Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCInternational Relations: One World, Many TheoriesAuthor(s): Stephen M. WaltSource: Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (Spring, 1998), pp. 29-32+34-46Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149275 .Accessed: 04/08/2014 14:54Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. .Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to Foreign Policy.http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Relations: O ne World, Many Theories byStephenM. Walt Whyshould policymakersand practitioners care about the scholarlystudy of interna- tional affairs?Those whoconduct foreignpolicy oftendismiss academictheorists (frequently, one must admit, with good reason), but there is aninescapable link betweenthe abstractworldof theory and the realworldof policy. We need theoriestomakesenseof the blizzardof informationthat bom- bardsus daily. Evenpolicymakers whoare contemptuous of "theory" must rely ontheir own(oftenunstated) ideasabouthow the world worksinordertodecidewhattodo. It is hardtomake goodpolicy if one'sbasic organizingprinciples are flawed, just as it is hardtoconstruct good theorieswithout knowing alot aboutthe realworld. Everyone uses theories-whetherhe or sheknowsit ornot-and disagreements about policyusually restonmorefundamental disagreements aboutthe basic forcesthat shape internationaloutcomes. Take, for example, the currentdebateonhow torespond toChina. Fromone perspective, China'sascentis the latest example of the ten- S TEPHEN M. WALTis professorofpolitical science andmaster of the socialscience colle- giate division atthe UniversityofChicago. He isamember of FO REIGN PO LICY'S editorialboard. SPRING199829 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations dency for risingpowers toalterthe global balanceof power inpoten- tiallydangerousways,especially as their growing influencemakesthem moreambitious.Fromanother perspective, the key toChina'sfuture conductis whetherits behaviorwill be modified by its integrationintoworldmarketsand by the (inevitable?) spread of democratic principles. From yet another viewpoint, relationsbetweenChinaand the restof the worldwill be shapedby issuesof cultureand identity: Will Chinasee itself (and be seenby others) as anormalmemberof the worldcom- munity or asingularsociety thatdeserves special treatment? Inthe same way, the debateover NATOexpansionlooksdifferent depending onwhich theory one employs. Froma"realist" perspective, NATOexpansionis anefforttoextendWesterninfluence-well beyond the traditional sphere of U.S. vital interests-during aperiod of Russ- ianweaknessand is likely toprovoke aharsh response fromMoscow. From aliberal perspective, however, expansionwill reinforcethe nascentdemocraciesof Central Europe and extend NATO 'S conflict- management mechanismstoapotentially turbulent region. A third view might stressthe valueof incorporating the Czech Republic, Hun- gary, andPolandwithinthe Westernsecuritycommunity, whosemem- bersshareacommonidentity thathasmadewar largely unthinkable. Nosingleapproach cancapture all the complexity of contemporary world politics. Therefore, we arebetteroffwithadiverse array of com- peting ideasratherthanasingle theoretical orthodoxy.Competitionbetweentheories helps reveal their strengths and weaknessesand spurssubsequentrefinements, while revealing flawsinconventional wisdom. Although we shouldtake care toemphasize inventiveness over invective, we shouldwelcomeand encourage the heterogeneity of contemporaryscholarship. WHERE ARE WE CO MING FRO M? The study of internationalaffairsis bestunderstoodas aprotracted com- petitionbetweenthe realist,liberal, andradicaltraditions.Realism empha- sizes the enduringpropensity for conflict betweenstates; liberalism identifiesseveral ways tomitigate theseconflictive tendencies; and the radicaltradition describeshowtheentiresystemof staterelationsmightbe transformed.The boundariesbetweenthese traditionsaresomewhat fuzzy and anumberof important worksdonot fit neatly intoany of them, but debateswithinand among them have largely definedthe discipline. 30FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt Realism Realismwas the dominanttheoreticaltraditionthroughout the Cold War.It depicts internationalaffairsas astruggle for poweramong self- interestedstatesand is generallypessimistic aboutthe prospects for eliminating conflictandwar.Realismdominatedinthe ColdWar years becauseit providedsimple but powerfulexplanations for war,alliances, imperialism, obstaclestocooperation, andotherinternational phenom- ena, and becauseits emphasis oncompetitionwasconsistentwith the centralfeaturesof the American-Soviet rivalry. Realismis not asingletheory, of course, andrealist thought evolved considerablythroughout the ColdWar."Classical"realistssuchas Hans Morgenthau and ReinholdNiebuhrbelievedthat states, like humanbeings, hadaninnatedesiretodominate others, whichled themtofight wars. Morgenthau alsostressedthe virtuesof the classical, multipolar, balance-of-powersystem andsawthe bipolarrivalry betweenthe Unit- ed Statesandthe SovietUnionas especiallydangerous. By contrast, the "neorealist" theory advanced by KennethWaltz ignored humannatureand focusedonthe effectsof the international system. For Waltz, the international system consistedof anumberof greatpowers, each seeking tosurvive.Becausethe system is anarchic (i.e., thereis nocentral authority toprotect statesfromone another), each statehas tosurviveonits own. Waltz argued that this conditionwouldlead weakerstatestobalance against, ratherthanbandwagonwith, more powerful rivals.And contrary toMorgenthau, he claimed that bipolarity wasmorestablethanmultipolarity. Animportant refinementtorealismwas the additionof offense- defense theory, as laid out by Robert Jervis,George Quester, and StephenVanEvera.These scholars argued that warwas more likely whenstatescould conquer each other easily. Whendefensewaseasier thanoffense,however, security wasmore plentiful, incentivestoexpand declined, and cooperationcould blossom.And if defensehad the advantage, andstatescould distinguish betweenoffensiveanddefensive weapons, thenstatescould acquire the meanstodefendthemselves without threatening others, therebydampening the effectsof anarchy. Forthese"defensive" realists, states merelysought tosurviveand great powers could guarantee their securityby formingbalancing alliancesand choosing defensive militarypostures(such as retaliatory nuclear forces). Not surprisingly, Waltz and most other neorealistsbelieved that the United States was extremely secure for most of the Cold War. Their SPRING 199831 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations principle fearwasthatit mightsquander itsfavorable positionby adopt- ing anoverlyaggressiveforeignpolicy. Thus,by the endof theCold War, realismhadmoved away from Morgenthau's dark brooding abouthumannatureandtakenonaslightly more optimistic tone. Liberalism The principalchallenge torealismcamefromabroad family of liber- al theories.O ne strandof liberal thoughtargued that economicinter- dependence would discourage states from using force against each otherbecausewarfarewouldthreateneach side's prosperity. A second strand, oftenassociatedwith PresidentWoodrow Wilson, saw the spread of democracy as the key toworld peace, basedonthe claimthat democraticstateswere inherently more peaceful thanauthoritarianstates. A third, more recent theory argued that international institutionssuch as the International EnergyAgency and the Inter- national Monetary Fundcould help overcomeselfishstate behavior, mainlyby encouraging statestoforegoimmediate gains forthe greater benefitsof enduringcooperation. Although someliberalsflirtedwith the ideathat new transnational actors, especially the multinational corporation, were gradually encroaching onthe power of states, liberalism generally sawstatesasthe central players ininternationalaffairs.All liberaltheories implied that cooperationwasmore pervasive thaneventhe defensiveversionof real- ism allowed, buteachviewofferedadifferent recipe for promoting it. Radical Approaches Until the 1980s, marxismwasthe mainalternativetothe mainstream realistand liberaltraditions.Whererealismand liberalismtook the state system for granted, marxismofferedboth adifferent explanationfor internationalconflictandablueprint for fundamentally transform- ing the existing internationalorder. O rthodoxmarxist theory saw capitalism as the centralcauseof inter- nationalconflict. Capitalist statesbattledeachotheras aconsequence of theirincessant struggle for profits andbattledsocialiststatesbecause they saw inthem the seeds of their owndestruction.Neomarxist "dependency" theory, by contrast, focused onrelations betweenadvanced capitalistpowers and less developed statesand argued that the former-aided by anunholy alliance with the ruling classes of the developing world-had grownrich by exploiting the latter.The solu- 32FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations tionwastooverthrowthese parasitic elites and installarevolutionary government committedtoautonomous development. Bothof thesetheorieswere largely discreditedbeforethe ColdWar evenended.The extensive history of economicand militarycoopera- tionamong the advancedindustrial powers showedthat capitalism did not inevitably lead toconflict.The bitterschismsthat dividedthe communistworldshowedthat socialismdid not alwayspromote har- mony. Dependencytheory sufferedsimilar empirical setbacksas it became increasingly clear that,first, active participationinthe world economy was abetterroutetoprosperity thanautonomoussocialist development; and, second, manydeveloping countries proved them- selves quitecapable of bargainingsuccessfully with multinationalcor- porations andother capitalist institutions. As marxismsuccumbedtoits various failings, its mantle was assumed by agroup of theoristswhoborrowed heavily fromthe wave of postmodernwritings inliterary criticismand social theory. This "deconstructionist" approach was openly skeptical of the effort todevise general or universaltheoriessuch as realismor liberalism. Indeed, its proponentsemphasized the importance of language and discourseinshaping socialoutcomes. However, becausethesescholars focused initially oncriticizing the mainstream paradigms but did not offer positive alternativestothem, they remainedaself-consciously dissident minority formostof the 1980s. DomesticPolitics Not all ColdWar scholarship oninternationalaffairsfit neatly intothe realist,liberal, or marxist paradigms. Inparticular, anumberof impor- tant worksfocusedonthe characteristicsof states, governmentalorga- nizations, or individualleaders.The democraticstrandof liberal theory fits underthis heading, as dothe effortsof scholarssuch as Graham Allisonand JohnSteinbrunertouse organization theory andbureau- cratic politics toexplainforeignpolicy behavior, and those of Jervis, IrvingJanis, and others, which applied socialand cognitivepsycholo- gy. Forthe most part, theseeffortsdidnot seektoprovide ageneral the- ory of internationalbehaviorbut toidentify otherfactorsthat might lead states tobehave contrary tothe predictions of the realistor liber- al approaches.Thus, much of this literatureshould be regarded as acomplement tothe three mainparadigms rather thanas arival approach for analysis of the international system as awhole. 34FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt NEWWRINKLESINO LDPARADIGMS Scholarship oninternationalaffairshas diversified significantly since the end of the Cold War.Non-Americanvoices are more prominent, awider range of methods and theories are seenas legitimate, and new issuessuch as ethnic conflict, the environment, and the futureof the state have beenplaced onthe agendaof scholars everywhere. Yetthe senseof dejavu is equallystriking. Insteadof resolving the strug- gle betweencompeting theoretical traditions, the end of the Cold Warhas merely launchedanew seriesof debates. Ironically, evenas many societies embracesimilaridealsof democracy, free markets, and humanrights, the scholarswhostudy these developments aremoredividedthanever. Realism Redux Although the end of the Cold War led afew writerstodeclare that realismwas destined for the academic scrapheap, rumorsof its demise have beenlargelyexaggerated. A recent contributionof realist theory is its attentiontothe problem of relativeand absolute gains.Responding tothe institutionalists'claim that internationalinstitutionswould enable states toforegoshort-term advantages for the sakeof greaterlong-termgains, realistssuch as Joseph Griecoand StephenKrasner point out that anarchy forces states toworry aboutboth the absolute gains from cooperationand the way that gains are distributed amongparticipants. The logic is straightforward: If one state reaps largergains thanits partners, it will gradually become stronger, and its partners will eventually become morevulnerable. Realistshave alsobeenquick toexplore avariety of new issues. Barry Posenoffers arealist explanationfor ethnic conflict, noting that the breakup of multiethnicstatescould place rivalethnic groups inananar- chic setting, therebytriggering intense fearsand tempting each group touse force toimprove its relative position. This problem would be par- ticularly severewheneach group'sterritory containedenclaves inhabit- ed by their ethnic rivals-as inthe former Yugoslavia-because each side would be tempted to"cleanse" (preemptively) these alienminori- ties and expand toincorporateany others from their ethnic group that lay outside their borders.Realists have alsocautioned that NATO , absent aclear enemy, would likely face increasing strains and that expanding its presence eastwardwould jeopardize relationswith Russia. Finally, scholarssuch as Michael Mastandunohave argued that U.S. SPRING 199835 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations Waiting for Mr.XThe post-Cold Warworldstill awaitsits "X "article. Althoughmany have tried, noone has managed topenthe sortof compellinganalysis that George Kennanprovided foranearlier era, whenhe articulatedthe theory of containment.Insteadof asingle new vision, the most impor- tant development inpost-Cold War writings onworldaffairsis the con- tinuing clashbetweenthosewhobelieveworld politics hasbeen(or is being)fundamentally transformedandthosewhobelievethatthe future will lookalot likethe past. Scholarswhoseethe endof the ColdWarasawatershedfallintotwodistinct groups.Manyexperts still see the stateas the mainactor butbelievethatthe agendaof statesis shifting from militarycompeti- tiontoeconomic competitiveness, domestic welfare, andenvironmen- tal protection. Thus, PresidentBill Clintonhas embracedthe view that "enlightened self-interest [and] shared values.., will compel ustocooperate inmore constructive ways." Some writersattributethis change tothe spread of democracy, otherstothe nuclear stalemate, andstillotherstochanges ininternationalnorms. Anevenmoreradical perspectivequestions whetherthe stateis still the most important internationalactor. JessicaMathewsbelieves that "theabsolutesof the Westphaliansystem [of] territorially fixed states. . . areall dissolving," and JohnRuggieargues that we donot evenhave avocabulary that canadequately describethe new forces that (he believes) are transformingcontemporary world politics. Although thereis still noconsensusonthe causesof this trend, the view that statesare of decreasing relevanceis surprisingly commonamongacademics,journalists, and policy wonks. Prominentrealistssuchas ChristopherLayne andKennethWaltz continuetogive the state pride of place and predict areturntofamiliar patterns of greatpowercompetition.Similarly, RobertKeohaneand otherinstitutionalistsalsoemphasize the centralroleof the stateand argue that institutionssuch as the EuropeanUnionand NATOare importantprecisely because theyprovidecontinuity inthe midstof dra- matic political shifts.Theseauthorsall regard the endof the ColdWar as afar-reaching shiftinthe global balanceof power butdonot see it as aqualitative transformation inthe basicnatureof world politics. Whois right? Toosoontotell, but the debatebears watching inthe years tocome. -S.W. 36FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt foreignpolicy is generally consistentwithrealist principles, insofaras its actionsarestill designed topreserve U.S. predominance andtoshape apostwar orderthatadvancesAmericaninterests. The most interestingconceptualdevelopment withinthe realist par- adigm hasbeenthe emergingsplit betweenthe "defensive"and"offen- sive"strandsof thought. Defensiverealistssuch as Waltz, VanEvera, and JackSnyder assumedthatstateshadlittle intrinsicinterestinmili- taryconquest and argued that the costs of expansiongenerally out- weighed the benefits. Accordingly,they maintainedthat greatpower warsoccurred largely becausedomestic groups fostered exaggeratedper- ceptions of threatandanexcessivefaithinthe efficacy of military force. Thisviewis now beingchallengedalong severalfronts. First, asRan- dall Schweller notes, the neorealist assumptionthat states merely seek tosurvive"stackedthe deck"infavorof the status quobecauseit pre- cludedthe threatof predatory revisioniststates-nationssuchas Adolf Hitler's Germany or NapoleonBonaparte's Francethat "valuewhat they covetfarmorethanwhat theypossess" andare willing toriskanni- hilationtoachievetheir aims. Second, Peter Liberman, inhis book Does ConquestPay?, usesanumberof historicalcases-such as the Nazi occupationof WesternEurope and Soviet hegemony over EasternEurope-toshowthat the benefitsof conquest oftenexceedthe costs, therebycasting doubtonthe claimthat militaryexpansionis nolonger cost-effective. Third, offensive realists such as Eric Labs, JohnMearsheimer, and FareedZakariaargue that anarchyencourages all statestotry tomaximizetheirrelative strengthsimply becausenostate caneverbe surewhenatruly revisionist powermightemerge. Thesedifferences help explainwhy realists disagree overissuessuch as the futureof Europe. Fordefensiverealistssuchas VanEvera, waris rarelyprofitable and usually resultsfrom militarism, hypemrnationalism, or someother distorting domesticfactor.BecauseVanEverabelieves suchforcesare largely absentinpost-Cold War Europe, he concludes that the regionis "primed for peace."By contrast, Mearsheimerand otheroffensiverealistsbelievethat anarchy forces greatpowers tocom- pete irrespective of theirinternalcharacteristicsandthat security com- petitionwill returntoEurope as soonas the U.S. pacifier is withdrawn. New Life for Liberalism The defeat of communism sparked aroundof self-congratulationinthe West, best exemplified by Francis Fukuyama's infamous claim that SPRING199837 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations CO MPETING PARADIGMS REALISMLIBERALISM CO NSTRUCTIVISMI MainTheoreticalSelf-interestedstates ConcernforpowerState behaviorshaped Proposition compete constantly for overriddenby economic/ by l61itebeliefs, powerorsecuritypolitical considerationscollectivenorms, (desire forprosperity, andsocialidentities commitmenttoliberalvalues) MainUnitsof Analysis StatesStates Individuals (especially l61ites) MainInstrumentsEconomicandVaries (internationalIdeasand especiallymilitaryinstitutions, economicdiscoursepower exchange,promotionof democracy) Modern TheoristsHans Morgenthau, Michael Doyle, AlexanderWendt, KennethWaltzRobertKeohane JohnRuggieRepresentative Waltz,Theory of Keohane,Wendt,"Anarchy Is Modern WorksInternationalPoliticsAfterHegemony WhatStatesMake ofIt" Mearsheimer, "BacktoFukuyama, "The Endof(International theFuture: InstabilityHistory?" (National O rganization,1992); inEuropeafterInterest,1989) Koslowski& theCold War"Kratochwil,"Under- (International Security, standing Changes in1990) International Politics" (International O rganization, 1994) Post-ColdWarResurgenceofIncreased cooperation Agnostic because it Prediction overt greatpowerasliberal values, free cannot predict thecompetition markets, andinterna-contentofideas tionalinstitutions spreac MainLimitation Doesnotaccountfor Tendstoignorethe Better at describing theinternational change roleof powerpast thananticipating thefuture 38FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt humankindhadnow reachedthe "endof history."History has paid lit- tle attentiontothis boast, but the triumph of the West did give anotableboosttoall threestrandsof liberal thought. By farthe most interesting and importantdevelopment hasbeenthe lively debateonthe "democratic peace."Although the most recent phase of thisdebatehad begunevenbeforethe SovietUnioncollapsed, it becamemore influentialas the numberof democracies begantoincreaseandas evidenceof this relationshipbegantoaccumulate. Democratic peace theory is arefinementof the earlierclaimthat democracieswere inherently more peaceful thanautocraticstates.It rests onthe beliefthat although democraciesseemtofight warsas oftenas other states, they rarely, if ever, fight one another.Scholarssuch as Michael Doyle,James Lee Ray, andBruceRussetthaveofferedanumber of explanations forthis tendency, the most popularbeing thatdemocra- cies embracenormsof compromise that bar the use of force against groupsespousing similar principles. It is hardtothinkof amoreinfluen- tial, recentacademic debate, insofarasthebeliefthat"democraciesdon't fight each other"has beenanimportantjustificationfor the Clintonadministration'seffortstoenlarge the sphere of democraticrule. It is thereforeironicthatfaithinthe "democratic peace" becamethe basisforU.S. policyjust as additionalresearchwas beginning toidentify several qualifiers tothis theory.First, Snyder and EdwardMansfield pointed out thatstates may be more prone towarwhenthey areinthe midstof ademocratic transition, which implies that effortstoexport democracymightactually make things worse. Second, criticssuch as Joanne GowaandDavid Spirohave argued thatthe apparent absenceof warbetweendemocraciesis due tothe way that democracy has beendefinedandtothe relativedearthof democraticstates (especially before 1945). Inaddition, ChristopherLayne has pointed out that whendemocracieshavecomeclosetowarinthe past theirdecisiontoremainat peaceultimately hadlittledowiththeirshareddemocraticcharacter. Third, clearcutevidencethatdemocraciesdonot fight eachotheriscon- finedtothe post-1945era,and, asGowahas emphasized, the absenceof conflictinthis periodmay be duemoretotheircommoninterestincon- taining the SovietUnionthantoshareddemocratic principles. Liberalinstitutionalistslikewisehave continued toadapt their owntheories.O nthe one hand, the core claimsof institutionalist theory have become more modest over time. Institutionsare now said tofacilitate cooperationwhenit is ineach state'sinteresttodoso, but it is widely SPRING 199839 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations agreed that they cannotforcestatestobehaveinways thatare contrary tothe states'ownselfishinterests. [For further discussion, please see RobertKeohane's article.] O nthe other hand, institutionalistssuchas JohnDuffieldandRobertMcCallahave extendedthe theory intonew substantive areas, most notably the study of NATO .Forthese scholars, NATO 'S highly institutionalizedcharacter helpsexplainwhy it has beenabletosurviveand adapt,despite the disappearance of itsmainadversary. The economicstrandof liberal theory is stillinfluentialaswell.Inpar- ticular, anumberof scholarshave recentlysuggested thatthe "globaliza- tion" of world markets, the rise of transnationalnetworksand nongovernmentalorganizations, andthe rapidspread of global commu- nications technology are undermining the power of statesand shifting attentionaway from militarysecurity towardeconomicsandsocialwel- fare.The detailsarenovel but the basic logic is familiar:As societies aroundthe globe becomeenmeshedinaweb of economicand social connections, the costsof disrupting theseties will effectivelypreclude unilateralstate actions, especially the useof force. This perspectiveimplies that warwill remainaremote possibility among the advancedindustrialdemocracies.It alsosuggests that bring- ing ChinaandRussiaintothe relentlessembraceof world capitalism is the best way topromote both prosperity and peace,particularly if this process createsastrong middleclassinthesestatesandreinforces pres- surestodemocratize.Get thesesocietieshookedonprosperity andcom- petitionwill be confinedtothe economicrealm. This viewhas beenchallengedby scholarswhoargue thatthe actu- al scope of "globalization" is modestandthatthesevarioustransactions stilltake place inenvironmentsthatare shaped and regulatedby states. Nonetheless, the beliefthateconomicforcesare superseding tradition- al greatpowerpoliticsenjoyswidespreadacceptanceamong scholars, pundits, and policymakers, and the role of the state is likely tobe animportanttopic forfutureacademic inquiry. ConstructivistTheories Whereasrealismandliberalismtendtofocusonmaterialfactorssuchas power or trade, constructivist approachesemphasize the impact of ideas. Insteadof taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks tosurvive, constructivists regard the interestsand identitiesof states as ahighly malleable product of specific historical processes.They pay close attentiontothe prevailing discourse(s) insociety because dis- 40FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt coursereflectsand shapes beliefsand interests, andestablishes accepted normsof behavior. Consequently, constructivismis especially attentive tothe sourcesof change, andthis approach has largelyreplaced marx- ismas the preeminent radical perspective oninternationalaffairs. The end of the Cold War played animportant role inlegitimating constructivisttheoriesbecauserealismand liberalismboth failedtoanticipate this event and had some trouble explaining it. Construc- tivists had anexplanation:Specifically, former president Mikhail GorbachevrevolutionizedSoviet foreignpolicy becausehe embraced new ideassuchas "commonsecurity." Moreover, giventhat we live inanerawhereold normsare being challenged, once clearboundariesare dissolving, and issuesof identi- ty are becoming more salient, it is hardlysurprising thatscholarshave beendrawntoapproaches that place these issuesfront and center. Fromaconstructivist perspective, infact, the centralissue inthe post-Cold Warworldis how different groups conceivetheiridentities and interests. Although power is not irrelevant, constructivism emphasizes how ideasandidentitiesare created, how theyevolve, and how they shape the way statesunderstandand respond totheirsitua- tion. Therefore, it matterswhether Europeans definethemselves pri- marily innationalor continental terms; whether Germany and Japanredefinetheir pasts inways that encourage their adopting moreactive international roles; andwhetherthe UnitedStatesembracesor rejects its identity as "globalpoliceman." Constructivisttheoriesare quite diverseanddonot offeraunified set of predictions onany of these issues.At apurelyconceptuallevel, AlexanderWendthas argued that the realist conceptionof anarchy does not adequatelyexplainwhy conflictoccursbetweenstates.The realissueis how anarchy is understood-inWendt's words, "Anarchy is whatstatesmakeof it."Anotherstrandof constructivist theory has focusedonthe futureof the territorial state, suggesting that transna- tionalcommunication andsharedcivic valuesare undermining tradi- tionalnational loyalties and creatingradically new formsof political association.O therconstructivistsfocusonthe role of norms, arguing thatinternationallawandothernormative principles haveerodedear- lier notions of sovereignty and altered the legitimate purposes for which state power may be employed. The commontheme ineach of these strandsis the capacity of discoursetoshape how political actors define themselves and their interests, and thus modify their behavior. SPRING199841 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations DomesticPoliticsReconsidered As inthe Cold War, scholarscontinuetoexplore the impact of domes- tic politics onthe behaviorof states.Domestic politics are obviously centraltothe debateonthe democratic peace, and scholarssuch as Snyder,Jeffrey Frieden, andHelenMilnerhaveexaminedhow domes- tic interest groups candistortthe formationof state preferences andlead tosuboptimal internationalbehavior. George Downs, David Rocke, andothershavealsoexplored howdomesticinstitutionscanhelp states dealwith the perennialproblem of uncertainty, whilestudentsof psy- chology have appliedprospecttheory and othernew tools toexplainwhy decisionmakersfail toact inarationalfashion. [For furtherdis- cussionabout foreignpolicy decisionmaking,please see the article by Margaret Hermannand JoeHagan.] The past decadehas alsowitnessedanexplosionof interestinthe concept of culture, adevelopment that overlaps withthe constructivist emphasis onthe importance of ideasandnorms. Thus, Thomas Berger andPeterKatzenstein haveusedculturalvariablestoexplainwhy Ger- many and Japanhave thusfareschewedmoreself-reliant militarypoli- cies; ElizabethKierhas offeredacultural interpretationof Britishand French military doctrinesinthe interwar period; andlainJohnstonhas tracedcontinuitiesinChinese foreignpolicy toadeeply rootedformof "culturalrealism."Samuel Huntington's dire warnings aboutanimmi- nent "clashof civilizations"are symptomatic of thistrendas well, inso- faras his argument restsonthe claimthat broadculturalaffinitiesare now supplanting national loyalties.Though these and other works definecultureinwidelyvaryingways and have yet toprovide afull explanationof how it worksor how enduring its effects mightbe, cul- tural perspectives have beenvery muchinvogueduring the past five years. Thistrendis partly areflectionof the broaderinterestincultural issuesinthe academicworld (and withinthe public debateas well) and partly aresponse tothe upsurge inethnic,nationalist, andculturalcon- flictssincethe demiseof the SovietUnion. TO MO RRO W'SCO NCEPTUALTO O LBO XWhile these debatesreflectthe diversity of contemporaryscholarship oninternational affairs, therearealsoobvious signs of convergence. Mostreal- ists recognize that nationalism,militarism, ethnicity, and other domestic factorsare important; liberals acknowledge that power is centraltointer- 42FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt national behavior; and someconstructivistsadmitthat ideaswill have greaterimpact whenbacked bypowerful statesandreinforced byenduring materialforces.The boundariesof each paradigm aresomewhat perme- able, andthereis ampleopportunity forintellectual arbitrage. Whichof thesebroad perspectives shedsthe most light oncontem- porary international affairs, andwhichshould policymakerskeep most firmly inmind whencharting our course intothe next century? Althoughmany academics (and morethanafew policymakers) are loathetoadmit it, realismremainsthe most compellinggeneral frame- workfor understanding internationalrelations.Statescontinuetopay close attentiontothe balanceof power and toworry aboutthe possi- bility of major conflict. Among other things, this enduringpreoccupa- tionwith power and securityexplainswhymany Asiansand Europeans are now eager topreserve-andpossiblyexpand-the U.S. military presence intheir regions. As Czech president Vaiclav Havel has warned, if NATO failstoexpand, "we might be heading foranew glob- al catastrophe ... [which] couldcost us all muchmorethanthe twoworldwars."Thesearenot the wordsof amanwhobelievesthat great powerrivalry has beenbanishedforever. As fortheUnited States, the past decadehasshownhowmuchit likes being "numberone"andhowdeterminedit is toremaininapredominant position. The UnitedStateshastakenadvantage of itscurrent superiori- ty toimpose its preferences wherever possible, evenat the riskof irritat- ingmany of its long-standing allies.Ithasforcedaseriesof one-sidedarms control agreements onRussia, dominatedthe problematicpeace effortinBosnia, takensteps toexpand NATO intoRussia's backyard, andbecome increasingly concernedaboutthe risingpower of China.It has called repeatedly for greater relianceonmultilateralismand alarger role for international institutions, but has treated agencies such as the United Nationsandthe WorldTrade O rganizationwithdisdainwhenevertheir actionsdidnot conformtoU.S. interests.It refusedtojointhe restof the worldinoutlawing the productionof landminesandwas politely unco- operative at the Kyotoenvironmentalsummit. Although U.S. leadersare adept at cloaking theiractionsinthe lofty rhetoricof "world order," naked self-interestliesbehindmostof them. Thus, the endof the ColdWardid not bring the end of powerpolitics, and realismis likely toremainthe sin- gle most usefulinstrumentinour intellectualtoolbox. Yet realism does not explaineverything, and awise leader would alsokeep insights from the rival paradigms inmind. Liberaltheories SPRING 199843 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternationalRelations identify the instrumentsthat states canuse toachieve shared inter- ests, highlight the powerful economic forces with which states and societies must now contend, and help us understand why states may differ intheir basic preferences.Paradoxically, because U.S. protec- tionreduces the danger of regional rivalriesand reinforcesthe "liber- al peace" that emerged after 1945, these factors may become relatively more important, as long as the United States continues toprovide security and stability inmany parts of the world. Meanwhile, constructivisttheories are best suited tothe analysis of how identities and interestscanchange over time, therebyproducing subtle shifts inthe behavior of states and occasionally triggering far- reaching but unexpected shifts ininternational affairs.It matters if political identity inEurope continues toshift from the nation-state tomore local regions or toabroadersense of Europeanidentity,just as it matters if nationalism is graduallysupplantedby the sort of "civiliza- tional" affinities emphasizedby Huntington. Realism has little tosay about these prospects, and policymakers could be blind-sided by change if they ignore these possibilitiesentirely. Inshort, each of these competing perspectivescapturesimportant aspects of world politics. O ur understanding would be impoverished were our thinking confined toonly one of them. The "compleatdiplo- mat"of the futureshouldremaincognizant of realism's emphasis onthe inescapable role of power,keep liberalism'sawarenessof domesticforces inmind, and occasionally reflect onconstructivism'svisionof change. WANTTO KNO WMO RE? For afair-minded survey of the realist, liberal, and marxist paradigms, see Michael Doyle'sWays of War and Peace (New York, NY: Norton, 1997). A guide tosome recent developments ininternational political thought is Doyle & G. JohnIkenberry,eds., New Thinking inInter- national Relations Theory (Boulder, CO : Westview,1997). Those interestedinrealismshould examine The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1995) by Michael Brown, SeanLynn-Jones, & StevenMiller, eds.; "O ffensive Realism and Why States Expand Their War Aims" (SecurityStudies, Summer 1997) by Eric Labs; and "Dueling Realisms" (InternationalO rganization, Summer 1997) by StephenBrooks.Foralter- 44FO REIGNPO LICY This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsWalt native realistassessmentsof contemporary world politics, see JohnMearsheimer's"Backtothe Future: Instability inEurope after the Cold War" (InternationalSecurity, Summer 1990) and Robert Jervis' "TheFutureof WorldPolitics:Will It Resemblethe Past?" (Interna- tional Security, Winter 1991-92). A realist explanationof ethnic con- flict is Barry Posen's"The Security Dilemmaand Ethnic Conflict" (Survival, Spring 1993); anup-to-datesurvey of offense-defense theory canbe foundin"The Security DilemmaRevisited" by CharlesGlaser (WorldPolitics, O ctober 1997); and recent U.S. foreignpolicy is explained inMichael Mastanduno's "Preserving the Unipolar Moment:RealistTheoriesand U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War" (International Security,Spring 1997). The liberal approach tointernationalaffairsis summarizedinAndrewMoravcsik's "Taking Preferences Seriously: A LiberalTheo- ry of InternationalPolitics" (International O rganization, Autumn1997). Many of the leading contributorstothe debateonthe democra- tic peace canbe foundinBrown& Lynn-Jones, eds., Debating the DemocraticPeace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1996) and Miriam Elman,ed., Paths toPeace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press,1997). The contributionsof institutionalist theory and the debateonrelative gains aresummarizedinDavid Baldwin,ed., Neo- realismand Neoliberalism:The Contemporary Debate (New York, NY:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1993). Animportantcritique of the institutionalistliteratureis Mearsheimer's"TheFalsePromiseof Inter- nationalInstitutions" (Intemrnational Security, Winter 1994-95), butone shouldalsoexaminethe responses inthe Summer1995issue.For appli- cationsof institutionalist theory toNATO , see JohnDuffield's"NATO 's Functionsafter the Cold War" (Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1994-95) and RobertMcCalla's"NATO 'sPersistenceafter the Cold War" (International O rganization, Summer 1996). Authors questioning the role of the stateincludeSusanStrange inThe Retreat of the State:The Diffusionof Powerinthe WorldEcon- omy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996); and JessicaMath- ews in"PowerShift" (ForeignAffairs,January/February1997). The emergence of the stateis analyzedby Hendrik Spruyt inThe SovereignStateand Its Competitors(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1994), and its continued importance is defended inGlobalizationinQuestion: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Gover- nance (Cambridge:Polity, 1996) by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thomp- SPRING 199845 This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Affairs son, and Governing the GlobalEconomy: InternationalFinanceand the State (Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress,1994) by EthanKapstein. Anotherdefense (from asomewhat unlikelysource) is "The World Economy: The Futureof the State" (TheEconomist,Septem- ber 20, 1997), and amoreacademicdiscussionof these issuesis Peter Evans'"The Eclipse of the State?ReflectionsonStatenessinanEraof Globalization" (WorldPolitics, O ctober 1997). Readersinterestedinconstructivist approaches should beginwith AlexanderWendt's "Anarchy Is WhatStatesMakeof It: The Social Constructionof Power Politics" (International O rganization,Spring 1992), while awaiting his Social Theory of InternationalPolitics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, forthcoming). A diverse array of culturaland constructivist approachesmay alsobe foundinPeter Katzenstein,ed., The Culture of National Security(New York, NY: ColumbiaUniversityPress,1996) and Yosef Lapid & Friedrich Kratochwil,eds., The Returnof Cultureand Identity inIR Theory (Boulder: CO : LynneRienner,1996). ForlinkstorelevantWeb sites, as well as acomprehensive indexof related articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com. aheanwaaetl g place oah fregng gg icyCmuiy http://www.foreignpolicy.com Selected full-text articles from the current issue of FO REIGN PO LICY * Access tointernationaldataand resources * O ver 150 relatedWeb site links * Interactive Letters tothe Editor * Debates * 10 years of archival summariesand more tocome... Access the issues! This content downloaded from 179.0.10.101 on Mon, 4 Aug 2014 14:54:52 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions