CHAPTER 3

Wake Under Siege ]

,Scarcely had tile VMF-211 planes re-turned to the field before it was time forLieutenants Davidson and Kinney to flythe only two serviceable fighters on theearly midday combat patrol. It wasthen nearly 1000, almost time for the.Japanese bombers to arrive, and the

Marines soon spotted 30 of these enemyplanes coming out of the northwestat 18,000 feet. Davidson downed two ofthese aircraft, and Kinney turned a thirdhomeward with smoke trailing behind it.Then the fliers pulled away as the enemyformation entered tile range of tile Wakeguns .

This antiaircraft fire splashed onebomber in the water off Wilkes anddamaged three others. Bombs hit close toBattery I) on Peale, and others explodedon Wake. There were no Marine casual-ties, and damage was slight, but the pat-tern of the attack convinced I)evereux thatthe Japanese had spotted the position ofBattery D. As soon as the attack el~dedhe ordered this unit to displace from theneck of Toki Point to tile southeastern

end of Peale.z Marines and civilians be-

‘ L’nless otherwise noted the material in ~ha~)3 is derived from L)crereN.r Rcpt;P/(tnot>t Rcgt;

( oficer’s Nmnf, ) Repts. esl)ecially lstI,t ,1. F.A“intzey hk’pt, Major IV, L. ,T. ,?uylcr Rept,andLtCol B. D. God bol<i Ii’rpt; I)c7crvf(.r S’torfl,

2At 1700, just prior to Battery lJ’s dis-placement, a smoke bomb and a chain-flareof three red balls was sighted about two nlilesnortheast of Toki Point. This signal v’as re-

gan this displacement after dark. Sand-

bags nt the old position could not be re-claimed, and cement bags and empty arr-munition boxes had to serve this purposeat the Ilew locztion. The work wasfinished by 04L5, and Battery D againwas ready to fire.

On 12 December the Japanese came towork early. Two four-engine Kawanishipatrol bombers arrived from Majuro atabout 0500 and bombed and strafed Wakeand Peale Islands. Bombs hit the airstrip

but caused little damage. Captain Tharin,v-ho had just taken off on the morningreconnaissance patrol, intercepted one of

the big flying boats and shot it down.After this raid the It’ake defenders Went

on with their work. Reach defenses were

improved on l~illtes, and the ordnance of-

ticer, Gunner ~~arold C. ~orth, serviced

Battery L’s battered 5-inch guns. At the

ai rfielcl Lieutenant Kinney managed to

patch LIp one of T7X1F–%21’S cripples, and

this broug-ht the stren@h of the Tvake air

force up to three planes. Such work con-

tinued for the remainder of the day. To

the surprise of everyone on the atoll, the

peated twice in the next 20 minutes. The sig-

nificance of these signals has not been estab-

lished. Japanese submarines were operating in

the vicinity of Wake, however and it may be

that the signals had something to do with rescueoperations in which these boats were trying to

aid survivors from a bombing raid or from thesurf ace action.

121

122 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCAN.4L

enemy did not arrive for the usual noonraid.3

This freedom from attack was a wel-come and profitable interlude for the gzr-risen. Captain Freuler,wh ohadbeenat-tempting since the opening of the war todevise some means of employing welder’soxygen to augment the dwindling supplyfor the fighter pilots, finally managed, atgreat personal hazard, to transfer t,l~egasfrom commercial cylinders to the fliers’oxygen bottles. Without this new supplythe pilots could not have flown many morehigh altitude missions.

Another important experiment failed.Marines tried to fashion a workable air-craft sound locator out of lumber. It was“a crude pyramidal box with four un-curved plywood sides,” by Major Deve-reux’s description. It was too crude tobe of any value; it served only to magnifythe roar of the surf.

That evening IJieutenants Kinney andKliewer and Technical Sergeant Hamiltonreadied Wake’s three planes for the finalpatrol of the day. Kliewer drew a planethat was always difficult to start, 4 and histakeoff was delayed for nearly fifteenminutes. While he was climbing to over-take the other fliers he spotted an enemysubmarine on. tl~e surface some 25 milessouthwest of the atoll. He climbed to10,000 feet and maneuvered to attack with

3From 12 December until about 20 December,another day on which the enemy did not raidJVake, the recollections of surviving defenderssometimes are confused beyond any possiblereconciliation. This condition is acute for theperiod of 12–14 December inclusive. Sourcesreconstructing the events of those dates arriveat few compatible accounts. This volume at-

temps to draw the best possible compromise fromthese conflicts.

‘ Last Man off Wake Island, 120.

the sun behind him. He strafed the Jap-anese boat with his .5o caliber guns, andthen dropped his two bombs as he pulledout of his glide. Seither bomb hit., butKliewer estimnted that they explodedwithin fifteen feet of the target. Bombfragments punctured his wings and tailas he made his low pull-out, and while heclimbed to cruising altitude he saw theenemy craft submerge in the midst of alarge oil slick.’

After their various activities on 12 De-cember, the atoll defenders ended the daywith a solemn ceremony. A large gravehad been dug approximately 100 yardssouthwest of the Marine aid station, and inthis the dead received a common burialwhile a lay preacher from the contractorscrew read simple prayers.

Next, dn~7the ,Japanese did not botherWake at, all, and Marine officers thoughtit possible that Kliewer’s attack on theenemy submarine lmd brought them thisday of freedom. The. til~y atoll, fre-q(lelltly concealed by clouds, was a diffi-

‘ The fate of this submarine is not kno\~7n.Enemy records are not clear. But after the fallof l~>ake, Kinney and other pilots were ques-tioned by a Japanese officer who asked them ifthey knew anything about a Japanese submarinethat had disappeared in the vicinity of the atoll.This led Kliewer to believe that wmcussion fromhis bombs had finished off the submarine. TheJapanese list two of their submarines ( RO–66and ROP62 ) sunk 25 miles southwest of Wakeon 17 Dec 1941, RO–66 was lost not to enemyaction but, to disaster, the Japanese said. Thecause of the 10SS of RO–62 is not known, and ittherefore may be assumed that there was someconfusion as to the date. And since the WakeMarines had trouble remembering exact datesiu their postwar reconstruction of specific events,it may be that Kliewer’s bombs sank the RO–62 MilHistSec, SS, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Stud-ies in WWH No. 116, The I.JN in W’WII, Feb-ruary 1952 (located at OGMH ).

’ Kin t?oy I tt tc’rr-ictr, 4.’ On this date hot rations cooked in the con-

tractor’s gillley were delivered to all battery l)O-sitions by il “ChUt*li \VilgOIl." This service (em-tinuecl for as long :is lwssible thereafter. It wasone of Jlr. Teters’ 11lany contributions to the cle-fmse.

” Et,cttry Soft s. 1.

were killetl :\lltl one wounded, :1lld n directhmb llit in ail ;~iq)lniie Ye\-etiiielit fill-idled oti aiiotlier figllter pl:iiie, lea\-iiig tileatoll‘s a\-iat ioii niiit only one plane tliatc~ollltl f ly . !’ Lieutellant K i n n e y , I’MF-%I l‘s engineering ofker, spriiitetl for tilerevetinent where he w-as joined by Tech-iGal Sergeant TI:mlilton tint1 ,~GtionM:tchinist’s Mate F i r s t ( ‘ l a s s ,James F .Hesson, l’SS,10 his two assistants. Ik-spite tlie fireof the plane,

rear’ endislletl the

mbelierable feat of removing tlie unclain-aged engine fiviii tlie fuselage ;ii1d drag-ging it clear.

Thwiiig his iiiori!ing patrol fliglit of 15I)ec+eiiiher, Rlajor Putiinni sighted anothershnarine southwest of Wake. ISut it ap-J>eilre<l to llare orange markings, :lllcl Put-nam (lit1 llot :ltt:uak. He thought it nlight

served nurkings o f that color o n Thtclla i rp lanes i i i Hawaii in l a t e 1041. Pnt-i~ain‘s emniiintion of the craft cansed itt o slibiiierge, Ilowe\-ei*, :incl M a r i n e s late1t o o k sipiticxnt notice o f t h i s -\vllell t h eregular bonlbing raid did n o t arrive tlli\tth)-. This seeniecl to :itlcl credence to thetlieory that snbiii:ii~iiies m-eye pr*oricliiign:ivig:~tion:~l “k?illllS” f o r the bonlbcrs.

13nt the Kawa~iislii flying bOiltS I<el)t tlie

F o u r t o six o f thesefo~lI.-niotor,e~l l)lilllt’S ciiiiie over at :lhllt

1800, xiid one civilian was killed v-lien tlie1)lanes iii:\de il Stl’ilfillg 1’1111 illOllg tllf? :ItOll.

I” Ht~ss011 \YilS :I Xavy ariation instrnlllent lY’-~MiIYIli\II Wilt OYe’I to T’JIF-211 f1’0111 t h e K\‘;1T’:llAir Station after the f i r s t ilttZlC’l< ll;lcl l)l:ycedSllCll lli\\vOC UlllOIIg t h e t i g h t e r S(lllildrOII’S

ground 1)ersonnel. He turned out to be MI ont-StilIldiIlg general ;ir-iation Inaintemnce 11~111.

124 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

Their bombing was less etfective. Theyapparently tried to hit Battery D cm PealeIsland, but most of the bombs fell harm-lessly into the lagoon and the otherscaused no damage.

Meanwhile defensive \vork continuedduring every daylight hour not inter-rupted by such bombing raids. Anotheraircraft was patched up, personnel shel-ters for all hands had been completed inthe VMF-211 area, and at Peacock PointBzttery A now- had two deep under-ground shelters with rock cover three feetthick.” And before nightfall on 15 De-cember the garrison completed its destruc-tion of classified documents. This secur-ity work began on 8 December when theCommandant of the 14th Naval Districtordered Commander Cunningham to de-stroy reserve codes and ciphers at the hTa-val Air Stationllz but codes remained in-tact in the VMF-211 area. Now MajorRayler and Captain Tharin shreddedthese classified papers into au oil drumand burned them in a gasoline fire.”

On the l(lth tlie ,Japanese made anot]lerdaylight raid. Twenty-three bombersfrom Roi came out. of the east at 18,000feet in an attempt to bomb Peale Islandand C’amp Two. Lieutenants Kinney andKliewer, up on air patrol, warned thegarrison of this approach, but the Marinefliers had no luck attacking the enemyplanes. They did radio filtitude inforn~a-tion for the antiaircraft gunners, how

ever! and the 3inch batteries kl~ockeddown one bomber and damagecl fourothers. The <Japanese spilled their bombsinto the waters of the lagocmn and turnedfor home.

“ Wake File.

u Cunningham Intervieto, 4.‘3Last Uan Off Wake Island, 112,

But experience had taught the atoll de-fenders not to expect ~ rest after this day-light raid was over. The flying boats hadbecome almost as persistent as the shore-based bombers, and at 1745 that afternoonone of the Kawauisllis came down througha low ceiling to strafe Battery D on PealeIsland. Poor visibility prevented theMarines from returning fire, but the at-tack bacl caused little damage. The planedropped four hea~y bombs, but these felll~armlessly into the lagoon. Marines whowere keeping score—and most of themwere-marked this down as Wake’s 1(Mair raid.

After this attack Wake had an uneasynight. It was black with a heavy drizzle,and maybe. this put sentinels on edge justenough to cause them to “see things’’-al-though no one could blame them for this.At any rate lookouts on R7ilkes passed analarm at (E200 tl)at they had sighted 12ships, and everybody fell out for generalquarters. Nothing came of this alarm andpostwar ,Japanese and IT. S. records imciicate that there were no snips nt allaround Wake that night.

At 0600 on 17 I)ecember I,ieutenantI<inney reported proudly that his engi-neering mew had patched LIp two moreairplanes. This still left the atoll with afour-plane air force, but fliers and otheraviation personnel COU1d hardly have beenmore amazed if two new fighter squadronsl~acl just arrived. Major Putnam calledthe work of Kinney, Hamilton, and HES-

son “magical.” “

. . . With almost no tools and a complete lackof normal equipment, they performed all typesof repair and replacement work. They changedengines and propellers from one airplane toanother, and even completely built up new

“ Putnam Rept, 15.

WAKE L?NDER SIEGE 1!25

engines and propellers from scrap parts sal-vaged from wrecks. . . all this in spite of thefact that they were working with new types[of aircraft] with which they had no previousexperience and were without instruction man-uals of any kind. . . Their performance wasthe outstanding event of the whole campaign.”

“~n~illes hal,e been traded from plane

to plane, have been junked, stripped, re-

built, and all but. created,” another report

said of Kinney’s engineering work.16

.%t 131’7 that afternoon 27 Japanese

bombers from Roi came out of the soutli-

west tit 193000 feet. Their bombs ignited

a diesel oil tank on TVilkes and destroyed

tile defense battalion messhall as well as

mueli tentage and quartermaster gear at

Camp One. ~ bomb explosion also danl-

aged one of the evaporator units upon

which ltrtike depended for its water sup-

ply. The 3-incl~ guns bronglit down one

of these planes,

lJater that day one of the Kinney-

patched fighter planes washed out during

take-oflj and it had to be sent back to theboneyard. Then at I’i50 came the heavi-est raid the Kawanishi flying boats everput into the air against Wake.’i Eigl~t ofthese planes bombed and strafed the atollbut inflicted little damage.

As if the Wake defenders did not alreadyhave their hands full, construction author-ities in Pearl Harbor wanted to know howthings were going with the lagoon dredg-ing. They also asked for a specific date o]~which the atoll would have certain other

“ Ibid.

‘“CO VMF-211 Rept to C() MAG-21, 20 Dec41,2.

‘7 As an example of how memories can growdim, not a single defender remembered to men-tion this raid in accounts prepared after thewar ended. Yet there is no doubt that the raidoccurred, because the garrison reported it toPearl Harbor that same afternoon. Wake File.

improvements completed. The island com-mander prefaced his preliminary reply tothis query with an account of the latest airraid, and followed this with a damage re-port which summarized his battle lossessince the beginning of the war. Hepointed out that half of his trucks and en-gineering equipment had been destroyed,that most of his diesel fuel and dynamitewere gone, and that his garage! blacksmithshop, machine shop, and building supplieswarehouse either had been blasted orburned to the ground.

In a supplementary report sent later,Commander Cunningham told the PearlHarbor authorities that everybody onWake had been busy defending the atolland keeping themselves alive. They couldnot do construction work at night, hepointed out, and if they used too muchheavy equipment during the day theycould not hear the bombers approaching.Besides, he reiterated, much of his equip-ment had been destroyed by the bombingraids, and most of his repair facilities had

met the same fate. On top of all this, headded, civilan morale was bad. Cunning-ham said he could not promise a comple-tion date on anything unless the Japaneselet up the pressure.” The originator ofthis Pearl Harbor query might have founda pointed hint in this reference to a let-upof pressure. But at any rate Cunninghamnever again was asked how his construc-tion work was coming along.

The 18th of December was quiet.” Oneenemy plane was sighted in the vicinity of

‘8Ibid.

“ Likewise typical of the day-to-day confusionwhich exists in the Wake records and recollec-tions is the fact that contemporar-y records—the Wake dispatches and Maj Bayler’s officialnarrative report prepared in December 1941—

126

Wake, however, and the defenders con-sidered its activity ominolls. It lv!lS al-most directly overhead at about 25,000 feetwhen first sighted. Well beyond antiair-craft or fighter range, it flew northwwtalong the axis of the atoll, and then turnedsouth, presumably returning to Roi. De-fenders believed this to be ~ photo-recon-naissance flight.

Next morning the defenders continuedtheir routine work, trying to add to theirdefensive installations before the bomberswere due. This was a routine now fa-miliar to them. After being cleared frommorning general quarters, the men wentabout their work until the midday raidsent them to gun positions or to cover.After that raid was over, the men cleanedup after the bombs or went ahead withtheir other duties. Then late in the after-noon they had to take time out to dealwith the flying boats. At night they couldusually sleep when they were not on sentryduty, or standing some other type ofvwtch. Following this pattern, crewn~embers of the various batteries had com-pleted their sturdy emplacements, andeverybody had contributed to the con-struction of primary and alternate posi-tions for beach defense. They had builtmore beach positions than they could pos-sibly man, but many of these were to bemanned only under certain conditions.’OThe shortage of trained fighting men wasso critical that a well coordinated ,Jap-anese landing attack would require themto be everywhere at once.

indicate that the memories of the survivors havexhnost unanimously transposed the events of 17and 18 December.

‘“ LtCol A. A, Poindexter reply to Hist Sec.HQMC questionnaire, 8Apr47.

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

.it 105012’7 bombers from Roi came in

from the northwest at about 18,000 feet.

They worked over the VNIF–211 area

south of the airstrip, finished off the Ma-

rines’ messhall and tentage at ~amp Onel

and struck the Pan.Lir area. Batteries D

and F, hit four of these bombers, and ob-

servers on the atoll saw one of them splash

after its crew bailed out, over the water.

llomh damage at Camp One was serious,

but elsewhere it was slight, and there were

no casualties.

December 20 dawned gloomily with

heavy rain, and ceilings viere low and visi-

bility poor all day. This wide weather

front apparently dissuaded the Japanese

from attempting their usual noon visit,

but it did not stop a U. S. Navy’ PBY

which arrived that day and provided

~~~ake with its first physical contact with

the friendly outer world since the start of

the war. This plane landed in the lagoon

at 1530 to deliver detailed information

about the p] tinned relief and reinforce-

ment of the atoll. These reports coll-

tained good news for nearly everyone.

~~11 civilians except. high-priority workers

were to be evacuated. fl Marine fighter

squadron (VhlF-221 ) would ff y in to re-

inforce VMF-211j which was aglin down

to a single plane. And the units from the

Ath Defense Battalion would arrive on the

T’angier to reinforce the weakened detach-

ment of the 1st l)efense 13attalion. The

rBY fliers had a copy of the I“ang$er’s

loa(ling plan,” and this list made the shipseem like some fabulous floating Christ-mas package that was headed for the atoll.

That night, Commander Cunningham,Majors Devereux and Putnam, and Lieu-

“ (’apt J\’. S. (lmniughmu, I-SN, ltr to CaptS. E. Morison, USNR, 7Feb47 ; Mc310rrti Inter-ricw, 2 ; (’inCI’ac 01’lan 3$41, 15Dec41.

WAKE L’NDER SIEGE 12’7

tenant Commander Greey prepared re-ports to seucl back to Pearl IIarbor.Major Bayler, his mission long since com-pleted, would carry the papers back as hecomplied with his orders directing him toreturn from Wake biby first available Gov-ernment air trallsl)o!>t:ltioll.” Mr. Heve-nor, the Bureau of the Budget oflicial whohad missed the Philippine Vlipper on 8December, i~lso planned to leave on theP13Y, but, someone pointed out that hecould not travel in a Naval aircraft, with-out parachute and Mae West, neither ofwhich w-as available. So Mr. Ilevenormissed another plane.

At 0700 next morning, 21 December, thePRY departe~l. Within less than twohours, at 0850, 29 ,Tapauese Navy attlckbombers, covered by 18 fighters, lashedclown at Wake through the overcast andbonlbed and strafed all battery positions.These were planes from (7urrier Division 2(Soryu and Hi,yu), called in by the ,Japa-nese to help soften Wake>s unexpectedtoughness.” Due to the low ceiling, theattack was consummated before the 3-inchbatteries could get into action, but the .50caliber antiaircraft machine guns emgaged the enemy. The attack caused littledamage, but its implications were ominous.

Only three hours later, 38 of the shore-based <Japanese.bombers arrived from Roi,and again they concentrated on Peale Is-land and (.hrnp Two. They approachedfrom the east at 18,000 feet in two mainformations, and the bombs from the sec-ond group plastered Battery D’s positionon Peale. This unit had fired 35 roundsin half a minute and had hit one bomberwhen a bomb fell squarely inside the di-rector emplacement, of the battery. Thisexplosion killed the tiring battery exem-

“ Capture of Wake, II, 372.

ti ve, Platoon Sergeant, Johnalson E.Wright, and wounded the, range officerand three other Marines.

NOW there was only one firing directorluechanisrn left. on the atoll, and it be-longed to Battery E located in tile crotcl~of Wake Island. But Battery E had noheight finder, although Battery I) still hadone of these. T]lus tile two ;l-incl~ batterieshad only enough fire control equipmentfor one battery. Because of Battery E’smore desirable location, and because. it hadescaped damage since its move to this spot,Major Devereux decided to maintain it ashis primary antiaircraft defense of theatoll. Thus by taking over Battery D’sheight, finder, certain other fire controlgear, one gu]], ancl the necessary personnel,Battery E became a fully manned and ful-ly equipped four-gun battery. Two otherBattery D gul)s ~vere shifted to a new po-sition on Peale Island where they couldassume beach-defense missions, and thefourth gun remzined at the original bat-tery position. Ihunmy guns also weremounted there to create the, impressio~lthat the battery was still intact. As a fur-ther measure of deception, Battery F onWilkes, also reduced to two guns, wouldopen fire by local control methods whene-ver air raids occurred. Battery D wasparceled out that uiglltj and by nextmorning the garrison 011Peale had beenreduced to less than 100 Marines and asmall group of civilians wl~o had beentraiued- by Marine noncommissioned of-ficers 10 man one of Battery 1)’s gulls.’:{

n of these civilians the Peale Island com-mander, Capt Godbold, later wrote: “The ci-vilians }vho served with this battery were ofiuestimahle value . under the capable leader-ship of Sergeant Bowsher, they soon were firingtheir gun in a manner comparable to the Marine-manned guns. Before the surrender of the is-

128

By 22 December VMF-211 again hadtwo airplanes capable of flight, and C’ap-tain Freuler and T~ieutenant Davidsontook them up for morningpatrol. David-son had been out nlmost an hour and wascovering the northern approaches to Wakeat 12,000 feet when he spotted enemyplanes coming in. He called CaptainFreu]er, who YVaSthen south of the atoll,and the Marines began independent ap-proaches to close with the enemy. TheJapanese flight consisted of 33 carrier at-tack planes (dive bombers) escorted by sixfighters, all from the Soryu-Hiryu carrierdivision. The fighters were at 12,000 feetand the dive bombers at 18,000. The fight-ers were of a sleek new type, the first Zerosto be encountered over Wake.

Captain Freuler dived his patched-upF4F–3 into a division of six fighters,downing one and scattering the others.Coming around quickly in a difficult op-posite approach, Freuler attacked anotherof the Zeros and saw it explode only 50feet below. This explosion temporarilyengnlfed the (2rumrnan in a cloud ofthunes and flying fragments. The Marineplnne was badly scorched, its manifold-pressure dropped, and the, controls reactedsluggishly. As tl~e captain turned to lookfor the atoll, he saw I,ieutenant Davidsonattacking the dive bombers. The lieuten-ant was diving at a retreating bomber, buta Zero was behind him closing on the Ma-

rine Grumman. This enemy fighter prob-ably downed Davidson, because the lieu-tenant did not return to the atoll.

Meanwhile a. Zero got on Freuler’s tailwhile he took in Davidson’s plight, and

lnnd, some of tl]ese men were slated to beewwnnted to Honolulu : however, the entire guncrew offered to stay on the island and ~er~e ~viththe battery. ” LtCol B. I). GOdb07d Rept, 1~,

PEARL HARBOR T() GUADALCANAL

tire from the ,Japanese plane wounded theMarine pilot in the back and shoulder.Freuler pushed his plane over into a steepdive, managed to shake off l?is pursuer, anddragged the shattered, scorched F4F intothe field for a crash landing. In the wordsof Lieutenant Kinney> whose shoestringmaintenance had kept VMF-211 flying forfifteen days: ‘(This left us with no air-planes.>’ In spite of the Marine squad-ron-s Iast blaze of heroism, the enemy divebombers came on in to strike at all batterypositions. But the atoll pilots were notmuch impressed by the work of the Jap-anese naval aviators. ‘(We who have beenused to seeing only the propeller hub are abit taken aback by their shallow dives andtheir inaccuracies,” Lieutenant Barningersaid. The Japanese bombs did not causemuch damage, and there were no casual-ties on the ground.

But now that, carrier air was beingbrought to bear against them, the Wakedefenders concluded that it would not belong before the Japanese came back with

a bigger task force and a better anlphib-ious plan. Ground defense preparationsintensified that afternoon. VMF-21 1’seffect ives—less than 20 officers and mell—were added to the defense battalion asinfantry, Peale Island completed its beachdefense emplacements, and Captain Plattdrew up final detailed orders for his de-fense of Wilkes. Platt ordered Marine

Gunner McKinstry, who commanded Bat-tery F, to tire on enemy landing boats aslong as his guns could depress sufficiently,and then to fall back to designated posi-tions from which his men would fight asriflemen. There these men from the 3-inchbattery would be joined by the personnelfrom Battery L. After that it would be

an infantry fight. “.All that can be done

WAKE VSDER SIEGE 129

is being done,” notecl one of the Wakeofhcers. “bl~t there is so little to do with.””~

K,VEMY PLANS .4ND .4 PTZOiVS.

11–21 DEOl?iJIBF.R 25

Wake defenders were correct in assum-ing that the Japanese soon would be backwith a stronger effort than the one whichlMd failed for Rear Admiral Kajioka. Theadnliral began to mull a few plans forhis next It tack while he withdrew towardKwajalein on 11 December, and he hadl]is statf in conference on 13 Decemberwhile his battered fleet still was anchoringill that Marshall atoll. Rear AdmiralKuniori Marushige, who had commanded(’~wit~er Division 18 (including the lightcruisers ~~Ltwta and ~erwyu as well astile flagship J’ubari), analyzed the causesof failure as follows: The landing attempthad failed, he said, because of the vigorousseacoast artillery defense, tighter oppo-sitiol~, adverse weatl~er> and because of imsutliciel~t ,Japallese f owes and means.

But, .idmiral Kajioka was more inter-ested in the success of the next operation,and so was Fowth Fleet CommanderInou-ye at Truk. While the ships remain-ing in Kajioka>s task force were beingpatched Ilp at Kwajaleill, Achniral lnouyesent destroyers A.wznagi and Yunagi overto replace the destroyers lost in the Wakeact ion. He also added the flboro, a muchmore powerful and newer ship of de-stroyer-leader characteristic which wasarmed with six 5-inch guns. zc The minelayer Tsugarw czme over from Saipan

“ LtC[)l C. A. Isumiit{]rrI{t’ltt.25rnless otherwise n~)ted the n)aterial in

this section is derived frolli Capture of W’ukc;I<ncm !1A’ot(’<?.2“ONI 222–J, “A Statistical Summary of the

Jalmnese Nay-y,” 20Ju1W, 56.

with the .Vaizaru Special Landing Forcei~um ber ThIo; and the transport Tenyo

Jlwu. and the float-plane tender Kiyo-li((.~()~ also joined the force. Troop re-]learsals began on 15 December, but Ad-miral Inouye still was not, convinced thatl~is force was large enough, and he askedthe Commander in Chief of the Combined

Fleet to send him more ships.Illouye’s sllperior officer, llo\v appar-

ently convinced that Wake would be hardto crack, sent to the Fourth F’?eet admiralthe fleet carriers ii’oryu and Hiwu of Crar-tiflr Z)ivi.vion ~, heavy cruisers Aobo? Fu-

tl[taka, Kako, and Kimugasw of (7rw%erI)ivision 61, heavy cruisers Tone and OhW-

urna of Crukr DiL*Lw?on 8, and a taskforce screen of six destroy ers.” The com-mander of the Combined Fleet assignedover-a]l command of this Wake task forceto Rear .$cbniral Koki Abe, commander ofCruisey” Lh’cixion 8. Rear Admiral Kaji-oka retained his command of the amphib-ious force.

Plans for the second attack against the.’lmerican atoll called for more softeningt~p than l~rake had received previous to

l<aj ioka’s first attempt to land troops

there. on 21 December, two days prior

L’] the proposed landing, the aircraft of

( ‘wrrier l)iLvi,YimI 2 would work over theatoll’s defenses to destroy first the U. S.air capability and then the shore batteriesam~ the antiaircraft weapons. Then themnphibious force would move up for thelanding, and in order that the atoll mightbe surprised 2’ there would be no pre-liminary naval bombardment on 23 De-cember.

To make sure that troops got ashore, thetwo destroyer-transports (Pdrol Craft

‘7 tbid,, 47, 49.

x Capture of Wake, II, 372.

130 PEARL HARBOR TO GU.4D.4LCAA’AL

32 and 33) would run aground on thesouth shore of the atoll near the airstrip,and the approximately 1,000 men of thespecial naval landing force ~“ lvoLdd tl~enbe carried to the beach in four to six lancl-ing bcrrges. T\~o of the~e woLdd land onWilkes Island, two on Wake Island be-tween the airstrip :uld (Uamp one, ancl theother two probably provided for wouldput their troops ashore just west of Pea-cock Point.’” If these special landingforce troops ran into serious trouble on theatoll, the naval force WOLIICIsend in 500men organized from ships’ lan[] ing forces.

.lnd if this combined force failed to sl~b-

due the at 011 clef enc~ersj more help woulcl

be sent, by means of an tI1tinlate rcncl des-

perate expedient. The clestroyers of the

task force would be beached, and their

crews would swarm nshore. ikclm irnl

Inonye W:LS determineci that this second

attack should not f ail.

The possibility of l.~. ~. na17al surface

intervention w-as taken irito consideration.

This possibility liad been clkimissed duril~g

planning for the attack of 11 I)ecember

because the ,Japanese reasoned tl~at tile

shock of Pearl Harbor would immobilize

llmerican surface ~l~erations for some

time. But now the tJapanese assumed that

[~. S. surface opposition was probable. To

guard against SLICIIthreat, the four heavy

cruisers of fltwi.wr Di/vMon 6 WOUIC1actas a covering force east of Wake. If amajor surface action developed, Rear .&{l-miral Abe would enter the tight with~’ruiser Divisio/2 $’ and conduct the battle.

As on the first attempt, submarines wouldprecede the invmion force to reconlmiter

“ Wake .4ttack, 2.

30HistSec, HQMC interview with CM J. P. S.Devereux, 12Feb47, 8, hereinafter cited asI)wx?reux Interview.

the island and to look out for L-. S. sur-face forces.

With these final plans issuecl, the in-vasion force well rehearse], and carriersSory71jand IFiryu on their way down fromnorth of Midway, the operation againstWake w:ls re:uly to go. At 0900 on 21December Aclrniral Kajioka cleared Roiwith t]le ships of his amp]libious force andlleaclecl back up toward the American-heldatoll.

Z’HE RELIEF ATTEMPT,1,5–t?.j DKIJEMRER “

Now the U. S. commanders taking helpto Wake were in a race with AdmiralKajioka, even if they did not know it..idmiral Fletcher’s Task Force 14 sortiedf 1om Pearl Harbor in two task groups on15 and 16 I)cwember,32 rendezvousedsouthwest of Oahu during the afternoono f t]lis second day, and sailed westward to-

ward Wake. Fletcher’s force was to ar-rive at tl~e atoll on 23 December (east]ongitude time). There the pilots ofMajor Verne ,J. McCaul’s VMF-221woLdcl fly in from the carrier ,~m’atogc~while tl~e Tangier anchored off Wilkeschan]lel to unload supplies, equipment,and the Marines from the W DefenseBattalion.’3 After taking wounded men

“ Prin(ilml sources bearing on the Relief Ex-pedition are: CinCPac OPlan 39-41, 1.5Dec47 ;Mc:Mf,rris Interview; Saratoga log; LtCol R. D.Heiul, ,Jr., “We”re Headed for Wake,” MO Ga-

wtte, .June 1943.‘“ l)atw in this section are either west or east

longitude as apI)licable to the location of eventsidentified by dates. Where confusion is Imssiblethe type of date will be indicated.

33Troolm and equipment would be transportedto the atoll on lighters, and if the !f’a??.qier wereseriously damaged by enemy action she would berun aground so the cargo would not be lost.

WAKK: I: XI)ER SIEGE 131

and certain civilians on board, these shipsthen would return to Pearl Harbor.

But the advance was aggravating]y slow.The old fleet oiler ,yecl~e.s, in the train withthe Tangier, could not manage more than12 knots, and the fleet’s zig-zag evasivetactics further slowed the rate of advance.To the Marines and seamen in this firstwestward sally of the war> the waters be-yond Oahu seemed very lonely and on~i-11OUS,and there was no contact, eitherfriendly or enemy, to vary the tensemonotony of the run. Each day on theTangier began with general quarters andthen lapsed into normal shipboard routine.Marines received sLlch training aud in-

struction as could be fitted into this sched-ule, and part of this educational programincluded lectures by the few radar techni-cians on board.

The few available maps and charts of

Wake received intense study. In antici-pation that Wake’s 3-inch guns might haveto deliver direct fire on ships or groundtargets, improvised sights were clesi~ned

and constructed in the ship’s machineshops. The oficer commanding the nKL-chine-gun detachment contrived with theship”s force to construct special slings withwhich his .50 caliber antiaircraft machinegLllIs could be hoisted from ship to barges

while remaining ready to ward off possible

enemy attacks during unloading. “ The 5-inch seacoast men stayed in practice bystanding their share of watches on theafter 5-inch gun of the Tangier. Al] M:~-riue antiaircraft machine guns were set upand manned on the superstructure.

On 18 December CinC’Pac ordered IT. S.submarines which were patrolling in thevicinity of Wake to move south out of thearea. These boats of Task Force 7 were

to patrol around Rongela]) in the Mar-shalls until tile relief exl)eclition reachedWake. (’in(xPac wanted to avoid any pos-sibility of one IT. S. force, conf[lsinganother for tile ellemy.:’-i Three days later,on the 21st, i]ltelligence information whichhad been arriving at Pearl Harbor indi-cated that a large force of shore-base(l,Japanese planes was building LIp h] theMxrsl~alls, and tl}at enemy surface forcesmight be east of Wake where they coulddetect tl~e approach of Fletcher’s TaskForce 14. Other reports indicated thepresence of ,Japanese carriers, includingpossibly the ,Yoryu, northwest of tile atoll.Fletcher’s mission, now about 650 mileseast of JVake, appeared to be growingmore hazardolls with eac]l hour. Qin~Pacordered the carrier I.ezington. ancl otherships of Task Force 11 over from thesout Ileast to give Fletcher closer support .~s

By 0800”on 22 Decenlber, Task Force 14was within 515 nliles of Wake, and .4d-n~iral Nlet,cher in the cruiser Astoria keptUp on the news about his race by n\onitor-ing the Cin(;Pac radio nets. ominous re-ports of .Japanese surface operationsaround the atoll continued to filter in atPearl Harbor, hut conditions at Wake were

unchanged. Fletcher decided to refuel.Although his destroyers still had a reason-able supply of oil, it might not be enoughif they llacl to fight. But this very act offueling, which took most of the day, keptthem out of the fight. By the time theU. S. ships moved on toward Wake, Ad-miral Kajioka was only about 50 milesfrom the atoll with his amphibious force.Fletcher had lost the race.

“ Paraphrased file of CinCPac dis~}atchescon-cerning wake relief, l)wen]her 1941.

“ IlJic7.

CHAPTER 4

The Fall of Wake’

.At Wake, 23 December began with inter-nlittent rain squalls, and shortly after 0100the defenders saw a succession of vivid, ir-regular flashes beyond the horizon northof Peale Island. Men on the atoll couldhear nothing above the rain and the boomof the surf, but it was obvious that theflashes were not signals or se:lrchlightscThey were too brilliant and irregular forthat. Olcl fleet-duty hands were remindedof night battle practice at sea. Was therea naval battle, or were the ,Japanese com-ing back ? Tile defenders conld onlyguess.

By this time the Marines were used toseeing lights, even though these were umuwml. But at 0145 came a more urgentalarm. The word over the “,J’’-line an-l~cnmced that the .Jctpanese were landingat, Toki Point on Peale. Major I)evereuxalerted all units and then telephonedLieutenant Kessler at Toki Point for ad-ditional information. Tl~e Battery IIcommander told Devereux that he couldsee lights in the distance but, that therewas no landing in progress. The beachpositions had been manned, Kessler adclecl,because boats were “believed” to be sonle-

‘ ~nless otherwise noted the niaterial in ~hall4 is deri~wlfron) ~)crercur RcPt; 1’/{t)la))lKrflt:(O~cer”s name ) Repts, especially LtCol W. McC.

P2att Rcpf, lstI.t .J. .L Mc.lli. $fcr Rcpt, M(: C. FL.

3[rKitl str?l Rcpt; Dc??rreft,r IH t<rricw; repliesto HistSec questionnaire by 0)1 (}. H. Potter,LtCol W. M{(7. I’latt, LtCol A. .+. Poinciester ;

Captllr(! of ~Va~~: JVal<c Attack; Hawaii-J[ala?/aATa@~.?; I)rrf’rc!(x fltor~!.

where offshore. By this time all unitshad sent their men to general quarters,and at (’amp one. ~Second I~ieutenantPoindexter loaded his scanty mobile re-serve unit of eight Marines 2 and four .30caliber machine gLms into their truck, re-ported his actions to the command post,and moved out, toward Peale Islancl. Butjthe word from Kessler lmd convincedDeve~eux that if the enemy were landing,they were not doing it on Peale Island.He pllt a damper on the genertcl a]arm,a]d ordered tl~at Poindexter be inter-cepted when his trnck passed t]~e com-mand post. He held the mobile reservethere to await developments.

I)evelopments were not long in coming.Admiral Ka j ioka’s amphibious force hadat last sighted the atoll’s faint outline,and the ships were reducing speed. Mo-ments later, in the worcls of a ,Japanese“combat corresponclent’> W11Owas movedto poetry by this amphibious venture,“The honorable., first order of ‘CHAR(+E’was given, and tl~e daring officers ancl men,with white sashes, bravely went down tothe surface of the sea. ” 3

2This unit. along ~vith a few Marines fromSU1)l)lY and a(lI1liIlistr:ltit)rl sections and 15 Xtivyenlisted men connn: anded by B31 lst(’1 .James F..Barnes. was also reslxmsible for the defense ofCamp One.

3This latter-day Masetield was Kayoshi Ibushiof the .Japanese A“a~al Information Section.

132

THE FA1,L OF WAKE 133

.ipprO~im:lte]~ 800”of the Af’i\’~~ t~oopswere distributed betlveell the tl}-o de.stroyer-trans]Jorts.4 The other 200” pre-sumably were enlbi~rked on board one ormore of the transl)orts or the float-planetender Kiyolawa, and the 500 sailors ofthe provisional reserve force apparentlywere to remain at their normal duties un-less calledto reinforce the landingeffort.’T’he 21aizutw Second ,Tpecial lVU ual Land-ing Force, now brought to full strength

by reillforcenlellts from Saipallj was es-sentially a ,Japanese version of the bat-talion landing team (13LT). Its threerifle companies had numerical design:~-tions but were more commonly identifiedby the names of their commanders. TILLSthe Ist (’ompany, comman(lecl by Lieu-tenant Kinichi (-cllida, NVWoften calledtile L7C11MCLut(it. Similarly, the W andJd ~otnp~fnie(~\\ere styled respectively tileTdwno unit and the Ztaya unit.

The Uchtia and Ztoya compamks wouldassault Wake Island while 100 “pickedmen’> of the Takmo unit seized Wilkes.O

“This reporter,’” as he later said of himself,“ . . . TY:lS able to ha Ye the honor of taking thefirst step al)on the island as a man of lettersthe cal)tnre of Jyake Island . . was so heroicthat e~en the gods wel)t. ”’ Ha waii-.![a~ayu X(I /.-

CJ[AS, 32.

‘ One :lccount says 300 ]aen of this force \vereon the two destroy er-translwrts. At this timeall SNI.F units attached to the Fourth l’leetwere com’entrated for the seizure of \v:ike inmuch the same manner that 1’. S. Fleet MarineForce units would have been employed.

5The exact nlunber of .Jal)anese troops whofon,ght on Wake 1]:1s not been determined. .kdmhlorison” (ites Marine estimates that “at least1,~()() tro{)l)s l:illded e:,rly ,)n the ~:+rd,j, ~~ndthat

others came ashore after the surrender. Risin.qS//}/i)) thc I’acilic, 245.

G Itaya’s male and that of his company ap-pears in one Japanese source as “Itatani.”Hawaii-Ma7ayu A“avOp.s, 28.

The balal~ce of the Tdwno company pre-sunmbly would back up the other twocompanies on Wake Island. At about thetime the premature landing alarm wassounded on the atoll, the amphibious forcewas putting landing craft over the side.The weather was giving them trouble, butat about 0200”the A’NLF troops clambereddown into these craft. “The hardships en-countered in lowering the landing bargeswere too severe even to imagine,;’ reportedcorrespondent Ibushi. ‘(Now we, the hTa-

val Landing Force, on the barges whichwe were in, must charge into enemy ter-ritory and carry out the final step of se-curing a landing point after touching theshore. ” r

As the landing craft pitched throughtl~e breakers, the destroyer-transportsturned to make their final runs onto thereef south of the airstrip. These vessels,Patrol ~oath 32 and 33, mounted the reefin a smother of breakers and foam, andwent aground near the west end of the air-strip. Two of the landing barges scrapedbottom as they approached the reef near(’amp one, and still there was no sign thatthe atoll defenders were ~wake. But sud-denly tracers pencilled from the beach atWilkes Island xnd .50 caliber slugs splat-tered through the gunwales of one barge.Then a searchlight from Wilkes flared onto silhouette the picked men of the Talca.nounit landing on that island. It was then0245, and the battle for Wake was on.(See Map 5, Iifap Section)

THE DEFENL3E OF~$7AKE ISLA,~D

since 0215 Marines had been confidenttl~at a landing against, tl~em was in prog-

‘ Ibid.

1:34 1’lMRL HARBOR T() GUADALCANAL

c-ess. l~iglltst’{}ulclbseell otkhorel~ortllof Peale Island and all along the southcoasts of Wake an(l Wilkes Island. Atabout 0230 3L~rines on Peacock Point,thought they could see the out] ines of twobarges headil~g iilong the coast towar{l theairfield, but these evidently were the pa-tlolcraftl lw~dillgi llto\v:lrclt llereef. Bynow Major Devereux, Major Potter, hisexecutive officer, a radioman, and aswitchboard operator in the defense de-tachment command post were swamped byreports of sounds, lights, and shapes. Asl~e collected this information and relayedreports to Commander (’unningharn,l)evereux saw that the greatest tllLX2ilt was

developing along the south coast of tileatoll, and he dispatcl)ed Lieutel)aut Poiwdexter>s eight-man mobile reserve to de-fensive positions betlveen (’amp one andtile airstrip.

Poindexter’s men had not left tl~e truck,and the lieutenant, had then) transporteddown the island and into position within15 minutes. The area into which the-ymovecl was just west of the road junction]lear the west end of the airstrip. Therethis small force commanded the southshore roacl as well as the critical beachsection south of the field. The ]ieutenantreported that this area was being bom-barded when he reached his defensive po-sitions, but there were no signs of alanding.

But at 02358 defenders on Wilkes re-ported that they coLIld near barge engines

8The Japanese list (MM as the official time oftheir landing, Statements of Marine officers donot. agree. Some say the landings came at about0130, while others place the time almost an hourlater. In his official report, Devereux givesthe time of landing on Wilkes at 0215, but hispublished narrative says 0120. Yet a subsequentstudy convinced him that the time of 0235 was

above tl~e surf, and Marine Gunner Mc-Kinstry opened fire with a .50 caliber ma-chine gun at, a dark shape near the beachbelow. Ten minutes later Captain Plattrequested permission to illuminate thebeach with his 60-inch searchlight., andthe landing was discovered. Two bargescould be seen on the beaches at Wilkes,the lights also revealed the patrol craftaground off Wake.

Neither of the 5–inch batteries whichcommanded the south approaches toWake’ could bear against the landings.Terrain masks likewise prevented themfrom firing at Patrol Craft 3.2 and 33 onthe reef}” The only weapon larger thana machine gun that could engage these de-stroyer-transports, already beginning tospew OLLttheir human cargo, was the 3-inchgun emplaced on the rise between the beachroad and VMF-2117S hard-stand parkingarea. But this gun was not manned.Realizing the importance of this weapon,

Second Lieutenant Robert M. Hanna, incommand of the antiaircraft machine gunsabout the field, gathered a scratch crewconsisting of one Marine, Corporal RalphJ. Holewinski, and three civilians” and

closer to the fact. Excepting the variances con-c,ernin~events during these dark early hours ofthe battle, ~larine accounts agree generally as toevents after daylight.

‘ Btry.4 (Peacock Point) andBtry L (Wilkes).‘0One of the advantagesof the Navy 5“/51 for

seacoast defense missions was that it had 360°train, as contrasted to the limited traverse ofthe l~~mmfield guns used bY the Army for thisrole. In this instance, however, terrain masks,slight thongh they were, prevented either A orL from bearing.

“ lstLt R. M. Ha?ma Rept to CO, 1st DefBnDet,lloct45, 2. Of these three civilians, two (PaulGay and Bob Bryan ) were subsequently killedin action, and the third, Eric Lehtola, waswounded. Hanna states that they fought with“exceptional gallantry.”

136 PEARL HARBOR TO GTJADALCANT.4L

raced to this gun. Major I)evereux alsorealized the critical importance of holdingthis area, and he ordered Major Putnamand the 20 men of VMF-211 to form aninfantry support. between the 3–inch gunand the enemy landing.

All defense units on Wake Island weredisposed to meet the enemy. Hanna andthe VMF-211 “infantrymen” held theleft flank south of the airfield parking area.To the west, and squarely in the path ofthe enemy’s initial rush toward the westend of the field, were Second LieutenantKliewer and three aviation Marines. Theyguarded one of the generators which waswired to detonate the mines buried in theairstrip. At the road junction fartherwest Poindexter’s mobile reserve wasalready firing its four machine guns east-ward along the beach at Patrol Craft 32ti’here the enemy troops had revealed them-selves by injudicious use of pyrotechnicsignals. At Camp One four .30 calibermachine guns were manned for beach de-fense by Battery 1’s gun shed crew and theNaval Air Station sailors who had beenserving as lookouts on the water tank OP.Behind this general line, two .50 calibermachine-gun sections (each of two guns)guarded the airstrip. One section heldthe west end of the. strip near Lieutenant,Kliewer’s generator, and the other sectionwas located on the east end of the strip.lzThese two sections could command thelength of the field, and could partially in-terdict movement across the field. other

“ ‘These two sections had been sited to provideantiaircraft fire as well as final protective firealong the airstrip. This conformed with defensebattalion practice, but the light of hindsightprompted Devereux to wish that he had movedthese sections closer to the beach where theycould have been tied in with the general line.

machine guns were in the Peacock Pointarea. At the battery positions gun crewsstood by their weapons and manned suchlo~i~l perimeter defenses as their meagerstrength permitted.

Lieutenant Hanna and his jury-riggedcrew quickly got the 3–inch gun into ac-tion. They laid the weapon by estimateand “Kentucky windage”;’ and fired theirfirst round at Patro7 ~~r(~~t J3 wllicb wasless than 500” yarcls away. The shell hitthe bridge of the destroyer-transport, andwounded the captain, the navigator, andfive seamen. Two other sailors were killed.While men of the Uchida and Ztaya unitsswarmed off the ship, Hanna and his crewfired 14 more rounds into the superstruc-ture and hull of the craft. Finally it burstinto flames, illuminating the landing area.“The scene was too beautiful to be a battle-field,” reported a ,Japanese observer onboard the cruiser Yubari.’4

Flames from this ship lighted PatrolCr[(~t 32 farther west along the beach, andHanna shifted his fire to this vessel.Three-inch shells hulled this transport-de-stroyer, and crews from both these shipsjoined the SNLF’ troops landing on theisland. This added possibly 100 extramen to the battle ashore, and Hanna>s gunalready was seriously threatened by thel~chida unit which had made the beachassault. Major Putnam’s aviators foughtofl these early attempts to silence the 3-inchgun, but the ,Japanese continued to attack.Alternating between creeping infiltrationtactics and screaming rushes, the Vchidatroops drove the Marines back on each side

‘3 These 3-inch Army antiaircraft guns wereequipped only for indirect fire at aerial targets,and they had no sights or other fire control equip-ment to facilitate direct sighting by local control.

‘4 Hatcaii-Malaya Na.vOp8, 33.

THE FAI.1, OF WAKE 137

of the gun until the defenders were in aposition whic]l T)evere(lx later describedas “a box-shaped tiling. ” Here they con-tinued to hold.

But farther west .Japanese troops hadreached the south shore road between themine field generator and I,ieutenant Poimdexter% small mobile reserve, and by thelight from the burning patrol craft l?oin-dexter could see these enemy cross the roadand disappear into the brusl~ beyond.The lieutenant was directing machine-gun fire into this brush area when hehem-d other firing from the direction ofCamp One. He left Gunnery SergeantT. Q. Wade in charge of the reserve forceand headed toward the camp. There hefound that two large landing craft hadgrounded on the reef some 30 yards off-shore southeast of the camp.’s Four ma-chine gLms from Camp One fired at thebarges, but the rounds ricocheted off. Thisfire evidently discouraged the craft fromattempting a landing at this point, how-ever, because they backed off the reef andnosed about as if seeking a better site.

While these, two boats floundered aboutin the surf, Lieutenant Poindexter formedtwo teams of grenadiers to move down tothe water;s edge and 10b hand grenadesinto the barges. One team consisted ofhimself and Boatswain’s Mate First (Yaw,James E. Barnes, while the other consistedof Mess Sergeant Gerald Cam, and a civil-ian, R. R. Rutledge, who had served as anArmy officer in France during lf70rldWar I. The machine guns, suspended fire,and the grenadiers attacked. By thistime the ,Japanese had 1anded a short dis-tance farther east, and Boatswain’s MateBarnes managed to throw at least onegrenade inside a barge just as the enemy

“ Lewis.

debarkiltiou commenced. The explosioninflicted llexvy cas~m]ties, hut some 7’5 to100 enemy splashed ashore and entered thelmderbrush east of (’amp One. This heavygro~vth llortll of t}le ro:~d soon bec:~nle :~

sort of no man’s 1and into which the ,Jap:~-nese continued to infiltrate and expandtheir beachhead.

All this Poindexter managed to reportback to Major Devereux in a final messagefrom Camp One before wire communica-tion was lost. But shortly after this apanicky civilian who had managed to pickhis way through the brush from Camp Oneto Devereux’s command post brought inreports-t ota]l y untrue-that Camp Onewas being overrun and that he had seen,Japanese troops bayoneting the machinegunners of the mobile reserve.

The loss of communications was notlocalized at Camp One. Devereux’s com-mand post had lost contact with Lieuten-ant, Hanna, the VMF-211 infantrymen,the CP of the .50 caliber machine-gun batt-ery near the airstrip, and Battery A atPeaccwk Point. The tactical line toWilkes Island also went out at this time,but the “J’’-line, which lay north of theairfield, still linked the defense battalionCP with that of Captain Platt on Wilkes.Nobody knows exactly what caused thiscommunications failure, but the nature oflhe trouble suggests that it might havebeen caused by a single break. The loca-tion of this major break, if there was one,must have been near the battalion com-mand post where lines were close together.But all Wrake survivors hold the opinionthat the Japanese cut the lines; and they

point out that the Wilkes “J’’-line did notgo out until some time after this failureof the line south of the field. Thus de-fenders believe that the lines were being

138 PEARL HAREMIR TO GUADALCANAL

cut as the enemy attack progressed in-land. Devereux tried tocontncthisN TakeIsland positions by radio, but this inter-island net, never had been reliable, and thesets characteristically failed to functionthat morning. ‘I’here were no comn~uni-cations personnel in the command post totrouble-shoot lines, ‘G and for the renmin-der of the battle Del’ereux had no com-munications with his defensive line alongWake’s south coast.

It was now obvious to De~ereux at his“blzcked-out” CP that fights were in prog-ress all along the west leg of Wake Is-land, and that he must sacrifice a defensiveunit, from some other area to reinforce hisefl’ort in the critical zone. LieutenantLewis’ Battery E in the crotch of WakeIsland could not be disbanded. It was theonly completely equipped and up-to-strength 17 antiaircraft, battery on theatoll. Battery B’s 5-inch guns’ on PealeIsland also should remain manned for pos-sible missions a~~inst enemy ships, ButCaptain Goclbold’s Battery D might beused as infantry. This unit had two 3-inch guns, but no fire control equipment;md Peale Island did not appear to bethreatened. Two officers and some 40 menfrom this battery became the atoll reserve,~l~dat 0300 Major Devereux ordered God-bold to send one gun section (about ninemen) from this reserve force to the aid

of Hanna% untrained crew. CorporalLeon Graves brought these men aroundfrom Peale Island in a truck driven by

‘e ~lSgt R, 31. .Junereply to Hk+tSw, HQNIc’,questionnaire, 11}1ar47,2.

“ “Up-to-strength” was a relative term on~’ake. The 1941 tables of organization alloweclsuch batteries two officers and 75 enlisted men..lt this time Battery E had two officers andabout 50 men.

one of the civilians, and Major Devereuxdirectecl them toward Hanna’s position.

By this time the Japanese had made atleast two penetrations through the Marine“line” along the south eclge. of Wake Is-land, and it is possible that the enemy wasalso landing inside the lagoon in rubberboats. Several defenders speak of seeingred flares rising from within the lagoon,and after the surrender Marine workingparties found rubber boats on these in-terior beaches. If these landings weretaking place, it is probable that they oc-curred on the north beaches of ~~TakeIs-land’s west leg.” From such sites the menlanding in rubber boats could join up withthose landing on the south beaches.

Captain (lodbold on Peale Island wasone of the defenders who saw these redflares inside the lagoon, and he lmd Bat-tery B at Toki Point send a two-manpatrol down the interior coast of thatisland to investigate. Godbold then senta three-nian patrol from his own batterydown the outer coast of Peale. These twopatrols met at the southeast end of theisland without encountering any enemy.The captain then established a three-manoutpost to cover the bridge between Pealeand Wuke Islands.

n Although Japanese sources do not mentionsuch interior landings the evidence to supportthem is generally convincing. The rubber boatsdid not enter the lagoon through the channel be-t\yeeIl ]Vilkes and JVake Island, beeause thisuarrow channel was covered throughout the bat-tle. Devereux surmises that the boats enteredthe lagoon at the open end of the atoll betweenKuku and Toki Points. Such landings wouldexplain, without necessarily ruling out infiltra-tion, the early presence of individual Japaneseat various points along the lagoon shore. OneJapanese source does mention that red rocketflares were to be used as a signal that “We havesucceeded in landing. ” Huwaii-,Vala~/u NarOps,

‘.’,

.5>,

‘rHE FAr,rJ OF JY.lKE 139

Bui interior landi Ilgs or 110, tile Wake(Iefendel’s lu~d tl~eir lMnds full. ,Japalwsecr~~isersbegan to bombard the atoll”s mainisland at about (1330. ‘1’he landings comtinued in spite of the fact that Battery F.l~ow tiretl ail’ bllrsts over the. beaches, andetlemy infantry colltil~ued to pless closerto Hanna’s ?-inch gun south of the air-strip. The VMF-211 troops still held,but their part ial perinlet er was being com-pressed tighter a]}d tighter around tilegun. This action was now little morethan a battle for ~jreservation of tileweapon and tl]e ~f:lrillesillvol~red. Majorl’l~tlmm’s men could l~ot check the ,Jap-

anese pelletratiojl farther to the west, norcould they prevent the enen]y fronl mov-ing behind them or into tl]e island tri -anxle above Peacock Point. .Ind the ,Jal}-al}ese Jvantecl to concentrate in this tri -al]gle so tl~ey could launch an attack u1)tl~e islal~d’s east leg. The ~IIF–211

troops coldd only hope to cling to theslight hillock of their positiol~j and staythere as long as possible.l!i

Meallwllile (Voporal (iraves and his de-t:lClld gllll S(~llit(l frolll Battery 1) weretrying to reach Htilllla~s 3-inch gun.Devereux had tol(l thenl to detruck at theroad jmlction sou)e 600 yards below tl~eel~d of tile strip a]ld west of PeacockPoint. From there they were to gothrough the llllderbrusll to the gun posi-tion. nut tile squa(l detlllcked consi(l-erab]y short of this jlll~ctioll—l)r~b:~blyless than 200 yarcls below the stril). Fronlthere the men struck out throug]l tile brushin the general directiol~ of the, H:lnl~:t-

~’MF-211 area. mley were SOO]lstopped,

“ Kinncu Intrrrirw, At about this time MajPutnam, already \Yf~un(le(l, told his men, “Thisis as fur as we go. ” Six hours later, when theisland fell, they still held.

however, by enemy nmcl~ine-gun a]~ds]ll:~ll-i~~ms tire which killed one Marineand l)illned C1O]VUthe others. zo .ifter atime (+raves witll(lrew his unit northwardtow:ud tile con~]tland post where it laterl)articilmted in defensive efiorts coln-mallded by Major Potter.

ItJ is not clear what sort of an enemyforce Corporal (irawxs encolmtered in tilePeacock triangle, or how the ,Japanese gotthere. There are indications that a land-ing n~lgl~t ha~~ebeen made in that area,with barges coming in on tile south coastbetween IIattery A o]) Peacock Point andtile IIann:~-TMF-211 position. Dev-ereux said after the war that, he believeda landing took place at this point, but theIIlatter never has been confirmed. $~ ome.Jalml~ese accou]lts, incllldiug those ofCaptain Koyama and a correspondent,”mention a landil~g “near the southeast tipof Wake” to overrun Battery A, whichnlust l~ave been l’el~~eulbered from the ac-tiol~ of 11 I)ecen~ber-especially by men

in the cruiser J’vbari. 13ut Captain Ko-yan]a also il~sisted that tl~e ,Japanese madeonly t\vo barge lal~dil~gs with a. total offour barges. .~ud these are accolmted forby the, landings l~ear Camp (he ZUC1at

lVilkes Island. l)iscoul~tillg a third bargelan(lingj this force nll~st have been builtup by tl~e rubber boat landings within thelilgoon, or by wholesale infiltration behinc]tl~e position held by Putnam and Hanna.

But at a]]y rate, T)everellx soon learnedfrom (’orpora] Graves tl}at there was an

‘“ C(J1 ])elereux suggests that some of thenlachine. gun fire ~vhich swel)t throuxh the I’ea-rock triangle might haye tome from friendlyWf3ilI)(JI]S. He points out that Marines had .30 or,fiO caliber machine gun sevtions on Yirtually theentire l)erimeter of the triangle.

“ Capture of Tfrul:r, 11, 372.

140 I’E.\RL H.\ I{ROR TO GU.kI).\LCAN.kL

euenly force in the triallg]e. And fronlthere the .Tapanese thretrtened the entireeilstel’11 rim of tile atoll. Ikttery E wasnow receiving light mortar and lollg-rxllgenlachil~e-gun tire, and Battery .~ likewisebegan to receive enemy mortar fire.” Inthe face of this, Captain Rarninger armecll~is range section with two .30 caliber n]:l-chine gu]~s and formed an infantry mlt-post line on the l~igl~ ground behind his5-inch guns.

The enemy fire against Battery Eseemed to come from the thick brush o]~tile other side of a]] inlet southwest of thebattery position. I)irect 3-inch fire intothis xrea silenced one automatic weapon,but this dicl not seem to ease tile pressllremuch. Lieutenant Lewis then sent i~patrol of approximately 10 men under,Ser~eant Raymon C~ragg to investigate.Gragg went out to tile road north of theairstri])l and l)atrolled to the soutl~westalong this lo:ld. Witllill 50 yards of tl~ebattery Gragg’s lx~trol ran ilito heavy.Japal~ese tire wl~icll fol’ced tlw lfaril~es to(leplo-y. .Inswering tile euwny fire, thepatrol held here until the surrender.

At about 0430 the .50 caliber nmchine-gwn section at tile east end of the airstrip,

still in co~l~l~l~illic:~tioi~\vitll Devereux, re-l)orted that the .Japanese \vere attacking incompany strength up the road from Pe:l-cock Point. ~orporal Winford .J. Mc-~lnally, in charge of the six MiLrilles andthree civilian volunteers at this l)ositionjwas trying to hold the ,Jal)anese south oftile airstrip. Fire from tl~e .50 caliber gullposition had halted the enemy a(lvance

“ Rarninger’s report also slm:lks tjf tx,c:lsi(jnalfire from 4’:1 small tield piece, ” Lt (’01 C. .1.Barninflfr I<(pt.6. This mrry have been ;i 70m]]Lhowitzer of the type or~rrnic to ,J’apanese infantrybtrttnlicms.

along tile road, bllt tile enenly now at-tempte(l to infiltrate around tile strollspoint. Mc:ina]ly contartecl another n~:bchine gun positim~ son~e 400 yal’ds to tilesouth on tile atoll’s f3ilSt shore, and thesetwo sections alternated in firing at the’enemy.

This .Japanese force probably was theZt([ya unit. This reinforced companyevidently infiltrated behind the Putnam-Hannz position at the 3-inch gun while tileUchid{t co~npatiy remained near the bearllto deal with that weapon which had firedon the patrol craft. The enemy at firsthad trollble ]ocating Mc.?Mm]ly’s gLm sec-tion, bllt before daylight they were allaround the position. Mc.Lnally’s nlen con-tinued to ]lold, how-ever, and the corporal’sreports to I)evereux gave the major hisonly link with tile action south of tile conl-nlancl post.

By 0500, a half hour before dawn, itwas clear that the Japanese had a superiorforce. firmly established on the atoll, andthat the enemy was free to infiltrate almostat will around and between the isolatedpositions of the defenders. At this timeCommander Cunningham sent his mes-sage, ‘tEnemy on island issue in doubt.>’ 23

But actually there was little doubt, al-though the defenders were far from ad-mitting it at that point. The 500 defend-ers on the atoll were then outnumbered ap-proximately two to one by the enemy; butwhat was worse., the Marines had theirmission and their own atoll against them.“1.ittle W:lke” has a vulnerable shore linei~bout !21miles in length, and the defendershad insufficient men to man even a mini-mtml of their antiaircraft and seacoastguns and at the same time the beach de-

fenses. (h Wake Island alone, nearly

“ wake File.

-— ... .-— 141THE FALL OK }\ .%KYj

half of the 200 defenders had to remain atBatteries A and E, and another 15 Ma-rines manned machine guns and search-lights at Heel Point where the island’s enstleg crooks toward Camp Two. T1lus OnlYabout 85 men could oppose the enemy land-ing force, and half of these were nmclline-gun crewmen. Marines serving as rifle-men against the enemy on Wake Islandnumbered between 40 and 45.

When Cunningham sent his message,Major Putnam still held the positionaround HannaJs .ggn, but the ,Japanese now-had these Marines surrounded. Here. thedefenders had sustained a number of cas-ualties, including the death of CaptainElrod.z4 Camp One also continued tohold, and Lieutenant Poindexter had re-

joined his small mobile reserve force nearthe road junction west of the airstrip.There at first dawn the Marines were takenunder heavy fire from the brush off theirleft (north) flank. Light mortar shellsbegan to fall around the gun positions, andone of the .30 caliber weapons was put outof action. In danger of being outflankedhere, Poindexter ordered a withdrawal to

Camp One where he would consolidate forhis final stand. The unit displaced by sec-tion in 150–yard bounds, and arrived at

Camp One shortly after daybreak. TherePoindexter organized his defenders along

a semi-circular line facing seaward andto the southeast. In this line he had about40 riflemen and 10 machine guns.

Lieutenant Kliewer and his three Ma-rines had survived the night beside themine field generator, but a heavy Japanese

attack threatened them just before dawn.

24The Japanese sustained at least 62 casualtiestrying to take this gun position, and one of themwas Lt Uchida, the company commander.

This was repulsed by close-in fighting withsubmachine guns and grenades, but the,Japanese came back again at dawn. Thistime the enemy made a shouting bayonetcharge against, the Marines, but againKliewer and his men, now aided by the .50caliber machine guns at the west end ofthe. airstrip, managed to halt the attack.

Enemy pressure against McAnally’s ma-chine-gun position east of the airstrip alsoincreased during the hour before dawn.The Marine strong point now had beenlocated, and the defenders were underheavy xttack by small-arms fire and gren-ades. McAnally’s gunners already hadbroken LIp a number of enemy rushes by

holding their fire until it would be most

effective, but these 10 men could not ex-

pect to hold out for long against the

reinforced company opposing them.

This was clear also to Devereux at the

command post, and at 0530 he directed

lIn jor Potter, who until now’ had assisted

in the command post, to assemble every

l~eadquarters, service, supply, or casual

~~arine in the command post a~a, includ-

ing (Xorporal Graves$ detached squad from

~~attery ~j and to form a final defensi~’e

line approximately 100 yards south of the

command post. This force of approxi-

mately 40 men would take up positions

astride the north-south main road. Dev-

ereux then telephoned Captain Godbold on

Peale and directed him to truck his entire

Rattery ~, plus the few .50 caliber gun-

ners, to the battalion command post for

immediate employment as infantry. With

these orders, the atoll’s final reserve, total-ling approximately 30 oficers and men,was committed.

By 0600 McAnally’s position was nearly

surrounded and under continual in fan-

142 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GUADALCANAL

try25 attack. Cnless he was to lose thesepersonnel, Major Devereux had no alter-native but to pull them back. This he didshortly after 0600, when McAnally wasordered to ~vit.hdraw northward and joinMajor Potter’s line.

After Captain Godbold’s reserve forceleft Peale Island, First Lieutenant Kesslerbecame commander there since his Bat-tery B was all that remained on the island.In the light of dawn Kessler could see onWilkes a line of .Tapanese flags across thecenter of tile island, and a large enemyflag waving from the approximate positionof Marine C~unner McKinstryk provi-sional 13attery F. This he reported toMajor Devereux, who could only concludethat Wilkes, which had been silent sinceabout 0300~had shared the f~te which nowappeared imminent for Wake Island.

Above the brush znd slight rise ofground which topped the west, leg of WakeIsland, Kessler could also see the super-structure of Patrol Craft 39. observingthat the ship appeared intact, Kessler at0600 requested Major Devereux’s pernlis-

sion to fire on it. Although the line offire and intervening partial mask 2e madethis hazardous, the request was approved,and on the first salYo Battery B shot away

the ship’s mainnmst. .1s a result of sulj-sequent adjustmel~t, tile ship was hit aboutthe superstructure and Ilpl)er null. Itfinally caught tire.

“ Among the ,Jalmnese killed before his positionat about this time were two flame-thrower oper-

ta ors. Although Ilse of flame is not recorded,this was perhalls the earliest tactical employ-Il)ent of this \veall{Jn in the I’aci tic island }var.

“ Kess16r lN({l t{} train the tfiit-trajectory3“/51 “s w as to tire O(N)SS Flil)pf’r I’{}illt an(l jUstclear the (rest {If Woke Isl:l]jtl. The line of tirepassed less than 23(1 y:lrds to the west of LtKliewer’s l)l)sition at the gentuator.

Meanwhile Second Lieutenant RobertW. Greeley had reached the command postwith the first 20 men from Battery D.There Major Potter, trying to piece outand extend his sparse line to the right(west), directed that the reinforcements beplaced on that flank around the edge of theclearing originally dozed out to preparefor the north-south leg of the airstrip.Captain Godbold arrived with other re-inforcements at about 0700,27 and thesemen joined those already emplaced byGreeley. This line now turned to the right(north) to refuse the flank along the edgeof the clearing. Potter’s line, now con-taining about the equivalent of a rifleplatoon, thus extended from near thebeach, across the two roads south of theCP, and to the airstrip clearing where itmade a northward turn. Thus a gap ofapproximately 450 yards existed betweenthe skirmish line and the shore of thelagoon. This gap the defenders wouldattempt to cover by fire.

By daylight the atoll defenders couldmake out the large task force which sup-ported the landing operations. Therewere then 13 ships at various positionsaround the island (the four cruisers of(‘~ utlser lli~<sion 6 were out of sight. east

of Wake), and all of them were keepinga safe distance from the 5-inch shore bat-teries. “Due to the previous experiencewith the American shore batteries,!> a

senior ,Japanese oflicer said l~ter, %ve did

“ I,ike so many other qnestions as to exactti]aes of events dnring the defense of Wake, thisone is snbjc-rt to conflicting testimony. MajPotter states that (;odhold reached the commandlmst at 0600.” Go(lbold gives 0715 as the time.other sOUIX’W, while not gi~ing times, put theilrrival (if Battery I J shortly after day brerak.B:dancing i~ll accounts against each other, 0700or shortly I)efore seems to be the best synthesis.

THE FALL OF WAKE 143

not want to come within range.”’s Inspite of this caution, however, the de-stroyer Mutsuli began at 0654 to lead twoother destroyers (probably the Yryoi andthe MocAizuli) in to}~i~rd Wilkes Island,possibly to fire shore bombardment mis-sions. But fire from Battery B on I’ea]equickly hit the Mutsuli, and the formationturned and scurried away. Obser~ers be-lieved that Kessler’s fire also hit the seconddestroyer in the formation after tile shipsturned, and that the M7Jtsuki later sank,but, Japanese records do not contirnl this.

Farther to the northwest the two ,Japa-nese carriers L$’ovyuand Iliv.yu headed ul}-wind with their cruiser and destroyerescort, 29 and at 0700 “the gallant Eagles

of the 3Tavy,:’ as the ,Japanese XTavalInformation Service styled them, ap-

proached Wake at 6,000 feet. As the for-mation wheeled over Peacock Point, Bat-tery E opened fire in what was the lastantiaircraft action of the battle. Tl~e for-mation split into component groups ac-cording to mission, and commenced umethodical and unceasing series of airstrikes in close support, of the speciallanding force. Wilkes, Peale, and WakeIsland were hit repeatedly.

Dive bombers now battered Kessler’s

5-inch gun battery on Peale Island, andthe air-supported enemy troops began tomove rapidly against Major Potter’s 1inesouth of the defense battalion commandpost. Battery E also was being attacke(lby the carrier planes, mnd Devereux be-lieved that Wilkes Island and most of the

= Hau:uii-Mala/ja IVuuop,?, 29.m In addition to the two carriers, this task

force was composed of the new 12,000-ton heavycruisers (’}?ikumu and Z’onr, and six destroyers,two of” which were T~niliuzr and [Tmkuze.

\vest leg of Wake Island already had fal-len to the Japtinese. Shortly after 0700the major called Commander Cunning-ham and told him that or~~nized resist-ance could not last much longer. ~~rasthere a chance that, the relief expeditionmight yet arrive ? No chance at all, Cun-ningham said..

And there was no chance, although upuntil two and a half hours earlier thanthis the men in Task Force 14 thoughtthere might be. During the night of 22-23 December (21–22 December at Hawaii)Vice Admiral William S. Pye, act-ing CinCPac pending the arrival of Ad-miral Nimitz from Washington, had beenin conference about, this relief force for

Wake. The officers at, Pearl Harbor knewthat Admiral Fletcher was running a closerace, and they were concerned that this

task force woLdd be lost, along with Wake,if the race ended ill a dead neat. At onepoint, they decided to order the Tangie~ tomake a solitary dash for the ato]l whilethe S“uwtoga, then some 425 miles short of

Nrake, 1aunched Ml jor McC’aul’s planesfrom that distance. But this order wascountermanded before Fletcher could be-gin its execution: aud finally at 0811 Ha-}~aiian time (some two and a half hoursbefore Wake was to surrender) TaskForce 14 ~~i~s recalled. The force spentmost of the day refueling its cruisers, andthat, night retired tc~ward Midway.

Commander Cunningham and MajorI)evereux decided that additional defenseefforts would be hopeless, and the islandcommander made. the decision to surren-

der. ~lct i1+1 on these orders, Deve.reux

carried a white flag out, of his ~P at 0730

:LI~rl wa]ked south nlong the shore road to

meet the ~Japanese.

144 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

THE -FIGHT OiV

WILKE,T [8LAND

“At this time,” states a Japanese report,“Wilkes Island was the scene of a fierceand desperate battle. ” 30 Here at 0245Gunner McKinstry fired the first shots inthe battle of Wake when l]e saw bargesapproaching to land at a point just westof the new channel. After this first burstfrom gun 10 (see Wilkes map) a Marinesearchlight flashed on to reveal the 100men of the Z’akano unit coming throug]lthe surf and onto the beach. But by tl~istime the Wilkes detachment was complete-ly disposed to repel a landing, thanks tothe earlier and erroneous report of a land-ing on Peale Island. (See Map 6)

When that false alarm sounded, Cap-tain Platt ordered two Battery I. gun sec-tions (each about the size of a rifle squad)to positions on the lagoon side of the is-land, and pulled the, remainder of BatteryL personnel back to defensive positionsalong the road near the new channel. Ex-tra ammunition i~ndgrenades were issued,and the Battery F personnel were in-structed to fire against any landing for aslong as they could, and then to pull backacross the road to join the men of BatteryIJ. Thus the Battery I. position, com-manded by I,ieutenant Mc.klister, waswell prepared when the ,Japanese bargeshit the beach near that defensive site.

The searchlight beam 1asted for onlya minute in the face of the ,Japanese at-

tack, but McKinstry continued to fire atthe landing craft he could see on the beach,and McAlister sent two men down towardthe beach to linrl grenades at the ,Japanese.ltl~enlv fire killed one of these men and.wounded the other. Battery F then began

to fire into the landing area with their3-inch shells cut for muzzle-burst, but theattack came on up the beach so rapidlythat these guns soon were unable to depresssufficiently to engage the ,Japanese.

Gunner McKinstry had crossed to the3-inch guns to direct this air-burst fire,but it soon became apparent to him thatthe position could not hold. The enemycontinued to expand their beachhead, anda strong force near Battery F was throw-ing grenades in among the Americans.The gunner removed the firing locks fromthe 3-inch guns, and then directed his mento retire to their designated infantry posi-tion on the right flank of McAlister’s linebeyond the road. ,Tapanese tried to pursuethis withdrawal, but McKinstry’s mendrove them back.

McKinstry and Mc.Uister now were ingood position to protect themselves and toguard tile road to Wake Island, but therewas little to st.ol) the ,Japanese from mov-ing farther west and spreading out overal1 of Wilkes Island unless fire from ma-th ine-guns 9 and 10 could aid the main de-fense line to keep the enemy bottled uparound the abandoned 3-inch guns. Gun9 was already delivering flanking fire:Lgainst these ‘,Japanese, and the enemyadvance was temporarily checked. TheTakallo troops now turned their attacksto knock out this machine gun, but its posi-t ion was well prepared and well camou-

flaged. .~]thOLlg]l nearly surrounded, theMarines on this gun continued to hold and

to repel attacks which kept up until dawn.Meanwhile (’aptain Platt, in his CP be-

l~i]ld the fornler I)ositions of Battery IJ,was haying tile same sort of comn3unica-

t ions trouble tl~atplagued Major Devereux011Wake Island. By 0300 the captain hadlost contact with every position except that

THE FALL OF WAKE 145

/

146

of the beleaguered men cm (;LIu 9. Fromthem he learned that the enemy were bnild-ing up pressure to extend their beachheadfarther inlancl. At about WOO CaptainI’latt moved out to the Gun 11 positionnear the beach, and from there he creptthrough the brushto a~’:lntagel~oil~texstof ~IL1n10. It was now about 0500, anclPlatt decided quickly thathemust mounta cou]lterzttack if the ,Japanese were to beprevented from staging daylight attackswhich ~vould enable them to overrun GLU19and spread out into the interior of theisland.

He hurried back to Gun 10 and orderecll’latoon Sergeant Raymond L. C’oulsonto round up the .30 caliber machine-gun(*rews ancl searchlight personnel fromKnku Point, plus anyone else he could1ay hold of, and assemble them at Gun 10for the counterattack. In 2,5 minutesCoulson was back with the two machine-gun crews ancl eight riflemen-about asq{md in al1. ‘1’hese men the capt aiu ledback through the underbrush toward the,Japanese.

‘1’he Marines crept and crawled to with-in 50 yarc]s of the ,Japanese. Platt thenplaced his two machine guns on each flankof ]lis line of departure, and ordered thegnlillers to fire their short bursts close tothe ground so this tire wo~lld not endangerthe Afr.ilister and M~Kinstry line fartherto the east. By this tinle dawn w-asbreak-il~g,and Platt quickly drew up his skirmish1il]e of eight Marines. He signalled tl~el~mclline guns to open tire, and then he ledhis riflemen forward against tile 100 n)enof tile TaAano unit.

At almut this time 01] tile other si[le ofthe .Ja]mllese position, I,ielltenant McAl-ister Ilad ol)serl-ed il six-nlan eneluy patrol]novi)~g tolvard his 31arilles, and lle or-

J?EARL HARROR TO Gl_’.kDALC.4NAL

dered his line to open fire. One enemywas killed and the others sought cover be-hind a large coral rock near the beach.Mc.%lister’s men continued to fire intothis area to keep the .Japanese pinneddown while Gunner McKinstry and Pri-vate First Class ~Villiam (’. Halsteadworked their way out to this rock and fin-ished oft the rest of the patrol.

Metinwhile Platt’s counterattack hadsurprised the other flank of the penetra-tion, and the Japanese at that point werein trouble. Obviously they had expectedno opposition from the west, and theirlight machine guns had been sighted forfire to the east against the Mc.klister-Mc-Kinstry line. Platt’s attack carried theMarines into the former position of Ilat-tery F, and the Japanese were driven backtoward the beach and toward the Marinedefense line by the island road.

It was now daylight, ancl Mc.ilistercould see this Marine attack on the farside of the ,Japanese position. When hismen finished mopping up the enemyi~~oulid the rock near the beach, the lieu-tenant gathered 24 Marines into a skirmishline of his own and launched a counter-att:lck from his side of the battlefield. Themen of the Ya.kono [andi~z,qjorve panicked.Organ ized resistance evaporaterl in frontof tile two Marine attacks, and the forcesof Platt and McAlister soon joined..~bout 30 .Japanese fled to sl]elter aroundtile Marine searc]digllt truck southeast oftl]e 13attery F gul}s, and there the Marinesunder l’latt ill](l M(:.~lister flnslled themout :I]ld killed tljenl. The T,(i’l(r{o ur?;t o~]l~il kes l)ad bee,) (lest royed.

Mc.ilister counted four officer and 90 en-listed bodies while his men policed up thebattlefield and removed the flags the Jap-anese had placed in the ground to mark

THE FAI,I, OF WAKE 147

their front lines. Two wounded Japanesewere captured. The other four Japanese—if the Talcano unit actually included aneven 100—were not accounted for. Ma-rines found several small maps of Wakein the effects of the dead Japanese, al~dMarine positions were marked accuratelyon these maps. The photographic missions over the atoll had obviously paid offwell.

By 0800 Captain Platt had reorgmizedhis Wilkes defenders, and he again triedto establish contact with Wake Island. Hewas able to contact the motor pool at CanlpOne where Poindexter’s force had nmn-aged to hold throughout the night, buthe cou]d not g-et through to Devereux Itthe defense battalion (3P. At about noonthe men on Wilkes observed Japanese land-ing boats headed for ~$rake Island and sev -ernl ships approaching toward Wilkeschannel. Platt ordered McAllister to gethis 5-inch guns into action against thesevessels, but the gun crews found that the~veapons were beyond use. The trainingmechanism on Gun 1 was wrecked, ancl theGun 2 recoil cylinder had been riddled bybomb fragments.

Wilkes had been under attack by the divebombers which had arrived over the atollat about ()’700,but sign language interroga-tion of the }vounded prisoners indicatedthat the enemy planned no more landingsagainst this section of the atoll. Platt de-cided to go find the enemy. He orderedYlc.klister, McKinstry, and (’oulson toro(lnd up all the men and to strike out east

toward the old channel. Dive bombersattacked this route. column as it, moved

down the island, and a destroyer moveclin to open L~pfrom 2,000 yards. one Ma-rine, Private First (“lass Robert I.. Ste-vens, was killed by this bonlhing, but tl~e

action against the Marines suddenlyceased.

Platt moved the men forward again in adispersed formation, and near the oldchannel he saw three men advancing fromthe other direction. Two were obviouslyMarines, Platt decided, but the figure inthe rear was a ,Japanese officer armed witha large sword. The captain moved for-ward and soon recognized Major Devereuxwho told him that the island had beensurrendered. It was then shortly after1330. Platt’s force did not get a chanceto help in the tighting on Wake Island, butit had given sL~cha good account of itselfin earlier action that a Japanese officer wasl)rompted later to make this estimate ofthe Wilkes fighting: “In general, that partof the operation was not successful.;’ 3’

TliE ,vL’lL’RK:TZ)K12 .I.VD AFTER

Prior to moving down the road towardthe Japanese, who were still receiving de-termined small-arms fire from the few Ma-rines south of the command post, MajorI)evereux passecl word of the surrender toall nnits in communication with his com-mand post. These were Batteries A andE on Wake Island, Battery B on Peale,and other small detachments includingthose at IIeel Point, and some of the .50calil)er positions on Wake Island. Com-munications with Battery A had been re-stored ilt about daybreak. All units wereordered to destroy their materiel as bestthey could prior to actual surrender.

These instructions were carried out withall possible thoroughness. At Battery Eat~attenlpt Ivas nla(le to damage tile ~;-inchantiaircraft gLIns b-y stuffing blankets intotl~e muzzles and then firing a round or two.Illen this failed to produce appreciable

148 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL

results, the firing locks were removed andsmashed, and grenades were rolled downthe muzzles to explode inside and damagethe rifling. .411electrical fire control datareceivers were smashed, electric cableschopped up, and the battery commanderfired twenty rounds of .45 caliber ammuni-tion through the delicate optical and elec-tro-mechallical parts of the height finderand director. After completing thesemeasures, Lieutenant Lewis assembled themen of Battery E and marched them undera white flag to the battalion commandpost.

At Battery A, the 5-inch firing lockswere broken and buried, and all gun tele-scopes smashed. The range keeper wasdamaged beyond repair. After that awhite flag was run up, and LieutenantBarninger ordered his men to eat as muchas they could hold. He then held his menon the position to await arrival of the Jap-anese. Elsewhere, the hard-pressed rifle-men stripped the bolts from their rifles andflung them into the brush.

It was after 0800 before all this had beenattended to, and the rifle fire of Potter’sline was still covering the final operationsof the command post. Major Devereuxthen tried to contact the Marine aid sta-tion located some 300 yards south of theCP. He believed that the <Japanese ad-vance must have reached this point, andhe wanted to instruct the battalion surgeonto contact the Japanese. But there was noresponse from the aid station, and it be-came apparent that a surrender party mustgo forward from the CP. Major Devereuxand Sergeant Donald Malleck, who car-ried a white rag tied to a mop-handle, thenmade their way down the road toward thefighting. At the Marine line Devereuxordered Potter’s men to hold their fire, and

he and Malleck walked on toward the,Japanese.

Near the hospital Devereux and the ser-geaut were halted by a Japanese riflemanwl~o motioned for them to throw downtl~eir arms and helmets. Then the soldiertook them to the hospital where the ,Jap-anese already were in charge. They hadkilled one patient and wounded anotherwhile capturing the hospital, and now theyhad all the patients outside trussed up withtelephone wire. Commander (hnning-]lam Arrived by truck while Devereux wasexplaining his mission to an English-speaking tJapanese officer, and the Marinemajor turned over his surrender duties tothe island commander. A <Japanese officerthen escorted Devereux and Malleck for-ward to pass the surrender order to Ma-rine units on the west leg of Wake Islandand on Wilkes Island.

They found the VMF-211 riflemen andHauna’s unit still holding around the3-inch gun in spite of continuing effortsby the ,Japanese. The Japanese, unableto advance, had taken up positions behindnearby plane revetments, and the fightingl~ere was a deadlock. Captain Tharin wastile only officer unwounded in the Marineposition, and he was directing the actionwhen Major Devereux contacted him at0930. There were now but 10 Marines sur-viving, and nine of them were wounded.

.\t 1014 Devereux reached LieutenantKliewer and his three men beside the mine

field generator. These men had been try-ing since 0900 to coax some life into thegasoline generator so they could blow upthe airfield, but the rain during the nighthad given it a thorough soaking and itwould not ol)erate. “Don’t surrender,lieutenant,” one of the men told Kliewer.“Marines never surrender. It’s a hoax.”

THE FALL OF WAKE 149

“It was a difficult thing to do,” Kliewerreported later, “but we tore down our gunsand turned ourselves over.?’ ‘+2

Shortly before 1115 the surrender party,now west of the airstrip, came upon therear of a Japanese skirmish line facingwestward and evidently engaged in a firefight against, Marines in the brush beyondthe west end of the strip. After some con-fusion during which the .Japanese tired onthe. surrender group, Major Devereuxpassed through the lines and made contactwith Lieutenant Poindexter. The lieu-tenant’s mobile reserves, in ignorance ofthe surrender, had retaken the ground be-tween Camp One and the west end of thestrip during the morning’s fighting. l}~henDevereux came L]pon Poindexter, the 30-odd Marines in this force had just com-pleted a steady eastward advance fromCamp One, fighting their way forwardalong the beach with the edge of the brushto their left. ‘+ “~ peclal naval landing forcetroops were in the thick brush to the north,but they had not attempted to attack theMarines. I)ivided into tlwee lo-lnansquads, Poindexter’s improvised platoonhad advanced with two squads in assault.one on the seaward side of the road andthe other north of the road. The supportsquad protected the exposecl left flank byadv:mcing in rear of tl~e left assault squad.

“ lstLt D. D. h“liewer Rept.

During the advance, particularly as heneared the airfield and retraced by day-light the scenes of IIis fighting during thelli~ht, I,iel~tenant Poindexter counted ap-proximately 80 enemy dead.

After assuring the surrender of thisforce, Major Devereux led the Japanesetoward Camp One, still held by nlachine-gun sections of Poindexter’s group. Therethe Marine prisoners watched a Japaneseclimb up the water tank and cut down the.Irnerican flag which had been flying therethrol~ghout the battle.

The surrender group, followed by ap-proximately 30 Japanese, then crossedWilkes channel by launch. No Marineswere to be seen when Devereux landed atabout 1300, and the party began walkingcautiously westward. At this time theenemy destroyer began firing on the island,but this fire. was soon checked by a Jap-anese signalman who flagged the ship tosilence. At 1330, almost midway betweentile new and old channels on Wilkes, MajorDevereux saw “a few grubby, dirty menwho came out of the brush with their riflesready . . .79 These were Platt’s Marineswho lmd almihilated the Z’akano landingtjarty on Wilkes and now were advancing

eastward to repel what they thought wasstill another landing. Thus all resistancehad been silenced, and Wake now was in

Japanese hands.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions

The defense of Wake was the first war-time operation conducted by the MarineCorps in defense of an advanced navalbzse. It wasalsot.h efirst combat test ofthe Marine defense battalion, although thestrength of the Wake detachment wasgrently reduced. The main reason for thefall of Wake seems obvious. The enemy ingreatly superior strength, supported by

ample surface and air forces, was able toeffect a lodgement on the atoll and then toapply his ground superiority to over-whelm the dispersed defenders in detail.Had it been possible for U. S. surfaceforces to intervene, or for substantial re-inforcements to reach Wakej the resultsmight hnve been entirely different. Butmilitary lessons of some value still may bedrawn by a survey of certain specific rea-sons why the defense was handicapped.These factors were interacting, of course.No single one of them can be clearly iso-lated within the framework of eventswhich brought military defeat to the atoll,

,Japanese procedure for the reductionand seizure of Wake, if not executed withthe skill or standards that U. S. forceslater attained, was nevertheless orthodox.It consisted essentially of two phases, thepreliminary bombardment and the assault1anding. The enemy’s first landing plan

nnderestimated the amount of preparationrequired, and he paid for this miscalcula-tion in the defeat of 11 Decsmber. Butthis he corrected in his second attempt.

Lack of radar and other early-warningequipment. severely handicapped Marinesduring preliminary aerial bombardment,and it would be difficult to overstate theseriousness of this shortage. It enabledthe initial ,Tapanese raid to destroy overhalf of VMF-211’s fighters on the ground,and the same lack of early warning con-tinued to hamper the effectiveness of thosefighter planes which remained in opera-tion. Thus the VMF–211 pilots never hada chance to plan effective fighter intercep-tion against the enemy bombers, and the,Japanese could proceed quite methodicallywith their program for the aerial soften-ing of Wake.

This lack of early warning and theshortage of aircraft can be lumped to-gether as matters of air defense, and airdefense depends upon coordinated em-ployment of fighter aircraft, antiaircraftartillery, and the essential warning sys-ten~s. But, on Wake only the antiaircraftartillery-undermanned and partially op-erational though it was—could be consid-ered f~llly and consistently effective, andl~obody ever expected antiaircraft weaponsalone to defend an advanced naval basea~r<linst air attack. They were there toprovide close-in protection to the aviationfacilities; the planes were to be the in-lmrtant factor in keeping the enemy awayfrom an island base. Deternlil~ation andstl~bbornness of the fighter pilots could not,avert the final outcome. The fliers couldonly exact from the enemy a maximumcost for every bomb dropped. This was

1.50

CONCLUSIONS 151

done until the last (lrumman was cle-stroyed by massed enemy fighters on 22December. After that, landing oper:~-tions against lt~ake COLIMproceed.

Once tile ground combat began, the fumdamental weakness of the defense bat-talion concept as it then existed becamestarkly underlined. The unit had no in-fantry component to act as an effectivemobi 1e reserve. Most garrison personnelwere tied to weapons and battery positions,and Major Devereux could muster only afraction of his n]anpower against the ill-vac{ers even after enemy intentions becanleapparent. On Wake Island, for example,only about 85 of $200Marines were readilyavailable to check the assault landing ofa thousand ,Japanese. Militarily speak-ing, there is something pathetic in thespectacle of I,ieutenant Poindexter and his“mobile reserve>’ of eight men and fourmachine guns dashing by truck from onethreatened point to another in the face ofsLIch f ant ast ic odds.

True, at that time trained infantry wasalmost as scarce as radar. But the faultlay in the defense battalion tables of or-ganizat ion. Later this omission was cor-rected, and Midw:~y had both infantry and1ight tanks. Had even one Marine in-f ant ry company reinforced with tanksbeen on Wake, it is possible that the gal.-rison might have, thrown the ,Japaneseback into the sea. This is borne out bywhat happened on Wilkes Island, where

Captain Platt was able to annihilate twicehis numbers of the enemy by shrewd, co-or(linated counter-attack. And after clay-lig]lt On ~~:lke Is]zlld, Poindexter, with

tile makeshift defenders of Camp Oneadded to his “mobile reserve,” had :is-sumed the offensive, driven bi~ck the ,Jap-anese to his front, and regained most of

448777o—5~11

the ground given up during the confusedhours of darkness.

-ifter the ,Japanese had landecl in forceon the south coast of Wake Island, it ap-pears that the coast artillery and antiair-craft, missions of Batteries B and D, re-spectively, had become of secondary im-portance in light of the serious enemyground threat. The military reader mightwonder why all available personnel fromBatteries B and D, with whom Devereuxwas still in communication, were not earlyin the battle brought down to the vicinityof the airfield and employed, together withsllch few other available Marines, as a mo-bile reserve to ~C)Unterattack the main Jap-anese beachhead. This was partially ac-complished at 0530” on the final morningwhen (Taptain Crodbold was directed to

bring the personnel of his battery (D)to the command post for employment asinfantry. By this time, however, it wastoo late for such a small number to influ-ence the outcome of the battle. In thisconnection, Major Devereux later pointedout that because of the partial failure ofcommunications he never had anythinglike. a clear picture of the situation duringthe final ,Japanese attack. For severalhours he was in doubt as to the location ofthe main enemy landing and hence did notconsider himself justified in strippingPeale Islznd of LLlldefenders.

.4s alluded to above, another major les-son to be derived from this phase of theoperation was a re-emphasis of Admiral~Iahan’s famous dictum that “(~ommuni-cations dominate war.” The partial fail-ure of col~~l~lullic:~tiolls,which occurredshortly after the ,Japanese landing. isolat-

ed the defense detachment commanderfrom most of his subordinate units then inact ion. .is a result he not only lost control

152 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

over much of the battle, but he also-andperhaps more important to this case—be-came unavoidably deceived as to the prog-ress of the situation. In ignorance ofwhat happened on Wilkes or at Camp One,he surmised that all was lost in those areas.Buried telephone lines and reliable fieldradios would have prevented this failureof communication, and the surrender de-cision would not have been made at thatparticular stage of the action. The Wakegarrison, however, had neither the per-sonnel to dig by hand, nor the machineryto dig by mechanical means, the manymiles of ditches which would have beennecessary to bury the telephone lines.

Perhaps one. of the fundamental reasonsfor the state of the Wake defensesstemmed from the fact that base develop-ment had consistently received priorityover defense preparations. That the de-fensive installations were in as good a con-dition as they were when the Japanesestruck may be credited to the tremendousefforts of the small Marine garrison.

All things taken into account, however,the decision to surrender Wake was rea-sonable, especially when considered inlight of the civilian situation and the factthat relief was no longer in prospect. Ma-rines who fought through the Pacific cam -paigns would later see many examples ofa totally unreasoning enemy who neversurrendered but was always defeated. Atthe same time, insensibly, some might cometo believe that unyielding refusal to sur-render was the proper role of a defender.

Of course this was neither true nor logical.Wake had exacted a full and more thanhonorable toll from the Japanese, but itsdefensive resources had been exhausted.

No fighter aircraft remained. Only oneantiaircraft battery was effectively opera-

tional. Enemy dive bombers on 23 De-cember had completely disab-led one 5-inchbattery (Wilkes) and largely destroyedthe fire control instruments of the remain-ing two. Without airplanes, fire controlinstruments, radar, spare parts, and per-sonnel to bring the defense to full strengthWake could not carry on. The onlyanswer was surrender. This took placefifteen days after the initial attack, and itwas eleven hours after the fighting com-menced on shore before Wilkes Island sur-rendered.

During this period the Marines sus-tained almost. 20 per cent casualties, butthey exacted a heavy toll from the Jap-anese. Nearly 500 enemy had been lostin the abortive landing attempt of 11 De-cember, the defenders on Wilkes Islandaccounted for nearly 100 in their defeat ofthe Tahmno unit, and Poindexter countedapproximately 80 enemy bodies during hismorning attack from Camp One. Give theHanna-VMF-211 position credit for atleast 20 more kills, and this would bringthe Wake total to 700 enemy. Others musthave lost their lives on Wake Island land-ing beaches and elsewhere on the island,although the figure probably would not begreat. But in earlier action the atoll anti-aircraft and fighter plane fire had downed21 enemy aircraft and claimed credit fordamaging another 11;

Based on this record, Major Putnam’sfinal VMF-211 report of 21 Decemberwould truthfully state that “AN handshave behaved splendidly and held up ina manner of which the Marine Corps maywell tell. ”

‘ A Japanese source says that 51 planes, inaddition to those shot down, were damaged byflak over Wake. i?akamura iVotebook.

PART W

Marines in the Philippines

CHAPTER 1

China and Luzon

In the first few months after Pearl Har- I -”’ ..-. ,–, .- .,#. – ,.

bor, it seemed that nothing could stop theJapanese. One by one, the western out-posts in the Far East were overwhelmed.Allied ground troops, in desperately un-equal contests, were forced to retreat, fight,and retreat again; at sea and in the airthe pitifully few ships and planes whichhad survived the initial onslaught werehoarded against the surety of further en-emy advances. A grim holding battle wasjoined along a line protecting Australiaand N’ew Zealand and their South Pacificlifeline to the States. Yet, despite itsstrategic importance, this vital defensiveaction gave first place in the news to theoutcome of a hopeless struggle hundreds ofmiles behind the enemy’s forward posi-tions.

For almost five months, two names—Bataan and Corregidor—dominated theheadlines, taking fire in the minds of theAllied peoples as symbols of courage and

devotion to duty. To the Japanese, whorealized that they could starve out the em-battled defenders at little cost to them-

selves, it became imperative that the issuebe decided forthwith in battle. On theeve of the all-out offensive that brought theend on Bataan, the Japanese commander,

addressing his combat leaders, clearlystated the importance of the isolated strongpoints in the eyes of the world:

The operations in the Bataan Peninsula andthe Corregidor Fortress are not merely a localoperation of the Great East Asia War. This

uacue nas Iascea ror aDouL mree montns as com-pared with our speedy victories in Malaya, DutchEast Indies, and other areas in the Philippines.As the Anti-Axis powers propagandize about thisbattle as being a uniquely hopeful battle and thefirst step toward eventual victory, the rest ofthe world has concentrated upon the progress ofthe battle tactics on this small peninsula. Hence,the victories of these operations do not only meanthe suppression of the Philippines, but will alsohave a bearing upon the English and Americansand their attitude toward continuing the vvar.1

Lieutenant General Masaharu Hommawas right: the outcome of the battle didhave a direct bearing on the .411ied atti-tude toward vigorous pursuit of the war.Perhaps in no instance since the defenseof the .41amo stirred Americans in anothercentury did an unsuccessful battle carrywithin its waging and its ending the sourceof so much national pride and dedication.

THE AHAD OW OF TJTAR2

On 26 .July 1941, shortly after Japan oc-cupied military bases in Indo-China, Pres-ident Roosevelt authorized the mobiliza-tion of the Philippine Army. The War

1HistSec, G–2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studies inWW1l No. 1, 14th Army Ops, 2 vols., n. d. (lo-cated at OCMH ), 141–142, hereinafter cited asIi$th Army Rept.

2 Unless otherwise noted the material in

this section is derived from Adm T. C. Hart,Narrative of Events, AsFlt Leading UP to Warand ~rom 8Dec?41 to 5Neb42, written beforellJun42 (located at NHD), hereinafter cited asHart Narratirc; Adm T. C. Hart, SupplementaryNarrative to Hart Xarratiw, 80ct46 (located atNHD) ; Gen J. C. Wainwright, Rept of Ops of

155

156 PEARL HARBOR TO GIJADALCANAL

Department, which had requested thismove, followed through with a directi%reorganizing a new command, ~TSi4FFE(United States Army Forces in the FarEast), which included all American Armyand Commonwealth troops in the Philip-pines. To head USAFFE the Armycalled out of retirement its former chief ofstaff, General MacArthur, who had servedas Military .4dvisor to the CommonwealthGovernment since 1935. He was givenrank as a lieutenant general and with char-acteristic energy tackled the enormous jobof putting the Philippines into a state ofreadiness against attack.

The bulk of USAFFE’S troop strengthwas drawn from the Philippine Armywhich was, in July 1941, an army in nameonly. It consisted of the islands’ policeforce, the 6,000-man Philippine Constab-ulary, a token air force and inshore navalpatrol, and ten territorial reserve divis-ions. Since the start of the Common-wealth% defense training program in 1936about 110,000 Filipinos had received a fewmonths of basic military instruction, butmost of these reservists had no experiencewith crew-served weapons and only rudi-mentary knowledge of their own pieces.

~SAFFE and USFIP in the Philippine Islands1941–42, 10Aug46 (located at TAGO), herein-after cited as VSAFFE-USFIP Rept; AnnexVIII to USAFFE-l?SFIP Rept, MajGen G. F.Moore, Rept of CA Cored and the Harbor De-fenses of Manila and Subic Bay, 19Feb41–6May42, 15Dec45 (located at TAGO ), hereinaftercited as Moore Rf’ut; BriGen S. L. Howard, “Re-l)ort of the operation, employment and supply ofthe old 4th Marines from September, 1941 to thesurrender of Gorregidor, May 6. 1942,” 26 Sep45,hereinafter cited as Howard Rept; Ihth Army

Rept; L. Morton, The Fall of the Ph itippines—

l~nited States Army in World War II (Washing-

ton : OCMH, DA, 1953), hereinafter cited as Fallof the Philippines; Ri8ing Sun in the Pacific.

The divisions had never operated as suchin field maneuvers and were scantily pro-vided with arms and equipment.. In orderto mold an effective fighting force fromthe Philippine Army, MacArthur neededjust about everything in the military sup-ply catalogs, but most of all he neededtime—time for training, time for materieland men to reach the Philippines from theUnited States.

The instructors and cadres needed fortraining the Philippine .4rmy were drawnfrom the, Constabulary and the regularArmy units available to US.4FFE. Mostof the 22,000 U. S. Army troops in theislands were serving in Coast Artilleryregiments, the Army .4ir Corps, or thePhilippine Division, sole regular infantrydivision in the islands. Over half of thesemen were members of crack Philippine

Scout units.s The regulars suffered, too,from a general lack of up-to-date weaponsand equipment,4 but they were well trainedto use what they had.

The Tt’ar Department supported Mac-Arthur’s requests for additional troopsand supplies to the fullest extent possiblein light of the country’s world-wide com-mitments; USAFFE received priority inalmost every man power and materielcategory. More than 7,000 men, mostlymembers of service and air units, and the

‘ The Philippine Scouts was a U. S. Armyorganization in which the enlisted men werenative Filipinos and most of the officers wereAmericans. The Scouts had and merited a highreputation for fielding units with good morale,excellent discipline, and a consistently superiorlevel of combat readiness.

4At the outbreak of the war, “the Philip-pine Division, less than two-thirds strength, hadonly three ( 3 ) new- 37mm automatic firing can-non, three (3) 81mm mortars per infantry regi-ment and no (0) 60mm mor tars...”US.4FFE- USFIP Rept, 94.

CHINA AND LUZON 157

major portion of the ~Tnited States’ heavybomber strength reached the Philippinesprior to the outbreak of war. Much morewas promised and planned, but the Jap-anese surprise attack effectively cut off theflow of reinforcement. It also forced a re-vision of MacArthur’s defensive strategy.

In view of his healthy reinforcementprospects, the USAFFE commander hadadopted an aggressive defense plan thatconceded the enemy nothing. He did notexpect the Japanese to attack before April19425 and by that time he considered thathis air and ground strength would be suchthat he could successfully hold his posi-tion against any attacking force. He wasconfident that the Philippine Army, whenadequately trained and equipped, wouldbe a match for the Japanese.

The Commander in Chief of the U. S.Navy’s Asiatic Fleet (CinCAF), AdmiralThomas C. Hart, was in substantial agree-ment with Mac.4rthur% philosophy of anaggressive defense. He recommended thatin the event of war his fleet units remainbased at Manila Bay and fight the Jap-anese in Philippine waters. The NavyDepartment, however, adhered to its long-

est ablished plan that the major ships ofthe fleet would retire to the south at theimminence of war, to a base of operationsin the h’etherlands East Indies or Malaya,where they could cooperate with Alliednaval units.’ Hart’s slim collection of

5Gen J. ~. l~ainwright, General Woinw>right’.sfi’tor~, R, Considine, ed. (Garden City, N. Y. :Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946), 13, here-inafter cited as Wa.inwright’s fltorg.

6 After the war, in supplementary comments tohis original report, Adm Hart agreed that theNavy Dept decision was the best that could havebeen made considering the situation at the time.He added, however, that if his original proposalof 270ct41 to continue to base at Manila had been

cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aux-iliaries, was certainly no match for theJapanese fleet, nor was it intended to be.The U. S. Pacific Fleet, based at PearlHarbor, was the American striking force,and war plans envisaged its fighting ad-vance to the Philippines if the Japaneseattacked.

The Asiatic Fleet’s major shore installa-tions were located at Olongapo on SubicBay and at Mariveles and Cavite withinManila, Bay. Since denial of Manila Bayto the enemy was a key point in war plan-ning, the activities of the 16th NavalDistrict (Rear .4dmiral Francis W. Rock-well ), the shore establishment supportingthe Asiatic Fleet, were closely coordinatedwith IJSAFFE’S defensive preparations.Contact mines were laid to connect withcontrolled mine fields of the Army’s har-bor defenses, completely closing ManilaBay. (h Corregidor, site of the prospec-tive command post for the defense ofLuzon, protected installations for navalheadquarters, a radio intercept station, anda torpedo replenishment depot were pre-pared and equipped. Large quantities offuel and ammunition stored at.Cavite weremoved to dumps away from the naval baseto lessen their vulnerability to bombing.

(See Maps 7 and 8, Map Section)If the Japanese attacked, the most dan-

gerously exposed elements of the AsiaticFleet were those stationed in China: seven

Yangtze River gunboats; Colonel SamuelL. Howard’s 4th Marine Regiment atShanghai; and the Marine embassy guarddetachments at Peiping and Tientsin.

turned down sooner he might well have made abetter dispositionof his fleet units; he had actedon the assumption that his proposal would beaccepted until it was disapproved in late No-vember.

158 PEARL H.4RBOR TO GIJADALCANAL

.kdmiral Hart had begun making informalproposals that his China forces be with-drawn early in 1941, and after. July, whenhe was “entirely convinced that the warwas coming,”’ 7 he followed up with em-phatic official recommendations that hismen be gotten out before it was too late.Japanese war preparations were so evidentby 1 September that the American Consul-General at Shanghai, the commander ofthe Yangtze Patrol, and Colonel Howardjointly recommended that all naval forcesin China be withdrawn. Hart naturallyconcurred and further recommended to theNavy Department that the troops be evacu-ated in late September when the transport17endemon made a routine call on Chineseports to pick up short-timers and otherreturnees.

Hart’s request was turned down as faras withdrawal on the Henderwon was con-cerned. He was told, however, that jointState-Navy conferences would be heldwithin a couple of weeks time to considerthe problem of a withdrawal and itseffect on negotiations for a settlement of

Japanese-American differences. DespiteCinCAF’s protest that this “was not, aquestion that could be delayed for weeksbut must be acted upon immediately,” 8he did not receive permission to withdrawthe gunboats and the Marines until 10 No-vember, “embarrassingly late” as he laternoted.g Five of the gunboats were able toreach Manila without hindrance onceclearance to leave was given.l”

‘ Adm T. C. Hart ltr to CLMC, 100ct56, herein-after cited as Hart Cow~menta.

‘ Quoted in Howard Rept, 1.‘Hart Na?-ratice, 29.

‘0 The smallest of the gunboats, the Wake, wasstripped and left at Shanghai to be used as a sta-tion ship and radio outlet for the remaining

Two President liners, the Machkon andthe Harrison, were chartered to transportthe Marines, attached naval personnel, andtheir supplies and equipment; provisionwas also made to evacuate some Americancivilians from Shanghai on the same ships.After it reached the Philippines and un-loaded, the Harrison was to return toNorth China and pick up the embassyguards and their gear at Chinwangtao.All signs pointed to the necessity for hastein the withdrawal.

The Japanese were replacing their sea-soned troops around Shanghai with re-cruits, and large numbers of specialarmored landing barges which had previ-ously been seen near the city disappeared;intelligence pointed to movement south-ward of both veteran units and landingcraft. Intelligence also indicated that the,Japanese .4rmy was eager to take over theInternational Settlement, by force if nec-essary, and that it was only being re-strained by the Nipponese Navy’s desirefor an “incident” which would seem tojustify such action. Several attempts weremade to manufacture incidents, but theMarines refused to knuckle under to thepressure, and Colonel Howard initiatedprompt action which kept the Americandefense sector clear. A copy of a Japanesewarning order was obtained which statedthat “in the event of war the 4th Marines

would attempt to break through [our]lines ;“ “ ample evidence of this belief wasseen in the increase in size and number ofthe patrols in the city and in the construc-

Americans; it was captured on 8 December. TheTutuila at Chungkiug was turned over to theChinese Nationalist Government under lend-leasesince it could not get downstream through theJapanese blockade.

“ Howard Rept, 3.

CHINA AND LUZONT 159

tion of concrete blockhouses on all roadsleading out of Shanghai.

Both the Madison and Harti~on neededto be converted to troop use after theirarrival at Shanghai, an{dthe first ship wasnot ready until 27 November. By 1600that date, the Madison with half the regi-ment and half its equipment on boardsailed for Olongapo. While this forwardechelon, the 2d Battalion and half of theRegimental Headquarters and ServiceCompanies, was loading out, a message wasreceived from CinCAF to expedite theevacuation. Even though the conversionwork on the Eation was three days shortof completion, the decision was made toclear Shanghai the following day with therest of the regiment and its remainingequipment.

Despite the short notice and the harass-ing tactics of the Japanese, 12 the Regi-mental R4 and Quartermaster, MajorReginald H. Ridgely, Jr., was able to loadall organizational gear, over 500 tons, by1300 on the 28th. At 0900 that morning,the regiment assembled at the 1st Batta-lion’s billet, formed up behind its band,and marched down Bubbling Well-Nank-ing Roads to the President Line’s dock onthe Bund. Thousands of cheering peoplelined the route of march, and the banks of

“ “All supplies had to pass through the Japa-nese Sector on the way to the Customs dock.About 3:00 p.m. ~ovember 27th they closedthe Garden Bridge over Soochow Creek to trafficand our trucks were delayed nearly an hourbefore contact could be made with the JapaneseAdmiral to get this bridge reopened to traffic.Customs officials ostensibly at the instigationof the Japanese were insistent that our suppliespass through the Custom House, but we @noredsuch orders and loaded them on lighters. TheJapanese instigated three strikes during thenight by the laborers loading the lighters.”Ibid., 4.

the river were alive with flag-wavingChinese as a power lighter took the Ma-rines downstream to their ship. At 1400the Harrison weighed anchor and sailedfor the Philippines, marking the end of acolorful era in Marine annals.

AS soon as the Ham”son cleared theWhangpoo River, machine guns werebroken out and manned for antiaircraftdefense, and blackout regulations were putinto effect.13 Flights of Japanese aircraftchecked the liner regularly as it movedout into the China Sea, but there were noincidents, and contact was made on the29th with submarine escorts dispatched by.Admiral Hart. On 30 November and 1December the two transports arrived atOlongapo where the troops disembarked.Only a few supplies were unloaded at thenaval station, ostensively because CinCAFhad issued orders that the ships must passthrough the mine field into Manila Bay bynightfall on the clay of arrival. Actually,Admiral Hart had given oral orders to hisstaff that the Marines were to be landedwith field equipment only, because it washis intention that:

. . . they would get into the field, near Olon-gapo, as soon as they could. We [Hart and hisstaff] all knew that they had been cooped up inShanghai through all those years where condi-tions for any sort of field training were verypoor—and we thought that not much time re-mained.1’

While the regiment’s heavy equipmentwas unloaded at Manila and trucked to

Olongapo, the Ha&on was readied fora return voyage to pick up the Marines

from Peiping and Tientsin. It was al-

UA’o special defensive arrangements weremade by the 4th klar elements on the President

Madisow. CWO C. R. Jackson ltr to CMC,100ct56, hereinafter cited as Ja@cson.

“ Hart Comment8.

160 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL

ready too late, however, to rescue theNorth China Marines. The Japanese warplans had been activated, and the carriertask force that would strike Pearl Harborwas at sea en route to its target. Thetroops, ships, and planes that would besent against the Philippines were concen-trated at Formosa, the Ryukyus, and thePalaus with orders to begin their attackon X-Day—8 December 1941 (ManilaTime) .’5

8 DECEMBER 1941”

When the dawn of the first day of thePacific War reached the China Coast, theattack on Pearl Harbor was over and thetroops in the Philippines had been alertedto their danger. At the Chinwangtaodocks, Second Lieutenant Richard M. Hui-zenga was supervising the stockpiling ofsupplies for the expected arrival of thePresident I?arrison. A truck driverbrought him word that the radio at hisrailhead, Camp Holcomb, was full of newsof Pearl Harbor. Although the Japanesemade half-hearted attempts to stop him onhis three-mile drive back to the camp,Huizenga was able to get through to hisunit. He found the 21 Marines of theloading detail surrounded, at a respectfuldistance, by a cordon of Japanese troops.The men, under Chief Marine GunnerWilliam A. Lee, were setting up a strongpoint amid the boxcars of supplies; two

‘5Carn~aignsof the Pacific War, 2G27, 50.

“ Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Hart Narrative;US AFFE-USFIP Rept; l~th Army Rept; How-a rd Rept; 4th Mar Jnl and Rec of Events,8Dec41–2May42, hereinafter cited as ~th Mar

Jni; Capt A. F. Metze Rept to CMC, “Surren-der of U. S. Marine Forces in North China,”23Aug42; Fall of the Philippines; Rising Sun inthe Pacific.

machine guns and several Tommy gunsand BARs had already been broken outof their cosmoline packing. Despite theirclesperate situation the Marines wereready to fight.

Huizenga and a Japanese captain heldan armed parley where the lieutenant wasgiven time to communicate to his superiorat Tientsin, Major Luther A. Brown, theenemy’s demand that he surrender the de-tachment. Orders soon came back to offerno resistance and the Marines werestripped of their weapons. Later in theday they were returned under Japaneseguard to the Marine barracks at Tient-sin.”

The situation of the detachments atTientsin and Peiping was similar to thatof the one at Camp Holcomb; Japanesetroops surrounded their barracks instrength and demanded their surrender.Since the embassy guard was not requiredto maintain a continuous watch on Cin-

CAF’S command” radio circuit, ‘8 the firstword that the senior Marine officer, Colo-nel William W. Ashurst, had of the out-break of hostilities came from the Japa-nese. He was given till noon to make hisc1ecision whether to fight or not and wasallowed to communicate by radio with

CinCAF and by phone with MajorBrown. In a sense .4shurst had been givena Hobson’s choice: he could surrender orhe could let his troops, fewer than 200 of-ficers and men, be overwhelmed. If dis-cipline and spirit would have won the day,

“ MIS, G–2, WD, Escape Rept No. 665, CaptR. M. Huizenga, 12Ju145.

‘8 LtCol W. T. Clement Rept to CMC, “Dis-positions and employment of U. S. Marines onthe Asiatic Station during the initial stages ofthe war,” 6Apr42, hereinafter cited as ClementRept.

CHINA AND LUZON 161

Ashurst could have opened tire on the be-

siegers—his men had already demon-

strated at ~amp Holcomb that they were

willing to take on hopeless odds. But

there was no purpose in fighting if the end

result could only be useless bloodshed.

In the absence of instructions to the con-

trary, Colonel Ashurst took the only sen-

sible course open to him and ordered his

men to lay down their arms. A strongpossibility existed that if no resistancewas offered the embassy guards would beconsidered part of the diplomatic entou-rage, entitled to repatriation. As theinitial treatment of the Marines was rela-tively mild and they repeatedly receivedinformal assurances from the Japanesethat they would be exchanged, few at-tempted escape. JJThen these rumorsproved false, the opportunity hadpassed.lg

By the time Ashurst’s report of his de-cision to surrender reached Hart in Ma-nila, the Philippines were in the thick ofthe war. The first news of the Japaneseattack was picked up at 0257 by a radiooperator at CinC.4F Headquarters who,recognizing the technique of the sender,vouched for the reliability of the nowfamous message, “Air raid on Pearl Har-bor. This is no drill.” n The duty of-ficer, Marine Lieutenant Colonel WilliamT. Clement of Hart’s staff, immediatelynotified the admiral who sent a war alertto all fleet. units. Minutes later, by a com-bination of intercepted official and com-mercial broadcasts and the spreading of

the word by the first agencies notified, thereport had reached all major USAFFEheadquarters.

“ Huizenga, op. cit.; MIS, G–2, WD, EscapeRept No. 666, Capt J. D. McBrayer, Jr., 12Ju145.

mGlement Rept.

A cacophony of sound broke the still-uess at Olongapo when the alert reachedthe naval base at 0350; the bugler of theguard blew “Call to Arms ;“ the steamwhistle at the power plant blasted a recallsignal to PBY crewmen; and the ship’sbell at the main gate clanged continu-ously.” Companies immediately mus-tered in front of their wooden barracksand in the streets of tent areas and wereput to work setting up machine guns forantiaircraft defense and digging individ-ual protective holes. Colonel Howardinitiated the first moves in what was to bea hectic period of redisposing, reorgan-izing, and reinforcing the regiment whichlasted throughout the month of December.

When the 4th Marines arrived fromShanghai its strength stood at 44 officersand warrant officers and ’728 enlisted men;organic naval medical personnel raised thetotal strength to 804. The regiment “hadbeen permitted to dwindle by attrition” 22in China so that it consisted only of Head-quarters Company, Service Company, andtwo battalions—the battalions short one oftheir rifle companies and the companieseach short one of their three rifle platoons.By utilizing the members of the regimen-tal band and absorbing the Mwrine Bar-racks Detachment, Olongapo, Howardwas able to form some of the missing pla-

“ Capt E’. W. Ferguson, Personal Experiences8Dec41–6May42, n. d., hereinafter cited as Fer-guson.

u Howard Reptj 8. As the threat of war with.Japan increased, Adm Hart initiated a policy ofwithholding replacements from Marine units inChina. Almost all of the men held back wereassigned to the 1st SepMarBn at Cavite. Hartfelt that if by some mischance he was unableto get the -lth Mar out of China he “could atleast stop sending any more Marines there untilsomeone bawled us out most vociferously. Theynever did.” Hart Comments.

162 PDARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

toons. In keeping with previous ordersfrom Admiral Rockwell, he sent the 1stBattalion by tug, lighter, and truck toMariveles to relieve the Marine detach-ment there. The men of the Marivelesguard had been taken from the other ma-jor Marine unit in the Philippines, the 1stSeparate Marine Battalion at Cavite.

The battalion was organized to functioneither as an antiaircraft or an infantryunit, but its primary mission was the anti-aircraft defense of the naval installationsin the Cavite-Sangley Point area. Itsfiring batteries, 3-inch guns and .5o calibermachine guns, had been on partial alertsince 14 October and as the threat of wargrew stronger the guns and their crewshad reached a high- degree of readiness.On 4 December, the battalion’s one longrange radar set and the necessary operat-ing personnel were assigned toI; SAFFE’S control and moved to a posi-tion on the west coast where the radarcould scan the approaches to Manila fromthe south; 2’ the set was one of two operat-ing in the Philippines on 8 December.

When the battalion commander, Lieuten-ant Colonel John P. Adams, passed theword of the Pearl Hmbor attack there was

little left to be done but to “cut fuzes,going into the last stage of readiness.!’ ‘~

Rut the Marine guns were not to see ac-tion. The Japanese reserved their firstday of attack for their primary target,MacArthur’s Far East Air Force(FEAF). And when that day was over,tl~e ,Japanese figured that, their “supren~-

= LtCol H. L. Davis ltr to CMC, 310ct56.24lstLt If”. F. Hogaboom, Personal Experiences

140ct41–6May42, n. d., 1–2, hereinafter cited asHogaboom. This narrative was published in theMC Gazette, April 1946, under the title, “ActionReport—Bataan.”

:Lcy, at least in the air, was establishedconclusively.” 2’

Except for 16 B–17’s at Del Monte onMindanao, the bulk of FEAF’s strengthin first-line planes was stationed at fieldsin central Luzon. Dawn of the 8th foundmost of these planes airborne, waiting toengage or evade ,Japanese attackers. Butthe land-based naval fighters and bombersof the ,Japanese Eleventh Air Fleet,charged with making the main air assault,did not appear at dawn. The enemy planhad called for such a surprise attack,timed to coincide with the start of opera-tions in Malaya and at Pearl Harbor, butthick clouds and heavy fog delayed thetake-off from Formosa of the major attackformations. It was noon before the enemyplanes could reach their targets, Luzon’sairfields, and the ,Japanese pilots veryreasonably assumed that with the. loss ofsurprise they would be met in force.z~

But this was not to be, for “shortlyafter 1130 all American aircraft in thePhilippines, with the exception of one ortwo planes, were on the ground.” 27 Thefighters were refueling after their fruit-less morning patrols o; awaiting a warn-ing of imminent attack; the bombers were

arming for an offensive mission againstFormosa. By an incredible chain of cir-cumstances, compounded by poor com-munications, a woefully inadequate airwarning system, and a generous amount

“ HistSec, Japanese Research Div, GHQ, F13C,Japanese Studies in WWI1 No. 11, Philippines.4irOpsRec, lFeb52, 7, hereinafter cited asPhilippines AirOp8Rec.

w Ibid.“ W. S. Craven md J. L. Cate ( eds. ), Plans and

Early Operations’, January 195’9 to August19&-The Army Air Forces in World War II

(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1948),209.

CHINA AND LUZON 163

of pure bad luck, the Japanese were givena sitting target. After” a day of violentaction, when all concerned tried to makeup for what hindsight calls mistakes, thestrength of the FEAF had been reducedby half. The way was open for the Japa-nese to begin landing operations.2a

The enemy had in fact made his firstlanding by the time of the main air at-tacks. A small force came ashore at dawnon Batan Island midway between Luzonand Formosa and immediately beganwork to set up an air base on an alreadyexisting strip to accommodate the rela-tively short-ranged Army fighters. Thenext day elements of two fighter regi-ments of the Japanese 5ti~ .4ir Groupwere using the field and flying reconnais-sance and strike missions over northernLuzon, site of the next planned landings.

THE FIRST DAYS “

On 9 December only a few enemy bomb-ers attacked, but these planes filteringthrough the early morning darknessreached Nichols Field outside Manila un-scathed whew their bombs increased thedamage and added to the toll of Ameri-can planes. An all-out attack on the Ma-nila Bay area had been planned for the

~ See Graven and Gate, OP.cit., 201–213 andJ’all of the Philippine, 79-90 for an examina-tion of the contradietor~ statements and chro-nology of misadventures that marked what may

well have been the blackest day in the historyof the Army Air Corps.

n Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Hart Narrative;

i7LSAFFE-L7S171P Rept; Moore Rept; RAdmF. W. Rockwell, Narrative of Naval Activitiesin the Luzon Area, lDec41–19Mar42, lAug42(located at NHD ), hereinafter cited as Roclc-well Narrative; Howard Rept; -&?h Mar Jnl;

l~th Army Rept; Fall of the Philippines; Rising

Sun in the Pacific.

second day of the war, but fog overFormosa prevented the take-off. .41-though the weather was again bad on the10th, the enem~y naval squadrons were ontheir way to their targets by midmorn-ing.ao Radar and glound observersspotted the incoming flights, but to noavail. Mrhen the outnumbered Americaninterceptors rose to greet the raiders, theenemy fighters swarmed all over them, notgiving as good as they got, but more thanmaking up for their losses whenever theydowned one of the few remaining planesof FEAF.

The Japanese bomber groups were head-ing for the best protected area in the Phil-ippines; almost all of the antiaircraftunits in USAFFE were concentrated nearManila. But the gunners below had aninsoluble problem; they had plenty ofammunition, but very little of it was fusedso that it could reach above 24,000 feet.After a few false starts the enemy learnedthat they could bomb from heights of25,000 feet with relative impunity. Therewas a limited supply of mechanically-fused ammunition which could reach30,000 feet, but there were not enoughsuch rounds to materially increase anti-aircraft defenses.

The gunners of the 1st Separate MarineBattalion at Cavite scored a kill on 10December when they downed an over-eager dive bomber that strayed from thepack over Nichols Field, lured by the tar-get of two PBY’s taking off from SangleyPoint. But that was the end of it. Thethree-inch batteries turned back the firstflight of bombers, which came in too low,but all subsequent flights approaching the

MHistSec, G–2, GHQ, FEC, Japanese Studiesin WWI1 A-o. 13, A’avOps in the Invasion of thePhilippines, 15May46 (located at OCMH), 7.

164 PlOARLHARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

naval base stayed well out of range andthe gunners were helpless spectators to thedestruction that followed.”

Stick after stick of bombs rained downon the naval base as successive flights ofbombers criss-crossed the area laying a per-ceptible pattern. Fires sprang up every-where as small dumps of ammunition andgasoline were hit and the old town ofC’avite was soon a raging mass of flames.All the ships that could possibly get awayfrom the, yard headed out into the bay, butthe bombers caught and fatally damageda submarine and a mine sweeper. Every-one feared that the ammunition depot,which still had large quantities of powderand ammunition in it, would be hit, butthe bombers missed their most promisingtarget. Still, the fires being blown to-ward the depot from (%vite might touchit off,32 and the rescue parties searchingamid the flaming ruins for the hundreds ofcivilian casualties were in constant danger.Long after the raid was over, into thenight and the early morning of the nextclay, the fires raged and Admiral Rockwellordered all personnel to evacuate the base.Only a small group of men from Lieuten-ant Colonel Adams’ battalion and a fewManila firemen remained. These volun-teers localized the fire and were able tosave the commissary stores; the ammuni-tion depot soon was out of danger.33

Admiral Hart had watched the air at-tack from the roof of his headquartersbuilding in Manila and had seen the endof Cavite as a base of operations. Rock-well’s damage report confirmed his obser-

“’ Hogaboorn, 3.

3’LtCol J. V. Lyon ltr to CMC, 310ct5t3.‘8 LtCol J. W. Keene, Narrative and tactical

dispositions of the 1st SepMarBn at Cavite,*26Dec41, n.d.

T-ations. On the night of the 10th Hartordered most of the remaining ships of theAsiatic Fleet still in Manila Bay to sailsouth to comparative safety. The nextday he advised the captains of all mer-chant ships in the bay to get their vesselsout while they still could; fortunately,only one merchantman out of 40 wascaught, by enemy bon~bers.34 The strong-est element of Hart’s fleet, his 29 subma-rines, continued to operate from the bayfor a short while, until Japanese controlof the air made this base untenable. Bythe year’s end only the submarine tender(7anogws and a small collection of yardcraft, motor torpedo boats, and auxiliariesremained in Manila>s waters.

In the judgment of a naval historian ofthis period the Asiatic Fleet was “sadlyinadequate>’ and therefore “unable to pre-vent the enemy from landing wherever hechose, or even to delay his efficient time-table of conquest.” 35 Nor were FEAFor the ground troops of 7JSAFFE able todo the job. In some instances there was atemporary delay when planes hit the land-ing forces, but nowhere were the Japan-ese stopped and forced to turn back. On10 December two combat teams from thegd For~no,ya Reginten,t of the J8th Divi8ion

came ashore at Aparri in northern Luzonand It Vigan on the northwest coast.Their mission, which was to secure air-fields for use by Army planes, was success-

ful. In a day the Japanese, despite theloss of several ships to American bombers,were firmly established ashore and in prac-tical control of the northern tip of Luzon.The one Philippine Army division in thearea, the llth, was responsible for the de-

3’ Hart Comments.= Rising S7un in the Pacific, 181.

CHINA AND LUZON 165

fense of the island north of Lingayen Gulfand was of necessity spread so thin thatit could offer no effective resist ante.

The same situation held true in south-ern Luzon where the defending forces, twoPhilippine Army divisions, were com-pletely unable to cover all possible landingbeaches. On 12 December, when a Japan-ese convoy carrying the advance assaultdetachment of the 16th Division, stagedfrom the Palaus, reached Legaspi in south-eastern Luzon, there was nothing to op-pose their landing. The troops wereashore, had taken their airfield objective,and were moving north by nightfall. Inall there were less than 10,000 enemy troopsashore at this time, but they had behindthem the rest of the Fourteenth Army andcommand of the SeLLand air to insure itsarrival on schedule.

The heavy air attacks of the 8th and10th were only harbingers of furtheraerial assaults. Reinforced by Armyfighters and bombers operating fromnewly-seized airfields, the naval planes ofthe Formosa-based l?leuenth AiT FZeetspread out over Luzon seeking new targets.The first turn of Olongapo and the 4thMarines came on 12 December, the daythat marked the end of effective U’. S. airsupport.

A flight of ,Japanese fighters followedthe PBY’s based at Olongapo into theiranchorage after the flying boats had madea fruitless search for a supposed enemycarrier task force. The enemy pilotscaught the seaplanes at their moorings anddestroyed them all. As the Japanesestrafed the naval station Marine machine

gunners attempted to bring them down;

Colonel Howard noticed that the tracersof Company H’s .30’s seemed to be CCbounc-ing off these planes indicating sufficient

armor plate to prevent penetration.)’ 38The enemy attacked again on the 13th,this time bombing from altitudes beyondthe range of the Marine automaticweapons. The few hits scored were all inthe town of Olongapo; there was no dam-age to the naval station and only a fewMarine casualties. The Filipinos who ig-nored the air raid warning suffered heav-ily; a bomb hit right in the midst of alarge group of townspeople who were‘(standing under a tree watching the per-formance,” 37killing 22 and wounding atleast as many more. Although alarmswere frequent thereafter, the Japanese didnot attack again until the 19th and thentheir aim was bad and they liberallyplastered the bay with bombs.

During this period, while the originalJapanese landing forces were advancingtoward Manila, top-level discussions wereheld between Hart and MacArthur andtheir staffs regarding employment of the4th Marines.’s On 2’0 December, Mac-Arthur formally requested that the regi-

ment be assigned to his command “as de-velopments of the Navy plan can make itavailable.” 3g Admiral Hart concurred

and directed Howard to report to

USAFFE for such employment as Mac-

= Houxzrd Rept, 9.

“ Jackson.38Although the -war plan for the Philippines

had long called for the available Marines to beassigned to the defending ground forces underArmy control, CSAFFE made no effort in thefirst few days of the war to contact CinCAFregarding his Marine forces. After a reminderfrom Hart, “there came back a request to sendone battalion into Manila City to guard USAFFEHeadquarters. Feeling that it would be a

wrong use of the best infantry available, [Hartissued] no order to that effect.” Hart Comments.

3’ Copy of CG, US&’FE ltr to CinCAF, 20Dec41,in ~th Mar Jrtl, 237; Cteme?tt Rept, 6.

166 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LCANAL

Arthur might deem necessary in the de-fense of Luzon.’” In a covering memo toRockwell, he pointed out that the assign-ment of the Mb Marines was the solecommitment that he had made and thathe had verbally made it clear that it washis policy that excess naval personnel beorganized and equipped and then “fed upinto the combat areas on shore with theFourth Regiment of Marines. A com-mand exercised over them by the Armywould normally be via C. O. FourthMarines.” 4’

The Kavy Department had directedHart on his departure from the Philip-pines to place all naval personnel, nluni-tions, and equipment at the disposal ofIJSAFF13. Rockwell, W11Owas to relieveHart as senior naval officer in the Philip-pines, nominally retained independe~tstatus, He adhered firmly, however, tothe principle of unity of command andcooperated closely with MacArthur.sheadquarters.

On 22 December, the reinforced ,Japa-nese 48th Dz%iaion landed in LingayenGulf. It was the logical landing pointfor any force whose objective was Manila,for the gulf stood at the head of a broad

valley leading directly to the capital. Thelanding was expected and it was resisted,but the combined eft’orts of .kmerican air,submarine, and ground forces could notprevent the ,Japanese from putting their

mAccording to the Hart Narrative, 45, oneplan considered for the employment of the 4thMm entailed the brigading of the regiment ( re-‘inforeed by a naval battalion from Marive]es )and a constabulary regiment under a Marinebrigade commander. The Marines were to fur-nish officers and XCO’S to the Constabulary unit,Time did not permit the execution of this scheme,

4’ CinCAF memo to ComSixteen, 22Dec41, in~th .tfar Jri 1, 239.

men ashore and effecting a juncture withJTigan-Aparri landing forces which haddriven down from the north. Resistance,althou:h sparked by the 26th Cavalry ofthe Phdlppine Scouts, was spotty and in-effectual, and the ,Japanese soon provedthat the partially-trained men of thePhilippine .4rmy were not yet a matchfor their troops. Covered by the Scout‘cavalrymen, the Filipino reservists fellback in disorder to reorganize in positionsbelow the ilgno River.

The enemy was ready to drive on Manilafrom the north.

On the 24th, the last major assault ele-ment of the Fourteenth Army, the 16thDivision from the Ryukyus, landed atLamon Bay only 60 miles cross-islandfrom Manila. Here the story was muchthe same as Lingayen Gulf. The enemyoverwhelmed scattered, ill-trained troopsand made good his beachhead. The Amer-ican South Luzon Force began to fighta delaying action along the roads lead-ing to Manila. The decision, however,had already been made to declare the capi-tal an “open city,>’ and the troops wereheaded for the 13ataan Peninsula.

13ataan, northern arm of Manila Bay,had long been considered the ultimatestronghold in a defense of Luzon. Whileit was held, and with it the fortified islandsacross the mouth of the bay, no enemycould use the harbor, and it was possibleto gain succor from friendly naval forceswhich might break through a blockade.MacArthur had rejected the concept of astatic, last-ditch defense when he tookover USAFFE and had expected with theforces underway to him from the Statesand trained Philippine Army divisions tobe able to repulse or contain enemy land-ing attempts. When the Japanese won

CHINA AND LUZON 167

control of the sea and air, however, he lostall chance for successful execution of hisorders to “attack and destroy” 42any land-ing force, and he was forced to adopt theonly course of action that would save hisarmy: a desperation withdrawal to Ba-taan. He made the fateful decision on 23December and the following day prepara-tions to effect it were begun.

Basically the withdrawal plan called forMajor General ,Jonathan C. Wainwright’sNorth Luzon Force to fight a series ofdelaying actions in the central island plainwhich would allow the South Luzon Force(Major General George M. Parker, Jr.)to reach the peninsula. Then Wain-wright’s units would pull back to 13ataan,join forces with Parker, and stand off theenemy. In the time gained by the delayi-ng actions, USAFFE would make everyeffort to augment the supplies alre?dygathered in scattered dumps on B ataanwith food, ammunition, weapons, andequipment from instdations in theManila area.

The role of the 4th Marines in this planwas laid out for Colonel Howard in aseries of conferences which took place inManila on 24 December. Admiral Hart,who was preparing to leave for Java thefollowing day, informed the Marine com-mander that the 1st Separate Battalionwould be added to his regiment as soonas it could clear Cavite and that he wasto report immediately to MacArthur forduty. At LTSAFFl? headquarters, amidstthe bustle attendant, on its move to Cor-regidor, Howard got a cordial welcome

from his new chief and then received

orders to moye the 4th to Corregidor andtake over its beach defenses. In a meeting

with Admiral Rockwell, after he had

42Wainlrrigli t’s Story, 28.

448777 o—!i~lz

made a final call on Hart, Howard was toldto destroy the Olongapo Naval Stationwhen he pulled out.

Mariveles at the southern tip of Bataanhad been designated the assembly area andtransshipment point for the Marine unitsand their supplies. The 1st Battalion hadalready spent two weeks in bivouac nearthe base weathering a series of air attacksand furnishing guard details, unloadingparties, and dump construction crews.Two men were killed and three woundedon 24 December during a bombing raidthat struck shipping in the harbor. Itwas an inauspicious portent for the recep-tion of the forward echelon of the regimentwhich left for Mariveles at 2200 that night.

Shortly after the truck convoy hadcleared Olongapo, Colonel Howard re-ceived warning from naval headquartersof an impending Japanese landing, and“sounds of motors could be distinctlyheard from seaward” 43in Subic Bay. Allavailable men manned beach defense posi-tions, but fortunately the report provedfalse and the motors turned out to be thoseof American torpedo boats. Early onChristmas morning a message from Rock-well’s new headquarters on Corregidorordered Howard to expedite evacuationand destruction lest the regiment be cutoff by advancing Japanese troops. ThePhilippine .krmy’s 31st Division hadpulled back to Bntaan from its coastalpositions northwest of Olongapo on the24th and the Marines’ north flank was nowopen; a threat also existed to seaward,since the Army’s coast defense troops werewithdrawing from Fort Wint in Subic

Bay. Motorcycle patrols ranging northof the base could find no sign of the enemy,however, and the movement of men and

“ Hotcard Rept, 11.

168 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL

supplies was completed without unduehaste. .4t 1410 Howard’s new CP openedoutside Marive]es, and the fate ofOlongapo was left in the hands of a demo-lition detail under Captain (later Major)Francis H. Williams.

Using charges improvised from 300-pound mines, Williams set out with hisdemolition gang to do a good job of eras-ing the Naval Station from the face of theglobe.” “ They sank the hull of the oldarmored cruiser Rochester in the bay andblew up or burned everything of valueexcept the barracks which closely borderedthe native town.45 The last supplies wereloaded early Christmas evening, and therear echelon pulled out with darkness.

Christmas also saw the completion ofdestruction at Cavite where a Marine dem-olition party from the 1st Separate Bat-talion blew up or fired all remainingammunition stocks and destroyed the sub-marine damaged in the 10 December airraid. The naval radio station near Sang-ley Point was already a shambles, for ina raid on 19 December enemy bombersleveled the buildings and set afire largequantities of gas and oil scattered indumps throughout the surrounding area.”Lieutenant Colonel Adams received orderson 20 December to evacuate the Cavitearea, and for the next fe~v days men andsupplies were trucked to Mariveles; theChristmas day demolition detail was thelast element to leave.47

After darkness fell on 26 Decembw, thefirst Marines to move to Corregidor, 14officers and 397 men of Adams’ battalion,

UFergw$on, 3.

* The town’s natives later burned their ownhouses and the barracks was consumed in theresulting fire.

~ Hogaboom, 4.

4’Keene, op. cit., 10.

made the seven and a half mile voyagefrom Mariveles’ docks to North Dock on“The Rock.)’

THE FORTIFIED 11.!!LANDS ‘8

The four islands that guarded the mouthof Manila Bay were fortified in the decadeprior to J$’orld War I before air powerchanged the concept of coastal defense.Most of the powerful 14- and 12-inch gunswere sited in open emplacements for thepurpose of repelling an invasion from thesea. Disarmament treaty obligations anddrastically reduced defense expendituresin the period between the wars allowedlittle concession to be made to the threatof air attack. Some antiaircraft guns wereadded to the fort’s defenses, however, anda start was made toward providing under-ground bombproof shelters, especially onCorregidor (Fort Mills).

Corregidor was at its closest point justa little over two miles from the tip ofBataan Peninsula. The island was tad-pole-shaped, three and a half miles longand one and a half miles wide at its head.This wide area, called Topside, loomedhigh above the rest of the island, its 500-

foot cliffs dropping sharply to a narrowbeachline. Most of the coast defense bat-

teries and permanent quarters were locatedhere, and the only access routes to the topfrom the western shore were two ravines,.James and Cheney. East of Topside,

along the neck of land that connected thetadpole’s head and tail, was Middleside, aplateau which held several more batterypositions and permanent buildings. A

‘8 Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from Moore Rep t; HowardRePt; ~tltMar Jnt; Philippine AirO@3ee; Fallof the p?L@@W8.

CHINA AND LUZON

third ravine, Ramsay, which led from the

southern beaches to Xliddlesidej was a crit-

ical clefensive point. (See ~~ap 8, Map

Section)

.4 logically-named third distinctive por-

tion of the island, Bottomside, consisted of

the low ground occupied by the industrial

and dock area and the native town of San

Jose. The nerve center of Luzon’s de-

fenses was an extensively -tunnelled hill,

Malint,a Hill, which rose directly east of

San Jose. The headquarters of Mac-

Arthur, Rockwell, and Major General

George F. lloore, commanding the forti-

fied islands, were all eventually located in

“the tunnels and laterals that spread out

beneath the hill. From Malinta the long,

low, narrow tail of the island bent away

to the east; a light. plane landing stript

Kindley Field, had been built along the

spine of the tail.

The other three island forts, Hughes,

Drum, and Frank, complemented the de-

fenses of Fort Mills, and Marines served

as part of the beach defense troops on all

but the last named. Caballo Island (Fort

Hughes), a quarter-mile square in area,

stood less than two miles from Corregi-

dor; its low-lying eastern shore rose

abruptly to a 3S0-foot height, which con-

tained most of the battery positions. Four

miles south of (laballo was the ‘(concrete

battleship,” Fort Drum. Tiny El Fraile

Island bad been razed to water level and on

its foundation a steel-reinforced concrete

fortress had been erected with sides 25-

to 36-feet thick, and a. top deck 20-feet

deep. Two case-hardened steel gun tur-

rets, each sporting a pair of 14-inch guns,

were mounted on the deck and the sides

of the fort boasted four 6-inch gun case-

ments. Its garrison could be completely

contained within its walls, and %he fort

169

was considered impregnable to enemy at-tack.” 4’ The island which seemed mostvulnerable to assault was Carabao (FortFrank) which lay only 500 yards from theshore of Cavite Province. However, sincesome of its guns were capable of firing in-land and most of its shoreline was ringedwith precipitous cliffs, the job of takingFort Frank promised to be quite a task.

General Moore later noted that “the fort-resses were not designed to withstand alanding attack from adjacent shores sup-ported by overwhelming artillery em-placed thereon ;“ 50and that of his big gunsonly the turrets of Fort. Drum, the 12-inchmortars, and two 12-inch long-range gunswere capable of all-round fire. A tabula-tion of the major coast defense armamentof the forts shows:

—-

Tspe

Mills——

14” guns. -..... -. —12” guns --------- 812” mortars. . . . . . 1010” guns --------- 28“ guns. . . . . . . . . . 26“guns ---------- 5155mm guns-. . . -_ 193“ guns ______ 10

h’umberof Guns

Hughes Drum Frank

2 4 2— . .

4 — 8— —— —

2 43 — 421 1 —

The forts had in addition a small numberof 75mm beach defense guns. For anti-aircraft defense, including tied-in bat -teries on southern Bataan, there were 17searchlights, 40 3-inch gunsj and 48 .50caliber machine guns.51

M:trilles fronl the 1st Separate Bat-talion ~vere able to add a few .50 caliber

“ .voorf,Rq)t,4.60Ibid., 9.5’ Ibid., Annex C.

170 PEARL HARROR TO GuADALCANAL

machine guns and a battery of four 3-inchguns taken from Cavite to the antiaircraftdefenses, but the primary function of thebattalion was now that of infantry. Itwas reorganized and re-equipped at Mari-veles to fill the role of the missing battalionof the 4th Marines; the formal change oftitle to 3d Battalion, 4th Marines cameon 1 January.

With the exception of Batteries A andC and the radar detachment of Adams’battalion which remained on Bataan, thewhole of the 4th Marines moved to Cor-regidor in successive echelons on the nightsof 27 and 28 December. Enough rationsfor 2,000 men for six months, ten unitsof fire for all weapons, two years supplyof summer khaki, and the medicines andequipment to outfit a 100-bed hospital ac-companied the move. Fortunately, theQuartermaster, Major Ridgely, dispersedthese supplies in small, scattered dumps asthey arrived and they emerged relativelyunscathed from the first Japanese air raidon Corregidor.

Many of the Marines in the bamboojungles surrounding Mariveles, who hadto shift camp constantly to avoid bombingand sleep “on the ground near a foxhole orsome convenient ditch into which [they]could roll in the event of an air attack>’ wlooked forward to moving to The Rock.They had “watched the Jap bombers steerclear of its antiaircraft barrages” and ithad been pointed out to them “that Cor-regidor’s antiaircraft was so good that theJaps had not even dared to bomb it—yet !’) 53 An additional lure of the island

w Statement of Lt ( jg) R. G. Hetherneck in CdrT. H. Hayes Rept on MedTactics, 4th Regt USMC,7Dec41-6May4’2, 15Feb46, 79, hereinafter cited asHayes Rept.

“ LtCol R. F. Jenkins, Jr., Personal Experi-ences 28Dec41-6May42, n.d., 1, hereinafter citedas Jenkins.

to some men was the vision of a Gibraltar,and they talked knowingly of the (non-existent ) intricate underground system ofdefenses.54

At 080029 December, Colonel Howardreported to General Moore for orders asFort Mills’ beach defense commander andthen started out to make a reconnaissanceof the island. His men, temporarilyquartered in Middleside Barracks, werestartled to hear the air raid sirens soundshortly before noon. No one paid toomuch attention to them as Corregidor hadnever been bombed, but soon their trust-ing attitude changed. “All hell brokeloose,” and as one 1st Battalion officerdescribed the scene, “there we were—thewhole regiment flat on our bellies on thelower deck of Middleside Barracks.” 55

The Japanese planes, 40 bombers of the5th Air Group with 19 covering fighters,attacked at 1154. For the next hour aparade of Army aircraft flew the longaxis of Corregidor dropping 200- and 500-pound bombs from 18,000 fret, and divebombers attacked the antiaircraft bat-teries, strafing as they plunged down. .&t1300, the Army planes gave way to the

Navy and bombers of the Ele~enth AiYFleet continued to attack until 1415. Noneof FEAF7S few remaining fighters, whichwere being saved for vital reconnaissancemissions, took to the air, but Corregidor’sgunners exacted a good price from theenemy—13 medium bombers fell to the3-inchers and the .50 calibers shot downfour of the dive bombers in a vivid demon-stration of the folly of flying within reachof these guns. But the damage done bythe enemy was considerable.

“ Ibid.= Ibid.

CHINA AND LTJZON 171

Almost all of the barracks and head-

quarters buildings and a good half of thewooden structures on the island were bat-

tered, set afire, or destroyed. .4 thick pall

of black smoke and clouds of dust obscured

the island from observers on 13ataan, andthe detail left to load out Marine supplies

wondered at the fate of the regiment inthe center of this maelstrom. 56 The

casualty score was miraculously low, onlyone man killed and four wounded. With asingle exception, bombs used by the Japa-nese did not penetrate all the way throughto the bottom deck of the concrete bar-racks, but, the building, shaken repeatedlyby hits and near misses, was a shambles.In all, the island’s defenders suffered about100 casualties, and 29 December markedthe end of “normal” above ground livingfor The Rock’s garrison.

As soon as the air raid was over, Howardassigned beach defense sectors to his bat-talions, and the troops moved out to theirnew bivouac areas before dark. The 1stBattalion, 20 officers and 367 enlisted menunder Lieutenant Colonel Curtis T.Beecher, dreti a possible enemy landingpoint—the East Sector which includedMalinta Hill and the island’s tail. Thebeaches of Ilottomside and most of Mid-dleside (Middle Sector), up to a line in-cluding Morrison Hill and Ramsay Ra-vine were occupied by Lieutenant Colonel:Idams’ battalion with 20 officers and 49omen. The defense of the rest of the shore-line of Corregidor was the responsibilityof the !ild Battalion (Lieutenant ColonelHerman R. Anderson) which mustered 18

otlicers and 324 enlisted men. A generalreserve of 8 officers and 183 men, formedfrom the Headquarters and Service Com-

panics, commanded by Major Stuart W.King,” bivouacked in Government Ravine,on the southern shore of the island belowGeary and Crockett Batteries.

h“ot all of Adams’ battalion was as-signed to the Middle Sector; besides theunits left on Bataan, the 3d Battalionfurnished most of the other special de-tachments. One platoon (1 officer and 28men ) with four .50 caliber machine gunsand a second ( 1 officer and 46 men) withfour .30’s left for Fort Hughes on the30th to bolster the antiaircraft and beachdefenses; the !i!dBattalion added ten menand four more .30 caliber machine gunsto the beach defenses on 3 January.s8 FortDrum got a section of 15 men and two .50’sto augment its crew. A third antiaircraftplatoon with six .50’s (1 officer and 35men ) was directly assigned to Fort Mills’air defenses and attached to a simila.rly -equipped battery of the 60th Coast Artil-lery which was emplaced near the Topsideparade ground.

By 1 January the pattern had been setfor the Marines’ duties on Corregidor.The men were digging in, stringing barbedwire, emplacing their 37mm7s, mortars,and machine guns, and tying-in for a co-ordinated and protracted defense. Aheadlay more than four months of waiting andpreparation for a battle, months in whichmore than one survivor likened life on

Corregidor to existence in the center of abull’s eye.

“ Hozta?”ti Rept, 14 lists Maj (then Capt ) MaxW. Schaeffer as commander of the regimentalreserve at this point; howe~~er, the contemporarymuster rolls at HQMC and survivors’ commentsindicate that Maj King held this position until17Feb4 when Maj Schaeffer took over and Kingbecame ExC) of the beach defense force at FortHughes.

“ Lyon ltr, op. cit.

CHAPTER z

Bataan Prelude

DRA WING THE B/l TTLE LINES ‘

The Japanese did not confine their oper-ations in the Philippines to Luzon, butDecember landings on Mindanao and JoloIslands were made primarily to securebases for further attacks against Borneo.Here again the hastily mobilized Philip-pine .irmy reservists and Constabularytroopers were no match for the assaultforces, and the enemy mzde good his lodg-ment. Offensive operations in the south,however, were limited by the fact thatGeneral Homma did not have sufficienttroops to press a campaign on two fronts.The main strength of the F’ouvteenthArm y remained on Luzon to win controlof Manila Bay.

The original Japanese operation planfor Luzon had contemplated its occupa-tion by the end of Janumy and had pro-vided for a mop-up force of one divisionand one brigade with a small air support

unit. Shortly after Homma’s troops en-tered Manila on 2 January, he receivedorders to expedite the withdrawal of the48th Divi,yioYt and the ~t]l Air Group

which were needed to reinforce stepped-upoperiitiolls against Java and on the -ksianmainland. In short return for these trooplosses Homma got the 65tA Brigude fromFormosa, originally assignecl to mop-up

and ~)olice dl~ties. The brigade, which

‘ [’nless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from (7SAFFE-1 “SWIP Rept;

1 ;tll .4 ~rjtu Bept; Fun Of the Philippine.

landecl on I.ingayen Gulf beaches on 1,January, was selected by Homma as hisBataan assault force and reinforced withan infantry regiment from the 16th Di-vision and tank, artillery, and servicetroops from army reserves. (See Map 7,Map Section)

The necessary reorganization of the65tA Brigcrde for combat and its movementinto jump-off positions gave MacArthurtime to establish an initial defense line.On 7 ,Jauuary he reorganized his forcesinto two corps and a rear area servicecommand. Jtrainwright was given I Phil-ippine Corps with responsibility for hold-ing the western front, and Parker became11 l?hilippine Corps commander with histroops manning defenses on the ManilaB:LY side of Bataan. More than /30,000men were now bottled up on the peninsulaal]d some 503000 held positions on or neartile il~itial defense line. These were im-pressi~’e figures, and in paper strengtht]~e Bataau c]efenders outnumbered theFowtem fh A?rny which had about, 50,000

troops under its command.Military superiority depends, however,

on many other factors besides relativetroop strength. The conglomerate Amer-ican-Filipino forces, completely cut offfrom effective relief, had limited suppliesof ratious, medicines, weapons, ammuni-tion, and equipment. By contrast, theenemy’s control of the sea and air gavethe ,Japanese an unmatchable resupplyand reinforcement potential. Even when

172

BATAAN PRELUDE 173

the Fourteenth. A~my’s fortunes were attheir lowest ebb, the enemy troops could

reasonably expect rescue and relief.

0115 eJaIILl:Wy &~aC.bthUL’, iLL ‘a move toconserve dwindling food stocks, had cut alltroops on Bataan and the fortified islandsto half rations.’ This order was un-doubtedly the most significant given inthe campaign. It prolonged the fightingfor weeks, until Ilataan’s defenses e~-entl~-ally collapsed. Men sapped by malnu-trition and its attendant diseases, forwhich there were no medicines, couldresist no more.

In launching their initial attack on Ba-taan the ,Japanese did not expect that thereinforced 65th Brigade would have muchtroub]e defeating the American-Filipino

forces. The enemy was flushed with hissuccesses and “completely ignorant con-cerning the terrain of Bataan Peninsula.>’ 3Homma’s intelligence otlicers had under-estimated Mac.irthur’s strength by half,had given their commander a distortedpicture of Filipino morale, and had formu-lated an altogether incorrect estimate ofthe c{efensive situation on ~ataan. TheFourteenth Army stafl had:

. . . optimistically presumed that, consideringits position relative to (’orregidor Island, theenemy would offer serious resistance at thesouthern end of the penins~,la with ~fariyeles as

a nucleus, withdrawing later to CorregidorIsland. Taking this for granted, the threat ofenemy resistance was taken lightly.4

Bataan Peninsula was an ideal positionfrom tile viewpoint of a force col~lmittedto a last-ditch stand. Thirty miles long at

2“Actnally, the tr(wl}s on Bataan recei~-edabout one-third ration. ” 1’A’.IFFE-US’FI1’ Rcpt,42

3 l~th .irnlyRcpt, 90.4Ibid., 91.

its deepest point and 25 miles wide at itsbase, the peninsula tapered to an averagewidth of 15 miles. Numerous streams,ravines! and gullies cut up the interiorand thick jungle growth blanketed every-thil]g. A spine of mountains runningl~orthwest to southeast split 13ataanroughly in half. The dominant. featuresin tl~e north were Mt. Natib (4,222 feet)and its companion Mt. Sih_mganan (3,620feet ), and in the south, Mt. Bataan (4,70()

feet ),, which commanded the Marivelesarea. .Ilthough numerous trails criss-crossed the peninsula, only two motorroads existed, one running along the coastand the other over t;:. saddle between themountain masses. The western coast linewas uneven with many promontoriesformed by mountain ridges; the easterncoast was more regular and open but be-came hilly and rugged in the south. (Seelisp 7, Map Sedion)

The final defense line selected byI“SAFFE was midway down the penin-sula, anchored on the towns of Bagac andOriol~, and generally along the trace ofthe cross-peninsula motor road. It wasthe necessity of covering the preparationof this area for defense and the need to usethe road as a supply route as long as pos-sible that dictated the occupation of theinitial defense line. Stretching across thepeninsula just above the point where itnarrowed, this position had a grave nat-ural \veakl\ess. The corps boundary ran

along the hTatib-Silanganan mountainmaw which pierced the defenses and pre-vented liaison or even contact betweenl~aillwright’s and Parker’s men. The.Japanese attempt to crack this defenseline eventually involved landings far be-l~ind the front ‘and brought the Marinesat Mariveles into action.

BATAAN PRELUDE 175

THE .NA VAL BA TTALZON ‘

Although the farthest distance from therear boundaries of the corps areas to thesouthern shore of Bataan was only tenmiles, the defensive problem facing Brig-adier C~eneral Allan C. McBride’s Service

Command was acute. J$’ith a relativelyfew men McBride had to guard over 40miles of rough, jungle-covered coast lineagainst enemy attack. A successful am-phibious thrust which cut the vital coastalsupply road could mean the prompt endof the battle for 13ataan. To protect theeast coast he had the newly-organized 2d(Constabulary) Division; on the westcoast he had a motley composite force ofservice troops and planeless pursuit squad-rons converted to infantry, backed up bya few elements of the 71st Division anda Constabulary regiment. Responsibilityfor the security of the naval reservationat Mariveles remained with the Navy.

In order to provide protection forMarive]es and support the Army in thedefense of the west coast, Admiral Rock-well on 9 January directed Captain JohnH. S. I)essez, commander of the sectionbase. to form a naval battalion for groundcombat. The senior naval aviator remain-ing in the Philippines, Commander Fran-cis ,J. Bridget , was appointed battalioncommander and he immediately set aboutorganizing his force. For troops he hadabout 480 bluejackets including 150 of hisown men from Air ~ .4siatic Fleet, 130

5Unless otherwise noted the material in thisSe(+tiOnis derived from RO~hwell Narrative; 16thNavDist War Diary, 8Dec41-19Feb42 (locatedat NHD) ; Clement Rept; Cdr F. J. Bridget Reptto CornSixteen, Action at Longoskawayan Point,9Feb42 (located at NHD ), hereinafter cited asBrid@ Rept; C’a!lt E. L. Sackett, USN, “History

of the USS Carmpus,” 28Apr47 (located at NHD),hereinafter cited as Cmop?Ls Hist; Hogaboom.

crewmen from the submarine tenderCanopus, 80 sailors from the Cavite NavalAmmunition Depot, and 120 generalduty men from Cavite and Mariveles.He was also assigned approximately 120Marines, members of Batteries A and Cwhich had remained behind on Bataanunder naval control when the rest of the1st Separate Battalion (now 3/4) hadmoved to Corregidor.

The men of First Lieutenant William F.Hogaboom’s Battery A had originallybeen slated to provide replacement and re-lief gun crews for Battery C (First Lieu-tenant Wrillard C. Holdredge ) whose 3-inch guns were set up in a rice paddybetween the town of Mariveles and thesection base. But on 5 January Hoga-boom had received instructions from aUSAFFE staff officer, “approved by navalauthorities on the ‘Rock’,” G to move hisunit to the site of MacArthur’s advanceCP on Bataan where the Marines wereto furnish the interior guard. This as-signment was short-lived, however, sinceCommander Bridget needed the men toserve as tactical instructors and cadres forthe naval battalion, and on 14 January hedirected Hogaboom to report back toMariveles. To replace Battery A,TTSAFFE detached two officers and 47men from the 4th Marines 7 and sentthem from Corregidor to Bat.aan wherethey guarded the advance headquartersuntil the end of the campaign.

The most serious problem Bridget facedin forming his battalion was the lack ofground combat training of his blue-jackets. As the commander of the Can-Opln, naturally an interested spectator,noted:

‘ Hogaboom, 5.‘ ~tb Mar Jnl, 26S.

176 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

. . . perhaps two-thirds of the sailors kuewwhich end of the rifle should be presented tothe enemy, and had even practiced on a targetrange, but field training was practically a closedbook to them. The experienced Marines werespread thinly throughout each company in hopethat through precept and example, their qualitieswould be assimilated by the rests

Even after the formation of the naval

battalion, the primary responsibility for

antiaircraft defense of Mariveles stillrested with the Marine batteries and onlya relatively fewmen, mostly hTCO’s, couldbe spared to help train the bluejacketcompanies. Holdredge’s 3-inchen re-quired at least skeleton crews and Hoga -boom’s unit, after its return fromL’SAFFE control, was directed to mountand man nine .50 caliber machine-gunposts in the hills around the harbor.Therefore, in both batteries the majority,of men available for ground combat weresailors; Battery A joined one officer and65 bluejackets on 16-1’7 ,Tanuary and aNavy othcer and 40 men joined Hol-dredge’s battery on the 18th and 19th?Throughout the naval battalion, trainingwas confined to fundamentals as Bridgetstrove to qualify his men as infantry. ASwas the case so often in the Philippines,the time for testing the. combat readinessof the jury-rigged battalion came. all toosoon.

LO NGONKA M7AYAN POINT ‘“

In opening his stack on Bataan, GeneralHomma committed the main strength ofthe 63th Brv”gad~ along the front ofParker’s II Corps, figuring that the moreopen terrain along the east coast gave hima greater opportunity to exploit successes.By 11 January the ,Japanese had devel-

8 Canopus Hist, 14.

‘ Col W. F. Prickett Itr to CMC’, October 1956.

oped and fixed Parker’s defenses and wereprobing for weak spots preparatory to anall-out assault. It was inevitable thatthey found the open and highly vulnerableleft flank. By 22 January Parker’s posi-tion along the slopes of Mt. Natib had beenturned and all reserves with the exceptionof one regiment had been committed tocontain the penetration. In order to pre-vent the defending forces from being cutoff, USAFFE ordered a general with-drawal to the Bagac-Orion defense line,to be completed by the 26th.

The enemy advancing along the moun-tainous west coast did not contact Gen-eral J$rainwright’s forward positions until15 ,January. By that date, Homma, im-pressed by the lack of resistance in thissector, had already ordered the $2(W In-~antry of the 16th Division to reinforceand exploit the drive, strike through tothe Bagac road junction, and gain the rearof Parker)s corps. Although I Corps hadbeen stripped of reserves to back up thesagging eastern defense line, Wainwright’sfront-line troops were able to stand off theinitial Japanese assaults. When Homma’s

fresh troops attacked on the 21st, however,they effected a lodgment behind the frontwhich eventually made withdrawal towardBagac mandatory. The local Japanesecommander, encouraged by his success, de-

‘0 Unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is taken from USAFFE–USFIP Rept;

Ihth .lrmv Rept; hth Mar Jnl; Clement Rept;Bridget Itept; Ifogaboom; Btry A, US NavBn,Xarrative of events, 2Feb42; 2dLt M. E. Peshekltr to CO, 2/4, “Report of operation of MarineDetachment sent to Bataan on 25 January 1942/’2Feb42; GunSgt H. M. Ferrell ltr to CO, 1/4,“Temporary Duty of Mortar Platoon, vicinityof Mariveles, Bataan, Philippine Islands, from,January 25, 1942, to .Tanuary 30, 1942, inclu-sive, ” 31,Jan42 ; Fall of the Philippines.

IMT.4AN PRELUDE 177

tided on a shore-to-shore amphibious as-sault which would hit the Bataan coastalroad about four miles below Bagac.

Embarking after dark on the night of92–23 ,January, the enemy’s 900-man land-ing, force ($d Battalion, ZOth Infantry)started out for its objective. It neverarrived. En route two launches of thebattalion’s boat group were discovered andsunk by an American torpedo boat I’ andit is possible that these attacks were in-strumental in scattering the remainderof the landing force. In any event, theenemy boats lost their bearings completelyin the darkness. Instead of landing onthe objective, two-thirds of the unit landedat Q,uinauan Point, eight miles south ofBagac. The remainder of the battalion,7 officers and 294 men, came ashore atLongoskawayan Point, a finger-like prom-ontory only 2,000 yards west of Mari -veles. (See Map 7, Map Section)

The Longoskawayan landing force wasnot discovered immediately, and the enemyhad time to advance along jungle-mattedcliffs and reach Lapiay Point, the nextpromontory to the north. The Japanesepatrols headed inland from Lapiay forMt. Pucot, a 617-foot hill which com-manded both the west coast road and thelanding site, The first word of the pres-ence of the enemy in his defense sectorreached Commander Bridget at 0840 on23 ,January when the small lookout detach-ment he had posted on Pucot was drivenfrom its position by enemy machine-gunfire.

Bridget immediately phoned Hogaboomand Holdredge, directing both oflicers tosend out patrols. Hogaboom, closestto

“CoinhlTBron+, Rept of Act of ~’SSPT-34 onthe night of 22–23Jan42,27~eb42 (located atNH~), 1.

the scene of action, sent one bluejacketplatoon under Lieutenant (junior grade)Leslie .4. Pew- directly to Pucot while heled a second platoon himself in a sweepthrough the ridges south of the hill. Pew’splatoon deployed as it approached the hill-top, attacked through scattered rifle andmachine-gun fire , and secured the highground without difficulty. The Japaneseoffered only slight resistance and thenfaded out of contact.

South of the hill Hogaboom ran into aplatoon from Battery C which had had abrush with the Japanese and taken a coupleof casualties, but again the enemy haddisappeared. The story of light firingand no firm resistance was much the samefrom the rest of the probing patrols whichBridget ordered out on the 23d; the Japa-nese evidently were still feeling out thesituation and were not as yet disposed tomake a stand or an attack. At dusk thepatrols assembled on the mountain andset up a defense line along its crest and theridges to the south facing Lapiay andLongoskawayan Points.

During the day Bridget had called onthe Service Command for reinforcementsbut few men could be spared as most re-serves already had been committed to con-

tain the larger landing force at Q,uinauanPoint. For infantry he got the 3d Pur-suit Squadron and 60 men from the 301stChemical Company whom he put into aholding line above Lapiay Point and onthe north slope of Pucot; for fire sLLppOrtlle received one 2.95-inch mountain packhowitzer and crew from the 71st Division.BY nightfall the chemical company had

tied in with the pursuit squadron on itsright and with Battery A atop Pucot onits left; platoons from Battery C, the Air,Asiatic Fleet Company, and the Naval

178 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

Ammunition Depot Company held the restof Pucot?s crest and the southern ridgeswhich blocked off the landing area fromMariveles. ‘z None of the naval battalionunits was at full strength and none of theplatoons strung out along the ridges wasstrictly a Navy or a Marine outfit. Sailorspredominated but Marines were present allalong the line, mostly as squad leaders andplatoon sergeants. The composition ofthat part of the battalion which got intoaction became even more varied as thebattle shaped up, and eventually about athird of the men on the front-line weredrawn from the Marine batteries.

Bridget’s men got their first real tasteof the blind fighting of jungle warfare onthe 24th. Hogaboom led a patrol downthe bluff above Lapiay Point and ran head-on into an enemy machine gun firing from

heavy cover. Grenades thrown at the gunexploded harmlessly in a tangle of lushvegetation which screened it from view;

the men were being fired upon and theywere replying, but sound rather than sight

was the key to targets. When reinforce-ments arrived later in the day an attemptwas made to establish a holding line across

the point, but the Japanese opened up witha second machine gun and steady rifle fire.Then they began dropping mortar andhowitzer shells among Hogaboom’s group.

“ fin officer of 3/4 who knew many of the sur-vivors of this action, later wrote an article de-scribing the battle. He maintained that the Armydetachments mentioned never joined, althoughthey may have been assigned, and that the purelynaval companies were not ~med as such, Insteadthe sailors who could be s~)ared joined one of theMarine onits. While this story is quite credible,in this instance the conternl]orary llrid(~pt Repthas b?en used as a guide. See I,tcol W, F.Prickett, “Naval Battalion at ]Iariveles,’” Jff’Gawtle, ,June 1930, MM:].

The Marine officer ordered a withdrawalto the previous night’s positions.

The source of the mortar and howitzerfire was Longoskawayan Point where apatrol led by I.ieutenant Holdredge hadencountered the main body of Japanese.His two-man point had surprised an enemygroup setting up a field piece in a clear-ing and opened up with a rifle and a BAR,dropping about a dozen men around thegun. The Japanese reaction was swift,agreeing with the B.AR-man’s evaluationthat the surprise fire “ought to make themmadder’n hell. ” 1s The patrol fell back,fighting a rear guard action until it clearedthe area of the point’s tip, and then itretired to the ridges. After the day%action Hogaboom and Holdredge com-pared notes and estimated that they facedat least 200 well-equipped enemy troopsin strong positions; they informed Bridgetof their conclusion that it would take afully-organized battalion with supportingweapons to dislodge them.

(h the morning of 2!5 January,USAFFE augmented Bridget’s force bysending him a machine-gun platoon andan 81mm mortar platoon from the 4thMarines on The Rock. The two mortarsimmediately set up on a saddle northwestof Pucot and, with Hogaboom spotting forthem, worked over the whole of Lapiayand Ixmgoskawayan Points; direct hitswere scored on the positions where the,Japanese had been encountered the daybefore. A midafternoon patrol discoveredthat the enemy had evacuated Lapiay, butit was soon evident where they had gone.Holdredge led a combined force of severalplatoons against Longoskawayan Pointand ran into a hornet’s nest. He himselfwas among those wounded before the pla-

1’ Quoted in Hogatmom, 10.

BATAAN PRELUDE 179

toons could extricate theinselves. Againthe naval battalion occupied blocking posi-tions on the ridges east of the points fornight defense.

During the action of the 25th, USAFFEhad changed the command structure in therear service. area and given the corps com-manders responsibility for beach defensethroughout 13ataan. In addition, Mac-Arthur had granted permission for the12-inch mortars on Corregidor to supportBridget’s battalion. Shortly after mid-night, the giant mortars, spotted in by anobserver on Mt. Pucotj laid several roundson Ixmgoskawayan Point. The daylighthours were spent in light patrol actionwhile the battalion was readied for a full-scale attack on the 27th. General Wain-wright sent a battery of Philippine Scout75mm guns to support the drive.

At 0700 on 27 January the mountainhowitzer, the Marine mortars, the Scout75%> and Corregidor’s 12-inch mortarsfired :1 preparation on Longoskawaym,and a skirmish line of ‘:~bout 200 men, some60–75 of t,hem.Marines, started to advance.The enemy reoccupied his positions as soonas the supporting fire lifted, and thejungle came alive with bullets and shellfragments. T!le right and center of theline made little progress in the face ofheavy machine-gun fire, On the leftwhere the goiilj{ was a little easier a ~dp

soon opened through which Japanese in-

filtr:tt ing groups were able to reach the

reserve’s positions.

lltring the resulting hectic fighting, the

enemy opened up with mortar fire to

herald a counterattack; fortunately, the

4tb llarines> 81’s were able to silence this

fire, but it was soon obvious that the navalbattalion was in no shape to advancefarther or even to hold its lines on Longo-

skawayan. Bridget again authorized awithdrawal to the night defense lines onthe eastern ridges.

The solution to the problem of elimina-ting the Japanese beachhead arrived latethat afternoon. Colonel Clement, whohad come over from Corregidor to adviseBridget on the conduct of the Longo-skawayan action, had requested reinforce-ments from I Corps. Wainwright sent inthe regular troops needed and the 2d Bat-talion of the 57th Philippine Scout Regi-ment relieved the naval battalion, whichwent into reserve. The 4th Marines’ mor-tars and machine guns were assigned tothe Scouts to support their operations.The oddly-assorted platoons of Bridget’sbattalion were not committed to actionagain, but they had done their job in con-taining the Japanese though outnumberedand outgunned.

The Scouts spent 28 January in develop-ing the Longoskawayan position. On the29th they attacked in full strength withall the support they could muster, Themine sweeper Quail, risking an encounterwith’ Japanese destroyers, came out fromMariveles and cruised offshore while Com-mander Bridget spotted for the 12-inchmortars and the 75mm guns, The shipclosed from 2,200 to 1,300 yards firingpoint-blank at Japanese soldiers trying tohide out in the caves and undergrowthalong the shores of the point.14 Ashorethe Scouts, supported by machine-gun andmortar fire from the landing flanking thepoint, did the job expected of them andsmashed through the enemy lines. Bynightfall organized resistance had endedand the cost of taking Lapiay and Long-

“CO USS (Wail Rept of Act at LongoskawayanPt morning of 29Jan42, 30Jan42 (located atNHD) , 1.

180 PEARL HARROR TO GUADilLCANAL

oskawayan had been counted. Bridget’sunit had lost 11 killed and 26 wounded inaction; the Scout casualties were 11 deadand 27 wounded; and the Japanese hadlost their entire landing force.

During the next few days patrols, aidedby ship’s launches armored and mannedby crewmen from the Canopu-s, moppedup the area, killing stragglers and takinga few prisoners, but the threat to Mari-veles was ended. Similar action by ade-quately supported Scout units wiped outthe Quinauan Point landing force by 7February. The major Japanese attemptto reinforce the beleaguered troops onQuinauan was beaten back by the com-bined fire of artillery, naval guns, and thestrafing of the four P40’s remaining onBataan. Elements of an enemy battalionwhich did get ashore on a point of landjust above Quinauan on 27 January and2 February were also finished off by thescouts.

By 13 February the last survivors of theamphibious attempts had been killed orcaptured. The make-shift beach defenseforces which had initially contained thelandings had barely managed to hold theirown against the Japanese. They had hadto overreach themselves to keep the enemyoff balance and prevent a breakthroughwhile the troops of I and II Corps werefalling back to the Bagac-Orion position.(hce that line was occupied and Wain-wright could commit some of his best

troops in sufficient numbers and with ade-quate support, the Japanese were finished.Discolu-aged by their amphibious fiasco,the enemy never again attempted to hit thecoastal flanks of the .&merican-Filipinopositions.

At the same time the survivors of thelanding attempts were being h(luted down,

the Japanese offensive sputtered to a haltin front of the Bagac-Orion line. Theinitial enemy advance on Bataan had notbeen made without cost, ,and the casualtyrate now soared so high that the attack-ing troops were rendered ineffective. On13 February Homma found it necessaryto break contact, pull back to a line ofblocking positions, and to regroup his bat-tered forces. The lull in the Fmwteenz%Army’s attack was only temporary, how-ever, as Homma was promised replace-ments and reinforcements. When thesecond phase of the battle for Bataanopened, the scales were heavily tipped infavor of the Japanese.

The detachment of Canopus crewmen,the sailors from the Cavite Naval Ammu-nition Depot, and the majority of the gen-eral duty men, nine officers and *27 en-listed men in all, were transferred to the4th Marines on Corregidor on 17-18 Feb-ruary. Commander Bridget and his navalaviation contingent moved to Fort Hugheson the 30th where Bridget became beachdefense commander with Major Stuart W.King of the 4th Marines as his executiveofficer. Battery C of 3/4 remained atMariveles to man its antiaircraft guns,but Battery A rejoined the regiment, withmost of its men going to Headquarters(lornpany to augment the regimentalreserve.

The assignment of the sailors of the

naval battalion to Colonel Howard’s com-mand accentuated the growing joint-

service character of the Marine regiment.Small contingents of crewmen fromdamaged or sunken boats of the InshorePatrol also had been joined and over 700Philippine Army air cadets and their offi-cers were now included in the 4th’s ranks.These men, most of whom had never had

BATAAN PRELUDE .n.

any infantry training, were distributedthrollghout the companies on beach de-fense and in reserve where the experiencedMarines could best train them by exampleand close individual instruction. No com-pany in the regiment retained an all-Marine complexion.

The arrival of reinforcements on Cor-regidor and Caballo came at a time whenthe Japanese had stepped up their cam-paign against the fortified islands. On 6February, the first enemy shells, fired by105mm guns emplaced along the shore ofCavite Province, exploded amidst the.lmerican positions on all the islands,The reaction was swift and the forts re-plied with the guns that could bear. Thecounterbattery e x c h a n g e continuedthroughout February and early March,occasionally waning as the Japanese wereforced to shift. to new firing positions bygunners on Forts Frank and Drum. Thelimited number of planes available toHomma made enemy bombers infrequentvisitors during this period, and the Jap-anese concentrated on reducing the islanddefenses with artillery fire. In the firstweek of March, the American commanderon Fort Frank received a demand for itssurrender with a boast that the Cavitecoast was lined with artillery and that:

. . . Carabao will be reduced by our mightyartillery fire, likewise Drum ; after reductionof C’arabao and Drum our invincible artillerywill pound Corregidor into submission, batterit, weaken it, preparatory to a final assault bycrack Japanese landing troops,id

The surrender note was unproductive

for the enemy, but it was prophetic regard-

ing the fate of ~orregidor.

Until the Japanese were ready to renew

their assault on Bataan in late March, the

‘“ Quoted in Ui3’AFFE-USFIP Rept, 40-41.

151

severity of the enemy shellings from Cavitewas not great enough to be effective inhalting the construction and improvement

of beach defenses on Corregidor.Trenches and gun positions lined theshores of Bottomside and the ravines lead-ing to Topside and Middleside from thebeaches. Barbed wire entanglements andmine fields improvised from aerial bombswere laid across all possible approaches.The ordnance stores of the island weresearched to provide increased firepowerfor the 4th Marines;’ and guns were sitedto insure that any landing force would becaught in a murderous crossfire if it at-tempted to reach shore.

The thoroughness of the regiment’spreparations was indicative of its highstate of morale. The men manning thebeach defenses, and to a lesser extent theircomrades in the jungles of Bataan, nevercompletely abandoned hope of rescue andrelief until the very last days of theirordeal.ls Even when General MacArthurwas ordered to leave the Philippines to

take over a new Allied command in theSouthwest Pacific, many men thought thathe would return, leading a strong reliefforce. The senior commanders in thePhilippines and the Allied leaders knewthe truth, however, and realized that bar-ring a miracle, Luzon was doomed to fall.

Only a few key men could be taken out ofthe trap by submarine, torpedo boat, or

‘7One source of beach defense guns was thesub-caliber 37nlm’s which were used for practicetiring by Corregidor’s big guns. These were dis-mounted from the gun tubes and turned over tothe Marines. LtGen S. L. Howard interview byHistBr, G–3, HQMC, 26(M%3, hereinafter citedas How’ard Interview.

MMaj T. E. PU1OSltr to CMC, 300ct56.

182 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

plane; the rest had to be left to accepttheir fate,

On 11 March, the day before MacArthurand his party started the first leg of theirjourney to .4ustralia, he created a newheadquarters, Luzon Force, to control theoperations on Bataan and appointed Gen-eral Wainwright to its command. On 20March, the. War Department notifiedWainwright of his promotion to lieutenantgeneral and of the fact that he was to becommander of all forces remaining in thePhilippines. To take the place ofUS.4FFE, an area headquarters, United

States Forces in the Philippines(USFIP), was created.

To take his place on Bataan, Wainwright

appointed the US.AFFE Artillery Officer,Major General Edward P. King, Jr. King

drew an unenviable task when he took overT.uzon Force, for the volume of Japanesepreparatory fire on Bataan and on the

island forts indicated the start of a majoreffort. To meet this attack, King hadtroops who had already spent two weekson a diet of ~/8of a ration on top of twomonths of half rations; they were readyto fight but “with not enough food in theirbellies to sustain a dog.” “ The LTSAFFESurgeon General, on 18 February, had ac-counted Bataan’s defenders as being only5570 combat efficient as a result of “debil-ities due to malaria, dysentery, and general

malnutrition.?’ 20 These same men werenow a month further along on the road to—exhaustion and collapse and were destinedto meet a fresh and vigorous enemy assault.

“ W’ain~crifll~t’sStor~, 7& The ration was catto Y( On 2 jMarch according to [’S.~FFE’–t~~~’11’

RegM entry for that date.20Quoted in Diary of Maj .4. C. Tisdelle, Aide

to MajGen King, entry of 18Feb42.

The Fourteenth Amy set 3 April as D-day for its reuewed of~msive on Bataan,and General Homma foresaw ‘(no reasonwhy this attack should not succeed.;’ ‘2 Hecould well be confident since he had re-ceived the infantry replacements neededto rebuild the 16th Division and the 65t?~Brz’g(/de, and he ld been sent the lth Di-vision from Shanghai. In addition, InY-peria7 Headquarters had allotted him astrongly reinforced infantry regimentfrom the (!?Ist Division, originally slatedfor duty in Indo-China. His artillerystrength had been more than doubled andnow included far-ranging 240mm howitz-ers. Two heavy bomber regiments hadbeen flown up from Malaya to increase ma-terially his mastery of the air.

Once the enemy attack was launched, thepressure on Bat aan’s defenders was relent-less. In less than a week the issue had beendecided. The physically weakened Ameri-cans and Filipinos tried desperately tostem the Japanese advance, but to no avail.By 7 April the last reserves had been com-mitted. A growing stream of dazed, dis-organized men, seeking to escape the in-cessant bombardment at the front :u]d tileonrushing enemy, crowded the roads andtrails leading to Mariveles. Only isolatedgroups of soldiers still fought to hold the,Japanese back from the tip of the penin-sula. Under these circumstances, GeneralKing decided to seek surrender terms. Hisaide recorded the situation in his diary:

8th [April]. Wednesday. The army can notattack. It is impossible. Area is congested withstragglers . General King has ordered all

“ ~Tl,lessother~yise {Ioted the material in thissection is derived from 1’,S.4FFE-liSFIP Rept :

l~tll .Ar>ll y Rcpt: I’ll lt of tllr PI(ilippincs.

“ l~th .lrm?i l?rpt. Appendix 4, 17.

BATAAX PREL1’DE 183

tanks thrown [blown?] and arms destroyed, andis going forward to contact the Japanese and tryto avert a massacre.”

Near midnight on the 8th a severe earth-quake tremor was felt on Corregidor andl;ati~:~i~, and soon thereafter the Marivelesharbor was shaking violently from man-made explosions, as King’s orders to de-stroy all munitions dumps were carriedout. To an observer on The Rock it seemedthat:

. . . the southern end of Bataan was a hugeconflagration which resembled more than any-thing else a volcano in violent eruption . . .white hot pieces of metal from exploded shellsand bombs shot skyward by the thousands inevery conceivable direction. Various coloredflares exploded in great numbers and charged offon crazy courses much the same as a sky rocketwhich has run wild on the ground.z’

All night long the water between 13ataanand Corregidor was lashed with fallingdebris and fragments from the explosions.Through this deadly shower a procession

‘3Tisdelle, op. cit.“LCdr T. C. Parker, “’l’he Epic of Corregidor-

Bataan, December 24, 1941-31ay 4, ltM2~’ [~S’A”IProcccdinas, January 1943, 18, hereinafter citedas Parker.

of small craft dodged its way to the northdock of Bottomside. Everything thatcould float was pressed into use by franticrefugees. Some of the arrivals, however,such as the nurses from Bataan’s hospitals,were under orders to report to Corregidor.Specific units that could strengthen TheRock’s garrison, antiaircraft batteries andthe 45th Philippine Scout Regiment, hadalso been called for. Only the AAA gun-ners from the Mariveles area, includingthe 4th Marines’ Battery C, managed toescape. The Scout regiment was pre-vented from reaching the harbor in timeby the jammed condition of the roads.

By noon on 9 April, General King hadfound out, that no terms would be givenhim; the Japanese demanded uncondi-tional surrender. With thousands of hismen lying wounded and sick in open airgeneral hospitals and all hope of success-ful resistance gone, King accepted the in-evitable and surrendered, asking only thathis men be given fair trcmtment. Thebattle for Bataan had ended, and morethan 75,000 gallant men began the first ofmore than a thousand days of brutalcaptivity.

44s777 0—.5s-13

CHAPTER 3

The Siege and Capture of Corregidor

THE JAPAA7ESE PLANfl ‘

On 9 April the victorious FourteenthAmy paused on the shore of I%taan withits next target.—Corregidor—dead centerin its sights. Many enemy staff officers,both in Tokyo and on Luzon, wanted tolaunch an immediate amphibious attack,taking advantage of the army’s successon Bataan. The dearth of landing craftin Manila Bay, however, effectively servedto postpone the operation. Most of the.Japanew landing barges and boats werelocated in Lingayen Gulf or Subic Bayand had to he moved past Corregidor’sguns to the designated staging areas onthe eastern coast of Bataan. (See Map8, Map Section)

On the night of 14 April the first smallgroup of boats slipped by The Rock, hug-ging Bataan’s shore while the enemyshelled and bombed the island’s northcoast to prevent their discovery. 2 Becausethey were forced to follow this method ofmoving a few boats at a time and theseonly at night and behind a curtain of pro-tective fire., the tJapanese took more thanthree weeks to assemble the necessaryassault craft.

The need for extreme caution in makingthe risky passage into Manila Bay wasnot the only factor which acted againstrapid execution of the ,Japanese assault

‘ Unless otherwise noted the nlaterial in thissection is derived frwn Iltlf .irwu Rept; Philip-pit!e .4ir0p81tec; Pall of tile Pili/ippineLI

‘ ltl, Mar tJnl,W-1.

184

plan. In mid-April a severe outbreak ofmalaria in the ranks of the .@h Division,Homma’s chosen. landing force, severelyhampered attack preparations, but am-phibious training and rehearsals continueddespite the temporary decrease in thedivision’s effective strength. Emergencysupplies of quinine tablets were flown toLuzon in time to check the spread of thedisease and restore fighting trim.

The Fourteenth Army was obsessed, withthe need for deception and secrecy andstringent security measures were takento conceal the preparations for the attackon Corregidor. A consistent effort wasmade to create the impression that CaviteProvince was the Japanese amphibiousbase and that Forts Frank and Drum werethe targets. Landing craft maneuveredoff Cavite’s shores while the army’s airand artillery pounded the defenses of thesouthern islands. Two battalions of the16th D~v&wn feigned preparations for anattack on Frank and Drum, but there waslittle doubt at USFIP Headquarters thatCorregidor was the primary Japaneseobjective.

Every day in April, starting with theday Bataan fell, an increasingly heavierconcentration of enemy artillery piecesfound firing positions in the peninsula’sj ungled hills. At least thirty-seven bat-teries, whose weapons ranged from 75mmmountain guns to !MOmm howitzers, cov-ered Corregidor with a continuous patternof fire that reached every position andknocked out the major portion of the

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 185

island’s de fenses.s Nine Japanese bomb-ing squadrons, capitalizing on the gradualweakening of antiaircraft fire, were over-head to add their bombardment to the at-tack preparation.

The enemy Jth Divtiion was reinforcedfor the assault with two independent en-gineer regiments to man the transportand support landing craft as well asa tank regiment and three mortar bat-talions to provide additional firepower.The actual landing operation was to bemade in two stages with Colonel Gem-pachi Sate’s 61st Znfan.try Re@rnent (twoinfantry battalions, a tank company, amountain artillery battery, and mortarunits) designated the initial assault force.Sato was to land his unit in successivewaves, battalions a b r e as t along thebeaches between Infantry and CavalryPoints on the night of 5 May. After es-tablishing a beachhead, he was to send mostof his men against Malinta Hill while theremainder of the regiment drove across thetail of the island to isolate and contain thedefenders east of Infantry Point. Theplan called for the 61st Regiment to be inpossession of Malinta Hill by dawn, readyto support a second landing.

Twenty-four hours after Sate’s forcelanded, the division’s main assault effortwould strike beaches between Morrisonand Battery Points, near James Ravine,and at the neck of the island. This secondlanding force, four heavily reinforced in-fantry battalions, would have the assist-

‘ Many survivors and a number of accountsof this siege credit the .Japanese with havingas many as 400 artillery pieces firing on thefortified islands by 5 May. The figure of 37batteries (approximately 150 pieces ) representsonly the enemy artillery units listed in 14t/tArmul?ept, 187 as part of the Corregidor attackorganization.

ante of Sate’s unit which was scheduledto make a concurrent attack against Ram-say Battery hill. Throughout the wholeoperation the artillery on Bataan, op-erating under army control, was to deliverpreparatory and supporting tires, and indaylight hours the army’s air squadronswere to fly close support missions,

The _@h Division had three infantrybattalions in reserve for its attack but didnot expect that they would be needed. TheJapanese were confident that their prepar-atory bombardment had knocked most ofthe fight out of Corregidor. Every ter-rain feature on the island was plotted andregistered on artillery target maps andany signal for support from the assaultforces would call down a smother of ac-curate fire on the defenders. The enemyfelt certain that dusk of 7 May would seetheir assault troops in control of Cor-regidor.

LIFE OAT A BULL’S EYE 4

During the 27 days between the fall ofBataan and the assault on Corregidor,life on The Rock became a living hell. Themen in the open gun pits and exposedbeach defenses were subjected to an increas-ing rain of shells and bombs, It becamevirtually impossible to move about the

4Unless otherwise noted the material in ttdssection is derived from .!7S.4FFll-uSFIPlte~t;Moore Rept; lth Mar Jnl; Hayes Rept; Capt C.B. Brook, USN’, Personal Experiences 8Apr-6 May 56, n.d., hereinafter cited as Brook; MajH. E. Dalness, USA, “The Operations of the 4thBattalion (Provisional ) 4th Marine Regimentin the Final Counterattack in the Defense ofCorregidor 5-6 May 1942,” AdvInfOff Course194%50, The InfSch, Ft. Benning, Ga., herein-after cited as Da tn(’8.s; Ferfw 80n; ~cakin 8;

lstLt O. E. Saalman, IJSA, Personal Experiences12Apr-6May42, n,d., hereinafter cited asSaalman.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 18’7

island by daylight; enemy artillery spot-ters aloft in observation balloons on Ba-taan and in planes overhead had a clearview of their targets. The dense vegeta-tion which had once covered most of Cor-regidor was stripped away by blast andfragmentation to reveal the dispositions ofHoward’s command. The tunnels throughMalinta Hill, their laterals crowded withheadquarters installations and hospitalbeds, offered refuge for only a fraction ofthe 11,000-man garrison and the rest ofthe defenders had to stick it out ~ith littlehope of protection from the deadly down-pour.

Most of the escapees from Bataan wereordered to join the 4th Marines, thus add-ing 72 officers and 1,173 enlisted men to itsstrength between 9 and 12 April.5 Themajority of the Army combat veterans,however, “were in such poor physical con-dition that they were incapable of evenlight work,” ‘ and had to be hospitalized.The mixed collection of infantry, artillery,aviation, and service personnel from bothAmerican and Philippine units assigned tothe beach defense battalions was in littlebetter shape than the men who had beencommitted to the hospital under MalintaHill. The commander of 1/4’s reserve,First Lieutenant Robert F. ,Jenkins, Jr.,who received a typical contingent of Ba-

taan men to augment his small force com-mented that he:

. . . had never seen men in such poor physicalcondition. Their clothing was ra~~ed and

‘ The former sergeant major of 2/4 believesthat the reghnent joined substantially more menthan this figure which appears in the regimentaljournal. He recalls that the 2d 1% “picked upfor rations, and on the crudest rolls, at least 600men” and believes that the other battalions didthe same. Jac%xon.

‘ Wainuwight’s Story, 87.

stained from perspiration and dirt. Their gaunt,unshaven faces were strained and emaciated.Some of them were already suffering from beri-beri as a result of a starvaflon diet of rice forweeks. We did what we could for them and thenput them to work on the beach defenses.’

The sailors from Mariveles, mostly

crewmen from the now-scuttled Cizn.opus,

were kept together and formed into a new275-man reserve battalion for the regi-

ment, the 4th Battalion, 4th Marines.aNot only was the designation of 4/4 un-usual, but so was its makeup and its per-sonnel. Only six Marines served in thebattalion: its commander, Major FrancisH. Williams, and five NCOS. The staff,company commanders, and platoon lead-ers were drawn from the nine Army and 18

Navy officers assigned to assist Williams.gThe four rifle companies were designatedQ, R, S, and T, the highest lettered com-panies the men had ever heard of. An-other boast of the bluejackets turned Ma-rines was that they were ‘the highest paid

battalion in the world, as most of the men

‘ Jenkins,~~.* Most survivors of 4/4 refer to the battalion

as having had approximately 500 men in itsranks. Strength breakdowns of the 4th Marexist up through lNlay42,howe~er, and nowheredo they support the larger figure. The S–3 of4/4 is certain that the total strength of the bat-talion on 6 nay was no more than 350men. MajO. E. Saalmanltr to CMC, 220ct56, hereinaftercited as Smlrnan1956.

9Survivors of 4/4 are unable to agree on theidentity of the man who served as ExO of thebattalion; at least five Army or Navy officershave been mentioned. In addition,the possibilitythat a hlarine who was closely connected with4/4 was de facto ExO was brought out by oneof the NC(M who recalls that “Major WilliamsalwaYs considered Gunner Joe Reardon [QMClkJoseph J. Reardon] as his Executive Officer andAdjutant.” MSgt K. n’. Mize ltr to CMC, 1Nov56.

188 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

were petty officers of the upper paygra ales.” 1°

The new organization went into bivouacin Government Ravine as part of the regi-mental reserve. The reserve had here-tofore consisted of men from theHeadquarters and Service Companies, re-inforced by Philippine Air cadets andMarines from Bataan. Major Max W.Schaeffer, who had replaced Major Kingas reserve commander, had organized thisforce of approximately 250 men into twotactical companies, O and P. CompanyO was commanded by Captain RobertChambers, ,Jr. and Company P by Lieu-tenant Hogaboom; the platoons were ledby Marine warrant officers and seniorNCOS.

A good part of Schaeffer’s men had pri-mary duties connected with regimentalsupply and administration, but each after-noon the companies assembled in thebivouac area where the troops were in-structed in basic infantry tactics and theemployment of their weapons. Despitethe constant interruptions of air raids andshellings, the Marines and Filipinos hada chance “to get acquainted with eachotherl familiarize themselves with eachothers’ voices, ancl to learn [the] t,ean-work” 11 so essential to effective combatoperations. Frequently, Major Schaetierconducted his company and platoon com-manders on reconnaissance of beach de-fenses so that the reserve leaders would befamiliar with routes of approach and ter-rain in each sector in wllicll they mighttight .

While Schaeffer’s ul~it had had sometime to train before the ,Japanese steppedup their bombardment of the island in

‘“ Brook, 1.“ Ferga30n, lo.

late March, Williams’ battalion was organ-ized at the inception of the period ofheaviest enemy fire and spent part of everyday huddled in foxholes dug along thetrail between Geary Point and Govern-ment Ravine. *2 Any let-up in the bom-bardment would be the signal for smallgroups of men to gather around the Armyofficers and Mlrine NCOS for instructionin the use of their weapons and the tacticsof small units. Rifles were zeroed in onflcxating debris in the bay and for mostof the men this marksmanship training wastheir first since 11’avy boot camp. Whendarkness limited ,Japanese shelling toharassment and interdiction fires, thesailors formed eager audiences for theArmy 13ataan veterans who gave them aresum6 of enemy battle tactics. Everyman was dead serious, knowing that hischances for survival depended to a largeextent upon how much he learned. “Thechips were down; there was no horse-play.>’ ‘3

To a very great extent the record of the4th Battalion in the fighting on Corregidorwas a tribute to the inspirational leader-ship of its commander. During the try-ing period under enemy she]lfire andbombilig when the battalion’s characterwas molded, Major Williams seemed to beomnipresent; wherever the bombardmentwas heaviest, he showed up to see how hismen were weathering the storm. Whenon separate occasions Battery Crockett andthen Battery Geary were hit and set afire,lie led rescue parties from 4/4 into thel’esulting holocausts of flame, chokingsmoke, and exploding ammunition torescue the wounded. He seemed to have

‘2 Dr. (’, E, Chonn ltr to CMC, 12Nov56, herein-:Ifter cited as Chunn.

‘3 Dalness, 7.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 189

an utter disregard for his own safety inthe face of any need for his presence.Survivors of his battalion agree withstartling unanimity that he was a giantamong men at a time when courage wascommonplace.

Raw courage was a necessity on the forti-fied islands after Bataan’s fall, since therewas no defiladed position that could notbe reached by ,Japanese 240mm howitzersfiring from Cavite and Bataan. Thebombers overhead, increasingly bold asgun after gun of the antiaircraft defenseswas knocked out, came down lower to pin-point targets. Counterbattery and anti-aircraft tire silenced some enemy guns andaccounted for a number of planes, butnothing seemed to halt the buildup ofpreparatory fires.

On 28 April Howard issued a warning tohis battalions that the next day would bea rough one. It was the Emperor’s birth-day and the Japanese could be expected to“celebrate by unusual aerial and artillerybombardment.”’4 The colonel’s prophecyproved to be a true one, and on the 29th oneobserver noted that even “the kitchen sinkcame over.”’5 The birthday celebrationmarked the beginning of a period when theenemy bombarded the islands without let-up, day and night. The men manning thebeach defenses of Corregidor’s East Sectorfound it:

. . . Imactically impossible to get any rest orto repair any damageto our positions and barbedwire. Our tield telephone system was knockedollt ; our water supply was ruined (drinkingwater had to be hauled from the other end of theisland in large powder cans) . . Corregidor wasenveloped in a cloud of smoke, dust, and thecontinuous roar of bursting shells and bombs.

“ ~tk Mar .Inl, 392.‘5Parker, 20.

There were many more casualties than we hadsuffered in the previous five months.la

About three days prior to the Japaneselanding, Lieutenant Colonel Beecher re-ported to Colonel Howard that defensiveinstallations in the 1st Battalion% sectorwere:

,.. practically destroyed. Very little defen-sive wire remained, tank traps construct~ withgreat difficultyhad been rendered useless, and allmy weapons were in temporary emplacementsasthe original emplacements had been destroyed.I told Colonel Howard at this time that I wasvery dubiousas to my ability to withstanda land-ingattack in force. ColonelHoward reported thefacts to General Wainwright, who, according toColonel Howard, said that he would never sur-render. I pointed out to Colonel Howard that Ihad said nothing about surrender but that I wasmerely reporting the facts as it was my dutyto do?f

The increase in the fury of the Japanesebombardment with the coming of May,coupled with the frequent. sightings oflanding craft along the eastern shore ofBataan, clearly pointed to the imminenceof an enemy landing attempt. The lastsuccessful effort to evacuate personnelfrom the island forts was made on thenight of 3 May. The submarine Spear#tshsurfaced after dark outside the mine fieldsoff Corregidor and took on a party of of-ficers and nurses who had been orderedout., as well as a load of important USFIPrecords and a roster of every person stillalive on the islands.’s The 4th Marines

“ Jenkin8, 15-16.“ BriGen C. T. Reecher ltr to Mr. G. J. Berry,

17Mar50 (deposited by Capt G. J. Berry, USMCR,in the USMC Archives, 300ct56 ).

“ Submarines were the beleaguered garrison’sonly contact with Allied bases outside the Phil-ippines during most of the siege. Although thesubs brought in rations, antiaircraft ammunition,and medical supplies on scattered occasions, the

190 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCAATAL

sent out their regimental journal, its lastentry, dated2 May, the list of the five menwho had been killed and the nine who hadbeen ~vounded during the day’s bombard-ment.

To one of the lucky few who got ordelsto leave on the A’pear$sh the receding is-land looked “beaten and burnt to acrisp.>’ lD In one day, 2 May, USFIP esti-mated that 12 240mm shells a minute hadfallen on Correg-idor during a five-hourperiod. On the same day the ,Japaneseflew 55 sorties over the islands dropping12 1,000-pound, 45 500-pound, and 159200-pound bombs.’” The damage was ex-tensive. Battery Geary’s eight 12-inchmortars were completely destroyed as wasone of Battery Crockett’s two 12-inch guns.The enemy fire also knocked out of actiontwo more 12-inch mortars, a 3-inch gun,three searchlights, five 3-inch and three.50 caliber antiaircraft guns, and a heightfinder. Data transmission cables to the

guns were cut in many places and all com-~nunication lines were damaged. The

beach defenses lost four machine guns, a37mnl, and a pillbox; barbed wire., minefields, and rm~iboat obstacles were tornapart.

The logical landing points for an assaultagainst Corregidor, the entire East Sectorand the ravines that gave access to Topsideand Middleside, received a special workingover so steady and deadly that the effec-tiveness of the beach defenses was sharply

amount that they COU1(lcarry was only enoughfor stop-gap relief. For the interesting story ofthe diversified subn)arine actions in support ofUSAFFE-USI!’lP see, T. Roscoe, United S’tatcs~ubrrlrrri?le t>pf>ratio)(s in world Wcrr II ( An.

napolis: U. S. Na~-al Institute, 1949). 23-39,‘“ Parker, 22.

‘0 Philippine .iirOpsRcc, Plate 8.

reduced. Casualties mounted as the men’sfoxholes, trenches, and shelters crumbledlmder the fire. L-nit leaders checking thestrrte of the defenses were especially vul-nerable to the fragments of steel whichswept the ground bare. By the Japanese-itppointed X-Day (5 May) the 1st Battal-

ion had lost the commander of Company A,Major Harry C. I.ang, and Captain PaulA. Brown, commanding Company B, hadbeen hospitalized as a result of severe con-cussion suffered during an enemy bombingattack.” Three Army officers attached tothe Reserve Company, an officer of Com-pany B, and another of Company D had allbeen severely wounded.

Despite the damage to defenses it had solaboriously constructed, the 4th Marineswas ready, indeed almost eager, to meet a

,Japanese assault after days and weeks ofabsorbing punishment without a chance tostrike back. On the eve of a battle -whichno one doubted was coming, the regimentwas perhaps the most unusual Marine unitever to take the field. From an under-strength two-battalion regiment of lessthan 800 Marine regulars it had grownuntil it mustered almost 4,000 officers andmen drawn from all the services and 142clitlerent orgtmizations.zz Its ranks con-

tained 72 Marine officers and 1,368 enlisted

“ Beeeher ltr to Rerry, op. cit.“ The last complete contemporary breakdown

of strength of the 4th lMar by component units iscontained in -$th .11({wJ)tt, 390. It was correctedthrough 1 May. .4 slightly earlier list dated28Apr42, detached from the journal book but un-mistakably once part of it, has an interestingappendix which gives the units from which at-tached personnel originated. It shows that 26Navy, 104 American and Philippine Army, 9Philipl)ine Scout, and 3 Philippine Constabularyorganizations furnished men to the 4th Mar.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 191

Marines, 37 Navy officers 23and 848 blue- The units that actually met the Japanesejackets, and 111 American and Philippine at the beaches—1/4, 4/4, and the regimen-Air Corps, Army, Scout, and Constabulary tal reserve—had such a varied makeup thatofficers with 1,455 of their men. it deserves to be recorded: 24

I 1

ServicecomponentHqCo I SerCo

——

off——- ——___. _—_— —__ . ——— ~

USMC &USMCR -------------------- 14USN (MC & DC)_____________________ 3USN---------------------------------USER. - . . . . . . . ---------------------- . . . . . .USA--------------------------------- 1Philippine Insular Navy ---------------- . . . . . .Philippine Army Air Corps ______________ 6Philippine Scouts ---------------------- ______Philippine Army ----------------------- ------Philippine Constabulary ---------------- ------

Totals ------------------------- 25

THE JAPAA7E8E LA NZ31iVG2’

The area chosen by the Japanese fortheir initial assault, the 4th Marines’ EastSector, was a shambles by nightfall on 5

“The five Marine officers, two Navy doctors,and 96 Marine enlisted men previously capturedin China and on Bataan have been omitted fromthese figures.

“The lMay42 listing of regimental strengthdoes not indicate the tactical breakdown of Hqand SerCos into Cos Oand P. The figures shown,

—— —En] Off Eal

—. ,——I

80 6 637 ------ 1

16 ______ 121 ------ . . . . . .

1 ------4 ______ _._:_.

83 ------ ------. . . . ..1......

— — —211 7 65

1stBn

off——

1631

26

7

1

53

.—Enl

344137830

286-----

2173322

1

1, 024

4thBn

off Enl

1 52 6

16 262--. -.— ------

9 2

28 1 275

May. Twodays earlier theregimental in-telligence journal had noted that:

There has been a distinct shifting of enemyartillery fire from inland targets to our beachdefenses on the north side of Corregidor thepast 24 hours.%

This concentration of fire continued and

intensified, smashing the last vestiges ofa coordinated and cohesive defensive zoneand shaping 1/4% beach positions into anirregular series of strong points where a

therefore, include a number of regimental staffofficers, probably two-thirds of the total, and a few machine guns and 37mm’s were stillfew enlisted men who did not serve in Maj in firing order. A pair of PhilippineSchaeffer’s command. One officer and five en-

. -.

Scout-manned 75mm guns, located justlisted men have been deducted from SerCo’sUSMC Strength and added to that of 4/4.

26cTn~eHs otherwise noted the material in this i94kFebruary 1947, hereinafter cited as BaM-

sertion is deri~-ed f mm U8AJ’FE- 1T8FIP Rept; win .Narratiw’; Fall of the Philippines; K. Uno,

Moore Rept; Ihth Army Rept; Howard Rept; Corvegidor: 181e of Delwion (China : Press Bu-

MG H. M. l?erreIl, Personal Experiences 5-6 reau, Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters,

May42, n. d., hereinafter cited as Frrrell; September 1942) ( located at OCMH), herein-

Jenkiws; H. W. Baldwin, “The Fourth Marines after cited as Isle of Delusion.

at Corregidor,” MP Gamtte, in 4 parts November m4th }far R–2 Jnl, 8Dec41–3May42, last entry.

192 PEARL HARROR TO GUADALCANAL

east of North Point, which had never re-vealed their position, also escaped the de-structive tires. Wire lines to commandposts were ripped apart and could not berepaired; “command could be exercisedand intelligence obtained only by use offoot messengers, which medium was un-certain under the heavy and continuousartillery and air bombardment.”’7

Along the northern side of the hogbackridge that traced its course from MalintaHill to the bend in Corregidor’s tail, Com-pany A and the reserves of 1/4 waited dog-gedly for the Japanese to come. Therewas no sharp division between unit defensesectors, and the men of the various unitsintermingled as the bombardment demol-ished prepared positions. Along the bat-tered base and sides of Malinta Hill, aspecial target for enemy the, were the menof Lieutenant Jenkins’ Reserve Company.Next to them, holding the shoreline up toInfantry Point, was a rifle platoon organ-ized from 1/4’s Headquarters Company;Captain Lewis H. Pickup, the companycommander, held concurrent command ofCompany A, having taken over on thedeath of Major Lang. The Ist Platoon un-der First Lieutenant William F. Harrisdefended the beaches from Infantry toCavalry Points, the landing site selectedin Japanese pre-assault plans. MasterGunnery Sergeant John Mercurio’s 2d Pla-toon’s positions rimmed the gentle curveof land from Cavalry to North Point. Ex-tending from N’orth Point to the tip of theisland’s tail were the foxholes and ma-chine-gun emplacements of First SergeantNToble W. Well’s 3d Platoon.

Positions along the top of the steepsouthern face of the East Sector)s domin-ant ridge were occupied by the platoons

‘“ Ut+lAFFE-USFIP Rept, 77.

of Company B under First LieutenantAlan S. Manning, who had taken overwhen Captain Brown was wounded.2s Themachine guns and 37mm’s of Captain NoelO. Castle’s Company D wera emplaced incommanding positions along the beacheson both sides of the island; the company’smortars were in firing positions near Ma-linta Hill.

At about 2100 on 5 May, sensitive soundlocators on Corregidor picked up the noiseof many barges warming Llp their motorsnear Limay on Bataan’s east coast. Warn-ing of an impending landing was flashedto responsible higher headquarters, but thelack of wire communication kept the wordfrom reaching the men in the foxholesalong the beaches of the East Sector. Theydid not need any additional advice of en-emy intentions anyway, since the wholeregiment had been on an all-out alert everynight for a month, momentarily expectingJapanese landing barges to loom out ofthe darkness. The men of 1/4 had with-stood some pretty stiff shellings, too, asthey waited, but nothing to compare withthe barrage that began falling on thebeach defenses manned by Harris’ 1st Pla-toon at about 2245.

The Japanese had begun to deliver theshort preparatory bombardment designedto cover the approach of Colonel Sate’sassault waves which was called for in theiroperation plan. If Sate’s boat groupsadhered to their schedule they would ren-dezvous and head in for the beaches just asthe artillery fire lifted and shifted to thewest, walling off the landing area fromAmerican reinforcement efforts. The regi-ment would be ashore before the moon rosenear midnight to give Corregidor’s gun-ners a clear target. In two respects the

%LtCol R. F. Jenkins ltr to CMC, 300ct56.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 193

plan miscarried, and for a while it. wastouch and go for the assault troops.

The artillery shoot went off on schedule,but Sate’s first waves, transporting most ofhis IstBattalion, were carried by an unex-pectedly strong incoming tide hundreds ofyards to the east of the designated landingbeaches. Guides in the oncoming craftwere unable to recognize landmarks in thedarkness, and from water level the tail ofthe island looked markedly uniform assmoke and dust raised by the shelling ob-scured the shoreline. The 61at Regiment’s2d Battalion, slated to follow close on theheels of the Ist,was delayed and disruptedby faulty boat handling and tide currentsuntil it came in well out of position andunder the full light of the moon.

When the Japanese preparatory fireslifted shortly after 2300, the troops alongthe East Sector beaches spotted the scat-tered landing craft of the Ist Batt&ion,61st heading in for the beaches at NorthPoint. The few remaining searchlightsilluminated the barges, and the island’stail erupted with fire. Enemy artilleryknocked out the searchlights almost as soonas they showed themselves; but it madelittle difference, since streams of tracer

bullets from beach defense machine gunsfurnished enough light for the Scout 75’snear North Point and 1/4’s 37’s to find tar-

gets. A Japanese observer on Bataan de-scribed the resulting scene as “sheer massa-cre,?’ 29but the enemy Ist Battalion came in

close enough behind its preparation to geta good portion of its men ashore. Althoughthe Japanese infantrymen overwhelmedMercurio’s 2d Platoon, the fighting wasfierce and the enemy casualties in the waterand on the beach were heavy. Colonel

“ Quoted in Isle of Delusion, 17.

Sate, who landed with the first waves,sorely needed his gd Battalion’s strength.

This straggling battalion which beganheading shoreward about midnight suf-fered much more damage than the firstwaves. The remaining coast defense gunsand mortars on Corregidor, backed up bythe fire of Forts Hughes and Drum,churned the channel between Bataan andCorregidor into a surging froth, whippedby shell fragments and explosions, Themoon’s steady light revealed many directhits on barges and showed heavily bur-dened enemy soldiers struggling in thewater and sinking under the weight oftheir packs and equipment. Still, somemen reached shore and Colonel Sato wasable to organize a drive toward his objec-tive, Malinta Hill.

Individual enemy soldiers and machine-gun crews infiltrated across Kindley Fieldand through the rubble of torn barbedwire, blasted trees, and, crater-pockedground to Denver Battery, a sandbaggedantiaircraft gun position which stood onrelatively high ground south of CavalryPoint. The American gunners, whoseweapons were out of action as a result ofthe bombardment, were unable to beat backthe encroaching Japanese who establishedthemselves in a commanding position withfields of fire over the whole approach routeto the landing beaches. Captain Pickup’sfirst word that the ,Japanese had seizedDenver Battery came when he sent one ofCompany D’s weapons platoon leaders,Marine Gunner Harold M. Ferrell, to es-tablish contact with the battery’s de-fenders. Ferrell and one of his men foundthe battery alive with enemy soldiers dig-ging in and setting up automatic weapons.Ferrell immediately went back to his de-fense area west of Infantry Point and

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

brought up some men to establish a line“along the hogsback to prevent the enemyfrom coming down on the backs of the menon the beaches.;> 30

Pickup came up shortly after GunnerFerrell got his men into position and con-sidered pulling Lieutenant Harris’ platoonout of its beach defenses to launch anattack against the enemy. After a con-ference with Harris the company com-mander decided to leave the 1st Platoonin position. ,Japanese landing craft werestill coming in , and the platoon’s with-drawal would leave several hundred yardsof beach open. The fact that enemytroops were ashore had been communi-cated to Lieutenant Colonel Beecher’s CPjust inside Maliuta Tunnel’s east entrance,and small groups of men, a squad or so ata time, were coming LIp to build on theline in front of Denver Battery. Theenemy now fired his machine guns steadily,and intermittent but heavy shellfire struckall along the roads from Malinta to Den-ver. Casualties were severe throughoutthe area.

By 0130 surviving elements of 1/4 on theeastern tip of the island were cut off com-pletely from the rest of the battalion.13eecher was forced to leave men in posi-tion on both shores west of Denver Batteryto prevent the enemy landing behind hislines. .411 the men who could be sparedfrom the beaches were being sent L~pto thedefensive position astride the ridgelinejllst west of Denver, but the strength thatcould be assembled there amounted to littlemore than two platoons including a fewPhilippine Scouts from the silenced anti-boat guns in I/4’s sector. No exact fiaguresreveal how many ,Japanese were ashore at

“0Fmvwll, 1.

this time or how- many casualties the 61stZn~an.try’s assault companies had suffered,but it was plain that the enemy at DenverBattery outnumbered the small force try-ing to contain them, and ,Japanese snipersand infiltrating groups soon began to cropup in the. rear of Pickup’s position.

The situation clearly called for the com-mitment of additional men in the East Sec-

tor. Colonel Howard had made provisionfor this soon after getting word of the

landing attempt. He alerted Schaeffer’s

command of two companies first, but heldoff committing Williams’ battalion untilthe situation clarified itself. There wasno guarantee that the ,Japanese would ac-commodate the 4th Marines by landing alltheir troops in the East Sector; in fact,there was a general belief among the menmanning the defenses which commandedthe ravines leading to Topside that theEast Sector landing was not the maineffort and that the enemy would be comingin against West and Middle Sectorbeaches.3] Complicating the entire prob-lem of command in the confused situationduring the early morning hours of 6 Maywas the fact that, only runners could getword of battle progress to Beecher?s andHoward’s CP. And any runner, or forthat matter any man, who tried to makethe 1,000-yard journey from the Denverline. to the mouth of Malinta Tunnel stooda good chance of never completing his mis-

sion. The area east of Malinta Hill wasit killing ground as Schaeffer’s men soonfound out when they made their bid toreach Denver Battery.

“ l{fr~c.’iRrpt, Statement of LCdr E. M. Wade,W. The ~e)tcrat existence of this belief wasquestioned by one surviror. ,Jach’son.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 195

THE (’OMMITME,+’T OF

THE RE/SER VE 3’

In Government Ravine the 4th Marines’reserve companies Saw and heard the ma-chine guns along the East Sector beacheshammering at the Japanese landing craft.Major Sclmeffer’s command was alreadystanding by to move out, and near 2400Companies O and P filed down the trailand started for Malinta. There was littleconfusion, for the men had rehemsed theirmovements often. Crossing Bottomsideby means of a tank trap which protectedthem from enemy shellfire, they moved intoMalinta Tunnel where company and pla-toon commanders supervised the distribu-tion of machine-gun ammunition and gre-nades cached there for just such an emer-gency. Volunteers from the Navy andMarine headquarters installations joinedthe companies to serve as ammunitioncarriers “although they were neither offi-cially or morally obligated to do so.’? 33

Major Schaeffer reported to ColonelHoward and received his instructions; hewas to take his men out into the East Sec-tor and counterattack the Japanese posi-sion. At 0200 the companies began tomove out of the oppressive heat xnd foulair of the crowded main tunnel onto thedeeply cratered roads which led to Den-ver.3~ Lieutenant Hogaboom’s Company

3’ unless otherwise noted the material in thissection is derived from lTS.4FFE-VS’FIP Rcpt;

l~th Army Rept: Howard I@t; Fer.qt(so~z; Fer-rcll; Hogaboom; ,Jt’nliin. q,. 13aldwin 1$’arrati~~;Isle of Dela8ima; Full of thr Philippines.

= Ferguson, 14.a By the time the Japanese landed, the only

road into the East Sector was that which ledthrough Malinta Tunnel. The road cut Gut ofthe side of the hill on the north had been com-pletely demolished, and Col Howard, looking foran alternate route of approach, had discovered

P was in the lead, following the left forkof the road behind its guide, CaptainGolhmd L. Clark, Jr., the 1st BattalionAdjutant. As the last platoon of the com-pany cleared the tunnel it was diverted toa vicious fire fight raging on the right ofthe Marine line by an officer who had comeback seeking reinforcements. Severalenemy machine guns had been set up nearthe base of a stone water tower forvardof Denver Battery and to the right frontof the Marine positions. The platoon, incommon with most of the rest of the unitsthat tried to reduce this strong point, waschopped to pieces by interlocking bands ofmachine-gun fire.

On Clark’s order, Hogaboom deployedhis remaining two platoons in line of skir-mishers once they were well clear of thetunnel, The. advancing line made contactwith Lieutenant Harris and the remnantsof Company A’s 1st Platoon holding theleft of the Denver defensive position andtied in with them. Hogaboom found thathis right flank was open; Captain Cham-bers’ Company O which was to have fol-lowed him out of the tunnel and come upon his right was not to be found.

Chambers’ men had left the tunnel allright, but almost immediately after thecompany column cleared the entrancebright flares were seen going up over the

,Japanese position. Chambers and his 1stPlatoon leader, (l,luarterrnaster ClerkFrank W. Ferguson, concluding that the

flares were a signal to the artillery onBataan, passed the word along the line to

look for the nearest shelter. The guess on

shortly before the landing that enemy artilleryhad blown a deep, ra~ine-like depression in thesouthern circling road that rendered it impassableto organized troop movement. Howard Inter-

%ieu~.

196

the flares was right, and Ferguson’s pla-toon was fortunate in taking its shelling inan area where the Japanese had provideddeep bomb craters. The platoon camethrough with only eight casualties. Assoon as the bombardment lifted, Fergnsonmoved toward Denver until he was forcedto deploy by heavy machine-gun and mor-tar fire. He looked for the 3d Platoon tocome up on his right according to plan, butonly its commander, Quartermaster Ser-geant John E. Haskin, and five men ap-peared, the rest had been lost in the shell-ing. Captain Chambers sent up the reserveplatoon, which was in even worse shape,having been caught in the open near thetunnel entrance. Quartermaster ClerkHerman L. Snellings had only four sur-\,ivors alive and unwounded.

Company O now contained but one pla-toon and had not yet made its attack.

Major Schaeffer established control overthe scattered groups of men from the 1stBattalion and the reserve and launchedthree separate counterattacks on the dug-inJapanese. Sometimes the men would getup the slopes leading to the battery gunpits, but they were always driven back,

fewer in number each time. On the rightflank, Sergeant Major John H. Sweeneyand Sergeant Haskin took advantage of

the water tower’s battered elevation to hurlgrenades down on the machine guns thatwere holding up the advance; Haskin waskilled trying to get more grenades up toSweeney, and Sweeney was picked offafter he had knocked out at least one ofthe guns. Ferguson, who knew and hadserved with both these long-time regulars,wrote their simple epitaph:

They were very close friends in life and it wasmost tltting that they should go out together.’s

“ ~w~wn, 18.

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

Many close friends died that morning in

the darkness and choking dust as the Jap-

anese and the Americans and Filipinos

faced each other from positions less than

forty yards apart. Some men cut off be-

hind the enemy lines still kept firing at

occasional landing craft that were coming

in to reinforce sate. Hogaboom could see

the tracers of a single .50 caliber and felt

that “the bullets smacking into the armor

of the barges sounded like rivet hammers

rattling away.” % 13very movement of the

Japanese botats which stood in number off-

shore was counted as an attempt at land-

ing, although many of them were impro-

vised gunboats whose mission was protect-

ing and supporting the landing craft. But

detachments of Sate’s force kept coming in

all night, and one enemy lieutenant, prob-

ably a member of one of the 61.~t’ssupport-ing units, gave a vivid description of thehelpless feeling of the men in the bargesas they were caught in Corregidor’s fire:

American high powered machine guns poureda stream of bullets on us from all directions.Rifle fire added to the hail of death. Our menwho were huddled in the center of the boat wereall either killed or wounded. Those who clung

to the sides were hit by shells that pierced thesteel plating. The boat had already sprung sev-eral leaks when we finally came within landingdistance of Corregidor. Desperately I gave the

signal and led the charge against the shore de-f enses. I don’t remember how many men re-sponded. 1 know I heard only a small chorus.In that mad dash for shore many were drownedas they dropped into the water mortallywounded. Many were killed outright . . . Ifit had not been for the fact that it was the darkhour before the dawn, pitch black, I doubt if anyof us would be alive today to tell the story.a’

However heavy the Japanese casualtieswere, they did not measurably weaken the

‘“ Hogaboom, 16.

‘7 Quoted in Isle of Delusion., 34.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 197

firepower of the Denver position. Eachattack by Schaefferjs men thinned the Ma-rine line still more, Lost were officers andN(2OS whose leadership was vital to theoperations of mixed units such as thosewhich held the Japanese at bay. CaptainCastle of Company D was killed trying tosilence a machine gun, and many smallunit leaders who still held their place inline were badly wounded. The situationwas so desperate that Colonel Howardcould no longer hold his last reserves outof the action. He ordered the 4th Bat-talion to move into the East Sector andjoin the embattled defense line.

THE 4TH BATT.4LIOiVI,3J A 12TIOiV 38

Major Williams’ 4th Battalion had beenalerted early in the night’s action, and hehad ordered the issue of extra ammunition

and grenades. At about 0100 he got theword to move the battalion into MalintaTunnel and stand by. The sailors pro-ceeded cautiously down the south shoreroad, waited for an enemy barrage whichwas hitting in the dock area to lift, andthen dashed across to the tunnel entrance.In the sweltering corridor the men pressedback against the walls as hundreds ofcasualties, walking wounded and littercases, streamed in from the East Sectorfighting. The hospital laterals were filledto overflowing, and the doctors, nurses,and corpsmen tended to the stricken menwherever they could find room to lay a

‘*Unless otherwise noted the n]aterial in thissection is derived from USAFFE-L7SFIP Rept;l~th A?my Rept; Howard Rept; Brook; Dalnew;

SSgt C. E. Downing, Personal Experiences 5-6-May@ n. d. ; Perga.!+ on;Fcrrell; Hogaboom;Jenkins; Btzldwin Narrative; Isle of Delwsion;B’all of thc Ph ilippinrs.

man down. At 0430, Colonel Howardordered Williams to take his battalion outof the tunnel and attack the Japanese atDenver Battery.

The companies moved out in column.About 500 yards out from Malinta theywere caught in a heavy shelling thatsharply reduced their strength and tempo-rarily scattered the men. The survivorsreassembled and moved toward the fight-ing in line of skirmishers. Companies Qand R, commanded by two Army officers,Captains Paul C. Moore and Harold E.Dalness, respectively, moved in on the leftto reinforce the scattered groups of rifle-men from Companies A and P who weretrying to contain the Japanese in thebroken ground north of Denver Battery.The battery position itself was assigned toCompany T (Lieutenant Bethel B. Otter,USN), and two platoons of Company S,”originally designated the battalion reserve,were brought up on the extreme rightwhere Lieutenant Edward N. Little, USN,was to try to silence the enemy machineguns near the water tower. The blue-jackets filled in the gaps along the line—wide gaps, for there was little that couldbe called a firm defensive line left—andjoined the fire fight,

The lack of adequate communicationsprevented Colonel Howard from exer-

cising active tactical direction of the battlein the East Sector. The unit command-ers on the ground, first Captain Pickup,then Major Schaeffer, and finally Major

Williams made the minute-to-minute de-cisions that close combat demanded. Bythe time Williams’ battalion had reorgan-ized and moved up into the Marine for-ward positions, Schaeffer’s command was

“ Saalman 1956.

198 PEARL HARBOR TO GU~DALCANAL

practically nonexistent. Williams, bymutual consent ( Schaeffer was senior),took over command of the fighting sincehe was in a far better position to get thebest effort out of his bluejackets whenthey attacked.~

At dawn Major Williams moved alongthe front, telling his officers to be readyto jump off at 0615. ‘l’he company andplatoon command posts were right up onthe firing line and there were no reservesleft; every officer and man still able tostand took part in the attack. C)n the leftthe Japanese were driven back 200–300yards before Williams sent a runner tocheck the advance of Moore and Dalness;the right of the line had been unable tomake more than a few yards before thewithering fire of the Denver and watertower defenses drove the men to the deck.The left companies shifted toward Denverto close the gap that had opened whilethe men on the right tried to knock outthe ,Japanese machine guns and mortars.Lieutenant otter was killed while leadingan attack, and his executive, Captain Cal-vin E. Chunn, took over: Chunn waswounded soon after as Company T chargeda ,Japanese unit which was setting up afield piece near the water tower.” Lieu-tenal)t Little was hit in the chest andWilliams sent a Philippine Scout officer,First I,ieutenallt Otis E. Saalman, to takeover Company S.

The Marine mortars of 1/4, 3-inchStokes without sights, were not accurateenough to support Williams’ attack. Hehad to order them to cease fire when strayrounds fell among his own men, who had

closed to within grenade range of the Jap-anese, Robbed of the last supporting

‘0Mi2e ltr, op. cit.4’ Chl(nn.

weapons that might have opened a breachin the Denver position, the attack stalledcompletely. Major Schaeffer sent. War-rant officer Ferguson, who had succeededto command of Company O when CaptainChambers was wounded, to Colonel How-ard’s CP to report the situation and re-quest reinforcements. Ferguson, likeSchaeffer and many of the survivors of 1/4and the reserve, was a walking woundedcase himself. By the time Ferguson gotback through the enemy shelling to Ma-linta at 0900, Williams had received whatfew reinforcements Howard could muster.Captain Herman H. Hauck and 60 men ofthe 59th Coast Artillery, assigned by Gen-eral Moore to the 4th Marines, had comeup and Williams sent them to the leftflank to block Japanese snipers and ma-chine-gun crews infiltrating along thebeaches into the rear areas.

At about 0930 men on the north flank ofthe Marine line saw a couple of Japanesetanks coming off barges near CavalryPoint, a move that spelled the end on Cor-regidor. The tal~ks were in position to ad-vance within a half houI, and, just as themen in front of Denver Battery spottedthem, enemy flares went Llp again and ar-tillery salvoes crashed down just forwardof the Japanese position. Some men be-gan to fall back, and though Williams andthe surviving leaders tried to halt thewithdrawal, the shellfire prevented themfrom regaining control. At 1030 Williams

sent a message to the units on the left flankto fall back to the ruins of a concrete trenchwhich stood just forward of the entranceto Malint a Tunnel. The next thirty min-

utes witnessed a scene of utter confusionas the Japanese opened up on the retreat-ing men with rifles: mortars, machine guns,and mountain howitzers. Flares signalled

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 199

the artillery on Bataan to increase its fire,and a rolling barrage swung back andforth between Malinta and Denver, demol-ishing any semblance of order in the ranksof the men straining to reach the dubiousshelter of the trench. “Dirt, rocks, trees,bodies, and debris literally filled, the air,” 4’and pitifully few men made it back toMalinta.

Williams, who was wounded, androughly 150 officers and men, many of themalso casualties, gathered in the trench ruinsto make a stand. The Japanese were lessthan three hundred yards from their posi-tion and enemy tanks could be seen movingup to outflank their line on the right. TheMarine major, who had been a tower ofstrength throughout the hopeless fight,went into the tunnel at 1130 to ask Howardfor antitank guns and more men. But thebattle was over: General Wainwright hadmade the decision to surrender.

SURRENDER 4’

Colonel Howard had personally re-ported the landing of the Japanese tanksto General Wainwright at 1000. TheUSFIP commander, who had kept currenton the situation in the East Sectorthroughout the night’s fighting, made thefateful decision to surrender. He laterrelated that “it was the terror that is vestedin a tank that was the deciding factor,” forhe “thought of the havoc that even one ofthese could wreak if it nosed into the tun-nel, where lay our helpless wounded . . .’? 44He did not believe, nor did any other otTi-

“ ~alne8S,18.43Unless otherwise noted the material in this

section is derived from USAFFE-USFIP Rep t;

lJth Arn6g Rept; Howard Rept; Baldwin Nurra-tive; Fall of the Philippines; Wai?tWright’8 Story.

44Wain.wrigh t’s StoW, 119.

448777 0—58——14

cer he consulted, that the defenses outsideMalinta could last more than the remain-ing hours of the day, and he set the hour ofsurrender for noon in order %o avoid thehorrors which would have accrued had Ilet the fight goon until dark.” *

The order to surrender was passed to thetroops on Topside and Middleside alongwith instructions to destroy all weaponslarger than .45 caliber. The sickened menof the 4th Marines’ !2d and 3d Battalions,who had been forced to stand by helplesslyas they heard and watched the battle to theeast, carried the order even further, smash-ing their rifles against the rocks. Veteransof fighting in World War I and a dozen“banana wars” stood unashamedly cryingas they were told they would have to sur-render, Inside Malinta, Colonel Howardordered the regimental and national colorsof the 4th Marines burned, to prevent theirfalling into enemy hands. Two 1st Bat-talion officers, Captain Clark and Lieuten-ant Manning, a field music, and an inter-preter were selected to carry Wainwright’sflag of truce to the Japanese. .4s the whiteflag was carried out of the tunnel, MajorWilliams ordered survivors of the EastSector fighting to move inside the hill andtake shelter from the Japanese bon~bard-ment which still was falling.

Captain Clarks party passed the lastAmerican outpost; the music sounded offand Manning waved a pole which bore apiece of sheeting. The enemy infantry-men, who had been given special instruc-tions regarding the reception of flags oftruce, did not iire, and Clark was taken tothe senior Japanese officer on the islandwho cent acted Bataan and arranged fora parley on the peninsula with GeneralHomma. When Mrainwright, accompa-

4’Ibid., 186.

200 PEARL HARBOR TO GUAD.4LGANAL

denied by a few senior officers and aides,walked out of the tunnel and up the longslope toward Kindley Field, he saw deadand dying men on every hand, a grimrecord of the ferocity of the fighting in thepast 12 hours.

No complete figures exist for the casual-ties suffered by either side on 5–6 May;estimates of the Japanese losses rangefrom 900 to 4,000.* - The strait betwe~nBataan and Corregidor was heavily dottedwith enemy bodies, and American pris-oners on Corregidor estimated that ~heyhelped collect a~d cremate the remains ofhundreds of Japanese soldiers.” The de-tailed losses of the 4th Marines will prob-ably never be known because of the joint-service nature of the regiment at the timeof battle and the scarcity of contemporaryrecords. The casualties of Marines aloneare known, however, and they may be con-sidered indicative of the fate of soldiersand sailors who served with them. In thewhole Philippine campaign the regiment

MMost American survivors of the battle men-tion that they heard from the Japanese later inprison camp that the enemy had suffered almost4,000 casualties in trying to take Corregidor.However, Japanese officers commenting on Dr.Morton’s draft manuscript of The Fa.tl of the

PhUippine8 wrote that the total casualties of theJapanese in the Corregidor operation between14Apr-7May42 were 603. MilHistSec, SS, GHQ,FEC, Comments of Former Japanese Officers Re-garding “The Fall of the Philippines,” 19Apr42(located at OCMH), Chap XXXI, 3.

4’ Saalrnan1956. Saalman recalls having re-marked to Maj Williams shortly after daybreakon 6 May, “I believe we could walk from Corregi-dor to Bataan over dead bodies.” In light of thenumber of bodies that were collected and cre-mated, Saalman is convinced that the 903 figuresupplied by the Japanese in commenting on thedraft of The Fall of the Philippine reflects onlyenemy dead rather than total casualties.

4’ See Appendix D for Marine casualties.

had 315 officers and men killed, 15 missingin action presumed dead, and 357 menwounded; ~ the great majority of thesecasualties occurred during the battle forCorregidor.

The bloody battle for the island fortressdid not end with Wainwright’s decision tosurrender. The Japanese went right. aheadwith their assault plan and preparatorybombardments, paying no heed to thewhite flags displayed on all the islands inthe bay. Eighty-eight. tons of bombs weredropped on 6 May, a good part of themafter the surrender.” Wainwright, whohad released his southern Philippine com-manders to Mac.4rthurk control before heattempted to meet the enemy commander,tried to surrender only the fortified islandsto the Japanese. He was rebuffed coldlyby Homma’s emissary and told that theJapanese knew that he was commander ofall the forces in the Philippines and thatthey would not accept his surrender unlessit meant the capitulation of every man inhis command, everywhere in the islands.The American general, convinced that theJapanese would treat the men on the forti-fied islands as hostages, perhaps even mas-sacre them if the fighting continued in thesouth, finally acceded to the enemy demandand broadcast a surrender message at mid-night on 6 May to all his commandingofficers. There was considerable dissensionregarding this order, especially on islandswhere the Japanese had not made mucheffort to subdue the Philippine Armytroops, but eventually most of the organ-ized units of USFIP came out of the hillsto lay down their arms. Wainwright felt,as did most of his advisors at the time, thatthe Japanese were quite capable of slaugh-tering the men surrendered on the fortified

“ Philippine AirOp8Rec, Plate 8.

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF CORREGIDOR 201

islands if he did not insure a completesurrender of all his forces.

The struggle for control of Manila Bayfinally ended on 7 May when the Japaneseoccupied the last of the island forts, butfor most of the captured men “the fightfor life had just begun.” 50 Thousandssuccumbed in the next three years to brutalmistreatment, malnutrition, and disease inJapanese prison camps in the Philippines,in the enemy home islands, and in Man-churia. Two hundred and thirty-nineoflicers and men of the 4th Marine Regi-ment died in enemy hands,

CONCLUSION

The battle for Corregidor was bitterand confused; relatively few men survivewho fought in the East Sector through thenight and morning of 5–6 May 1942.Hundreds of well-trained infantrymen inpositions within a mile or so of MalintaHill were only spectators and auditors ofthe fighting. The poorest-trained ele-ments of the 4th Marines constituted thevital mobile reserve. On the surface andin hasty consideration it would seem thatthe tactics of the beach defense left muchto be desired.

Corregidor, however, was not a fortresswith only one entrance. The beachesfronting the ravines defended by 2/4 and3/4 led directly to the island’s major de-fensive installations. The threat of am-phibious assault existed all around theisland’s perimeter, but especially along thenorthern and western shores. The Japa-nese. laid down preparatory fires all alongthe north side of the island, devoting asmuch attention to James Ravine and Bot-

tomside west of Malinta as they did the

50Jenkins, 19.

eastern beaches. Until the night of 5 Maythere was no compelling reason to believethat the East Sector would draw the firstassault. And even after the enemy landedat North Point the very present threat towestern Corregidor existed and could notbe ignored. To meet it, a number of .4rmyunits were alerted to back up the positionsof 2/4 and 3/4.51

The problem which Colonel Howardfaced of when, where, and in what strengthto commit the reserves available to himwas a classic one for commanders at alltroop levels. If he committed all his re-serve at one time and in the area ofgreatest existing threat, he distinctly in-creased the vulnerability of other sectorsto enemy attack. If he committed onlypart of his reserve and retained the capa-bility of reinforcing against further at-tacks, he stood the chance of not usingenough men to have a decisive effect inany sector. The decision to commit thereserve piecemeal reflected the regiment’sestimate of the enemy’s capabilities andintentions in light of their actions.52 TheJapanese, although opposed by a rela-tively small force, did not or could notvigorously pursue their advance afterreaching the Denver position. The con-tinued presence of numerous small craftoff Corregidor’s north shore indicated apossible, even probable, early attempt ata. second landing. lTmjer these circum-

stances the East Sector assault might well

be a secondary effort which had stalled,

with the enemy’s main attack still to come.

Actually this was the Japanese plan, with

the difference that the second landing was

to follow the first after a day’s interval

“ Col F. P. Pyzick ltr to CMC, 300ct56- Howard Interview.

202 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

rather than as soon as the Marinesexpected.

In large part the 4th Marines’ reservestrength wasalready comrnitte don5 May,The ,Japanese preparatory fires, especiallythose which were laid on areas in plainsight of Bataan, made movement by anybody of troops extremely difficult-witnessthe fate of Company O. The bombard-ment had the effect of tying the regimentto its defenses. The trained infantrymenin its ranks were kept where they could dothe most to bolster the crucial beach posi-tions.53 If any sizable number of thesemen had been withdrawn from the beachesto forma reserve, it is questionable whetherthe remaining men could have withstoodany enemy assault. Once the Japanese be-gan to bombard Corregidor in earnestthere was no such thing as a strong beachdefense position; the very fury of the bom-bardment, destroying as it did most of theprepared defenses and demolishing themajor supporting weapons, placed a high

premium on having the best infantrymenat the point where their value would begreatest—the beaches.

The fall of Corregidor was inevitable;the garrison simply did not have enoughfood to hold out until relief could arrive.Although the enemy, primarily for pres-tige and propaganda reasons, choose to as-sault the island, they could easily havestarved its defenders into submission.When the Japanese did make their attackthey paid a high price for their haste,but extracted as great a one from the de-fenders. In the immediate tactical sense,however, the enemy artillery was the vic-tor in the siege and fall of Corregidor; nodefending force could have withstood its

devastatingly accurate bombardment.Although it was a defeat, the battle of

Corregidor is marked down in the annalsof the 4th Marines as a fight to be proudof. Those who fought and died in itsranks, whatever their service of origin,were, if only for a brief moment, Cor-regidor Marines.

PART V

Decision at Midway

CHAPTER 1

Setting the Stage:Early Naval Operations’

Early in January 1942 the U. S. PacificFleet ~~aslooking for a way to strike backat the Japanese; and advocates of the fastcarrier force, believing their case ironicallyhad been proven by tie Japanese at Pea~lHarbor, ~~ere read; to test-their theories.’But first there were some fences to mend.The all-important communications chainto Australia and New Zealand was rathertenuous, and the bulk of the Navy had tobe used for escort duty until reinforce-ments could be put ashore to bolster someof the stations along the route.

One of the most important links in thiscommunication chain was Samoa. The

worst was feared for this area when the

‘ Llnless otherwise noted the material in Part

V is derived from Rising Sun in the Pacific; S. E.Morison, Corul Seu, .llidwav and flabrnarine .4c-tion~, May 19~Z–.Lt{gust 1942: History of UnitedStates Naval Oprration.s in World Wor II (Bos-ton : Little, Brown and Company, 1949), here-inafter cited as Coral Sea a~bd Midwag; L7. S. &

Sea Power; M. Fuchida and M. Okurniya, .lfid-way: Thf Battle That Doomed Japan (Annapo-lis: (’. S. Xaval Institute. 1955), hereinafter citedas Battle That Downed Japarz; Marinc8 at Mid-UWV; “The Japanese Story of the Battle of Mid.way,” OIVI Rctiicw, May 1947, hereinafter citedas OIVI Rruiew.

‘ “There was still much difference of opinion[shout the effectiveness of the carrier strikingforce] until 7 Dee 1941 when the Japanese attacktook the controversy out of the laboratory class.,. Japan knifed us with our own invention.”Capt Miles R. Browning, USN, “The Fast CarrierForce,” MC Gazette, .June 1946, 19.

Pago Pago naval station was shelled bya Japanese submarine on 11 January whilethe 2d Marine Brigade (composed for themost part of the 8th Marines and the 2dDefense Battalion) still was en route to theislands from San Diego. But on 23 Jan-uary after the Marines’ four transportsand one fleet cargo vessel were deliveredsafely to Samoa, Vice Admiral WilliamF. Halsey’s Enterprk force, togetherwith a new fast carrier force commandedby Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcherand formed around the Ym%town, were re-leased for the raiding actions that the fleetwas anxious to launch.

While the 2d Marine Brigade unloadedat Samoa on 23 January, the Japaneselanded far to the west at Rabaul wherethe small Australian garrison was quicklyoverrun. Although the importance ofRabaul to the Japanese w-as not realizedat once, it was soon clear that from theBismarcks the enemy could launch an at-tack through the Coral Sea toward ALM-tralia and N’ew Zealand. This threattended to increase rather than diminishthe danger to Samoa. It was reasonedthat a Japanese attack there would precedea strike at Australia or h’ew Zealand toblock U. S. assistance to the Anzac areas.Japanese occupation of Makin Island inthe Gilberts seemed to point towardSamoa, and naval commanders held thatthe best insurance ag~inst subsequent

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SETTIh’G THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL 01’ERATIOA”S 207

moves would be a raid a~~inst the Mar-sballs, from which much of this ,Japaneseaction w asmounted. Halsey’s Entetp?iwforce therefore set out to strike W’otjeand Maleolap, seaplane bases in the Mar-shalls. while Fletcher prepared to attackMili and ,Jaluit (also in the Marshalls)plus Makin with his l’orlcto~cn group.(See Map 9)

A submarine reconnaissance found theMarshal]s lightly defended and spot-ted the largest concentration of Japaneseplnnes and ships at Kwaj alein Atoll inthe center of the island group. Halseydecided to add this choice target to hislist, and for the missions he divided TaskForce 8 into three groups. The Enterpm”.se

with three destroyers would strike Wot j e,Maloelap, and Kwajalein; Rear AdmiralRaymond .1. Spruance with the cruisersiVorthampton and ,Sa~tLake City plLMonedestroyer would bombard Wotje; andCaptain Thomas M. Sl~ock in USS(’hester, and with two destroyers, wouldshell Maloelap. The three southern atollsin the Marshalls group and Makin in thenorthern Gilberts would, be attencled to byFletcher in the Yonltown with his inde-pendent command ( TF 17) made up of thecruisers Lou{.y viJJeand ii’t.[.ouis and fourdestroyers.

The twin attacks struck on 1 February.Halsey began h~uncbing at 0443 under afull moon when his carrier was just 36miles from Wotje. Kwajalein, the mainobjective was 155 n~iles away. N’ine tor-pedo bombers and 37 dive bombers led offthe attack, the SBIYS striking Roi air baseon the nortl~ern end of the atoll and the tor-

pedo bombers bitt ing Kwaj alein Islanclacross the lagoon.

At Kwaj alein the hlu~ting was better;

but. in spite of the fact. that there was no

fighter opposition, and that the reportsbrought, back by pilots were enthusiastic,damage to the Japanese instaktions andshipping was slight. Five Wildcats shotdown two Japanese planes over Maloelap,and nine S13D’S that returned from Roilater sortiecl again and damaged some air-field installations. The surface bombw-d-ment, too, was disappointing, and thebombardment flagship, Chester, took alight bomb through her main cleck and losteight men killed and eleven wounded.

To the south, Fletcher had bad luck over,Taluit when his fliers found their targetsconcealed by thunder showers. Two ,Jkp-anese ships off ,Jabor Town were hit, butnot sunk, and the damage ashore w-asslight. A mine layer was hit at Makin,and damage at Mili was also slight.

Similar actions were continued in otherareas of the Pacific to harass the .Japmeseand to provide at least one outlet, for effortsto fight back at the enemy when the newsfrom all other fronts was gloomy. Mostnotable were strikes in early March agpinstVTake and Marcus Island, and the daringraid by planes of Admiral Wilson Brown’stask force over YTew Guinea’s 15,000-footOwen Stanley Mountains to hit the ,Jap-anese newly moved into Lae and Salamaua.lll~t in all cases actual damage to theenemy still failed, to measure LIp to ex-pectations, much less to the reports turner]in by overenthusiastic aviators.

Most audaciolls and unorthodox of theattacks, of course, was that which launchedI,ieutenant Co]onel ,James H. I)oolittle andhis Army raiders from the Hornet’s deckto tile 18 .Ipril Tokyo raid. Planned as“sonlething really spectacular”-a properretaliation for Pearl Harbor-the raid wasdesigned more for its dramatic impactupon morale than for any other purpose.In that it was highly successful.

SETTING THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL OPER.4TIONS 209

After security-shrouded planning andtraining, Doolittle’s 16 B–25’s left SanFrancisco on 2 April 1942 on board theHornet which was escorted by cruisersVincennes and Nashville, four destroyers,and an oiler. After a 13 April rendezvouswith the Enterprise of Halsey’s TF 16, theraiding party continued along the north-ern route toward the Japanese homeislands.3 Enemy picket boats sighted theconvoy when it was more than 100 milesshort of the intended launching range,and, with Doolittle~s concurrence, Halseylaunched the fliers at 0725 on 18 Aprilwhile the Howwt bucked in a heavy sea668 miles from the Imperial Palace incentral Tokyo.4

Much of the rai~s anticipated shockeffect on Tokyo was lost by the coincidenceof Doolittle’s arrival over the city at aboutnoon just as a Japanese air raid drill wascompleted. The Japanese, confused bythe attack which followed their ownmaneuvers, offered only light oppositionto the B–25’s which skimmed the city attreetop level to drop their bombs on mili-tary targets. One plane which struckKobe received no opposition, although twoothers over Nagoya and Osaka drew heavyfire from antiaircraft batteries; but nonewas lost over Japan.

Halsey managed to retire from thelaunching area with little difficulty, and

‘ Plans called for the bombers to land onfriendly Chinese fields some 1,093 miles fromTokyo, and completion of this trip for the planesloaded initially with four 500-pound bombs and1,140 gallons of gasoline required that they belaunched within 500 miles of Tokyo.

4 .klthough the picket boats were prompt witha warning, Japanese interception attempts weretardy. It was assumed that Navy planes, witha shorter range than B–25’s, were on the carrier,and that the force could not strike Japan untilthe ships steamed for another day.

both carriers returned to Pearl Harbor on25 April. Although the raid did more toboost American morale than it did todamage Japanese military installations,more practical results came later. It al-lowed a Japanese military group whichfavored a further expansion of their terri-torial gains to begin execution of theseambitious plans, and this expansion effortled directly to the Battle of Midwaywhich “. . . alone was well worth the ef-fort put into this operation by . . . [those]. . . who had volunteered to help even thescore.’> 5

The first of Japan’s planned expansionmoves in the spring of 1942 aimed forcontrol of the Coral Sea through seizureof the Southern Solomon Islands andPort Moresby on New Guinea as basesfrom which to knock out growing Alliedair power in northeastern Australia.Seizure of New Caledonia, planned as partof the third step in the second major seriesof offensives, would complete encircle-ment of the Coral Sea. This would leavethe LT. S. communications route to theAnzac area dangling useless at the SamoanIslands; and later ,Japanese advanceswould push the U. S. Pacific Fleet back to

Pearl Harbor and perhaps even to thewest coast.

Characteristically, the Japanese plan

called for an almost impossible degree oftiming and coordination. It depended forsuccess largely on surprise and on theIT. S. forces behaving just as the .Japanese

hoped that they would. But this secondelement was largely corollary to the first,and, when surprise failed, the Japanesewere shocked to discover that the U. S.fleet did not follow the script.

‘ Rising SW tn. the Pacific, 398.

210 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

The Japanese anticipated resistancefrom a U. S. carrier task force known to belurking somewhere to the south or south-east, but theyexpectedt ocornert his forcein the eastern Coral Sea with a pincersmovement of carrier task forces of theirown. Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi wouldskirt to the east of the Solomons with hisStriking Force of heavy carriers Shoha.kwand Zui?ca.ku and move in on the U. S. shipsfrom that direction, while Rear AdmiralAritomo Goto’s Coverv”ng Force builtaround the light carrier A’hoho would closein from the northwest. Destruction of thenortheast Australian airfields would fol-low this fatal pinch of the U. S. fleet, andthen the Port More.sby Inwzsion Groupcould ply the southeastern coast of NewGuinea with impunity.

But Japanese overconfidence enabledU. S. intelligence to diagnose this opera-tion in advance, and Fletcher’s Task Force17 had steamed into the Coral Sea where heall but completed refueling before the firstJapanese elements sortied from Rabaul.On 4 May Fletcher’s Lemington, Yorktown,screening ships, and support vessels werejoined by the combined Australian-Ameri-can surface force under Rear Admiral J. C.Crate of the Royal Navy.

On the previous day the Japanese hadstarted their operation (which they called~~fifo~~)like any other routine land grab.

A suitable invasion force, adequately sup-ported, moved into the Southern Solomons,seized Tulagi -without opposition b andpromptly began setting up a seaplane base.There Fletcher’s planes startled them next

“Tulagi, with which U. S. forces were to get

better acquainted, was the capital of the BritishSolomon Islands Protectorate. Officials andsuch garrison as existed had been amply fore-warned and evacuated several days earlier. SeePart VI of this volume.

day with several powerful air strikes onthe new garrison and on the Japanese shipsstill in the area. The U. S. carrier planesstruck virtually unopposed,7 but theycaused little damage in proportion to theenergy and ammunition they expended,This startling deviation from the “Mo”script caused the Japanese to initiate theremaining steps of the operation withoutfurther delay.

The Battle of the Coral Sea proved thefirst major naval engagement in historywhere opposing surface forces neither sawnor fired at each others Although bothwere eager to join battle, combat intelli-gence was so poor and aerial reconnais-sance so hampered by shifting weatherfronts that three days passed before themain forces found each other. But otherthings they did find led to a series of eventson the 7th that might be described as acomedy of errors, although there was noth-ing particularly comical about them to

those involved.Early that morning an over-enthusiastic

.Japanese search pilot brought Takagi?+ en-tire striking air power down on the U. S.fleet tanker Neosho and her lone convoying

destroyer, the USS Nimx, by reportingthem as a carrier and heavy cruiser re-spectively. This overwhelming attacksank the A!hnx and so damaged the A7~osho

‘ Experience to date had indicated to the Jap-anese that one of their landings constituted afait accompti which no enemy would dare dis-pute, and the na~al force supporting the landinghad departed in order to get on with the war.Takagi’s powerful Carrier Striking Force at thistime lay north of Rougainville to keep beyondthe range of Allied air search.

8 “SO many mistakes were made on both sidesin this new mode of fighting that it might becalled the Battle of Xal-al Errors. ” Coral Sea

anc7 Midmau, 63.

SETTING THE STAGE: EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS 211

that she had to be destroyed four dayslater.

Not to be outdone, the Americans reactedsimilarly a short time later to a scoutplane’s report of two Japanese carriers andfour cruisers north of the Louisiades. Ac-tually these craft were a subordinate enemytask group consisting of two old lightcruisers and three converted gunboats.But more by good luck than good manage-ment, the attacking planes investigatingthe report sighted the Japanese coveringForce, then protecting the left flank of theI>ort M ores by in.vasion Group, and con-centrated on the Nfioho to the virtual ex-clusion of her consorts. Against 93 air-craft of all types, the lone light, carrier hadno more chance than Task Force Neosho-A’im.s had against the Japanese, and, herdemise prompted the morale-boostingphrase, “Scratch one flattop !” g

As a result of these alarms and excur-sions, both commanding admirals hadmissed each other once again. By mid-afternoon, however, Takagi had a prettygood iclen of the LT. S. carriers’ locationand, shortly before nightfall, dispatched abomber-torpedo strike against Fletcher.Thanks to a heavy weather front, theseplanes failed to find their target, andAmerican combat air patrol interceptedthem on their attempted return. In theconfusion of dogfights, several Japanesepilots lost direction in the gathering dark-ness and made the error of attempting to1and on the Yor?ctoum?o

9“Scratrh one flattop ! Dixon to Carrier,Scratch one flattop !“ Voice radio report LCdrR. E. Dixon to USS I,e.rinqtoti, quoted in Coralk’ea and Midway, 42. Action against the tlltoho

was U. S. Navy Air’s first attack on an enemycarrier.

‘0 Six planes in two groups of three each. Al-though they were recognized and fired on, all but

Early the following morning, U. S.search planes finally located the Japanesecarriers at about the time the Japanese re-discovered the U, S. flattops. At last thestage was set for the big show.

Loss of the flhoho had cut the Japanesedown to size. The opponents who sluggedit out on 8 May 1942 were evenly matched,physically and morally, to a degree rarelyfound in warfare, afloat or ashore?’ How-ever, at the time the battle developed, theJapanese enjoyed the great tactical advan-tage of having their position shrouded bythe same heavy weather front that hadcovered the U. S. carriers the previousafternoon, while Fletcher% force lay inclear tropical sunlight where it could beseen for many miles from aloft.

The attacking aircraft of both partiesstruck their enemy at nearly the same time(approximately 1100), passing each otheren route,’2 The two Japanese carriers andtheir respective escorts lay about ten milesapart. As the Yorktown’s planes orbitedover the target preparatory to the attack,the Zuikaku and her screening force dis-appeared into a rain squall and were seen

one escaped. In this action the Japanese lost 9planes in combat and 11 attempting night land-ings without benefit of homing devices, againstU. S. loss of 2 fighters.

“ A lucid summary of the several factors in-volved occurs in Coral Sea and Midway, 48.Fletcher’s potential marked advantage in surfacescreening strength had been dissipated when,early on 7 May, he had dispatched Crate’s force ofcruisers and destroyers on a dash westward tointercept the enemy transport convoy expected toround the southeastern tip of New Guinea thenext morning en route to attack Port Moresby.For analysis of this perhaps ill-judged move andits results, see Ibid., 37–39.

“ “The story current shortly after the battle,that the Japanese and American planes sightedbut paid no attention to each other when passingon opposite courses, is not true.” Ibid., 52n.

212 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

no more during the brief action that fol-lowed, thereby escaping damage. So allU. S. planes that reached the scene concen-trated on the Shokaku, but with disap-pointing results.

The Yorktown7.s torpedo bombers wentin first, low and covered by fighters. Butfaulty technique and the wretched qualityof U, S. torpedoes at this stage of the warcombined to make this attack wholly in-effective: hits (if any ) proved to be duds,the pilots launched at excessive ranges,and the torpedoes traveled so slowly thatvessels unable to dodge had only to out-run them. The dive bombers, followingclosely, scored only two direct hits. Butone of these so damaged the. Shokaku’sflight deck that she could no longerlaunch planes, although she still wascapable of recovering them. Many of theLexington planes, taking off ten minutesafter those from Yorktown, got lost in theovercast and never found their targets.Those that did attack made the same mis-takes the Yorktown fliers committed. Thetorpedoes proved w%olly ineffective, andthe damaging bomb hit on the ,S”hokwkuwas something less than lethal despite the

pilot’s enthusiastic report that she was

“settling fast.:”s

The ,Japanese did considerably better,

thanks to vastly superior torpedoes and

launching techniques. Two of these

powerful “fish” ripped great holes in the

Lexington’s port side, and she sustained

two direct bomb hits plus numerous nearmisses that sprang plates. The moremaneuverable York to /r71 dodged all of thetorpedoes aimed at her and escaped allhilt one of the bombs. l]ut this was an800-pounder, and it exploded with sLlch aspectacular display of flame and smoke

“ Ibid.,51.

that the .Japanese pilots may be excusedtheir claim that they had sunk her.

These events made up the Battle of theCoral Sea. It was all over by 1140.

Preoccupation of both forces with theflattops left opposing escort vessels un-scathed, although the Japanese claimed tohave left burning ‘Lone battleship orcruiser.” ‘~ The Americans had sustainedfar the heavier damage and casualties, buthad inflicted the greater tactical blow inknocking the .S’hokaku. out of further of-fensive action while both U. S. carriersstill were operational. Even the crippledLemh,gton had put out fires, shored uptorpedo damage, and was capable of sus-taining 25-knot speed and conductingnearly normal flight operations an hourafter the battle ended.

The ,Japanese had lost the greater num-ber of planes: 43 from all causes against33 for the Americans. Their command,accepting at face value the ecstatic reportsof their pilots that they had sunk both 17. S.carriers, started the beat-up S’hokahw forhome, and in the afternoon commencedwithdrawal from the area on orders from

Rabaul. Admiral Takagi concurred withhigher authority that it-would be unwise

to risk the vulnerable transport convoy inthe narrowing waters of the western CoralSea in face of the Allies’ Australian air-fields under cover of the whittled-downair complement of the single operational

carrier. So the Port Moresby [n.vasionGroup was ordered back to Rabaul.

But the final, tragic act of the drama re-

mained. The gallant old Gzin.gton, herwounds pat ched up anc1 aplmrently fit toreturn to Pearl H;~rbor for permanent re-pairs, w-as suddenly racked by a terrible

“ Ibid., 56.

SETTIXG THE STAGE: EARLY XAVAI, OPERATIONS 213

exl)losion. This res(dted only indirectlyfrom enemy :~ction: relezsed gasolineflmles were ignited by sparks from a gen-erator sonleone hacl carelessly left running.This set off lvhat anlounted to a chain re-act ion. The best elforts of her crew avatlednothing, and at 1707 her skipper gave theor(ler to abandon ship. This movementwas carried out in the best order, Ivithoutthe loss of a man. At about 2000, nearlynine hours after the ,Japanese had with-drawn from the battle, torpedoes of her

own escort put her under the wavesforever.

I.oss of the Leiw%gton gave tactical vic-tory to the Japanese. 13ut by thwartingthe invasion of Port Moresby, principalobjective of the entire operation, theL“nited States won strategic victory. Atthe time the enemy regarded this merelya postponement of their invasion phms;but events would prove that. no ,Japaneseseaborne invasion ever would near PortMoresby again.

CHAPTER ~

Japanese Plans: Toward Midwayand the North Pacific

Apparently ignoring this setback in theCoral Sea, Japan next turned toward theCentral and North Pacific to launch thesecond complicated operation on her sched-ule. Admiral Yamamoto’s two-prongedthrust at Midway and the Aleutians wouldautomatically wipe clean the Coral Seareverses and extend the outer perimeterof defense a safer distance from the homeislands. And in the bargain, Yamamotohoped, these attacks would lure forth theremainder of the L’. S. fleet so that hecould finish off the job he started on 7December?

The admiral accepted his aviators’ re-ports that they had destroyed both U. S.carriers in the Coral Sea, and he there-fore reasoned that the tT. S. could bringno more than two flattops against him any-where in the Pacific. Actually the PearlHarbor yard had put. the Yorktoum backinto operation in less than 48 hours so thatthe U. S. had three carriers, including theEnterprise and the Hornet. But againstthese Yamamoto had seven, and four sea-plane carriers as well. His force also con-tained 11 battleships, including three ofthe latest type.’ The U. S. had no battle-

‘ Battle T?Lot Doomed Japan, Chaps 4 and 5,pu.wirn. The Aleutians phase was intended onlyas a diversion and to protect the northern flankof the Midway thrust, the plan being to with-draw the landing troope in September. Ibid., 79.

~Adm Yamamoto flew his flag in the Ymnuto,the largest, fastest, and most heavily armed ( 18”guns) ship in the world.

ships+r at least none in position for thisupcoming battle.3 And Yamamoto alsohad a substantial edge over the U, S. incruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Butthe Japanese admiral squandered this lop-sided advantage by dispersing his armadain widely scattered groups and openedhimself for defeat in detail by the inferiorLT.S. Pacific Fleet.’

This Japanese fleet, divided for thecomplicated plan into five major forces,with some of these split into smallergroups, steamed eastward independentlyto carry out the various phases of the sec-ond step in this strategy for 1942. Planesfrom two light carriers in the Second Mo-Me Force would strike Dutch Harbor,Maska on 3 June to confuse the U. S. com-

‘ Although some of the battleships knockedout at Pearl Harbor had been put back in serv-ice, and three others had been brought aroundfrom the Atlantic, these ships were operatingfrom the west coast as a final defense for theu. s.

‘ In view of subsequent developments, Morisondescribes Yamamoto’s disposition as “cockeyed.”Coral Sea and Midwag, 77–79. See also BattleThat Doomr’d Japan, 73–78. These Japaneseauthors, although sometimes carefully kind toYamamoto (who was killed later in a SolomonIslands air action ), are most often highly criticalof the Japanese Navy and of war plans in general.Although the work is valuable and serious (n. b.the final two paragraphs of the book, at pages247–248), the authors sometimes sound like menon the morning after, ruefnlly surveying the nightbefore.

214

J.4PANESE PLANS : TOWARD MII)WAY AND THE NORTH PACIFIC 215

mand and to cover diversionary Japanese.landings in the western Aleutians by theOccupation Forces for .&dak-Attu andKiska. Next the (’omier Striking Fome,commanded by Vice Admiral ChuichiNagumo, would soften Midway with theplanes from the big fleet carriers Akagi,Kaga, Hiryu, and floryu,5 and would thenmove on to strike the first blow at,the U. S.Pacific Fleet if it challenged in a sortiefrom Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Yamamoto’s Main Body, in-cluding three battleships and a lightcruiser of his force plus the .47eutian.Screening Force of four battleships andtwo light cruisers, then would go in forthe kill against the U. S. Fleet. This en-gagement would be followed, after dark-ness on 5 ,June, by Vice Admiral NoblltakeKondo moving in to shell the U. S. basefor two days. Then Kondo’s conroyedTransport Oroup would approach to landthe Midway Occwpction Force of 5,000ground troops. While crossing the Pacific,Yamamoto remained some hundreds ofmiles to the rear with his Main, Body,awaiting word from the .4dvcmce Expe-ditionary Force of large fleet submarinesalready manning stations on the ap-proaches to Pearl Harbor to warn aboutsorties of the American ships.

This ambitious plan might have worked,even though it was over-intricate. Butagain the ,Japanese had allowed their opti-

5Absent members of the original Pearl Harborstriking force were the Shokxzlcu and the Zu ikaku,the former undergoing Coral Sea damage rel}airs,and the latter reforming its air groups batteredin that same action. Presence of these big car-riers at Midway might well hare been decisi~e.

mism and overconfidence to cast the U. S.Pacific Fleet in the role of a timid char-acter actor cued for a vulnerable “walk-on”part. They begged the question of tacticsbefore their plan moved to the operationalstage. The U. S. Fleet, according to Japa-nese plans, would be steaming for theSecond Mobile Force in the Aleutians, orwould be vacillating in Hawaiian waters,until the strong (7arrier Stm”king Force hitMidway and revealed the target of themain effort.G In either event nothing butthe small Marine garrison force wouldstand in the way of the occupation of Mid-way, and the Japanese would have an airbase of their own there before the U. S.Fleet could reach them.

But, as at the Coral Sea encounter, theU.S. Fleet already had sortied to await the,Japanese. For more than a month Nimitzhad been aware that something like thiswas in the wind, and he bet nearly every-thing he had that the strike would hit Mid-way. The weakened Pacific Fleet stoodsome 300 miles northeast of Midway, thereto refuel, before the Japanese picket sub-marines took position. As a result, theseboats sighted no U. S. ships and radioedno reports, and Admiral N’agnmo discov-

ered the presence of the U. S. carriers in amost unpleasant manner.

e Fuchida and Okumiya state that Japaneseplans “calculated that the enemy naval forceswould be lured out by the strike on Midway Islandand not be fore.” Battle That L)oemed Japan, 128.

But in this calculation their overconfidence musthave beeu tempered somewhat, else why the di-version into the Aleutians? Morison discussesthis faulty Japanese strategy, probably more real-istically. Coraz Sea and Midwav, 74-79.

44s777 0—58—15

CHAPTER 8

Midway Girds for Battle’

Even before these Japanese plans weremade, and long before Admiral Yamamotosortied eastward, all U. S. military plan-ners recognized the vulnerable position ofthe Midway Atoll.’ Especially was thisposition clear in the light of early Jap-anese successes elsewhere in the Pacific,and none w-as more keenly aware of thegrim situation than the atoll’s small gar-rison force. The 12 PBY>S of VP-21 weresoon withdrawn, and little help w-as ex-pected from the crippled fleet. But on 17December, while the 6th Marine DefenseBattalion worked to improve existing de-fense installations, 17 SB2U-3’S (Vindi-cators) of Marine Scout-Bomber Squad-ron 231 ( VMSB-231 ) flew in unexpectedlyfrom Hawaii. Led by Major Clarence J.Chappell, Jr., and assisted in over-waternavigation by a PBY, the obsolescent craftmade the 1,137-mile hop in nine hours andtwenty minutes.’ Other reinforcements,

‘ Editor’s Note: Material contained in Chap-ters 3 and 4 is derived mainly from Chapters IIIand IV of the historical monograph Marines atMidwaV by Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl,Jr., published by Headquarters, L’. S. MarineCorps, in 1948. This has been extensively re-written and checked against sources subsequentlybrought to light.

2See Part II for a description of the geographyand history of Midway.

3This was then the longest massed flight ofsingle engine landplanes on record, and it hadbeen carried out with no surface rescue craftavailable. CO MAG-21 serial 1173 to MGC,19Dec41. The flight took off from Hickam sinceEwa’s runways were too short for the heavily-laden planes to use with complete safety.

including about 100 officers and men ofBatteries A and C of the 4th Defense Bat-talion, left Pearl Harbor on 19 Decemberwith the old Navy 7-inch b and, the 3-inchguns which had been shipped to Pearl Har-bor for Midway prior to the outset of war.(See Map 10, Map Section)

This force, on board the USS Wright,arrived on Christmas Eve, and LieutenantColonel Harold D. Shannon, who com-manded Marine defense forces on the atoll,turned over to Battery A (Captain CustisBurton, Jr. ) the mission of installing andmanning the 7-inch and 3-inch batteriesto be emplaced on Eastern Island. BatteryC (First Lieutenant Lewis A. Jones) wasassigned the job of setting up its 3-inchbattery on Sand Island.’

Next day Midway received anotherChristmas present: 14 Brewster F2A–3’s,the air echelon of Marine Fighter Squad-ron 221 ( VMF-221 ), flew in from the USSSarotoga which was retiring from theabortive attempt to relieve Wake Island.This squadron immediately began a dailyschedule of air search and patrolling. C)n26 December the 1?SS Tangier brought in

4These 7-inchweapons had been removed frompre-World War I battleshipsandstored in reserveat naval yards. K, J. Bauer, “Ships of the Navy,1775–1945,” (}1S available from the author).

5Interview with LtCol ~. Burton, Jr., 26Sep47,hereinafter cited as llur;on. The two EasternIsland batteries were located side by side on thesouth shore of the island, near the western tip,and the SandIsland battery was set up along thenorth shore of Sand Island.

216

MIDWAY GIRDS FOR BATTLE 217

Battery B of the 4th Defense Battalion(First Lieutenant Frank G. Urnstead) ;additional machine gunners and 12 anti-aircraft machine guns from the SpecialWeapons Group of that same battalion;an aviation contingent of three oflicers and110 enlisted Marines constituting theground echelon of VMF-221; aviationsupplies; additional radar; and much-needed base-defense artillery material.Umstead;s 5-inch battery, along with theisland’s other 7-inch battery, were set upsouth of the radio station on Sand Island.By New Year’s Day of 1942 Midway wasgarrisoned by a strongly-reinforced de-fense battalion, and one fighter and onescout-bomber squadron.

A major air base took shape on EasternIsland under the direction of LieutenantColonel Wrilliam J. Wallace who on 9,January became commanding oflicer of theMarine Aviation Detachment. Individualaircraft. bunkers and underground person-nel shelters were built, emergency fuelingexpedients devised, radars calibrated, andinexperienced operators trained to usethem properly. Colonel Wallace was as-sisted by Major Walter L. <J.Bayler, theMarine aviation oflicer who had been sentback from Wake with that atoll’s lastreports.’;

The first test of this defense came on25 ,January during twilight general quar-ters when a Japanese submarine surfacedabruptly and opened fire on Sand Island,apparently trying to knock out the radiostation. Battery D opened up with its;Lincb guns and forced the enemy craft to

crash-dive three minutes after it had sur-faced. Sand Island and the adjacentlagoon had received from 10 to 15 indis-

6LtCol W. J. Wallace ltr to (3o1 C, .4. Imrkin,18Jan42.

criminate hits, and Captain Buckner’sBattery D had expended 24 rounds.

The next action against the atoll cametwo weeks later, on 8 February, when an-other submarine appeared less than 1,000yards south of Sand Island and openedfire on the radio towers. Captain LorenS. Fraser’s Battery A opened fire on thisboat, and it submerged after Marines hadreturned two rounds. The enemy had hita concrete ammunition magazine, but for-tunately the small arms ammunition wasnot detonated. Two days later anothersubmarine-or the same one—surfacedalmost directly below two Marine fighterplanes flying the sunset antisubmarinepatrol. The submarine got off two roundsbefore First Lieutenant John F. Careyand Second Lieutenant Philip R. White,the fliers, could launch a diving attack.Both rounds from the submarine splashedin the lagoon, and then the boat wasdriven under water by the air attack justas the batteries of the 6th Defense. Bat-talion were going into action. This wasthe last time for a number of months thatMidway was troubled by enemy sub-marines.

.1s the winter wore on, Midway’s air armbegan to profit from the general expansionof Marine Corps aviation, and the twosquadrons and their small provisionalheadquarters on 1 March became MarineAircraft Group 22 (MAG-22). On 20:~pril Lieutenant Co]onel Wallace was sLlc-ceeded in command by Major Ira L. Kimes,and at the same time Major Lofton R.Henderson took command of VMSB-241,(the new designation of former VMSB-231). This was a busy time for MAG-2Z2,which was then converting Eastern Islandfrom a small advanced air base to a majorinstallation capable of handling as manysquadrons and aircraft types as could

218 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

physically be accommodated and protectedthere.

On 10 March, during the work and re-organization, the Marine fliers got theirfirst test against enemy aircraft. Radarpicked up a Japanese four-engined“Mayis” (Kawanishi 97) approximately45 miles west of Midway, and 12 fightersunder Captain Robert M. Haynes vectoredout to intercept. They made contact withthe enemy flying boat at 10,000 feet andshot it down.

Although the enemy plane did as well asit could to fight off this attack, this contactwas more important as intelligence forNimitz’ staff in Pearl Harbor than as a testfor the Marine. fliers. Two aircraft of thistype had tumbled four bombs into the hillsbehind Honolulu on the night of 34March, and Nimitz already believed thatthis portended an offensive toward Hawaii.Now this new sighting near Midway gaveadded weight to his estimate, and this in-formation went into the CinCPac intelli-gence “hopper” which shortly thereafterreached the considered opinion that theJapanese attack would strike Midway.By this time the Japanese code had beenbroken, also.’ Thus were the fragmentspieced together into Nimitz’s May 1942decision which caused him to -wager nearlyevery ship he had in an early sortie fromPearl Harbor to the position 300 milesnortheast of Midway from which theJapanese could be intercepted.

It was a bold, even though w-ell-calculated, wager. The many ships onSouth pacific convoy duty had to be lefton their important jobs; Halsey’s Enter-pri,~e and Hornet bad rushed from theDoolittle launching area part way to the

‘ Battle That Doomed ,lapan, 131 ; U. S. & Sea

Power, 686.

Carol Sea and back again to Pearl Harborwhere they were placed under a new com-mander, Rear Admiral Raymond A.Spruance; Fletcher’s Yorktown had justlimped in from the Coral Sea needing anestimated 90 days of repair work; and allthe Fleet’s battleships were on the westcoast where they could not be used (partlybecause Nimitz felt he did not haveenough air strength to protect them, any-way ). But h’imitz was convinced that hisintelligence estimate was correct, and thatthe stand had to be made,

For the engagement Nimitz gaveFletcher, in over-all tactical charge: directcommand of Task Force 17 which includedthe Yorktown, (rushed into shape in twodays rather than 90), two cruisers, and sixdestroyers. Spruance commanded TaskForce 16 which included the Enterpriseand Hornet, six cruisers, and nine destroy-ers. Four oilers and 19 submarines alsowere assigned to the area, and, in addition,a h’orth Pacific Force was formed of fivecruisers and ten destroyers to screen theAleutians. The Japanese had him out-numbered on all counts, and Nimitz knewthat the enemy would be gunning for thethree U. S. carriers. But his carriers like-wise were his only hope, and the admiralordered his subordinates to apply the ruleof calculated risk when they went in withtheir air groups to stop the Japanese.

WThile Nimitz readied this receptioncommittee? the ,Japanese completed theirMidway plans and polished the rough op-erational edges with carrier training and

SFletcher was senior to Spruance, and thus be-came Officer in Tactical Command. But as itturned out, Spruance exercised practically an in-dependent command during the critical days of*6 June, and this probably was fortunate be-cause Fletcher had no aviation staff while Spru-ance had inherited Halsey ’s.

MIDWAY GIRDS FOR B.4TTLE 219

rehearsals. By the last week of May, all,Japanese fleet elements were underway,and on decks Imperial sailors sunbathedand sang songs—vocal eruptions of whathas been described as the “VictoryDisease.”’

Meanwhile on Midway, the focal pointfor these vast efforts, Marines got theirfirst inkling of all this attention whenNimitz flew in on 2 May to see their senioroflicer, Lieutenant Colonel Shannon, andthe atoll commander, Commander CyrilT. Simard. The admiral inspected the in-stallations, and then directed Shannon tosubmit a detailed list of all supplies andequipment he would need to defend theatoll against a strong attack. Nimitzpromised that all available items requestedwould be forwarded immediately, andwithin less than a week men and materialwere being embarked in Hawaii to bolsterthe island strength.

Three more 3-inch antiaircraft batteriestotaling 12 guns, a 37mm antiaircraft bat-tery of eight guns, and a 20mm antiaircraftbattery of 18 guns were temporarily de-tached from the 3d Defense Battalion atPearl Harbor; and two rifle companies ofthe 2d Marine Raider Battalion, togetherwith a platoon of five light tanks, also weresent along to Midway. For M.AG–22, stillflying Brewster fighters and Irought Vin-dicator dive bombers, there would be 16SBD-2 dive bombers and seven relativelynew Grumman F4F–3 fighters.

Shortly after his return from Midwayto Pearl Harbor, A’imitz arranged “spot”promotions to captain and colonel respec-tively for Simard and Shannon, and de-scribed to them in a joint personal letter

SBattle That Doomed Japan, 245. “. . . thespread of the virus was so great,” the authors say,“that its effect may be found on every level of theplanning and execution of the Midway operation.”

the steps being taken to reinforce theiratoll against the anticipated attack.Japanese D-Day, the admiral predicted,would be about 28 May. On the day theyreceived this letter, Simard and Shannonconferred on their final plans for defense,and that evening Colonel Shannon as-sembled his key subordinates and warnedthem of the impending enemy attack..Additional defensive measures and priori-ties of final efforts were outlined, and allrecreational activities suspended. May 25was set as the deadline for completion ofthe measures ordered.

On the 25th, however, came two wel-comed changes for the picture. First,

Nimitz passed the word that the Japaneseattack was not expected until early June,andj second, the first reinforcements ar-rived. On this date the USS St. Louiscame in with the 37mm antiaircraft bat-tery of the 3d Defense Battalion plus thetwo companies of raiders. Four of the37’s were emplaced on each island whileRaider Company C (Captain Donald H.Hastie ) went to Sand Island, and Com-pany D (First Lieutenant John Apergis)to Eastern Island.

Next day the aircraft tender Kittyhawkarrived with the 3d Defense Battalion’s;~-inch antiaircraft group commanded byMajor Chandler W. Johnson, the lighttank platoon for the mobile reserve, andthe SBD–2’S and the F4F–3’s. In thefollowing week additional Army andNavy planes arrived, and by 31 May therewere 107 aircraft. on the island.l”

MBy this date the daily aviation gasoline con-sumptionof planes based on Eastern Island was&5,000gallons, and the following numbers ofplanes were based there: U. S. Army—fourB–26’s and 17 B–17’s; U. S. ~avy—16 PBY–5A’sand six TB~’s; U. S.Marine Corps-19 SBD–2’S,17 SB21~–3’s,21 F2A–3’s, and seven F4F–3’s.

220 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

For the ground forces and key civilianworkers who had remained behind to helpdefend the island, the week was equallybusy. Reinforcing weapons were in-stalled, tanks tested in the sand, all defen-sive concentrations registered in, and theemplacing of an extensive system of ob-stacles, mines and demolitions completed.Sand Island now was surrounded with twodouble-apron barbed wire barriers, and allinstallations on both islands were ringedby protective wire. Antiboat mines ofsealed sewer pipe, and obstacles of rein-forcing steel lay offshore; the beaches weresown with homemade mines of ammuni-tion boxes filled with dynamite and 20-penny nails; cigar box antitank mines cov-

ered likely beach exits; and bottles ofmolotov cocktail stood ready at every posi-tion. A decoy mockup airplane (a ,JFU—Japanese fouler-upper) was spotted prom-inently on the seaplane apron, and all un-derground fuel storage areas on SandIsland were prepared for emergency de-struction by demolition.’l

“ The demolition system worked, too. On 22

May a sailor threw the wrong switch and blew

up a good portion of the aviation gasoline. Thesupply was so critical after this that the pilots

who arrived on the Kittvhawk did not get aprebattle chance to check out in their SBD–2’S.

Pipe lines also were wrecked in the blast, and

MAG-22 thereafter had to refuel all planes by

hand from 55-gallon drums.

CHAPTER 4

Midway Versus4-5 June 1942

the Japanese

A Midway PBY spotted the approach-ing Japanese first, at about 0900 on June3:- and tracked them long enough to re-port eleven ships making 19 knots east-ward. These vessels were probably thetransport and seaplane groups of the Occu-pation Force, and they were attacked at1624 by nine B–17’s which Captain Simardsent out following the PBY’s contact re-port. The pilots reported having hit “twobattleships or heavy cruisers’s and twotransports in the group then 570 milesaway from Midway, but the fliers weremistaken in both ship identification andin calling their shots, for they actuallyhit nothing. A Catalina scored on one ofthese oilers later that night in a moon-light torpedo run.

This was enough to convince Fletcherthat the battle would soon be on, and hechanged course from his station 300 mileseast-northeast of Midway to gain a newposition about 200 miles north. Fromthere he could launch his planes the fol-lowing morning against the Japanese car-rier force which was expected to come infrom the northwest. U. S. intelligencestill was good. .Nagumo continued to steamin from the northwest while his transportswere under attack, and near daybreak on4 June, when the Yorktown launched anearly-morning search and while 11 PBY’s

‘ ~lidway (Zone plus 12) time and West Longi-tude date.

were going up to patrol from Midway, hehad reached a position approximately 250miles northwest of the atoll. There at0430 the Japanese admiral launched 36“Kate” torpedo planes and 36 “Val” divebombers, plus 36 escorting Zeros, for thefirst strike against the atoll.

At 0545 one of the Midway PBY’ssighted these planes about 150 miles outfrom the island, and a short time lateranother PBY reported visual contact withtwo enemy carriers and the balance of theJapanese Curvie~ Str+king Fo~ce some 200miles from Midway. Enterprise inter-

cepted this report, but. Fletcher wanted to

recover his search planes and sift further

intelligence before launching his strike,

and so he ordered Spruance to take the van

southwesterly and lead off the attack

ag-ainst the enemy carriers.

Yleauwhile the Midway Marines were

ready for the first shock of attack. Ground

force defenders at general quarters manned

every weapon and warning device, and

MilG-22, which already had fighters up to

cover the sortie of the PBY’s stood by for

orders. lit 0555, shortly after the second

P1;Y report had fixed the position of the

,Japanese Striking Force, the 6th Defense13attalion radar logged a report of “manyplanes,” and the NTavalAir Station raisedsimilar blips almost simultaneously. Airraid sirens began to wail, Condition Onewas set, and the NL4G-22 pilots mannedtheir planes. 130th squadrons were in the

221

MIDWAY VERSUS THE JAPANESE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 223

air in less than 10 minutes, VMF–221heading to intercept the enemy planes andVMS13-241 off to rendezvous station 20miles east where the dive bomber pilotswould receive further instructions.

The VMF fliers under Major Floyd B.Parks sighted the Zero-escorted Val divebombers at 0616 about 30 miles out fromMidway, and Captain John F. Carey,leading one of Parks’ divisions in anF4F-3, launched the attack from 17,000feet. The Marine fliers were hopelesslyoutnumbered, and they found that theZero fighters could “fly rings aroundthem.” They had time for only one. passat the bombers, and then had to turn theirattention to the swarm of Zeros, from oneto five of which got on the tail of eachMarine fighter. Only three of the original12 Marine pilots survived this brawl, andalthough the damage they inflicted on theenemy has never been assessed, it is be-lieved that they splashed a number of thebombers and some of the Zeros. OtherZeros were led into the Midway antiair-craft fire.

Meanwhile another group of 13 Midwayfighters under Captain Kirk Armisteadcame in for an attack against the enemyair formation. Again the damage inflictedupon the enemy was undetermined, butfewer Marine pilots were lost. For betteror for worse, however, the fighter defenseof Midway had been expended, and theproblem now passed to the antiaircraftguns on the atoll.

The first Japanese formation attackedat about 0630 from 14,000 feet. Antiair-craft fire knocked down two of these hori-zontal bombers before they could unload,but 22 came on through to drop theirbombs. And just as these initial explo-sions rocked the two islands, 18 planes ofthe enem y’s second wave came over for

their strike. Since each of these Japaneseformations had left the carriers with 36planes, it is possible that the Marine fliersscored some kills.z

The Kaga aircraft group in the firstwave, assigned to attack the patrol planefacilities on Sand Island, dropped nine242-kilogram bombs on and about the. sea-plane hangars, setting them aflame andstarting a large fire in the fuel oil tanks500 yards to the north. The Akagi planesplastered the north shore of EasternIsland to destroy the Marine mess hall,galley, and post exchange. These the re-turning enemy fliers described as hangars>Other targets of the Japanese divebombers included the already-flaming fuelstorage at the north end of Sand Island,the Sand Island dispensary, and the East-ern Island powerhouse which suffereddirect hits from two 805-kilogram bombs.These hits virtually destroyed the entireplant. And at the very end of the strike,the 6th Defense Battalion’s F,astern Islandcommand post received a direct hit whichkilled the Marine sector commander,Major William J$’. Benson, and woundedseveral other men. After these bomberscompleted their runs, the Zeros came infor strafing attacks. This one and onlyair strike on Midway was over shortlyafter 0700.

‘ Maj W. S. McCormick, an experienced anti-aircraft officer, counted the 22 ; and Capt M. A.Tyler, a VMSB-241 pilot with a grounded plane,counted the 18. CO, VMF-221 Rept to CO, MAG-22, 6Jun42, 1. However, Battle That DoomedJapan, 155, reports that “not a single hit” was

sustained by the Japanese bombers until they

struck in two waves of 36 planes each. Thisseems highly improbable in view of eyewitness

accounts and damage sustained.‘ ONI Review, 4.5-48. Information on ground

defense from CO, 6th DefBn Rept to CO, N.&S,Midway on action of &5 Jun42, 13Jun42, 1–8.

224 PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

Marine defense batteries fired through-out these attacks, and one source creditedthis antiaircraft fire with 10 kills,’ Re-ports from Marine flyers would appear torequire an increase of this estimate, how-ever, since returning Midway pilots de-scribed enemy planes falling out offormation and others floundering into thewater.5 But ,Japanese authorities claimthat only six of their planes—three levelbombers, two dive bombers, and a fighter—failed to make it back to the carriers.’This controversy probably will never be re-solved, for regardless of how many of these,Japanese planes made it back to their car-rier decks, Fletcher and Spruance—with acertain unintentional assistance fromNagumo-initiated action which resultedin the destruction of all these planes,anyway.

N“agumo’s mistake was a natural one fora commander who believed himself to beunopposed on a “field” of battle of his ownchoice. Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga, theflight officer who had commanded the firstattack wave against Midway, radioed dur-ing his return flight that “There is need fora second attack wave.’; Meanwhile, withNagumo still ignorant of the U. S. fleet’spresence in the vicinity, six AmericanTBF’s and four B–26’s from Midway came.in to attack his ships. This convinced the,Japanese admiral that Tomonaga wasright, and he sent below to hangar spacesthe 93 planes he had kept spotted forstrikes against possible surface opposition.These planes were to be re-armed withbombs for the second strike. ThenNagumo called in the returning planes to

arm them for the new attack of the atoll.While his men were involved in this workon the flight deck and in hangar spaces,Nagum.o got the bela~ed word from a Tonesearch plane that U. S. ships, including atieast one carrier, were in the area. Thiscaused another change of mind, and theadmiral ordered the planes’ ordnancechanged again, from bombs back to tor-pedoes with which to attack the surfaceships. But this decision was just tardyenough to allow Spruance to catch himwith his planes down, and with torpedoesand bombs strewn in great confusion aboutthe hangar deck.7

Meanwhile, as Nagumo vacillated, ..Ad-miral Nimitz’s orders for Captain Simardto “go all out for the carriers,” whileMarine antiaircraft batteries worriedabout Midway, were under execution.VMSB-241, like the fighter squadron, haddivided into two striking units, the firstcomposed of 16 SBD–2’S led by MajorLofton Henderson, and the second of 11SB2U–3’S commanded by Major BenjaminMT.Korris. Henderson’s group climbed to9,OOO feet to locate the enemy carriers,which were then undergoing the attackfrom the TBF’s and the B–26’s. Fliers ofthis group sighted the ,Japanese. ships at0744, but as the SBD’S spiralled down theywere set upon by swarms of Nakajima 97’sand Zeros flying air cover, which weresoon reinforced by more fighters from thecarriers below. Henderson and severalothers were shot down (only eight of theseplanes got. back to Midway) and the strikescored no hits although some wereclaimed. s

‘ OXI Reciex, 72.

‘ CinCPac Rept to CominCh on the Battle ofMidway, 8.

6Bottle That Doomed Japan, 156.

‘ ONI Review, 17–19, 44-45.

‘ Statement of Capt E. G. Glidden, 7Jun42, 1.Japanese sources disclose, however, that no hitswere scored in this attack. The ~uadalcanal

MIDWAY VERSUS THE JAPANESE, 4-5 JUNE 1942 225

Next came an attack by 15 B-17’s led byLieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney,USA, but again claims of hits were opti-mistic. And as these Flying Fortressespulled away, Major Norris came in withhis 11 Vindicators which had taken offwith Henderson. Beset by the Zeros,Norris turned to the nearest target at hand,and the Marines crowded their ancientplanes into a standard glide rnn almoston top of the .Japanwe battleshipHcu-ww—previously claimed as an ArmyB–17’s victim off Luzon. Some of thefliers also went after the Kirishirna, whichwas nearby, but neither attack managedany hits. Three Marines were shot down,and the group was credited with splasilingtwo enemy fighters, plus two probables?

By 1100 all surviving Marine aircrafthad made their way back to the atollwhere all hands grimly assessed the battle’sdamage and prepared for subsequent ac-tion. Of the VMF-221 fighters which had

airfield: captured two months later, was namedin }Iaj Henderson’s honor. Rear gunners of thisstrike group are credited with four enemy killsplus two additional probables.

9 ONI Review, 19; USSBS Intcrrogatiorw, NavNO 2, Capt Susumu Kawaguchi, IJN,I,6. Seealso Coral Sea and Midway, 111, for Adm Mor-ison’s dismissal of damage claims by land-basedfliers.

gone in against the attacking Japaneseplanes, only 10 returned, and of this num-ber only two were in shape to leave theground again. Thirteen F2.4–3’s and twoF4F’s were missing, along with the eightcraft lost from the Henderson group andthe three shot away from the Norris force.Slick black smoke from oil fires billowedup from the islands, and ruptured fuellines left more than two-thirds of the avia-tion fuel temporarily unavailable. Craso-line had to be sent to the field from SandIsland, and hand-pumped from drums.The Marine ground defense force had sus-tained 24 casualties, and four ordnance-men of VMF-221 had been lost to a directbomb hit.

.4t 1700 a burning enemy carrier was re-ported 200 miles northwest of Midway,and Major Norris prepared VMSB-241>Ssix operational SBD–2’S and five SB21J–3’Sfor a night attack. The planes took offat 1900, but could not find the carrier.Major Norris failed to return from thismission, although the other pilots managedto home by the light of oil fires andthe antiaircraft searchlights which wereturned up as beacons.’” Meanwhile, theBattle of Midway had been decided at seain a fi~ht of carrier aircraft.

‘“ V~lSB–241Rept of Gombat,7Jun42,3.

CHAPTER.5

Battle of the Carrier Planes4 June 1942

While the land-based fliers had their

morning go at the Japanese StrikingForce, and while Nagumo juggled his

planes and decisions, Spruance steamed

southeast to lead off the attack against the

enemy. The American admiral intended

to hold his planes until he drew within

about 100 miles of the Japanese. But when

he heard of the strike on Midway, Spru-

ante. launched two hours before this in-

tended range would have been reached.

By this calculated risk he hoped to catch

the Japanese planes back on their carriers

rearming for a second attack of the atoll.

And about twenty minutes later NTagumo

made the decision which set up himself

and his planes as exactly the target Spru-

ance hoped his pilots would find.1

Enteqnise and Hornet began launching

at about 07007 sending off every operational

plane they carried, except a few to cover

‘ In his introduction to Battle That DoomedJapan, Spruance writes : “In reading the accountof what happened on 4 Jurie, I am more than everimpressed with the part that good or bad for-tune sometimes plays in tactical engagements,The authors give us credit., where no credit isdue, for being able to choose the exact time forour attack on the Japanese carriers when theywere at the greatest disadvantage-flight decksfull of aircraft fueled, armed and ready to go.All that I can claim credit for, myself, is a verykeen sense of the urgent need for surprise and a

strong desire to hit the enemy carriers with

our full strength as early as we could reach

them.”

the task force. The strike was led by 29

Devastator (TBD–1 ) torpedo bombers,

and these were followed by 6’7 Dauntless

dive bombers and 20 Wildcat fighters.

Eighteen other Wildcats, plus a like num-

ber withheld to relieve them later, pa-

trolled overhead. Yorktown held back its

planes for about two hours; Fletcher con-

sidered that the aircraft from his carrier

might be needed against other enemy car-

riers not yet located, but by 0838 there had

been no enemy sightings, and he decided

to launch half his dive bombers and all

his torpedo planes, along with escorting

fighters. 13y shortly after 0900 the Yor~-

town had 17 SBD’sj 12 TBD’s, and six

F4F–3’s in the air, and other planes ready

for takeoff.

As Spruance had hoped, Nagumo con-

tinued for more than an hour to steam to-

ward Midway, and the first U. S. planes

found the Japanese Cartier Striking Forcewith its flattops in the center of a larger

formation consisting of two battleships,

three cruisers, and 11 destroyers. By

0917, Nagumo had recovered his Midway

attack planes, and at that time he made a

90-degree change of course to east-north-

east. This course change caused 35 of the

Hornet’s SBD’S and escorting fighters to

miss the battle, but HornetY.s torpedo

planes found the enemy and went in low

without fighter cover.

The 15 obsolete Devastators met heavy

antiaircraft fire from the Japanese Strik-

226 “

BATTLE OF THE CARRIER PLANES, 4 JUNE 1942 227

in.g Force, and pulled down upon them-

selves the bulk of the Zeroes patrolling

overhead. Against this combined fire, few

of the planes got close enough to Japanese

ships to launch torpedoes, and again, as in

the Coral Sea battle, any hits scored by the

slow unreliable torpedoes of that period

proved duds. This antiaircraft and

fighter opposition started while the planes

had yet eight miles to go to reach the Japa-

nese ships, and only one Devastator pilot

lived to pull up from this attack,’

The 14 TBD’s from the Enterprise fared

only a little better. Four of these planes,

likewise striking without fighter escort,

survived their torpedo runs against the

,Japanese shipsj although they scored no

hits. But these two Devastator attacks,

costly as they were, served to pull down the

Zero canopy to such a low altitude that the

following SB~’s from Enterprise and

Yorktown had an easier time of it.

These Dauntless dive bombers came in at

about 1020 while ~agumo>s ships still were

dodging the Devastators. The ~ltag; took

two hits which set her afire, and Admiral

Nagumo transferred his flag to the light

cruiser Nagara.3 The Xaga sustained

four hits, and at 1925 she blew up and sank.

The A’oryu was hit three times by the planes

and also struck by three torpedoes from the

submarine i47auiilwg which arrived on the

scene between 1359 and 1495.4 Finally the

‘ Ensign George H. Gay was this sole survivor.

His plane splashed shortly after he had palled

LqI from his run which had skimmed a carrier

deck at about 10 feet. Gay’s gunner had beenkilled, but Gay was rescued from his life raft next

day by a Catalina.3Althou~h the Akafli remained afloat, she was

abandoned at 1915 and later scuttled by a torpedofrom one of her screening destroyers.

‘ Battle That Doomed Japun, 185, 189–191,

presents strong evidence to indicate that thk was

&’oryu>s gasoline stowage exploded and

broke the ship in half.

By 1030, Nagumo had lost the services of

three carriers, and in all three cases, as

Spruance had hoped, the American attack

had caught the ships in process of refuel-

ing and re.arrning the planes of their llid-

way strike. But even with these ships and

their planes gone, ~agumo still was deter-

mined to fight back with his surviving car-

rier, the Eliryu, which had escaped damage

by getting far out of position in some of

the earlier evasive actions to escape the tor-

pedo planes. ‘t.llthough defeat now stared

the Japanese starkly in tl~e face, they felt

that the battle had to be continued as long

as we retained even a sma]l part of our

striking power.>’ 5

~~rhen the Alcagi was shot from under

N“agumo, the Japanese A“tr%ing Force com-

mander temporarily passed his command

to Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe on board the

heavy cruiser Tone, and command of air

operations simultaneously passed to Rear

ildmiral Tamon Yamaguchi in the lliryti.

.At about 1050 two float planes from the

cruiser Ph%uma si~hteil the Yorktoumi,ask group and guided to it a strike of 18

dive bombers and six fighters up from the

llir~t~. The LT. S. air patrol and antiair-

craft t fire knocked down or turned back

most of these enemy planes which arrived

not the Sorya but the Kuva, and that the one tor-pedo which actually hit pro\7ed a dud.

‘ Battlr ZVtat I)ooa?ed Jwpan, 191. In CoralArea and Jfidwau, at page 132, Adm Morisonpoints out that the ,Japanese at this time assumedfrom scout plane reports that the L1. S. force hadno more than two carriers, and possibly only one.The Japanese authors in I?attie That DoomedJapan point out on page 174, however, that whilethe torpedo planes were yet approaching for theirfirst strike against Nagurno, “Reports of enem}7planes increased until it was quite evident thatthey were not from a single carrier.”

228 I’EARL HARBOR TO GCADALCANAI,

at about noon, but those that got through

scored three hits which started fires.

W’ithin 20 minutes the big carrier was dead

in the water.

Her crew got her unclerwa~ a~ain in

about an hour, but a second strike from the

Z<iryu. appeared early in the afternoon.

.llthough the Japanese lost half of the 10

l<ate torpedo bombers and six Zero fight-

ers of this attack, four of the ~ates came in

to attack the Yonltown at masthead level.

lJaUnCh@ at a range of about 500 yards,

two of the torpedo planes scored hits which

left the carrier not only dead in the water

but listing so l)adly that she was abandoned

a few minutes later.’

Meanwhile, one of Yorktown’s searchplanes (one of 10 scout bombers sent outbefore the first attack on the ship) spottedthe Hiryu, two battleships, three cruisers,and four destroyers at 1445, and reportedthe position of these enemy ships. At 1530

Spruance had !24 SBD’S Tup from the En-terprise, and they found the IIiryu and herscreening ships at 1700. Using the sametactics which had paid off in their morningattacks, the dive bombers scored four hitswhich finished operations for Nagumo’s

“ The speed with which her crew had put l-ork-fouw in shape after the first attack led the 7apa-nese to believe that this second strike was againsta different carrier. They had by now spotted allthree U. S. (Jarriers, but at this point they thoughtthey had destroyed two of them. This secondstrike still did not finish the battered carrier,however. She remained afloat and regainedsome degree of equilibrium without human aid.Salvage parties went on board the following day,and the ship was taken under tow. Rut one ofh“a.gumo’s float planes spotted her early on 5tTune, and a submarine was sent out to finish heroff. The sub found the carrier on the 6th, p~lttwo torpedoes in her, and she finally went downearly on 7 June.

7Ten of these were ref ngees f roar Yorktozon,and the others veterans of the earlier strikes.

fourth and last flattop.’ The bombiugcost three SBD~s and their crews.

During all this action Admiral Yama-moto, still miles to the rear, consideredhimself fortunate to have drawn out theU. S. Pacific Fleet. Shortly after noon,when he heard of the Hivyu’s first strikeagainst the YoAtown, the Japanese com-mander ordered the .4 teutian Nureening(7roup and Admiral Rondo’s Second Fleetto join his Mtiin Body by noon the next

day to finish off the ~T. S. ships and com-plete the occupation of Midway. And afull hour and twenty minutes after heheard of the i%te of Nttgumo’s final car-rier, Admiral Yamamoto sent out a mes-sage in wl~ich l~e reported tl~e U. S. fleet“practically destroyed and . . . retiringeastward,>? and he called on Nagumo, theZnva.sion Force (less Crt6iser Division 7)and the ~ubrnam”ne Force to “immediatelycontact and attack the enemy.>’ A stimu-lating message, but “In the light of thewhole situation . . . so strangely optimisticas to suggest that Commander in Chief wasdeliberately trying to prevent the moraleof our forces from collapsing.’> 9

Nagumo’s morale obviously needed tobe stimulated by stronger stuff; at 2130 hereported: “Total enemy strength is 5 car-riers, 6 heavy cruisers, and 15 destroyers.They are steaming westward. We are re-tiring to the northwest escorting Hiryu.Speed, 18 knots. ” I“ Yamanlotols answer

‘ The Hiryu floated in flames until. as in thecase of the Aku.yi, one of the ships of her screen-ing force put her to death with torpedoes at 0510]lext morning. 0h71 Rrview, 13.

‘ Battle That Doomrd Jopan, 213.‘0 Ibid, To which message the authors quote

a response by one of Yamamoto’s staff officers,

who, they say, “voiced the dejection of the entireCombined Fleet staff. . .“ Made by Rear Ad-miral Matome [Jgaki, Y-amamoto’s chief of staff,

BATTLE OF THE CARRIER PLANES, -1 .J~NE 1942 229

relieved Nagumo of command in favor ofRear .Idmira] Kondo; but later n~essngestold the comm:ulder ill chief that there waslittle chance of finding tl]e 1“. S. “Fleet untilafter dawn next day. It 0255 on 5 ,Junetl~e admiral changed his lnil~d, abandonedthe Midway venture, and ordered a generalwithdrawal.

Admiral Spruance, now more on hi., owilthan ever, following Fletcher’s move fromthe dtmlaged l’orlto~rn to the A.sto~ia/’of course did not know of Yamamoto’sdecision; but he did know that vastly morepowerful enemy surface forces could wellbe nearby, quite possibly with additionalcarriers that, had come in with the MainBody or with another enemy force. Hisproblem, m he sa~vit, was to avoid combatin which he could be hopelessly outclassed,especially at night, and yet at tile sametime keep within air support distance ofMidway in case the ,Japanese should per-sist in their assault plans. This he suc-ceeded in doing, but in the process lostcontact with the enemy fleet. He did notregain contact until 6 .June.

In tile early morning hours of 5 June,however, a retiring ,Japanese column offour cruisers and two destroyers wassighted by U. S. submarine Z’a)nbor; aud

when the .Japanese sigl~ted the 7’cINbor,

evasive action resulted in il collision oftheir cruisers, Mogmni and Mikuma.~lrhile the other ,Japanese cruisers re-tired at full speed, these two lagged behind

the statement must likewise be considered aclassic of understatement: “The Nagumo Forcehas no stomach for a night engagement !“

1’ Shortly after 1300 on 4 June, Spruance ra-dioed his disposition and course to Fletrher on

board the it storia, and asked if Fletcher hadinstructions for him. Fletcher replied : “None.Will conform to your movements.” Corat Sea

and .Uidwa~, 141n.

with the destroyers to screen them, theMogmwi with a damaged bow and theMzXWna trailing oil. Tl~e submarine comtinued to stalk these four ships, did notmanage to gain a firing position, but atbreak of day rel)orted their position.

(“aptain Simard sent 12 B–17’s out fromMidway to attack these ships, but theFlying Fortresses had trouble locatingtheir targets, and Simarcl then ordered aMarine bombing squadron off on this mis-sion. Captain M. A. Tyler with sixS131)–27sand (’aptain Richard E. Flemingwith six SB2L”-3’S took off at about 0700

to attack the ships which were then re-ported to be 170 miles west of the atoll.They located the ships at about 0800, and‘~yler led his diIisioIl out of the s~~r~to.

ward the stern of the Mogami while Flem-ing and the other Vindicator pilots wentdown at the Mikw;ta.

Both divisions met heavy antiaircraftfire, but Tyler aucl his fliers bracketedtheir target with six near misses whichcaused some topside damage to the Mo-gumi.” Fleming’s plane was hit, but thepilot, stayed on course at the head of hisattack formation and crashed his planeinto the Mikum a’s after gLm turret.~3 Thisadditional damage further slowed the

“ VS’S~S’ Interro(/ut{ons, Xav No S3, RAdmAkira Soji, I, 363. Adm ( then Capt) Soji hadcommand of the MofIami during this action.

‘3 Fleming’s dive “. crashed into the afterturret, spreading fire over the air intake of thestarboard engine room. This caused an explo-sion of gas fumes below, killing all hands work-ing in the engine room. This was a damagingblow to the cruiser, hitherto unscathed exceptfor the slight hull (Iamage recei~ed in the col-lision with .lfo~a~ni, Both cruisers were now

hurt, and they continued their westward with-

drawal with darkening prospects of escapingthe enemy’s fury. ” BattleThat Doomed Japan,

226.

930 PEARL HARBOR TO GLTADALCANTA1,

cruisers, and Admiral Sprurrnce’s carrierI)lanes found tile cripples the followingday, the 6th. Tlw attack of these planessank tile ill;l:?(/}/a and irlflicted enoughadditional damage on tile i11~9~/ti i to keepher out of the }var for the next two years.

The Battle of Midwzy-which many his-torians and military experts consider thedecisive naval engagement of the PacificWar-was over, and all actions followingthose of 4 June were anti-climactic. TheU. S. had lost 98 carrier planes of all types,and woulcl lose the Yorktown., then undertow. The Japanese carriers sustainedtotal losses of about 3Y2 planes of alltypes.” And with the four carriers hadgone the cream of their experienced navalpilots. This, along with later losses in airbattles over Guadalcanal, was a blow fromwhich the ,Japanese never fully recovered.15

Although the carrier planes had clecidedthe large issue, the contribution of Marinesto the defense of Midway had hen consid-erable, from the inception of brrse develop-ment, to the end of the action. Not onlyhad the ild and 6th Defense Battalions con-tributed their share of labor, vigilance, andflak, but the aviation personnel of MAG-22, at a cost rarely surpassed in the history

of U. S. naval aviation, had faced asuperior enemy and exacted serious dam-age. At a cost of 49 Marines killed and 53wounded, Midway had destroyed some 43enemy aircraft (25 dive bombers and 18Zeros) in air action, plus another 10 shotdown by antiaircraft guns.”

“ Ibid., 250. This tignre may be suspect. Itexceeds considerably the regular complement ofthe four carriers.

fi For a discussion of the “crack-man policy” of

the Japanese Navy Air Force, see Battle !7’hatDoomed Japan, 24X243

“ These are reported fi~ures based on the sound-est possible estimates. The Japanese account in

In another air-air action, similar to thatat Coral Sez, Fletcher and Spruance hadsent the proud Imperial Fleet scurryinghome to Japan without firing a shot fromits superior naval rifles. Yamamoto couldgain little consolation from the fact thatthe northern operation had secured twoAleutian bases: what good the bowl if therice is gone? For”. . . unlike most of theNipponese war lords, [Yamamoto] ap-preciated American strength and re-sources.” ‘7 He knew that destruction oftl~e U. S. Fleet early in 1942 was a neces-sary prerequisite to the year’s plans forcontrol of the Coral Sea and the Americansea hmes to Australia and New Zealand,and, in the final analysis, the necessaryprerequisite to the success of Japan’s en-tire war effort.”

But now that the ,Japanese. clearly weredefeated at Midway, they no longer couldoverlook the setback they had received atCoral Sea in phase one of their 1942 plans,and phase three-occupation of the Fijis,,Samoa and New Caledonia—soon wasscrapped. “The catastrophe of Midwaydefinitely marked the turning of the tidein the Pacific War . . .“ ‘g and from ar-rogant otfense the ,Jrrpanese soon turnedto chagrined defense and ultimate defeat.1?. S. plans for a first offensive alreadywere well advanced, and the rest of 1942was destined to be a most gloomy periodfor the ,Japanese.

In Battle That Doomed Japan., Fuchidaand Okumiya devote their final chapter toa scholarly and complete analysis of this

l~attle That Doo$ned Ja~an does not bear themout. The authors list only six planes lost in theMidway strike and 12 in combat air patrol.

“ Coral Sea and Midway, 75.

~ Ibid. See also Battle That Doomed Japan,60.

“ Battle That Doomed Japan, 231.

B.ATTLE OF THE CARRIER PLANES, 4 J[’XE 1942 231

defeat, and they end on an introspectivenote :

In the final analysis, the root cause of Japan’sdefeat, not alone in the Battle of klidway butin the entire war, lies deep in the Japanese na-tional character. There is an irrationality andimpulsiveness about our people which results inactions that are haphazardand often contradic-tory. ~ tradition of provincialism makes usnarrow-minded and do~rnatic,reluctant to dis-card prejudices and slow to adopt even necessary.improvements if they require a new concept.Indecisive and vacillating, we succumb readilyto deceit, which in turn makes us disdahrfulofothers. Opportunistic but lacking a spirit ofdarhrg and independence, we are wont to placereliance on others and to truckle to superiors.

Our want of rationality often leads us to confusedesire with reality, andthustoclo things withoutcareful planning. Only when our hasty actionhasended in failure dowebegint othinkr ation-ally about it, usually for the purpose of findingexcuses for the failure. In short, as a nation,we lack maturity of mind and the necessaryconditioningto enable us to know when andwhatto sacrifice for the sake of our main goal.

Such are the weaknesses of the Japanese na-tional character. These weaknesses were re-flected in the defeat we suffered in the Battle ofMidway, which rendered fruitless all the valiantdeeds and precious sacrifices of the men whofought there. Inthese weaknesse sliestheeauseof Japan’s misfortunes.z”

~ Ibid., 247–248.

44S777 0—5S——16