacher-to-student relationship composed commentar­ies on it: rNog's student rGya dmar pa Byan chub grags; rGya: dmar pa's student Phya pa Chos kyi sen ge; and Phya pa's student gTsaIi nag pa brTson 'grus sen ge.8 To these we may add the commen­tary of the second Sa skya pa hierarch, bSod nams rtse mo (1142-

va tara is difficult to pinpoint. Akira Saito has analyzed Bu ston's suspi­cion that the version of the Bodhicaryavatara available to him (which he included in his bsTan 'gyur collection) contains unwarranted "emenda­tions" made by gTsan nag pa; see Saito, "Bu ston on the sPyod 'jug," 79-85. In one example, which he takes to be representative, Saito (p. 84) suggests that "the alteration [of rNog's translation] appears to have been made with rather careless consultation of the old translation(s)." A thor­ough evaluation of this textual conundrum will require an examination of the Bodhicaryavatara stanzas embedded in the various Indian and Tibetan commentaries, as compared to the stanzas preserved in the bsTan 'gyur editions and in the Dunhuang manuscript (Stein 628) edited in Saito, A Study of the Dun-huang Recension. My initial investigation shows that gTsan nag pa's commentary offers readings of the Bodhicaryavatara stanzas that accord with the stanzas preserved in the bsTan 'gyur but not with those found in the Dunhuang version (in cases where the bsTan 'gyur edition and Dunhuang version disagree). If gTsan nag pa was indeed Bu ston's culprit, he does not seem to have been utilizing a translation of the Bodhicaryavatara related to the Dunhuang version.

7 For an overview of rNog's compositions, see Kano, rNgog Blo­ldan-shes-rab's Summary, 125-128 and Kramer, The Great Translator. Fragments of rNog's commentary are cited in bSod nams rtse mo's com­mentary (discussed below); the whereabouts of the complete commentary remain unknown. I thank Kazuo Kano for alerting me to his discovery in Lhasa of rNog's sPyod 'jug gi bsdus don, a "topical outline" of Santideva's text, which he is now preparing for publication.

8 The available texts are rGya dmar pa Byan chub grags's Bymi chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i tshig don gsal bar Mad pa; Phya pa's sPyod 'jug bsdus don, a topical outline (Phya pa's full commentary is not presently known); and gTsan nag pa brTson 'grus sen ge's sPyod 'jug gi rnambsad.

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1182), which according to its colophon relates the comments of his teacher Phya pa and also occasionally cites rNog's commentary.9 These four generations of commentaries allow us to see the evolu­tion of gSan phu exegesis, revealing a variety of ways to accom­modate and even champion the transcendent ultimate found in the Bodhicaryavatara, while at the same time holding to gSan phu's emphasis on inferential logic. These early commentators' solutions to the problems attendant upon Santideva's ultimate took the shape of two interrelated discussions of the nature of ultimate truth and of the cognitive processes involved with realizing it. These in turn gave rise to distinct Madhyamaka categories to classify views on each.

The ultimate: "like an illusion" or "not abiding at all?"

bKa' gdams pa discussions of ultimate truth, and the Madhyamaka classifications these discussions engendered, center round Santi­deva's famous proclamation, "The ultimate is not a referent of awareness; awareness is said to be conventional,"lo as well as the

9 bSod nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa. In the colophon (515.2,4-6), we read: "Indeed, the Commentary composed by the lord (btsun pa) is exceedingly clear. However, ... I write this for the ease of realization of myself and those like me. For the sake of easy realization even of the wisdom chapter, the spiritual friend bSod nams rtse mo clearly arranged (fie bar sbyar) this from the concise (tshig bsdus, "a summary") and difficult to understand (go dka' ba) Explanation of Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practices composed by the monk ehos kyi Sen ge." In in­cluding bSod nams rtse mo's commentary in this discussion of early bKa' gdams pa commentaries, I do not intend to portray him as a bKa' gdams pa, but rather take his attribution of "arranging" his teacher's comments on the' Bodhicaryavatara as rendering his comments germane to this in­vestigation. As will be seen, his comments would prove to be more faith­ful to Phya pa's views than those of another of Phya pa's students, gTsan nag pa. Even still, the subtle criticism implicit in calling Phya pa's sum­mary "difficult to understand" may suggest a certain distance between teacher and student that we would be unlikely to see in later master-to­disciple relationships within the established orders of Tibet.

10 La Vallee Poussin, Prajfiakaramati's Commentary (1905), 352:

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stanzas that follow this, which discuss how more advanced yogis' views "harm," or invalidate, those of less advanced yogis.u This latter consideration allows commentators to flesh out just who harms whom, a doxographical project that in some treatments in­cludes higher and lower types of Madhyamikas,12 Unfortunately, the continued absence of rNog Blo ldan ses rab's Bodhicaryiivatiira commentary prevents us from exploring his views on these stan­zas. However, in his extant works, rNog touches upon Santideva's proclamation on the ultimate, albeit in a quite different context, his commentary on the Ratnagotravibhiiga. There, rNog relates "The ultimate is not a referent of speech and ... is not a referent of conceptuality, since conceptuality is conventional."13 This clearly

buddher agocaras tattvaf!2 buddhil;. saf!2vrtir ucyate II The Tibetan (vol. ya, 31al) reads: don dam blo yi spyod yul min I blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod II Saito ("Santideva in the History of Madhyamika," 261, n. 3) re­ports that the Dunhuang version for pada dreads: blo dan sgra ni kun rdzob yin II = buddhiJ:! sabdas ca saf!2vrtiJ:! ("awareness and speech are conventional"), which would seem to associate "awareness" and "speech" in the way rNog (just below) associates "conceptuality" and "speech."

11 Stanza4ab states this concisely (La Vallee Poussin, Prajiiakaramati's Commentary [1905], 370): biidhyante dhfvise!felJa yogino 'py uttarotta­raiJ:! I "Through refinements of yogis' awareness, the progressively higher harm [the lower]."

12 Stanza 4c, which notes how higher yogis "harm" lower yogis, would seem to be germane to this discussion of Madhyamaka classification. It reads (La Vallee Poussin, Prajfiiikaramati's Commentary [1905], 371): dr!ftiintenobhaye!ftena; "through examples accepted by both [parties]." This could well be an allusion to Candraklrti's Prasannapadii critique of Bhaviveka's logical procedures, a discussion that led Tson kha pa to distinguish between CandrakIrti's "Prasangika" Madhyamaka and Bha­viveka's "Svatantrika" view (on Candraklrti's critique and Tson kha pa's distinction, see Ruegg, Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka Philosophy). However, none of the bKa' gdams pa or Sa skya pa scholars whose com­mentaries I examine here make this association.

13 Kano's edition of the Tibetan reads (Kano, rNgog Blo-ldan-shes­rab's Summary, 286): rdo rje gnas 'di bdun dmigs pa med pa'i ye ses kyis rtogs par bya ba tsam yin gyi I brjod du med pa yan don dam pa'i ran biin yin pa'i phyir ro II don dam pa ni nag gi yul ma yin pa'i phyir te I rnam par

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parallels Santideva's statement, substituting "conceptuality" for "awareness," and suggests that, in rNog's estimation, the ultimate is only beyond the ken of conceptuality but can be accessed by non-conceptual, yogic awareness. This would delimit the ultimate's transcendence, returning it to the realm of (highly refined) human intellect, an approach characteristic of later gSaIi phu authors, such as Phya pa.

In the generation following rNog, available sources reveal fur­ther discomfort with a literal reading of Santideva's proclamation. Discussing how the two truths are divided, rGya dmar pa first notes that "the basis of division" (dbye ba'i gii) into two truths is "mere object of knowledge, taken as a referent by awareness."14 This would entail that the ultimate, like the conventional, can be brought within the scope of human awareness: it is knowable. Awareness itself is of two types: "All awarenesses that engage ob­jects of knowledge are counted as only two: mistaken conscious­nesses that engage erroneously and reasoning consciousnesses that engage non-erroneously."ls As rGya dmar pa explains, a "reason­ing consciousness" (rigs pa'i ses pa) is the type of consciousness (which is here used synonymously with "awareness") that knows ultimate truth, through a logical process of investigating the final nature of phenomena.16 The ultimate would seem then to be a refer­ent of awareness, directly contradicting Santideva.

rtog pa ni kun rdzob yin pas don dam pa rtog pa'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro II "The seven vajra topics are only to be realized by the wisdom that lacks an intentional object; they are ineffable due to being the nature of the ultimate. This is because the ultimate is not a referent of speech and because the ultimate is not a referent of conceptuality, since conceptual­ity is conventional." Kano's translation is on p. 383.

14 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 125,3 (59a3): bios yul du bya pa'i ses bya' tsam. An interlinear note on ses bya' tsam explains the phrase as ses bya ma yin pa las log pa.

lS rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 127,1 (60a1): ses bya la 'jug pa'i blo' mtha' dag ni nor bar 'jug pa 'khrul ses dan I ma nor bar 'jug pa rigs pa'i ses pa gfiis kho nar grans nes pas na II

16 Ultimate truth is "true in the perspective of a reasoning [conscious­ness]." rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 127,1 (60a1): rigs pa'i

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However, when commenting on Santideva's proclamation, rOya dmar pa seems to contradict himself:

[The ultimate] is passed beyond all referents of awareness, conceptual and non-conceptual. It also has no proliferations (spros pa) because it is not a determined referent of speech or conceptuality .... The ulti­mate is not to be characterized by any quality and has no character­istic; thus [Santideva] said, "not a referent of awareness." ... Since all awarenesses are mistaken and conventional, all referents of aware­nesses are conventional truths. Thus it is established that the opposite of conventional truth, ultimate truth, is not a referent of awarenessY

Whereas rOya dmar pa's previous discussion divided awareness into "mistake" and "reason," here awareness is uniformly mistak­en, functioning only in the conventional, dualistic world of charac­teristics and the characterized. How are we to reconcile rOya dmar pa's conflicting positions? We might read "not a determined refer­ent of speech or conceptuality" as delimiting the scope of aware­ness, the same move that rNog made, thereby allowing for a non­conceptual form of awareness that accesses the ultimate. However, the first sentence of the quote, implicating both conceptual and non-conceptual awareness, would seem to preclude this interpreta­tion. To make sense of rOya dmar pa's earlier statement, that the two truths divide "objects of knowledge" (ses bya), we would have to tease out some kind of consciousness (ses pa) that is not included in "all awarenesses." The ultimate would be accessible to (some

nor bden pa.

17 We can note in this passage that rGya dmar pa uses spyod yul (found in Santideva's text) and yul (in rGya dmar pa's comments) interchange­ably. Both are used to translate the Sanskrit vi~aya, but typically only the former is used to translate gocara, which is the reading found in the Sanskrit of Santideva's text. rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar bSad pa, 127,2-4 (60a2-4): rtog pa dan mi rtog pa'i blo'i yul thams cad las 'das pa'o II spros pa med pa yan yin te I sgra dan rnam par rtog pa'i zen pa'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro II ... chos gan gis kyan mtshon par byar myed pa mtshan fiid med pa fiid don dam pa yin pas I blo'i spyod yul min zes bya' ba'o I ... blo thams cad 'khrul pa kun rdzob pa yin pa'i phyir blo'i yul mtha' dag kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin pas I kun rdzob kyi bden pa las bzlog pa don dam pa'i bden pa blo'i yul ma yin par grub po I

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kind of) consciousness but would be beyond the scope of concep­tual and non-conceptual awareness. rGya dmar pa, unfortunately, leaves the discussion unresolved.

For his part, rGya dmar pa introduces a further distinction when explaining the relationship between the two truths (in technical ter­minology, the "meaning of the division into two truths" [bden pa gfiis kyi dbye ba'i don]). He relates, "[The two truths] are inex­pressible as the same or other due to not being one and not being different," a position that he identifies as the view of the "utterly non-abiding system (rab du mi gnas pa'i lugS)."18 He provides an alternative view, that of the "illusionists" (sgyu ma lta bu) who hold that "the two truths are two qualitative divisions in a single en­tity, just like product and impermanence;" however, he notes that Santideva's position is the former.19 This discussion does not an­swer the previous conundrum of how the ultimate is an object of knowledge but not a referent of awareness. However, we can detect some amount of harmony between these two stances and the two Madhyamaka viewpoints rGya dmar pa here mentions: The "il­lusionist" position holds that the two truths are "qualitative divi­sions" (chos kyi dbye' ba) of an entity (dflOS po), with "entity" being (in some presentations) equated with "object of knowledge." This suggests a stronger status for ultimate truth, making it a knowable phenomenon, accessible to analysis. In contrast, the "non-abiding" position states that the relationship between the two truths is sim­ply ineffable, transcending speech in the same way that Santideva declared that ultimate truth transcends awareness.20

18 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 126,3-4 (59b3-4): gcig pa yan ma yin tha dad pa yan ma yin pas de iiid dan gian du brjod du med pa .. , dbye' ba'i don 'di ni rab du mi gnas pa'i lugs la ltos ste rnam par biag pa'o /

19 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 126,4-5 (59b4-5): sgyu' ma Ita bu' ni byas pa dan mi rtag pa biin du bden pa gfiis dnos po cig la chos kyi dbye' ba gfiis su 'dod mod kyi / slob dpon 'di'i lugs ma yin pas Ina {read: sna} ma ltar yin no /

20 Unless, a la rNgog, we pair "ineffable" with "beyond conceptuality," rather than "beyond awareness."

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Looking beyond rGya dmar pa's work, we see that this divi­sion of Madhyamaka is widely referred to - and widely rejected - in early bKa' gdams pa literature.21 rNog, his student Gro luIi pa Blo gros 'byun gnas (c. 1040-1120),22 and Phya pa all refer to this as a potential bifurcation of Madhyamaka according to positions on ultimate truth. They all argue against it, but for different rea­sons. Jose Cabez6n points out that rNog and Gro lun pa see both of these potential divisions of Madhyamaka as, instead, deviations from the middle way.23 "Illusionists" assert (in this portrayal) that the illusory appearance of phenomena is ultimate truth, which in rNog's and Gro lun pa's estimation amounts to an extreme of real­ism, as this illusory nature would stand through reasoned analysis. Additionally, Gro lun pa is keen to point out that the "illusionist" view is not that of Santarak~ita, although he does not say who held it. 24 The "non-abiding" position carries several possible valences in rNog's and Gro lun pa's work: rNog seems to equate the position both with the meditational practice of "no [thing] abiding" in the mind (yid la mi gnas pa) and with the ontological claim that no phenomenon abides (chos kun mi gnas); these would be extremes of quietism (from a practice standpoint) and nihilism (from an on-

21 This bifurcation of Madhyamaka is also rejected by Tson kha pa and his dGe lugs pa followers; see Napper, Dependent-Arising and Emptiness, 403-440 (Appendix I: "The Division of Madhyamikas Into Reason­Established lllusionists and Proponents of Thorough Non-Abiding") and Ruegg, Three Studies, 96-1Ol.

22 Jose Cabez6n discusses the problems attendant upon Gro lun pa's dates, as well as this provisional estimate, in "The Madhyamaka in Gro lung pa's Bstan Rim chen mo."

23 My discussion here is based on that in Cabez6n, "The Madhyamaka in Gro lung pa's Bstan Rim chen mo," which relies on rNog Blo ldan ses rab, sPrift yig bdud rtsi thig le and Gro lun pa Blo gros 'byun gnas, bsTan rim chen mo.

24 Gro lun pa criticizes the view that "Siintarak~ita and others posit il­lusion as the ultimate;" Gro lun pa, bsTan rim chen mo, 805: slob dpon ii ba 'tsho la sogs pa ni sgyu ma don dam pa bied pa ste / While he does not tell us who the "others" are, they likely include Kamalaslla.

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tological perspective).25 Gro lun pa, instead, states that the "non­abiding" view holds that the non-abiding of phenomena is itself established by a "reasoning consciousness," which, similar to al­lowing that an illusory nature withstands reasoning, suggests that something stands out of emptiness - albeit, in this case, that some­thing would be non-existence.26 This perspective would then repre­sent an overly reified ultimate. In all interpretations, rNog and Gro lun pa reject both the "illusionist" and "non-abiding" positions and so discount their use for dividing Madhyamaka.

In his recently published doxography, Phya pa takes a quite differ­ent approach to this division, claiming that since all Madhyamikas assert both the utter non-abiding and the illusory appearance of all phenomena (not neither), there can be no division of Madhyamaka along these lines. The important issue, instead, is just what "with­stands analysis" (dpyad bzod pa). If one holds that appearances withstand analysis - that they are not utterly non-abiding - one would not claim that they are like illusions; this, then, would make one a realist. If one does not hold that appearances are "mere af­firming negatives" (ma yin dgag pa tsam), one deprecates the con­ventional and becomes a nihilistY For Phya pa, then, to say that phenomena are "utterly non-abiding" and to say that they are "like illusions" come back to the same point: appearances do not with­stand analysis and so exist only illusorily.

Further, Phya pa states, ''All Madhyamikas, due to not asserting that illusory [phenomena] withstand analysis, assert that only utter non-establishment withstands analysis; there is [thus] no difference

25 rNog's summary criticism reads (sPrin yig bdud rtsi thig Ie, 708): sgyu ma gfiis med chos kun mi gnas dbu ma yi lugs gfiis rnam 'byed de yan rmons pa mtshar bskyed yin; "Distinguishing two Madhyamaka systems [according to those who hold that] illusion is non-duality and [those who hold that] all phenomena do not abide amazes [only] fools."

26 This position would also make emptiness an "affirming negative" (ma yin dgag), as the existence of "non-abiding" would be affirmed. This view is unacceptable to Gro lun pa and to all the bKa' gdams pa authors treated here.

27 Phya pa, bDe bar gsegs pa, 65,6ff.

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[among Madhyamikas] at all."2B "Utter non-establishment" (cir ywi rna grub pa) appears to be synonymous with "utterly non-abiding" in Phya pa's usage, an equation not reflected in rNog's orGro lun pa's discussions. Holding that "utter non-establishment withstands analysis" saves this portrayal of the ultimate from the extremes of quietism and nihilism that rNog argued against, as Phya pa's ultimate would be reached by a "reasoning consciousness" - it would "withstand" the analysis of that consciousness - and would be counted as an existent "object of knowledge." Where Gro lun pa criticized the "non-abiding" ultimate for affirming the existence of "non-abiding," Phya pa draws a fine line: the ultimate withstands analysis but is not established by reasoning; it is still "utterly not established."29

While Phya pa's portrayal might seem to solve some of the problems in the "illusionist" and "non-abiding" positions adduced by rNog and Gro lun pa (by redefining those positions) and, fur­ther, might seem to ameliorate divisions within Madhyamaka, two points bear consideration. First, he introduced this discussion by noting "someone claims there are two systems of assertions on ulti­mate truth."30 However, Phya pa's discussion of the "illusory" status of phenomena centers on the conventional world. The real problem would not arise from claiming that conventional phenomena are illusory but would arise from the claim that an "illusory" nature is ultimate truth, which is the position rNog and Gro lun pa both rejected. Elsewhere, Phya pa too argues against this position at length, which he characterizes as the view that the union of appear­ances and emptiness (snan stan giiis tshags) is the ultimate; to this claim, he points out that each of the components would per force be

2B Phya pa, bDe bar gsegs pa, 67,2: dbu ma ba thams cad kyis sgyu ma lta bu iiid ni spyad par [dpyad bzod par?} mi 'dod pas I cir ymi ma grub pa kho na dpyad bzod par 'dod pa la tha dad gtan med pa yin no II

29 For a more complete discussion of Phya pa's views on the ultimate, see Vose, Resurrecting Candrakfrti, 92-99.

30 Phya pa, bDe bar gsegs pa, 65,6-7: don dam pa'i bden pa la yan kha cig bden pas stan pa'i snan pa sgyu ma lta bur smra ba dan I ma yin dgag du bden pa gan du yan rab tu mi gnas par smra ba'i lugs giiis yod zer ba.

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the ultimate, making ordinary appearances ultimately true.31 Phya pa, then, follows his gSan phu forebears in rejecting the ultimate validity of the "illusionist" view.32 The frequency and vehemence of this refutation in early bKa' gdams pa literature suggests that it was a powerful current outside ofbKa' gdams pa circles in twelfth­century Tibet. 33

The second point to consider is that, as Phya pa was well aware, not all those who call themselves Madhyamikas assert that the ul­timate bears analysis. Such a position would be labeled "realist" by other Tibetan Madhyamikas, and constituted one of the chief points of contention between Phya pa and twelfth-century support-

31 Phya pa emphasizes the distinction between the absolute negative, emptiness, that a reasoning consciousness realizes and the affirming negative, the collection of appearance and emptiness (the illusion-like nature), that inference comprehends. The inference that proves "entities are empty of a true nature" must realize an affirming negative, because it associates the inferential subject, "entity," with the predicate, "emp­tiness." However, a reasoning consciousness realizes only the absolute negative, "empty of a true nature," based on this inference. Phya pa, dBu ma sar gsum, 93,14-97,14; especially 94,14-18.

32 Phya pa adopts a position very close to the "illusionist" view on "the meaning of the division into two truths." Above, we saw rGya dmar pa report the "illusionist" position to hold that "the two truths are two quali­tative divisions (chos kyi dbye' ba) in a single entity." Phya pa held that "the two truths are only different isolates in a single entity;" Phya pa, dBu ma sar gsum, 10,12: bden pa gfiis no bog cig la ldog pa tha dad pa kho na'o II

33 The distinction between "illusionist" Madhyamaka and "utterly non-abiding" Madhyamaka may have arisen in proto-bKa' brgyud pa sources. The two terms are used to denote types of Madhyamaka in Maitripada/Advayavajra's Tattvaratniivalf, where the terms are given as miiyopamiidvayaviidin and sarvadharmiiprati~thiinaviidin. On MaitrI­pada's views, see Mathes, "Blending the Slitras with the Tantras," 201-227. Ruegg reports that the distinction is also found in sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen's work, Tshogs chos legs mdzes ma, in volume one of his gSun 'bum (Delhi: Khasdub Gyatsho Shashin, 1975), ca, folio 85a; see Ruegg, Three Studies, 32-35.

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ers of CandrakIrti.34 His claim, then, that there is no division within Madhyamaka is not a claim that there is no dispute within Madhya­maka. Instead, "his is the highly polemical claim that those who disagree with him are not even Miidhyamikas.

Phya pa's reconfiguration of the "illusionist" and "non-abiding" positions allows him to accept his teacher rGya dmar pa's claim that Siintideva held the "non-abiding" view, without subscribing to the transcendent ultimate that such a position may have entailed. Additionally, like his gSaIi phu predecessors, Phya pa can reject the notion that Siintarak~ita and KamalaSUa hold an "illusionist" ulti­mate, while at the same time accepting the conventional validity of "illusion-like" phenomena.35 These steps are important for pre­serving the gSail phu interpretation of Madhyamaka, which cham­pioned the works of all of these authors: Siintideva, Siintarak~ita, and KamalaSUa. With the rise of CandrakIrti's importance in Tibet during Phya pa's lifetime, preserving Siintideva's affiliation with views that now came to be labeled "Sviitantrika" - and thereby dissociating Siintideva from the new Priisailgika - required inter­pretive finesse. 36 Furthermore, in Phya pa's treatment, the "non­abiding" view comes to represent a well-acceptable Madhyamaka stance; in Phya pa's view, all Miidhyamikas espouse it. This inter­pretation would make it possible for Phya pa's students to stand be­hind the "non-abiding" label and, as we will see in the next section, to subdivide the position further.

34 Twelfth-century Prasaitgika views on ultimate truth are treated in Vose, Resurrecting Candrakfrti, 88-92.

35 As noted above (n. 32), Phya pa's position on "the meaning of the division into two truths" is nearly identical with the "illusionist" position that rGya dmar pa reports.

36 The Indian commentaries on the Bodhicaryavatara that treated the text from a Yogacara-Madhyamaka standpoint, discussed by Saito ("Siintideva in the History of Madhyamika," 259), are important prec­edents for the early gSait phu interpretation. Santarak~ita's citation of the Bodhicaryavatara in the Tattvasiddhi may also be taken as indicating a compatibility between Santarak~ita's and Siintideva's views, although it seems doubtful that the Tattvasiddhi's author is the same Siintarak~ita who wrote the Madhyamakiilarp,kara.

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One of those students who did not take up the "non-abiding" label and who would reject his teacher's Madhyamaka views in fa­vor of the new Prasangika was gTsan nag pa brTson 'grus sen ge. gTsan nag pa'sdiscussion of Santideva's ultimate evinces some of the same tensions we saw in rGya dmar pa's explication. gTsan nag pa holds that ultimate truth is an "object of knowledge" but, "an instance of the ultimate is passed beyond referents of awareness."37 A significant difference from rGya dmar pa's presentation is that gTsan nag pa credits his position to Candraklrti, noting that ulti­mate truth is "found in the perspective of a final reasoning con­sciousness, ... just as the Master Candraklrti said."38 Unlike his gSan phu forebears, gTsan nag pa takes Prajfiakaramati's lead in drawing Candraklrti's exposition of the two truths into his own explanation of Santideva's stanza. While gTsan nag pa's position on the ultimate may appear identical to rGya dmar pa's stance two generations prior, Candraklrti's presence is crucial, as an examina­tion of gTsan nag pa's division of Madhyamaka reveals.

gTsan nag pa interprets Santideva's statement that higher yogis harm lower yogis as implying three successively higher levels of Madhyamaka.39 The first type holds that "an affirming negation, a composite of appearance and emptiness" is the ultimate. This,

37 gTsan nag pa, sPyod 'jug gi rnam Mad, 557,2-3 (36a2-3): ses bya'i lus bden gfiis su rnam par giag pa and 557,7-8 (36a7-8): don dam pa'i mtshan gii' ni blo'i yullas 'das pa.

38 gTsan nag pa, sPyod 'jug gi rnam Mad, 557,5 (36a5): mthar thug rigs pa'i ses nor rfied pa.

39 gTsan nag pa initially speaks of two types of Madhyamikas, but then points out a third Madhyamaka view that invalidates these two (sPyod 'jug gi rnam Mad, 561,2-3 [38a2-3]): dbu' ma'i rnal 'byor fiid la ston pa mtshan mar lta ba gfiis yod de I bden pa'i dnos pos ston pa'i ses bya ma yin dgag don dam par smra ba dan I ston fiid med dgag don dam par smra ba'o II de dag la yan dbu' ma chen po'i rigs pas gnod te I "Madhyamika yogis have two views on the mark of emptiness: (1) those who hold that an affirming negative, an object of knowledge that is empty of true entity, is the ultimate; and (2) those who hold that an absolute negative, emptiness, is the ultimate. (3) The reasoning of Great Madhyamaka harms those also."

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of course, is the "illusionist" position already critiqued by rNog, Gro lun pa, and Phya pa. This position is invalidated (or "harmed") by the second type of Madhyamika, "those who hold that an ab­solute negative (rned dgag), emptiness, is the ultimate." As noted, this view appears to have been a very common position among early bKa' gdams pa authors, as it continued to be in the develop­ment of Tibetan Madhyamaka. This position, then, would seem to be unassailable; yet gTsan nag pa states, "The reasoning of Great Madhyamaka (dbu rna chen po) harms those, also." What is wrong with holding emptiness to be the ultimate? And, what does "Great Madhyamaka" signify? gTsan nag pa tells us

Since the entity to be negated is not established, the negation too is not established, like the death of a barren woman's child. In that way, it is realized that ultimately phenomena - entites, non-entities, and so forth - do not exist at all. ... [This] also dispels the idea that the ulti­mate is established as an analytical referent of awareness.40

These points suggest that "Great Madhyamaka" upholds a strong interpretation of Santideva's transcendent ultimate: the reasoning process that negates "true entity" (bden pa'i dftos po) itself has no standing and "ultimately phenomena do not exist at all." In this in­terpretation, the seemingly unproblematic position that "emptiness is the ultimate," while invalidating the "illusionist" position, still assigns too strong a status to negation.41 Something still stands out of emptiness. The position is further criticized for a perceived waf­fling from the ultimate's transcendence; only "Great Madhyamaka" understands that the ultimate passes beyond the scope of human intellect.

40 gTsaIi nag pa, sPyod jug gi rnam biad, 561,3-4 (38a3-4): dgag bya'i dflOS po ma grub pas de bkag pa ymi mi 'grub ste I mo sam gyi bu si ba biin ies bya'o I de ltar na don dam par dnos po dan dnos med lasogs pa'i chos 'ga' yan med par rtogs par 'gyur ro II ... don dam blo'i spyod yul du grub par 'gyur sfiam pa'i rtog pa 'an bsal ba yin no II

41 Pa tshab, too, points out that since the object of negation is not es­tablished, the negation of it lacks status (dBu' ma rtsa ba'i ses rab kyi ti ka, 49: dgag bya'i ran biin ma grub pas na bkag pa yan mi 'thad de); see Georges Dreyfus and Drongbu Tsering, "Pa tshab and the origin of PriisaIigika," in this volume.

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gTsaIi nag pa's invocation of CandrakIrti (to make essentially the same point that rGya dmar pa made) can be understood in the context of his Madhyamaka rankings. "Great Madhyamaka" aligns Santideva's ultimate with CandrakIrti's and gives both a transcend­ent reading. In showing how Great Madhyamaka trumps those who hold emptiness to be the ultimate, gTsaIi nag pa attacks a position very much like the one Phya pa argued for and attempts to answer Phya pa's critique of CandrakIrti and his newfound followers. Phya pa holds that an absolute negation, emptiness, is the ultimate and that emptiness withstands analysis, a position that gTsaIi nag pa understands as an overly reified view. Where Phya pa held that the ultimate is an object of knowledge, gTsaIi nag pa criticizes those who "think that the ultimate is established as an analytical ref­erent of awareness." We can recall that Phya pa emphasizes that the ultimate is "utterly non-established." gTsaIi nag pa may here misrepresent his former teacher's position in order to draw a clear separation from his own view, which itself offers a significant sof­tening from both CandrakIrti's and Santideva's proclamations. Jayananda, for one, took CandrakIrti very literally and claimed that the ultimate was not even an object of knowledge. Phya pa pointed out a number of problems with this position, the most sig­nificant being that the ultimate - realization of which is soteriologi­cally necessary - could not be known.42 Here, we see gTsaIi nag pa arguing that the ultimate is an "object of knowledge" but is not "established as an analytical referent of awareness," a position he arrives at in response to Phya pa's critique. Among gTsaIi nag pa's chief concerns are defending and championing CandrakIrti's inter­pretation of Madhyamaka, here reading that interpretation (rightly or wrongly) into Santideva's text. "Great Madhayamaka," then, is gTsaIi nag pa's term for what others in this time period began to call "PrasaIigika.''43

42 For the debates between Jayiinanda and Phya pa over the status of the ultimate, see Vose, Resurrecting Candrakfrti, 88-99.

43 In his contribution to the present volume, Thomas Doctor shows that rMa bya, likewise, calls Candraklrti's views "Great Madhyamaka."

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Buddha perception: PrasaIigika v. Svatantrika

A second set of divisions of Madhyamaka found in these early commentaries takes as its chief criterion the status of those trans­formed by their realization of the ultimate: Buddhas. These divi­sions are found in exegeses of Santideva's answer to the objection that the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness renders the pas­sage from saJ?1siira to nirvaI).a pointless. Paul Williams noted that where the received Sanskrit of Santideva's text here offers preci­sion, the Tibetan translation of it offers ample room for interpreta­tion.44 Translating from the Sanskrit, we can read the objection as "If what is ceased ultimately is cycling in saJ?1siira conventionally, then the Buddha, too, would be cycling in saJ?1siira; thus, what use would the practices of enlightenment be?,'45 In the Tibetan transla­tion, "what is ceased" (nirvrtal.z) is rendered my a nan 'das, allowing the possibility that "nirvaI).a" is at issue. Additionally, the verbal sense of saJ?1siira is lost, as are the adverbial usages of "ultimate" and "conventional." The Tibetan, then, offers several possibilities, including the very straightforward rendering, "If the ultimate is nirvaI).a and saJ?1siira is the conventional, the Buddha too would be saJ?1siira; thus, what use would the practices of enlightenment be?''46

The ambiguity of the Tibetan translation allows for a number of interpretations, not all of which would seem coherent when reading the received Sanskrit. Williams pointed out that many Indian and

44 Williams, "On PrakrtinirviiIJ-alPrakrtinirvrta in the Bodhicaryii­vatiira," 522-523.

45 The Sanskrit of stanzas IX.l3cd and 14ab reads (La Vallee Poussin, Prajfiiikaramati's Commentary [1907], 385): nirvrtaJ:t paramiirthena sa-/!lvrtyii yadi saf!!saret II buddho 'pi saf!!sared evaf!! tataJ:t kif!! bodhi­caryayii I While redundant, my "cycling in saf!!siira" conveys the Sanskrit verbal use of the word.

46 The Tibetan, edited from the canonical versions, is found in Oldmeadow, A Study of the Wisdom Chapter, vol. 2, 34: gal te don dam my a nan 'das II 'khor ba kun rdzob de ita na II sans rgyas kyan ni 'khor 'gyur bas II byan chub spyod pas ci zig bya II The Dunhuang version does not differ substantially (Saito, A Study of the Dun-huang Recension, 50).

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Tibetan commentators read this objection as embodying a misun­derstanding of the difference between "natural nirvaI).a" (or "natu­ral cessation;" prakrtinirvtilJa/prakrtinirvrta) and the attainment of nirvaI).aY Prajiiakaramati reads the passage in just this way, having the objector state that "a Buddha, who has cessation due to aban­doning all defilements, also would be cycling in saf[lstira."48 The identity between natural nirvaI).a and saf[lstira that Madhyamikas accept leads the objector to contend (mistakenly) that the attain­ment of nirvaI).a would leave one still in saf[lstira. Prajiiakaramati's reading of the objection makes for an easy Madhyamaka answer: despite the "natural cessation" of all phenomena, the attain­ment of nirvaI).a depends on attaining the cessation of ignorance (avidytinirodha), at the root of the twelve links of dependent aris­ing, as explained in a lengthy quote from the Stilistambasiitra. 49

Upon the cessation of ignorance and the remaining links, "there would be no cycling in saf[lstira."50

rNog BIo ldan ses rab, bSod nams rtse mo tells us, took a simi­lar approach to explicating Santideva's question and answer. On rNog's reading, the objector claims that since all things are natu­rally nirvaI).a, which is in the end no different from saf[lstira, those

47 Williams, "On PrakrtinirviiT}a/Prakrtinirvrta in the Bodhicaryii­vatiira," 522ff., especially 525-526 where Williams notes, "The distinc­tion between innate 'enlightenment' and that attained through following the path means that the prakrtinirviiT}a is almost universally employed in Tibet to explain the opponent's objection and its solution." As will be seen, the early bKa' gdams pa materials present an important counter to this claim.

48 La Vallee Poussin, Prajfiiikaramati's Commentary (1907), 385,17-18: buddho 'pi sarviivaraT}aprahiiT}ato nirvrto 'pi sal!lsiiret / The Tibetan translation here renders nirvrta as my a nan las 'das pa, consistent with the handling of Santideva's stanza. However, in Prajfiakaramati's intro­duction to this passage, his usage of prakrtinirvrta (385,7) is rendered ran biin gyis ldog pa. For the edited Tibetan of the complete passage, see Oldmeadow, A Study o/the Wisdom Chapter, vol. 2, 34-35.

49 La Vallee Poussin, Prajfiiikaramati's Commentary (1907), 386,12ff.

50 La Vallee Poussin, Prajfiiikaramati's Commentary (1907), 389,12: sal!lsiiraT}al!l na syiit /

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who attain nirvax;ta are in actuality still in sa1flSara; so, the objector wonders, what is the point of the practices of enlightenment? rNog explains (according to bSod nams rtse mo) that while all things are ultimately naturally nirvax;ta, conventionally there is a difference between the attainment of nirvax;ta and sa1flsara according to "the extinction or non-extinction of the adventitious causes that gener­ate affiictions."51 rNog's explanation, then, may have relied on that of Prajfiakaramati, or at minimum was drawn from consultation of a Sanskrit version of Santideva's text related to that preserved in Prajfiakaramati's commentary, a version that facilitates a "natural nirva1'}a versus attained nirva1'}a" reading of the objection and an­swer.

Surprisingly, Prajfiakaramati's and rNog's explication of this passage was not adopted by other early bKa' gdams pa authors. One reason for this departure is the above-noted ambiguity of the Tibetan translation of Santideva's question. A second reason is Santideva's somewhat cryptic answer: "If the causes do not have their continuum cut, illusion also is not stopped; upon the causes having their continuum cut, it does not arise even conventionally."52 Following Prajfiakaramati, "the causes" would be ignorance, de­sire, and hatred - the causes of sa1flSara; the cutting of their con­tinuum would refer to the reversal of the twelve links of dependent arising. The parallel construction of this passage implies that what "does not arise even conventionally" is "illusion." However, the va­riety of interpretations left open by the objector's question allows Tibetan authors to develop various readings of just what has its "continuum cut" and just what Santideva claims "does not arise," readings that give rise to distinct classifications of Madhyamaka.

51 bSod nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, 495.3,4 (295b4): non mons pa skyed pa'i rgyu glo bur ba zad ma zad kyis 'byed do.

52 La Vallee Poussin, Prajniikaramati's Commentary (1907), 386,6-7: pratyayiiniim anucchede miiyiipy ucchidyate na hi I pratyayiiniirrz tu vicchediit sarrzvrtyiipi na sarrzbhavaJ:z II Oldmeadow, A Study of the Wisdom Chapter, vol. 2, 35: rkyen nams rgyun ni ma chad na II sgyu ma'ang ldog par mi 'gyur gyi II rkyen nams rgyun ni chad pas na II kun rdzob tu yan mi 'byun no II While the original has no pronoun in the final piida, I insert "it" as a placeholder for the interpretations discussed below.

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The clearest statement of this alternate interpretation is found in bSod nams rtse mo's commentary, our source for the previous presentation of rNog's reading. Having given rNog's position, bSod nams rtse mo notes, "That explanation is not very good. Regarding this, the great commentator explains in this way."53 Following this unnamed "great commentator" (likely to be Phya pa), he claims that rNog has misunderstood the objection, for in Sautrantika, "the intentional objects of nirvii1}a are ultimate and thoroughly afflicted intentional objects are conventionaL" Given this, the Sautrantika opponent here asks

Would the Buddha also have awareness of appearances or would he not? If not, it follows that the Buddha is a non-entity or is matter. If Buddha has awareness of appearances, is that conventional or ulti­mate? If ultimate, [your] thesis stating that awareness is conventional deteriorates. If conventional, it follows that [the Buddha] is sal'(tsiira due to having conventional, thoroughly afflicted proliferations. If you accept that, what is the point of the bodhisattva practices?54

Rather than charging Madhyamaka with a suffering Buddha -through the confiation of natural nirvii1}a and the attainment of nirvii1}a - in this interpretation the objector is concerned about what a Buddha can perceive. The equations that the Tibetan trans­lation allows between nirvii1}a and the ultimate, on one hand, and

53 bSod nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, 495.3,5 (295b5): Mad pa de ha cali legs pa ma yin no II 'di la 'grel chen byed pas 'di ltar 'chad de I

54 bSod nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, 495.3,5-495.4,2 (295b5-296a2): spyir mdo sde pa rali gi grub mtha' my a lian las 'das pa'i dmigs pa ni don dam pa yin la I kun nas non mons pa'i dmigs pa ni kun rdzob ces bsams nas rgol ba ni I gal te don dam my a nan 'das II 'khor ba kun rdzob de Ita na II sans rgyas kyan ni 'khor 'gyur bas II byali chub spyod pas ci zig bya II zes smos te I gal te don dam pa ni my a lian las 'das pa yin na 'khor ba ni kun rdzob kyi spros pa yin na sans rgyas la'ali snan bcas kyi blo yod dam med I med na salis rgyas dlios med dam bems por thalIa I yod na de kun rdzob yin nam don dam yin I don dam yin na blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod kyi dam bca' nams la I kun rdzob yin na kun rdzob kun nas non molis spros pa yod pas 'khor bar thallo I de 'dod na byali chub spyod pas ci Zig bya zes rgol ba na I

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sa1!lsiira and the conventional, on the other, leaves the Buddha per­ceiving only an ultimate emptiness, without the ability to perceive conventional appearances. If a Buddha perceives conventional ap­pearances, the objector reasons, that Buddha must have "conven­tional, thoroughly afflicted proliferations," which the bodhisattva path was to have removed.

bSod nams rtse mo's interpretation of the issue is not unique to him but is first found in rGya dmar pa's commentary. rGya dmar pa further reads the objector to equate "mistake" (,khrul pa, bhriinta) and awareness (bla, buddhi); a Buddha's perception of appearances would entail a mistaken Buddha.55 rGya dmar pa and bSod nams rtse mo thus see a debate on just what connection a Buddha has with the conventional world. Specifically, if nirviilJa is the ultimate, do those who reach nirviilJa perceive the conventional, which has (in this interpretation) been declared to be sa1!lsiira? And if they do, do these perceptions entail on the part of Buddhas ignorance, the root of sa1!lsiira?

rGya dmar pa notes that Madhyamikas have two possible an­swers to this objection, which divides them into two camps: "those who assert that wisdom has its continuum cut" and "those [who assert] that wisdom does not have its continuum cut." rGya dmar pa clearly reads Santideva's answer ("upon the causes having their continuum cut, it does not arise even conventionally") in a new way: here, the issue is whether awareness continues through the transformation to buddhahood or, alternatively, whether it is a Buddha's wisdom that "does not arise." On the first group's answer, rGya dmar pa tells us

Some Madhyamikas assert that since all awareness is mistaken, when mistake is extinguished awareness itself does not exist and thus wis­dom has its continuum cut; "even conventionally" wisdom does not exist. These assertions are not reasonable. . .. Even though mistake is extinguished, wisdom is not stopped .... Since [Buddhas] see (gzigs pa) illusory dependent arising as just illusion without the capacity to apprehend it as true, they are not mistaken. 56

55 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 133,3-4 (63a3-4). 56 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar bsad pa, 134,6-135,1 (63b6-64a1):

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Accepting a strong correlation between nirvii1Ja and perceiving the ultimate, emptiness, the first camp holds that the transformation to a Buddha eradicates all awareness, which is necessarily mistaken. Without awareneSs - the instrument that perceives conventional appearances - wisdom (which is here understood to be a type of awareness) cannot arise. With mistaken awareness extinguished, Buddhas are left in emptiness.

This notion is unacceptable to rGya dmar pa, a partisan of the second camp, who instead holds that mistake and awareness are separable. Rather than read Santideva's answer as entailing a wisdom-less Buddha, rGya dmar pa nuances his response, writing "When, at buddhahood, 'the causes' that are collected in sa1'(tsiira 'have their continuum cut,' that [awareness] collected in sa1'(tsiira 'even conventionally does not arise."'57 Whereas the first group understands Santideva to claim that "even conventionally, wisdom does not arise" due to all awareness being extirpated along with ignorance, this interpretation limits the negation to those states of mind "collected in sa1'(tsiira." While "mistake" characterizes awareness in sa1'(tsiira, it is not a necessary quality of awareness. Wisdom is a Buddha's awareness, stripped of mistake by way of a Buddha's overcoming the conception that ordinary appearances are true. rGya dmar pa notes a further significant difficulty in the first interpretation: "If wisdom did not exist, the Buddha would not exist; thus, the Buddha's teachings themselves would not exist and the sangha who realize them would not exist."58

'on kyan blo thams cad 'khrul pa yin pas 'khrul pa zad pa'i tshe blo iiid med pas ye ses rgyun chad do ies kun rdzob du yan ye ses med do ies dbu' ma pa kha cig 'dod pa ni mi rigs ste / ... 'khrul pa zad kyan ye ses de mi ldog go / ... rten 'brei sgyu' ma la bden par 'dzin pa mi mna' bar sgyu' ma iiid du gzigs pas ma 'khrul ies bya'o /

57 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 133,7-8 (63a7-8): sans rgyas pa'i tshe' 'khor bas bsdus pa'i rkyen rnams rgyun ni chad pas na / 'khor bas bsdus pa kun rdzob du yan mi 'byun no /

58 rGya dmar pa, Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 134,3 (63b3): ye ses myed na sans rgyas iiid med pas / de'i bstan pa ilid med cin de la bsgrub pa'i dge 'dun med pas /

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rGya dmar pa's portrayal of these two Madhyamika explanations appears in similar form in bSod nams rtse mo's explication. Having already declared that the "natural nirviilJa v. attained nirviilJa" in­terpretation of rNog misses the point and reoriented the problem around the issue of what a Buddha perceives, bSod nams rtse mo gives two possible answers to this problem, which he further iden­tifies as the PrasaIigika and Svatantrika positions. He begins with the PrasaIigika answer, which reads Santideva's "causes" as "the causes of awareness of appearances:"

'Upon the causes having their continuum cut:' The diamond-like meditative equipoise cuts the continuum of all signs and conceptual­ity, thereby cutting the continuum of afflictions. Cutting that [further] cuts the continuum of actions. Cutting the continuum of that [further] cuts the continuum of awareness of appearances, whereby sarrzsiira, 'even conventionally, does not arise.'59

This equation of samsiira and perceiving conventionalities works well with the Tibet~n translation of Santideva's stanza. However, bSod nams rtse mo cannot accept this equation, as it either leaves Buddhas in the dark or, as the objector has claimed, leaves all man­ner of realized beings in saY[tsiira.

Instead, bSod nams rtse mo states "We do not assert that all con­ventionalities are saY[tsiira, nor do we assert that all nirviilJas are ultimate; we posit [them] as ultimate or conventional through bear­ing or not bearing analysis."60 He endorses the Svatantrika read­ing of Santideva's answer, that "'Upon causes,' that is, actions and afflictions, 'having their continua cut, even conventionally' that is,

59 bSod nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, 495.4,4-495.4,5 (296a4-296a5): rkyen rnams rgyun ni chad pa na* ste rdo rje ita bu'i tin ne 'dzin gyis mtshan ma dan rnam par rtog pa thams cad rgyun bead pas non mons pa rgyun bead / de bead pas las rgyun bead / de rgyun bead pas snan bcas kyi blo rgyun bead pas 'khor ba kun rdzob tu'an no i.es bya ba'o / * The text incorrectly reads ma chad pa for chad pa na.

60 bSod nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, 496.1,1 (296b1): kho bo cag kun rdzob thams cad 'khor bar khas mi len / my a nan 'das pa thams cad don dam du khas mi len te / dpyad bzod mi bzod kyis don dam kun rdzob tu 'jog go /

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even to Buddhas' conventional wisdom, [illusion] 'does not arise' as saY(lsara."61 Appearances themselves are not cut off by the trans­formation to buddhahood, afflictions are. As with rGya dmar pa, appearances have a somewhat neutral status: illusory appearances can "arise as saY(lsara" to the afflicted or they can be perceived by a Buddha's conventional wisdom without these appearances serving as a cause of suffering. As for rGya dmar pa, afflictions and aware­ness are separable. There is a point to the practices of enlighten­ment, after all.

Before considering what we can glean from these divisions of Madhyamaka, we must ask a more basic question: was this alternate interpretation of Santideva's objection and answer simply a misun­derstanding of the original passage? The issue of a Buddha's ability to perceive ordinary appearances would be nearly impossible to derive from the Sanskrit versions that we have of Santideva's text. Prajfiakaramati's lengthy commentary takes a straightforward ap­proach to this passage, explaining the distinction between saY(lsara and nirvalJa with recourse to the twelve links of dependent arising. While my investigation of Indian commentaries is far from com­plete, we can note that Vibhuticandra's interpretation of this pas­sage suggests a concern with the relation between "mistake" and "appearances," and whether a Buddha's ability to perceive the latter entails possession of the former. He writes, "Ultimately, saY(lsara just does not exist; the appearances of saY(lsara due to mistake [lasts] for as long as ignorance exists. Having dispelled ignorance through the arya path, those [appearances of saY(lsara] also do not exist."62 Vibhuticandra's reading echoes the Prasailgika interpreta-

61 bSad nams rtse mo, sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa, 496.1,2-3 (296b2-3): rkyen las dan non mons pa rgyun chad na kun rdzob tu'an ste sans rgyas la ye ses kun rdzob yod kyan 'khor bar mi 'byun ies bya ba dbu ma ran rgyud pa rnams Mad pa byed do / In reading "even conventionally" as "even to Buddhas' conventional wisdom," bSod nams rtse mo must read Santideva as assuming that Buddhas' meditative absorption (mnam biag ye ses) contains no appearances at all; the point here, as bSod nams rtse mo sees it, is that appearances, while occurring in Buddhas' conven­tional wisdom, are not the affiicted appearances of sal!lsara.

62 Bodhicaryavataratatparyapanjika Vise,yadyotanf, 260b7-261al: don

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tion that bSod nams rtse mo sketched and rejected. Vibhuticandra's commentary, however, was composed later than all of the Tibetan commentaries discussed herein and so could not serve as bSod nams rtse mo's referent.63 Vibhuticandra may be repeating an in­terpretation from an earlier Indian commentary on Santideva's text (which would likely require an alternate version of the Sanskrit that would allow for this interpretation), suggesting that Tibetan com­mentators may have had some Indian precedent for reading this passage as concerning a Buddha's perceptive abilities. At the very least, we cannot dismiss this Tibetan interpretation on the grounds of poor philology.

Returning to the issue of Madhyamaka classifications drawn from this passage, it is clear that rGya dmar pa and bSod nams rtse mo refer to the same debate, portraying the two Madhyamaka positions in very similar terms and themselves taking the same side in the dispute. What are we to make of bSod nams rtse mo's addi­tion of labeling the two positions "Prasangika" and "Svatantrika?" In the generation between rGya dmar pa and bSod nams rtse mo, Candraklrti's philosophy began to attract a strong following. Among the issues that Phya pa, who was bSod nams rtse mo's teacher of the Bodhicaryiivatiira, found the most distressing about this develop­ment were the "Prasangika" (although he did not use the term) por­trayals of the ultimate and of buddhahood. We see Jayananda, the twelfth-century commentator on the Madhyamakiivatiira, interpret CandrakIrti's claims that the ultimate "is ineffable and just not a

dam par 'khor ba med pa fiid 'khrul pas 'khor ba'i man ba ni gti mug yod pa ji srid du'o II 'phags pa'i lam gyis gti mug spans nas de 'an med par 'gyur ro /

63 In his colophon (Bodhicaryiivatiiratiitparyapafijikii, 28Sa7), VibhU­ticandra states that he translated his text into Tibetan himself at 'BriIi mtshams, making it highly unlikely that it would have been known to bSod nams rtse mo, as Vibhuticandra made the first of his three trips to Tibet in 1204, in the company of SiikyasrThhadra, twenty-two years after bSod nams rtse mo died. On Vibhuticandra's travels, see Stearns, "The Life and Tibetan Legacy," 127-146. It remains possible that VibhUticandra wrote his commentary in Tibet and in this passage offered something of a response to bSod nams rtse mo.

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referent of consciousness" and that Buddhas have no mind very lit­erally.64 Since the ultimate is beyond awareness, Jayananda tells us, realization of the ultimate must entail the cessation of awareness and with it the ability to perceive appearances.65 Phya pa argued at length against these positions, for reasons quite like bSod nams rtse mo's: Buddhas must have wisdom, wisdom is a type of aware­ness, and so awareness must continue in a purified form through the transformation to buddhahood; to hold otherwise, Phya pa says, one's position would resemble the nihilism of the Carvakas.66 Phya pa, in turn, was criticized for his "reified ultimate," an ultimate that bears analysis and is accessible to awareness (although, as noted

64 La Vallee Poussin, Madhyamakiivatiira, 108,9-11: sans rgyas rnams la ni chos thams cad rnam pa thams cad du mnon par rdzogs par byan chub pa'i phyir I sems dan sems las byun ba'i rgyu ba gtan log par 'dod pa yin no I "We assert that for Buddhas, due to being manifestly and completely enlightened to all phenomena in all aspects, the movement of mind and mental factors has entirely ceased." Candraklrti makes similar statements in his discussion of buddhahood, particularly in his autocom­mentary to stanzas XII.8-9.

65 Jayananda, Madhyamakiivatiiratfkii, 146a7-146b1: ci yan thugs su chud pa med pa'i sgo nas byan chub pa'i phyir sems dan sems las byun ba'i rgyu ba gtan log par 'dod pa yin te Iiams su myon ba'i mtshan liid can gyi sems dan tshor ba la sogs pa sems las byun ba rnams kyi kun du spyod pa ste 'jug pa log par 'dod pa yin te I sems dan sems las byun ba rnams Jug pa ma yin no ies pa'o II des na ci yan snan ba med pa yin no ies pa'i tha tshig ste I rnam par rtog pa thams cad 'gag pa'i phyir ro I "Since enlightenment is by way of not knowing at all, we assert that the activities of mind and mental factors - feeling and so forth - hav­ing the character of experiencing, have ceased their engagement; there is no engagement of mind and mental factors. Therefore, there is no ap­pearance at all, because all conceptuality has been blocked." Jayananda's views on ultimate truth and buddhahood are discussed in detail in Vose, Resurrecting Candrakfrti, 88-92 and 112-122.

66 Phya pa chos kyi sen ge, dBu ma sar gsum, 72,16-76,5. This passage is translated in Vose, Resurrecting Candrakfrti, 159-164 and analyzed at 122-131.

Making and remaking the ultimate 311

above, Phya pa holds the ultimate to be "utterly not established"), a position that Jayananda rejects as "Svatantrika."67

bSod nams rtse mo remains the earliest known author to pair the terms "Prasangika" and "Svatantrika," here using them to distin­guish alternative visions of ultimate truth and buddhahood. His us­age - and the absence of these terms in rGya dmar pa's discussion­holds two significant consequences for our understanding of how Tibetans read Santideva. Prior to the widespread dissemination of Candraklrti's texts in the early twelfth century, Santideva was not a Prasangika. While rGya dmar pa refers to variant interpretations of Santideva (without calling these interpretations "Prasangika" or "Svatantrika"), he reads Santideva's views as consistent with those of Srlgupta and Jiianagarbha; and he seems to have had Indian precedent for doing SO.68 Further, even as Candraklrti's fame grew, Prasangika became only one option for reading Santideva; as bSod nams rtse mo's work evinces, Santideva could be read as a Svatantrika. Santideva became a Prasangika only after generations of Tibetan debate.

We can recall that gTsan nag pa, writing in the same generation as bSod nams rtse mo, invoked Candraklrti's transcendent ulti­mate to explain Santideva's presentation; his "Great Madhyamaka" unites Candraklrti and Santideva around a transcendent reading of ultimate truth. Intriguingly, gTsan nag pa says nothing about the Prasangika-Svatantrika divide over a Buddha's ability to perceive appearances. Rather, his explanation of this passage in Santideva returns to a portrayal similar to Prajiiakaramati's: at issue is a mis­understanding on the part of the objector between natural nirviilJa and the attainment of nirviilJa. He has the objector ask,

67 Jayananda, Madhyamakilvatiiratfkii, 120a.

68 rGya dmar pa reads Santideva's portrayal of the two truths as consist­ent with that of Jiianagarbha (Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 127 [60aJ) and refers to SrIgupta to explain a Buddha's perception of ordinary appear­ances (Tshig don gsal bar Mad pa, 135 [64aJ). Saito notes the Yogacara­Madhyamaka interpretation of the Bodhicaryiivatiira in two early Indian commentaries ("Santideva in the History of Madhyamika," 259).

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If it is suitable that even natural nirviilJa is sa,!!siira conventionally, it is not contradictory that the attainment of buddhahood through making effort on the path also is sa'!!siira conventionally; thus, what would be the point of attaining a buddhahood that does not cast off the sufferings of sa'!!siira?69

gTsaJi nag pa quickly answers that Santideva's discussion teaches that upon the attainment of buddhahood, the causes of sarrtsiira are cut off.7° This brief answer and the failure to discuss the is­sue of a Buddha's perception - following three generations (if we include Phya pa) of commentaries that discuss the issue - suggests that gTsaJi nag pa's portrayal of a transcendent ultimate does not provide him with a good answer to rGya dmar pa's and bSod nams rtse mo's criticisms. An ultimate beyond the ken of the intellect, realization of which entails the cessation of awareness, provides no nuanced way of presenting how a Buddha's "conventional wisdom" arises. Rather than answering bSod nams rtse mo's critique of the PrasaJigika "blind Buddha," gTsaJi nag pa changes the subject. One senses that the early Tibetan tradition following Candrak'irti had to set aside the thorny issue of where an utterly transcendent ultimate left a Buddha's perception of ordinary appearances.

The early evolution of Madhyamaka categories

We have seen how Santideva's statements on ultimate truth and the distinction between sarrtsiira and nirviilJa gave rise to compet­ing interpretations, which in turn served as criteria for classify­ing Madhyamikas. Santideva's ultimate could be "like an illusion" or "utterly non-abiding;" his buddhahood could be PrasaJigika or Svatantrika. One further discussion suggests how we might trace an evolution among these twelfth-century Madhyamaka catego­ries. Rather than a division between "illusionists" and "utterly non-abiding-ists," Grags pa rgyal mtshan, bSod nams rtse mo's

69 gTsan nag pa, sPyod jug gi rnam Mad, 562,7-8 (38b7-8): ran biin gyis my a nan las 'das !ryan kun rdzob du 'khor bar run na lam la 'bad pas sans rgyas thob !ryan kun rdzob du 'khor ba mi 'gal bas 'khor ba'i sdug bsnal mi 'dar ba'i sans rgyas 'thob pas ci bya ies pa la I

70 gTsan nag pa, sPyod jug gi rnam Mad, 562,8 (38b8).

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younger brother, writes of a division within the "utterly non-abid­ing" Madhyamaka position between "Continuum Cutting Utterly Non-Abiding [Madhyamikas]" and "Union Utterly Non-Abiding [Madhyamikas]."71 In his discussion of these two groups, instead of these unwieldy names Grags pa rgyal mtshan calls the former "PrasaiLgika" and the latter "Svatantrika." His explanation of the two categories maps very closely onto the divisions we have seen rGya dmar pa and bSod nams rtse mo make: Prasangikas hold that "Since Buddhas are always in meditative absorption, they only [have] ultimate [awareness];"72 ordinary awareness perceiv­ing appearances has had its continuum cut. The Svatantrika po­sition, which Grags pa rgyal mtshan endorses, instead holds that "Buddhas' non-conceptual minds are ultimate; as [their] pure worldly wisdom is supported by [non-conceptual] wisdom, it ac­cords with the conventional."73 Grags pa rgyal mtshan's notion of

71 Grags pa rgyal mtshan, Rin po che'i !jon sin, 21.4,1 (42b1): rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa'i 'dod tshul dan / zun 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa'i 'dod tshul.

72 Grags pa rgyal mtshan, Rin po che'i !jon shin, 21.4,5-6 (42b5-6): dbu ma thaI 'gyur pa dag ni ... sans rgyas ni dus rtag tu mfiam par gtag pa yin pas don dam pa 'ba' zig go tes zer ro / This passage is set within a discussion of what kinds of awareness ordinary and enlightened beings possess (21.3,6-21.4,1 [42a6-42b1]: blo thams cad bsdu na blo kun rdzob pa dan / blo don dam pa tes bya ba gfiis yin pas na / blo gfiis po de gan zag gan gi rgyud la ldan ze na / "When encompassing all awareness, there are two: conventional awareness and ultimate awareness. Thus, one might ask, 'Which persons have these two awarenesses in their continua?"'). Grags pa rgyal mtshan goes on to list four positions (the "Hearer" posi­tion, the Yogiiciira position, the PriisaIigika position, and the Sviitantrika position), detailing where each school stands on the mental states of "or­dinary beings" (so so skye bo), iiryas, and Buddhas.

73 Grags pa rgyal mtshan, Rin po che'i !jon sin, 22.1,1-3 (43a1-3): dbu ma ran rgyud pa dag ... sans rgyas kyi thugs rnam par mi rtog pa ni don dam pa yin la / dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye ses ni ye ses la dmigs nas rnam grans kyi kun rdzob yin no / For a more substantial discussion of this passage that discusses Grags pa rgyal mtshan's views on "concordant ultimates" and "concordant conventionals," see Vose, Resurrecting Can­drakfrti, 104-107.

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"pure worldly wisdom" mirrors his brother's "conventional wis­dom;" both show how Buddhas can continue to perceive conven­tional appearances along with their realization of emptiness. Grags pa rgyal mtshan further notes that both kinds of wisdom are neces­sary to explain non-abiding nirviilJa (aprati~rhitanirviilJa, mi gnas pa'i my a nan las 'das pa), in which Buddhas are both fully realized and fully able to aid sentient beings.74

Grags pa rgyal mtshan's discussion suggests that, at least in one reckoning, Prasailgika and Svatantrika evolved out of the "utterly non-abiding position" and that neither could be mapped onto the "illusionist" position, which was widely rejected in bKa' gdams pa circles. Having cast aside the "illusionist" view, early bKa' gdams pa authors (and their Sa skya pa students) found significant enough philosophical differences to split further the Madhyamaka view. Despite a mutual adherence to the "non-abiding" of all phenomena, disputes over buddhahood produced, at least in part, the Prasailgika­Svatantrika divide.75 The only outlier category is gTsail nag pa's "Great Madhyamaka," interestingly posited by the one Candraklrti supporter in this group of commentators. Above, we saw that gTsail nag pa's "Great Madhyamaka" refers to Candraklrti's revivalists, whom others in this time period would call "Prasailgikas." The similarities between gTsail nag pa's views and those of Jayananda, as well as the positions that bSod nams rtse mo and Grags pa rgyal mtshan criticize (and label "Prasailgika"), strengthens this identi-

74 After stating the Prasailgika position, Grags pa rgyal mtshan notes, "That is not correct; it incurs the fault that it would absurdly follow that Buddhas would not enter non-abiding nirva;(ta" (Rin po che'i ljon sin, 21.4,6 [42b6]: de'an yan dag pa ma yin te / sans rgyas rnams ni mi gnas pa'i my a nan las 'das pa labiugs pa ma yin par thai 'gyur ba'i skyon yod do I). Following his statement of the Svatantrika position, he notes, "Thus, there is non-abiding nirvii(ta" (Rin po che'i ljon sin, 22.1,3-4 [43a3-4]: des na mi gnas pa'i my a nan las 'das pa'an yin la I).

75 This, of course, discounts those like rNog and Gro lUIi pa who re­jected the "non-abiding" position out of hand. However, as noted above, both understood the "non-abiding" view quite differently from how it is portrayed by rGya dmar pa and Phya pa.

Making andremaking the ultimate 315

fication. Why then doesn't gTsaIi nag pa take up the "PrasaIigika" moniker?

To sketch a tentative answer, we can note that bSod nams rtse mo's discussion of PrasaIigika and Svatantrika, when explicating Santideva's distinction between saJ?'lsara and nirva1'}a, skews the playing field against the former, equating it with the clearly prob­lematic stance that awarenesS is cut off upon buddhahood. Rather than take up the "PrasaIigika" side of the debate on this issue -and thereby attempt to defend a blind Buddha - gTsali nag pa ig­nored the dispute altogether. At least on this issue, the Svatantrika position had a clear advantage over Prasaligika in twelfth century Tibet?6 In contrast, "Great Madhyamaka" would represent gTsali nag pa's attempt to divide up Madhyamaka with Candraklrti on top. Rather than make a case for CandrakIrti's superiority on the issue of a Buddha's perception, gTsali nag pa uses CandrakIrti's portrayal of a transcendent ultimate, utterly distinct from mundane objects of knowledge, to valorize the "Great Madhyamaka" view. In the context of early Tibetan Bodhicaryavatara commentaries, these evolving Madhyamaka categories attempt to give the author's system top billing and to claim Santideva as their own. gTsali nag pa aligns Santideva's ultimate with CandrakIrti's, adopting him into Great Madhyamaka. The host of Svatantrika-Ieaning com­mentators instead nuanced Santideva's stanzas on ultimate truth and the saJ?'lsara-nirva1'}a distinction in order to forge a more co­herent model of ultimate truth and those transformed by realization of it. rGya dmar pa and bSod nams rtse mo would have us believe that Santideva's "true thought" aligns with what would come to be called "Svatantrika."

Santideva, then, was called many things by early Tibetan com­mentators. Fidelity to Santideva is difficult to judge given the poetic nature of his work. It may well be easier to square Santideva's state­ment that "the ultimate is not a referent of awareness" with a tran-

76 This is not to say that no Candraldrti partisans adopted the label "Priisaligika" in this period. Georges Dreyfus and Drongbu Tsering's ar­ticle in this present volume shows that Pa tshab Ni ma grags indeed used the term "PriisaIigika" for his CandrakIrti-inspired Madhyamaka.

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scendent reading, consistent with how Candraklrti's twelfth cen­tury revivalists portrayed his views. However, reading Santideva as advancing views similar to those of Srlgupta, Jfianagarbha, Santarak~ita, or KamalaSIla held historical credibility and re­mained a viable option for early Tibetan commentators. We see in these commentaries a variety of ways to reconcile Santideva's seemingly transcendent ultimate with his broader project of map­ping the practices of enlightenment. Harmonizing the ultimate with the path leading to its realization is an issue at the very core of Mahayana Buddhism; harmonizing realization of the ultimate with the kind of epistemological program that gSari. phu Ne'u thog was known for would remain a defining feature of Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism. Early Tibetan Bodhicaryiivatiira commentaries pro­vide a glimpse of how these processes played out in the making and remaking of one of the preeminent figures of Buddhist India.

References

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Grags pa rgyal mtshan. rGyud kyi mnon par rtogs pa rin po che'i ljon sin. In Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum, volume 3. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968.

Gro lun pa BIo gros 'byun gnas. bsTan rim chen mo. Mundgod: Library of His Eminence Trijang Rinpoche, 2001. Also, bKa' gdams gsun 'bum, vol­umes 4 and 5.

rGya dmar pa Byan chub grags. Byan chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i tshig don gsal bar Mad pa. In bKa' gdams gsun 'bum, volume 6,11-175.

Jayananda. Madhyamakilvatilratfkil (dBu ma la 'jug pa'i 'grel Mad). bsTan 'gyur, sDe dge edition, Tohoku 3870; dbu ma, volume ya.

bKa' gdams gsun 'bum phyogs bsgrigs. Chengdu: dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe riii:f1 fib 'jug khan, 2006.

rNog Blo ldan ses rab. sPrin yig bdud rtsi thig Ie. In bKa' gdams gsun 'bum, volume 1,707-710.

Phya pa Chos kyi sen ge. dBu ma sar gsum gyi ston thun, edited by Helmut Tauscher. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 1999.

- bDe bar gsegs pa dan phyi rol pa'i giung mam par 'byed pa. In bKa' gdams gsun 'bum, volume 9, 7-73.

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- sPyod jug bsdus don. In bKa' gdams gsun 'bum, volume 7, 131-145.

Prajfiakaramati. Bodhicaryavatarapafijika. See La Vallee Poussin.

Santideva. Bodhicaryavatara (Byan chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la jug pa). bsTan 'gyur, sDe dge edition, Tohoku 3871; dbu ma, volume ya.

bSod nams rtse mo. sPyod pa la jug pa'i 'grel pa. In Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum, volume 2. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968.

gTsan nag pa brTson 'grus sen ge. sPyod jug gi rnam Mad. In bKa' gdams gsun 'bum, volume 13, 487-581.

VibhUticandra. Bodhicaryavataratatparyapafijika Vise~adyotanf(Byan chub kyi spyod pa la jug pa'i dgons pa'i 'grel pa khyad par gsal byed). bsTan 'gyur, sDe dge edition, Tohoku 3880; dbu ma, volume sa.

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La Vallee Poussin, Louis de. Prajfiakaramati's Commentary to the Bodhi­caryavatara of 9antideva, Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905-1914.

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Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. "Blending the SUtras with the Tantras: The Influence of Maitrlpa and his Circle on the Formation of Sutra Mahamudra in the Kagyu Schools." In Tibetan Buddhist Literature and Praxis: Studies in its Formative Period 900-1400, Proceedings of the Tenth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Oxford 2003, volume 4, edited by Ronald M. Davidson and Christian K. Wedemeyer, 201-227. Leiden: Brill, 2006.

Napper, Elizabeth. Dependent-Arising and Emptiness. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1989.

Oldmeadow, Peter R. A Study of the Wisdom Chapter (Prajfiapiiramita Pa­riccheda) of the Bodhicaryavatarapafijika of Prajiiakaramati. Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, 1994.

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Thought, Part One. Vienna: Arbeitskreis flir Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 2000.

- Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka Philosophy, Candrakfrti's Prasanna­padil Madhyamakavrttif:t on Madhyamakakilrikil 1.1 and TSOli kha pa Blo bzan grags pa / rGyaltshab Dar ma rin chen's dKa' gnad/gnas brgyad kyi zin bris, Annotated Translations, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Ma­dhyamaka Thought, Part 2. Vienna: Arbeitskreis flir Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 2002.

Saito, Akira. "Santideva in the History of Madhyamika." In Buddhism in India and Abroad, edited by Kalpakam Sankarnarayan, Motohiro Yoritomi, and Shubhada A. Joshi, 257-263. Mumbai and New Delhi: Somaiya Publications, 1996.

- "Bu ston on the sPyod 'jug (Bodhisattvacaryilvatilra)." In Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinke1lner, and Helmut Tauscher, 79-85. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

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Williams, Paul. "On Prakrtinirvilr:za/Prakrtinirvrta in the Bodhicaryiivatiira: A Study in the Indo-Tibetan Commentarial Tradition." Etudes Asiatiques 46, no. 1 (1992): 516-550.