Grassroots, self-aggrandisement, Astroturf, trolls or sockpuppets in Ukraine?

Evidence… and evidence of a lack of evidence

As part of my ongoing analysis of metal detecting (an open-source analysis of quantitative data), I have been looking at Central-Eastern Europe, specifically Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. I have managed to identify ranges of keywords in Belarusian, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian; ranges of online forums, social networks and other indicators; and a variety of sources that help to contextualise and interpret the evidence.

I have gathered evidence that indicates there are at least more than 100,000 treasure-hunters across these countries. However, I have also found evidence of impossible numbers in communities for Ukraine, which cannot easily be dismissed, either as a product of the automatic registration of bots (web crawlers or spiders, also known as “general bots” to distinguish them from “social bots” and “political bots”, cf. Zhdanov and Orlov, 2017: 5) from search engines that index the information on those sites, or as a product of the deliberate registration of bots to fabricate evidence of larger communities. Of what it is a product, I do not know.

Much of the text is a description of the data, for the sake of accessibility. However, I have tried to highlight the key data in the tables and their graphs. Hopefully, it is only necessary to skim-read the painful details of the data or even the plain English summary of the data, before reading the consideration of what is being done?

A plain English summary of the data

Belarusian and Polish communities grew by ranges from fewer than a hundred to more than a thousand, at rates of fewer than five persons per day. Russian communities grew by thousands, at rates of between ten and twenty persons per day.

Although Ukrainian communities started with populations that differed by thousands or even tens of thousands, one “pair” grew by the same, far larger number of around 16,000, at the same, far higher rate of around 53-54 persons per day; another “pair” grew by the same, even larger number of around 163,000-164,000 at the same, even higher rate of around 533-536 persons per day, which is obviously exactly ten times higher.

The painful details of the data

Date BS BSP PE PKPS MDReg MDRu ShS VA VFB VVK02/08/03 83906/02/05 204308/08/05 0 0 004/01/07 4,04929/11/08 003/02/09 15221/02/09 23125/09/10 8,02118/02/11 1,28803/04/11 1,94716/12/11 13,377

02/01/13 13,28901/04/13 6,04024/04/13 2,29107/08/13 5,11517/01/14 11,52301/07/14 3,24526/11/14 3,01416/01/15 13,02015/03/15 14,45111/04/15 56,77617/06/15 15,47021/06/15 4,55215/09/15 14,56928/10/15 20,81608/12/15 29,68613/01/16 17,53817/01/16 13,96718/02/16 3,53105/03/16 10,36614/03/16 21,954 19,58020/04/16 5,52207/07/16 10,82215/07/16 22,516 16,81616/07/16 17,90421/08/16 5,77613/09/16 16,74114/09/16 3,63311/10/16 23,022 42,429 22,11312/10/16 3,309 18,65014/10/16 31,98207/11/16 11,20215/11/16 3,64818/11/16 34,16111/01/17 39,01213/02/17 38,36606/06/17 156,03029/06/17 6,47514/07/17 3,720 12,155 6,498 24,178 65,260 40,641 17,261 185,872 38,09213/08/17 3,726 12,272 6,538 24,272 65,542 40,884 206,480 38,55914/08/17 181,70018/08/17 19,641Table 1: size of online communities for metal-detecting in Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2009; 2011; 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2009; 2011; 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; MDRegion, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; MDRussia, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Pasja Eksploracja, 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2003; 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b)

Persistent impossible rates of growth

Manifestly, since winter 2017, there has been an enormous spike in the apparent numbers of metal detectorists online in Ukraine. In fact, it is a continuing spike in the apparent rate of growth of metal detecting communities there. These have not been mirrored in Russia (e.g. MDRegion, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; MDRussia, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c), Poland (e.g. Pasja Eksploracja, 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b) or Belarus (e.g. Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b). In those territories, there has been remarkably steady, slow growth.

Moreover, the population explosions in the Ukrainian communities on Violity Auktsion (2013; 2014; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c) and Violity Facebook (2016; 2017a; 2017b) have not even been mirrored in the community on Violity vKontakte (2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b), all of which appear to have been online since 8th August 2005. Nor have they been mirrored in the community on Shukachi Skarbiv (2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c), either.

Although its significance is difficult to pinpoint, it is notable that, overall, vKontakte is used by far more (11,900,000+) people in Ukraine than Facebook (8,000,000+, according to Detector Media, cited by Zhdanova and Orlova, 2017: 8). Yet, at the start of the surge and long before its technical block, Violity vKontakte was being used by far fewer people (22,113) than Violity Facebook (42,429, as of 11th October 2016).

Sudden impossible increases in size

Based on the somewhat more complete archival data for Violity Auktsion, there was actually an earlier massive spike in growth in autumn 2016, as its apparent user base jumped by 13,332 within two days (so, around 6,666 per day), from 18,650 on 12th October 2016 to 31,982 on 14th October 2016. Due to more limited more recent archival data for Violity Auktsion, it is not possible to determine if there were any other such near-vertical spikes. Still, it seems that the apparent user base is now expanding more or less continuously, as it has jumped by a further 117,664 (in 113 days, so around 1,041.27 per day) from 38,366 on 13th February 2017 to 156,030 on 6th June 2017 and by yet another 25,670 (in 69 days, so around 372.03 per day) to 181,700 on 14th August 2017.

Due to the dearth of archival data, it is not possible to determine whether Violity Facebook experienced any earlier spikes or exponential increases. However, it spiked by 143,443 (in 276 days, so around 519.72 per day) from 42,429 on 11th October 2016 to 185,872 on 14th July 2017 and by another 20,608 (in 30 days, so around 686.93 per day) to 206,480 on 13th August 2017.

Likewise, Violity vKontakte and Shukachi Skarbiv may or may not have spiked in autumn 2016, too; there is not enough data to tell. Violity vKontakte grew by 15,979 (in 276 days, so around 57.89 per day) from 22,113 on 11th October 2016 to 38,092 on 14th July 2017 and by another 467 (in 30 days, so around 15.57 per day) to 38,559 on 13th August 2017. Shukachi Skarbiv grew by 13,952 (in 275 days, so around 50.73 per day) from 3,309 on 12th October 2016 to 17,261 on 14th July 2017 and by another 2,380 (in 35 days, so around 68.00 per day) to 19,641 on 18th August 2017.

The start of the impossible surge

Comparing communities’ growth rates until the first immediately visible spike in mid-October 2016 with the rates before that, it is possible to identify an even earlier start to the surge. Between 1st April 2013 and 12th October 2016, Violity Auktsion grew by an overall rate of 9.78 persons per day; yet, between 1st April 2013 and 15th July 2016, it had grown by only 8.97 persons per day. Between 17th January 2016 and 11th October 2016, Violity vKontakte grew by an overall rate of 30.40 persons per day; yet, between 17th January 2016 and 16th July 2016, it had only grown by 21.75 persons per day. So, the surge appears to have begun at some point between mid-July 2016 and mid-October 2016. The abrupt ramping and flatlining of activity appears to be a feature of some “like farms” (cf. de Cristofaro, Friedman, Jourjon, Kaafar and Shafiq, 2014: 3; 4 – figure 2).

In comparison with Violity Auktsion and Violity Facebook, Violity vKontakte and Shukachi Skarbiv may appear to have been more resilient to the causes of the population explosions. However, comparisons of rates of growth across the suspicious period, which smooth out the peaks and troughs in growth, suggest something rather different. There appear to be two programmes (or, perhaps more appropriately, programs) of artificial growth, in which the differences in numbers and rates and the periodic variations in rates of growth function to disguise their nature.

Ukraine in comparison with Russia, Poland and Belarus

In Belarus, Belaruski Skarbashukalnik grew by 93 persons (in 333 days, so around 0.28 persons per day) from 3,633 on 14th September 2016 to 3,726 on 13th August 2017. Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal grew by 1,450 (in 402 days, so around 3.61 persons per day) from 10,822 on 7th July 2016 to 12,272 on 13th August 2017.

In Poland, Pasja Eksploracja grew by 762 (in 357 days, so around 2.13 persons per day) from 5,776 on 21st August 2016 to 6,538 on 13th August 2017. Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów grew by 1,250 (in 306 days, so around 4.08 persons per day) from 23,022 on 11th October 2016 to 24,272 on 13th August 2017.

In Russia, MDRegion grew by 8,766 (in 855 days, so around 10.25 persons per day) from 56,776 on 11th April 2015 to 65,542 on 13th August 2017. MDRussia grew by 11,198 (in 614 days, so around 18.24 persons per day) from 29,686 on 8th December 2015 to 40,884 on 13th

August 2017.In Ukraine, Shukachi Skarbiv grew by 16,332 (in 310 days, or 16,121 in 306 days, so

around 52.68 persons per day) from 3,309 on 12th October 2016 to 19,641 on 18th August 2017. Violity vKontakte grew by 16,446 (in 306 days, so around 53.75 persons per day) from 22,113 on 11th October 2016 to 38,559 on 13th August 2017. In other words, both of those Ukrainian communities grew by around 16,000, at a rate of around 53-54 people per day.

Violity Auktsion grew by 163,050 (in 603 [sic – 306] days1, so around 532.84 persons per day) from 18,650 on 12th October 2016 to 181,700 on 14th August 2017. Violity Facebook grew by 164,051 (in 306 days, so around 536.11 persons per day) from 42,429 on 11th October 2016 to 206,480 on 13th August 2017. In other words, both of those Ukrainian communities grew by around 163,000-164,000, at a rate of around 533-536 people per day.

At that rate of growth, some of the apparent difference may have been produced simply by the time of day at which the statistics were recorded (including, where it is not continuous, the time of day at which the statistics were updated). Even accepting the

1 typed incorrectly, yet calculated correctly

apparent difference, Shukachi Skarbiv grew at almost exactly the same rate (98.03 per cent) as Violity vKontakte; Violity Auktsion grew at almost exactly the same rate (99.39 per cent) as Violity Facebook.

Out of all of the other communities, none shared such close growth rates. Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal grew at a similar rate (88.30 per cent) to Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów. Yet it was inevitable that at least two of six other communities would have close to the same rates of growth, when four grew by fewer than five persons per day.

It is practically impossible for the population explosions in Ukrainian communities to be real growths, but they even happen in different organisations, in the same volume at the same rate. So, unless two organisations spontaneously decided to buy the same number of fake accounts to be added at the same rate (which continue to be added now), someone else is planting these accounts.

Community Earlier archived

size

Mid-August

2017 size

Growth scale

(percent)

Growth total

(persons)

Growth period (days)

Growth rate

(persons per day)

Belaruski Skarbashukalnik (BY)

3,633 3,726 2.56 93 333 0.28

Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal (BY)

10,822 12,272 13.40 1,450 402 3.61

Pasja Eksploracja (PL) 5,776 6,538 13.19 762 357 2.13Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów (PL)

23,022 24,272 5.43 1,250 306 4.08

MDRegion (RU) 56,776 65,542 15.44 8,766 855 10.25MDRussia (RU) 29,686 40,884 37.59 11,198 614 18.24Shukachi Skarbiv (UA) 3,309 19,641 493.57 16,332 310 52.68Violity Auktsion (UA) 18,650 181,700 874.26 163,050 306 532.84Violity Facebook (UA) 42,429 206,480 386.65 164,051 306 536.11Violity vKontakte (UA) 22,113 38,559 74.37 16,446 306 53.75Table 2: comparison of recent growth rates (Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2016b; 2017b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2016b; 2017b; MDRegion, 2015; 2017b; MDRussia, 2015; 2017c; Pasja Eksploracja, 2016b; 2017c; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2016c; 2017b; Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2016e; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016c; 2017b)

Community Earliest archived

size

Earlier archived

size

Growth scale

(percent)

Growth total

(persons)

Growth period (days)

Growth rate

(persons per day)

Belaruski Skarbashukalnik (BY)

231 3,633 1,472.73 3,402 2,762 1.23

Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski

152 10,822 7,019.74 10,670 2,711 3.94

Partal (BY)Pasja Eksploracja (PL) 3,245 5,776 78.00 2,531 782 3.24Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów (PL)

839 23,022 2,643.98 22,183 4,819 4.60

Violity Auktsion (UA), until the spike

6,040 18,650 208.77 12,610 1,290 9.78

Violity Auktsion (UA), before the spike

6,040 16,816 178.41 10,776 1,201 8.97

Violity vKontakte (UA), until the spike

13,967 22,113 58.32 8,146 268 30.40

Violity vKontakte (UA), before the spike

13,967 17,904 28.19 3,937 181 21.75

Table 3: comparison of earlier growth rates (Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2009; 2016b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2009; 2016b; Pasja Eksploracja, 2014; 2016b; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2003; 2016c; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2016c; 2016e; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; a dearth of archived data made it impossible to compare the earlier growth rates of MDRegion, MDRussia, Shukachi Skarbiv and Violity Facebook)

Community Earliest archived

size

Mid-August

2017 size

Growth scale

(percent)

Growth total

(persons)

Growth period (days)

Growth rate

(persons per day)

Belaruski Skarbashukalnik (BY)

231 3,726 1,512.99 3,495 3,095 1.13

Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal (BY)

152 12,272 7,973.68 12,120 3,113 3.89

Pasja Eksploracja (PL) 3,245 6,538 101.48 3,293 1,139 2.89Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów (PL)

839 24,272 2,792.97 23,433 5,125 4.57

MDRegion (RU) 56,776 65,542 15.44 8,766 855 10.25MDRussia (RU) 29,686 40,884 37.72 11,198 614 18.24Shukachi Skarbiv (UA) 3,309 19,641 493.56 16,332 310 52.68Violity Auktsion (UA) 6,040 181,700 2,908.28 175,660 1,596 110.06Violity Facebook (UA) 42,429 206,480 386.65 164,051 306 536.11Violity vKontakte (UA) 13,967 38,559 176.07 24,592 575 42.77Table 4: comparison of long-term growth rates (Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2009; 2017b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2009; 2017b; MDRegion, 2015; 2017b; MDRussia, 2015; 2017c; Pasja Eksploracja, 2014; 2017c; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2003; 2017b; Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2017b)

Figure 1: size of online communities for metal-detecting in Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2009; 2011; 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2009; 2011; 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; MDRegion, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; MDRussia, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Pasja Eksploracja, 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2003; 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b)

Figure 2: size of online communities for metal-detecting in Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, with trendlines from earliest known dates (Belaruski Skarbashukalnik, 2009; 2011; 2014; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Belaruski Skarbashukalnitski Partal, 2009; 2011; 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; MDRegion, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; MDRussia, 2015; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Pasja Eksploracja, 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Portal Klubowy Poszukiwaczy Skarbów, 2003; 2005; 2007; 2010; 2011; 2013; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b; Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f;

2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b)

Figure 3: size of online communities for metal-detecting in Ukraine (Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b)

Figure 4: size of online communities for metal-detecting in Ukraine, with trendlines (Shukachi Skarbiv, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity Auktsion, 2013; 2014; 2015a; 2015b; 2015c; 2015d; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2016d; 2016e; 2016f; 2016g; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; Violity Facebook, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; Violity vKontakte, 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; 2017a; 2017b)

What is being done?

It is important to state that I do not know what is happening and the following discussion does not reach a conclusion on what is happening. The possible explanations for the surge do not progress through the ones that I dismiss to the one that I accept; they progress from

the simplest to the most complex. Also, I am not an expert on internet technologies or internet activities, so I may have missed some context or some evidence that corroborates one of the simpler explanations, rather than one of the more complex explanations.

Grassroots?

Theoretically, it might reflect reality, insofar as offline detectorists may have improved access to the internet and duly increased participation in online community life. However, there is no evidence of a unique and correspondingly great improvement in access to the internet in Ukraine.

Theoretically, it might reflect changes in choices of online meeting places. However, even if no detectorists in Ukraine had been members of Violity Auktsion and Violity Facebook as well as Violity vKontakte and if all of those in vKontakte had migrated to Facebook and Auktsion after the ban on vKontakte, the supposed sizes of those communities dwarf the entirety of the local detecting community.

Theoretically, it might also reflect a sudden and massive regionalisation of a predominantly Ukrainian space. However, the Ukrainian community has not only grown to a population that is larger than all of the region’s communities put together, which would already make it implausible. It is unlikely that all of the region’s online detectorists converged on both Violity Auktsion and Violity Facebook in the course of nine months. The Ukrainian community has actually grown by a population that is larger than all of the region’s communities put together, which would practically require Ukraine’s own community and/or the other regional communities to have grown suddenly and massively at the same time as they converged on Violity Auktsion and Violity Facebook. So, the surge cannot plausibly be a product of grassroots activity.

In terms of facilities for access, Violity Auktsion (2013) appears to have been a Russian-language service at the latest by 1st April 2013. At least key text such as “users” was written in Russian (polzovatelei [пользователей]) at least until 18th November 2016, although the users themselves may have written and presumably did write in other languages as well. “Users” appeared to have been converted to Ukrainian (korystuvachiv [користувачів]) by 13th February 2017, but that may have been an automatic product of settings and readings when and where the site was archived. The site provided somewhat multilingual service in Russian, Ukrainian and English by 13th February 2017 (Violity Auktsion, 2017a); in Russian, Ukrainian, English and Polish by 6th June 2017 (Violity Auktsion, 2017b); and in Russian, Ukrainian, English, Polish and Belarusian by 14th August 2017 (Violity Auktsion, 2017c). Regardless, none of these pre-date the start of the surge, so, again, it cannot plausibly be a product of grassroots activity.

Accident?

Without the comparison data from Shukachi Skarbiv and Violity vKontakte, it might have been argued that it made sense for Violity Auktsion and Violity Facebook to grow at the same rate, as different meeting places for the same people. Yet that would have been undermined by those sites’ own data since, before the surge, Violity Facebook was more than twice the size of Violity Auktsion.

With only the comparison data from Violity vKontakte, the same argument might have been made, since access to vKontakte was blocked along with other Russian internet

services around 15th May 2017. Yet, it is easy to bypass the ban (as I have done to check the statistics while in Ukraine); the number of its users continued to grow; its growth does not suggest that it grew at the same rate as Violity’s other communities, then was halted by the technical block; and it is unlikely that exactly ten per cent (10.02-10.09 per cent) of Violity Facebook or Violity Auktsion’s new members managed to bypass the block to register on Violity vKontakte.

It is similarly unlikely that web crawlers visited Violity Facebook and Violity Auktsion at the same rate and visited Violity vKontakte at exactly one-tenth of that rate. Also, since web crawlers had been visiting the communities before the surge and the groups would have continued to grow at different rates during the surge, it is unlikely that web crawlers would have visited the communities at different rates (far in excess of their visits to any of the region’s other communities) that combined with the communities’ natural growth to incidentally produce the paired growth rates (including the paired “ten per cent relationship” between the pairs). Equally, it is unlikely that the registration systems for a Facebook group (Shukachi Skarbiv), a vKontakte group (Violity vKontakte), a website (Violity Auktsion) and a Facebook page (Violity Facebook) incidentally produced the paired growth rates.

With the comparison data from Shukachi Skarbiv as well, the evidence becomes even more complicated. Shukachi Skarbiv is a Facebook group for discussion of metal detectors and metal-detected cultural objects (and a paired Facebook group for private trading of metal-detected cultural objects), which is associated with a dealership for metal detectors and accessories, not Violity. While there may be significant overlap in their memberships, they are completely different organisations, yet they grew at almost exactly the same rate. So, it cannot plausibly be a product of the innocuous activity of general bots.

Self-aggrandisement?

Without the comparison data from Shukachi Skarbiv, it might have been suspected that the impossible numbers were a product of investment in fake accounts by Violity, in order to make its community appear larger than it is. Theoretically, administrators might do this to attract genuine participants, by giving the impression of offering more experts for training and more partners for activity.

However, there is very little competition for the available detectorists; Violity already dominates the market; and there is marginal benefit from attracting additional detectorists to a community that already numbers in the tens of thousands. Moreover, as noted, it is unlikely that both Violity and Shukachi Skarbiv paid for the same number of fake accounts to be produced at the same time and at the same rate. So, the surge cannot plausibly be a product of self-aggrandisement.

To add to the existing confusion, vKontakte is ‘[t]he easiest and the cheapest platform for the creation of bots’ and Facebook is ‘the most challenging environment for bot creators’ (Zhdanova and Orlova, 2017: 8; see also Zhdanova and Orlova, 2017: 12), yet Violity vKontakte was the joint least affected and Violity Facebook was the joint most affected. If this were an amateurish effort by quick-fix commercial operators, the surge would have been implemented the other way around.

To be very clear, I do not believe that either Shukachi Skarbiv or Violity are involved in this phenomenon in any way. Indeed, I believe that the evidence demonstrates that they are not involved.

Yet fake accounts may like pages other than their target pages (and perform other human-like behaviour), in order to evade automatic fraud prevention mechanisms (de Cristofaro, Friedman, Jourjon, Kaafar and Shafiq, 2014: 1; 5). Is it possible that fake accounts for other campaigns in other places are evading fraud detection algorithms by entering metal detecting communities in Ukraine?

Astroturf?

In the same way that other campaigners have simply fabricated numbers without any evidence, metal detecting activists might also fabricate evidence of numbers to give the impression of a community that is too large to be controlled with restrictive or prohibitive regulation. There is an ‘organised offensive [Organizovanyy nastup]’ to advance the ‘right of “people with metal-detectors” and buyers of finds to a free market [prav “lyudyny z metaloshukachem” ta pokuptsya snakhidok, pro vilnyy rynok]’ (Ivakin, 2013: 87).

Still, as yet, there is no evidence of a campaign that has exploited the apparent numbers. So, it does not appear to be a product of astroturfing. As seen in Russian archaeologists’ adoption of Russian detectorists’ fabricated numbers, such an astroturfing (fake grassroots) campaign might backfire anyway, by giving the impression of a community that is too large to be managed with permissive regulation.

Trolls and sockpuppets?

To restate, I do not know what is happening. This is the most detailed description because it is the most complex explanation, not because I accept it. Still, these considerations do suggest more intriguing yet similarly hypothetical possibilities of trolls or sockpuppets.

Trolls are accounts that provoke people and derail discussions. In the conduct of information warfare, they pursue ‘organised and aggressive’ projects of ‘online influencing’ (Aro, 2015). Sockpuppets are false identities that are used to deceive, in order ‘to praise, defend or support a person or organization’ or ‘to influence public opinion, stifle dissent, [or] spread misinformation’ (Trewinnard, 2016; for a commercial example, cf. Erhart and Barbara, 2015). They may be difficult to identify or deliberately misidentified (Zelenkauskaite and Niezgoda, 2017), due to the existence of ideologically-committed community members and even activists (rather than employees) and the rhetorical benefit of denigrating opponents as trolls.

International activity:

Although such fake characters originated in more personal deceptions, they are also now used in state operations and state-aligned operations on an industrial scale. Including commercial as well as political applications, industrial-scale operations have been documented in Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; China, including China-occupied Tibet; the Dominican Republic; Egypt; Honduras; Mexico; Peru; Russia; Saudi Arabia; South Korea; Spain; Syria; Turkey; the United Kingdom; the United States; and Vietnam (Gallagher, 2017).

In order to ‘counter… enemy propaganda outside the US’ (according to Central Command Spokesperson Commander Bill Speaks), specifically extremist propaganda in the Middle East

and Central Asia, the United States’ armed forces has supported the development of an “online persona management system” for tens of agents who each have multiple personas, where ‘each fake online persona must have a convincing background, history and supporting details’ (Fielding and Cobain, 2011). It has also run a Twitter network ‘to undermine communist control’ of Cuba (Calabresi, 2017).

In Mexico, president-benefiting “Peñabots” flood president-disadvantaging conversation with spam, to trigger automatic anti-spam mechanisms that muffle discussion (Trewinnard, 2016). In South Africa, as demonstrated with open-source research methods (cf. Bellingcat, 2017), evidence of “state capture” by private interests is defamed by fake news sites and that defamation is spread by bots (Cronjé, 2017; Faull, 2017; Head, 2017).

Turkey’s government employs thousands to attack dissidents and fabricate evidence that enables the government to attack dissidents (Benedictus, 2016). China’s government employs between hundreds of thousands and millions of people to plant hundreds of millions of fake comments online, including entirely fake discussions amongst themselves (Benedictus, 2016). Whether their directors were in the United States or the Russian Federation, hundreds of trolls and tens of thousands of bots were deployed to shift the terms of debate in the United States’ presidential elections in 2016 (Morgan and Shaffer, 2017).

Regional activity:

Russia’s government, allied businesses and allied movements employ thousands (at home and abroad) to subvert public discussion and advance state narratives around the world (Benedictus, 2016; Seddon, 2014). The Russian Federation is using a ‘troll army’ against the United States as well its own citizenry, where the trolls use “sock puppets” (in American parlance) or ‘dead souls’ (in Russian parlance) to populate American sites of news and opinion with pro-Kremlin positions and arguments (Seddon, 2014).

It appears to be doing the same in alliance with other powers, as it produces pro-regime documentation in relation to Syria, which is then spread by local social media accounts (according to open-source intelligence analyst Matt Kodama, cited by Seddon, 2014). Furthermore, there are ‘spying accounts’ that try to monitor public information and hack private information of key targets (Reuters, 2017).

Some of Russia’s “troll farm” or “troll factory” workers maintain sets of fake personal blogs with individually-tailored political digressions; others ‘flood Russian internet forums, social networks and the comments sections of western publications’ with fake material (Walker, 2015; see also Chen, 2016; Khazan, 2013); as in China, certain teams fake entire discussions (according to former Internet Research Agency worker Marat Burkhard, interviewed by Volchek and Sindelar, 2015).

There are even fake websites that provide public sources for memetic and potentially viral media, from images to infographics to videos. And there are fake news stories on fake versions of international newspapers (Stern, 2017), as well as fake news stories on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik News, which are translated into Arabic, French, German, Spanish and even Vietnamese (Roblin, 2016). These may advance Russian positions; sap the will of people, who would advance other positions, to argue with trolls or compete with bots; or simply undermine trust in any position (Chen, 2016; Roblin, 2016).

With regard to its desired “sphere of influence”, Russian state propaganda is an ‘everyday reality on many websites’ and platforms that serve Finnish audiences (Aro, 2015).

Meanwhile, it is published as supposedly independent news in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Spriņģe and Jemberga, 2017).

In terms of targeting, ‘they throw everything they’ve got at Ukraine’ (according to former Internet Research Agency worker Marat Burkhard, interviewed by Volchek and Sindelar, 2015; see also Seddon, 2014). As a demonstration of the range and depth of such operations, a Ukraine-based Russian soldier ‘successfully infiltrated’ and advanced Russian state positions in an American ‘social media group by pretending to be a 42-year-old American housewife’ (according to senior U.S. intelligence agents, cited by Calabresi, 2017).

Russia’s agents act through ‘believable sock puppet accounts’ with ‘the prevailing qualities [of] an average account’ and automatically amplify their message with bots (according to a former special agent at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Clint Watts, cited by Hatmaker, 2017). While it is known that there are thousands of troll accounts that divert opinion on Facebook (Volchek and Sindelar, 2015), one social network analyst alone has identified mass-produced networks of tens of thousands of bots that crowd out dissenting opinion on Twitter (Alexander, 2015a) and serve search engine optimisation to crowd out contrary sources on the web (Alexander, 2015b); thousands of trolls who blog conformist narratives on LiveJournal (Alexander, 2015d); and hundreds of bots that increase the apparent popularity of conformist accounts on Twitter (Alexander, 2015c). Meanwhile, part of Ukraine’s volunteers’ counter-strategy is ‘to create social media accounts and amass friends posing as residents of eastern Ukraine’ (Shearlaw, 2015).

A Russian state-backed news agency, whose pro-Russian state reports are being spread by networks of bots and trolls on social media and on media platforms (cf. Alexander, 2015c), Life News (Life Novosti, 2014), has published allegations that Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk had secretly and illicitly exported twenty billion dollars’ worth of Scythian gold artefacts to the United States as collateral for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In reality, ‘[i]t was not exported anywhere’; ‘[n]obody even tried to do that’ (according to the Head of Historical Treasures of Ukraine, Lyudmila Strokova, cited by StopFake, 2014; see also Hardy, 2014).

Whether a state-employed or proxy-employed troll or a civilian who had been influenced by such propaganda, denialism of Russia’s invasion, occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s territory is being spread on cultural heritage media platforms (e.g. McGowan, 2014).

And Russia is even investing in museum exhibitions about cultural property crime in the occupied territories. ‘Crimean artefacts…, seized by the FSB [Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation] from “black archaeologists” in the past three years [крымских артефактов..., изъятых сотрудниками ФСБ у “черных археологов” за последние три года]’ – in other words, since the territory’s invasion, occupation and annexation by the Russian Federation – have been exhibited as evidence that the ‘FSB [is acting] against “black archaeologists” [ФСБ против “черных археологов”]’ (as presented by the Central Museum of Tavrida in Simferopol, paraphrased by Groznov, 2017).

Although the operations are incomparable, it should be noted that Ukraine’s government at least intended to assist thousands of volunteers to contradict Russia’s lines and advance their own (Shearlaw, 2015). Reinforcing the incomparability, the ‘almost 40,000… “information soldiers”’ were not given any orders (Zhdanova and Orlova, 2017: 16), so the “internet army” never conducted any operations. There is an ‘industry’ of “computational propaganda” by political actors who advance their own interests within the state and society (Zhdanova and Orlova, 2017: 10).

Notably, with regard to the differential growth of Violity on vKontakte (VK) and Violity on Facebook, since mid-May 2017, VK has been blocked in Ukraine (along with other Russian services, sites and platforms), in order to block the cyber warfare component of Russia’s “hybrid war” (Zhdanova and Orlova, 2017: 18). The primary focus may be on information security rather than cyber security. It has been observed that, as Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine has been documented in social media by supposedly covert Russian soldiers, so Ukraine’s resistance may be mapped by Ukrainian soldiers who are at risk of being targeted (according to Deputy Vladimir Ariev, cited by Sinelschikova, 2017).

Still, Ukraine has clearly been worried by ‘mass Russian cyber attacks’ (according to President Petro Poroshenko) and the ban is also intended to ‘counter Russian propaganda’ (according to Prime Minister Vladimir Groisman, cited by Sinelschikova, 2017; see also Gerretsen, 2017). Yet Russian propaganda can be found ‘on Facebook as easily as vKontakte’ (according to journalist Patrick Jackson, cited by Kobie, 2017).

Are fake accounts being seeded in plausible communities in order to be able to spread cultural heritage propaganda? may like pages other than their target pages (and perform other human-like behaviour), in order to evade automatic fraud prevention mechanisms (de Cristofaro, Friedman, Jourjon, Kaafar and Shafiq, 2014: 1; 5). Are fake accounts, for other propaganda campaigns, evading fraud detection algorithms by entering metal detecting communities in Ukraine?

What is the reality?

Regardless of the explanation for the impossible numbers, it is possible to use the data from before the surge to infer possible numbers for the size of the metal detecting community in Ukraine. A dearth of data prevents any inference for Shukachi Skarbiv or Violity Facebook. Still, if Violity Auktsion had continued to grow at its “pre-surge” rate of 8.97 people per day, it would have grown from 16,816 on 15th July 2016 to 20,359 on 14th August 2017, rather than 181,700. At its “pre-surge” rate of 21.75 people per day, Violity vKontakte would have grown from 17,904 on 16th July 2016 to 26,452 on 13th August 2017, rather than 38,559. By analogy with the estimated size of the largest community, in the light of Marc’s (2004) finding elsewhere that only 93.42 per cent of online detectorists are active detectorists, it is reasonable to infer that there are at least 24,711 illicit detectorists in Ukraine.

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