The Difficulty of Spreading Democracy through Foreign Imposed

Regime Changes:

Implications for Political Order and Marginalized Populations

By: Mason Ji

Email: mason.ji@yale.edu

Telephone: (206) 335-4085

Institution: Yale University

Abstract

Democratic Foreign Imposed Regime Changes (FIRCs), are the FIRCs that uproot an existing authoritarian regime and replace it with a democracy. Though many democratic FIRCs have occurred, few have succeeded. There are three reasons why democratic FIRCs often fail. First, target countries of FIRCs generally have little to no prior experience with democracy. Second, after the FIRC, the population equates the new government with foreign oppressiveness. Third, FIRCs disproportionately target poor, unstable countries that do not yet have good foundations for democracy. In addition, high levels of economic development in the country prior to the FIRC are favorable conditions for why some FIRCs succeed. Future research on FIRCs should focus on addressing how foreign aid can increase FIRC success rates in poor countries. Moreover, how endogenous democratization happens in countries should be studied, especially in countries transitioning to middle income status, like China. Finally, a theory of FIRCs should depend on a theory of democracy, so studying what democracy properly is and how it is sustained is a new frontier for studying FIRCs.

Keywords: Foreign Imposed Regime Changes, Democracy, Economic Development, Domestic Preconditions

Introduction

In recent years, the US has been involved in foreign imposed regime changes (FIRCs)

around the world, the most salient cases of which in recent memory were in Iraq and

Afghanistan, where the US uprooted the existing authoritarian regimes and replaced them with

democratic ones. There are many kinds of FIRCs, and some FIRCs do not impose democracy on

the target country, such as those that replace an existing dictator with another one. This paper

will specifically addresses democratic FIRCs, which are the FIRCs that uproot an existing

authoritarian regime and replace it with a democracy, to examine why democracy does or does

not persist. In particular, an emphasis will be placed on democratic FIRCs carried out by the US

in recent years. A FIRC's "failure" or "success" is defined as follows. A "failure" is when the

post-FIRC regime either crumbles into factions or is outright overthrown. "Success" is defined as

democracy taking hold so that a stable transition of power between leaders and groups occurs on

regular election intervals.

In 1994, President Clinton "invoked the absence of war between democracies as a

justification for promoting democratization around the globe."1 The US believes that because

democracies do not go to war with each other, if every country becomes a democracy, then there

will no war. The logic behind the democratic FIRCs executed by the US is that democracy is the

best form of government to redistribute power amongst the population, whereas autocracy

concentrates power in the hands of few. To give marginalized groups a greater chance in shaping

politics, thus, is theoretically a goal of democratic FIRCs. Following this ideology, the US has

sought to impose democratic regime change on those countries that it sees are "undemocratic."

However, the problems that the US has encountered in recent years, especially with insurgency

1 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, 1995, p. 5.

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and civil conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan after regime change, has raised questions on the

effectiveness of the US's foreign policy. Do FIRCs work? Does war break out after FIRC? Why

do some countries revert back to authoritarianism after FIRC and others do not? These are

questions this paper seeks to address.

There are three reasons why FIRCs have largely failed. First, target countries of FIRCs

generally have little to no prior experience with democracy. Second, after the FIRC, the

population equates the new government with foreign oppressiveness. Third, FIRCs

disproportionately target poor, unstable countries that do not yet have good foundations for

democracy. I then find that the literature points to high levels of economic development in the

country prior to the FIRC for why some FIRCs succeed. Finally, I make some speculations and

recommendations about the direction of future research on FIRCs and the spread of democracy.

I. Why FIRCs Fail: Three Reasons

Though democratic FIRCs try to redistribute power to previously marginalized

populations, FIRCs have largely failed in recent years, resulting in the reversion to

authoritarianism and marginalization of different parts of the population. There are three reasons

why FIRCs have failed, which are explored below.

1. Not Enough Experience with Democracy in the Target Country

Not all countries have experience with democracy, which can impact whether or not an

imposed democracy will survive. It is not that some cultures are inherently incompatible with

democracy, but rather, it takes time for democracy to take hold. Going from no democracy to full

democracy can destabilize the country. Especially if democracy is forcibly imposed after a long

time authoritarian regime falls, the population is more or less accustomed to authoritarianism and

a lack of civic engagement. Robert Putnam et al. highlight the connection between civic

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engagement and the success of democracy in their seminal book, Making Democracy Work,

which has been influential in the literature on FIRCs. Their central thesis is that a high level of

civic engagement is a central factor in allowing democracy to succeed.2 They explored degrees

of social association with civic engagement and democracy in different parts of Italy and found

that in populations with little to no experience in civic engagement, democracy was much less

likely to take hold.3 Previously marginalized populations found themselves in control of the

government, but had no experience with governance, especially immediately after the longtime

authoritarian regime is overthrown, causing the new democratic government to be weak and

ineffective. Thus, if a country did not have a high degree of civic engagement prior to the FIRC,

as in the population was oppressed by authoritarian regime for extended periods of time, an

imposed democracy is not likely to succeed.

As Grieg and Enterline find in their 2014 article on the durability of imposed

democracies, prior experience with democratic political institutions, such as independent courts

of justice, is an important precursor to a successful FIRC.4 If there is no prior experience with

these institutions, imposed democracies are not durable and are vulnerable to factionalism and

infighting.5 It is difficult, Grieg and Enterline conclude, to go from absolutely no democracy to

full democracy, and such a transition is very likely to fail.6 Mansfield and Snyder in their widely

cited article "Democratization and the Danger of War" also note that there is a difference

between democratizing states and established democracies.7 As they reason, perhaps mature

democracies like the US or France do not go to war with each other, but "countries do not

2 Robert Putnam, Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 7-16. 3 ibid. 4 J. Michael Greig and Andrew J. Enterline, "The Durability of Imposed Democracy," International Interactions, 2014, pp. 169-170.5 ibid. 6 ibid. 7 Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, p. 5.

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become mature democracies overnight...they go through a rocky transitional period," during

which the struggle between the "masses and the authoritarian elites" are especially volatile.8 If a

country did not have much experience with democracy or did not yet possess stable institutions

that support the transition into mature democracy, a FIRC may reverse the country's

democratization process and aggravate conflicts.

Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten are two of the most well known scholars

who examine FIRCs, and their recent influential article "Forced to be Free?" has driven the

literature to examine more closely the importance of domestic contexts of FIRCs. Downes and

Monten find that "some countries are better candidates for democratization than others," and

"external methods to bring about democratic change" are more likely to work only if the

domestic preconditions of the country are conducive to democratization.9 Thus, if a country does

not yet have the political infrastructure for and experience with democracy, a FIRC will not

result in a stable, democratic government, but a fractured government that does not mesh well

with local cultures and needs, potentially marginalizing new parts of the population.

For instance, consider the situation in Libya. After international intervention and the fall

of Gaddafi's government, the Western powers instituted a FIRC and tried to establish a

democracy in Libya. However, Libya did not have experience with democracy nor did it have the

institutions to support a full democracy. This caused low voter turnout, which stalled the writing

of a new constitution, and gave an excuse for faction militias to seize control of power.10 While

low voter turnout is not necessarily detrimental for mature democracies—the US has low voter

turnout—for a new democracy like Libya's, it signals skepticism and dissatisfaction with the new

8 ibid.9 Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, "Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization," International Security, 2013, p. 131. 10 For more information, see: "Democracy Fatigue in Libya," Foreign Policy, 2014, http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/02/26/democracy_fatigue_in_libya

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government, causing the democracy to crumble. Hence, from the Libya example, lack of prior

experience with democracy is an issue that makes democratic FIRCs difficult to succeed, in

Mansfield and Snyder's words, a democratic FIRC in an inexperienced country can make it

"more aggressive and war prone...and do fight wars with democratic states."11

2. Association of New Regime with Foreign Oppressiveness

FIRC may cause the population to associate the new regime with foreign oppressiveness,

causing the regime to lose power. A leading paper in the literature by Downes (2010) found that

especially when entirely new leaders are elected after a FIRC, the regime change "foments

grievances and resentments" in the population, which creates new marginalized groups or further

marginalizes existing disadvantaged populations, which undermines the FIRC.12 These new

leaders do not identify and have not yet established rapport with most of the population, and

could be viewed as merely puppets, which in some cases they are, of powerful foreign interests.

This disconnect between the new regime and the population is a source of conflict, which can

lead to the FIRC's failure.

Indeed, tensions between the population and the new regime can help explain why

FIRCs rarely work, and the explanation is relatively straightforward. FIRCs, by their very nature,

privilege some individuals or groups and alienates others. There is always a reason for FIRC to

happen to a country, whether it is because powerful countries did not like the existing regime or

some other reason, and the intervening forces will likely want to install leadership that is friendly

to them.13 However, in many cases, the intervening forces have very little knowledge of the

politics and needs of the country, and their choice of leadership may not address the population's

11 Mansfield and Snyder, 1995, p. 5. 12 Alexander B. Downes, "Catastrophic Success: Foreign Imposed Regime Change and Civil War," paper presented at the annual meeting of the "Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners," New Orleans: New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, 2010, pp. 1-3. 13 Alexander B. Downes, "Regime Change Doesn't Work," Boston Review, 2011, pp. 16-22.

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demands, which accumulates grievances against the new regime. In general, as Downes (2011)

points out, intervening forces do not want to stay in the target country indefinitely, and want to

exit the target country after the FIRC and the installment of a government that is friendly to their

interests.14 Moreover, the reluctance of foreign powers to stay involved in the target state's

politics gives opposition groups more reason to continue resisting, as they can afford to wait until

the foreign powers leave. The post-FIRC regime's unpopularity and its associations with foreign

occupation and oppression thus give populist leaders, backed by marginalized groups, reasons to

oppose the government.

For instance, first the transitional Iraqi government and later the US backed al-Maliki

government were unable to garner the support of the different political, nationalist and ethnic

groups in Iraq. The result was not only the perceived weakness of the government in the

population, but also the government's fragmentation and powerlessness. The US's actions did not

help the Iraqi government's situation. While the US tried to back the Iraqi government by

stepping in, it succeeded only in further enflaming tensions between the Sunni, Shiite and

marginalized Kurdish groups, because the US did not know what the groups wanted and how

Iraqi culture worked.15 Thus, the lack of connection between the new regime and the population

that often happens after a FIRC is problematic. As the government continually fails to address

local needs, grievances and resentment for the government among the population builds, which

gives rise to insurgency that challenges the government's authority, in some cases, insurgent

groups may even overthrow the government, and the FIRC ultimately fails.

The temporal element of FIRCs is hence important. Once the interveners have achieved

their purpose and have left the country after passing power to the new government, the

14 Downes, 2011, pp. 16-22.15 For more information, see: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5366677.

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grievances accumulated in the population towards the foreign powers are translated onto the new

government.

3. Selection Effect for Poor, Unstable Countries

In recent years, the countries that tend to have experienced FIRCs were poor and unstable

to begin with, and changing the regime when the situation is already bad makes things worse.

For instance, Peic and Reiter, in their article on FIRCs and civil war onset, find that if the

country is weak to begin with and political structures and institutions in the country are forcibly

changed, it is much more likely that a civil conflict will break out.16 If the political dynamics of a

country dramatically changes in a short period of time, grievances that were previously

suppressed by the government re-emerge, potentially leading to conflict. Especially for groups in

the population that were heavily repressed by the government, the removal of the oppressive

regime is a perfect opportunity for them to "seek revenge." Downes and Monten note an

interesting point, that regime change is a "low-cost option for powerful democracies like the

US," because the targets of FIRCs are weak states.17 However, although it is relatively costless

the US in the short run to uproot an authoritarian regime in weak and easy to target states, in the

long run, the US may find itself in "protracted quagmires" like Iraq and Afghanistan, where the

imposed regime crumbled from existing ethnic tensions that resurfaced with the political

upheavals brought by the FIRC.18

A gap in the current literature on FIRCs is that articles do not address the population's

desire for stability. Perhaps an idea that needs to be explored more is that people are willing to

sacrifice some freedoms in exchange for stability. Consider Thailand. Thailand's democratic

government had been unstable, and years of political violence finally led to its collapse, resulting 16 Goran Peic and Dan Reiter, "Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State Power and Civil War Onset, 1920–2004," British Journal of Political Science, 2010, pp. 453-454. 17 Downes and Monten, 2013, pp. 130-131. 18 ibid.

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in a military takeover in May 2014, which the Thai king supported and many Thais welcomed.19

The military regime, however undemocratic, had been chosen by the Thai over democracy. Even

Thai groups that perceived themselves to be discriminated against chose the military takeover

over some other type of government, precisely for its relative stability. Since many of the

countries targeted for FIRC are unstable and poor to begin with, this desire for a stable

government over a democratic government should to be accounted for, or else a FIRC is not

going to help resolve any problems. If anything, it will make things worse.

The "selection effect" or selection bias for poor, unstable countries is thus another

explanation for why FIRCs so often fail and makes it difficult to assess the long term impacts of

FIRC. When trying to assess the effectiveness of interventions like FIRCs, the issue of selection

bias must be taken into account. A metaphor used in some articles is testing drugs to treat cancer,

which is a type of "intervention."20 In order to overcome selection bias, drug testing is

randomized, as in, the group of individuals taking the drug does not differ appreciably from the

group of individuals taking a placebo. So, if the drug is observed to have an effect, it is because

of the drug itself, not because of the group of individuals taking the drug. However, assessing the

effects of FIRCs and why they commonly fail suffers greatly from selection bias. In FIRCs, the

selection of targets is non-random, as in, the criteria depend on other factors such as the impact

on the interests of the potential intervening forces.21 It is therefore difficult to assess whether or

not democratic FIRCs would succeed in the long run if the occurrences of FIRCs is

systematically biased in the first place. Perhaps the core ideas driving FIRCs—spreading

democracy and relieving the population from oppressive regimes—are not wrong, but the

19 For more information, see: "Thai King endorses army chief as new leader", The Guardian, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/26/thai-king-endorses-army-chief-leader-military-coup20 Downes and Monten, 2013, pp. 130-131.21 ibid.

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selection of FIRC targets is flawed, exacerbating existing conflicts and making it difficult for

FIRCs to succeed. FIRCs are thus "predisposed" to failure because the target countries are

already struggling from economic or ethnic problems and do not yet possess the stable

foundations for a free and democratic government.

II. Why Some FIRCs Succeed: The Impact of Economic Development

Though FIRCs often fail, and, as Downes and Monten put it, democracy has been spread

"at the point of bayonets" over the last century, there are cases of FIRCs that succeed, and do so

exceedingly well, as in the case of Japan, which has divided scholars in the literature on whether

or not sustainable democratic governments can be produced by FIRCs.22 Optimists cite the

successful transformations of West Germany and Japan after World War II into mature

democracies as evidence that FIRCs, if done correctly, are capable of producing stable

democratic governments.23 Pessimists like Bueno de Mesquita and Downs argue that the

examples of West Germany and Japan are outliers, because World War II was such a traumatic

event for the German and Japanese people, their desire for peace and demilitarization led them

on paths towards democracy.24 As Bueno de Mesquita say, such special circumstances cannot be

normalized, as establishing a "truly liberal democracy possesses a number of drawbacks" for

intervening parties, ones that cannot assure "that the target state will adopt policies that are

consistent with the preferences of the intervener."25 For instance, consider the case of Karzai in

Afghanistan. After the US installed Karzai, who it thought would be sympathetic to US interests,

but balancing Afghanistan's domestic political factionalism and the US's demands for "liberal

22 Downes and Monten, 2013, p. 91.23 Nancy Bermeo, "Armed Conflict and the Durability of Electoral Democracy," in Ronald Krebs and Elizabeth Kier, eds., In War’s Wake: International Conflct and the Fate of Liberal Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 67–94.24 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," International Organization, 2006, p. 631-632. 25 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006, p. 631.

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democracy" proved too much for Karzai, and Karzai ultimately went against the US to appease

domestic audiences. The lack of trust between Karzai and the US resulted in Karzai pursuing

policy counter to US interests.26 Foreign powers thus have an incentive to "keep a hand" and

prevent a true democracy from taking shape, so that they can influence the new government

should things go awry. The uncertainty of whether or not the new government will continue to

support the foreign interveners, Bueno de Mesquita and Downs argue, make it difficult, if not

impossible, for a robust and stable democracy will emerge from a FIRC.27

However, there exists a third wave in the FIRC literature that examines the impact of

economics on the success of FIRCs, which perhaps proves more to be more constructive than

totally dismissing FIRCs, as Bueno de Mesquita and Downs do. Countries that had strong

economic bases and high income levels prior to the FIRC have more success transitioning to

democracy. This argument goes hand in hand with the one that on selection bias. A developed

country is likely to not suffer from the basic economic problems poor countries struggle with.

Developed countries are likely to have a complete infrastructure system that enables

transportation of wealth and the development of a large middle class. When the gap between the

elite and the rest of the population shrinks, democracy is more likely to succeed, as greater social

mobility allow more people access to power and government. A smaller difference in the wealth

distribution and a greater access to power allow marginalized groups to more effectively express

their grievances, which are the ingredients that allow a democracy to take hold. If a FIRC

happens to an authoritarian regime in a developed country, therefore, democracy is more likely

to succeed.

26 Sheri Berman, " From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan," Foreign Affairs, 2011, pp. 2-9. 27 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006, p. 631.

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Adam Przeworski, one of the leading proponents in the literature of combining

economics and FIRCs, examines in his article "Economic Development and Transitions to

Democracy" this very link between economics and democracy. He finds that "democracies are

much more likely to survive in more developed countries," and that democracies are more stable

at "higher income levels," because of the greater social mobility and access to power in the larger

population.28 Przeworski's assertions are supported by James Robinson's findings. Robinson, in a

review of economics and democracy, finds that income per capita is strongly correlated to the

success of democracy, coming to the same conclusions that Przeworski proposed, and even went

to suggest that there might be a causal relationship between economic development and the

survival of democracy.29

A distinction must be made here between imposing democracy and the rise of democracy

endogenously. Przeworski points out that it is not that development automatically leads to

democracy, indeed, it is uncertain that democracy is more likely to emerge from developed

countries than underdeveloped countries.30 Przeworski explores the connections between

democracy and high income countries in another article "Democracy and Economic

Development." Przeworkski notes that high income countries with authoritarian regimes are

unlikely to convert to democracies.31 The point he makes is that if an authoritarian regime is to

be overthrown in a developed country, like Hungary for instance, and a democracy is installed,

that new democratic government is much more likely to survive.32 The primary explanation for

this is that high income countries tend to be very stable, regardless of whether or not the

28 Adam Przeworski, "Economic Development and Transitions to Democracy," Working Paper, 2004, pp. 1-3, 27. 29 James Robinson, "Economic Development and Democracy," Annual Review of Political Science, 2006, pp. 503-504, 524-525. 30 Przeworski, "Economic Development and Transitions to Democracy," 2004, p. 27.31 Adam Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," In Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson, eds., The Evolution of Political Knowledge (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2004), p. 5. 32 ibid.

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government is authoritarian or democratic—changing the government structure does not alter the

fundamental stability of the country.33 Another explanation could be that democracy thrives if

stability existed prior to democracy's inception, and democracy tends to promote stability, as it

allows for more civic engagement and access to power, thus forming a positive feedback loop.

So while democracy may not occur endogenously in high income countries, exogenous regime

change is likely to succeed.

Przeworski's findings have had important implications for not only how FIRCs should be

studied. Counter to the idea that FIRCs are inherently unable to succeed in engendering

democracy because of trust issues, as Bueno de Mesquita and Downs seem to argue,

Przeworski's findings suggest that FIRCs could succeed, it is just that they must occur in

countries that are economically developed enough for democracy to persist. This link between

economic development and FIRCs, as Robinson notes, has yet to be examined in great enough

detail, and it potentially can change the way of how FIRCs are conducted in the future.34

The economic argument in the literature helps to explain why FIRCs in West Germany

and Japan were successful, but FIRCs elsewhere were not. Both Germany and Japan were highly

industrialized countries before World War II, and despite the fact that both countries were

devastated in World War II, both still possessed some of the necessary infrastructure rebound

economically and neither were considered among the "poorest" of countries, even in the

immediate aftermath of World War II.

The lessons learned from the successful FIRCs in Japan and Germany are ones that

should guide future research on FIRCs. At the same time as the FIRC happened in Japan and

Germany, the US supplied large amounts of recovery capital, which allowed the two to quickly

33 Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," 2004, pp. 16-19. 34 Robinson, 2006, p. 525.

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rebound economically, stabilizing the new governments as average income rose in the

population. Therefore, there is an element of prior experience with development and human

capital that may also influence whether or not a FIRC survives. If the country had been a

developed country at some point before FIRC, even if the economy had been destroyed by war,

the FIRC is more likely to succeed. Perhaps Japan and Germany were able to transition to stable

democracies because they possessed human capital that allowed them to utilize post-war US aid

to quickly rebuild and stabilize. Even if World War Two devastated infrastructure in both

countries, the industrialists and engineers that made pre-war industrialization possible were still

living, and were able to assist in the country's swift recovery. In some sense, it did not matter

what type of government existed post-war, but economic stability was key to the success of the

regime, which happened to be democratic. An example to illustrate the necessity of human

capital is Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the US put in vast amounts of aid money to rebuild the

country after the war. However, little to none of that money was actually used for development

—it was either embezzled by corrupt officials or the government did not know where to use it.35

Contrary to the cases of Japan and Western Germany therefore, the lack of experience with

development and lack of human capital made it difficult for Afghan income levels to rise

quickly.

Hence, whether or not a FIRC is successful and democracy survives depends also on pre-

FIRC economic conditions. If a country is developed or was developed, FIRCs are much more

successful. If the country is poor and does not have much experience with large scale

industrialization, it is difficult for democracy to survive, as the gap between the elite and the rest

of the population is too large.

35 For more information: http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/11988-sigar-worried-about-embezzlement-of-us-aid-.

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III. Conclusion and Implications for Future Research

FIRCs have been largely unsuccessful in recent years. Mainly, there are three reasons to

explain why FIRCs have routinely failed to implement stable democracies in previously

authoritarian countries. Specifically, there needs to be more consideration for the domestic

situation of the potential target. In poor countries where wealth disparity is large, it is simply not

feasible to go from no democracy to full democracy—chaos and fragmentation will ensue as

power is distributed too quickly among too many competing interests. Furthermore, this is

worsened by the fact that the intervening foreign powers also have an interest in being involved

in the new government and install leaders that are sympathetic towards their cause, undermining

the entire notion of a true liberal democracy coming out of a FIRC.

That is not to say that FIRCs are destined to fail, as West Germany and Japan were

examples in which FIRCs have led to mature, stable democracies. FIRCs are more likely to

succeed in developed countries, even if those countries have been devastated by war, as they

have experience in industrializing and extensive human capital, which allows them to rebound

quickly. The general conclusion that can be reached, therefore, is that FIRCs must be conducted

with caution, and only when the necessary preconditions, such as high income and low wealth

disparity, exist.

The current state of the art of the literature on FIRCs has a couple of implications for

future research. First is that future research should further examine how to combine FIRCs with

economic development. Though Przeworski and Robinson have been examining the linkages

between economics and FIRCs, they have yet to delve deeper than describing general trends in

FIRC success rates in low income versus high income countries. Studying how to increase the

success rate of democratic FIRCs with the influence of foreign aid and economic development is

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thus something that is lacking in the literature and is a gap that should be addressed. Perhaps

FIRCs should be used only in circumstances where it is very likely that democracy will take

hold, and even so, should be done in tandem with non-violent development and foreign aid to

help raise income levels and stabilize the country. Exploring potential synergies between FIRCs

and economic development is thus a new direction for the research on FIRCs.

Studying how endogenous democratization emerges is also something that needs to be

explored further, especially for countries transitioning to middle income status. The indigenous

population can devise a democratic system that is right for its society. Only when a democracy

rises endogenously will it be suitable for the culture and addresses the immediate needs and

problems of the population. The process takes time, particularly if the country currently lacks

institutions to support democracy, even if it is a country approaching middle income status liek

China. Over time, as the population gains experience with democracy and income levels rise, the

government can become stable. Such is the path to a mature democracy that will tend not to fight

with other democracies. As Przeworski notes in his article "Democracy and Economic

Development," middle income countries are likely to transition to democracy endogenously. 36

How to encourage this transition is thus a question that needs to be explored further. For

instance, Tunisia, which is a middle to high income country, was arguably the only country that

emerged from Arab Springs with a relatively stable democracy.37 Lessons from Tunisia's

democratization and how those experiences can be generalized to encourage other endogenous

democratizations are subjects worth researching. Endogenous democratization and its relations to

FIRCs is thus a research field that warrants more attention, and it is a field that scholars currently

know little about.

36 Przeworski, "Democracy and Economic Development," 2004, p. 5.37 Lisa Anderson, "Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt and Libya," Foreign Affairs, 2011, pp. 2-7.

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Finally, developing a theory of democratic FIRCs depends on developing a theory of

democracy in general. The field has yet to understand exactly what is democracy properly is and

what properties and qualities a democracy should have. Moreover, there needs a better grasp of

what causes democracy, both in terms of its endogenous rise and imposition, and how democracy

is sustained. Defining in more detail the specific mechanisms by which democracy is sustained

would shed light on how FIRCs should be conducted in the future to maximize their ability to

install stable democracies in countries that did not have them before. Exploring the nature of

democracy and how it comes about is thus the next frontier for research on FIRCs.

If FIRC happens in a country that does not have preconditions conducive to democracy,

democracy will not last, and the country will face even more acute conflicts than before the

FIRC. The goal of helping marginalized populations in oppressive governmental regimes

worldwide gain a political voice is well-intentioned and worth pursuing, but FIRC may not be

the correct method for reaching this goal in every scenario. Hopefully failed FIRCs like Iraq and

Afghanistan will teach the US and other powerful democracies that FIRCs may not always be the

best answer for establishing a democratic world.

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