Parties, Leaders andParties, Leaders andReferendum Voting:Referendum Voting:

An Internet Survey ExperimentAn Internet Survey Experiment

Walt BorgesWalt BorgesUniversity of Texas at DallasUniversity of Texas at Dallas

wborges@utdallas.eduwborges@utdallas.edu

Harold ClarkeHarold ClarkeUniversity of Texas at Dallas,University of Texas at Dallas,

University of EssexUniversity of Essexhclarke@utdallas.eduhclarke@utdallas.edu

Do party and leader cues influence voters’ choices in national “polity-shaping” referenda?

National polity-shaping referenda – high stakes and abundant uncertainty – e.g., Canada’s 1992 referendum on the Charlottetown Constitutional Accord, recent referendums on EU Constitution National referenda often infused with party and leader

politics. Respondents often have some residual knowledge of the

referendum issues through discussion of the issue in a partisan context.

In other cases, divisions within parties and among leaders forced the issue to be thrown to the people.

Parties, leaders and elites use cues to prompt electorate on preferred outcomes.

Electorate has some knowledge of the proposition issue, but individuals are: uncertain of promised outcomes overwhelmed by complexity of some proposals have limited interest and resources to determine choice.

Voters rely on cues to help them make their decisions.

National Pre- and Post- Congressional Election Internet Survey of the American Electorate Conducted in October and November 2006

Survey House – YouGov – Survey Director, Joe Twyman

Survey Experiment in Post-Election Wave, N = 2778

Suppose there was a national referendum on a proposition that would deny public services to illegal immigrants. Would you vote:

In favor of the proposition to deny public services to illegal immigrants?

Against the proposition to deny public services to illegal immigrants?I would not vote in the referendum.Don’t know.

Control group and seven treatment groups. No cue Republicans for Democrats against Republicans for / Democrats against Bush for Clinton against Bush for / Clinton against Bush, Republicans for / Clinton, Democrats

against Interactions with party identification and

leader affect.

Treatment group 2 Suppose there was a national referendum on a proposition

that would deny public services to illegal immigrants. The Democratic Party opposes the proposition. Would you vote: [for, against, wouldn’t vote, DK]

Treatment group 4 Suppose there was a national referendum on a proposition

that would deny public services to illegal immigrants. President Bush supports the proposition. Would you vote: [for, against, wouldn’t vote, DK]

Treatment group 7 Suppose there was a national referendum on a proposition

that would deny public services to illegal immigrants. Republican President Bush supports the proposition and Democratic Senator Hillary Clinton opposes it. Would you vote: [for, against, wouldn’t vote, DK]

Effects of cues on hypothetical 'yes' vote to deny benefits to illegal immigrants

Cue

Coef.

SE Republicans positive

-0.060

0.150

Democrats negative

-0.086

0.139 Republicans positive/ Democrats negative

0.294 * 0.141

GW Bush positive

0.271

0.142 HR Clinton negative

-0.114

0.126

Bush positive/ Clinton negative

0.103

0.124 Republican Bush positive/ Democrat Clinton negative

0.118

0.128

Constant

0.777 *** 0.074 Pseudo R2 = 0.007 Estimation by multinomial logit with no vote as the reference category

Note: N=2778 * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Interaction effects of cues, party ID and leader affection

Coef.

SE

GOP positive * GOP PID

2.265 *** 0.646 Democrats negative * Democratic PID

-0.867 *** 0.218

GOP positive/ Democrats negative * GOP PID

1.655 *** 0.424 GOP positive/ Democrats negative * Democratic PID

-0.544 * 0.219

Bush positive * affect for Bush

0.097 ** 0.034 Clinton negative * affect for Clinton

-0.117 *** 0.022

Bush positive/ Clinton negative * affect for Bush

0.186 *** 0.035 Bush positive/ Clinton negative * affect for Clinton

-0.097 *** 0.023

Republican Bush positive/ Democrat Clinton negative * GOP PID * affect for Bush 0.260 *** 0.071

Republican Bush positive/ Democrat Clinton negative * Democratic PID * affect for Clinton -0.080 ** 0.026

Constant

0.854 *** 0.062 Pseudo R2 = 0.051

Estimated with multinomial logit. Comparison group is those who say they will vote no.

Note: N=2778 * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

By themselves, the cues have no significant effects.

When the cues are interacted with party identification, leader affect or both, they produce significant effects in the predicted directions.

Thus, impact of party and leader cues depends on partisanship and leader images.

Interaction effects of party and leader cues are significant net of larger composite model of forces affecting referendum voting.

Coeff.

SE Level 1 (individual)

Liberal-conservative ideology -0.062 *** 0.017 Immigration as the most important issue 0.464 * 0.229 Affect for Republican Party 0.114 ** 0.038 Affect for HR Clinton -0.116 *** 0.034 Democratic PID -0.504 ** 0.170 Other PID -0.162

0.315

Male 0.428 * 0.179 Age 0.012 * 0.005 African American -0.224

0.238

Hispanic -0.728

0.607 Asian -0.390

0.502

Income 0.074 * 0.032 Education -0.049

0.051

Foreign born -0.286

0.578 Support for Bush immigration policy -0.025

0.090

Attitudes towards immigration 1.666 *** 0.127 Economic evaluations 0.144

0.104

Level 2 (aggregate) Constant 2.408 *** 0.399

Percent of foreign born -0.021

0.011

Estimated with multinomial logit HLM. Composite model contains only significant variables from demographic, cost-benefit and heuristic sub models. Note: N=2621.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Multiple forces affect voting in national “polity shaping” referendums.

Leader and partisan cues typically available in referendum campaigns.

Voters’ use of leader and partisan cues may help explain public opinion dynamics in referendum campaigns.

Unpopular leaders of governing parties cannot use referendums to bolster support. (e.g., Mulroney in Canada’s 1992 constitutional referendum)

Continuing puzzle: Why do national referendum propositions often fail?

Possible Answer (for at least some referendums): The Irony of Governing Leader and Party Cues – popular leaders and governing parties supply positive cues BUT are popular because of their performance – performance that enhances the attractiveness of the status quo.

Cost effective – Very large N’s feasible. Several treatments possible.

Cost effective – obtain extra respondents with particular demographic characteristics if needed.

Sophisticated treatments – Audio, video, feedback to respondents. Mostly impossible with conventional RDD. Possible with CAPI, but can be difficult and obtrusive.

Seamless incorporation of experiment in survey instrument, even with sophisticated treatments. Unobtrusive.

Minimize social desirability biases. Respondents may be more honest answering internet surveys than face-to-face or telephone interviews.