vpn and security flaws rajesh perumal clemson university

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VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

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Page 1: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS

Rajesh PerumalClemson University

Page 2: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

VPN – AN ATTRACTIVE TARGET

Carry Sensitive information Remote access VPNs exposes entire

internal network Intrusion Detection Systems cannot

Monitor VPN Traffic Increase in security in Internet

servers makes VPN a tempting Target.

Page 3: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

VPN FLAWS Insecure storage of Authentication

credentials by VPN Clients Username Enumeration Vulnerabilities Offline Password Cracking Man in the Middle Attacks Lack of Account Lockout Poor Default Configurations Poor Guidance and Documentation

Page 4: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

Insecure storage of Authentication credentials by VPN Clients

Storing the username unencrypted in a file or the registry

Storing password in scrambled form or obfuscated form

Physical memory dumps can reveal plain text passwords

Caching credentials

Page 5: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

Username Enumeration Vulnerabilities

IKE Aggressive Mode with PSK will prompt or give clue the hacker, the login name is incorrect. So the hacker can deduce the correct user names.

Page 6: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

Offline Password Cracking

Easy to obtain Hash function. Responder hash is obtained Dictionary attack on the password will

reveal in feasible amount.

Page 7: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

Man in the Middle Attacks By installing a packet sniffing system between the

VPN client and server , we can sniff clear text user names and the password can be cracked by the 1st and 2nd packets of the IKE Aggressive mode exchange.

The sniffing system (SS), acts as a server for the client and as a client for the server. SS can get passwords, user names and ISAKMP message from the client and issue its own ISAKMP message. Similarly the sniffer can send its own ISAKMP message, since the user name and password is known.

Page 8: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University
Page 9: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University
Page 10: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

Poor Guidance and Documentation

End user is not provided with proper documentation and is not well informed to take proper decisions.

User goes with default settings, default encryption.

Page 11: VPN AND SECURITY FLAWS Rajesh Perumal Clemson University

CONCLUSION Remote access VPN systems , 90% have had significant

security issues. Cryptographic Techniques adopted are strong but

vulnerabilities are due to poor configuration. Well accepted security practices are not adopted. Info leaking about valid usernames is prevented in OS but not

in VPN. Users make Default configuration on the basis of ease of use

rather than security. Eg. IKE Aggressive mode with PSK authentication

Users do not know the intensity of bad Configuration options. Proper testing is needed. Tools like “ike – scan” should help

testing the VPN.