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Opening ShotThanks to everyone who voted WI'Best Wargames Magazine'in the recent F.I.A.S.C.O. polls. We finished ahead of StuartAsqvith's Pructical Waryame. and Society of Ancients' joumal,Slirgsiot. Full results and F.LA.S.C.O. report nextmonth.

last month I said the results of the Tactical Problem would bein this issue - forgetting that I was off to Historicon and had tofinish WI60 within two weeks of WI59 - not enough time foryour rcsponses. So, next monlh there'll be rhe Tactical Problemsolution and a reDort on Historicon '92.

Page13 M. Bisbop

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ContentsModem MusketeersRules fu nden frftfrehBBack to Basics III: ArtillryGcftldg tlrc ,,att tuon fovr ta etqguns'{rty God - Maiwrdd!"AlehaDistan - trcver a good countrr

ArtilerJ ofahe Sung DlrrstyAl unl/,ng $m ollhe Sung an tr?Rul6 for th WsIs ofth Ros6Time for agoad hack!The Germaos who never lost, Part IEan Ahican adwnhtrfs duinstheGreatWarSamuai Warfar -Mrth & ReditvWe rc thcr rcallr s uc h ; hiwt rov s cds ps?Colours '92 PreyiwtYes, Rickie Patrol is a non de plunell

Frcrt Co[eji Some fine First Corps 25nn ACW Irom one olBritain's leading designerc, Rob Baker.

lmWARK IRRECULARS will be meeting again, on anirregular basis. at the Scour Hall. Lovers Lane. Newark.lopposit the Editoa. house I The 6rsl thre meelings will beWednesday 26lh Augusl, Wednesday l6lh Sptmbr, andWednesday 7lh Ocrober. we look fonard (o seing anyonewho's interested, from Newark and the suroundiDg area, atour infomal gatherings. Funher details from LaurenceBaldwin, Tel: Nottm 500066.

Weryames lllusteted is published on the last ThuBday oleach nonlh by: Sttatagem Publicalions Ltd., 18 Lovers Lane,Newark, Notts. NG24 1HZ Tel: 0636 71973 EDITOR: Duncanlilacfarlane. IYPESETIING & REPnODUCTION BY: PrcssplanServices Lld. PRINTED in England. DISTRIAUTORS: ComagMagazane Marketing, Tavistock Road, Wesl Drayton,liiddlesex UB7 7OE. USA| The Emperols Headquarters,5744 Wesl lruing Palk Road, Chicago, lllinois 60634. Tel:3i2777

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MODERN MUSKETEERS"AII for one and one for all"

b," M. Bishop

Dur ing and aher the Vje lnam uJar the US Arm\ carr ied out anumlrer ot beha\ ioura l s tudies of io ld ic |S in combat s i tu . r t ions.These studics hn\c f . rngcd l ronr i . \ .s t i l r r i . r th . hcht t \ iour o lr roops in actual combr l Io contro l lcd c\p. . imcnrs Nhere-guinea p igs are p laced in *ncar conrhr l condi l ions tocomparc thc i r rc t ions s i lh contro ls . A numbcr of conclus ionshave been drasn f rom th is Nork. some of $hich afe notobl iors. The! sho$ just ho* inef iect i !e the a\erage sold ier canbc and ho\ ' lo ta lh untr e the Hol l ! *ood image of supermcn$ho adlance Ni lhout tear and h i t e \er ! I . r rse l . rcru i lh is Ar : rscr ious level lhese studies hr le in f lLrenced loN le\e l orgrn isr-l ion ofWeslern r fmies- most ror lb l \ d i \ id ing r i f lc sectrcns in tof i re teams. Ihe) a l lo pr(n ide r r$ matc r l l ( r$r i lehof smal lact ron $argam ru lcs.

Onc conclus ion $as that nrosr so ld icr \ do not f ight on thei rosn. the) f ight $ i th thc i r conrr ldcs. In fact \ . tcran! form aclosc kni t grcuf of thrcc to e ight mcn inc luding onc lcadcr . \ r i tha phls iobgicdl l ) opt imum sl rcnl rh of four to f i rc . No rer( )n$.rs g i \en as to $h! th .sc numbcrs appcarcd to havc a bc l rermoralc . r l l o thcr factors bc ing equal . than s ix or rhrce. or wh]n incs a l*a\s subdiv ide. bur e iehts do not . \Vhen iso lared f ronthis group soldiers Nill freeze and Nrthdra$ lrom the oursidewor ld. The et fects of th is iso la l ion can be .nh!nced bI p lac ingthe indi l idur i l i r a h ighl \ drngrou! s i lur t ion. Onc of lhe mostinstmcr i \e bat t le repor t \ I ha\ . rcad i \ a scr ic ! o l accounls ofOmaha Be.rch on D Dav. Hundrcd! of US t roops landcd therebecame iso latedand h idnmongst thc Nreckage becauscthe) d idnor knoN Nhat e\act l \ '$ . rs goi r -q on: lhc! had no

-quidance. andthe\ t lere under hea\ ' \ f i re . t hc onl \ rcrson \ \h ! the Aner icanshnalh secured the beach $ as t hnt n.rtu ra l leaders rose abo\ e thedcarh and chaos and pushcd the others inlo actlon. Such mengi \c nc l r l f a l l thc ordcr \ . b t r r lead morc b\ conscnr thanaurhor i t \ . Assis tanl lcxdcrs do not re. r lh er i is l . the\ arc jus l

mnk and f i le Ni th n l i t t lc more char isma.Another corc lus ion $as thar most \o ld iers do nor f i re at thc

cn.m\: thc) f i re in thc d i rcct ion of thc enemt. or do nor t i rc atr l l Such behr\ iour is no st ranger Io those $ho studv\ , t . , , , , r " ! \ " r . " r . . i n , r . i s r , r ' r m p o r r a n r r e , r , . ' , o rtraining methods. It is nrcrc surprising for it to happen inmodcrn warfare with its more accurale and longer ringed smallarms. but i r does actual lv occur . ln fac l l rom . r mi l i tar ! poin l o fv ie\ \ rhe leader is rhe man r lho in l l ic rs mon of thc cnemvcasual t ies which the group ma! cause. He is a lso thc one \Lhosingle-handedlr takes the enem! bunker. qhj ls t the othcrrc o s e r o u l o f s i g h t H o s e \ e r t h e l e i d e r s h o u l d n o l b e s e e n . t s rfcarlest hero. $p.ciallv if he is a letefan One studv sholvedthat vctcrans considcr thc sur \ iva l o l themsehe5 and thei rmatcs more rmport rnt than the uni t s operat ional object i les.For cxample. i f sent out on patro l veterans $ i l l o f ten f ind$ m c $ h c r c t o h o l e u p u n t i l i t i s t i m e t o r e t u r n h o m e D u r i n g t h eSecond \ \ or ld \var sonc US !c terans senr even fur ther I f lhe i rsqurd $as g i len a large number of rcc.u i ts thcv would use themas a sk i rmish l ine in f ront of lhcnsehcs. I f thc rccrur ls ran in tothe enemv and got $iped out then ir w.rs obliousl! not safc to

A quick anal ) l is of th is presents a p ic ture of a group ofback-s l idcrs *ho put thc i r l ivcs rbo!c !nvth ing c lse. and onl )oneof them is going to do anv rcal drmage tothcenenl \ Afesvearsago I \ rotcalc tof ru lcson th i5brs is . not just us ingthe USarm) studics. but a lso bat t le repor ts br ind i l iduals. This is norcf lcct ion on thc o c inal matcr ia l . i t $at just that r t d id notcorcr a l l thc rspccls of combat $hich I Ni lhed ro inc lude in theru le! . Combat $a\ fa i f l ) convenl ional : lv i th the e) icept ion o lsnipers. a l l f i r ing $as area f i re . Bul the morale sect ion Nasmafkedly d i f ferenl . I Nished to s ingle out the leader. so rhat hccould keep f ight i f lg \ \h i ls t h is mates h id. )et keep a c losc

t4identity with them. As I hold the view thatgood quality troopsare not better than poor qualiry troops, (they just do notperform so badly), it was necessary thatthe rules reflected this,hence selecting from a group of dice rather than a straightmodifier for the unit's basic morale. The battle reportswhich Iread seemd to indicate that soldiers in action have tunnelvision. ifit is not happening to them (or theirrnates, it is reallythe same thing) then it has litde impact on them. One goodreason for front line troops having tunnel vision is that mostfront line troops are suffering from fatigue caused by lack ofsleep, too much noise, etc.

"Firepower" (the rirle I adopted for the rules) becane largerthan life during a counter ambush scenario I ran. (A counteranbushiswheretheambushrsthemselvesarea'nbushed). Anambushersquadin a {orward position came under fire and tookcasualties. The leader and one other remained fighting, whilstthe others froze. The attackers threw two squads at the wood,borb of which were beaten off by the leader, at times fightingalone. In fact the leader ran out of ammunition and had toscavenge it from the others. ln the endthe attackers withdrew,partlybecause theyould not acquire a machine gun which wasalso firing at them, butprincipally because they could not defeat

THE \4ORALE SECTION FROM.FIREPOWER'EraThe rules can be used for actions ftom the mid l9th Century 1othe early 21st Century for troops using modem small arms- Ifused in Colonial actions then they should not be applied totroops arned with nothing better than primitive fire arms, orstanding in close orderformations. The strength ofeach side canvary from two five man squads to a weak company. Thenurnbers deployed are purely dependent on the action beingfought and 6gures available- However I severely resirict AFVSand artillery.

perfectly reasonable to considerthose in the turret as a weaponscrewand thedriveras a separate individual in the Group.

All Groups, officers and specialists are given a morale level

Irvel1 Fanatic2 Aggressive3 Confident4 Timid5 Fearful

Morale DieLowest ofthree D6Lowes. oftwo D6One D6Highest of two D6Highest of three D6

Tests I and 2 are taken during movement. tests 3 and 4 aftercombat. Roll dice for the Group and test the morale of eachrnember. This may lead to differing states of morale fordifferent members. If so then they will react accordingly.1) Wish to charge, or start an advance in the direction ofpresent/past enemy fire.2) Beingcharged by enerny which the Group is not charging.3) Figures attemptingtostop a rctrcat, or recover from afteeze,or recover from being shaken.4) Under fire (unless in a bunker or AFV and received nocasualties) or in a melee.Factors applid in above tbur cares

Percasualty last (case l or 2) or this(case 4) tumUnder HE firUnder LMG/HMG fireNot under fireUnderfire from unacquned enemy

Enemy is behind an obstacleFigure is shaken or frozenGroup is advancingReceived more melee casualties thistum than the enemySpacing: no Groupmember is in sight0,a Group rnenber is in sight 1.

l 2+ l + l

3 4+ 1

+2+ 1

- 1+2 +2

+1 +11

+3

+2-2

+ l+2 +2

I

ScalesI figurelmmI turn

: l m

In practice I use a ground scale of2mm to 1m and the rulesusedcould easily accommodate 4mm to lm. It dependson howmuch space you have available. The length of a turn can varyfron 30 seconds to2 minuies, long enough forweapons to inflicta large number of casualties, but no so long that everybody isincapacitated before they can react. Incidentally I ignore thedifference between those who are dead and those who wish theywere!lfsomeone cannotcontinue b fighthe is removed.OrganisationThe basic unit for morale is the Croup and it starts the actionwith three to eight figures, including a leader who usually holdssome form ofjunior rank. If the smallest sub unit of a formalorganisation is stronger than eight fighters then it should bedivided into two ormore Groups ofapproximately equalsize-

Officers are commanders of units of three or more Groups.They may join a croup on a temporary basis. Specialists. suchas snipers and forward observers, may operate independently-They nay no. join a Croup. Detached officrs and specialistsare treated asone man Groups.

Weapons crews are fighters manning a weapon which isdependent on more than one individual to operate it. Thereason for their improved norale is that there is feedbackbetween them, so they can reassure one another. Weaponscrews can vary from squaddies manning an LMG, to artillerygun bunnies, to tankies. The principal qualifications are thaathey must be able 1() communicate with each other and all arerequired ro operate the weapon- In the case of tankies it is

within 50rnm -2,within l2.5cm (figure is a detached officer/specialist) -4,figure is in aweapons crew -6(all above are not accunulative)Conmand: figure is aleader -2,an officer is wilh the Group -2

Uniasiz: if Group is 4/5 figures strong and has no officers ITotal casualties: +2 per leaderor officer in the Group who hasbeen incapacitated,+1 per other in the Group who has been incapacirated

lf the final result is zero or less carry on. otherwise rcact asfollows:Case l) No advance this tum. If shaken in the open then retreatfor three tums,Cas 2) Retreat for three tums if shaken in the open; becomeshaken if no1.Cas 3) Continue retrearremain frozen or shaken.Cas 4) (under fire) If in open then move to covernot occupiedby known enemy, or go prone; iI in cover go prone; ;f prone,lreere: an) retrear is delayed. but not cdncel led.Case 4) (melee) Retreat three turns ifshaken, retreatthree turnsor become shaken ifnot.

Frozen troops may not move except to esape ftom adestroyed vehicle. or fight. They will surrender to any enemy

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within 12.5m who can then move them. Retreating figuresmoveat maxrmum speedand may not \ toprof i reorgo prone intheopen. Shakentroops are less effetivein rnelees.Bunkers: defenders may ignore any morale result which ordersa rctreat as longasthey rcmain in thebu.ker.Vhicls: troops baling out of a destroyed vehicle ignore thenature ofthe weapon which actually destroyed ir.

I{you believe that troops do not have tunnel vision and willquicklyreact to losses in otherGroups then applythese DMs:+1 per 3 incapacitated rnembers of other visible friendlyGroups-l per 3 incapacitated members ofvisible enemy croups+l per friendly Group seen to be retreating-l per enemy Group seen to be retreating

The morale effect of an officer can be changed from 2 to - Ito 3 depending on the officer's charisma and the respect hismen hold him in.

VIETNAMWAR MORALEUS and Australian specialforces; FanaticAu\tral ian l ine: Aggre'siveUS Armyregulars and marines: ConfidentUS Army conscripts: TinidAR\4\ in defence: ConfidentARVN in attack oron patrol: TimidVietcong and North Vietnamese: Confident or Timid(dependingon which part ofthe war)Civilians Fearful

If a Group consists of mixed morale classes then diffrentfigures may react to different die, e.g. a squad of US regularsand conscripts would roll two dice, the firsr (of a particularcolour) would be used for the regulars, the highest of the twowould be used for the conscripts.

LTTERARYSOURCESFilepowef. Chris Dempsler and Date Tomlins.The Shary End ol wat, lohn Ettis.Dah,n of D- DaJ , Da\id Ho\ tatth.The Face ol Battle, Iohn Keegan.FirrrS Z,ae, Richard Holmes.Wat on the Mind, Peter W atson.Death's Men, Denis winrer.

For the combat sections I watched news clips on thetelevision. They confirmed what was written on firing, namelythat most troops do not aim at specific targets, they just fire at

15

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BACKTOBASICSIII:ArttfieryBy RichardCbke

When considring aitilery we may often look at its develop-ment do*n the centuries, From the mechanicallv Doweredengines of ancient times, to the higtrly specialised wiapons wesee today, with guns desigtred for use solly against armourdvehicles, oa aercplanes, or boats, even weapons which killcountless human-bings, and yet leave buildings and infrastruc-ture undamaged. The list is virtually endless, bdt do we everconsider why this diversification has happened, or how best touse this powerful arm of our miniature amies. I bope we do.Napoleon clearly did and it helped his career no end. As \r'iththe previous two anicles we will be looking at this Factical sideof things, and showing some examples in the folm of a gamereport. Fintly though, let us look not at how dvelopment hasoccurred, but why.

Technological advancments tend not to happen by accident,and this is as true of artillry as of anything els. Before anyoneinvents anything there must generally be a ned, or at least awish lor it. No one. for example, invented armour-piercingshells until someone else had invented tanks. Eadv artillervpieces. Iike the ir a ncient forerunner the siege engine. *ere seenas little use for anlthing other than siegs, due to their Iack ofmobility. lt must have been clear however, that artillery couldmake a worthwhil contribution io a field battle, if only theycould get there in time. So, due to this demand, the gun carriagewas invented. This enabled the guns to keep up with theircomrades in the infantry. Ho'se artillery was merely a logicalstep away. Lightr guns and mounted guturers gave cavalry thesupport they needed, enabling them to both hold a dfensiveposition and attack the nemy more effectively. The howitzerwas also mercly th ofhpring of the siege mortar of old, rhemodem infantry mortar and field anilery being the latest in thatpanicular line of the family tree.

Over the centuries both military men and scientists havelooked for ways to make artillery more effectiv. This has takenus from bronze muzzle{oading smoothbore pieces to themodem specialist weapons and missiles we have today. All thetime this quest for improvement has really been nothing morethan a case of trying to go one step further ihan anyone else. lfyour gun has a longer nnge than your enemy's you can destroyhim before he is in range, or if your gun is twice as accumte youcould do twice the damage. As new forms of wapons weredeveloped, new typs of artillery developed too, to counter thenew threat. What should always be remembered when using

artillery in a wargame, is tbat it is mo6t effective when used inthe role forwhich it was designedl horse anillery is Do us in asiege, and siege artillery cannot give clo6e support to a unit ofcavalry. Like most theories therc is always one exception whichbeggars tbe rule. In this case the 88mm cerman Flak gun of thSecond World War was more than effective against tanks, but Isuppose one can always use a sledgehammer to crack a nut!

So, aside ftom saying "us the gun in the role it was built for",what is the best way to get the mo6t from our artillery. l,et usstart at the beginning by defining what the rcle of artillry is. Inmy view this can be summed up in two points. Firstly to supporttheir own infantry and cavalry, and secondly to desrroy theenemy, either physically or morally. The first point is slfer(planatory, and covers either offensive or defensive situations.The second is more interesting. By intimation it states that it isnot or y casualty losses that destroy a unit, it may simply be thenasty barying noiss ! This is panicularly true of inexperiencedtroops. So now we know what they are there to do, how do wgo about getting them to do it?

Before looking at an)'thing else we must examine what theanillery is doing before battle is joined, wherc their place is inthe line of march. As we saw last month cavalry have a definiteplace in an army on the move. Thefu positioning allows thom tobest play their role when the enemy is met. The artilery is littledifferent. As soon as the enemy is contacted it must be able todeploy as quickly as possible to support its commds in theother ams. ln some periods this could mean it being vinually atthe head of the colunn, in others ten miles distaDt. This mustdepend on the range and accuracy of the guns, and, indeed, onthe ability to communicate from the target area to th baltery.Unobsrved firc can often be more of a haz:ard to ftiendlytroops than to the enemy. In later periods it matters not wherthe field artillery deploy, as long as they hav accss to the sky,and are in range, they can drcp their shells wherver they lvantto. Prior to this century however, things were a bit morccomplex. There were definite advantages and disadvantagesassociated with the choosing of deplolment areas. This is stillfire for direct fue pieces, such as anti{an} guns. We shall lookat these shortly, but fiIst let us look in morc detail at dle lin ofmarch. With the direct fire weapons of the nineteenth centuryand tefore, at least some pan of an army's artilery should benear the front of the column. This will enable the army as awhole to deploy into batde formation with artillery support

18Iiom virtually the wordgo. Atlhispoint the a illeryistheretodo two things. One, to stop the enemy launching an attackbefore your force is in a position to reply, and secondly to drawthe eflemy'sfirefrom your forming troops. Without artillery inthe vanguard your infantry and cavalry would be forced todeploy whilst under fire, not to mention the threat of assault.Some historical amies have put all theirguns near the front ofthe column, some favoured merely a proportion. I must sidewiththe latter. If the cavalryderelicttheirduties, andthe rearofthe column is attacked, then help from the guns may be a longway off. So, now we know where to keep ourartillery while onthemarch.let us lookwhere to Dut them in a battle.

By definition a line of sight weapon is at its most effectivewhen it can see things. Looking at prints of English Civil lvarbattles one tends tofindthat when the initial lines are dra{n upahe guns are situated at wo.st in the fuont rank, and, more often,slightly ahead oftheir infantry comrades. This was not becausethey were used as some kind of flarning pig, trundled ahead tobe rammed into the enemypike blocks, but wasto give them theclear fields of fire they needed to be effective at the start of thebattle. This tactic was fine when battles were fought byrelatively small armies in open terrain not much larger than afew fields. It was a case of to hell with the terrain, j ust stick theguns out fuont and let them get on with it. As time progessedand armies, and consequently battlefields, grew in size, thingsgot a bit morc complicated. The battle lines were stretchedlonger and longer, and terrain factors became moreimportant.Hills were valuable, not just because they were difficult tocharge up, but also because they offered good panoramic viewsof the land around. This should aho be true on the wargamestable, units which were previously hidden become visible andgood targts. Hills were not the only terrain factor to be ofconcern to the artillerist. Too much cover near deployed gunscould allow an enemy to move up unseen. This left the gunssusceptibl to attack by enemy infantry or cavalry and, whihtpoweful, their firepower would probably nol be sufficient tobalt an ordered charge from close quarters. What anillery needis generalty a chance to whittl down the enemy as they advanceacross open ground- In melee gunnerc arc notoriously inept,prefening to runratherthan fight to the last Inan (andwho canblame them). So wherever you place your artillery, try andensure that any approach by ihe enemy would be seen, or betterstill, give them sone infantry or avalry support.

Wlen laying guns it is important to think ahead, in terms ofyourplansandin termsof terrain. They maybe ideallyplaced atthe beginning of the game, but whathappens after a few moves.If you nay have to move them, think caretully. Artillery,particularly ihe field variety. is not the fastest thing on thebauletield. ll cannot climb over walh. lwim acros. rilers orjunp over hedges. Ensuring that your guns have acess to aroad will not only enable you to move them to support anyadvance more readily, it may just save them from capture ifthings don't go to plan.

Another matter to consider. in addition to terrain, whendeployingis that of concentration. It may be reassuringto yourtroops to have guns dotted along your entire frona, lendingsupport to the whole line, but the effect on the enemy willcertainly be watered down. Napoleon learned that concentra-tion wins battles, and so shouldwe. As discussedwhen lookingat infantry, every battle has its critical point. The seoet is notjust guessingwhere thatpoint willbe, but dictatingwhere, andwhen, it comes. lf then, in addition to having superiority ofinfantry at that point, you have a superiority of adllery, thenlosing becomes even more unlikely. This is really to my mindthe most important lesson with artillery, and any firepower forthat matter: concentration equals success. It is the differencebetween whittling away at a number ofunits, and making greatbig holes in them one at a time. A trickle of casualties isgeneralty suffered sroically by a unit; losing 40% in one fell

swoop is not - they tend to run away,If concentration is the most important principle, then

mobility must surely be a lose second. It is vital that artillery isavailable to carry out its duty to support the other arms. If thismeans moving, do it. Here, however, there must be a dderadded. Don't move them for the sake of it. Guns can be veryeffective indeed, but they do take time to achieve maximumefficiency. Even when they get to where they want to be, theyhave to unlimber and range in. Add to this the time spentlimbering up and actually moving, and they could be out ofaction for some time. With the sizes oftables we as wargamefttend to play on, if you choose your spot with foresight at thestart of many games, you may find you do not have to move aninch. If so, great. If however, you do find that your guns arebadly positioned, for God's sake move them, they achievenothing when they do nothing, and really they can be match

Horse artillery must be mentionedwhen discussing mobility.They were developed to use this principle to the full. Theircrews were trained to move up to close range and blast holes inthe enemy's mnks with cannister fire. This enabled the cavalryto break into what moments before had been a solid,unbrcakable wall of nen. Whilst this tactic exposed them tocertain risks. ihe dividends were hieh andconsidered worth it.

So, now we know where we are giing to deploy, let us look atwhaa we are going to shoot at. Artillery is always at its mostefrective when firing at dense targets. No matter how welltrained thegunne are, there isvi(ually always deviation fromthe point of aim. So logically, the bigger the larget, the morechance there h ofhitting it. Cavalry and infa.try cotumns, andinfantry squares make the best targets; close order lines are anear second. Skirmish lines make bad targets and should beavoided unless they pose a direca threat. In real warfareammunition is not limitless. and would not be wasted- Thisfactor is not always reflected in the rules we use; it should be.Wargamers certainly behave in a more realistic fashion whenthey know they cannot blaze away all day. All of a suddentargets are prioritised andpicked withcare.

Stating, as we do, that artillery is a support weapon, let uslook how, in an ideal siluation. they would work iogether withtheir infantry to attack an enemy position.

Firstly one would see an anillery duel. Some wargamen feelthat this iswrong, condemningcounter-batteryfire as a waste ofbothtime and ammunition. I cannot agree. Without exePtion itwas a recognised tactic in every period of history. Until theenemy guns are silenced the risks involved in sending infantryforward to attack ar horrific. I personally fel a lot happiertrying to get rid ofmy opponent's guns first. Once this has beenachieved the artillerywill be free lofire on the enemy infantry.At this stage this will be aa long range, so that the enemy cannotreply by scoring hits on the gun crews. The enemy, now takingcasualties and unable to answer back, will find his moraledropping rapidly. It could be that he will wilhdraw from hispositions at this point, to take cover elsewhere. Should this bethe case then the artillery has achieved the objective withoutrisk or loss to theircomrades in the infantry. Should this not belhe ca.e lhen il will be necesrar) lo move on lo the nexl .lepThis involves the infanlry moving into small arms range andopening fire on the enemy line. Ar this point this should be atextreme small armsmnge, minimising casualtieson both sides,but naintaining the pressure. Under cover of this fire theartillery should move forward, into cannister range ifpossible.The enemy foot can now be subjected to withe ng fire fromboth the artillery and the in{antry. This will then, in the finalstp, be followed up by an infantry assault. By now this shouldbe a mere formality, the initiation ofa charge being enough todrive the defenders from theirposilion.

So, now we have seen what to do, and what not to do, let uslook at a game I recently umpired. which illustrates some ofthe

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2l"Il[Y GOD - MAfWAND!" (Lefi$t Maxrefi)

WARGAMINGTHEBATTTEOFMAIWAIVD, 1880

by Paul D. Stevenson

.MY GOD - MAIWAND!''The complacent Bdtish tend to sit up at news of a disaster andthen make a big effort to retrieve what they should have doneight in the fint place. Victorian colonial military history hassignificant examples of such an attitude - Isandhlwana againsttheZulus, Kiartoum against the Mahdists, Majuba Hill againstthe Boers and Maiwand against the Afghans. In each case asmall regular force, badly led or disposed, was annihilated byoverwhelming numben of native troops. For the British, thAfghan War was somewhat different ftom these other colonialwars, in that a core of the enemy army was made up of rcgularforcs trained on European lines with a *ell organised artillerysupport.

For the wargamer, the prospect of "native bashing" fades inthe light of a cunning and pitiless enemy backed by artillery,such as those forces deployed by the AJghans in 1879-80. Thechances of a British win at Maiwand were diminished by passivetactics which encouraged the Afghans to come to close qua(ers.At Ahrned Keyl, the British were almost overwhelmed as theydeployed ftom a marching column but managed to retrieve thesituation. At Maiwand they weren't so lucky. This is a battlebest fought as a solo game from the British side; unless, as theBritish player, you can fise to a challenge. Ifthe rules are good,then the best way of dealing with the Afghans is to attack beforethey can tully deploy theL artillery, thus discouraging thetribesmen and upsetting the regulars who could not match theBritish training and weaponry.

BACKGROIJND TO TIIE BATTLEThe battle came about as a result of a claim to the Aminhip ofAfghanistan by the 29 year old Ayub Khan, brother of the latelydeposed Yakub Khan. The British had the situation inAfghanistan under control. They had created a new state,Kandahar and installed Sher Ali there as Wali (ruler). Theysupported the new Amir, Abdur Rahmao, who, despite hisRussian connection, was agreeable to several British requests.

Yakub posed a serious threat to stabilityio Afghanistan. On 9June 1879 frorn his base in the province of Herat, Yakub movedon lGndahar with 5,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and six baftriesof artillery. To prevent local tribesemen from

.ioining Yakub,the Walfs British equipped army of 2,500 cavalry, 2,000infantry and six guos, moved towards his northem ftontier. AsYakub approached nearcr, the Wali's men became restive andhe appealed to the British to send help. A brigade underBrigadieFceneral G.R.S. Burrows (see army list) was sent tothe Wali's assistance with ordrs not to cross the HelmundRiver, which it reached on 11July. lt was agreed that the Wali'stroops should be moved back across the Helmand, where theywould be quietly disarmed; but before thiscould bedone, theymutinied. The infantry and artillery along with one cavalry

regiment fled towards Herat and the remaining cavalry fled forKandahar. Burrows pursued the rebels and, after a sharp fightio which 50 mutineerc were shot, recaptured th Wali's guns butnot the ammunition wagons. In this fight one of Burrows'captains noted the unsteadiness and enatic firing of the 30thNative Infantry - even with the enemy a long way off.

Burows could not hope to prevent Alub crossing theHelmund and, with 25 miles of desert to his rear, he decided towithdraw 35 miles to Khushk-i-Nakhud where suDDlies weremore easily oblainable. But he wasstill46 miles from Kandaharand some of his officers pressed for an immediate retu to thecity. On the same day (17July) as Burrows reached Khushkii-Nakhud, Ayub's advance guard reached the Hlmund. Threedays later his main army came up. The Afghan arny was joinedby thousands oftribesmen, stined up by the retreatofBunows.

Burrows' original mission had been thwarted bythemutinyofthe Wali's troops and he awaited new orden. Lieutenant-General Primrose. commanding ihe Kandahar garrison wasconcemed that Ayub might movepast Kandahar to Ghazni andcombine forces $ith Mohammed Jan. Burrows \r,as thereforeordered to strike a blow at Ayub, to prevent this happeniog.

On 19July Bunows hadmade camp within 3 miles of Girishkand two days later, fearing a night attack from Alub's armystationed there, he withdrew. A)'ub now slipped past Burrowsand moved via Sangbur towards Maiwand. At 07.00 on themoming of27 July Burrows left hisentrenchmentsand marchedfrom Khushki-i-Nakhud hoping to intercept Ayub's advance toMaiwand, a distance ofthirteen miles. Moving at right-angles tohill| fron Sangbur (16 miles from Maiwand) was Alub's army.Advance cavahy scouts reported the presence of the enemy totheir respective commandels, with Burrows about five milesfrom Maiwand.

ORDERS OF BATTLEBritish Army: Brigadicr Ccnral G.R,S. BurrowsCs*lry: Brigadier-General Y. Nuttall3rd Bombay Light Cavalry: 6 British officers, l3 Iodian officersand300men.3rd Scinde Hone: 5 office^ and 250 rnen.Artillery: Major BlackwoodE/B Battery Royal Hone Artillery: 6 x 9 pdr light freld guns;5 officers and 189men.Captain Slade\ Smoothbore Battery (wali's): 4 x 6 pdls,2 x 12 pdr howitzers; 4 officrs and 56 men (42 belonging to66th Foot).InIa ry:H.M.66th Foot, (Berkshirc Regiment): 19 officen and 500 men(in six companiet.1st Bombay Grenadiers: 7 British officers and 641 me .

Tuto photos of a BiiE vercus Afghot$ gane staged by Alan & Michael Perry at the Pa izan convention at Newark in lune. Figurcsarc 25nm Waryames Fountuy, designed by the twit$, v'ho abo pain ed them and soatch-built tlte builditrgs and te ain. (Burh.ydidn't take the Dictures!J

22

30th Bonbay Infantry, (Jacob's Rifles):8officers and 617 nen.71 znd Company Bomhay Sappen and Miners:2officen and 43

Note: only4gT rounds available for smoothbore battery.Afghan Arml: Amir Ayub KhanCavahy:3 regiments of Kabul Regular Cavalry: I,000 men.I Regimenr oI Wal i \ Regular Cavalry: 500 men.Tribal Cavalry: 1,500men.Artilery:Battery:6 x Armstrong 12pdr breechloaders.4 Batteries each of: 6 x 6 or 9 pdr smoothbores, plus2 x 3pdrmountarn guns.Infantry:5 Regiments of Kabul Regular lnfantry: 2,000 men-4 Regiments of Herat Regular Infantry: I ,600 men.3 Regiments of Wali's Kandahar Regular Infantry: 1,000 men.Tribesmen:3,000 to 5,000 (including about 2,000 Ghazis).

bageage atMandabad. The attackson the baggagc train. whichwas defendd by about 600 men. lasted throughout thc baltle.The left flank of the British line was in the air and prone toattack hom Afghan cavalry so Burrows ordered the reserve tocover thh flank. The cavalry. parcelled out along the rear andflanks of the line. offered the only hope of salvation if theDosition was broken.

Ayub was as much surprised as Burrows and it took a halfhourforthef i rstof hisart i l leryto come into acl ion. Astheydidso theywere extended to the Afghan left and some were pusheddown the subsidiary ravioe to enfilade the British line- Theregularinfantrywas deployed in the centre of Ayub's Une; therewere nine regiments of these. On the right were most of hiscavalry and on the left irregular troops and ghazis. The wali stroops had also been added to Ayub's force. giving him astrength of some l2,ixxl men and 36 guns against the British2.600 and 12 suns.

ARTILLERY FIGHTINCAs Ayub brought more and more guns to bear on the Britishline, Burrows slowly began to realise the untenability of hisposition. The British guos could not subdue the Afghan fire.The Afghans had six 12 pdr breech-lordcrs which threw aheavir shell than the guns of the Royal Horse Artillery.Fortunatelythe Afghan shellsexploded in the rearofthe Britishline. The 66th aod 30th were partially covered by a fold in theground, but the two companies of the 30th on the extreme Ieftwere in open ground and suffered badlr'. The cavalry toosuffered severalcasualties. At about m'dday Burrows orderedthe Grenad;ers 1o advance. bul having made only 200 yards,they were forced 1o go to ground in the face ofheavy fire.

The Afghan regulars were also pinned down by the fire fromthe Grenadiers and the Horse Arlillery. Atlacks by tribesemenwere quickly repulsed by the devaslating f;e of the 66th, andthe smoothbore batterywas doing good service on both flanks.By l3.tn hours the 30th were showing signs ofwavering and thearmy was almost surrounded- Manyofficers in the Brithhfbrcebegan torealise thatonly a miracle could save them.

Half an hour later the smoolhbore battery ran out otammunition and was withdrawn to replenish. Slade, itscommander. assumed command ofthe horse artillery when hediscovered Blackwood going !o the rear with a severe wound.The Afghan cavalry now m assed for a charge on tbe British left.On officr suggested to Burrows that the lefl companies ofahe30th b thrcwn back to neet the charge. Burrows insisted thatthey be left;n place, fearing a rout ifheordered this manoeuvre.The sepoys were instead encouraged to open vouey fire at 700yardson the cavalry, but their marksmanship wasdefective-

On the right, the 66thwere in danger of being attacked in therear. BrieadieFGeneral Nuttall. commanding the cavalry,ordered Lieutenant Smith s troop and a half of the LightCavalry to charge. The troopers were reluctant to do so andNuttall had to speak to them severcly. ordering the men ioretum their carbines and draw sabres. Fonunately for thereluctant heroes. a ravine was discovered to the front andNuttall cancelled the charge.

CRISIS

BATTLE IS JOIIIEDBurrows' column was strung out for just over a mile and hisorder ofmarch was as follows:Scouts - Lt. A.M. Monteith's trooD- 3rd Scinde Horse and Lt.Ceoghegan stroop,3rd Bombay Light Cavalry.Advance Gunrd (1 mile behind scouts), Squadron of 3rdBombay Light Cavalry and Maclaine's section gB Royal HorseArtillery.MainBody- (500yardsbehind Advance Guard), 2 squadrons of3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, Bunows with staff and MajorBlackwood with Fowell'ssection E/B, R.H.A.Infantry in parallel columns with the smoothbores and Sappersand Miners between the columns. Baggage train on the right ofthe column escorted by 200 infantry.Rearguard - Malcolmson's Squadron of Scinde Holse andOsborn's setion ofE/B, R.H.A.

As Burrows ordered his force to cross a large ravine beyondthe village ofMandabad, he probably thought that he still had achance of reaching Maiwand before Ayub could bring up hismain army and artillery. Once across the ravine, he becamepainfully aware that this was not possible due to the largenumbers ofthe enemy in his front.

The battle commenced as Fowell\ section crossed the deepravine, galioped ahead for 500 yards, and went into action atabout 10.50 hours against some retiring Afghan cavalry whowere moving beyond effective range- Maclaine's guns crossedwest of Fowell and galloped out to nearly a mile beyond theravine where they opened fire against the enemy 1700 yardsaway. Burrows claimed that Maclaine's movement so far inadvance was completely unauthorised and had committed thewhole army to support him. Nevertheless, the infantry was gotacross the ravine and Osborne's sect;on unlimbered alongsideFoweil's who had also moved forward about 1500 yards andMaclaine'ssectionwas recalled so thatthe battery layin echelonfrom left forward with the Sappersaod Miners in support.

As they ame up the infantry formed on either side of thehorse artillery but to the rear, Greoadiers to the left and theright wiog ofthe 30th to the right and the 66th on the extremeright. The left wing of the 30th was in reserve and thesmoothbore battery to the left rear of the horse anillery. Theright fl ankof the Britishlineeventuallyhadtobethrown back inorder to face fire from a subsidiary ravine that xtended fromthe ravine they had crossed at Mandabad. The Afghans madefull use of this facility, sweeping down it and attacking the

By now the Afghans had managed to posilion two guns in theravine about 250 yards from the British centre. The Grenadierscame under a damaging fire from these. At about 1,1.30 hours.the Afghan anillery fire slackened. Suddenly. from thesubsidiary ravine, huge masses of tribesmen. led by ghazis,rushed upon the centre and left of Burrows' line. Th twocompanies ofthe 30th on the left instantly broke and thc chargestruck the Grcnadiers who had no time to form square hut

Sketch map showing theatre otoperations in Southern Afghanistan

managed to form a 'V' shaped line with its rear completelyexposed. The Grenadierc do not even seem to have managedtofix bayonets and they were so crcrvded together that they got ineach others way and were cut down in very short order. Thehorse adllery, firing their last rounds at 20 yarCs, managed,apart from Maclaine's section, to get away.

The disintegration of the left wing caused the remainingmmpanies ofthe 30th to retire hastilyon the left of the 66th, butthen broke under the Afghan onslaught. The only way toretrieve the worsening situation was to call a cavalry charge.Bec-ause the cavalry were distributed in penny packets behindthe line, Nuttall was only able to assemble the equivalent of twosquadrons - about 150 sabres. The cavalry had already beendi$oncerted by the Afghan artillery fire and were not keen tocharge. Nuttall ordered the charge as he had been directed,towards the abandoned guns of Maclaine's section. Instead ofattacking the main mass oftribesmen, the cavalry rode onto afew advanced Chazis who were amongst the Crenadiers, cutthem down and wheeled about. Burrows then asked MajorCurie to charge with the remainder of the cavalry, but Currieclaimed not to have have heard this oder and did not charge.Burrows asked Nuttall to make one morc charge, but Nuttallrcplied that this wasimpossible ashis men were outofhand, butthathewould rallythemon the retiringguns, which wasdone onthe far side of the main ravine near Mandabad. The smooth-bores were also Dlaced in Dosition here.

DISASTER

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Buftows losses were as follows:S t a f f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2R o y a l H o r s e A r t i f I e r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7R o y a | E n g i n e e r s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 6 t h F o o t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 83 r d 8 o m b a y L i g h t C a v a I r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 r d S c i n d e H o r s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 03 r d S a p p e r s & M i n e N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 21 s t B o m b a y G r e n a d i e n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A j3 0 t h B o m b a y I n f a n t r y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 3Nativedriversandfo|Iowers.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .786C a m e | s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 , 6 7 6P a c k p o n i e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 5M u I e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4D o n k e y s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 1B u | I o c k s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9Insses ran to 4570 of the total combatant force. The Afghanlosses are nowhere reliably stated, but 3,000 killed andwounded would be a fair estimate given the available data.

WARCAMINGTHEBATTLEOne ofthe best reasons for wargaming the battle is the fact thewhole affail can be fought on a table no more than eight or ninefeel long by six feet wide, using a ground scale of lmm to theyard. The ation was the bloodiest of the war, yet representsone ofthe smallest battles in terms of area covered and troopsinvolved. All this is within reach of the average wargamer.

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of refighting the wargame isthe tenain, which requires two major ravines plus several

The artillerytried to cover the retreat of the infantry, but theirposition on the main ravine was short lived as Afghan avalrythrcated to encircle the guns. By now the smoothbores werecompltely out of ammunition, but the horse artillery managedto come twice more into action. The infantry ran in the genenldirection of Mandabad, but the 66th, the Sappers and Minersand most of the Grenadiers retired on Khig. The bulk of thecasualties occurred during the retreat, especially amongst thenative soldiers who could not be induced to defend themselves.

At Khig a desperate last stand was made amidst its walledenclosures by. a hundred men of the 66th and they all paid withtheir lives- Bunows himself displayed great personal sacrificeby handing over his hoIse to the wounded Major Irdell of the30th in order to facilitate his escape. Burrows was finallyrescued by a nativeofficerof the3rdScindeHorsewhotookhimup behind him on his horse.

Once acrcss the main ravine, the Afghan pursuers began toease off, exhausted and lured byplunder. The RHA, a companyof the 66th, which had been on baggage guard duty and a troopof the Scinde Horse brought up the rear of the routed armywhich continued its weary way to Kandahar. reachingthecity at1400 hours the next day. The cavalry came under bitter criticismfor their failure to charge the pursuers and prevent stragglenand wounded from being cut down by the Afghans.

< I b'hbri,.n d

24

smaller ones to cut across the area of the battlefield. On a flattable, these ravines will have to be represented with cleverlyshaded lengths of card to create an illusion of depth.Altemativly some embanked river sections could be used,painted with sandy bottoms. (Or, if already painted as rivers,sand orbrown flock covered bottoms.) For a three dimensionaleffect, terrain squares will look best. but a cloth draped overareas ofcard spaced to representthe ravine couldlook almost asgood. The mainor Mandabad Ravine was 25 feet deep and lmfet wide andthesubsidiary ravine which ran at right angles intoit was 20 feet deep and about 50 feet wide. On table theravinesshould be scaled up to about half the figure sale used. In 15mnthe main ravine ould be 12cms wide. The rest ofthe tabletopterrain poses no problems, being a flat plain with occasionalscrub (use lichen), rocks and trees. The cover afforded by minorirregularities and undulations in the ground can be taken care ofin the fire factors or change dic roll.

For a historical refight ofthe game the British forces can beset up as they were shortly after 11.00 hours, or the British maybe allowed to develop their own tactics and perhaps advisedlydefend the main ravine near Mandabad. But in either case theright flank will be well open to infiltration via the main ravine,unless the Bdtish attempt to seize its junction with the

figures.Half Company Bombay Sappers & Miners, 2 B Class figures.3rd Bonbay Light Cavalry: 3 squadrons of 5 C Class figurs.3rd Scinde Horse:3 squadrons of4 C Class figures.Baggage Trainr 50 assorted animals (nainly camels), plus

Notq All companies ofthe British force may operate indepen-dently.

AFGHANS

WARGAME FORCESI have chosen to base the army lists oo Newbury's 19th Centuryrules and have represented 50 tribesmen $ith one figure. Forthe British, one artillery figure represents 10 men, one modelrepresenrs 2 guns and for all others, one figure represents 20men. AJghan b.tteries, regiments and battalions hav a similarreDresentation. but I have reduced the overallnumbers ofunitsby one third to allow for sfiaggling on the march and theineffectiveness of the numerical superiority they enjoyed.

The British have a good selection of commanders to maintainmorale. They may become casualties in the normal way. Theloss ofan Indian unit commandetcauses the usual -3 to moraleif within 30cms but also causes a permanent 1 in subsequentmorale tests. The British and Sepoys are armed with breech-loading rifles, though the British guns (Martini-Henry's) aremore accurat and shoot further than the SeDovs' Snider-Enfields which range up lo o0cms only. The cavairyare arrnedwith Snider-Enfield breechloading carbines. The Afghanregulars have Enfield nuzzle-loading rifles. The 3 and 6pounders and 12 pounder howitzen count as light guns, the 12poundenas heaiy, and all others medium.

Total figures for the British are 9 staff figures, 90 infantry, 27cavalry,6 guns. Totals for the Afghans are 7 stafffigures, 150rgular infantry, 45 regular c.avahy, 8 guns, 60 irregular horseand 160 irrecular foot.

BRITISHArny Commander (Bunows)Cavalry Commander (Nuuall)Artillery Conrnander (Blackwood)Smoothbore Battery Commander (Slade)3 Infantry Commanders2 Cavalry Comnanders3 x9pdr rifled guns plus 12A Class RHA gun crew.2x6pdr smoothbore guns, 1x12pdr howitzr plus 9 A Classcrew figures,66th Foot: 6companies each of 4 A Class figures.lst Bombay Grenadien: 8 companies, each of4 B Class figures.30th Bombay Native Infantry: 8 companies, each of4 C Class

Army Conmander (Ayub)2Infantry Commanders1 Cavalry Commander1 Artillery Commander2 Tribal LeadersBattry: 2x12pdr rifled breechloaders plus 10 C Class crwfigures.2 Batteries each of: 2x9pdr smoothbores, plus 8 C Class crcwfigures.2 Batteries each of: 2x6pdr smoothbores, plus 8 C Class crwfigures.Battery: 2x 3pdr moufltain gun, plus 6 C Class crew figures.6 Regular Infantry Battalions (Ayub's), each of 20 C ClassMilitiafigures.2 Regular Infantry Battalions (.wali's), each of 15 D ClassMilitiafigures.2 Regular Cavalry Regiments (Ayub's), each of 15 C ClassMilitia figures.I Regular Cavalry Regiment (Wali's), of 15 D Class Militiafigures.IregularHorse:4 Bandsof 15 B Classfigures each.Inegular Foot:4 Bands of Jezailchis (skirrnishers), each of 15C Class dbesmen figures.2 Bands of Swordsmen, each of 30 C Class tribesemen figures.2 Bands of Ghazis each of 20 B Class fanatic figures.

TAILORING TIIE RULESTo reflect more accurately the superiority of the Britishfirepower compared to that of the Sepoys it is necessary to classthe sepoys as"OtherRegulars" for troop type butcount them as"British Regulars" in melee.

Afghan smoothbore artillery may fire up to I bound ofcanister fire, otherwise shot only. Afghan rifled adllery mayfire shell only- The British guns may fire shrapnel on short fusewhich counts as canister, as well as case and shell, The Britishsmoothbore battery has enough ammunitionwith it to fire for 6bounds, only two more bounds ofshell fire by replenishing fromthe supply train. The RHA battery may fire for 8 bounds andmay resupply another four bounds ofammunition.

Due to the heat haze, the dust and th irregularities of theground, troops firing at targets over 600 yards away must makea reduction of -2 on their fir factors. Artillery firing shell orcase at prone troops take an additional -4 reduction on theirfire factors. Prone troops cannot shoot at any standing targetsmore than 400 yards away and other prone troops at more than200 yards away.

Rallying squares can be formed in a half move by individualBritish or Indian cornpanies who have a reaction of "Stand orevade" in an initial charge reaction test. No firing is allowedwhilst forming a rallying square. A rallying square does notcount as a proper battalion square would to charging oppo-nents. but counts as a +3 in melee reaction.

Afghan tribesmen count an extra +1 for morale for each

PEfiR PIG ut*..wirh More oinkNElg l'mVW? - Th. sh of a big mgaIdel for s*imish6 o. battl6. U* you. disring r 5'm r.min. .4rothdorigin2l ide fiom Peter AE, W sd with aly Eurcpcr dtar. ofop.niio6. P6ec 3 FrcL5 cd 95p ud cooein a piec6.

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snd sAI to. smple md [st. P&P ro% .Trroihd 7 696a. gstrm-(Nom6ey$!

Andenon, J. H. ( l90s), Tft e Afshan wat, R.J . t-e,ach & co.Cailwell, C.E. ( la06). Snaal Warr. E.P. Publishing.Featherstone, D.F. (1973), Colonial Snu Wan, David &Charles.Featherstone, D.F. (1989\,victo a's Enemies, Blandford.Heathcote, T. A. ( 1980), r,,r e Afghan wars, Osprey .Roberts, F.S. (1987), Fo.,)-One Yea6 in India,landon.Robson,B. (1986), rre Roal ro /

26..ARTILLERY OF THE SUNG DY:IIASTY'

By Chris Peers

The Sung dynasty of medieval China (or more accurately theNorthem and Southern Sung dynasties: 960 to 1126 and 1127 to1279AD respeclively) was among the leading exponents in thepre-Renaissance world of the use of artillery, bo.h for siegewarfare and in thefield. Artillery in the fonn of giant crossbowshad been known in China since the Chou period, parallelingdevelopments in Greece, bur by the sixth century A.D. adisdnctively Orientat type of stone'throwing engine was in use,based notonlorsion as in the West, buton leverage, employinga pivoted throwing arm with a sling at one end containing themissile. Power was supplied by crwmen pulling on ropesattached to the other end of the aIIn;the end holding the missilewas fastened or held down while tension was applied and thenreleased suddenly, the combination of leverage and theflexibilityofthe arn givingthe projectile its force. Thistype ofartillerv. sometimes known as a "Derrier" from ahe French"penidre" was brought to;ts peak oa development by the Sungand is the subject ofthis article. The crossbow type was still inuse. but other systems sometimes associated with this dynastyseem not to have been known, at least until the very last years ofthe Sung. Gunpowder cannon first appear in the historicalrecord in the 1280s and the rocketlaunchers often found inSung wargames armies are even more ofan anachronisn, beingfirst described in the 1340s. Rokets had existed since about1150, but evidence for their rnililary use is very uncertain, theterm fta chien" which was later used forthem probably in Sungtimes denoting a fire-arrow. In the West the rope-operatedstone'thrower developcd into the trebuchel, powered by acounterweight, which permitted greater accuray and the use ofrnore powerful engines and heavier nissiles at the cost of areduced rate of fire, but the earliest appearance ofthis type inChina was in a Mongol army at the siege of Hsiang-yang in 1272,where it proved its superiority by bringing about the rapidsurrender of the city. Subsequently the counterweight engineenjoyed a briefvogue in China, but the influene ofgunpowderbrought th development of the traditional type to a halt;examples illustrated in seventeenth-cefltury manuak being ineffect identical to those ofthe Sung era.

From sources such as the'wu C hinq Tsung Yao' ("Coltec-tion of the Most Important Military Techniques") of 10,14 wecan obtain precise information on the construction of thesemachines as well as on their perfonnance. The throwing arm,which could be up to 28 feet in lenglh, had to combine strengthwithflexibility, a combination sometimes achieved by making ito{ up to 15 pieces of wood lashed together and planed into acoflical shape, the end with the sling attached being thinner incross-section than the other. The arm was fixed to the pivot sothat the thinner section was the longer (see illustrations) 2 to 3times the lengtb of th short section in heavy engines,5 to 6times in light ones. in which the whip-action of the armcontributed propodonally 'nore ofthe power. The hempropesattached to the short section numbered up to 125. with a total of250or more men to pull on them. Missilesolover 130lbs couldbe propelled by the heavier varieties. and the manualsestablished an optimum arm length and thickness for eachweighi ofprojectile.

The ftames supporting the arms fell into three naincategories, as illustrated below. The first. mounted on a singleolumn, was the earliesi. lt was relatively light and so could bequickly set up, and was often mounted on a wheeled base forextra rnobility, but could not cope with the stresses involved inshooting heavy missiles. The second (type B below) was on atriangular base. which, to judge from its Chinese names.

rerninded people ofan animal sitting on its haunches. The factthat its centre of gravity was towards the thick end of the armwas said to make ii the most powerful system for its size, butagain ir was not suitable for very heavy weights. The largest andcommonest type was a pyramidal four legged base, which wasthe best for very powerful engines. The range ofthese machineswas dependent on a number of factors other than size, but forpractical purposes may not have varied much; optimum rangewas in the region of 80 to 160 yards, with 500 yards as anabsolute maximum for the best stone-throwers. Standardisationmade mass-production ofartillery fairly simple, and very largenumbers were often employed. The Emperor T'ai tsungorde.ed 800 in 979, and at the defence of K'aifeng against theJurchen in 1126 the Sung had at least 500 engines. Thiscompares with the very much smaller numbers of trebuchetsseen in medieval Europe; Chnstine de Pisan, early in thefi fteenthcentury, suggests thal abesieging annyneeds atotal offourl

AA: Light stoneahrch'er mounted on single colunn suppo .Frcm "Wu Pei Chih of 1621, this nachine is tlpical oJ thosebuilt undet the SunB and i ustrltis the persistence of tradinonala i ery we into the Bunpowder age.

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENTSung anillery was in general used in similar circumstances tothose in which later dvnasties would enploy cannon. ApartIrom its obvious value in sieges, il was regularly carried on shipsand sited to defend harbours and bridges against naval attack.In the field, it was valuable for cover'ng or opposing rivercrossings and for the defence of camps. as well as in pitchedbattles. Ii is likely that the l;ghrness and rnobilily of manyChinese machines made them more suitable for fleld use thanthe heavy Wesrem trebuchets. An interesting development wasthe use against besieging armies of indirect fire from engineshidden within the walls, th fall ofshot being conrrolled by anobserver in a suilable vantage poinl. Each machine was underthe command of a Pao-rlo, or anilleryman - ihis is the sameterm as that used for the manufacturers of artillery, and it islikelythatoften ahe same man woulddesign a piece, oversee itsconstruction and command it in action.

' Obviously the accuracy of these engines would normally onlypermit them to engage larger targets such as a body of troops, aship or a ciry wall. although the counterweight weaponinlroduced at Hs;ang yang caused a stir by hitiing the cenlrallower ofthe cily. a considefable distance beyond the walls, withitsfirstshot.lt was recognised. however. thatitwould be usfulto pick offenemy officers at bcyond nornal battlefield ranges,and throughout Sung history we hea. of prominent commandersbeing killed by artillery, although perhaps not as a resuh ofindividual aimd shols; the mosi eminent victim was probablythe Mongol Khan Mongke. fatally wounded outside Tiao-yu in1259. lt should be mentioned in tbis connection that the mainenemies of the Sung. the Jurchen and the Mongols, quicklyadopted Chinese ani l lery. usingit in numbers andwith aski l l tomatch the Sung themselves. Mongol artillerymen were in factmainlv northern Chinese.

TYPESOFMISSILESAnolber aspecr of Chinese artillery which reached its peakunder the Sung was ihe use of an enormous variety ofspecialised nissiles for different purposes. Most common weresolid stone or clay balls. carefully polished for aerodynamicefficiency. which were used for destroying fortifications. Whenstone was not available balls could be made fron metal,terracotta or even ice. By about 975 the development ofgunpowder had proceded to a poinl which permitted the use ofincendiary missiles. using a mixturevery low insaltpetre similarto that used for slow maicb. These were particularly usefulagainsl ships. and by the thirteenth ceniury had given rise to asemiexplosive coloured flare which could be shot into the airfor signalling purposes. Meanwhiie truly explosive bombs hadbeen invented;these are f'rst described in ihe 'lyr Crr-"g IJ,ngydo of 10,14. but for a long time could be used only with softcasings as the explosive power ofrhe gunpowder available wasinsufficientto burst a hard shell. By 1220 this had been recrifiedby inc.casiog the proporiion of saltpetre in the powder to}ound 75", . { i r ing r i .e ro r nFi le kno$n h) lhe awe inrpir in8namc ol chien-t'ien-lei or -heaven-making thunder" aniron-cascd fragmentation bomb. This musrbave had a dramaticeffecl on anillery ractics. and contemporary sources are full ofaccounts of heavy casuahies inflicted by such missiles. ThOfficialHistorv oftheJurchen Kin dvnasrv describes one bomb

B:The SitliigTiBer", an engi e ofthe second rype. Alter "WuChinq Tsung Yaa of 1011.

5O,OOO + SECOND HAND WARGAMES FIGURESAlways in stock. All scales. Most manufacturers.

SAE for lists to:A.J. Dumelow,

53 Stanton Road' Stapenhill,Burton-on-Trent, Staffs. DE15

Telephone: (02E3) 30556as devastating an area of haff a "mu" Goughly an area 20yardssquare), the splinters penetra.ing both iron and leatherarmour.The Japanese "Mongol Invasion Scroll" of 1293 shows such abornb exploding in front of a mounted samurai. Towards theend ofthe Sung dynasty, however, there seems to have been ashonage ol thi . t lpe of ammun'r 'on: Li f fnC po. wri t ing in1257. complained that although the garrison of Chingchiangshould have had several hundred thousand iron bombs therewere in fact only 85. No doubt thiswas one reason for the failureof the Sung artillery .o play a nore decisive role in the dynasiy'sfinal death-struggle against the Mongols.

SUGGESTED READING

27

cC Ensine on four-legged tane ofthe third type,lrcn"wu Peichih".

P.V. Hansen. "The Witch with Ropes for Han". in Militar!IUU:narcd no .47 , April 1992.J- Needham, Sclnce drd Ctvilisation inChinaVol.s, Part7, TheGunpowdet Epic; Camb'idge Univcrstity Press. 1989.S. Skoljar, "L'Artillerie de Jet a l'Epoqu Sung", in E aderSors Series 1, Vol.2 (ed. F. Aubin), Sorbonne. 1971.

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2A

RULES FOR THE WARS OF THE ROSESBy lohn Banlett

THE R.EASONINC BEHIND TI{E RIJLES theunitt morale points- A result of:It is my opinion that warfare in this period was mainly a set oflarge mCles, preceded by an exchange of archery andoccasionally cannon fire. The leader in such a conflict wereusually on foot and led from the ftont, thus makingany attemptto control the conflict, except in their immediate vicinity, animpossibility. I wanted a set of rules that mimicked this lack ofcommand control, which is the reason each unit has a writtenorder before the battle ommences and must then operatewithin the Darameters of that order- AcceDtable orde^ couldbe, for archers, "Hold + Fire : Retire if charged" or for mainBattles (a Battle in this instance being a group of mel6esDecialists) "Move forward behind archersi when archers retirecharge enemy". These examples should give the general ideathat orders should be no more than two choices and should besimplistic.

Another concept that I wished to eliminate was that ofsmallindependent units, zipping about willy niIy, which in myopinion l