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Seager/Sefzik Negative Brief: Gerrymandering – is bad Personal Brief

Negative Brief: Gerrymandering Reform [Includes Iowa] STRATEGY .............................................................................................................................................................. 3

ONE PAGE STRATEGY SHEET......................................................................................................................................5ONE PAGE STRATEGY SHEET (SS)..............................................................................................................................6

TOPICALITY ............................................................................................................................................................ 7 1) Redistricting is Controlled by States.............................................................................................................7

INHERENCY ............................................................................................................................................................ 8 UPHELD BY COURT.................................................................................................................................................8

2) A/T Violates One Person, One Vote. It fits with constitutional history.........................................................83) Approved in 2006 by Supreme Court...........................................................................................................8

PROBLEM IS OVERBLOWN.........................................................................................................................................94) Gerrymandering is an easy scape goat (Doesn’t cause many problems).....................................................95) Gerrymandering can only tweak, but not completely alter the makeup of Congress..................................9

A/T POLARIZATION................................................................................................................................................96) Gerrymandering – very little effect on polarization.....................................................................................9

A/T BAD POLICIES...............................................................................................................................................107) Summary: Gerrymandering has nothing to do with bad policies...............................................................10

A/T ANTI-DEMOCRATIC.........................................................................................................................................108) Gerrymandering is not anti-democratic.....................................................................................................10

A/T REPUBLICAN VICTORY......................................................................................................................................119) Republicans won, not because of gerrymandering....................................................................................1110) Even states whose redistricting is controlled by Democrats come out supporting Republicans..............11

A/T INCUMBENTS................................................................................................................................................1111) Incumbents are not helped by gerrymandering.......................................................................................11

SOLVENCY ............................................................................................................................................................ 12 AT: BLIND DRAWING............................................................................................................................................12

12) Some Knowledge is Necessary.................................................................................................................12A/T COMMITTEES................................................................................................................................................12

13) Committees can be Influenced by Politicians (Anecdote)........................................................................1214) Standards don’t create perfect Committee members..............................................................................1315) No Historical Precedence to the Idea that this Plan will Work.................................................................13

A/T IOWA PLAN..................................................................................................................................................1316) Key part of Iowa success: the state’s political culture..............................................................................1317) It's naive to believe you can ever totally take politics out of redistricting................................................13

DISADVANTAGES .................................................................................................................................................. 14 COMMITTEES ARE NOT ELECTED...............................................................................................................................14

18) Independent Committees Not Accountable to the Public........................................................................1419) The Legislature Was Elected.....................................................................................................................14

FEDERALISM........................................................................................................................................................1420) Partisan gerrymandering can facilitate federalism...................................................................................1421) Gerrymandering protects from Federal Overreach (Short)......................................................................1522) Founders created House of Representatives for states’ rights.................................................................15

CONSTITUTIONALITY..............................................................................................................................................1523) Link 1: 10th Amendment...........................................................................................................................1524) Some State Constitutions Leave Redistricting up to the Legislature........................................................16

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25) PROOF: Where The Constitution Is Silent, Power Belongs With The States.............................................1626) IMPACT: States’ Rights Important. Federal Government not supposed to be primary power.................1627) What is best for Rhode island is not always best for California (States are different)..............................17

BALANCES OUT IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM....................................................................................................................1728) Frequency of Redistricting Prevents Power Grabbing..............................................................................17

LOST EXPERTISE...................................................................................................................................................1729) Legislators Have a Unique Knowledge on Redistricting............................................................................17

SHORTEST SPLITLINE ............................................................................................................................................ 18 SS: REPRESENTATION............................................................................................................................................18

30) Mathematical distribution hurts the community aspect..........................................................................1831) EXA – some districts should be rep. of a community that historically lived there....................................1832) Doesn’t respect communities – violates CA Constitution.........................................................................1833) IMPACT – Hurts community interest........................................................................................................1934) Impossible to accurately define and map CCI's without involvement of locals........................................19

SS – ILLEGAL FOR THREE REASONS............................................................................................................................1935) Split-line is illegal according to the voting rights act (1st reason)............................................................1936) BU - Any change to voting is legally unenforceable until cleared with district court...............................1937) Backup: Section 2 allows the DoJ and private parties to litigate redistricting..........................................2038) Backup: Section 2 requires majority/minority districts............................................................................2039) Preserving communities of interest is required by many states (2nd reason).........................................2040) Split-line will vary by five percent of the population, larger than allowed (3rd reason)..........................2041) Backup: Even 1% variance in population is unconstitutional...................................................................21

SS - IGNORING VITAL FACTORS................................................................................................................................2142) Link 1: Split Line ignores every redistricting factor except equal population...........................................2143) Link 2: There are several other factors that are currently considered.....................................................2144) Protects against disenfranchisement of minorities from the political process.........................................2245) IMP-EXT: Dilution of votes is just as bad as denying the ballot................................................................22

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY (SS) ................................................................................................................................. 23 46) Ideal in vision, almost impossible in practice...........................................................................................2347) All redistricts will produce a winner or a loser.........................................................................................23

SOLVENCY (SS) ..................................................................................................................................................... 24 48) Splitline Redistricting Doesn’t Do Enough To Ensure Proper Representation..........................................2449) Equalizing Population Isn’t Enough (Cities divided in pieces)...................................................................2450) “Probably impossible to create a computer program that solves these problems”.................................2451) It comes down to who gets the final say in what becomes law...............................................................2552) Computer Algorithms Can Be Tweaked To Gain A Political Outcome......................................................25

A/T IOWA PLAN (ADDITIONAL CARD).......................................................................................................................2553) Iowa's system is nice, but does not fix the root cause.............................................................................25

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StrategyGerrymandering is the act of splitting up districts to favor your party. I assume you know that if you are using this brief.

This case would be pretty darn good if it weren’t for the fact that a federal reform like this completely tramples on the states. I wouldn’t run Topicality just because it’s more fun (and effective) to use that time for other arguments.

Here’s a breakdown of the issues:

Inherency

Upheld by Court – Two cards supporting the fact that Gerrymandering has never really been struck down by SCOTUS. The first card refutes the one person one vote idea, and the second shows that gerrymandering (even partisan gerrymandering) is allowed by SCOTUS since 2006.

Problem is overblown – Essentially card 4 is saying lots of things are blamed on it because it’s a scape goat, but it’s not really the problem. Card 5 is saying it can only tweak results, it can’t really win an entire election. Use this to respond to the whole idea that it removes democracy because it pre-determines elections.

Polarization – The argument is that Congress can’t agree on anything, and that’s somehow caused by gerrymanding. Card 6 is simply saying polarization comes from other sources. It’s based on a study.

Bad policies – People claim Obamacare, government shutdown, and other things were a result of gerrymanding. This evidence quickly dispenses with all of them, and it’s three Ph.D’s so it trumps Aff evidence.

Anti-democratic – If Aff keeps pushing that the votes are already determined and it’s undermining democracy, read this. It’s not anti-democratic because we choose our state legislature, and our state legislature uses districting to help choose the federal legislature based on their own views. We still have the ultimate choice.

Republican Victory – I doubt people will run this argument, but this responds to the argument saying Republicans used gerrymandering to win a majority in the House. The reality is that they would win either way. It’s an alternate cause.

Incumbents – Aff might claim that redistricting is used by incumbents to get re-elected. It sounds logical but this study shows it hasn’t actually happened. Sometimes gerrymandering backfires.

Solvency

Blind drawing – This evidence is a laundry list of uses for knowledge in redistricting. In other words, a committee can’t just draw the lines without knowing anything because it will cause more problems than just partisanship

Committees – Basically Committees are easily fallible. Card 13 is an anecdote of democrats infiltrating a committee, Card 14 is a good quote saying that no matter how many standards there are, committee members are, partisans will eventually get the last word on districting. Card 15 references past attempts in some states that have failed.

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Iowa Plan – Essentially several articles claim Iowa fixed gerrymandering. All you have to do is say that Iowa’s political climate makes it easier to fix gerrymandering in. That’s Card 16. What works for one state doesn’t work for other states or especially the federal government.

Disadvantages

Committees are not elected – This is a pretty nice point. Do we want non-elected random scholars deciding the fate of our elections? If gerrymandering is such a big deal, then putting random scholars in charge of it (especially unelected ones) is a big deal. Capitalize on this with rhetoric at the judge: “Do we want the fate of our elections to be determined by a faceless scientist the Affirmative team can’t even name, or those whom we the people elect?”

Federalism – Pull out your best Federalism rhetoric, boys, cause we’re about to have some fun. This is a really interesting argument. We elect state legislatures. One party gets a majority. Now that party wants their party’s representation in federal Congress to be high, so that policies passed towards their state are favorable. It is good when both the state and federal legislatures from one place are the same party, so they can work together. So they gerrymander to get the best chance of federal legislators of their kind in power. It’s not corruption, it’s self-preservation. We elected those representatives, so why shouldn’t we want them to get more of their own elected?

By doing this these legislators can protect the state’s sovereignty and rights from the Federal government.

Constitutionality – Probably the best point in the brief. State constitutions give the redistricting job to their legislatures. Passing a federal law (especially a constitutional amendment) that trumps this is wildly, ridiculously, bad. “Hey, let’s just violate the rights of 50 states at once!”

Balances out in the current system – This point is just kind of… there. Basically gerrymandering is part of our system now. And it balances out because it happens quite often, so the majority party usually has districts that favor them. That’s just how it goes. It’s more balanced than trying to get a commission to do it because it naturally balances out. I don’t really recommend this point.

Lost Expertise – This is a pretty nice point. Legislators know their home state more than random folks that would be in charge of this proposed committee. It’s better to let the legislators who actually live in the state and have experience with the state do the work.

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One page strategy sheet

Note: This is against my prediction of what a normal Gerrymandering case will be. Arguments will vary.

1NC Theme: Problem Overblown, Legislators better than Committee1. Devote the first part of the speech to responding to the important claims. Unconstitutionality, polarization, government shutdown, etc. Leave a good amount of time, though.

2. A/T Committees. Card 15 and Card 13 musts. Card 14 optional. Read card 15 first because it shows that overall, states have not had success. Card 13 is a good way to bring in a story/anecdote for judges that like those. Essentially, fill the judge with despair for humanity: There is literally no way to avert partisanship. It will happen no matter what. If there was any benefit, it would be minimal. Card 17 (Optional) to reinforce that partisanship will always exist.

3. Committees are not elected (Disadvantage or Solvency). The point of the American political system is that we are somewhat of a democracy. (Constitutional republic.) Handing over the election process to a “nonpartisan” group of scientists or whatever they are is basically laughing at the Founding Fathers’ design. I recommend both Card 18 and Card 19 for this.

1NC is the speech for doubt. Make the judge doubt that committees will solve the problem. What you can do is take a gamble and don’t use point 1 (don’t respond to gerrymandering bad evidence). Then use the Aff’s evidence against them. If the problem is so bad, how will a committee fix it? It won’t. Make the judge worry about throwing away our election system to a “nonpartisan” board whose names we don’t even know. Aff can’t tell them who these people are. They are just hoping it ends up being a good group of people.

2NC Theme: State’s Rights all DAYYY1. Federalism. I can’t explain everything that goes into Federalism. I recommend reading a few articles to get your mind around this concept and the importance of it so you can communicate effectively. Card 22 and 21. Card 20 if this is a committee using plan since it specifically mentions committees.

2. Violating the Constitution. Tenth amendment provides that states have whatever rights not given to the Feds. Card 24 shows that Utah’s constitution gives the job of redistricting to its state legislature. The same applies for almost all other states. Logic: Federal mandates giving the feds or a committee charge over state’s redistricting is violating the tenth amendment big time. Card 26 impact.

This speech has less evidence wielding, and more speech time because it is for the more advanced speaker. Use this time to instill fear of Aff’s plan into the judge. But don’t just instill fear: give the judge an outlet. That outlet is voting negative. Don’t let the judge fail to realize how big of a deal trampling on states like this is.

Besides just the constitution, it’s best if states decide for themselves because they know themselves better than the Federal Government knows them. That’s Card 27.

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One Page Strategy Sheet (SS)

1NC Theme: This is just a theoretical idea, NOT one that is proven1. Sounds nice, but it’s an untested theory only. Aff plan is permanent. This is like putting out an untested drug on the market because it sounds good. Card 46.

2. Ignores vital factors. Splitline algorithms only deal with population, and nothing else. Card 42 and 43. Card 49: Cities divided. Card 48: Population is not the only important thing.

3. Representation hurt. Communities of interest split up.

2NC Theme: This plan hasn’t been used because it’s illegal1. Illegal in three ways. 1) Voting Rights Act. Card 35. 2) Communities of interest split up. Card 39. 3) Inaccurate by 5%. Card 40, 41.

2. Impact: Hurts minorities. Card 44 and 45.

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Topicality1) Redistricting is Controlled by States

Jeffery G Hamilton (JD; Emory Law School; Attorney) 1994 “Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court” with the Emory Law Journal http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=a1045dc19256d91071e706e00fa50e7e&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzt-zSkAz&_md5=056541a294d3cb7acc14339f728b8959

“Redistricting in most states is controlled by the state legislature, and state legislatures are controlled by political parties. Historically, the political party in control of a state legislature used political gerrymandering in order to increase its chances of maintaining its majority in the state legislature. It did this by forming as many districts as possible in which the party in power could be assured a majority of the registered voters.”

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Inherency

Upheld by Court

2) A/T Violates One Person, One Vote. It fits with constitutional history

Dr. Franita Tolson (Professor of Voting Rights. J.D. University of Chicago. Before entering academia, she clerked for the Honorable Ann Claire Williams of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Professor Tolson was a member of the University of Chicago Law Review. Recently, she has written on Congress's authority to regulate elections under the Elections Clause, the federalism implications of partisan gerrymandering, the scope of voting rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.),"Benign Partisanship", November 2012 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2199003 (Giovanni S)

"As state legislatures quickly realized, gerrymandering could coexist comfortably beside the one person, one vote doctrine, which alarmed numerous dissenters in cases following Reynolds and Wesberry. But this does not have to be a matter of alarm - partisan gerrymandering as a safeguard of federalism fits comfortably with the constitutional history, text, and the Court's doctrines. It allows states to comply with their constitutional and statutory obligations to draw districts while protecting their governing prerogatives. States can constitutionally redistrict more frequently which, when combined with the infrequency that Congress uses its power to "make or alter" congressional districts and the lack of judicial solicitude of continuing federal involvement in state electoral processes, means that partisan gerrymandering permits the House to play a role similar to the pre-Seventeenth Amendment Senate."

3) Approved in 2006 by Supreme Court

Halen Allison (Masters Degree; Strategic Intelligence ; Intelligence analyst) August 15 2012 “Gerrymandering: The Radicalization of Politics and the Stifling of Democracy” with the Steuben Courier http://www.steubencourier.com/community/blogs/steuben_courier_town_square_blog/x1132447120/Gerrymandering-The-Radicalization-of-Politics-and-the-Stifling-of-Democracy

“Some democracies around the world have seen the dangers of gerrymandering and have their districts drawn up by non-partisan entities. Several states, such as Arizona, California, and Washington, have similar committees. But in 2006, the US Supreme Court in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, ruled that gerrymandering is acceptable as long as it’s not harmful to minorities, and that states can gerrymander not just every ten years, but whenever they want so long that gerrymandering, or redistricting, is done at least once every ten years. We’re sure to see some districts created in a wide variety of interesting shapes in the coming years, all in the name of power.”

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Problem is overblown

4) Gerrymandering is an easy scape goat (Doesn’t cause many problems)

Dr. Eric McGhee (Research Fellow with expertise in elections. Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.),"Gerrymandering Really Isn't a Big Deal", April 7, 2013 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/ten-miles-square/2013/04/gerrymandering_really_isnt_a_b044043.php (Giovanni S)

"Why is gerrymandering is such a popular explanation for things? I'd guess it's because it reeks of corruption and manipulation, so it taints everything it touches. It's easier to get mad about something if you can blame it on politicians rigging the game to thwart the will of the people. If more mundane forces are at work, it becomes harder to get mad, and harder to think of the solution."

5) Gerrymandering can only tweak, but not completely alter the makeup of Congress

Professor Howard Rosenthal (Professor of Politics at New York University, he earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.), Professor Keith Poole (Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Ph.D. from the University of Rochester in American politics), and Professor Nolan McCarty (Nolan McCarty is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. politics, democratic political institutions, and political methodology. He has made notable contributions to the study of partisan polarization. He is the chair of the Department of Politics at Princeton University and the Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He received a PhD in political economy from Carnegie Mellon in 1993.), Princeton University,"Gerrymandering Didn’t Cause the Shutdown", October 9, 2013 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-09/gerrymandering-didn-t-cause-the-shutdown.html (Giovanni S)

"There is another distinction. Many districts are safe for one party or the other because of how Americans have sorted themselves geographically -- choosing to live closer to people who are politically or culturally like-minded. In Florida, for example, Palm Beach County will be reliably Democratic and the Panhandle will consistently vote for Republicans. These geographic shifts mean that state legislatures, which approve congressional district lines, can tweak but not fundamentally alter the ideological makeup of Congress. "

A/T Polarization

6) Gerrymandering – very little effect on polarization

Professor Brendan Nyhan, PhD (He is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. He received his Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Duke University in 2009 and served as a RWJ Scholar in Health Policy Research at the University of Michigan from 2009-2011. His academic research focuses on political scandal and misperceptions about politics and health care. He also studies social networks and applied statistical methods.) “Exaggerating the effect of gerrymandering,” February 17, 2009 , http://www.brendan-nyhan.com/blog/2009/02/exaggerating-the-significance-of-gerrymandering.html

In fact, the evidence suggests that gerrymandering has played a relatively small role in the increase in polarization. As UT-Austin's Sean Theriault emphasizes in his book Party Polarization in Congress, the Senate has polarized almost as much as the House in recent decades despite not having redistricting.

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From a more technical perspective, here's the abstract of a new study on the subject from Princeton's Nolan McCarty, UCSD's Keith Poole, and NYU's Howard Rosenthal (PDF):

A/T Bad Policies

7) Summary: Gerrymandering has nothing to do with bad policies

Professor Howard Rosenthal (Professor of Politics at New York University, he earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.), Professor Keith Poole (Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Ph.D. from the University of Rochester in American politics: Professor Poole's research interests include American Political-Economic History, Congress, Economic Growth and Entrepreneurship, and the Political-Economic History of Railroads. He is the author or coauthor of over 40 articles as well as the coauthor of Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. He has received grants from the National Science Foundation, the Carnegie-Bosch Foundation, and the Center for Political Economy.), and Professor Nolan McCarty (Nolan McCarty is an American political scientist specializing in U.S. politics, democratic political institutions, and political methodology. He has made notable contributions to the study of partisan polarization, the politics of economic inequality, theories policy-making, and the statistical analysis of legislative voting. He is the chair of the Department of Politics at Princeton University and the Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. McCarty graduated from the University of Chicago with an BA in economics in 1990. He received a MS in political economy from Carnegie Mellon University in 1992, and a PhD also in political economy from Carnegie Mellon in 1993.), Princeton University,"Gerrymandering Didn’t Cause the Shutdown", October 9, 2013 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-09/gerrymandering-didn-t-cause-the-shutdown.html (Giovanni S)

"What if we told you that the gerrymandering of congressional districts has nothing to do with political polarization in Washington? Gerrymandering didn't have anything to do with the shutdown, or the battles over the debt ceiling, or Obamacare. In fact, the accepted view that politically based redistricting led to our state of intransigence isn't just incorrect; it's silly. "

A/T Anti-democratic

8) Gerrymandering is not anti-democratic

Dr. Thomas Barnico (Mr. Barnico is an adjunct faculty member at Boston College Law School. Earlier, he was a visiting professor at the Law School, teaching Federal Courts and Administrative Law. He received his J.D. degree from Boston College Law School. He served as an Assistant District Attorney in Essex County (MA) in 1980 and 1981.),"Gerrymanders and state [s]elections", November 13, 2013 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/190013-gerrymanders-and-state-selections (Giovanni S)

"The Constitution makes senators and congressmen officials of the national government, but they are apportioned in number and chosen by state. Their eligibility for election is based on their residence in the electing state. Their office doors at the Capitol often bear the seals of their home state. They have been historically assumed to "represent" - at least in some degree -- their states. The parties controlling the state legislatures, in turn, wish to elect - if indirectly - a House delegation sympathetic to their views. As Franita Tolson of Florida State University has written, "the ability to partisan gerrymander is a tool that a state can use in order to influence its congressional delegation and federal policy in a ways favorable to its interests." In this light, modern-day gerrymandering is simply a new, highly-efficient means to revive old powers over the selection of congressional "delegations".

These are not necessarily anti-democratic or anti-constitutional means or ends. Rather, state legislative selection of federal representatives has democratic roots. The people of each State drive the selection of

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federal officials by controlling the election of state legislators. High-stake state fights over the drawing of congressional district lines ought to increase interest in state legislative races in the years preceding and following the year of enactment of new districts."A/T Republican victory

9) Republicans won, not because of gerrymandering

Dr. Sean Trende (Sean earned a juris doctorate from Duke University, a master's degree in political science from Duke University and bachelor's degree from Yale University. Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics.),"Gerrymandering Isn't to Blame for D.C. Impasse", October 11, 2013 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/10/11/gerrymandering_isnt_to_blame_for_dc_impasse_120300.html (Giovanni S)

"This idea of an invulnerable GOP majority as the result of gerrymandering is bunk. If Democrats could win GOP-leaning seats at the rate that they did in 2008, 2006, or 1992, they would win control of the House, and by roughly the margins that they did in those respective years. To the extent that Republicans are insulated from electoral pressure, it isn't because of redrawn lines. It's because Democrats haven't won in red territory in the past two elections at the rates that they did in 1992, 2006 or 2008."

10) Even states whose redistricting is controlled by Democrats come out supporting Republicans

Sean Trende, JD (Sean earned a juris doctorate from Duke University, a master's degree in political science from Duke University and bachelor's degree from Yale University. Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics.) “Gerrymandering and the Republican House,” July 1, 2013 , Published by Real Clear Politics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/07/01/gerrymandering_isnt_the_real_cause_of_polarization.html

First, the underlying assumption about the cause of district polarization is wrong. As I’ve suggested before, the natural geographic concentration of the Democratic vote is more responsible for polarized districts than any efforts by Republicans. For that matter, states where Democrats controlled the redistricting process yielded pretty heavily Republican districts as well. Illinois has two evenly matched districts (one represented by a Republican, one by a Democrat), but the remainder of the Republican-leaning districts went for Mitt Romney by healthy margins (even as he lost nationally by four points).

A/T Incumbents

11) Incumbents are not helped by gerrymandering

Dr. Richard Holden (Ph.D in Economics. Lecturer at the University of Sydney.) and Dr. John Friedman (Assistant Professor of Public Policy. His research aims to produce rigorous empirical evidence that is tied to theoretical models to inform public policy decisions. He holds a Ph.D. in Economics, an A.M. in Statistics, and a B.A. in Economics, all from Harvard University.),"The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: Whatís Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?", May 29, 2008 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfriedm/incumbents.pdf (Giovanni S)

"The probability that an incumbent in the United States House of Representatives is reelected has risen dramatically over the last half-century; it now stands at more than 98%. A number of authors and commentators claim that this rise is due to an increase in bipartisan gerrymandering in favor of incumbents. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find evidence of the opposite effect. All else equal, changes in redistrict-ing have reduced the probability of incumbent reelection over time. The timing

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of this effect is consistent with the hypothesis that legal constraints on gerrymandering, such as the Voting Rights Act, have become tighter over time. Incumbent gerrymandering may well be a contributor to incumbent reelection rates, but it is less so than in the past."

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Solvency

AT: Blind Drawing

12) Some Knowledge is Necessary

Mitchell N. Berman (JD; MA in Criminal Law; University of Michigan Ann-Arbor Law Professor at UT Austin) February 2005 “Managing Gerrymandering” with the Texas law Review http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=d71bb4c0325b1bf307cb86aedb61cc5b&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzB-zSkAW&_md5=207b48ab1e82be33e60db571e1e7b6cd

“Fairness in Districting. - But where? Let us start again with the notion of what it means for partisanship to be present at all. Districting is a reason-directed activity. Mapmakers draw district lines in order to advance some combination of ends. Put otherwise, the drawing of lines is responsive to practical reason. It is not performance art. 233 Legitimate objectives in the shaping of electoral districts include (and are nearly limited to) the following: guarding against excessive population disparities, maintaining contiguity and compactness, following major geographical features like rivers and mountains, tracking political subdivisions, preserving communities of interest, ensuring no diminution in the voting strength of racial and ethnic minorities, protecting incumbents, securing public acceptance, and promoting party electoral success. These are possible purposes. It is not the case that a given redistricter attends to all of these purposes all of the time.”

A/T Committees

13) Committees can be Influenced by Politicians (Anecdote)

Times - Standard (Newspaper of California’s North Coast) December 29 2011 “Democrats manipulated California redistricting commission; ProPublica investigation reveals process was biased” http://www.times-standard.com/toptenstoriesof2011/ci_19637849

“California's congressional Democrats ran a secret effort earlier this year to manipulate the work of the independent citizen panel that drew the state's new political districts, foiling the intent of reformers who sought to remove the redistricting process from the control of party bosses. Democrats met behind closed doors at the party's Washington, D.C., headquarters, hired consultants, drew their ideal districts and presented maps to the panel through proxies who never disclosed their party ties or “public interest” groups created specifically for the purpose. In many cases, the panel responded by doing just what the Democrats wanted. The New York-based nonprofit investigative foundation ProPublica released findings last week from a months-long reconstruction of the Democrats' stealth redistricting strategy, relying on internal memos, emails, interviews and map analysis. The success of the strategy has Democrats projecting they may pick up as many as seven congressional seats in 2012 under new district boundaries adopted last summer, far more than had been expected originally.”

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14) Standards don’t create perfect Committee members

Susan Myrick (former US Congressman from north Carolina) March 18, 2013 “Independent Redistricting Commissions” with the Civitas Institute http://www.nccivitas.org/2013/lipstick-on-a-pig-independent-redistricting-commissions/

“SB 155 (as do all “independent” redistricting bills) appears to pass off our elected officials redistricting responsibilities to appointees but, ultimately, the appointees are appointed by the politicians we elect to be in charge of the process. No amount of restrictions placed on who can and who cannot be appointed to the commission, and no matter how convoluted the appointment process, we know that in the end partisans will make the final decisions on the maps. We also know the system can be scammed. All we need to do is look to Arizona and California and their “independent” redistricting committees to see that these committees aren’t what their proponents claim they are, but ultimately partisan cover for politicians.”

15) No Historical Precedence to the Idea that this Plan will Work

Stuart C. Reid (Member of Utah’s 2011 Redistricting Committee) August 30th, 2011 “Perspective: Why the legislature should redistrict” with the Salt Lake Tribune http://www.senatesite.com/home/independentcommission/

“There are currently 13 states that have decided to use some form of commission to make their redistricting decisions as opposed to their legislatures. However, the history of these commissions shows they are by no means an insulator from litigation nor does a state that uses a commission have fewer overall problems or fewer challenges over the redistricting process than states that allow their legislature to make the decisions. Arizona, who has what many hold up to be the “model” for a redistricting commissions, just spent seven years embroiled in legal battles over the composition of their state’s redistricting commission.”

A/T Iowa plan

16) Key part of Iowa success: the state’s political culture

Edith Munro (Reporter for the Times Union.) “Gerrymandering? Not in Iowa,” April 14, 2011 , Published by the Times Union, http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Gerrymandering-Not-in-Iowa-1336319.php

Steffan Schmidt, an Iowa State University political scientist known as "Dr. Politics," sees Iowans' political culture, which emphasizes fairness, as a key contributor to the system's success. His observation is borne out when you hear Iowa politicians talk about this year's plan.

17) It's naive to believe you can ever totally take politics out of redistricting

Phil Power (Former newspaper publisher and University of Michigan Regent Phil Power is a longtime observer of Michigan politics and economics. He is also the founder and chairman of the Center for Michigan, a nonprofit, bipartisan centrist think–and–do tank.),"Iowa, California offer ideas on how to fix gerrymandering", October 28, 2013 , accessed November 20, 2013, http://bridgemi.com/2013/10/iowa-california-offer-ideas-on-how-to-fix-gerrymandering/ (Giovanni S)

"But the more essential and complicated question is what to do about it. Many urge we take the drawing of district lines out of the hands of politicians (usually state legislators) and give the job to independent nonpartisan folks like retired judges.

This is the system adopted in Iowa, where there is some evidence it has reduced overt partisanship in drawing lines. Maybe so, but I still think it's naïve to believe you can ever totally take politics out of redistricting, the most political act of all."

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Disadvantages

Committees are not elected

18) Independent Committees Not Accountable to the Public


“Considerable noise has been made about the possibility of changing the responsibilities of redistricting in Utah from that of the legislature to one of an independent commission. When you think about it, the noise itself is not unhealthy. In fact, it is representative of our democratic process. Discussion and examining both sides of an issue reflects the democratic principles our country is built on. It is those very principles that endorse the existing, legislative, decision making process for redistricting Utah. On the other hand, those democratic principles are considerably altered when a commission is used. For example, Arizona has a five member redistricting commission, two from each political party and one independent. That means when the decision is partisan, a single independent member has ALL the decision making power. Do we want a body of legislators, who are accountable to the public, making a decision as our Utah Constitution prescribes or a few individuals with no accountability to the public?”

19) The Legislature Was Elected


“Lastly, some people believe politics should be taken out of redistricting by using a commission. But when the outcome is inherently political, it’s not possible to take politics out of the process, nor perhaps should it be. What must be safeguarded above all else is the politics of the people’s voice. The people in Utah spoke when they determined the composition of the Legislature elected to represent their interests. Some don’t like the makeup of the Legislature because they don’t like the majority view of things.”

Federalism

20) Partisan gerrymandering can facilitate federalism

Dr. Franita Tolson (Professor of Voting Rights. J.D. University of Chicago. Before entering academia, she clerked for the Honorable Ann Claire Williams of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Professor Tolson was a member of the University of Chicago Law Review.),"Benign Partisanship", November 2012 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2199003 (Giovanni S)

"Partisan gerrymandering can facilitate state-federal relations by increasing the probability that a state can send a cohesive delegation to Congress, a delegation that can effectively express the state's policy preferences regarding national legislation. Increased use of mid-decade redistricting and at-large voting schemes may be desirable in order to get an accurate gauge of voter preferences and hold elected officials accountable when gerrymandering occurs. Similarly, leaving redistricting in the hands of strong state parties that are distinct from their national counterparts, rather than delegating this power to independent commissions, is also key to this outcome. As the 2003 Texas redistricting illustrates, the Supreme Court cannot articulate rules that insulate federalism-reinforcing gerrymanders from erroneous invalidation, but the Court can, through related substantive areas that implicate redistricting, promote this federalism benefit so that states can protect their authority in a way that has been constitutionally mandated - through congressional redistricting."

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21) Gerrymandering protects from Federal Overreach (Short)

Franita Tolson (JD; University of Chicago; Professor of Law) December 19, 2010 “Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism” with the Utah Law Review http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1674507

“In a similar vein, I argue that partisan gerrymandering is a product of our political system that can also protect the states from federal overreaching. All redistricting conducted by state legislatures is partisan in that the lines are drawn based predominantly on political considerations, but “partisan gerrymandering” is generally considered to be true partisan bias in redistricting, achieved through a combination of dispersing and concentrating voters either within or across districts (or more colloquially, cracking and packing). Both commentators and courts view partisan gerrymandering in a manner that is at times politically naïve and at others, anachronistic and atextual. It was not until the Supreme Court’s decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer that a significant number of the justices recognized that partisan gerrymandering can be both malignant and benign which, according to a plurality of these justices, makes it beyond the reach of judicial review”

22) Founders created House of Representatives for states’ rights

Dr. Franita Tolson (Professor of Voting Rights. J.D. University of Chicago. Before entering academia, she clerked for the Honorable Ann Claire Williams of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Professor Tolson was a member of the University of Chicago Law Review. Recently, she has written on Congress's authority to regulate elections under the Elections Clause, the federalism implications of partisan gerrymandering, the scope of voting rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.),"Benign Partisanship", November 2012 , accessed November 21, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2199003 (Giovanni S)

"Despite these conflicting propositions, the question of justiciability cannot be resolved without appropriate consideration of a fact that has been overlooked by both the legal scholarship and the courts: that the process of congressional redistricting is a political safeguard that helps insulate the states' regulatory authority from federal overreaching. The Framers devised the House of Representatives to give citizens a voice in the new government and, along with the Senate, to protect the states. This latter role is fulfilled when states draw districts for their House delegations, allowing states to influence not only who serves, but also what policies will be promoted on the national stage. As I have argued elsewhere, partisan gerrymandering is a safeguard of federalism because states can create safe, partisan districts pursuant to their power under the Elections Clause, and use this redistricting authority as leverage to influence their congressional delegations and in turn, federal policy, in ways favorable to their interests. In order to properly account for this federalism interest, I offer a new perspective on the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims, a perspective that also has broader implications for federalism doctrine and judicial review more generally."

Constitutionality

23) Link 1: 10th AmendmentTenth Amendment – Constitution. Cornell University Law School [Legal Information Institute], “TENTH

AMENDMENT” http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/tenth_amendment [MOCK/SEFZIK]

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”

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24) Some State Constitutions Leave Redistricting up to the Legislature

Stuart C. Reid (Member of Utah’s 2011 Redistricting Committee) August 30th, 2011 “ Perspective: Why the legislature should redistrict” with the Salt Lake Tribune http://www.senatesite.com/home/independentcommission/

“Utah’s Constitution, clearly places the responsibility for redistricting on the shoulders of the individual legislators elected by the people. The Utah Legislature by constitutional design handles the difficult issues facing the state and as history has repeatedly shown, they are corrected by the vote of the people when they go astray. As a collective group, the Legislature has an incredible knowledge of the geography, demographics and interests of the state and the people they represent. The comprehensive perspective of the Legislature would be hard pressed to duplicate in any commission.”

25) PROOF: Where The Constitution Is Silent, Power Belongs With The StatesProf. David J. Bodenhamer [ Professor of history and executive director of the Polis Center at Indiana University-

Purdue University, Indianapolis. He is the author or editor of six books, including Fair Trial: Rights of the Accused in American History (1992) and The Bill of Rights in Modern America: After 200 Years (1993), with James W. Ely, Jr.] “Federalism & Democracy,” (At least 2000) Accessed October 30th, 2013, http://www.ait.org.tw/infousa/zhtw/docs/demopaper/dmpaper4.html

“And in areas where the Constitution is silent regarding national authority, states may act provided they do not conflict with powers the central government may legally exercise. On large and important subjects that affect citizens in their daily lives -- education, crime and punishment, health and safety -- the Constitution fails to assign direct responsibility. According to the republican principles that guided the founding generation, especially the theories of John Locke, the people reserved these powers, which they delegated to the states through the various state constitutions.”

26) IMPACT: States’ Rights Important. Federal Government not supposed to be primary power

Heritage Foundation [Founded in 1973, The Heritage Foundation is a research and educational institution—a think tank—whose mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.] “Solutions for America: Re-embracing Federalism,” Aug. 17, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/08/re-embracing-federalism

“In the American plan of constitutional government, the national government was never supposed to have all of the power or make all of the decisions. Indeed, most powers of government were located, and the decisions that affect citizens’ day-to-day lives were to be made, at the state level… Federalism is a crucial component of our system of government and part of the very infra structure that makes our political liberty possible.”

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27) What is best for Rhode island is not always best for California (States are different)

Prof. Alexander Tabarrok [Senior Fellow for The Independent Institute, Assistant Editor of The Independent Reviewand Associate Professor of Economics at George Mason University. He received his Ph.D. in economics from George Mason University, and he has taught at the University of Virginia and Ball State University. The Independent Review,( The Independent Institute is a non-profit, non-partisan, scholarly research and educational organization that sponsors in-depth studies of critical social and economic issues.) “Arguments for Federalism,” Sep. 2001, http://www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=485

“The diversity of preference view says that even in the long run, policies will differ across jurisdictions because people have different preferences. What is best for Rhode Island is not necessarily what is best for California, and what is best for San Jose is not necessarily what is best for San Francisco. By decentralizing power one can better match preferences with policies.”

Balances out in the current system

28) Frequency of Redistricting Prevents Power Grabbing

Franita Tolson (JD ; University of Chicago; Professor of Law) December 19, 2010 “Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism” with the Utah Law Review http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1674507

“Third, midyear elections may change the party in power in state legislative bodies, which may then seek to institute a new redistricting plan at the behest of their congressional counterparts.67 In Texas, for example, Republicans gained control of both houses of the state legislature in 2003 and, at the behest of national party officials, enacted a new congressional redistricting map in 2004, despite the fact that a federal court had already instituted a redistricting plan following the 2000 census.68 Similarly, a state court drew a new map of Colorado following the 2000 census because the legislature could not agree on a plan. However, after the 2002 elections, the Republican Party became the majority party in Colorado and replaced the court-ordered plan with a new plan that eliminated the one remaining competitive seat, making the seat safely Republican.69 The increasing frequency of partisan redistricting, therefore, has forced representatives to be more vigilant about their electoral prospects.”

Lost Expertise

29) Legislators Have a Unique Knowledge on Redistricting


“Utah’s Constitution, clearly places the responsibility for redistricting on the shoulders of the individual legislators elected by the people. The Utah Legislature by constitutional design handles the difficult issues facing the state and as history has repeatedly shown, they are corrected by the vote of the people when they go astray. As a collective group, the Legislature has an incredible knowledge of the geography, demographics and interests of the state and the people they represent. The comprehensive perspective of the Legislature would be hard pressed to duplicate in any commission.”

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Shortest Splitline

SS: Representation

30) Mathematical distribution hurts the community aspect

Kari Chisholm (Political consultant with a degree in political science. Runs a blog called BlueOregon, which is the state's most widely read political blog.),"Jim Huffman calls for mathematical redistricting. A very bad idea.", 2011, accessed January 1, 2014, http://www.blueoregon.com/2011/05/jim-huffman-mathematical-redistricting/

"In short, it's a pretty bad idea. While you get some mathematical neutrality, you end up jettisoning all the human aspects - what makes community, which roads divide communities and which ones connect them, (usually) political boundaries like cities and counties and school districts, and never mind a key legal requirement that Huffman failed to quote in his op-ed: that "no district shall be drawn for the purpose of diluting the voting strength of any language or ethnic minority group." All that, and legislators still have to be the ones that decide which mathematical algorithm gets used and what criteria it should utilize and prioritize."

31) EXA – some districts should be rep. of a community that historically lived there

Llewellyn Hinkes-Jones (is a Washington, D.C.-based writer and the author of Demented Agitprop: The Myth and Madness of Agenda 21 Conspiracies.), The Atlantic News,"WHY COMPUTERS ALONE CAN'T ELIMINATE CORRUPTION IN REDISTRICTING", February 26, 2013, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.theatlanticcities.com/politics/2013/02/why-computers-alone-cant-eliminate-corruption-redistricting/4790/

"There are often a host of other concerns that are worked into region definition that complicate the situation: coincidence with other boundaries, easily identifiable regions, geographic monuments, defining an area by "communities of interest" or what is termed "vernacularly insular" - a complicated way of saying the designated region should actually be representative of a community that has historically lived there"

32) Doesn’t respect communities – violates CA Constitution

Desmond Silveira (Senior software engineer who manages a blog to discuss better political representation through the use of fairer redistricting practices.),"Shortest Splitline", 2010, accessed January 1, 2014, http://redistrictingnow.wordpress.com/2010/04/13/13/

"Next (and this one is debatable), the algorithm should result in districts that respect communities of common interest (which I'll abbreviate as CCIs from now on). Shortest splitline doesn't respect CCIs at all. In many cases it draws lines directly through them. Some would say that CCIs should not be respected because that violates the objectivity of the algorithm and provides an opening for gerrymandering. While objectivity and CCI-respect certainly can compete with each other, I personally think that they don't compete in all instances and there exists a good balance between the two objectives. Regardless of whether one thinks CCIs should be respected or not, for implementation of California's Voters FIRST Act, that respect is required by the California Constitution."

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33) IMPACT – Hurts community interest

Citizens Redistricting New York (Citizens Redistricting New York is an effort to improve the redistricting process in New York through public dialogue. This is a project of Common Cause/New York, an organization that has decades of experience fighting to make government work better. Common Cause is a leader in redistricting reform across the nation.),"What is a “community of interest”?", (No date given), accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.citizenredistrictny.org/about/what-is-a-%E2%80%9Ccommunity-of-interest%E2%80%9D/

"The concept of a "community of interest" is very important to fair and non-partisan redistricting. A community with unified and cohesive political leadership will have stronger influence in the legislature. On the other hand, if a community with shared interests is divided by political district lines, the representation of those interests in the Capitol will also be divided and weak."

34) Impossible to accurately define and map CCI's without involvement of locals

Citizens Redistricting New York (Citizens Redistricting New York is an effort to improve the redistricting process in New York through public dialogue. This is a project of Common Cause/New York, an organization that has decades of experience fighting to make government work better. Common Cause is a leader in redistricting reform across the nation.),"What is a “community of interest”?", (No date given), accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.citizenredistrictny.org/about/what-is-a-%E2%80%9Ccommunity-of-interest%E2%80%9D/

"Although very important to establishing fair districts-and thus fair democracy- a community of interest is influenced by many different factors. It is impossible for any individual or commission to accurately define and map communities of interest without the involvement of those who actually live in these communities."

SS – Illegal for three reasons

35) Split-line is illegal according to the voting rights act (1st reason)

Greg Wolfe quoting Warren Smith (Greg is a software engineer. Warren Smith is the creator of the Shortest Splitline method.),"shortest splitline algorithm vs voting rights act?", 2007, accessed January 1, 2014, http://allaboutvoting.com/2007/08/10/shortest-splitline-algorithm-vs-voting-rights-act/

"Here is what Warren has said on the matter: CA [California] secretary of state and heroine D. Bowen was there listening to the talks. I sat next to her at lunch and tried my best to give her the goods. But she's very knowledgeable. I'm impressed. She said shortest splitline would be illegal under the voting rights act. Basically her argument was that gerrymandering is mandated by the VRA to create "majority minority" districts and splitline would prevent that hence is illegal, QED. [brackets added for clarity]"

36) BU - Any change to voting is legally unenforceable until cleared with district court

United States Department of Justice,"Section 5 of the voting rights act", (No date given), accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php

"Under Section 5, any change with respect to voting in a covered jurisdiction -- or any political subunit within it -- cannot legally be enforced unless and until the jurisdiction first obtains the requisite determination by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or makes a submission to the Attorney General. This requires proof that the proposed voting change does not deny or abridge the right to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. If the jurisdiction is unable to prove the absence of such discrimination, the District Court denies the requested judgment, or in the case of administrative submissions, the Attorney General objects to the change, and it remains legally unenforceable"

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37) Backup: Section 2 allows the DoJ and private parties to litigate redistricting

Dr. Heather Gerken (Law professor at Yale University. Professor Gerken specializes in election law and constitutional law.),"Coloring Inside the Lines: Will the Voting Rights Act stop Republicans from redistricting as they please?", 2010, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/11/coloring_inside_the_lines.html

"The second provision that matters for redistricting is Section 2, which authorizes both the DoJ and private parties to challenge districting plans that dilute the voting power of racial minorities. While these tussles emerge after districts have been drawn, politicians keep a close eye on Section 2's requirements when drawing lines. They don't want a successful lawsuit blowing up the political deal they've struck. "

38) Backup: Section 2 requires majority/minority districts

Dr. Jeffery Hamilton (JD; Emory Law School; Attorney),"Racial and Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court", 1994, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=a1045dc19256d91071e706e00fa50e7e&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzt-zSkAz&_md5=056541a294d3cb7acc14339f728b8959

"Today the mandate of the Voting Rights Act requires states to form "majority-minority districts" 146 whenever possible. This adds a new dimension to the task of state legislatures. For the party in power in a state legislature, political gerrymandering generally involves the preservation of safe seats for as many of the party's incumbents as possible and the weakening of political support for candidates from the minority party. The creation of majority-minority districts mandated by the Voting Rights Act has made political gerrymandering by state legislatures much more difficult. The minority voters needed to create a majority-minority district must come from other districts. This means that minority voters are no longer available for use in a political gerrymandering scheme and the party in control of the state legislature has fewer overall voters to use in fashioning a redistricting plan that will maintain its status as the majority party in the state legislature."

39) Preserving communities of interest is required by many states (2nd reason)

Dr. Justin Levitt (Associate Professor of Law. JD from Harvard Law School. Levitt is a national expert in constitutional law and the law of democracy, with particular focus on election administration and redistricting.),"All About Redistricting", (No date given), accessed January 2, 2014, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-state.php#communities

"Preserving "communities of interest" is the next most common criterion reflected in state law. 24 states consider keeping "communities of interest" whole when drawing state legislative districts; 13 states do the same for congressional districts."

40) Split-line will vary by five percent of the population, larger than allowed (3rd reason)

Dr. Micah Altman (Senior Research Scientist for the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard. Dr. Altman has developed award winning research software, and authored numerous scholarly publications on redistricting and in the field of poiltical science.) and Dr. Michael McDonald (Associate Professor at George Masno University. He has been an expert in redistricting litigation in five states.),"THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF COMPUTERS IN REDISTRICTING", 2010, accessed January 2, 2014, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=djclpp

"A shortest split-line algorithm. This algorithm splits area jurisdiction with alternating horizontal and vertical lines until districts approximately equal in population are developed. This yields districts that are roughly rectangular but not necessarily compact by any recognized measure. Nor does it allow for any other criteria to be incorporated. Even with these limitations, the districts produced still vary by five percent of the population, which is larger than allowed for congressional districts"

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41) Backup: Even 1% variance in population is unconstitutional

Dr. Justin Levitt (Associate Professor of Law. JD from Harvard Law School. Levitt is a national expert in constitutional law and the law of democracy, with particular focus on election administration and redistricting.),"Where are the lines drawn?", Copyright 2013, accessed January 2, 2014, http://redistricting.lls.edu/where.php#equalpop

"The U.S. Constitution requires that each district have about the same population: each federal district within a state must have about the same number of people, each state district within a state must have about the same number of people, and each local district within its jurisdiction must have about the same number of people. The standard for congressional districts is quite strict, with equal population required "as nearly as is practicable." In practice, this means that states must make a good-faith effort to draw districts with exactly the same number of people in each district within the state. Any district with more or fewer people than the average (also known as the "ideal" population) must be specifically justified by a consistent state policy. And even consistent policies that cause a one percent spread from largest to smallest district will likely be unconstitutional."

SS - Ignoring vital factors

42) Link 1: Split Line ignores every redistricting factor except equal population

Dr. Micah Altman (Senior Research Scientist for the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard. Dr. Altman has developed award winning research software, and authored numerous scholarly publications on redistricting and in the field of poiltical science.) and Dr. Michael McDonald (Associate Professor at George Masno University. He has been an expert in redistricting litigation in five states, has consulted for redistricting authorities in two states, and has written numerous scholarly publications on redistricting.),"THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF COMPUTERS IN REDISTRICTING", 2010, accessed January 2, 2014, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=djclpp

"A shortest split-line algorithm. This algorithm splits area jurisdiction with alternating horizontal and vertical lines until districts approximately equal in population are developed. This yields districts that are roughly rectangular but not necessarily compact by any recognized measure. Nor does it allow for any other criteria to be incorporated. Even with these limitations, the districts produced still vary by five percent of the population, which is larger than allowed for congressional districts."

43) Link 2: There are several other factors that are currently considered

Dr. Gary King (professor of social science at Harvard. King graduated summa with a B.A. in Political Science from New York State University. H e earned an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin (UW) in Madison.) and Dr. Andrew Gelman (professor of political science and statistics at Columbia University. He earned an S.B. in mathematics and in physics from MIT in 1986 and a Ph.D. in statistics from Harvard.),"Enhancing Democracy Through Legislative Redistricting", September 1994, accessed January 2, 2014, http://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/red.pdf [brackets signify a word added from earlier in the article for clarity of the sentence]

"In addition to the high levels of political conflict and uncertainty and the conflicting goals of those who draw the district lines, the entire [redistricting] process includes several severe legal and political constraints. These include the requirements of equal population, contiguity, compactness, minority representation, maintaining communities of interest, not splitting local subdivisions, and especially protecting some incumbents, all within the context of complicated local geography. "

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44) Protects against disenfranchisement of minorities from the political process

Dr. Claudine Gay (Professor of Government at Harvard. Gay earned her PhD from the Department of Government at Harvard University in 1998. Before joining the Department of Government in September 2006, Gay was an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University from 2000 to 2005, and an associate professor from 2005 to 2006.),"The Effect of Minority Districts and Minority Representation on Political Participation in California", California Public Policy Institute, 2001, accessed January 2, 2014, http://scholar.harvard.edu/cgay/files/Gay_PPIC_2001.pdf

"Many advocates have argued that, regardless of its influence on legislative outcomes, the creation of majority-minority districts-and the subsequent election of minority representatives-serves an important role in pulling the Latino and African-American communities into the political process. By "creating a climate of inclusion," these districts are expected to increase political participation and make voters out of previously unengaged minority Californians (New York Times, April 12, 1992)."

45) IMP-EXT: Dilution of votes is just as bad as denying the ballot

Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg (Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan agreed with dissent) (J.D. from Columbia law school. she was a research associate and then associate director of the Columbia Law School Project on International Procedure. professor of law at Rutgers from 1963 to 1972. In 1970, she co-founded the Women's Rights Law Reporter, the first law journal in the U.S. to focus exclusively on women's rights. In 1977, she became a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.),"Shelby County, Alabama vs. Holder, Attorney General, Et Al", June 2013, accessed January 2, 2014, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-96_6k47.pdf

"A similar effect could be achieved if the city engaged in discriminatory annexation by incorporating majorityareas into city limits, thereby decreasing the effect of VRA-occasioned increases in black voting. Whatever the device employed, this Court has long recognized that vote dilution, when adopted with a discriminatory purpose, cuts down the right to vote as certainly as denial of access to the ballot."

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Negative Philosophy (SS)46) Ideal in vision, almost impossible in practice


"For some time now, computer scientists have been trying to eliminate corruption in the U.S. Congressional redistricting process by passing on the decision-making to computers. Ideally, if a computer could auto-generate boundary lines based on predefined algorithms and updated census numbers, the dark art of gerrymandering would be completely eliminated. No longer would politicians be able to choose their constituents rather than the other way around. States would be divided into equally populous regions according to pre-defined algorithms, and politicians would have no control over the outcome. Complex software programs like Maptitude, Redand autoBound are already being used to design and gerrymander districts. So why not let them fully automate the process?Algorithmic redistricting appears ideal in vision, but it is almost impossible in practice. At its most basic, drawing equally populous regions should be a very solvable problem. A simple splitline algorithm can repeatedly halve a state into subdivisions until the optimum population-per-area is achieved."

47) All redistricts will produce a winner or a loser

Justin Buchler (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University. Ph.D., University of California at Berkeley, 2004; M.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1999; B.A., Pomona College, 1998.),"THE INEVITABILITY OF GERRYMANDERING", Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, 2010, (Volume 5:17), accessed January 2, 2014, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1024&context=djclpp

"However, an apolitical algorithm is another matter altogether. More than any other aspect of electoral rulemaking, the placement of district lines determines election results because party identification is the strongest determinant of vote choice. Because any election can only have a single winner, every redistricting plan creates a set of winners and losers. Therefore, the choice between any two redistricting algorithms is a choice between two sets of winners and losers. Further, not only do all redistricting plans create winners and losers, they all do so based on politically relevant criteria. Thus, all redistricting plans can be considered "gerrymanders" and an apolitical redistricting algorithm is impossible."

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Solvency (SS)48) Splitline Redistricting Doesn’t Do Enough To Ensure Proper Representation


"Algorithmic redistricting appears ideal in vision, but it is almost impossible in practice. At its most basic, drawing equally populous regions should be a very solvable problem. A simple splitline algorithm can repeatedly halve a state into subdivisions until the optimum population-per-area is achieved. The problem is that districts need to be more than equally populous. Proposition 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which is being debated in the Supreme Court this week, requires that states may not deprive minority voters of the opportunity to "elect representatives of their choice." It's for this reason that some Southern states are still required to have their redistricting plans approved by the Department of Justice so that their boundary lines do not gerrymander minority groups completely out of representation."

49) Equalizing Population Isn’t Enough (Cities divided in pieces)


"The historical example of this is the 1973 redistricting plan for Hinds County, Mississippi. Officials there were able to devise a county-dividing algorithm that would equalize population, land area, county road mileage, and number of bridges. Egalitarian and simple on the surface, the resulting map split the largely African American city of Jackson into five divisions, all without minority representation. Although lacking the abstract expressionist geometry of what we commonly think of as a gerrymandered district - the divisions were simple, rhomboid-esque shapes - Hinds County had all the political implications of one. "

50) “Probably impossible to create a computer program that solves these problems”


"But that is only the beginning of the computational complexity of automating our internal political borders. In a landmark 2010 paper in the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy, Micah Altman and Michael McDonald argue that "the problem of creating optimally compact, contiguous, equal-population districts is provably 'NP-hard.'" In other words, with only a small handful of variables the problem becomes incredibly complex very quickly, so complex that it is "probably impossible to create a computer program that solves these problems optimally and reliably except in very small or limited cases.""

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51) It comes down to who gets the final say in what becomes law


"Having software that can compute complex metaheuristics certainly helps, but it is meaningless without a public process to help decide upon the results. Otherwise, any number of variables can be tossed in to skew the results one way or another. And the issue of gerrymandering has never really been about how to draw congressional lines, but instead who gets the final say in which version becomes law."

52) Computer Algorithms Can Be Tweaked To Gain A Political Outcome

Dr. Micah Altman (Senior Research Scientist for the Institute for Quantitative Social Science, Harvard. Dr. Altman has developed award winning research software, and authored numerous scholarly publications on redistricting and in the field of poiltical science.) and Dr. Michael McDonald (Associate Professor at George Masno University. He has been an expert in redistricting litigation in five states, has consulted for redistricting authorities in two states, and has written numerous scholarly publications on redistricting.),"THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF COMPUTERS IN REDISTRICTING", 2010, accessed January 2, 2014, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=djclpp

"The goal of automated redistricting is to eliminate unfairness. Proponents of automated redistricting argue that human judgments should be replaced by a set of neutral criteria such as equal populations, contiguity, and compactness within and across districts. Many proponents for automated redistricting emphasize a particular neutral criterion, such as compactness, rather than a particular computer program or algorithm. Regardless, the core argument is the same-by automatically creating lines to optimize a particular pre-specified set of criteria, we can retain a district based system and eliminate gerrymandering. A difficulty with this approach is that seemingly neutral criteria may lead to biased outcomes; indeed, criteria may be chosen with a specific political outcome in mind."

A/T Iowa Plan (Additional card)

53) Iowa's system is nice, but does not fix the root cause

Fairvote (Grounded in its unique networks, analysis, strategic insight and body of research, FairVote acts as a catalyst for electoral reform and voting rights through regular engagement with scholars, journalists, civic leaders, policymakers, and state and local reformers.),"Iowa’s Laudable Redistricting Process - and the Super District Alternative", June 27, 2011, accessed December 31, 2013, http://www.fairvote.org/iowa-s-laudable-redistricting-process-and-the-super-district-alternative#.UsMuC7QaHvM (Giovanni S)

"Even though Iowa is quite balanced in its partisan division across much of the state, Iowa's incumbency rate in fact has been more than 97% since the first use of independent redistricting three decades ago. Even if independent commissions are a laudable reform to draw up redistricting plans, they are not the panacea to our country's democratic deficit - as evidenced through competitiveness, racial fairness, and geographical coherence.

The overarching factor in this problem is the winner-take-all, single-member district configuration in place. As a result, most incumbents are elected by default because their party is the preferred one in any given district. While Iowa's redistricting plan is not without value, it still does not address the root causes of incumbency advantage and competitiveness, which is our nation's electoral system."

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