Running head: KENNEDY – KHRUSHCHEV NEGOTIATIONS 1

Kennedy – Khrushchev Negotiations

Lori Bingaman

Siena Heights University

LDR 655

Professor Wallace

August 3, 2012

KENNEDY – KHRUSHCHEV NEGOTIATIONS 2

Kennedy – Khrushchev Negotiations

President John F. Kennedy at the age of 43 was the youngest man to be elected President of

the United States. He was handsome, charismatic, and a brilliant orator, who was outwardly

confident. During those three short years in office which took place during the cold war, he was

called upon to lead the United States in complicated negotiations with the Soviet Union against

an older, more polished opponent, Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev was the leader of the Soviet

Union. Khrushchev honestly believed in the superiority of communism, and felt that it was only

a matter of time before it would destroy the capitalist system once and for all. Several major

events took place during that period requiring negotiating skill and artful accomplishments.

Khrushchev was looking forward to these future negotiations with the newly elected President

Kennedy verses the alternative of Richard Nixon who had outwardly condemned his communism

(Kempe, 2011, p. 6). Shortly after taking office the Bay of Pigs fiasco happened under the

President’s watch and due this blunder, Khrushchev was eager to negotiate with Kennedy just six

weeks later at the proposed Vienna summit, a site that highly favored the Soviet leader. By

President Kennedy’s own admission he was ill prepared for the negotiations that took place there

and Khrushchev mercilessly “…beat the hell out of me” (Thrall & Wilkins, 2008).

Already downtrodden by the Bay of Pigs incident and the Vienna Summit, in August of 1961,

the Berlin Wall was erected with virtually no opposition from the Kennedy. It was not until

October of 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis that Kennedy appeared in charge and on top of

his negotiation game.

Kennedy, during his short tenure in office, dealt with much at home, but also much in the way

of negotiations with the Soviet Union while the world watched. The cross-cultural negotiations

that took place were complicated and included the added dimensions of different social structure,

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different culture, different values, different beliefs and different practices. Did he avert world

catastrophe and nuclear annihilation through skillful negotiations during that period or did he

bring them upon us with his youthful inexperience?

Negotiations – Distributive verses Integrative

Negotiations are a fact of life. Negotiating agreement without giving in, getting taken or

getting nasty is possible and the difference between distributive and integrative negotiations

(Fisher & Ury, 1981). Distributive bargaining situations, also coined win-lose bargaining or

competitive bargaining generally result in the goals of one party being met with little or no

positive outcome resulting for the opposing party. They are “… a conflict situation, wherein

parties seek their own advantage – sometimes through concealing information, attempting to

mislead, or using manipulative actions” (Lewicki, Barry & Saunders, 2011). In contrast,

integrative negotiations, also known as win-win negotiations incorporate a collaborative effort

between the parties to achieve positive outcomes for both parties and to maximize objectives

through determining commonalities and problem-solving (Lewicki et al., 2011). Integrative

negotiations should produce a wise agreement if agreement is possible. They should be efficient

and it should improve or at least not damage the relationship between the parties (Fisher & Ury,

1981). When the ‘parties’ are countries partaking in a cold war who have at their disposal the

ability to launch a nuclear missiles aimed toward each other, maintaining relationships,

communication, and determining the best possible outcome, that is the BATNA, is certainly to

say the least, imperative.

Cross-Cultural Negotiations

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As we look at cross-cultural negotiations, that is, negotiations when more than one country or

culture partakes in the negotiations, the complexity of the situations will increase immensely

(Lewicki et al., 2011). Both the environmental context and the immediate context at shown in

Table 1 below must be taken into account. One must understand how these forces both

manipulate and influence the situations at hand. The environmental context includes: political

and legal pluralism, international economics, foreign governments and bureaucracies, instability,

ideology and culture (Lewicki et al., 2011, p. 232). The immediate context, while having

influence and existing in all negotiation, will have new and more complicated implications in

cross-cultural situations.

Table 1

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Cultural values and negotiation norms must also be taken into account as they may differ in dramatic

ways. Dimensions of culture identified by Brett (2009) include:

Individualism versus collectivism (human motive concerning preservation of self vs. the

collective)

Egalitarianism versus hierarchy (means by which people influence others, either laterally or

hierarchically)

Direct versus indirect communication (manner in which information is exchanged)

The United States would be identified with high individualism and hierarchical power, while Russian

culture would profess collectivism and egalitarian tendencies.

Negotiating with Russia – Bias and Stereotypes

Preceding, during, and even after the cold war, stereotypes and perceptions surround our

image of Russia or the then, Soviet Union. Negotiations with the Soviet Union are primarily

characterized as distributive in nature. “American and Soviet nuclear doctrines are diametrically

opposed...they are products of totally different historical experiences and political and

socioeconomic systems...In Russia, the primary approach to negotiating is to employ distributive

and contingency bargaining” (Katz, 2006). A zero - sum game, in which one side’s gain equals

the other side’s loss, is the preferred negotiation style. Ambassador Edward Rowny, special

adviser to former President Reagan for arms control, also contends that “that there is a great

difference between what Soviet leaders say in public and what they permit to happen at the

negotiating table” (Katz, 2006). They do not make concessions as that would be dubbed a “mark

of weakness, and weakness is not to be respected” (Katz, 2006). Rowny describes Russian

negotiation tactics as purely distributive win-lose negotiation in nature while trying to give the

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impression of win-win (2006). “We (United States) have come to understand that, whereas we

would like to ‘work out solutions’, the Soviet side believes that it must compete in order to win”

(Rowny, 2006). Based on his personal experiences of 15 years of negotiating with Russia, he

developed a list he called the ‘Ten Commandments for negotiating with the Soviet Union’:

1. Above all, remember the objective.

2. Be patient.

3. Keep secrets that concern negotiations.

4. Bear in mind the differences in the two political systems.

5. Beware of “Russians bearing gifts”.

6. Remember that to the Soviet side form is substance.

7. The concept that Soviet leaders have “paranoid fear of being invaded” is a Western myth.

8. Beware of negotiating at the 11th hour.

9. Pay great attention to semantics, since Soviet representatives try to habituate the other

side to employing Soviet terminology.

10. Don’t misinterpret the human element.

Rowdy’s conclusion states that “our systems, culture, history, national experiences and goals

are very different” (2006). Therefore, we must bear in mind our differences, become familiar

and attempt to manage them. We must be as prepared as “they” have become and study their

political systems, know their weaknesses and attempt to remain strong while holding on to the

values of our country.

Cutlture as an Iceberg

Thompson (2005) provides us with a comparison between a typical iceberg and roots of

culture. Generally, only about one-ninth of an iceberg structure is visible while the rest is hidden

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and submerged. “The top portion includes the behavior, artifacts and institutions that

characterize a culture” (Thompson, 2005, p.244). Deeper held values, beliefs, and norms lie

below the surface and buried deeper yet are the “fundamental assumptions about the world and

humanity…to change such expressions and customs would be to challenge centuries-old beliefs

and values” (Thompson, 2005, p. 245). Kennedy dealt with deeply held values and assumptions

of Khrushchev and others. While not assumed to come to fruition in his lifetime, Khrushchev

firmly believed that communism would win out and replace capitalism. Two opposing deeply

held assumptions and values were competing while the world was watching the events about to

unfold.

President Kennedy’s Inaugural Address

It is clear from his speech, President Kennedy was aware that the cultural and spiritual

origins of the United States were not those of the Soviet Union as he himself referenced those

differences in his inaugural address. Kennedy said, “We dare not tempt them with weakness.

For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they

will never be employed” (The greatest american, 2006, p. 125). And later, the now famous and

often quoted “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate. Let both

sides…formulate serious and precise proposals…and bring the absolute power to destroy other

nations under the absolute control of all nations” (The greatest american, 2006, p. 126). In those

few short paragraphs, President Kennedy noted or alluded to the fact that during the cold war, the

external stakeholders went well beyond the government and borders of two nations. Much was

at stake. The ideological differences, cultural difference and political pluralism, combined with

instability of the cross-cultural negotiations called for massive value creation during negotiations

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and a definite win-win outcome. President Kennedy, in his speech, seemed to indicate that he

was well aware of these factors, yet history tells perhaps not prepared for them.

Bay of Pigs – Perception Begins

The Bay of Pigs was an operation began during the Eisenhower administration by a group of

Cuban exiles. Kennedy “neither canceled the operation…nor gave it the resources required for

success” (Kempe, 2011, p. 487). The blunder was quickly studied by Khrushchev. Kennedy

was thought to be rash enough to strike at Cuba but not bold enough to finish the job. “The

European view was that we were watching a gifted young amateur practice with a boomerang,

when they saw, to their horror, that he had knocked himself out” (Kempe, 2011, p. 175).

Khrushchev’s perception of Kennedy after the debacle was the he was an inexperienced young

leader who could be intimidated and blackmailed.

Power and Perception Continues in Vienna

After the Bay of Pigs, Khrushchev was eager for the young, inexperienced President Kennedy

to meet with in Vienna. The president had two short months to prepare for the meeting. During

the summit, he ignored advice was consequently bullied and overpowered by the more skilled

Khrushchev. His charm and personality did not win in this arena. Kennedy, in an interview with

New York Times columnist James “Scotty” Reston, when asked about the Summit, responded

“He savaged me” (Thrall & Wilkins, 2008). Kennedy realized he needed to determine two

things, first exactly why Khrushchev “…did it, and in such a hostile way. And second, to figure

out what we can do about it” (Thrall & Wilkins, 2008). While not prepared for the battle,

Kennedy seemed ready to diagnose the fundamental structure of the negotiations that had take

place.

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According to Katz, the pace of negotiations in Russia is generally slow and protracted.

“Success requires extreme patience in this country” (Katz, 2008). The fact that Khrushchev was

now ready to meet, and meet quickly at that, should have alarmed President Kennedy.

“Although Kennedy was keenly aware of some of the risks of such meetings — his Harvard

thesis was titled “Appeasement at Munich” — he embarked on a summit meeting with

Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, a move that would be recorded as one of the more self-

destructive American actions of the cold war, and one that contributed to the most dangerous

crisis of the nuclear age.” Khrushchev left Vienna with a profound sense of victory and very

“low opinion of the leader of the free world” (Thrall & Wilkins, 2008). It would appear at this

point intangible factors were now play within the negotiations. Khrushchev and the Soviets were

out to win.

“Often, value is left on the table because people are not prepared for the challenges of cross-

cultural negotiation” (Thompson, 2005, p. 243). This also was certainly true for President

Kennedy during the Vienna Summit. In the Cold War summitry between Kennedy and

Khrushchev in Vienna 1961, Khrushchev was obviously employing a power-based approach,

given his aggressive attitude toward the US president (Cheng, 2009). Perhaps if he had insisted

on more time and preparation, and exerted more patience, the ego boost received by Khrushchev

may have been less profound.

Negotiations are based on perception, cognition and emotion. Perception and emotion over

past negotiations will guide the current and future attitudes and events (Lewicki et al., 2011).

Kennedy, for his all his faults thus far, at least appeared to realize the negative image he

portrayed and the perception he created for the world.

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Berlin 1961 – Be Willing to Walk Away

Germany was a country divided after the WWII. The division lied between the political and

social idealologies of the Western free world (West Germany) and the Eastern communist states

(East Germany). The west flourished bringing forth an onslaught of refugees from the east via

Berlin on a daily basis. This created a struggle for Khrushchev as it was well known that if East

Germany fell, other countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and the rest would follow.

Khrushchev was aware of the external stakeholders that were involved along with the remaining

environmental context employed. He was also aware of how masterfully he had beaten Kennedy

during the Vienna Summit. The Berlin wall was constructed seemingly overnight. The cold war

battle lines were clearly drawn and would be frozen in place for another three decades. As

President Kennedy stood by and offered no resistance, conceded “a wall is a hell of a lot better

than a war” (Thrall & Wilkins, 2008).

Lewicki et al., (2011) states that “achieving a valued outcome, not reaching an agreement per

se. Strong negotiators remember this and are willing to walk away from a negotiation when no

agreement is better that a poor agreement or when the process is so offensive the deal isn’t worth

the work” (p. 253-254). Harvard Business School Professor of Management Practice, Michael A.

Wheeler explains “Skillful negotiation starts with having a clear sense of when to walk away, in

order to avoid being browbeaten into accepting unreasonable terms” (Johnson, 2012). Kennedy

allowed the Berlin wall construction as a concession and under the precept a wall was better than

a war. Realistically, would the Soviet Union have responded with force had Kennedy disallowed

the wall? Khrushchev’s intent was to show to power, his power and the power of the Soviet

Union. His intent was to dominate and to humiliate and achieve as much of the pie as possible.

So, perhaps unfortunately, yes.

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Cuban Missile Crisis Negotiations – Saving Face

The Bay of Pigs incident, the perception of Kennedy during the Vienna Summit, and

Kennedy’s failure to act in 1961 over the construction of the Berlin wall, in all probability were

the contributing factors that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. While the crisis was brief, it was

also very real and very dangerous. The Soviets had placed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba as

a show of force. However, these negotiations, between Kennedy and Khrushchev did not yield

the same unfortunate results as previous encounters. Lines of communication were open with

both direct and indirect correspondence. The best possible BATNA, no war, no admitted

concessions, no initial removal of missiles from Turkey, afforded Kennedy ‘win’ in a win-lose or

lose-lose situation. The perception of the president and the United States in the eyes of the world

changed for the better with the outcome. Khrushchev however never regained his prestige after

the incident and was ousted from office two years later. As history reports, there is no evidence

to support that Khrushchev questioned the power of America, but he did indeed question

Kennedy’s readiness to use it (Brussel, 1992).

Today’s ‘Cold War’

Then, as now, “…negotiators face strategic and moral issues every time they go to the

bargaining table (Johnson, 2012). "In the long run, reputations matter…And what we think of

ourselves when we look in the mirror may matter even more. When parties can get beyond mere

haggling and are able to create tangible value, they may also be more inclined to reach outcomes

that square with one another's personal values." (Johnson, 2012)

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The political and legal pluralism in the early 1960’s, a time during the cold war, was of course

much different than that of today (Lewicki et al., 2011, p. 233). While that is true with modern

Russia, our new apocalyptic worry is of course Iran. As President Obama took office, he

promised the Muslim world respect and “…American friendship…in Iran and beyond, that this

could be a new start” (Parsi, 2012). However, negotiations over the nuclear programs quickly

failed. America and her allies “assumed Iranian duplicity and insincerity. For their part, the

Iranians saw in America’s outstretched hand only the determination to snatch from their country

its independence, rights and potential”(Parsi, 2012). The cultural differences that exist between

Iran and America run deep. “Animosity towards America is written into the Islamic Republic’s

DNA” and the three decades of “demonizing each other, is no longer a phenomenon…it is an

institution” (Parsi, 2012).

To the credit of Kennedy and Khrushchev and their predecessors, even during the “deepest

chill of the cold war, they found ways of talking” (Parsi, 2012).

Conclusions

There were numerous miscommunication and misunderstandings between the United States

and Soviet Union that makes one wonder whether we might have produce better outcomes if we

had more clearly understood the domestic, economic, political, and other forces compelling our

rival’s behavior. Kennedy was intelligent and charismatic but young and inexperienced. His

reputation was damaged which perhaps prohibited from further exploring mutual interests and

creating mutual value early on in his presidency.

As with all history, being what it is, history, we have ability to look back, reflect and analyze

the negotiations that took place on those multi-cultural fronts and speculate about what might

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have been had the negotiations evolved differently. We can speculate whether or not the Bay of

Pigs incident should have happened at all and why when allowed to continue, Kennedy did not

stand behind his decision and send much needed aid during the operation. We can see that

Kennedy worsened relations with the Soviets and the image of the United States in the eyes of

the world during the Vienna Summit. Could he, should he, have delayed the Summit and

prepared better for such an event? One would definitely think so. As the ominous Berlin Wall

was being constructed and later stood as a divide along party lines, could Kennedy have

prevented its existence or removed it by force? Had any of these events evolved differently,

would the Cuban Missile Crisis have happened at all? One thing is for sure, “while negotiations

are always in the present they are influenced by what looms in the past and are constrained by

the shadow of the future” (Lewicki et al., 2011, p. 241).

President Kennedy dealt with the issues at hand within the environmental contexts set before

him. In regards to the Bay of Pigs and the Vienna Summit, results were poor and the president

did not come close to achieving a BATNA. He failed to prepare, was intimidated and achieved

no valuable outcome. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, BATNA was achieved. Missiles were

removed and a nuclear war did not ensue. Did the former negotiations inspire or cause the latter?

One would have to say yes. Were Kennedy’s actions acceptable as the Berlin wall held so many

captive for so many years? Was it time to walk away because there was no true alternative? Just

as the Israelites were made to wander in the desert for forty years until a generation had died off

and the deep rooted culture was waning, perhaps the end of the cold war could not come about

until leaders who had thrived under Stalin, i.e. Khrushchev had also died off as well.

Khrushchev was a communist through and through and ready to die for his cultural values and

beliefs. His cultural roots were deep. The world was watching and the relationship that was

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visible between the Soviet Union and the United States at the time was only the tip of the

iceberg. How Kennedy faired throughout his tenure of course lies in the eyes of the beholder and

as Kennedy himself said in his inaugural address, “with history the final judge” of his deeds (The

greatest american, 2006, p. 127).

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References

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Brett, J. M. (2009). Negotiating globally, how to negotiate deals, resolve disputes, and make decisions across cultural boundaries. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc Pub.

Brussel, G. S. (1992). The cuban missile crisis. Case Study 334, Columbia University, New York, New York. Retrieved from http://userpages.umbc.edu/~simpson/Hist 725 Summer 2006/Cuban Missile Crisis 1962.pdf

Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). Getting to yes negotiating agreement without giving in. New York, NY: Penguin Books.

Johnson, K. (2012). The art of haggling. Retrieved from http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/6922.html

Katz, L. (2006). Negotiating international business. (pp. 345-353). Booksurge. Retrieved from http://www.globalnegotiationresources.com/cou/Russia.pdf

Kempe, F. (2011). Berlin 1961: Kennedy, khrushchev, and the most dangerous place on earth. (1st ed.). New York, NY: Penguin Group.

Lewicki, R. J., Barry, B., & Saunders, D. M. (2011). Essentials of negotiation. (5th ed.). New York: Irwin Professional Pub.

Parsi, T. (2012, Februart 25). A single roll of the dice: Obana's diplomacy with iran. The Economist, 402(8773), 97.

Thompson, L. L. (2005). The mind and heart of the negotiator. (3 ed.). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc.

Thrall, N., & Wilkins, J. J. (2008, May 22). Kennedy talked, khrushchev triumphed. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/22/opinion/22thrall.html?_r=3&hp&oref=slogin&oref=slogin