war and state in africa

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War and the State in AfricaAuthor(s): Jeffrey HerbstSource: International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring, 1990), pp. 117-139Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538753.

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War nd tfie tatein JeffreyerbstAfnicaMIost nalyses ssumethat nAfrica, s elsewhere, tateswilleventually ecome trong. ut thismaynot be true nAfrica,where tates redeveloping n a fundamentallynewenvironment.essons drawnfrom hecase ofEurope howthatwar san importantause ofstateformationhat s missing n Africa oday.Thecrucial olethatwar hasplayed ntheformationfEuropean tateshas longbeennoted. SamuelP. Huntingtonrgued hat warwas thegreat timulustostatebuilding, nd CharlesTillywent o far s to claim hat warmadethestate, nd the statemadewar.I Similarly,woofthe most successfulstates nthe ThirdWorld oday, outhKoreaandTaiwan, re argelywar-fare tates hathavebeen molded, n part,bythenear constanthreat fexternalggression.However, tudiesofpolitical evelopmentnd stateconsolidationnAfricand many ther arts ftheThirdWorld aveallbutignored he mportantolethatwar canplay npolitical evelopment.The roleofwar has notbeenexamined ecause thevastmajorityfstatesinAfrica nd elsewheren theworldgained ndependencewithout avingtoresorto combat nd have notfaced securityhreatince ndependence.2

I am grateful oHenry Bienen, Aaron Friedberg, lizabethHart,Dave Rawson, the nternationalRelationsDiscussion Group at PrincetonUniversity, nd two anonymous readers forhelpfulcomments.

Jeffreyerbsts Assistant rofessorfPoliticsndInternationalffairs, oodrow ilson chool,Princetonniversity.1. Samuel P. Huntington,PoliticalOrder n Changing ocietiesNew Haven: Yale University ress,1968), p. 123; and Charles Tilly, Reflectionson the Historyof European State-Making, nCharles Tilly, ed., The Formation fNationalStates n Western urope Princeton:PrincetonUni-versity ress, 1975), p. 42. An important ecent ddition to this iterature s Brian M. Downing,'Constitutionalism,Warfare nd PoliticalChange in EarlyModern Europe, Theorynd Society,Vol. 17, No. 1 (January1988), pp. 7-56. The general literature n warfare'seffect n society svoluminous. An early work which concentrates n some of the themesexaminedhere is HansDelbruck, istoryf heArt fWarwithinhe rameworkf olitical istory,ol. II,trans.WalterJ. Renfroe,Jr.Westport,Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982).2. For instance, n Morris Janowitz's classic studyof the militaryn the developingworld, thepolitical, ocial, and economic functions f themilitaryre studiedextensively ut thepotentialeffects f war, or of peace, are not analyzed. MorrisJanowitz, The Military n the PoliticalDevelopmentfNew Nations: n Essay n ComparativenalysisChicago:Universityf ChicagoPress, 1964), p. 12.Internationalecurity,pring 1990 (Vol. 14, No. 4)? 1990 y thePresidentndFellows fHarvard ollege nd of heMassachusettsnstitutefTechnology.

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Internationalecurity 4:4 1118

Those scholarswho haveanalyzed hemilitaryn thedeveloping orldhavestudied he armedforces' ole n economic ndpolitical rocesses uthavenot examinedthe changes thatwar could potentially ffect n a state.3Studying he militarynd studying arfare re not the same, especially nthearea of state onsolidation, ecause warfare as independent ffects neconomic olicies, dministrativetructures,ndthe citizenry'selationshipwith hestate hathavevery ittle o do with hemilitary.4inally, eyondthe usual problem f trying o study he mpact fa factor hat s missing,there s a less excusablenormative ias which has sometimes reventedstudents f politicsfrom xamining he effects f war. The questionofwhether t is only possibleto create nationout of bloodand iron sapparently ne thatmany nalysts ind oo disturbingo examine.5Comparison f theEuropean ase withthat f Africas thereforerucialto understanding hether he analogyholds. War in Europe playedanimportant ole in the consolidation f many now-developed tates:warcaused thestateto becomemore efficientn revenuecollection;t forcedleaders o dramaticallymprove dministrativeapabilities; nd it createdclimate nd importantymbols roundwhich disparate opulation ouldunify.While heres little eason o believe hatwar would haveexactlyhesamedomestic ffectsn Africa oday s it did in Europeseveral enturiesago, t s importanto ask fdevelopingountriesanaccomplishntimes fpeace whatwar enabledEuropeancountries o do. I concludethattheyprobably annotbecause fundamentalhanges n economic tructuresndsocietal eliefs redifficult,fnot mpossible,obring boutwhen countriesarenotbeingdisrupted runder evere xternal hreat.Thenext ection fthis rticle utlines owwaraffectedtateformationinEurope,with articularttentiono twocrucial evelopments:he reationofcentralizednd efficienttructureso collect axes, nd thedevelopmentofnationalism. thencompare heEuropeanexperience f state-buildingthroughwarfareo the relative eace thatAfrica as experiencedince the1960s.While African tateshave benefited rom eace, their evelopment

3. The literatures reviewed yHenryBienen, Armed orces ndNationalModernization:ContinuingheDebate, Comparativeolitics,ol.16,No. 1 (October 983), p. 1-16.4. Gabriel rdent,Financial olicy nd EconomicnfrastructurefModern tatesndNations,in Tilly,TheFormation fNationalStates,p. 89.5. A useful orrectiveo theconventionaliew sprovided yJohn . Hall, War ndtheRiseof heWest, nColinCreightonnd Martin haw, ds.,The ociologyfWarndPeace London:Macmillan, 987).



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War nd the tatenAfrica 119

hasbeen stunted ythe very roblemshatwar helpedEuropean ountriesto solve.I thenevaluatethe possibilitieshatAfricantatesmight evelopstrategieso solvethesefundamentalroblemsn times fpeace. I concludethat ome stateswillprobably e unsuccessfuln finding ays of buildingthestate n timesofpeace and will thereforeemainpermanently eak.Accordingly,heinternationalommunity illhave to develop non-tradi-tional oliciesforhelping new brandofstates: hose hatwill continue oexist utthatwillnotdevelop.Other tates, erceivinghat eace ocks heminto permanentlyeak position,maybe tempted o use war as a meansofresolvingheir therwisentractableroblems f state onsolidation.EffectsfWar n State onsolidation:heEuropean aseIt s instructiveo ookat war's mpact nEuropean ocieties ecause, s willbe notedbelow,war in Europehelped alleviate omeofthe problems hataffect fricanountries oday.At the mostbasic evel,war nEurope ctedas a filter herebyweakstateswereeliminated nd politicalrrangementsthatwere not viableeitherwerereformedrdisappeared.WeakstatesdoexistnEurope oday-Belgiums oneexample-but henear-constanthreatofwardidpromptmost tates o become trongerosurvive. he contrastbetweenhis volutionaryevelopmentnd the urrentituationntheThirdWorld,where even states that are largely ependent n foreignid willcontinue o exist forthe foreseeable uture,s dramatic. t is, of course,importantotto generalize oomuchbecausewarhadmany ifferentffectsovertime, nd evenin thesameperiod tates eactedn a varietyfwaystoexternal hreats. owever,wardid affecthe bilityfEuropean tates oincrease axation ndcontributedo theforgingfnationaldentitiesnmanycountries.t s thereforemportanto examine hepotentialmpact f xternalthreat obetter nderstandtate onsolidationntheThirdWorld.TAXESPerhaps he mostnoticeableffect fwar nEuropeanhistory as to causethe stateto increase ts ability o collect ignificantlyore revenuewithgreaterfficiencyndlesspublic esistance. iven hefreedom fEuropeanstates o attack achother,hose tates hat ouldraisemoney uicklyouldsuccessfullyhreatenheir eighbors ith warthatmightead tosignificantdamage r evencomplete estruction.ichard eanwrites,Once thepowertotaxhadbeensuccessfullyppropriatedy anyonesovereign,ncehehad



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Internationalecurity4:4 | 120

used thatpower to bribe r coercehis nobilitynto cquiescence, hat tatecould face all neighboringtateswiththechoiceofbeing conquered r ofcentralizinguthoritynd raising axes. 6While uccess n wardependsonmany actorsncluding echnology,actics,ndmorale fthetroops, aisingsufficientevenuewas a necessaryondition oprevent efeat. tates hatdidnot raise sufficientevenue orwarperished.As MichaelMannnotes,A state hatwishedto survive ad to ncreasets extractiveapacityopayfor rofessionalrmies nd/or avies.Those thatdid notwouldbe crushedon thebattlefieldnd absorbedntoothers-thefate fPoland,ofSaxony,ofBavarian[the eventeenthnd eighteenthenturies]. o European tateswerecontinuouslytpeace. It is impossibleoescapethe conclusion hatpeaceful tatewould have ceased to exist venmore peedily han hemili-tarilynefficientctually id. 7War ffectstate inances or woreasons.First,tputstremendoustrainson leaders to findnew and moreregular ourcesof ncome.Whilerulers

may recognize hat heir ax system s inadequate, war may be the onlything hat orces hem o expend henecessary olitical apital nd undertakethe coercion equired o gain morerevenue.For nstance, n Mann's studyoftaxationnEnglandbetween1688 nd 1815,he finds hat herewere sixmajor umps n state evenue nd that ach corresponds ith hebeginningofa war.8 he association etween heneedtofightnd theneed tocollectrevenue s perhaps learest n Prussia,where hemain axcollectiongencywas calledtheGeneralWarCommissariat.9Second, citizens re muchmore ikely o acquiesceto increased axationwhenthenation s atwar,becausea threat o theirurvivalwilloverwhelmother oncerns heymighthave about ncreased axation.n fact, axationfor war canbe thought fas a lumpy ollectiveood:notonlymust hepopulation aytogetthegood,but t must lsopaya considerablemountmore han he currentevel of taxation, ecause a small ncreasenrevenue6. Richard ean, War nd the Birth f theNation tate, JournalfEconomicistory,ol. 33,No. 1 (March 973), . 220.7. MichaelMann, State nd Society, 130-1815: n Analysis fEnglish tateFinances, nMann, States,War ndCapitalism:tudiesn Political ociologyOxford: asilBlackwell, 988),p. 109.8. MichaelMann,TheSources fSocial ower Cambridge:ambridge niversityress,1986),p. 486.9. MichaelDuffy,TheMilitary evolutionnd theState, 500-1800, nMichaelDuffy,d.,TheMilitary evolutionnd the tate, 500-1800, xeter tudies n History o. 1 (Exeter, .K.:UniversityfExeter,980), . 5.



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War nd the tate n Africa121

is often otenough omeet henewsecurityhreat acinghe tate.10nthisway,taxation or war s liketaxation or uilding bridge: veryonemustpay tobuildthebridge nd a small ncreasen revenuewillnotbe enough,because half bridge, ikefightingalf war, s useless.Thus, war oftencauses a ratchet ffect whereby evenue ncreasessharply hena nationsfightingutdoes notdecline othe nte ellumevelwhenhostilitiesave ceased.11 ncegovernmentsave nvested he unkencosts n expanding ax collectionystems nd routinizedhecollectionfnew sourcesof revenue, he marginal osts of continuinghose structuresarequite ow andtheresources hey ollect an beused for rojectshatwillenhance heruling roup's upport.While t s not a universal ule,war nother ocieties t other imes ftenplayedthesame kind ofrole thatwardid in Europe.For nstance, osephSmaldonewritesnhis study f heSokotoCaliphate inwhat s nowNigeria)between 500 nd 1800:Warwas theprincipalnstrumentorthe establishmentnd extension fpolitical uthority ver subject peopteand foreign erritory,nd fortheorganization,maintenance,nd reinforcementf thatauthority.he de-mands of perennialwar evoked nstitutionso subordinatehe sectors fsociety rucial o the nterests fthesemilitarizedolities.The permanentrequiremento mobilize uman nd material esources ormilitaryurposes[i.e., taxation] ntensifiedendencies oward he monopolization f powerand theelaboration fauxiliarynstitutionsf socialcontrol.12Similarly,heSouthKorean nd Taiwanese tateshavebeenabletoextractso manyresources rom heir ocietiesn partbecause thedemandsto beconstantlyigilant rovoked hestate ntodeveloping fficient echanismsfor ollectingesourcesndcontrollingissident roups.13 highly xtractivestate lso couldcloak demandsforgreater esourcesn appeals fornationalunityn thefaceof a determinednemy.10. Lumpy oods areproducts hich re notusefulfonly art spurchased.Margaretevi,OfRule ndRevenueBerkeley:niversityfCaliforniaress, 988), p. 56-57.11. Mann,Sourcesf ocial ower,p. 483-490.12. Joseph . Smaldone,Warfaren the okoto aliphate:istoricalndSociologicalerspectives(Cambridge:ambridge niversityress, 977), . 139.Thesamepoints madebyRichard .RobertsnhisWarriors,erchants,ndSlaves: he tate nd he conomyntheMiddle iger alley,1700-1914PaloAlto: tanfordniversityress, 987), . 20.13. Joel . Migdal, trongocietiesndWeak tates:tate-SocietyelationsndState apabilitiesnthe hirdWorldPrinceton:rincetonniversityress, 988), . 274.



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Internationalecurity4:4j122

NATIONALISMWar lso had a major mpact n the development f nationalismnEurope.Indeed,thepresence f a palpable xternal hreatmaybe the strongest ayto generate common ssociation etweenthe stateand the population.External hreats ave such a powerful ffect n nationalism ecause peoplerealizen a profoundmannerhat hey re under hreat ecauseofwhotheyare as a nation; hey re forced o recognize hat t s only s a nation hatthey an successfullyefeat he hreat. nthony iddens ecountshe ffectsof WorldWar : TheWarcanalized hedevelopmentfstates' overeignty,tying his o citizenshipnd to nationalismn such a profound ay that nyother cenario ofhow the nternationalystemwouldbe ordered] ametoappear as littlemorethan dle fantasy. '14imilarly, ichaelHowardnotesthevisceral mpact f warson thedevelopmentf nationalismhroughoutEurope:Self-identifications a Nation mplies lmostby definitionlienation romother ommunities,nd themostmemorablencidentsnthegroup-memoryconsistedn conflict ith nd triumphver other ommunities.rancewasMarengo,Austerlitznd Jena:militaryriumphetthe eal on thenew-foundnational onsciousness. ritainwas Trafalgar-butthad been a nationforfourhundredyears, incethoseearlier attles recy ndAgincourt. ussiawasthetriumph f 1812.Germany as Gravelottend Sedan.15In Europe therewas an almost ymbiotic elationship etween he state'sextractiveapacity nd nationalism: ar increased oth as thepopulationwas convinced yexternalhreat hat hey houldpaymore othe tate, ndas, at the same time, hepopulation nited roundcommon ymbols ndmemories hatwereimportant omponents fnationalism. ightingwarsmaybe theonlyway wherebyt s possible o havepeople paymoretaxesandatthesametime eelmore losely ssociatedwith hestate.TheAbsencef nterstatear ntheModernraWhile ryingostudy he chaos causedbyadministrativeisintegration,heforcefulrushingf ethnic hallenges,nd large-scaleumanrights buses,14. Anthony iddens, heNation-StatendViolence,ol. I ofA ContemporaryritiquefHistoricalMaterialismBerkeley: niversityf Californiaress, 985), . 235.15. MichaelHoward,War ndtheNation tate Oxford: larendon ress, 978), . 9. Emphasisin theoriginal.



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War nd the tate nAfrica 23

many cholarshavegenerally ssumedthatpoor countriesodayfaceevenmoreexternalhallenges hanEuropean tatesdid in their ormativeeri-ods.16nfact, ince heend oftheSecondWorldWar, ery ewThirdWorldstateshave foughtnterstate ars of thetype hat ffectedhe evolution fEuropean tates.The fewThird Worldnterstate ars thathave occurred(e.g., India-Pakistan,ran-Iraq, hina-Vietnam)ave obscured he fact hatthevastmajorityfThirdWorld tatesmost f he ime o notface ignificantexternalhreats. tates ike srael,SouthKorea,orTaiwan,wherenationalsurvival as been a real considerationn nationalpolitics, re exceptionalandeven thesecountries avesurvivedntact.EveninAfrica, hecontinenteeminglyestined orwargiven he colo-nially-imposedoundaries nd weak politicaluthorities,here as notbeenone involuntaryoundary hange incethe dawn of the ndependencerainthe ate1950s, nd very ew ountries ace ven theprospect f a conflictwith heir eighbors.MostoftheconflictsnAfrica hathave occurred erenot,as in Europe,warsof conquest hat hreatenedheexistence f otherstates, utconflictsver esser ssues thatwereresolvedwithouthreateningtheexistence fanother tate. For instance, anzania nvaded Uganda in1979to overthrowdi Amin,not to conquerUganda.Similarly,he war ntheWestern ahara s a colonial uestion, ot conflictetween ndependentstates.Even South Africa's estabilizationffortsgainst tsneighbors reprimarilyttempts o influence hepolicies f themajority-ruledountries,notto change theborders f theregion.LesothoorSwazilandwould notexisttoday fSouth Africahad anyreal territorialmbitions.n thefewconflictshatdid have thepotentialo threatenundamentallyheexistenceof tates-Somalia's ttempto nvadeEthiopianthe 1970s ndLibya'swaragainstChad inthe1970s nd 1980s-the aggressor id not ucceed.17Africantateshave seldomfoughtnterstate arsand thecontinent asnotwitnessed ignificantoundary hanges,because independenteaders16. See, fornstance, oseph aPalombara,Penetration: Crisis fGovernmentalapacity,in LeonardBinder, t al., Crises ndSequencesn Political evelopmentPrinceton:rincetonUniversityress,1971), . 222.17. In 1977Somalia, s part of its irredentistroject o create Greater omalia, nvadedEthiopia n the hope ofannexing heOgaden; theEthiopians, ith ignificantelpfrom heSovietUnion ndCuba, defeatedomalian1978.DavidD. Laitin ndSaidS. Samatar,omalia:NationnSearch f StateBoulder, olo.:Westview,987), p. 140-143.n 1973Libyan orcesinvadedChad bymoving orcesnto hedisputedAozoustrip. heLibyanmilitaryresencegraduallyxpandeduntil dramaticeries fconflicts ith heChadiangovernmentheavilysupportedyFrance nd theUnited tates) n 1987forcedheLibyans oagree oan end tohostilities.ohnWright,ibya, had ndthe entralaharaLondon:Hurst, 989), p. 126-146.



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Internationalecurity4:4 1124

have continuedhe ystem fboundarymaintenancehat he olonial owersfirst eveloped o regulate he cramble orAfrican the ate1800s.18Africanleaders ecognizedn the arly 960s hat potentiallyargenumber fgroupswouldwant o secede from he tates hey representlyn,to oinothers rcreate ntirelyew ones. norder o preventhe ontinentrom eing hrowninto the chaos of large-scale oundary hanges n whichthestabilityndintegrityf anystate ould be threatened,hey reated system fexplicitnorms,propoundedby the Organizationf African nity n 1963,whichdeclared ny change n the nherited olonial oundaries obe illegitimate.Most of the continent as, accordingly,efused o recognizeboundarychanges e.g.,Biafra, ritrea) ven where heprinciple fself-determinationmight ave edthem o do so. This ystem as been successfulnpreservingAfricanational oundaries nd has so far eterredlmost llcountries rominitiatinghekind of conquestwars that were so common n Europeanhistory. he system hatmaintained he nherited orders s inviolatewasstrengthenedomewhatnadvertently,ecause two of the argest tates nthe continentNigeria nd Zaire),which ouldconceivablyave threatenedtheirmuch maller eighbors,aced ignificantecessionisthreatsfromheIbo and Kataganese respectively) nd thereforeworkedresolutely ostrengthenhe norm hat heborders houldnotbe changed.The stabilityf new states, speciallynAfrica,s a remarkableevelop-mentgiven hat he vast majority f the overone hundred ountriesn theThirdWorld hathave gainedtheir ndependenceince1945 repoor,haveweakadministrativetructures,ndconsist fpopulationshat resplinteredalongregional r ethnicines. n otherwords, hey repreciselyhekindofstates hatbefore 945 wereroutinelynvaded and takenoverbystrongerstatesntheir egion rbyexternalowers.Yet,very ew tatesntheThirdWorld, espite heir videntmilitaryndpoliticalweaknesses, ace ny sig-nificantxternalhreat.In contrast, illy stimates, he enormousmajority f states n Europefailed. eace was the xceptionnd ongperiodswithnomajor ightingerealmostunknown, s for enturies eak stateswereroutinelyefeatedndpopulationsegularlybsorbed yforeignulers.19hepsychologyfEuropein its formativeenturies,where state survivalwas a veryreal issue of18. This rguments developed nJeffreyerbst, TheCreation ndMaintenancefNationalBoundariesn Africa, nternationalrganization,ol. 43, No. 4 (Fall1989), p. 673-692.19. Tilly,ReflectionsntheHistory fEuropean tate-Making, . 38.



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constant oncern o leaders, s so differentrom heoutlookfacingThirdWorldeaders oday s to suggest hat here as been a fundamentalhangein the survival rospects f weak states nd that ontrol f territorys nolonger orrelated ithmilitaryower.20

Problemsf tate onsolidationn AfricaAfricantates acenumerous roblemsntheir ffortsoconsolidate ower.They are poor, short f trainedmanpower,nd confrontocieties hat reoften ragmentednd have little rientationo the state s a whole.Manyother hirdWorldnations ace hese ameproblems lthough hey re oftenmost xtremenAfrica, iven hepovertyf the continentnd thefragilityof the states.Elitescan come to power but, giventheprecariousnessfcontroln countrieswhererulesgoverningeadership nd successionhavenotbeen nstitutionalized,heymaybe displaced.Oncethey ose power, rarepreventedrom aining t,ambitious oliticiansave no other pportu-nity oaccumulatewealth r powerbecause the tate ontrols hebadges ofstatus ndmany f thefree-floatingesourcesntheeconomy,uch as theyare.21Even whentheydo controlheapexof thestate, litesmayfeel hatbecause oftheir ountry's ulnerabilityo exogenous hocks e.g., suddensharpdrops n thepriceof their awmaterialxports)nd thepresence fsophisticated ultinationalnterprisesndwell-connected inorityroups(e.g.,Lebanese nWestAfrica,ndians nEastAfrica),hey re notreallyncontrol ftheir wn destinyndthereforere vulnerable. s a result ftheirgross nsecurities,hese lame Leviathans 'try esperatelyo control ver-greater arts f society hroughutrightwnership r regulation. owever,since hey reweak, heir ffortsrealmostnevitablylumsy, eavy-handed,andauthoritarian.Therefore,lthoughheaverage tatenAfricaomparedo other tates ssmall as measuredby governmentpending s a percentagefgrossdo-20. Ibid.,p. 81.21. RichardHodder-Williams,An Introductiono thePolitics fTropical fricaLondon: Allen andUnwin, 984), . 95.22. ThomasM. Callaghy,The State ndtheDevelopmentfCapitalismnAfrica:heoretical,Historical,nd Comparative eflections,n DonaldRothchildndNaomiChazan, eds., ThePrecarious alance:State nd Society n Africa Boulder,Colo.: Westview, 1988),p. 82.



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mestic roductGDP]),23t appearsto be too argebecause tsclumsy xtrac-tive ffortsause so muchdamagecompared o thebenefits hat t delivers.Thus arises the image of so many African tatesas overdeveloped rswollen. 24 he problems onfrontedy states nAfrica anbe illustratedby comparingheir xperience ithEuropean tatesntwoareas wherewarhad a significantmpact: he tate's bility o extractesources hrough axes,and the degreeofnationalismnthecountriesouthof the Sahara.A classicexampleof how weak statepowercauses thestate o institutedesperate nd self-defeatingconomic olicies s inthe area of governmentrevenue.Governmentevenueposes a majorproblem or ll African tatesandmanyothersn the ThirdWorld.These states redesperatelyhort frevenue o fund ven minimal tate ervices e.g.,pay nurses' alaries, uybooks for chools, upply ransportor griculturalxtensionervices) hattheir opulations ave long been promised.n addition o these recurrentcosts,ThirdWorld ountriesre nneed ofmore xtensivend more fficienttax ystems ecause the process f development equiresarge xpenditureson infrastructureopromote conomic ctivityhroughouthecountryndto handle theramificationsf development,specially helarge expensesincurred yurbanizingountries.25.Arthur ewisestimateshat hepublicsectornThirdWorld ountrieshouldbe spending n theorder f20 percentof GDP on services, xclusive f defense nd debtrepayment.26owever,whendefense 2.5 percent fGDP) and debtrepayments3.4 percent fGDP) are subtracted,heaverageAfricanountrypends only15.7percentof tsGDP on allgovernmentunctions.27hile hesefiguresreonly oughestimates iventheproblems ssociatedwith African conomic tatistics,they o illustrateheextent fthefiscal risis acing fricantates.Due to the weaknessofadministrativend statisticaltructuresnAfrica,manygovernmentselyon taxation fforeignrade,becauseimportsnd23. The shareof totalgrossdomestic roduct f sub-Saharan fricantates s smaller,t21.6percent, hanthe developing ountry verageof 25.5 percent. Bothfiguresrefrom 984.)International onetary und (IMF), Governmentinance tatisticsearbook988 Washington,D.C.: IMF, 1988), . 94.24. See, for nstance, arryDiamond, Class Formationn the SwollenAfrican tate, TheJournalfModern fricantudies, ol. 25, No. 4 (December 987),pp. 592-596; ndNzongola-Ntalaja, TheCrisis f the State n Post-Colonial frica, nNzongola-Ntalaja,evolutionndCounter-Revolutionn AfricaLondon:Zed Books, 987), . 85.25. W. Arthur ewis, The Evolutionf the nternationalconomic rder Princeton:rincetonUniversityress, 978), . 39.26. W. Arthur ewis,Developmentlanning: heEssentialsfEconomicolicyNew York:HarperandRow,1966), . 115.27. Calculated romMF, Governmentinancetatisticsearbook988, p. 58, 74, and 94.



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War ndthe tatenAfrica 27

exportsmust physically ass through relativelymall number f borderpoststhat an be easilymanned.Thus,theaverageAfrican tatedependson revenuefrom ariffsor20.5 percent ftotalrevenue, ompared o alldeveloping ountrieswhich, n average,gain 12.9percent f their evenuefrom ariffs,nd industrializedountries here ariffsccount or nly 1.3percent ftotal evenue.28Unfortunately,undinghe statethroughndirectaxes on foreignradedamages national conomiesbecause leaders are compelled o erect ver-greaterdministrativeontrols n imports. hesetariffsromote orruption,smugglingnd, most mportantly,ver-valuedxchange ates, ecausegov-ernmentsrowto rely n administrativeontrolsather han he marketoregulate mports.Overvalued xchange ates n turn ead to wide-spreaddamagewithin oorer conomies s exportersre universally urt, hepop-ulation s encouraged o becomedependent n imported ood,and blackmarkets uickly evelop to take dvantage fdistorted rices.29 eyond he

immediate amage caused by a tax system ependent n imports nd ex-ports, histype f taxsystems particularlynappropriateorThirdWorldcountries. hese countries eed guarantees f slowand steadyncreasesngovernmentevenue bovetherateof economic rowthnorder o accom-plish he tasks rucial o development: uildtransportndcommunicationssystems,stablish tilities,nd create ducationalystems.30Anothermajorproblem acing eaders nAfricas theabsenceof a strongpopular dentity ith he tate.The ackof popular onsensus vernationalpurposebothaggravateshe state's lumsy ffortsoextract esources ndis itself xacerbated yan insecure, uthoritarianlite. ndeed, the pictureofAfricanocietieswidely ccepted odays ofpopulations ryingesperatelytoescape the clutches fthestate, ather hanbecomingmore nvolvednit, ndcertainly otwilling o pay more axes o t.31 wenty-fiveears fterthenationalist eriod, here re few signsof nationalismnmostAfricancountriesespite henow pro ormaxhortationsrom ropaganda rgans oengage n state-building.ndeed, themajority f states tillhave difficultycreatingiable ymbols oattracthe oyalties f their itizens.28. Calculated rombid.,p. 54.29. See WorldBank, Acceleratedevelopmentn Sub-Saharan frica:An Agenda orActionWash-ington, .C.: World ank, 981), p. 24-30.30. AlexRadian,ResourceMobilizationn PoorCountries:mplementingaxPoliciesNew Brunswick,NJ: ransactionooks,1980), p. 13-17.31. See Rothchild nd Chazan, ThePrecarious alance.



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Notsurprisingly,herefore,here retodayvery ew ttemptsnAfricancountrieso forge national onsensus nmajor ssues,much essa nationalidentity.or nstance,most ormulaso decrease nter-ethnicension oncen-trate nlyon amelioratinghe negative spectsof ethnic onflicty accom-modatingt through ecentralized overnmenttructuresnd preferentialpolicies.32 owever, ormulasuch as federalismften reinappropriatencountrieswherenational nstitutionsre not strong.Federalist olutionsbrokedown nSudan and Uganda, amongother laces,becausethe ncen-tivesfor eaders o attempt o gain total ontrolweremuchgreater han hebarriers osed by recentlydopted nstitutionalrrangements.33oreover,no matterhow well accommodationistormulas f intra-societalonflictwork, lmost veryonenAfrica nd elsewhere n the ThirdWorldwouldagreethat morebasic national oyalty y all societal roupswould still edesirable.However, he means by whichto induce a disparate ociety oidentify orewiththe nation-statere unknownnAfrica nd few n thecurrentra are even attemptingo speculate n howto developa nationalconsensus.Difficultiesf tate onsolidationithout arWar n Europe playedsuchan importantole n theevolution fthestatemechanismnd society's elationship ith hestatebecause t s extraordi-narily ifficult,utside imes fcrisis, o reformlemental arts fthegov-ernmentalystem, uchas the means oftaxation,r to effect realchangeinnational dentity. or nstance, ince taxes re so consequential o everybusiness ecision,he ax ystemver ime eflectslargenumber fpoliticalbargainsmadebythe tatewith ifferentnterestroups.Often overnmentsfind ttoo politically ifficulto provide irect ubsidies o those heywantto favor, o the tax system s a convenient ackdoor o aid politicallympor-32. See, for nstance, onald L. Horowitz, thnic roupsn ConflictBerkeley: niversityfCaliforniaress, 985), p. 563-680.33. Bugandahad a degree f autonomy henUganda gained ndependencend theKabaka,the traditionaluler f the Bugandapeople, was the country's irst resident. owever, hisarrangementell part n1966when thenPrimeMinister iltonOboteoverthrewheKabakaand invadedBuganda.Crawford oung,ThePoliticsfCultural luralismMadison:Universityof Wisconsin ress, 1976),pp. 149-156. n 1983,President aafarMohamedNimeiri f theSudan ffectivelybrogated heAddisAbaba greementhich ad given utonomyoSouthernSudan.TheSudan has been embroiledn a civilwarever ince.MansourKhalid,NimeirindtheRevolution fDis-May London: KPI, 1985), pp. 234-240.



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War nd the tatenAfrica 29

tantgroupswithout ncurringpprobrium.hepolitical argains hat on-stitutehe ax ystem evelop momentumftheir wn because ndividualsand businessesbase their uture conomic ecisions n the ncentivesnddisincentivesntheexisting axcode. Indeed,Joseph chumpeteralledthefiscal ystem a collectionfhard,naked facts nd claimed hat thespiritofa people, ts cultural evel, tssocial structure,he deeds itspolicymayprepare-all this and more s writtenn its fiscalhistory, tripped f allphrases. 3Therefore,venminor hanges uch as alterationsn the evelof taxationor shiftsnthetaxburden, s theUnited tates nd mostWesternuropeancountries ave made in the last fewyears, ngender remendousoliticalbattles.Not only the previously avored olitical roupsbut all thosethatsimply ollowed hesignals ent outby government illforcefullypposefiscal eform. reater hanges nthenature fthetax ystemreeven moredifficult.dwardAmes' and Richard app'sconclusionhat ax ystemslastuntil he end of the governmenthat nstitutedhem nd that axsystemsinsomeEuropean ountriesurvived almost ntact rom he hirteenthndfourteenthenturiesntil he ate ighteenthentury ay eanexaggeration,but their onclusions uggestusthow much nertia particularystem orcollecting overnmentevenue andevelopovertime.35ther hanwar,notypeofcrisisdemandsthat hestate ncrease axeswith uchforcefulness,and few other ituations ould impelcitizens o accept hosedemands, rat least not resistthem as strongly s they otherwisemighthave. It isthereforeard to counter illy's rgumenthat the formationfstandingarmiesprovided he largest ingle ncentiveo extractionnd the largestsinglemeansof tate oercionver he ongrun fEuropean tate-making. 36Domestic ecurityhreats, fthetypeAfricanountriesace o often,mayforce hestateto increase evenue;however, hesecrises re almostneveras grave s thetypeofexternalhreat heEuropean tateshad to confront,because theydo not threaten he very xistence f the state. n addition,domestic onflictsesultn fragmentationnd considerableostilitymongdifferentegments f thepopulation.As a result, he statedoes not neces-sarilychieve hegreaterevenue fficiencyains ngendered y an external34. JosephA. Schumpeter,The Crisisof theTax State, n Alan T. Peacock, t al., eds.,Internationalconomicapers, o. 4 (London:Macmillan, 954), p. 6-7.35. EdwardAmes ndRichard .Rapp, The Birthnd DeathofTaxes:A Hypothesis, ournalofEconomicistory, ol.37, No. 1 (March 977), . 177.36. Tilly,Reflectionsn theHistory fEuropean tate-Making, . 73.



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Internationalecurity4:4 j 130

crisis. ndeed, n a civilwar-as inNigeria n the ate1960s-partsofthestate re fightinggainst ach other,whichhardly romotes fficiencyntaxcollection. ublic acceptance f tax increases, crucialfactorn allowingEuropean tates o extract reater esourcesntimes f war,willbe a muchmore omplicatedssue ncivildisputes.As Mann notes, thegrowth fthemodern tate, s measured yfinances,s explained rimarilyot ndomesticterms ut n terms f geopolitical elations fviolence. 37The obstaclesposed by largepeasant populations, ignificantonmone-tarized ectors, nd widespreadpoverty re, of course, mportantontrib-utors o therevenue risis f theAfricantate.However, heseproblems onotfully xplainwhypoor tates o not xtract reater esources rom ocietyina manner hat s less economically armful. actors uch as politicalwill,administrativebility,nd the population'swillingnesso be taxed-issuesthat an be affected ythedecisions f politicaleaders-are also crucialnunderstanding hy states re unable toachieve heir otentialevel of tax-ation n a benignmanner.38or nstance,Margaret evisuccessfullyhowsthat n such diverse ases as republican ome,France nd England n theMiddleAges, eighteenth-centuryritain,nd twentieth-centuryustralia,levels of taxationwere affected rimarilyy political onstraintsacedbyrulers, espite he fact hatmostof these economies lso posed significantbarrierso ncreased ax collection.39Nor has there eenanysuccess n developingmeanstocause thepopu-lation o dentify orewith he tate, therhan ightingwar.Nationalism,whichwas nevernearlys strongrwidespread especiallyutside hemajorcities)nAfrica s manyhadthought, aspalpable n the ate olonial eriodbecause therewas a relevant ther -the olonialists-who ouldbe easilyidentifieds oppressors nd aroundwhich nominal ational dentityouldbe built.40owever, ince ndependencenmostAfricanountries,here asbeen no relevant ther o oppose, so it has been extremelyifficultocreatenation-wideymbols f dentity.herehas thereforeeen nowayofgenerating national dentityn Africa uch as wars forgedn Europe.37. Mann, Sources fSocial Power,p. 490.38. Raja J.Chelliah, TrendsnTaxationnDeveloping ountries, nternationalonetaryundStaffapers, ol. 18,No. 2 (July 971), . 312.On thepossibilityf hanging iscal rrangementsin Africa, ee Dennis Anderson, ThePublicRevenue nd Economic olicy n African ountries,WorldBankDiscussion aperNo. 19 Washington,.C.: World ank, 987), p. 14-15.39. For instance, see Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, . 105.40. The mportancef the relevant ther onceptndeveloping roup ohesion s exploredby Young, The Politics fCulturalPluralism, . 42.



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Anthonymithwrites, thecentral ifficultyf nation-building'n muchofAfricand Asia is the ack ofany sharedhistoricalmythologynd memoryonwhich tate lites an setabout building' henation. he nation' is builtup] fromhecentral und fculture nd symbolismndmythologyrovidedbysharedhistoricalxperiences.41 The result s theanomie n mostAfricancountriesoday.Itcould be argued hat he ackofnationalismimply eflectshefact hatAfricanountries re artificialroupings f disparate eoplesand thereforeare notreally ation-states.owever,no natural ation-statesrematureat birth ith opulationshat ave readily greed oa centraldentity. ather,thegoalof thosewho want ocreate henation-states toconvince ifferentgroups hat heydo, in fact, hare common dentity.his s why even nEurope,whichtoday seems to have nation-stateshat re more naturalthanAfrica's,war had such a crucial ole to play nthe forgingf commonidentities.Indeed, the symbioticelationshiphatwarfosteredn Europe betweentaxcollection nd nationalisms absent nAfrica, reciselyecause there sno externalhreat o encourage eople to acquiesce nthe state'sdemands,and no challenge hat causes them to respondas a nation. nstead,theAfricantate's lumsy ffortstgreater xtractionremetby popularwith-drawalrather hanbya populaceunited round commondentity.Ofcourse,not allwars ed to thestrengtheningf administrativenstitu-tions nd greater ationalism. orexample,Joseph trayer otesthat heHundredYears War was so exhaustingorboth sides that tdiscouraged

thenormal evelopmentfthe pparatus fthe tate.Therewas a tendencytopostpone tructuraleforms,o solveproblemsn an ad hoc basis ratherthan tocreate]new agenciesofgovernment,o sacrificefficiencyor m-mediate esults.42However, he HundredYears War was exceptional e-cause of tslength nd itthereforeid not allow rulers o consolidate hegains usuallyachieved after acing shortperiodof external anger.Yetoverall, he historical ecord uggests hatwar was highly fficientnpro-moting tate consolidationn Europe,and that t would be much moredifficultor tates oaccomplishhe ame tasks npeacetime.41. Anthony . Smith, State-Makingnd Nation-Building,n JohnA. Hall, ed., States nHistoryOxford: asilBlackwell,986), . 258.42. Joseph . Strayer, n theMedieval riginsf heModerntatePrinceton:rincetonniversityPress, 970), . 60.



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AreThere eaceful outes o State onsolidation?SinceAfricannd other hirdWorld ountries eed to transformmportantparts ftheir overnmentalystems,ncludingheir iscalrrangements,ndto promote ationalism,utdo nothavethetraditionalvenueofwartoaidthem, he mmediate uestions whetherhey an follow pathother hanthat adopted by Europe to consolidate tatepowerand to developnewnationaldentitieso reduce he divisions etween ocietynd the state.Once again t s interestingo focus n governmentevenue ecausetheissue s so decisive n ts own right nd becausetax ystemsre such a goodreflectionf the basic bargainsn society.n an age withreduced evels ofinterstate ar, African ountries re faced with the problem f trying oincrease he capacity f the statewithout eing ble to use wars to ratchetup the tate's xtractivebility. iven he vidence fEuropean iscalnertia,it s clear hat t willbe even moredifficulto institute ajorreforms henstates reoperatingnnormal ircumstances.he one clear hanceAfricancountries idhave to nstitute ajor eforms as atindependence,ecauseatthatmoment olitical rrangements ere nsuchflux hat ignificantewinitiativesould be undertaken.ndeed, some African ountriese.g.,Moz-ambique,Angola)did makemassive hangesntheir olitical conomye.g.,nationalization,ollectivization);nfortunately,heseparticulareformsereeconomicallyuinous ecausetheir ocialist olicies istortedconomies venmore han nmostAfrican ountries. nce independence ecomes he nor-malsituation,s ithas inAfricanountries,tbecomes xtraordinarilyiffi-cult oreaders omakebasicreformsfpolitical rrangements,uch s fiscalsystems, hichmight urt owerful roups.As PeterBachrach ndMortonBaratznoted n thecontext fAmerican olitics, ominant alues,myths,rituals, nd institutionsuickly ssify o that rucial ssues, suchas fiscalreform,re not even on the agenda.43 here ppearstobe no impetus rominside African ountries o disrupt hecurrent iscal rrangementsignifi-cantly. ndeed,muchoftheargumenthat here s currently significanteconomic risis nAfrica,nd that his risiswas causedbymalfunctioninggovernmentolicies, amefromutside hecontinent.4443. Peter achrachnd Morton . Baratz, TwoFacesofPower, mericanoliticalcienceeview,Vol. 56, No. 4 (December 962), . 950.44. For instance, the World Bank's report, Acceleratedevelopmentn Sub-SaharanAfrica,wascrucialn noting he dimensions f Africa's conomic risis; t set theagendafor eformfAfricanconomies.



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War nd the tate nAfrica133

However, tcouldbe argued hat tructuraldjustment,ressed nAfricancountries ythe nternational onetary und (IMF), the WorldBank, ndbilateralonors, ould servemany tate-makingunctions. s externalctorsdedicated ofundamentaleformsf theeconomy nd of theway thestateoperates, he MF and other onors re not ubject o the amerigiditieshatparalyzedomestic eformers.he IMF and other ctorswho insist n fun-damental eformouldpressure fricantates or ignificanthangesntheirtaxsystem.Demands from n external ctor re similar o war, n thatleader an egitimatelyrgue o tspopulationhatthas no choice naskingthem o makeverydifficultacrificesecause t s under oomuchexternalpressure.It would be a majormistake, owever, otake oo far he nalogy etweenpressure rom ctors uch as the MF and the effectsf war.For nstance,warproduced uchspectacular ains ngovernmentalfficiencyecause thestate tself elt hreatened.heIMF,oranyother ctor, annot roduce hatfeeling;ndeed,structuraldjustment as been eastsuccessful hen thastried o address the ssues of how the state tself peratesn areas such aspublic enterprisesr fiscal rrangements.45he cost to the state tselfnfailingoadopta structuraldjustmentrograman be severe, utfallsfarshortof whatwar would threaten. he IMF will never cause a state todisappear.Atworst, state an simply ptfor hehigh ostofbreakingffrelations ith he MF.Nordoesexternalressure f he ype heFundexerts roduce nychangeinnationaldentity.While eaderscan occasionally ally eople against heexternalhreatosed by imperialists,hese entimentssually renot ong-lasting ecausethepopulationmaybe unabletodistinguishetween nter-national ctors upposedly raining way thenation's unds uring struc-tural djustmentxercise,nd thosenational eaderswholed their ountryinto uch spectacularconomic ebacle.While urope's eaders npreviouscenturies ardly reated heir opulationswellbymodern tandards,t wasusuallyunambiguous hatpeoplewould be better ffftheywon the warthan fthey ost.Theprospects fstructuraldjustmentosteringomekindofnationalismbased on resisting oreignerss also limited ecause the MF is notreally45. Jeffreyerbst, Political mpedimentso EconomicRationality: hy ZimbabweCannotReformts PublicSector, heJournalfModern fricantudies, ol. 27, No. 1 (March 989),pp. 67-85.



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relevant ther o a largely easantpopulation, ndcannot nduce hangesin national onsciousness f the type hatwars nEuropeproduced.Unlikea war where theentire opulationwas threatenedecause of itsnationalidentity,tructuraldjustment illhelp certain roups nambiguouslye.g.,peasantswho growexport rops), learly urt ome e.g., the urbanpopu-lationdependent n imported ood), nd haveambiguous ffects n manyothers.Further, he intensityn shared experience hat a war generatessimply annotbe replicated y, say,protracted egotiationsverthe MF'sExtended undFacility.TheLikelihoodfWarn AfricaIf nternal eformeems mprobablend there s no other xternalhreathatcan perform uite thesame roleas war,thequestionbecomeswhether tsomepoint nthefuture fricaneaderswillbegin oseewaras a potentialavenuefor tate-making.ome eadersmay ooktowarsimply ecausetheyare truly oncerned bout thefateofthenation nd see no other ption.Othersmaynotbeconcerned articularlyithnation-building,utmayfindthat their ountries ave suffered conomicdeclineforso long thatthepossibilitiesor heirwnpersonal nrichmentavebecome everelyimited,and therefore ill seek to seize theassetsofother ountries. o far, hesystem hathas preserved hecontinent's oundaries as not beensignifi-cantlyested ecausemost eaders onsideredtobvious hat heywerebetteroffwiththeir nherited oundaries hantheywould be in a chaoticwarsituation here overeigntyr considerableerritoryight e lost.However,especiallyn the context f decades of economic ecline, t s possiblethatsome Africaneadersmayrecalculatehebenefits f peacethat ocks hemintoperpetualweakness. nstead, heymay try oincrease heir tate's x-tractivebilitynd divert heir itizens romnter-ethnicquabbles yseizinguponthemultitude fprovocations,lwayspresent,oprovoke fight ithneighboringtates.Paul Colinvaux resents heextreme ase for hepros-pectsof nterstate ar n Africa:Africaholds thegreatestpossibilitiesfor heaspiringgeneral.... That therewillbe battles etweenAfrican ations s they uildtheirAfrican ontinentin a new image s as certain s anythingnhistory.oreachcountryheremust come timeswhen wealth,hopes, ambitions,nd numbers ll rise



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together.t thenneeds only ccessto high-qualityeaponsfor naggressionto be an attractivendertaking.46If ignificantnterstate arsbreak ut whenprovocationsresmall utelitesrealizewhat warcould do for hestate nd thenation, twouldnotbe astrikinglyew development. ather,ncreasednterstate arfaren Africawould simply e a return o theEuropeannorm.Whetherwar in Africatodaywould actually ring boutthe samekindofchanges hat t did inEurope enturiesgo is unclear, utthepossibilityhat eadersmight ecomeso desperate hatthey ry n somefundamental ay to alter hepoliticalrulesunderwhich heir ations unctionhouldnotbe ignored.Many are the possibleprovocationshatcould bring bout significantinterstate ar in Africa. ertainly,here replenty f border isputes ndfragmentsf ethnic roupsthatneed to be rescuedfromforeignomina-tion o provide nough ationalizationor ostile ctiongainst ther fricancountries. onflictsetween anguageblocs e.g., English ersusFrench),47disputesover control f crucial ivers nd railroadsespecially iventhenumber f and-locked ountries),r thesimpleneedtohavemore and forpopulations hatdoubleevery wenty earsprovidemanyotherpotentialreasonsforwarinAfrica.Morethan fewAfricaneadersmight omedayagreewithBismarck, brilliantonsolidatorfa newnation, n theonlyrealway to unite fragmentedeople:Prussia . ., as a glance t themap will how, ouldno longerwearunaidedon its ong narrow igure hepanoplywhichGermany equired or ts se-curity;tmustbe equally distributedverall German eoples. We shouldgetno nearer hegoal by speeches, ssociations, ecisions fmajorities; eshouldbe unableto avoida serious ontest, contestwhich ould onlybesettled y blood and iron.18

Although fricanountries ad moreor ess equaldefense apabilitiestindependence, hegrowing ifferentialn force rojection apabilities aveled some to suggest hatAfricawill experiencemuchgreater esort o forcein the future.nventories f tanks nd other rmored ehicles s well as46. PaulColinvaux, he ates fNations: BiologicalheoryfHistoryLondon:Penguin, 980),pp. 219-220.47. Ibid.,p. 219.48. Otto,Princevon Bismarck, ismarck,heManand the tatesman:eing heReflectionsndReminiscencesfOtto, rince onBismarck,rittenndDictatedyHimselffterisRetirementromOffice,ranslatednder hesupervisionfA.J.Butler, ol. (NewYork:Harper ndBrothers,1899), . 313.



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artillery,etfighters,nd naval craft ave ncreased onsiderablyhroughoutthe continent.or nstance, ust n the periodbetween 966and 1981, henumber fcountriesn sub-Saharan frica ith anks ncreased rom wo toeighteen, he numberwithfield rtillery entfrom even to thirty-six,henumberwith ight rmorwent from hirteeno thirty-six,nd the numberpossessing et aircraft entfrom ix to twenty-one.49ountries uch asNigeria nd Zaire have developedmilitaryapabilitieshat re fargreaterthan theirneighbors'. o far, he assuranceof stabilityhat s thecentraladvantage f thecurrent frican tate ystem as almost lwaysbeen moreattractivehanwhatever easons Africaneaders may have had to beginconflict iththeirneighbors.However, s PresidentNyerere f Tanzaniashowed when he invadedUgandatodeposeIdiAmin, venstrong ropo-nents fAfricanorms an be driven o nterstateonflictf hey elieve hatthecosts of notacting re highenough. n thefuture, fricaneadersmayfind hat, espite ll their fforts,conomic eformannot rogressndtheycannot ettheir itizenryo unite roundnational ymbols;t s conceivablethat henthedeterrentalue ofthenorms fsovereignty ayseem muchless powerfulhan hey o now. f hesenorms o onger rovided rotectionto a largenumber f states, heywould lose all meaning hroughoutheAfricanontinent.While he iming f hesewars s notpredictable,t houldbe obvious that he ncentives hatAfricaneadershave to incitewars forthepurposes fstate-makingre significantndmaybecomemuch trongerinthefuture hen thefutilityf domestic eformuring imes fbusinessas usual,that s,peace,becomes lear.ThePermanentlyeak tate:A NewDevelopmentMuchof his iscussion as focused nthepotentialpportunitiesorAfricanstates hat,n a European-typetate ystem,might aveengaged nbattle,won orat eastnot osttoobadly), ndtherebysed war norder o furtherstate uilding.However,tshouldbe recognizedhat nother lassofstates49. William .Thom, Sub-Saharan frica's hangingMilitaryapabilities,n Bruce . Arling-haus and Pauline H. Baker, eds., AfricanArmies:Evolution nd Capabilities Boulder, Colo.:Westview, 986),p. 101. See also Walter . Barrows, ChangingMilitary apabilitiesn BlackAfrica, n William Foltz and Henry Bienen, eds., Arms nd theAfrican:Military nfluencendAfrica'snternationalelationsNew Haven: Yale Universityress,1985),p. 99 and p. 120; ndHenry ienen, African ilitariess Foreign olicyActors, nternationalecurity,ol. 5, No. 2(Fall1980), . 176.



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inAfricas directlyffected y the currentbsenceof war: those tates hatwouldhave ostbadly nd would have been absorbed ythewinners. hesestates angefrom hose that re ust geographic nachronismseft y colo-nialism e.g., The Gambia,Djibouti), nd very mall tates n the shadow ofgiants e.g., Benin and Togo, close to Nigeria,or Rwanda and Burundibordering aire), to thosethat implyacksignificantesources ordevel-opment rdefense e.g., Mali, Mauritania).n Europeduring heformativecenturies, isintegrationf weak states ikethesewas a regular ccurrence.Weakstatesthatwere defeated henbecame thepoorerregions frichercountries,ut t east hey ad a chance o sharentherevenuend resourcesof a viablestate. Yet theabsenceofa truly ompetitivetate ystem hatpenalizesmilitary eaknessmeansthat ven those tates hathave no otherprospects han ong-term ependenceon internationalid will survive ntheir rippled orm or heforeseeable uture. erhaps heonly askofstateconsolidationhat hese therwise eak states an accomplishs to physicallycapture heir opulationswithin hestableboundaries f the African tatesystem.50The presence f permanently eak states hatwill not be eliminateds anew developmentninternationalelationsndonethat oses novel devel-opment hallenges.All theoretical orkon developmento far,no matterwhat theideological redispositionf theauthors, as implicitlyssumedthat omehowthe nation-statess they urrentlyxist re viablearrange-ments or evelopment,fonly hey ollow heproper trategiesnd receiveenoughhelpfrom he nternationalommunity.his ssumption as appro-priate or heEuropean ontext here enturies fwarhad eliminatedtatesthat implywerenotviable.However, orAfrica, hose states avenotbeentested y an internationalystem hat everely unishespoliticalweakness,there s little eason to believe thatmany ofthemwill be able to have afavorablenough geographic osition, ontroldequatenatural esources,gainthesupport fa significantortion ftheir opulations,nd constructstrong dministrativetructureso everdevelop.In thelong term, hesestatesmaydisappear f nterstate arsfinallyo break ut nAfrica.In themeantime,what is to be done withstates hatexistbut cannotdevelop? t is far oo early owrite ff nystate'sprospects.We havebeenwrong bout hedevelopment rospectsfmany tates oth nAfricawhere50. See Jeffreyerbst, Migration,hePolitics f Protest, nd StateConsolidationnAfrica,African ffairs, orthcoming.



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scholarswere oooptimistic)ndelsewherentheworld, uch s EastAsia.5'It would also be morally nacceptable imply o allow thesecountries ograduallylidefrom heworld'sview into a twilightfperpetual overtybecausenature nd history avebeen unkind o them.However, houghtmustbe given onontraditionallternativesor id tostates hat nprevioustimeswould simply avebeendefeated ndabsorbed ystrongereighborsinawar.For nstance, he nternationalommunity ightonsider ewardingthosecountriesn the ThirdWorld hathave taken n economicmigrantsfrom on-viabletates.52 heWestcouldconsider rovidingdditional idtothosecountries illing oengage n somekindofregionalntegrationomitigateheproblems funchanging oundaries,muchas countrieshathaveadoptedmore ationalconomic olicieshaveattractedreaterid fromdonors.The worldmaysimply ave to recognize hat certain umber fcountriesre locked ntonon-viable ositions,nd develop long-termp-proach otheirwelfare atherhan cting urprisedvery ime he nevitablefamine recological isaster ccurs.ConclusionIt simportantotto glorify ar.Thewarsthat uropewent hroughausedimmense ufferingorgenerationsndwholesaledestructionfsomesoci-eties. Yet it is undeniable hat out of this destructionmerged trongerpoliticalrrangementsndmore nified opulations. o one would dvocatewar as a solution o Africa's olitical nd economic roblems,where thecostsof nterstate ar could be evenhigher han nEurope. t is doubtfulthat, fAfrican ountries o start ighting ars, theywillundergo xactlythesameprocessesof stateconsolidationhatwarengenderedn Europe.However,t houldberecognizedhat here sveryittle vidence hatAfricancountries,r manyothersn the ThirdWorld,willbe able tofindpeacefulwaysto strengthenhe state nd developnationaldentities.n particular,theprospects or tates hatwillnotdisappear, utsimply annotdevelop,mustbe examined.Atthe sametime,we must ecognizehepossibilityhat51. In the 1950sAmerican dministrationsebatedwhether outh Korea could achieve nyincrease n living tandards nd if Americanid shouldbe devoted o simply reventinghecountryrom etting oorer. liveCrook, Trial nd Error, he conomist,eptember3, 1989,p. 4.52. See Jeffreyerbst, Migration elpsPoorest f Poor, Wall treetournal,une 5, 1988,p. 12.



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some Africaneaders n the futuremay come to believethatthe costs ofpeace-limits on reform ossibilitiesnd a fragmentedopulation-are sohigh hatwar may not seem ike such an undesirable lternative.fAfricanleadersdo indeed make thiscalculation, he sufferinghatAfrica as seeninthe asttwenty-fiveearsmayonlybe a prelude o muchmoredangerousdevelopments.

war and state in africa

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