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Environmental PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713635072

'New' Instruments of Environmental Governance:Patterns and Pathways of ChangeAndrew Jordan; Rüdiger K. W. Wurzel; Anthony R. Zito

Online Publication Date: 21 January 2003To cite this Article: Jordan, Andrew, Wurzel, Rüdiger K. W. and Zito, Anthony R.(2003) ''New' Instruments of Environmental Governance: Patterns and Pathways ofChange', Environmental Politics, 12:1, 1 - 24To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/714000665URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714000665

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Environmental Politics, Vol.8, No.1, Spring 1999, pp.00–PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

INTRODUCTION

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‘New’ Instruments of EnvironmentalGovernance: Patterns and Pathways

of Change

ANDREW JORDAN, RÜDIGER K.W.WURZEL andANTHONY R. ZITO

The deployment of ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (NEPIs), namelyeco-taxes and other market-based instruments (MBIs), voluntary agreements(VAs) and informational devices such as eco-labels, has grown spectacularlyin recent years. In 1987, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD) [OECD, 1994: 177 ] reported that most nationalenvironmental policies still relied upon a regulatory or ‘command and control’mode of action, but since then the number of MBIs has grown ‘substantially’[CEC, 2000: 2]. Some estimates put the growth in use in OECD countries atover 50 per cent between 1989 and 1995 [CEC, 2000: 2]. Daugbjerg andSvendson [2001: 3] have estimated that the number of environmental taxes inOECD countries grew from just 30 in 1987 to over 110 in 1997. Environmentaltaxes are now a mainstay of the national budgeting process, accounting foraround seven per cent of total government revenues in 2002.

VAs, too, are becoming much more popular. In 1997, the European

Environment Agency (EEA) [ EEA, 1997 ] put the total in the EuropeanUnion (EU) 15 at around 300, with more and more being signed each year.Outside of France, the Netherlands and to a lesser degree Germany, therewere virtually no VAs in use in the early 1970s; most countries relied uponissuing regulations to manage the relationship between society, theeconomy and the environment. Finally, within the EU 15, the number of industrial sites subject to eco-management and auditing systems(EMAS)has risen from zero to over 4,000 in just six years. EMAS, a set of voluntaryenvironmental management standards which firms can choose to adopt,gives consumers more environmental information about how industryoperates.

The research underpinning this study was undertaken for a project entitled ‘Innovation inEnvironmental Governance: A Comparative Analysis of New Environmental Policy Instruments’which was generously funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s (ESRC) FutureGovernance Programme under grant number L216252013. For more details see:http://www.uea.ac.uk/env/cserge/research/fut_governance/Home.htm.

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This shift is not, of course, confined to the EU Member States. Golub[1998a, xiii] suggests that the eagerness to extend the conventional toolboxof environmental management is producing a ‘fundamental transition’ inenvironmental policy the world over. In Japan, one (conservative) estimateput the total number of VAs at around 30,000 [ Andrews et al., 2001: 10]. TheUS Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) recently conducted an auditand discovered ‘an enormous number’ at the federal and state level, with‘literally thousands’ at the sub-state level [USEPA, 2001: 23, 85]. The sheerdiversity of instruments now employed in the USA, the report continued, isalso ‘remarkable’ [ibid.: ix]. The USEPA [ibid.: iv] concluded that thegrowing popularity of NEPIs represents ‘one of the most remarkabledevelopments in environmental management over the past decade’.

New Instruments: A Revolution or an Evolution in Environmental

Management?Clearly, something is happening, but what is the long-term significance of the growing popularity of NEPIs? It is undeniably true that the total numberand diversity of environmental policy instruments has grown, in somecountries stunningly fast. However, there are still two aspects of the shift tousing ‘new’ environmental policy instruments, which remain curiouslyunder-researched. The first is how ‘new’ are they? The Oxford English

Dictionary defines new as ‘novel’, ‘not existing before’, ‘strange orunfamiliar’, ‘starting afresh’, ‘restored or renewed after decay’. ‘New’ istherefore a relative term; it has to be related in some way or another to whatcame before, which in our case, are regulatory instruments. However, we

already know that regulatory instruments differ in the way they arecalibrated and implemented from one country to the next, so what may be a‘new’ environmental policy instrument in one country, may already be partof established practice in another. In other words, what is or is not ‘new’ isproperly a matter for detailed empirical comparative and historicalinvestigation, which traces current patterns back along their historicalpathways of change.

The second relates to the comparative politics of their adoption and use.The existing literature tends to be dominated by three types of publication:(1) broad surveys of specific types of instruments (undertaken byinternational bodies such as the EEA and the OECD); (2) case studies of a

specific type of instrument in a small selection of sectors and/or countries;and (3) broad surveys of countries. These publications tend to advocate onetype of instrument (often using highly theoretical models), describe ‘bestpractice’ or simply classify NEPIs using different typologies. Of the studiesthat have tried to investigate the broader patterns of use for different sub-

4 ‘NEW’ INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE?

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types of NEPIs, most bring together an inconsistent mix of instruments orsectors [ Andersen and Sprenger, 2000; Dente, 1995; Golub, 1998a; Knill

and Lenschow, 2000]. Obviously, this limits greatly the conclusions that canbe drawn from such an exercise. Crucially, the prevailing literature has notdirectly addressed the apparently simple question of why do states appear tofavour some policy instruments and not others? In short, ‘why [do] someinstruments appear in the repertoire of some [political] systems and notothers’ [ Anderson, 1971: 122]?

This volume addresses these research needs by examining fourinterrelated questions. First, what are the most important drivers of (andbarriers to) the continuing uptake of NEPIs in particular countries? Havingundertaken a detailed empirical investigation of different countryexperiences, is it possible to make more informed assertions about what ismotivating states to change, if indeed they are changing? Furthermore, arecountries changing their national repertoires for similar reasons, or are they

doing similar things for different reasons?Second, what is the overall pattern of use? Who is adopting what, when

and why? Unlike some other recent surveys, this collection examines thefull range of NEPIs, rather than concentrating upon one, or perhaps two,sub-types in a small number of countries.

Third, how different (that is, ‘new’) are the NEPIs to the traditionalstyle, structures and content of national environmental policy instruments?Does the appearance of NEPIs amount to a revolution in modernenvironmental policy, or a much slower and more conservative evolution of national environmental policies? Having examined NEPIs and theirpredecessors in considerable empirical detail, we should be in a better

position to judge whether NEPIs are replacing or simply supplementing‘old’ instruments, particularly regulation. There is an obvious inclination tolabel anything that is not regulation as a ‘new’ instrument, when a moredetailed historical survey of their use could reveal that they wereextensively employed a good deal earlier than the 1990s.

Finally, how well do popular theories of comparative politics and publicpolicy explain the emerging pattern of instrument use in the environmentalsector? There are two very broad schools of thought that speak to thisquestion. At the risk of oversimplifying, the first regards the selectionprocess as being highly instrumental, in which shifts in ideas and interests(that is, policy learning) are prominent. According to this view, a broad

pattern of innovation across countries is capable of occurring if and only if the ideas and the political will to use them are present. The secondemphasises the importance of deeply rooted national institutional legaciesthat give rise to distinctive and highly enduring ‘national repertoires’ of particular instruments [ Bennett, 1988: 439]. Anderson [ibid.: 122] suggests

5‘NEW’ INSTRUMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

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that each national ‘policy repertoire’ is distinct from the broader,international repertoire of potentially applicable policy instruments. Incontrast to the first school of thought, this second perspective predicts muchmore ‘bounded’ forms of innovation [Weir, 1992], with countriesexperimenting with what they know well, while shunning institutionallyincompatible tools used elsewhere in the world. Each of these fourquestions is unpacked and explored at much greater length below.

The contributions in this volume focus on NEPI use in eightindustrialised countries, namely Australia, Austria, Finland, France,Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands and the UK, which have historicallydifferent levels of environmental performance. Each analysis seeks toidentify some of the underlying causes of NEPI use by situating the trendsin instrument selection against the backdrop of broader developments inmodern environmental politics, such as the internationalisation of policy-making and the emergence of ecological modernist ideas [Weale, 1992]. In

order to make them generally comparable, each contribution concentratesupon three types of NEPI, namely MBIs, VAs and eco-labels. However, inorder not to squeeze out national variation, where appropriate each studyalso includes a ‘residual’ category of NEPIs that are of particular nationalimportance (for example, subsidies or informational devices such asEMAS), or which are ‘new’ to the country in question, although they are notconventionally defined as NEPIs. Finally, although the main purpose of thisvolume is to describe and explain the use made of NEPIs within andbetween different countries, for the reasons explained above eachcontribution also reviews recent trends in the use made of regulation tocheck whether it is also being applied in ‘new’ ways.

The remainder of this introduction proceeds as follows. Part III explainsthat our study not only illuminates the theory and praxis of modernenvironmental politics and policy making (and particular instrumentselection and use), but also makes a much needed empirical contribution tothe highly rarefied debate about the theoretical importance of governance inmodern society. Many analysts believe that the use of instruments that donot rely upon the formal sanctions and authority of the state (that is,regulation) is the very essence of governance. So, by carefully documentingand comparing the use made of NEPIs in different national setting, we hopeto assess how far environmental governance is supplanting or simplysupplementing traditional forms of environmental government . Obviously,

if NEPIs are not as important as some analysts have claimed, then perhapsthe putative shift from government to governance may not be as significantas is often thought.

Part IV introduces and defines the main types of NEPI covered in thisvolume, while Parts V to VII draw upon the existing theoretical literature to


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begin answering the four questions outlined above. Thus, Part Fiveexamines the most important drivers of NEPI use and the emerging patternsof use, Part VI examines how ‘new’ they are, and Part VII reviews two rivaltheoretical perspectives on instrument selection and use. Finally, Part VIIIdescribes the analytical structure of the case study accounts, brieflydescribes the eight countries and introduces the rest of this collection.

‘New’ Environmental Policy Instruments: Government …

or Governance?

Until now, NEPIs have tended to attract the attention of environmentalsocial scientists, international agencies and think tanks. Economists, wholike to extol the theoretical advantages of economic instruments inparticular, dominated the early literature on NEPIs. The OECD and the EEAhave emerged as important disseminators of best practice in the

industrialised world, by cataloguing instruments, undertakingbenchmarking exercises using large databases and measuring theireffectiveness. Although immensely useful, this literature tends towardsdescription and is also quite normative. Moreover, it also ignores (ordownplays) the bureaucratic and institutional context in which instrumentsare selected and deployed, and the politics that surround their use [ Andersen

and Sprenger, 2000].In some examples of work undertaken by economists, individual tools

are subjected to detailed analysis in a way that suggests that regulation hasnever existed, or is inherently inferior. Not surprisingly, economists reactwith disappointment to the failure of political systems to adopt NEPIs as

quickly or in the unadulterated manner that their models predict [Siebert,1976; Hanley et al., 1990; Pearce et al. 2000]. Until relatively recently, thepolitics of NEPI selection and use have remained largely unexplored, whichis a great pity because political science and policy analysis have a great dealto say about how and why tools are (or are not) adopted in the form thatthey are.

One of the main purposes of this volume is to shed new light on thecomparative politics of instrument selection, adoption and implementation.However, it also speaks to a much more general debate about the structureand function of the state that spans the social sciences. The debate about‘governance’ [Czada and Schmidt, 1993; Marin, 1990; Pierre, 2000; Pierre

and Peters, 2000] seeks to understand contemporary changes in the waythat society is governed. Put very simply, the claim is often made thatalthough modern states continue to exist in society and remain important,their form has changed hugely [Pierre, 2000, 5]. According to many writers,state structures underwent a slow but nonetheless radical transformation in


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the latter part of the last century, as government metamorphosed intogovernance.

According to Stoker [1998: 17 ], the word ‘government’ refers toactivities undertaken primarily or wholly by state bodies, particularly those‘which operate at the level of the nation state to maintain public order andfacilitate collective action’. The term ‘governance’, on the other hand, refersto the emergence of new styles of governing in which the boundariesbetween the public and private sectors, and the national and internationallevels have blurred. For Stoker, then, ‘the essence of governance is its focuson governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority

and sanctions of government ’ (emphasis added). Kooiman [1993: 4]summarises governance as follows:

No single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and informationrequired to solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems; no

actor has sufficient overview to make the application of particularinstruments effective; no single actor has sufficient action potential todominate unilaterally in a particular governing model.

If we adopt these interpretations, then the increasing deployment of NEPIsis quite clearly a symptom of governance. It constitutes an attempt by statesto share their steering capacity with other actors. According to this line of argument, hierarchical government structures are increasingly giving way topublic–private partnerships and various forms of ‘ecologicial self-organization’ [Teubner et al., 1994]. We reflect below upon some of thefactors that are stimulating the state to think and act in this way. The keypoint to make here though, is that a comparative empirical assessment of the

way in which NEPIs are actually being deployed, should serve as aninteresting test of when and how far governance has replaced governmentin the environmental sector. If the overall extent of innovation has beensudden and very strong, then perhaps we are witnessing the dawn of a newphase of environmental management characterised by governance. But if regulation remains important, then perhaps the shift from government togovernance is more blurred and partial than the governance ‘turn’ in thesocial sciences suggest.

What Are ‘New’ Environmental Policy Instruments?

Policy instruments are the ‘myriad techniques at the disposal of governments to implement their policy objectives’ [ Howlett, 1991: 2] (seealso: Howlett and Ramesh, [1993: 4], and Schneider and Ingram [1990:

527 ]). Analysts have tried to flesh out this general definition bydifferentiating between three distinct though interrelated sub-types.


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Bemelmans-Videc et al. [1998: 50–2] present such a typology focused onconstrain, that is, regulation (sticks, that is, highly choice constraining);economic instruments (carrots i.e. moderately choice constraining); andinformation (sermon, that is, facilitates and informs free choice). Thiscategorisation broadly matches the fourfold distinction we have used above,that is, (1) regulatory instruments, (2) MBIs, (3) VAs, and (4) informationaldevices. Some scholars suggest a fifth category, which involves someattempt to manipulate ‘organisation’, that is, the resources of government(such as the setting up of new – environmental – ministries or agencies[ Hood, 1983; Howlett, 1991: 81; Kern et al., 2000]. However, we havedecided to concentrate on a more narrowly defined concept of policyinstruments.

Figure 1 provides a different, though equally simple typology of environmental policy instrument types according to how the ends andmeans of management are defined. In the top left-hand cell we find most

types of regulation, which prescribe both the means and ends of environmental policy. Good examples are the bans that are sometimesimposed upon the use of particular substances, or the specification of emission limits for certain industrial processes. In the top right we also findmany types of regulation, specifically those that require the use of aparticular type of technology (for example, specifying the Best AvailableTechnology (BAT) principle). In this cell, the operator of a particularprocess is simply required to use a particular type of technology, but maynot be required to attain a given emission level. In the bottom left cell wefind certain types of VA, but, interestingly, also types of regulation such asthose that specify an environmental quality objective (EQO). Finally, the

bottom right cell is where we normally find NEPIs such as MBIs, eco-labelsand EMAS-type systems. This typology is especially revealing of theoverlaps between the different instrument types. For instance, forms of regulation are found in three of the four cells.


FIGURE 1A TYPOLOGY OF NEPIs

Regulator SPECIFIES the Regulator does NOT SPECIFYgoal to be achieved the goal to be achieved

Regulator specifies HOW Command and control Technology-based regulatorygoal is to be achieved (regulation) standards

Regulator does NOT Most negotiated VAs; Most MBIs; some VAs;SPECIFY HOW goal some MBIs; some informational devicesis to be achieved regulation (e.g. EQOs)

Source: Based on Russell and Powell [1996 ].

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These two typologies illuminate the relationship between differentinstruments types, but they do not explain the instruments themselves. Theremainder of this section very briefly describes the different types of NEPIin the order that they appear in the national case studies.

Market-Based Instruments

A very broad definition of market-based instruments (MBIs) is that theyare instruments that ‘affect estimates of costs of alternative actions open toeconomic agents’ [OECD, 1994, 17 ]. The total number of MBIs used inOECD countries has grown steadily since the early seventies, as has therange, which now extends from subsidies through to emission charges andtradable permits [OECD, 1998]. The OECD distinguishes between fourmain types of MBI: taxes (including charges and levies); subsidies;tradable emission permits; and deposit-refund schemes (see OECD [1998,

7–9] for a more extensive taxonomy). Charges and taxes are already quite

well known, but tradable permit schemes are still relatively novel in mostOECD countries outside the USA where they first originated. There aremany sub-types of tradable permit schemes. Two key variables centre on(a) whether the authorities set an upper limit (that is, so-called caps) on thetotal amount of a substance (for example, carbon dioxide) that a particularsector or group of sectors can emit; and (b) how the permits to emitpollutants are initially allocated to the various firms involved (for example,for free (so-called ‘grandfathering’) or through an auction in which thehighest bidder gets the permits). Once a tradable permit scheme is set up,firms are allowed to buy and sell the permits amongst themselves, which,at least in theory, should facilitate greater cost-effectiveness and allow

greater scope for technological innovation (compared to traditionalregulation).

Voluntary Agreements

The first VAs appeared in Japan in the 1960s and then later in France[Karamanos, 2001: 71]. There is, however, no commonly agreed definitionof what they are. In some circles the term ‘voluntary’ is usedinterchangeably with ‘environmental’. Other commonly used terms are‘codes of conduct’, ‘covenants’ or ‘negotiated agreements’. The EEAdefines them as ‘covering only those commitments undertaken by firms andsector associations, which are the result of negotiations with public

authorities and/or explicitly recognised by the authorities’ [ EEA, 1997: 11](emphasis added), but the EU Commission adopts a much more inclusivedefinition: ‘agreements between industry and public authorities on theachievement of environmental objectives’ [CEC, 1996: 5]. The OECD[1998: 4] also subscribes to this broader, more inclusive definition:


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‘voluntary commitments of the industry undertaken in order to pursueactions leading to the improvement of the environment’.

Börkey and Lévèque [1998] have helpfully provided a typology whichdifferentiates between three different sub-types: unilateral commitments,public voluntary schemes, and negotiated agreements. Unilateral

commitments consist of environmental improvement programmes instigatedby individual companies or by industry associations. Strictly speaking,these are not really instruments of government, because they do not involvethe state; they are instruments of governance because they offer industry ameans to communicate its environmental commitment to the public. Public

voluntary schemes (PVS) are established by public bodies, which definecertain performance criteria and other conditions of membership. Individualcompanies are free to decide whether or not to join, although the schemedefines the criteria that have to be met. Most PVSs would qualify as aninstrument of governance, although they still involve a great deal of

government involvement in their design, adoption and monitoring. Finally,negotiated agreements are more formal ; ‘contracts’ between industry andpublic authorities aimed at addressing particular environmental problems.They may be legally binding. Usually, their content is negotiated betweenindustry and public bodies. Consequently, they are much closer to thegovernment end of the government-governance spectrum than the other twosub-types.

Eco-labels

Eco-labels are not very intrusive policy instruments in comparison toregulation (see Figure 1) and also some MBIs (such as tradable permits and

eco-taxes). They mainly rely on moral suasion by providing consumers withinformation about the environmental impact of particular products andservices [ Jordan et al., 2003]. Eco-labels provide information to consumersin a standardised manner, allowing them to make more informedcomparisons. Widely recognised and supported eco-labels may influenceproducers in a similar manner to traditional regulatory standards (especiallyif they stipulate the BAT principle) in markets where green consumerism isvery strong [OECD, 1999]. Producers and service providers which cater forsuch markets (or market segments) have a strong incentive to apply for eco-labels to avoid possible competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis eco-labelledproducts/services provided by their competitors. However, eco-label

schemes are largely ineffective (in terms of changing producer behaviour)in markets which are characterised by a low degree of environmentalawareness, although they may help to raise public awareness aboutenvironmental issues.


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Other Instruments

Each case study in this collection also contains a ‘residual’ category of NEPIs, which we define as instruments that are of national importance (for

example, subsidies), or which are ‘new’ to the country in question. Theseinclude environmental impact assessment (for example, Finland) andsubsidies (for example, France). There are other informational devicesbesides eco-labels, ranging from the softer tools such as informationcampaigns to EMAS.

‘Old’ Instruments: Regulation

Finally, each case study also investigates the contemporary form and functionof regulation to gauge the extent to which it is also being applied in ‘new’ways. A lot of the impetus for regulatory change is now coming from the EUsimply because it is the pre-eminent source of national environmental policy inEurope [ Jordan, 2002; Wurzel, 2002; Zito, 2000]. The EU affects nationalregulation both directly and indirectly. The EU has a direct effect by alteringthe nature of the regulation it adopts. For example, the Commission is makinga concerted effort to employ framework Directives that set out a generalframework of control, rather than highly prescriptive Regulations andDirectives. The recent EU White Paper on governance [CEC, 2001] advocates‘co-regulation’ – that is a blend of voluntary initiatives and binding legislativeacts. The most high profile manifestations of co-regulation in theenvironmental sector are voluntary initiatives such as the Auto-Oil Programmewhich rely on so-called ‘New Approach’ Directives [Friedrich et al., 2000].

Under the ‘New’ Approach (it actually dates from the late 1980s),Directives set only the essential requirements to be achieved, leaving the

technical conformance details to be negotiated between industry and theEuropean standards body (CEN). So far, it has only been applied in the areasof packaging waste and integrated product policy. The EU also indirectlyaffects the operation of national regulation by adopting policies that differfrom pre-existing national approaches. For example, national regulation inthe UK has changed significantly since the 1970s through this slower andmore diffuse process of Europeanisation [ Jordan, 1993; 2003].

Why Are NEPIs Being Adopted?

Having defined NEPIs, we now turn to the first question outlined above i.e.

what is driving the adoption of NEPIs? In his seminal account of stategovernment innovation, Walker [1969] distinguishes between two mainsources of change: those external and those internal to the state. These havesince been developed into two distinct models: the external determinants


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model of change and the internal determinants model of change [ Berry and

Berry, 1999: 170]. Each of the eight case studies examines in considerabledetail the most important external and internal drivers of NEPI adoption atthe national level. However, it is perhaps worthwhile briefly identifyingsome of the most important external drivers beforehand, as the existingliterature implies that they are common to most, if not all, the eight countries.

It is worth saying up front that the appearance of ‘new’ policyinstruments is not an entirely new phenomenon. As long ago as the 1950s,Dahl and Lindblom [1953: 8] described it as ‘perhaps the greatest politicalrevolution of our times’ (emphasis added). That said, a number of morespecific factors combined in the 1980s and 1990s to fuel a search for ‘new’instruments of environmental policy – a policy sector which of coursebarely existed in the 1950s.

Dissatisfaction with Regulation

The first driver was a growing dissatisfaction with regulation. For decades,standard economic accounts of environmental problems have underlined theextent to which policy-making by means of MBIs is more economicallyefficient and effective than regulation by administrative rules. In the late 1980s,this academic message began to attract a much wider and appreciative politicalaudience. In particular, highly regulated industries such as those involved inthe production of bulk chemicals began to advocate MBIs and also VAs as theirpreferred alternatives to regulation. Other actors, who were expressingdissatisfaction with regulation as the policy sector, paid more attention to theproblems of implementation associated with the traditional forms of regulation. Policy-makers also began to appreciate that they would never

achieve sustainable development – a new and increasingly important leitmotif of environmental policy giving equal weight to environmental, economic andsocial considerations – by regulation alone. Regulation might be well suited todealing with point sources, but it simply could not be used to police diffusesources and activities such as agriculture and global problems (such asgreenhouse gas production) which occur at myriad locations.

The Perceived Strengths of NEPIs

Second, NEPIs were assumed to have a number of putative benefits overregulation. The European Commission claims that VAs: encourage industry toadopt a more proactive attitude to environmental protection; are more cost

effective than regulation; allow a quicker and smoother achievement of policygoals [COM (96) 560 final: 3, 6–7 ]. The EEA [1996: 15–19] argues that MBIsalso have a number of distinct advantages: they internalise externalities; theymake the polluter pay; they are more cost effective than regulation and theyprovide a constant spur to innovate with new technologies. MBIs are a form of


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governance as they shift steering capacity from the state to non-state bodies.However, the precise extent of that shift depends upon how the MBIs aredesigned and implemented. In the 1990s, these and other advocates of NEPIsfound they could push their case much more easily than before (see below).

The Governance ‘Turn’

Third, the political attractiveness of NEPIs began to grow in most OECDcountries starting in the 1980s. NEPIs fitted with the debate about governance– the idea that the state should not seek to interfere in every facet of social andeconomic life (see above). In an era of governance, the state is smaller, morenetworked and much less heavily reliant on binding legislation [ Marin and

Mayntz, 1991]. More recently, the allure of MBIs has grown even morerapidly, as politicians realised that they might offer a handy and politically lesscontentious source of revenue. Crucially, the concept of ecological tax reform– taxing economic ‘bads’ and recycling the revenue to promote economic

‘goods’ such as employment – fitted neatly with the emerging Third Wayideology of ruling (Social Democratic) parties in Germany and the UK.

Instrument Changes in the EU

Fourth, in the 1990s the EU began to experiment with NEPIs for a numberof reasons [ Jordan et al., 2003]. It was under political pressure fromindustry to simplify legislation and make it economically less burdensome(see the 1995 Molitor report on legislative simplification [COM (95) 288,

21-6-95]). NEPIs were an important means of promoting ‘sharedresponsibility’ – a theme of the 1992 Fifth Environmental ActionProgramme - to achieve sustainability. NEPIs also attracted new advocates

in the early 1990s as the EU struggled to justify its involvement in nationalenvironmental affairs; they reflected the subsidiarity principle more than thepreferred instrument of EU environmental policy since the 1970s –regulation [ Jordan, 2000]. The Commission’s environmental Directoratehas also warmed to NEPIs, as they appear to offer sharper and moresensitive tools for cutting away at the knotty issue of sustainability.

Economic Pressures

Another contextual factor that made the idea of more flexible NEPIs moreattractive was the economic conditions facing both the EU member statesand other OECD countries such as Australia. The economic recession in the

1990s had a severe impact even in the wealthy Scandinavian countries. Thispressure combined with the fears of increased global economic competitionto focus governments more on the priorities of protecting firms andemployment [Golub, 1998b]. Economic actors and their allies had a further


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weapon to argue against environmental regulation that imposed more costsand inflexibility from their perspective.

Growing Domestic Political Support

Finally, in recent years environmental groups and green parties havebecome much more supportive of NEPIs than they used to be. As with theEU, there are several motivations at work here. First, many regulations werenever fully implemented; NEPIs appeared to remedy some of these failings[Knill and Lenschow, 2000]. And second, the tide of support behind NEPIsis now so great, that previously critical groups like Greenpeace and Friendsof the Earth (FoE) have realised that they have to engage positively lest theyare left behind by industry and regulators.

Barriers to Change

Pressing in the other direction are a number of obstacles to the widespread

adoption of NEPIs [ Hanley et al., 1990; Pearce et al., 2000]. The case studyauthors reflect upon these in much more detail, but it is probably worthidentifying some of them beforehand. They include: the lack of economicexpertise within national administrations; a cultural antipathy amongbureaucrats, many of whom have a long training in the use of regulation;opposition from vested interests, including environmental pressure groups, butalso sections of industry; legal constraints imposed inter alia by the EU; fearsabout competitiveness and the economic burden of NEPIs; and the potentiallyadverse distributional impacts of new MBIs. The case studies examine howthese drivers and obstacles have interacted in particular national settings.

Concluding CommentsThe case studies seek to describe the overall pattern of NEPI use in the eightcountries (question two above). However, it is already abundantly clearfrom the very broad-brush comparative analyses that have been undertaken,that the overall pattern of NEPI use is quite strongly differentiated acrosscountries and sectors. The remainder of this introduction explores and seeksto account for the overall pattern. Second, the use of instruments appears tobe affected by the same leader-laggard dynamic that is said to drive otherdomains of environmental policy [e.g., Héritier, 1995; Liefferink and

Andersen, 1998]. Often, one state or a small group of countries experimentwith a particular policy tool and then experience disseminates outwards to

other countries, often via international organisations such as the OECD andthe European Commission. There is empirical evidence that policy diffusionand transfer may occur where other countries borrow the general principle(or specific elements) of policies and/or environmental policy instruments[Kern et al., 2000]. Third, the range of NEPIs used is also broadening, from


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a small number of MBIs and one or two VAs in the 1970s, to a veritablearsenal of different tools. One of the most urgent debates now taking placein some OECD countries, is how best to fit these different tools together intoeffective policy instrument mixes. Finally, there appears to be a pronouncedNorth–South gradient which reflects the differences in economicdevelopment within the EU. Generally speaking, the wealthier NorthernEuropean states innovated earlier than the poorer Southern/peripheral EUmember states (such as Ireland), and have also adopted many more NEPIsacross a wider range of sub-types.

How ‘New’ Are NEPIs?

Innovation and Incrementalism in Public Policy

The third question outlined above was how ‘new’ are NEPIs? Does theirapparently sudden and widespread appearance constitute a revolution inmodern environmental policy, or a much slower and more conservativeevolution of national environmental policies? The policy innovation literaturedefines innovation as the adoption of a policy that is new to the governmentthat is adopting it [Walker, 1969: 881]. Consequently (but perhaps not veryhelpfully!), an innovative policy instrument could be defined as one that is‘new’. The distinction between old and new, and evolution and innovation (orrevolution) bring us back to the hoary debate in policy analysis, which pittedthe incrementalists against their critics. The former argue that most politicalchange is highly incremental in nature, that is, it usually amounts to little morethan a marginal alteration of existing policy goals and instruments [ Lindblom,

1965; Berry, 1990]. According to this view, innovation is highly unusual;

there is very little in modern political life that it entirely ‘new’. The second, ismuch more optimistic about the possibility of innovation.

In this volume we have chosen to define the novelty (or otherwise) of aparticular instrument by examining how far it departs from the traditionalstyle, content and structure of national policy. These three are not hard andfast concepts, but they provide us with a fairly consistent typology formapping out the historical and spatial distribution of change.

Policy Content, Structures and Style

Following Hall [1993], the content of policy refers to the way in whichpolicy is expressed and the instruments used to implement it. He subdivides

policy content into three different levels or parts. The first and highest level(in conceptual terms) is the goals of a policy. These operate within a policy

paradigm or a framework of ideas that specifies not only the goals of policyand the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very


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nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. The second levelequates to the instruments or techniques of policy, while the third andlowest level relates to the precise setting of those instruments. Traditionally,the dominant paradigm of environmental policy was curative, that is, howbest to prevent pollution once waste matter had been created. The goals of policy were framed in such a way as to reduce the amount of waste enteringthe environment to a level that did, not impair human health and causeexcessive environmental damage. The main tools were, as discussed above,regulatory. Very few governments had environmental ministries in the early1970s. Those that did, tended not to be directly involved in the selection,calibration and implementation of instruments.

The style of policy normally describes the manner in which environmentalpolicy decisions are made, although it also affects the way in whichinstruments are used. The most common, but fairly rough, categorisation of policy style is that offered by Richardson et al. [1982], which distinguishes

between consensual vs. conflictual and reactive vs. proactive styles.Finally, policy instruments do not exist in a bureaucratic and

administrative vacuum. They have to be championed, designed, adoptedand implemented by the administrative structures of government. Thesestructures comprise the bureaucratic and procedural arrangements (forexample, government departments, coordinating mechanisms, sub-nationalimplementing agencies) that states establish either to make and/orimplement policy. As explained above, most environmental policyinstruments (in practice regulation) were the responsibility of environmental ministries.

Theories of Instrument Selection and Use

The fourth and final question posed above was how should we theorise theprocesses of instrument adoption and diffusion as described in the casestudy chapters? Or, to put it slightly differently, what factors are likely toinfluence the choice between different types of policy instrument, and howis that choice likely to be affected by a particular country’s institutional andpolitical characteristics (that is, the structure, style and content of its policies– see above)? Below, we concentrate upon two broad theoreticalperspectives, which make very different predictions about the outcome of the selection process and the intervening influence of endogenous factors

(for example, a country’s institutional make-up and distinctive policy style)in shaping the form in which they are selected and deployed. The firstemphasises the importance of policy learning in driving the selection of instruments. On this view, instruments are adopted to fit new policyrequirements and policy paradigms. The overall pattern of use is likely to be


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uniform in those sectors and countries where the ideas driving change are inexistence. Sudden bursts of innovation in instrument use may occur if andonly if advocates manage to colonise key institutional niches.

The second emphasises the distorting effect of national institutionalforms. An institutionally ‘bounded’ form of innovation produces distinctiveand enduring national repertoires of particular instruments. According tothis perspective (which has a great deal in common with incrementalistapproaches) the same level of political pressure applied to different politicalsystems is likely to generate a differentiated pattern of change, whichfollows the grain of existing national institutional forms.

Ideational Theories

Ideas are dominant in this body of literature: they drive the search for newinstruments. Policy change is first and foremost a cognitive strugglebetween different groups to improve their understanding of the causes of

policy problems or the suitability of particular instruments to act assolutions [ Hall, 1993: 278]. According to these theories, policy instrumentsplay an instrumental role in the policy process. Normally, existinginstruments are simply recalibrated to reflect changing circumstances andpolitical demands, but occasionally sudden, and unforeseen (external)events will completely de-stabilise a policy area, triggering a frantic searchfor new instruments and explanatory frameworks (paradigms).

Two very popular examples in this canon are Hall’s study of sociallearning and Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). Hall [1993:

292] argues that policy-making occurs within the context of a particular setof ideas ‘that recognise some social interests as more legitimate than others

and privilege some lines of policy over others.’ At any point in time, one setof ideas (a policy paradigm) prevails. This is ‘a framework of ideas andstandards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of

instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of theproblems they are meant to be addressing’ (emphasis added).

For Hall, policy change can occur at all three of the levels discussedabove: (1) the precise calibrations of policy instruments (first order); (2) theparticular techniques or policy instruments employed to provide policysolutions (second order); (3) the overarching goals that guide policy-making(third order). Shifts in the first two levels occur regularly and incrementallyand are associated with ‘normal’ policy-making. They involve slight

changes to the existing repertoire of instruments, for example, tightening anemission limit. A paradigm shift of substantial proportions is required toknock them from well-trodden paths, altering the underlying goals of apolicy area (third order change). Such shifts take place periodically as newproblems emerge, and anomalous or ‘unexplainable’ events accumulate.


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The widening debate eventually spills over into the public sphere, drawingin a much broader array of pressure groups, journalists, intellectuals andacademic analysts, who compete to alter the prevailing policy discourse.

Sabatier’s [1998] advocacy coalition framework (ACF) conceives of thepolicy process in terms of discrete sub-systems. Within each subsystem areadvocacy coalitions (ACs) comprising actors with similar core beliefs orvalues. The ACF divides beliefs into three hierarchical layers reflecting adecreasing resistance to change. Deep core beliefs define an individual’sbasic philosophy and are immune to empirical challenges. Near (policy) corebeliefs relate to fundamental value priorities surrounding the policy area,such as perceptions of causation and strategies for realising deep core values.Finally, there is an outer band of secondary elements, which prescribe howpolicies should be implemented (that is, the choice of instruments).

At any one time, there is likely to be a dominant coalition which sets theintellectual framework (a paradigm?) within which individual policy

decisions are made, and defines a series of minority coalitions. The strugglebetween these coalitions provides the primary motor of policy change. ForACs, learning is an instrumental process of achieving a priori beliefs. Whilechanges at the secondary level emerge incrementally as different coalitionsengage in a cognitive struggle, changes in the core aspects of a policyrequire an exogenous ‘shock’ outside the sub-system.

Institutional Theories

Institutional theories focus on ‘the whole range of state and societalinstitutions that shape how political actors define their interests and thatstructure their relations of power to other groups’ [Thelen and Steinmo,

1992: 2]. These theories assume that the choice of instruments is shaped bythe historical-institutional context in which the act of selection takes place.This view characterises many of the ‘new’ institutional theories of politics,especially the historical and sociological variants. March and Olsen [1998:

948] define an ‘institution’ as ‘a relatively stable collection of practices andrules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specificsituations’. National institutions would therefore include each country’srepertoire of policy instruments.

The fact that these repertoires provide appropriate solutions to nationalproblems gives them an institutional embeddedness that is hard to dislodgeunless the instrument in question is manifestly dysfunctional. Over the

course of time, actors invest substantial time and resources adapting toparticular policies and tools, locking them in place [Pierson, 1993]. Eventhen, any ensuing institutional change is likely to be incremental and pathdependent (that is, shaped by what has already accumulated). Importantly,actor preferences are derived endogenously on the basis of what is


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appropriate (that is, politically acceptable and can be implemented on theground) in a given institutional context. Consequently, they try to satisfice(that is, muddle through) within pre-existing institutional constraints ratherthan design new solutions or instruments.

Institutional theories suggest that institutions form and adapt slowly, inthe process investing in certain norms, values and cultures. When thesenorms and procedures become institutionalised they are not changed easilyunless there are sudden, external shocks. ‘Revolutionary policy learning’[Kitschelt, 1991] is therefore extremely rare. In the environmental spheretypical triggers are sudden ecological catastrophe or a spectacular policyfailure. However, when confronted with such challenges actors first refinewhat they have before searching for novel approaches. The tendency tocling to existing policy instruments that appear to work rather than innovatewith new ones ensures that institutions endure long after they cease to beoptimal (‘competency traps’) [ March and Olsen, 1989: 53–67 ].

In other words, institutions are ‘sticky’ in that they persist beyond thehistorical moment and condition of their original design (‘the stickiness of adaptation’) [ibid., 1989: 169]. This arises because societies invest time andresources in adapting to tools, locking them in place. Economists argue thatthe increasing returns reaped from remaining with regulation may make adecisive shift to NEPIs highly unattractive to all those (including regulatorsand the regulated) involved in the regulatory process [ Arthur, 1994: 112]. If we add in the bureaucratic costs of establishing, setting, reviewing and re-tuning NEPIs, the incentive to innovate appears to be very low indeed. Toconclude, in sharp contrast to ideational theories, institutions powerfullyrefract external political pressures for change in ways that perpetuate

existing arrangements. Thus the implementation of a common set of ideason NEPIs is likely to produce ‘widely divergent outcomes in societies withdifferent institutional arrangements’ [ North, 1990: 101].

Theorising the Adoption of NEPIs

What predictions are these two literatures likely to make about thedistribution of NEPIs in Europe? Ideational theories are more likely toaccount for the (seemingly) wholesale switch to NEPIs in Europe andother parts of the world in terms of networks of ideas and expertise. Onepossible explanation might be the emergence of a transnationalcommunity of experts imbued with a strong belief in the superiority of

NEPIs as against traditional, regulatory policy instruments. However,ideational theories say little about what happens afterwards, that is, whenthe ideas are implemented in different national contexts. Do countriesadopt the same set of new tools in one revolutionary wave or do theyevolve what they already have to make it look as if they are implementing


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the new paradigm? Incrementalists such as Lindblom [1959] (see above)would presumably argue that incrementalism (or muddling through) iscommonplace, whereas genuine innovation is rare. A second possibility isthat actors apply NEPIs more strongly and uniformly in those countrieswhere the coalition is dominant and more sporadically where it is not.Finally, ideational theories assume that policy makers are fairlyunencumbered by institutional constraints and rationally oriented in theirobjectives. They do not, for example, cling to particular types of instrument because they ‘appear’ to work well or are supported by aparticularly powerful constituency of interests (that is, policy drivesinstrument choice, not the other way round).

Institutional theories on the other hand make very different predictions.The first and most obvious point is that instruments will change only veryslowly. The most oft-cited barriers to innovation are often broadly‘institutional’, namely bureaucratic resistance, complexity (the difficulty of

fitting them in alongside existing instruments) and political inertia (seeHanley et al. [1990]; Keohane et al. [1998]). Second, instruments that workwith the grain of national institutions are more likely to be adopted than thosethat work against them. The EEA’s [1997: 39] analysis of VAs in Europedoes indeed confirm that national administrative structure decisively affectsinstrument selection (compare the UK and Netherlands – see above). Third,the structuring/filtering effect of national institutions may only become fullyapparent after studying the transfer of policy instruments through into theimplementation stage. If ‘discordant’ instruments are adopted (that is, oneswhich do not fit national institutional legacies) they will be eroded during theimplementation phase to achieve a better goodness of fit. To conclude,

institutional approaches predict fairly low levels of innovation unless anduntil there are sudden exogenous shocks to the system. Generally, the overallpattern of instrument use will be fairly heterogeneous, reflecting theresilience and longevity of national institutional traditions.

Conclusions

The remainder of this volume is devoted to the eight case studies. These arefollowed by a set of comparative conclusions that seek to answer the fourquestions identified above. The case studies have been written to fit a standardstructural template which covers the main drivers and/or barriers to NEPI use,

the traditional content, structure and style of national policy, the main trendsin the use of NEPIs and a set of conclusions.The countries, which are dealt with in alphabetical order, represent a

broadly representative selection of EU states. The addition of Australia offersan insight into whether the same dynamics of change are present within a


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broadly comparable, non-EU state. The Netherlands and Germany are oftenportrayed as environmental ‘lead’ states, which forcefully advocate highenvironmental standards at home and in international settings [ Liefferink and

Andersen, 1998]. However, while the Netherlands has a long history of experimenting with different instrument types, Germany has struggled toovercome the long tradition of being a ‘high regulatory’ state [ Héritier et

al., 1996 ]. Austria and Finland also have strong environmental reputations,but whereas Finland pioneered the use of environmental taxes, adopting theworld’s first carbon dioxide tax in 1990, Austria has been a much slowerdeveloper. France, meanwhile, pioneered the use of certain types of VAs andMBIs as early as the 1970s, but these tools are only now being extensivelyadopted across French environmental policy. Australia and the UK could beplaced in a middle position as far as their environmental reputations areconcerned, though both began to experiment enthusiastically with NEPIs inthe 1990s. Finally, Ireland is often characterised as a laggard state in the EU

and even today, the extent of innovation with NEPIs has been very limited.The EU is obviously a common factor among almost all these countries, butbecause of insufficient space we have chosen to omit it from our caseselection (but see Jordan et al. [2003] for an analysis of its role).

The contributors were asked to examine the broad trends and search forunderlying explanations rather than identify and comment upon each andevery NEPI. Therefore, this volume offers a broad, comparative politicalassessment of the state of play in the early part of the new millennium, notan exhaustive audit as this could easily replicate the EEA’s and the OECD’swork. Finally, space limitations restricted the accounts from detailedanalysis of the effectiveness of the instruments. However, where relevant,

some of the studies draw on secondary literature to comment upon theeffectiveness of particular tools where assessments have been undertaken orwhen effectiveness has emerged as a political issue within a particular state.

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