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Turkish Dialog: Foreign Policy on a tic Passport14pril 2017SHORT VERSION OF THE ARTICLEFULL VERSION OF THE ARTICLEAnticipating the new tourist season, Turkey is facing a number of new issues that Ankara will have to solve.

Anticipating the new tourist season, Turkey is facing a number of new issues that Ankara will have to solve.

Firstly, the Turkish economy was significantly damaged by the decrease of the tourist flow. These days Ankara is undergoing one of the toughest periods in its foreign policy. And it reflects in the tensions between Turkey and the Western countries where most of the tourists come from. It should be emphasized that the Turkish home affairs situation is quite complicated, with an unsuccessful attempt to mount a coup d'état in July 2016, the Syrian crisis, and numerous migration flows going directly through Turkish territory. All these factors define the difficult situation that the Turkish economy and tourism sectors have for their part gotten into.

Russian citizens do not believe in the threats most mass media are referring to, and the Turkish recreation facilities remain a high priority.

Secondly, there are a number of unfavorable circumstances in Turkey-Russia relations that have changed the image of Turkey for Russians, and vice versa. It is obvious in this context that Russia, having long served as the second largest «supplier» of tourists to Turkey after Germany, inflicted a «social» setback on the Turkish economy. The crisis after the Russian aircraft was shot down in November 2015 and the subsequent high level rhetoric on both sides, as well as that it was keenly discussed in the mass media, created a negative image in the minds of the citizens of both countries.

New Stage of Russia–Turkey Economic Relations. RIAC Report

On the one hand, Moscow faced the issue of the opportunity for Russian citizens to spend their holidays in the resort areas they are used to — in Turkey, Egypt, Tunisia; on the other hand, Turkey found itself in a situation where it might lose one of the key players in its tourism sector —Russia.

Splendid Tourism — Decline or Resumption?The 76% decrease in the tourist flow from Russia to Turkey (from 3.6 million people to 866,000 in quantitative terms) in 2015-2016 has been one of the most turbulent in recent times. One can track direct links between the political statements and their impact on Russian tourism by analyzing statistical data. The number of Russian tourists decreased by 87% in the first half of 2016 (before the Turkish establishment apologized for the shooting down of the aircraft) compared with the first half of 2015. Turkey incurred substantial costs due to the amount in arrears from the Russian market in 2016, which approximately equals to USD 2.5 billion. It should be noted that in 2015-2016 the total number of tourists to Turkey from other countries dropped from 36.2 million to 25.3 million people, which can be primarily explained by the Syrian crisis and security issues. Ankara’s profits shrank from USD 31.5 to 22.1 billion.

It is obvious that the situation has negatively influenced domestic economic conditions in the country. The tourism sector makes up about 6.2% of the total GDP and 21.9% of the total Turkish export. The decrease in the tourist flow also affected other areas of the Turkish economy, such as logistics and construction. Russian mass media and anti-Turkish propaganda played a pivotal role in the situation especially when it reached a cosmic level after 2015.

Pyotr Stegniy: Russia–Turkey Interface for Europe

It is evident in this context that Turkey is more than interested in the rapid resumption of the tourist flow from Russia. This explains a number of statements made by the Turkish establishment on the opportunity to give Russian citizens the right to cross the Turkish border on domestic passports. It is worth noting, however, that Ankara already gave this right to Georgian citizens at the end of 2011, and to Ukrainian citizens in March 2017. This proposal is nothing new for the Russian side as well. The issue had been widely discussed by the two sides before November 2015 and was basically closed for discussion after the crisis in Russian-Turkish relations. It is known that Moscow has imposed a number of restrictions in terms of toughening the visa scheme which includes a ban on employment for Turkish citizens in Russia and a temporary suspension of charter flights between Turkey and Russia. Apparently, the issue of crossing the border on Russian domestic passports was postponed indefinitely.

In the course of reestablishing relations, the tourist flow from Russia has grown dramatically. In January 2017 it increased by 82% compared to January of 2016, and in February 2017 it skyrocketed to 96% compared to 2016. Since 2014, the Russian national currency exchange rate has been decreasing, which has resulted in an increase of the tourist flow to the Crimea and the Caucasus. However it is clear now that the infrastructure of the Russian sea resort areas is not competitive with the ones in Antalya, for example. This largely defines the intention of the Russian tourists to go back to the customary resort areas on the Turkish coast.

Besides, Turkey is trying to attract those Russians who don't have an international passport, and this is about 72% of the population. From this perspective it can be assumed that Russian citizens do not believe in the threats most mass media are referring to, and the Turkish recreation facilities remain a high priority. That is why it is extremely important for Ankara to justify this trust and to ensure ultimate security for foreign citizens on their territory.

Both states being partners «on paper» are playing their own political games, unacceptable for each of the partners respectively.

Tourist season might have positive connotations in terms of planning the launch of passenger cruises between Sochi, the Crimea, and Istanbul in the short run. Though a number of factors, of political character primarily, might compound the implementation of the project. On top of that, Ankara has made a decision to ban Russian ships from the Crimea from entering the Turkish Black Sea ports. It can be assumed that the Turkish proposal on permitting Russian citizens to enter the Turkish Republic on Russian domestic passports is a signal of closer cooperation with Moscow that can be started in the tourism sector.

Controversial Trends

Hüseyin Diriöz: We Need to Bring Russia–Turkey Relationsto the Next Level

No matter what the rhetoric on both sides on establishing good neighborly relations and leading a solid state-to-state dialog is, it is clear that a number of sharp contradictions between Ankara and Moscow haven’t been resolved. Pre-crisis «compartmentalization» of their relations has obviously changed to a situation where Moscow is no longer likely to separate foreign policy by segments that are either independent of one another or are not closely interconnected. Now the economic cooperation with Turkey is shaped by the decisions on key regional issues in Russia’s foreign policy. On the one hand, this approach is pragmatic for Moscow and reflects the Realpolitik concept, on the other hand, it largely complicates the process of regional reconciliation, state-to-state relations in particular, and causes new political contradictions.

It is known that the heads of both states acknowledged their commitment to promote the resolution of the political conflict in Syria, though in real terms both Moscow and Ankara pursue different aims. For Turkey, which is immediately next to the military activities along its borders, it is of vital importance to secure its own national interests in Syria. Russia’s key interest is to ensure security and its influence regionally. At the same time both states being partners «on paper» are playing their own political games, unacceptable for each of the partners respectively. For example, Moscow’s cooperation and real support of the Kurdish groups that Ankara officially considers terrorist groups gives rise to a lot of concern. Moreover, on the one side Russia is said to organize a «buffer zone» between the Kurdish forces in Afrin and Manbij, and opposition groups supported by Turkey and the Turkish army on the other side. Such agenda made Ankara terminateOperation Euphrates Shield in the North of Syria on March 30, 2017.

Apparently Moscow is looking forward to seeing more concessions from Turkey, and the process to normalize of state-to-state dialog is played according to the Russian script.

At the same time, the Kremlin proposes to adopt a new constitution for Syria, which grants «autonomy» to the Kurdish groups. This is definitely inconsistent with the way Turkey sees the future of Syria and with Ankara’s regional policy in general. The process that was successfully launched in Astana to normalize the Syrian dialog is losing its positive vector: the last meeting was not attended by the representatives of the Syrian armed opposition groups.

Both Ankara’s and Moscow’s actions towards the slowdown of lifting sanctions seem unreasonable. In defiance of the arrangements on the promotion of bilateral economic cooperation and bringing it to the level of USD 100 billion, the Kremlin stays reluctant in lifting a number of major sanctions on Turkish goods, and Ankara, despite the development of bilateral dialog, imposed restrictions on the shipment of grain products from Russia right

after the meeting of the heads of states at the High-Level Cooperation Council on March 10, 2017. Apparently Moscow is looking forward to seeing more concessions from Turkey, and the process to normalize of state-to-state dialog is played according to the Russian script. This is perfectly tracked in the Syrian issue and in Turkey-Russia energy cooperation. It should be reminded that Ankara de facto omitted most of its claims on the implementation of Turkish Stream, whereas Moscow has not clarified its position on the key issues, for instance, in what status the Kremlin sees Ankara in the regional energy market, if it will be given the status of «energy hub» or just that of a «transit state».

Russia-Turkey relations are having controversial trends, still there is an opportunity to find common points of contact. The necessity for consensus on the most pressing issues both for Ankara and Moscow shapes the future of the state-to-state dialog and the situation in the region. In this context it is important to have a slow start with minor issues to rebuild the broken relations step by step, and it is tourism that might become one of the first steps towards further dialog.

Russia–US Relations: Unstoppable Escalation? Unpredictability is His Strength

President Donald Trump’s learning curve for a leader never holding public office has a trajectory like that of a mountaineer scaling Mount Everest. Persevering through the elements, a lack of oxygen, or fear of plummeting onto a rocky crag, Trump’s remarkable resilience has seen him tweet and shoulder his way through skepticism in the GOP, an agenda driven media acting as the opposition, and progressive anarchists unwilling to uphold the law and perpetuate fascist disarray.

REUTERS/Maxim ShemetovIvan Timofeev:Russia–US Relations: Unstoppable Escalation?

Not since Truman has there been a President that came into office with so little expectations. Not since Reagan has there been so much visceral fear of the unknown President with a hair trigger on the nuclear arsenal. Decades later, history respects their

legacy for the courage to strategically drop the atomic bomb to close out a WW II that claimed upwards to 80 million lives and the ensuing fortitude in dismantling the Soviet Union’s clench on Eastern Europe and win the Cold War.

Aside from the total inadequacy of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency and his debacle over the American hostages held in Iran, we can surmise that a hard turn to the left under the Obama Presidency garnered socialist garble from the likes of Sharpton, Black Lives Matter, and out of touch liberal elites that ceased to be the party that helped the deserving blue collar and simply took money from those earning a living and recklessly gave it out to special interests in exchange for their votes.

The ambivalence of the populace voting and hoping for the first black President liberating Americans from centuries of guilt over its oppression of African Americans, they arrived at the polls eight years later in droves to privately overcome the politically correct Manchurian voices that knowingly brainwashed and shamed the masses to act toward the pursuits of the far-left. The charlatan globalist policies were exposed by then candidate Donald Trump as an imminent collapse and an incessant loss of the values and national freedoms cherished under the American Constitution.

Democracy won out when the people elected a leader who would resurrect their tenets out from beneath the heap of liberal dung that resents the principles of international affairs where America was being hemmed, cornered, and fenced by disdainful dictators, terrorist franchises, and religious extremists in lands afar running amuck over innocence, allies, and overseas national interests. Americans fathomed their past electoral fault when they decidedly opted for a proven leader from gritty main street to elevate America over the folks on Obama-Clinton elite street.

Unlike Obama’s failed limited military actions and economic sanctions, Trump fully understands that validating respect for America comes only through leveraging its position of strength and a real fear of unpredictable reprisals.

President Donald Trump’s learning curve for a leader never holding public office has a trajectory like that of a mountaineer scaling Mount Everest. Persevering through the elements, a lack of oxygen, or fear of plummeting onto a rocky crag, Trump’s remarkable resilience has seen him tweet and shoulder his way through skepticism in the GOP, an agenda driven media acting as the opposition, and progressive anarchists unwilling to uphold the law and perpetuate fascist disarray.

Trump is a very quick study of the institution as he moves a breakneck business speed on minimal sleep. He did not need to go far to figure out how to project power and influence on the world’s political stage. Just as Roosevelt appointed generals George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Douglas MacArthur, and Admiral Chester Nimitz; Trump has surrounded himself with the likes of Secretaries James Mattis, Wilbur Ross, Rex Tillerson, NSA James McMaster, and VP Mike Pence, some of the most proven and talented leaders in America that are given the tactical latitude in neutralizing the enemy from wreaking havoc and strategically asserting American influence to keep the world a safer and more prosperous planet.

Unlike Obama’s failed limited military actions and economic sanctions, Trump fully understands that validating respect for America comes only through leveraging its position of strength and a real fear of unpredictable reprisals. U.S. President Richard Nixon receives very little recognition for this approach when he responded to North Vietnam’s attack on the South when the Chinese-Russian backed regime sent 150,000 soldiers and 200 Soviet tanks across the negotiated DMZ on the eve of Nixon’s historic visit to China and ensuing trip to Moscow.

REUTERS/Carlos BarriaPavel Sharikov:How to Make Russia-U.S. Relations Great Again?

Nixon ordered an attack on the North that included over a thousand air strikes a day from 85 B-52s, an aircraft carrier, and 500 fighter bombers. This was in sharp contrast to his predecessor; U.S. President Johnson’s failed bombing halt on the North in response to mounting deleterious American public opinion. Nixon’s response, with little support from the U.S. Military Joint Chiefs, smashed the North’s aggression and furthermore damaged four Soviet ships.

President Nixon defended the credibility of the U.S., and commented afterwards that the Office of the President would not be worth holding if he was chased out of Vietnam by communists who had treated every conciliatory gesture with contempt.

With Nixon’s historic visit to China that changed our world; and China no longer throwing its full weight behind regime in North Vietnam, it placed additional pressure on Moscow to wedge itself in U.S.-China relations or be absconded from the big picture. The Soviets reaffirmed their invitation to the President; and Nixon responded by ordering an increase in airstrikes on North Vietnam from 1,000 to 1,200 a day upon his arrival. Nixon was greeted with much respect and ceremony; and the Russians promptly agreed to a Nuclear Weapons Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). Unmistakably, the Nixon Doctrine of American projected vigor was venerated by the Russians.

The Democrats and so called experts on CNN have attempted at every military response by the President to indicate he has no foreign policy strategy or that he has is flip flopped on his campaign positions and dragging America into an unsustainable quagmire. Nothing could be further from the truth. On the contrary, it was the Chamberlain-like passivity by then President Obama after Syria crossed his ‘red line’ and his teetering counterbalance to the Russian offensive strategy that resulted in diminishing fear of American retaliation of unchallenged aggression. Obama’s docility and absence of a solid U.S foreign policy doctrine essentially green-lighted the Russian annexation of Crimea and the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime on their own people.

Trump simply upheld the ‘red line’ Obama drew in the sand which has been widely supported by our allies and friends abroad. It is no surprise that the only four countries (Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Russia) that publicly renounced the US cruise missile pinprick cBig Bang in Afghanistanomprise of a Russian-led fanatical alliance on the wrong side of history.

Flickr / defensedesk

Big Bang in AfghanistanThe dropping of the MOAB or so-called Mother of All Bombs on the ISIS tunnel hideout in Afghanistan was not Trump dragging America deeper into war as some would suggest but simply keeping another campaign promise to bomb the hell out of ISIS. This precision mega-blast was targeted to take out ISIS infrastructure with zero innocent lives lost; something Obama consistently failed to accomplish with hundreds of drone strikes resulting in collateral damage far beyond just the bad dudes.

The Syrian strikes to prevent further war crimes on humanity and the massive ordinance dropped on the cold-blooded anti-Christian cave men, along with a Nixonian U.S.-China diplomacy wedge following Trump talks with President Xi Jinping, has preemptively set a determined foreign policy ground work to finally deal with the threats by North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, to rain nuclear tipped ballistic missiles onto America, Seoul, and Tokyo. For good measure that America is taken seriously, U.S. military commanders have sent a naval armada supported by USS Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group to the Korean Peninsula, along with ever lurking Ohio Class submarines loaded with twenty-four 100 KT nuclear warheads capable of obliterating the rogue dictator if he is crazy enough to launch a nuclear attack.

For added quantification that the American military is fully capable of operating in several theatres, the George H.W. Bush CSG is readied in the Middle East if Iran decides to go off the rails with a bluster of antagonizing threats in the Persian Gulf. The Obama era of allowing Americans to be taken hostage and paraded on Iranian media is over.

President Trump has made it very clear in keeping everyone off balance when he often purported that he will not broadcast to the enemy what his plan is. For the first time in eight years, Putin must ask, “What will America do?”

The tacit demeanor of a kinder and gentler America over the last eight years has certainly led to a more unstable and ruthless world. The world is not looking to America to police the world, but they are desperately seeking a cop on the beat to bring back the rule of international law and the voice of freedom. Our allies, NATO, Israel, and the American military believe and are relieved American leadership is back and has their back.

The ebb and flow of leadership on this historic scale is nothing new as the world prods forward with new spearheads and global tribalism. Historians will begin to quickly look back at a failed foreign policy presidency where Obama’s doctrine of appeasement ruled the day over fortitude and steadfast American leadership; resulting in rogue leaders less apt to second guess themselves through the incompetence to sustain a greater peace through unpredictable strength.

President Trump has made it very clear in keeping everyone off balance when he often purported that he will not broadcast to the enemy what his plan is. For the first time in eight

years, Putin must ask, “What will America do?” Yes, the markers are being placed, and America’s will and character will be tested.

Western media, including official Pentagon news outlets, have been citing a US Central Command report to the effect that “the largest-yield conventional bomb” has been used against a regional Islamic State cell in Afghanistan. What does this mean?

The bomb in question is the GBU-43/B MOAB (the abbreviation stands for Massive Ordnance Air Blast, but is commonly known as the Mother Of All Bombs) GPS-guided munition. It was urgently developed in the run-up to the second Iraq war and produced in a small series of about 20 units (according to some estimates, only 14 such bombs are currently left). The urgency was due to the need to replace the legendary US BLU-82 Daisy Cutter heavy bombs developed back in the Vietnam War era, as the stocks of these were fast depleting. Contrary to popular belief, neither the BLU-82 nor the MOAB munition is a fuel-air explosive device. The Mother Of All Bombs is simply a very powerful high-explosive bomb: at around 10 t total weight, this 9 metre-long, 1 metre-wide device packs 8.5 t of high-yield explosive payload. Because of its great dimensions it can only be delivered by US Air Force Special Operations Command Lockheed MC-130 Combat Talon transport aircraft. The MOAB is pulled from the aircraft's rear cargo ramp using a drogue parachute, in the same manner as military vehicles are paradropped. This delivery method necessitates GPS guidance, without which the bomb would be carried off-target by wind.

Despite the high priority development effort, the MOAB was not used either in the Iraq war or in the subsequent 15 years or so. The munition has a very specific characteristic: in essence, it does not offer any particular advantages either against hardened targets (these are more effectively taken out by specialized penetration weapons, from smaller ones to the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator) or against soft area-type targets, which are more reliably destroyed by dropping several dozen lower-yield bombs on them. In both cases

conventional bombers will do the job, whereas using transport aircraft against a more-or-On his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 President Xi Jinping of China unveiled his ‘Chinese Dreams’ of reviving the ancient Silk Route through Central Asia. Specifically, he proposed the idea of a Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). The proposal was aimed at connectivity with Europe via Central Asia to increase trade between the Asia Pacific Region (APR) and Europe. Later, in October of 2013 on a visit to Indonesia, President Jinping put forward the idea of a ‘Maritime Silk Road of the Twenty first Century’ (MSR). Taken together, the ‘Belt’ and the ‘Road’ initiatives reflect China’s core strategy and policy orientation. Incidentally, in Chinese lexicon the two initiatives are referred to as the Belt and the Road or the One Belt One Road (OBOR). When viewed against the backdrop of a rising China and its present assertive foreign policy, these appear as monumental ideas and goals of tremendous significance to both Asia and the rest of the world. It reflects China’s ambition to play a pivotal role in world affairs and it helps define what that role will be.

In recent times there have been major investments by China in transport links, particularly the transcontinental railway lines that have already opened up for freight routes. The Yuxinou International Railway that runs from China to the Duisberg, a distribution hub in Germany, has started transporting laptop computers, shoes, clothes and other non perishable goods in one direction, and electronic goods, medical equipment and car parts in the other.

On the other hand, the Central Asian States (CAS) have extended cautious support to President Jinping’s SREB project, as this coincides with their own focus on connectivity projects. The CAS would like to overcome their landlocked status and connect with the world. Their cautious response is primarily because the contours of the project are not yet clear. As noted by the Chinese scholar Zhong Sheng, “The ‘Belt’ and ‘Road’ initiatives look at ideas and suggestions for cooperation and development” (Zhong Sheng, Spring 2014). However, the SREB is not a multilateral effort, although it should have been given that SREB is expected to traverse through several countries. A consultative mechanism would have had greater acceptance. The CAS in all likelihood will support the SREB, as long as Chinese investments and infrastructure development projects are in tandem with their own plans. Any hint of infringement of their sovereignty or territorial integrity will be unacceptable. The position of the CAS will become clearer once the details are made available. A brief background of the Fifth century Silk Route can provide a historical perspective in understanding the present initiative.

Historical BackgroundThe ‘ancient Silk Route’ came into being during the westward expansion of China’s two great dynasties; the Tang and Han Dynasties (206 BC–220 AD). A Chinese historian Sima Qian living in the first century B C wrote, “The granaries in all towns are brimming with reserves, and the coffers are full with treasures and gold worth trillions” (The Financial Times, 12 October 2015). This provided an impetus to the Silk Route and with that, China’s westward expansion began. In due course trade networks throughout the present day CAs and Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent sprang up. . These routes eventually extended over four thousand miles from Kian in Central China to Europe and connected East Asia, Central Asia and the Mediterranean region nearly 800 years ago. The extensive network of trade routes not only resulted in the exchange of goods, but as the saying goes, “culture follows trade!” There was exchange of cultural contacts and interaction of historical experience.

RIAC Working Paper “Prospects for Russian-Chinese Cooperation in Central Asia”

Since millennia, trade and the movement of goods has been a regular feature of human activity. The emergence of the Silk Route gave a boost to political unification and led to the development of many cities and regions. These cities were not only centres of trade but centres of learning as well (N Joshi, 2014).

Central Asia was the epicenter of the trade routes, connecting eastern and western markets and spurring immense wealth creation. Valuable Chinese silk, porcelain, jade, Indian Ivory, spices, Kashmiri shawls and other goods from other centres were highly sought after, while China received gold and other precious metals, ivory, and glass products. The route peaked during the first millennium, under the leadership of first the Roman and then Byzantine Empires, and the Tang dynasty (618–907) in China.

The Crusades in the fifteenth century as well as advances by the Mongols in Central Asia seriously disrupted the Silk Route. By the sixteenth century, commerce with Europe had largely shifted to maritime trade routes, which were then considered cheaper and faster. Today, Central Asian countries are unable to interact with other countries. They are keen to integrate with the world economy. They are members of WTO but are still heavily dependent on Russia. For example, remittances, which dropped from earlier figures to a mere 15 percent in 2014, were specifically due to Russia’s economic woes (James McBride, 2015).

In the contemporary globalised world order connectivity and trade have come to occupy the centre stage of international politics. Recently, several connectivity projects have been launched. In this interplay of connectivity projects and North-South/East-West links, Central Asia occupies a key position. Central Asia’s abundant natural resources and geopolitical location in the centre of the Eurasian heartland has attracted major powers who are vying for presence through such projects.

The Silk Road Economic BeltIn 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission of China’s (NDRC, 2015) Central Planning body published a document entitled, “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Maritime Silk Road”. The motivation for the current Silk Route project is surplus steel and cement and the growing trade with the CAS. The SREB is 8,400 km long originating in Xian and includes 3,400 km in China, 2,800 km in Kazakhstan and 2,200 km in Russia. Both the Belt and the Road are focused on economic cooperation, and to build cultural and people-to-people exchanges. In the Chinese view, these are purely economic proposition and should not create any interference in the affairs of the countries involved.

In this context, the NDRC has identified five major goals and six OBOR. The goals are Policy coordination; Facilities connectivity; Unimpeded trade; Financial integration and people to people bonds. The OBOR are an integral part of the mega connectivity projects. These are- China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor; New Eurasia land bridge economic corridor; China-Central Asia West Asia economic corridor; China-Pakistan economic corridor-Bangladesh-China India-Myanmar economic corridor; China-Indochina economic corridor.

RIAC discussed challenges to the internationalorder. The expert meeting with ProfessorYan Xuetong 

In effect, the OBOR can be understood as China’s initiative to increase connectivity and cooperation among countries along China’s old overland and maritime trade routes. Kim Chong Min rightly calls it China’s ‘new international economic diplomacy initiative’ (Kim Chong Min, 2016). It is certainly new and puts the spotlight on a number of countries that are often not in the centre of the world’s attention. It, would also accelerates outward investment, and shift industries into Central South and South-East Asia, which aligns with China’s desire to develop the western part of the country (Van Dijk, 2012).

Georgia is also part of China’s plan to create the SREB and is attractive for several reasons, including the fact that it avoids the necessity of a rail linepassing through Russia. This is a plus because it is considered easier for China to deal with a small country that is more dependent on China than China is on it. (Van Djik, August 2016). Importantly, Georgia also has excellent ports on the Black Sea.

The SREB and MSR have become China’s flagship projects. The question is what motivates this Chinese priority?

Drivers of the SREBIn an era of globalisation, a country’s economic profile and prowess plays a vital role. Perceived as a rising power, China is pursuing a highly pro active policy in the region. The importance of Central Asia had become obvious by 1991 because of their geographical proximity. While launching the SREB this importance has increased phenomenally. Other factors of equal significance are economic cooperation, security concerns and strategic interests. In the economic sphere, as observed by Peter Frankopan, a Senior Research Fellow at Worcester College, Oxford, and Director the Centre for Byzantine Research at Oxford University, “the Chinese government is building networks carefully and deliberately to connect to minerals, energy sources and access to cities, harbours and oceans. Barely a month goes by without the financing (on a massive scale) to either upgrade, or build from scratch, infrastructure that will enable volumes and velocities of exchange to rise sharply. It does so in partnership with countries whose status is raised from “‘iron friends’ to

relationships that can survive in ‘all-weather’ conditions” (Frankopan, 2015, p-516). The OBOR related projects would also provide an outlet for China to use its overcapacity in steel, cement and construction materials, as well as its surplus financial reserves. Through this Chinese expression of expansion, China aims at promoting a whole range of Chinese interests. The protection of resources such as oil, gas, uranium, copper and gold is key motive, along with the set up and expansion of new trade routes and sales markets. According to a report by the news agency Reuters, Xi told a delegation of Chinese entrepreneurs that he hopes to achieve a trade volume of over 2.5 trillion dollars with the OBOR countries in around ten years’ time ( Patrick Bessler). And the main focus of the initiative is on the countries within Central Asia, which is where these interests are precisely highly complex.

In the process China hopes to diversify exports, contribute to development in Eurasia, increase access to food and energy, lessen dependence on the US dollar and improve representation of developing nations in global affairs. Helga Zepp-La. Helga Zepp-LaRouche, the founder of the Schiller Institute, feel that OBOR is actually offering a replication of the Chinese economic miracle to every country that wishes to cooperate in this situation (HelgaZepp- Rouche, 2016, p-31). It is from Kazakhstan that the three branches of the trade routes spread out. The northern branch goes via Russia to Europe. The central branch goes through the Kazakh port of Atyrau, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. This branch bypasses Russia to reach Europe. The southern branch is via Turkmenistan, Iran and Oman. No further details are available as of now.

REUTERS/Damir SagoljThe Present and Future of the ChineseAuthorities under Xi Jinping

China is being driven both by domestic and foreign considerations. The urge to achieve development in all of China’s 31 provinces is a major factor and all provinces have already affirmed their active participation in a different aspects of the enterprise. The western province of Qinghai has indicated that it will build a rail, highway and aviation network to link the provinces and countries along the OBOR; Guangdong province along the coast will execute some major infrastructure projects, such as a power plant in Vietnam and an oil refinery in Myanmar. Of course see the western province of Xinjiang would be playing a major role; its cities of Urumqi, Kashgar and Khorgos will be at the centre of many of the proposed routes. And the realisation of the OBOR is expected to benefit the entire population in these regions.

Apart from economic compulsions, there are serious security concerns explaining why China wants to build its leverage in the Central Asian States. China’s Western periphery, especially the Xinjiang province, is vulnerable because extremism and separatism has taken root among the typically restive Uyghur minority leading to a long and drawn-out insurgency. China’s worry is that the ethnic affinity on the other side of the border, where a

large number of Uyghurs reside in Central Asia, could create a common cause and strengthen the Uyghur cause. The SREB is expected to bring economic prosperity, development and political stability to Xinjiang and also help the developmental process in Central Asia. Interdependence would benefit China in the long run in enhancing its presence and subsequently build leverages in Central Asia. It would also promote good neighbourliness and tranquillity in the Western periphery.

At the broader level, the timing of China’s proposals is probably in response and counter-initiative to the so-called Pivot to Asia or the R balancing strategy of the U S announced in 2011. The pivot includes two main security and economic arms- to redeploy 60 percent US air and sea power to Asia by 2020, surrounding China, and to negotiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement with allies, excluding China. The de facto containment effects of these policies prevent China from expanding its influence to the East and South.

An equally significant aspect is, as Tingyi Wang,,a Chinese scholar of Tsinghua University, explained, while the OBOR is prompted by China’s interests in energy, security and promotion of economic ties, it is actually driven by the vision of a “greater Eurasian idea” that calls for “strengthening economic and cultural integration” across this whole swathe of territory; and building “a new type of international relations underpinned by win-win cooperation”. Wang summarises that the Chinese strategy is “to guarantee its interests in this region and at the same time cooperate with the other powers”(Talmiz Ahmad, 2016). Furthermore, Saroj Jha, the Regional Director, Central Asia, World Bank, says that, beyond hydrocarbon and key commodities like, cotton, aluminium, etc., the production structure in most countries in the region are quite similar, limiting intra regional trade. At the same time, his argument continues, this creates opportunities for countries within central Asia to benefit more under a friendly environment and through trade-enabled regional value chains, (Saroj K Jha, 2015.) as proposed by China’s OBOR initiative.

Given China’s increasing vital interests in the region, the Belt and the Road strategy has become the core of its Eurasian policy of building an overland route.

Tracking the SREBThe SREB is not a single corridor, but rather, it has multiple branches. The northern route is split between the Trans-Siberian Railway and a route running south of Mongolia via Kazakhstan to Russia and on to the ports of Rotterdam and Duisburg (See image: 1). These connections have been used extensively. For instance, Deutsche Bahn, between 2011 and 2012, employed nearly 200 container trains for BMW to both Chongqing and Shenyang respectively. Apart from this, rail freight service on the route via Kazakhstan has been operative since 1992 (Zhang Xiaotong, Marlen Belgibayev, 2016).

Image. 1

Source: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru, accessed on 20 October, 2016

On the southern route that eschews Russia, various trial connections have recently been tested. These newly emerging connections have several comparative disadvantages, such as numerous custom controls, but they are being energetically expanded and could one day become a true rival to the much longer northern routes. One such trial took place between China and Teheran on 16 February 2016 and is expected to become a regular freight service running once a month. In 2015, DHL(Deutsche Post DHL) also commissioned shipping from Lianyungang in China via Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, including two sea transit segments, for arrival in Istanbul within 14 days (See Image: 2), (Hans-Joachim Spanger, 2016).

Image. 2

Source: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru, accessed on 20 October, 2016

Although the Ukrainian jump onto the bandwagon might be indicative of the fact that some countries along the Belt would like to use the Russian-Chinese connectivity competition to their advantage, the real challenge for Russian interests is the predominantly bilateral nature of the OBOR initiative. The “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, a draft and publication by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, states: “We should strengthen bilateral cooperation, and promote comprehensive development of bilateral relations through multi-level and multi-channel communication and consultation.” It also calls for the development of “a number of bilateral cooperation pilot projects” and the establishment and improvement of “bilateral joint working mechanisms”. At the same time, it aims to “enhance” the role of multilateral cooperation

mechanisms, notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus China (10+1), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and even those aligned with the (Japan-dominated) Asian Development Bank, such as the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) Economic Cooperation and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC). (Hans-Joachim Spanger, 2016).

The Central Asian Response

Second International Conference “Russia andChina: Taking on a New Quality of BilateralRelations”. Event Report

China has long been a key driver of infrastructure investment and occupies a critical position in its overland connectivity projects in Central Asia. It has invested heavily in the region’s natural resources especially in the extraction of gas, oil, uranium, gold and copper, which make up the key exports of the region. The Chinese companies have also built roads, railways, tunnels, power lines and refurbished oil refineries and established special economic zones. It is also actively involved in agri-business and telecommunications investments.

Since the Central Asian States especially Kazakhstan are central to the SREB, it is important to assess their response. At this juncture, the contours of the SREB are not clear nor are any further details. As previously mentioned, the initiative was not consultative in nature. It is wholly a Chinese project. However, it would not be wrong to state that the CASs would welcome any initiative that promotes their own objective of infrastructure development, as it would help them overcome their landlocked status.

. The main issue is whether or not the Chinese investment will lead to an infringement of their sovereignty and violate their territorial integrity? Alternatively, would it cause Chinese economic domination, which could result in a geopolitical fallout? Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have guarded against this with local content quotas. Turkmenistan technically requires that a project’s workforce consists of 70 per cent local employees, and Uzbekistan mandates that Chinese companies can only send management personnel, not labourers.

Briefly, the CASs have launched their own transport connectivity projects. Kazakhstan is associated with all of the North-South and East-West transport corridors. Turkmenistan has launched a major effort to emerge as a transport hub. Its central location is favourable to its ambitions. Mention must be made of The Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran rail link that was inaugurated in December 2014; the Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Turkmenistan link is currently in the making. It is awaiting investments but Turkmenistan has already constructed a short 2km rail link from its border with Afghanistan. The Persian Gulf Corridor passes through Turkmenistan and ends at Oman. In September 2015 Turkmenistan organized an

international conference in Ashgabat focused on the harmonisation of rules and regulations. The Ashgabat Declaration states this goal. Also, India has now become a member of this Corridor. Afghanistan is probably operational or, at the very least, upgrades of the existing infrastructure are taking place.

Uzbekistan has initiated the Persian Gulf Corridor. The current status of this venture is not known. Its focus, however, is on improving existing domestic infrastructure or planning new projects for internal connectivity. It has also built an international free economic zone at Navoi for air connectivity to the West.

In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan there is a more visible Chinese workforce. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, the construction of two roads (Osh-Sarytash-Irkeshtam and Bishkek-Naryn-Torugart) partly-funded by China consisted of 30 per cent local workers versus 70 per cent Chinese workers, with 60 per cent of raw materials being imported. This highlights the often China-centric relationship that is quite typical on such infrastructure projects.

Strategic Planning of Russia–China Relations in Cross-Border and Inter-Regional Cooperation

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have played a crucial role in the Northern Distribution Network. However, a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan road link is currently held up because of Uzbek Kyrgyz differences about its entry point into Uzbekistan (N Joshi, 2016).

A lack of clarity regarding the terms of official lending to Central Asia may also increase economic vulnerabilities in the region. A representative at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Dushanbe noted that the organisation was encouraging Tajikistan to accept the loans, given the very low interest rate. Despite these good terms, in reality the loans are offered with quiet scepticism that they will ever be paid back. This is particularly true of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, given their heavier dependence on Chinese aid. A Wikileaks report from 2009 highlighted this scepticism, saying ‘no one in either the Chinese or Tajik governments is speaking about paying back Chinese loans’. But the Chinese may seek loan repayments in other ways. Sometimes deals are structured so that the access to resources or mineral rights become part of the repayment plan. However, there are suspicions of other, less transparent agreements, such as Tajikistan’s 2011 agreement to settle a land demarcation issue with China, in which the latter gained 1,000 sq km. This has been described as an ‘unofficial debt writing-off agreement’, although there is no documentary evidence to confirm this theory. Mounting debt exposure within already structurally vulnerable economies could exacerbate domestic inequalities and potentially encourage unfair practices. (Sarah Lain, 2016)

In addition, there has been criticism of Chinese companies engaging in non-transparent operations in the region. A case involving Chinese state-owned oil and gas company (CNPC) is a prominent example. Furthermore, China’s historical track record of investment engagement in the region raises concerns that the SREB could instead exacerbate

economic inequalities and poor governance. Possibly when the details of the SREB are known, the CAS will weigh their options and decide to what extent they could support the Chinese initiative. Meanwhilem there are other challenges that China will have to address.

ChallengesThe fisrt major challenge is institutional in nature. Russia has established the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a multilateral grouping aimed at economic integration. It is comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Although Russia and China joined an agreement for greater cooperation between EAEU and SREB in May 2015, the prospects for true partnership between the two institutions emerging appear distant at present. The sticky issue is harmonisation of border control, customs regime and (importantly) the granting of Free Trade Area status to China.

The Russian vision for Eurasia, especially in Central Asia, and the Chinese approach to the region have significant differences. Russia sees it as its own backyard to be defended against Western expansion in favour of keeping the existing order. China, by contrast, sees Central Asia as a strategic corridor in its OBOR initiative, linking Europe, sharing prosperity and conveying inclusiveness in a changing international order (Tao Wang and Rachel Yampolsky, 21 September 2015).

Most significantly it is believed that China will provide half of the total investments for the infrastructure development. The remaining is expected to be provided by the countries involved. However, in the final analysis the decisions of those countries will be crucial. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus will be caught in the vortex of two competing institutions.

ConclusionTo conclude, in the coming years progress in the SREB project will depend on changes at the global level, as well as on the new elite; the youth who are coming of age in Central Asia and may have their own ‘Dreams’ for the future.

Does this mean that the Mother Of All Bombs has no advantages at all? Is it just a hoax aimed at expropriating U.S. defence budget money, as Russian radical patriots would no doubt like it to be? Not quite. The thing is, even the MOAB's predecessors, including the aforementioned BLU-82, which were developed for very specific needs (such as clearing vegetation for helicopter landing sites in the jungle, hence the nickname Daisy Cutter), demonstrated a surprising side effect: they had a powerful psychological effect on those under attack. An urban legend linked to the BLU-82 has it that a British SAS detachment which witnessed the explosion of one such bomb from afar in 1991 broke radio silence and reported that a tactical nuclear device had been used.

The GBU-43/B was also created with this psychological side effect in mind. Moreover, it still remains a devastating weapon, especially in canyons where the blast does not spread evenly but rather generates a tunnel effect. U.S. military reports state that the MOAB was actually used against an Islamic State camp situated in a “cave network” (possibly in a snug canyon) in Afghanistan's eastern province of Nangarhar. Even on open terrain a blast yielding around 11 t in TNT equivalent would have a severe damage radius of some 150 m and would result in minor destruction and concussions at distances of up to 1.5 km away. This effect would certainly amplify in enclosed spaces.

The above is more likely to be of interest to enthusiasts of contemporary military aviation, who might be awed by the MOAB's unusual characteristics. What does its employment mean in the context of the Afghan war then?

First of all, it is a reminder for everyone that the war continues, and that it has intensified recently. The number of aerial strikes and the amounts of air-delivered munitions used in 2016 exceeded the 2015 figures by roughly 50%. The figures for the first three months of 2017 alone amounted to approximately 50% of the 2015 levels [1] . Despite the fact that international media have been ignoring the Afghan war in the past several years, it continues to consume enormous sums [2] , and U.S. troops continue to suffer losses in the country. In this context, the use of the MOAB may have been an act of revenge for the fatal loss of a U.S. Marine several days prior; at least this is how some media chose to interpret this development.

Could it be that this “big bang” is exactly what is needed for the world, which is currently busy searching for the allegedly missing Tomahawk cruise missiles and bracing, again, for a new Korean war, to finally become aware of Afghanistan?